MR 1982-1 NeutronWeapons

,

Since 1977, there has been growing concern that the strategy offlexible response and forward defense of NATO Cente#might not work.z The outlook is e.cpecia[ly pessimistic if onepostulates a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact,3 with orwithout nuclear weapons, combined with their increasing.capability JOattack from a standing start.4 In this article, theauthor analyzes NATOs potential use of enhanced radiationreduced blast weapone, co-called neutron warheads, as ameans to increase deterrence until perceived defense weaknessescan be corrected. More important, the article postulates an im-proved NATO war-fighting capability using enhanced radiationweapons for its defense. This proposed capability ie eualuatedin support of the covering force area operations, between theinter-German border and the first main battle positione, duringthe first a!ay8of battle. Its operational theme is consistent withopinions expreseed in publications by the Soviet General Stafffor two decadea and summarized in Soviet MilitaryStrategyinEurope.

b

*.

1982

Part I

NEUTRONWEAPONS:Solution to a Surprise Attack?

Colonel Daniel Gans, US Army Reserve, Retired

Part IIof this artmlewill appear in the February 1982 Military Review.. .

19

I . .

MILITARYREVIEW

The views expressed in this article are how ofthe author and do not purport w reflect the posi-tion of the Department of the Army, the Depart-ment of Defense or any other g?uernment officem agency,Editor.

~HE underlying premises of this1 article are. Soviet combined arms and tank

wmiee are dual-purpose forces equippedand trained to fight both conventional/chemical and nuclear Ware They are Theheart of the Soviet threat to Europe . . .nuclear strikdjs) may decide the war, butthe ground forces secure the ultimate vic-tory. To deter attack or deny a WarsawPact victory, NATO must have the capa-bility to so severely blunt the cuttingedges of the echeloned pact armies thatthey have little or no hope for ultimatevictory even before entering the mainbattle area (MBA].

l Depending on the warning timepreceding an attack, which may be aslittle as 48 hours, the relative militarypostures of opposing forces (correlation offorces), and NATOs political will tomobilizeg and use the time effectively, thepact has several offensive options. It hasthe capability to launch a surprise con-ventional attack, a surprise nuclear at-tack or a surprise nuclear attack precededby a conventional phase.

Regardless of the relative militarypostures, NATO muet have a viablenuclear war-fighting capability. Depend-ing on the relative postures, NATO musthave the political will to use ~actictdnuclear weapons (TN Ws) from the onset,even at the risk of pre-empting pact use.To maximize the deterrent value of such acapability, the policy must be understoodby both sides.

l The dilemma to the planners onboth sides is how to fight a nuclear warwithout destroying the political, eco-

nomic, military and other prizee inWestern Europe that both sides want.The Soviets believe that the generrdnuclear attack on cities does not accom-plish strategic aims and may be counter-productive. . . . it is far better to capturecities with, the ground forces. 1 SuchSoviet use of nuclear weapons ie un-likely. Whatever we bel ve, the West

DGerman citizen must bel eve he risks areworth the gain!

Some Weaknesses of the Forward Defense

The Soviets believe that the first, sur-prise and massive use of nuclear w~aponswill be decisive. Concentrated on selectedand critical targets on the main axes ofadvance throughout the depth of theMBA, the war will be short. With thenuclear attack initiating combat or fol-lowing a short conventionrd phase of oneto several days, the opening phase of thewar in the covering force area (CFA)becomes crucial. The several perceivedweaknesses of NATO which affect itsability to win the opening phase includethe following:

Comparative armored strength in posi-tion. On D-day, these forces in the Ger-man Democratic Republic, the FederaJRepublic of Germany and Czechoslovakiaare fairly evenly distributed in the north-aouth direction, but Warsaw Pact divi.sions outnumber NATOs by a ratio of1.7-to-1, even th~ugh a Soviet tank divi-sion was withdrawn from the GermanDemocratic Republic during 1980.6 Table1 shows opposing armor strength ex-pressed as equivalent divisions andnumbers of main battle tanks (MBTs) tomeasure relative offensive capabilities.Using the latter measure, pact tanks out-number NATOs by 2.1 -to- 1. This ratio in-

20 January

, NEUTRONWEAPONS.

creases to 2.7-to-1 after opposing forceshave been reinforced with ~1 active divi-sions in Europe.

Rearward distribution of main forces.Belgiqrn and the Netherlands each has acorps m the line, and Denmark contri-butes to the LANDJUT (Allied LendForces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutlend)Corpe (see Figure 1). However, only one-fifth of their ermored etrength is in poei-tion. During 1979-80, Belgium withdrewa mechanized brigade.1 With a eurprise

Force/Country

attack, it will take several days to rein-force theee corpe, and their in-positionforcee constitute little more than cover-ing forces.

Maldisttibution and shortages of am-munition. Modern ammunition ueagerates are four to five times larger than an-ticipated prior to the 1973 Arab-IsraeliWar. .4 US mobilization exerciee,NIFTY NUGGET, conducted during thefell of 1978 to support a hypothetical warin Centrsd Europe, showed en immediate

Opposing Armor Strength in Positionat NATO Center, D-Dayl

NATOBelg,umCanadaDenmarkFrance

Federal Republic of Germany

Netherlands

Un,ted K,ngdom

Un,ted Slates

Total NATO

Warsaw PactCzechoslovakia

German Democrabc Revubl,c

Poland

Sowet Un,on

Total Pact

Type Divisions?

Mechanized Armored

113 113I:3

2

4 4 I ;3

1/3 4

2 2/3 3

9 2/3 11 2/3

3 3

4 2

13 li

20 16

Main Battle Tanks3 ~

200See footnote,

o300

2200100600

1.600

5000

15001,400

0

7,600

10,500

[ovaleflt womb !tl!ee br,gms em a wm.] exmm NA1O con!lngents m Ber,,n US armoredCaar, WSIIW13 are mum as ew.valml ammoOwade$ N.bel 0< .8. battle $aks , r,de, 01 !, eme,t hdwd W,eO 0 1,11 tab!,, 01 OW,,I,I,, ,0 ,q,,cm,ot ,ZC,DI la, (,,0, .,,c, .0,6 ha,,vDro,#.at,ly 30

,Tbe M,,,,,,, 8,/,,, 19801981 1, !l,rna!!on,l !,l, !.!, 1,! Slr,leW SIudles LoOO [,B 1380CO1OII!I Dan,el Gms F,ghl O.lnu. bewd and W,n kwosl wat 060%, MwarrRev,e. Part 1 Dete.oer 198D Pa!lll Januw 1981

Table 1

1982 21,!

MILITARYREVIEW

~

Dispositions in CentralEurope ~ a

-=.--, ....s [ ;- ; [ NortherrifNm!p

...... . . .. . -

.BAORa I Army/ GWG \ p~l~d

Frankfort

>{: sv$?Y%?YnOsOvaKa

)# @%x%@Tjcy!~-,onn * $%-% / - CI@ . ., ,. .

i-

&_w=,~~Group

/ J$%J+*-/: Anctria

y Switzerland ~. ---------

7

1-1(,,) Troou concentrations a{e assumed

Figure 1

requirement for 350,000 tons from Conti-nental United Statee stocks.zl To beshipped by sea (emulated), it still had not

22

arrived 30 days after ordering and longafter it was needed.zz

European members of NATO have only

January

NEUTRONWEAPONS

enough to fight for three or four weeks,@ and only10 percent is interchangeable.z

The reparation of many US divisionsfrom their ammunition supply points,concentrations which tempt pre-emptiveair attack, the location of many weet ofthe Rhine, and the inadequacy of trans-portation means allindlcate NATO cen-not sustain the required usage rates forconventiomd war.Zs

Time to occupy main battle positions.For ihfantry forcee to survive high-in-tensity pact artillery firee or nuclearweapone, they. . . ebould fight from for-tified poeitione with overhead cover.During test conditions, a US mechanizedbrigade with an attached engineer com-pany required 18 houre to dig primaryfighting poeitione for ite tanke and TOWSwithout overhead cover. Aeeuming that

the laet of NATOe main forces do notmove out to occupy MBA poeitione untilthe eve of the attack, one can eetimatethat a minimum period of 48 to 72 hourswould be needed to prepare coveredprimary and secondary positions in a pactsir superiority environmentmuch moretime if movement occure after H-hour.a

War gamee of US covering force opera-tions oppoeing secondary or main sur-priee attacke of a combined arme army in-dicate that battles for the MBA will beginlate on the firet day or at midday of thefirst day, respectively.g Under theeecircumstances, the battle for tbe MBAwill be more like a meeting engagementthan an active defense. To prepare fordefense adequately, covering force opera-tions rhet be strengthened to provide aminimum delay of two orthreedaye.

NATO Center has no space to spare.The German Wehrrnacht was succeeefulagainet the Red army, fighting at greatodde, as long as it retained freedom ofmovement and could trade epace fortime. With the waist of the Federal

Republic of Germany at the Meinz cross.ing of the Rhine only 150 kllometere fromthe inter-German border, NATO cannotmake thespace-time trade.

With the typicsf CFA at Fulda Gaponly 30 kilometer deep, the successfuldefense of NATO Center is initiefly con-strained by three intractable boundarycondition: CFA operations must beenhanced to permit a two to three-daydelay, in an twea 30 to 50 kilometers deep,while reducing pact MBT strength tomanageable ratioe of lese than 2-to-I.azThis defenee problem cannot be solvedby conventional means alone based onpresent opposing strengthe and disposi-tions.

implications of Modern War

Increased lethalit~ The 1973 Arab-Ieraeli War dramatized the lethality ofmodem war-in particular, the deadli-nes of the modern tank and antitankweapons, S$and the relevance of surpriee

deepite new, sophisticated surveillancedevjces. During that 18-day war, botheides lost MBTs at 5 percent per days Incontract, war gaming a Soviet combinedarms army attack on a US armored divi-sionin the Fulda Gap, with eacb side us-ing 100aesorted TNWe, resulted indsdlySoviet MBT loeeee of 25 percent during afive-day breakthrough battle, comparedwith US loseeeof 17 percent.

.The reason for the different rates wasthe substantially greater density ofSoviet troops. 36Heretofore, casuakiee. on

the battlefield declined as firepowerlethality increased because troop mobil-ity and dispersion increased at a fasterrate. One l-kiloton enhanced radiation(ER) weapon is 60 to 90 times more effec-tive against tanks or protected troops

i982 23

,MILITARYREVIEW

then a division sfice of artiflery firing avolley of improved conventional muni-tions. Such a smrdl weapon, weighing 1/8

+

ton, has the same let elity as 600 to 800tons of the type am tion the UnitedStates is short of t.g For coveringforce operations eing extremelymobile, more diepersed end similar forconventionrd. or nuclear war fightingTNW support should be indicated.

Need for force multipliers. If WarsawPact armor is to be reduced to manage-able proportions, NATO must developmore sophisticated force (combat power)multipliers. For example, to reduce theMBT ratio in the MBA to 1.5-to-1 endequalize combat power, pact lessee mustbe more then doubled to 12 to 13 percentper day without increasing tbe NATOloss rate of 5 percent. Pert of that im-proved attrition could occur during the in-terdiction battle as Stauka reservesmove up by rail. However, the biggestincreaee must occur in the CFA whererelative mobility and troop density of op-posing forces favok NATO operations,especially if supported with improvedconventional munitions and TNWS.

Both sidee recognize the tremendousfirepower of nuclear weapons and the flex-ibility, ease and rapidity with which thisfirepower can be maneuvered and concen-trated on identified stationary targets byaircraft, missiles end artillery. It appears that nuclear weapons are the ordy ~force multiplier that can achieve thedesired attrition rates. Whether we canuse them to maintain the large differen-tief rate is a major thrust of this article.

While it is likely that tbe Soviets havestockpiled nuclear weapons considerablyin excess of end qualitatively superior tothose of NAT0,3 the diversification, lowyielde, number end distribution of NATOnuclear weapons with artillery deliverymeene are superior to those of the

Soviets. Having an all-weather, accurate,$iring capability, thi$ force should beenhanced and multiplied.

Before examining. a historical forcemultiplier, two additional aepecte ofnuclear weapon employment should beunderstood.

l The Soviets recognize that one oftheir most important tasks has been toturn tacticsJ intelligence means-for ex-

ample, sigd, photographic, agentsintoreel-time observers for their nuclearstrike force. They see the principal advrm-tage of sir power to be the eyes off thepilot and his radio.

l Target identification and the abilityto engage moving targets are importanttoo.

During 1940, the British won the airBattle of Britain with a force multi-plier. It was a system that enabled themto maximize the use of a relatively smellFighter Command and to win against thenumerically superior Lzzftwaffe atalmost 4-to-1 odds,

Organizationally, all units with an sirdefense mission were placed under onecommander. A new technology, radar,detected incoming German aircraft muchearlier. High-frequency radio was used inspecial nets to allow radar contacts to becommunicated instantly to sector controlcenters. Backup telephone nets connectedcontrol centers wit h the command centerend with fighter airfields, air defense ar-tillery command posts and the groundobserver corps that filled out the radarscreen and worked when radar stationswere knocked out. The superior coordina-tion and control of all resourcee providedeconomy of forces,8 and . . . it wasthe radar end the Observer Corps whobrought the whole battle, alive, right intothe (command center) itself. 9

Knowing that a modern battle can befought end won against great odds, one

24 January

.NEUTRDNWEAPONS:

can apply some of these concepts todevelop a nuclear war-fighting system.First, examine the new technology to beused.

Characteristics of Fission arrd ER Warheads

The energy yield of current TNWScomes from fissioning certain isotopes ofuranium or plutonium. For a typical air-burst, 50 psrcent of the fiseion energy ap-pears as blast effects, 35 percent as ther-mal (flash) effects and 5 percent as instan-taneous gamma end neutron radiation.Ten percent is released over time with theradioactive fallout.

Pure, hypothetical fusion devices wouldyield their energy by fusing isotopes ofhydrogen. For the predominant fusionreaction, fit20 percent of the fusion energywould appear as blast and thermaf ef-fects, end 80 percent as instantmreousneutron radiation. There would be no in-stantaneous gamma radiation or fallout.

ER weapons are primarily fusiondevices with smrdl fission triggers toinitiate the fusion reaction. The weaponeffects are essentially the sum of itsparts. One unclassified source suggeststhat the yield of a l-kiloton ER weaponmay result from a .5-kiloton fissiontrigger and a .5-kiloton fusion device,even though smaller fission weapons withyields of tens of tons to a few hundredtqns are available.

The important weapon design charac-teristics, such as fission-fusion ratio andamount and configuration of the fuel,high-explosive, tamper and case ma-terials, are classified. This article supplements known weapon effects param-eters by assuming a 50-50 fission-fusionenergy split, with airburst effects dividedas followrc blast, 30 percenC thermaf, 20

percent; immediate radiation, 45 percenC.and fallout, 5 percent. The predominanteffect resulte from fusion weapons re-leasing five to six timee as mtlny neutronsas fission weapons of the same yield,sband the neutrons are of higher energy andmore biologically damaging. Theseassumptions permit characterizing theER weapon as an equivrdent fissionweapon and extrapolating the effectsgiven in a standard reference publica-tion.

Table 2 compares the weapop effects ofa l-kiloton ER weapon with those of a10-kiloton fission weapon, even thoughthe smallest Soviet fission weapon mayhave a yield as small as 5 kiloton.kSelected effects radii, in particular thoeeimpacting armored warfare, are depictedin Figure 2. Note that for both weaponethe radiation dose effects are equal. Blastand flash effects are controlling with thefission weapon$ radiation and flash con-trol the ER weapon.

With a 500-foot height of burst (HOB)maximizing blast effecte for the ERweapon, its blast effects are still signif-icant. What ie important is that, by rais-ing the HOB for tbe ER weapon to 1,500feet, severe structural damage to build-ings can be eliminated without reducingradiation effects.Gg (A similar increase inHOB for a 10-kiloton fission weapon in-creases blast effects.)eo

All blast damage can be eliminatedwith an HOB of 3,000 feet, but with asignificant reduction in radiationeffects.el What this meene is that RR

weapon effects can be readily tailored totarget~equirements, especially to townssheltering civifians or tree blowdown. inthe path of covering force counterattacks.Thie characteristic is especially signifi-cant because 30 percent of the inter-German border area ie forested. In addi-tion, built-up areas often control the sur-

. .

1982 25

MILITARYREVIEW

Weapons Effect Radii, Meters.

Weapon Yield/Type

Type Effect

Radiation Dose, Rads. Prom@l

8,0003,000

650

. Groundburst fallout500

Blast Damagel Tanks, severeal Structures

ModerateSevere

. Irees, moderates

Forest Firess

10-Kiloton Fission

760

910

1,200

3,000-10,000

370

1,200910

2,500

1,400

l-Kiloton Enhanced Radiation

760910

1,200

7002,200

{170

550430880

340

Table 2

rounding open areas.e%To better understand the nuclear radia-.

tion effects of the ER weapon comparedwith a fiseion weapon, eeverel aepecte areexamined below

Dose concept and biological effects.When radiation dose is measured inrads, the relative biological effec-tiveneea of gamma and neutron radiationie accounted for and the >eponee to agiven expoeure ie the same for ER end fis-eion weapone. Table 3 describes thebiological effecte of three instantaneous

dose levele of military significance.Figure 3 chows the deaths that reeultfrom varioue dose levele.

There are those who would argue thatonly the 8,000 and 3,000-rad dose levelsare eignificent along the line of contact.However, all three levels are felt with atingling sensation that leaves thetergettank crewman with the knowledge he hasbeen exposed, and rdl three reeuk insevere and frequent vomiting and func-tional impairment in less than two houre.

Since meet moderate tree and struc-

26 January

l.,

NEUTRONWEAPONS

Weapon Effects Templates

-650 Rads, Flashr(3-Tree ~lowdown*o - Structure*1: 0 500 1000

l-Kdoton Enhanced Rad!atlon I I IScale Mews

r65o Rads

~ ~~~

Structures*

/..-3.000 Rads/

-8,000 Rads

10 Kdotons

Bluwdown,*flash

Blast effects are lot moderate s!r.clur,l damage and l,ee uwdwn

Figure 2

.,

27

.MILITARY REVIEW

Biological Effects of Radiation Dose LevelsWith Military Significance*

Dose level, Rads Biological Effect$

8,000 Personnel ,IKapacdated wth,n I,ve rmnutw and mna,n ,mcapac,tated unhl deathm one to two days

3,000 Personnel mcap.mtated *!th, n fwe rnmutes and remam so tor 30 to 45 mmutesPartial recovery but functionally ,mpa! red until death m fow to SIX days

650 Personnel become Iunctaonally ,mpared wthm two hours and rern.wn m unt,ldeath m several weeks /

Table 3

turd blowdown cannot be cleared fromthe path of attacking troops in less thantwo hours, the 650-rad dose radius (1,200metere) was eelected as the limit forprompt radiation casualties from an ER

weapon. As shown in Figure 3, one-halfof those exposed between the 650 and200-rad doee radii (between 1,200 and1,400 meters from ground zero) will even-tually die. The other half wilf recover, butall wilf have to be hospitalized so somecan be saved.

Shielding effectiveness. Because of ~their differing neutron and gamma yields,the shielding requirements for ER end fis-sion weapons differ. For example, thehigher energy fusion neutrons need topass through greater thicknesses ofshielding to be absorbed than do lowerenergy fission neutrons. With the neutrondoee contribution from ER weaponshigher than fiesion weapons, low atomicweight materiafs are more effective thanhigh atomic weight/density materials

which are more effective gamma shields.Table 4 compares the one-tenth value

thickness of eeveraf shielding materials.These are the thicknesses required toreduce incident radiation doses by 90 per-cent, to one-tenth their unshielded value.Note that the high-density materiale likesteel are the most effective shieldingmateriale for gamma radiation which con-trols the dose from fission weapons.

For ER weapons, where three-fourtheof the dose is due to neutrons and onlyon~fourth due to gammae, the shieldingmaterief effectiveness ie strongly depend-ent on its hydrogen or water content.Berated Permafi is a suggested, wood-likematerial, with a high hydrogen concentra-tion to reduce neutron energy end withboron to capture the resultant low-energyneutrons. Paraffin, polyethylene or anyother hydrogenous material could be ueed if other physical properties are accept-able.

Armor plate on the turret sides end rear

28

NEUTRONWEAPONSr.

,100r

Radiation Dose and Morbidity

10I 1 I 1 1

100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Dose, Radsw [1!,,1,o?$wc!ear war !ll,ce ,1 T,choleey A,,,$MwI US COW$S w,sw$0 DC 1979

Figure 3

of the 262 and 772 Soviet MBT is only80mm (3.1 inches) thick.68 This shieldingie efficient to reduce the unshielded dosefrom an ER weapon by 63 percent or froma fission weapon by 76 percent not a bigdifference! The inherent strength of thetank in a TNW environment with fiesionweapons ie to reduce the blaet and flasheffects which control casusltiee. In an ERweapon environment, the tank dose notneed as much protection against blast,and its radiation-shielding effectivenessis reduced and now controls crew

casusltiee. The tank does not pro~idemuch more protection than en armoredpersonnel carrier.

Soil and equipment activation. Whenthe eerthe eurface and armor are ir-radiated by neutrons, some neutrons arecaptured by atomic nuclei of themateriels to release a burst of so-celledcapture gammas and others to formradioactive isotopes which releaee gem-mas at rates consistent with theirradioactive half-lives. With an ERweapon releasing five to eix times as

1982 29

many neutrons as a 10-kiloton fissionweapon, one might expect the soil andequipment activation problem near.ground zero to be significant.

Figure 4 shows soil activation at radialdistances from a l-kiloton ER weapon asa function of time. Even though soil ac-tivation reaches out nearly 900 meters, itie significant only to a radius of less then600 meters and, even then, decays awaywith en initial radioactive half-life of 40minutes. Assuming that exposed pereon-nel were to cross the induced radiationzone along a diameter immediately fol-lowing weapon detonation end that ittook one hour to cross, each would receivea 5-rad dose. Such a dose is not signifi-cant from a military viewpoint. However,if it was desired to occupy ground zero,even this low-activation dose rate couldbe essentially eliminated by increasingthe HOB to 1,500 feet.

Similarly, activation of typicsd armorplater 80mm thick, has been calculatedfor a tank target at a radial cf+ance of3,OOO feet (914 metere) from a hypo-thetical l-kiloton ER weapon.w Contraryto expectations, even though the initialactivation dose rate ie high (7.7 rads perhour), the dose rate rapidly decays awaYto less than 3 snillirads per hour by theend of the first day, and the total in-tegrated doee for the first week ie leeethan 4 radsineigniffcant from a militaryviewpoint.

This means that, even though the tankcrew received en incapacitating 3,oO -rad

?doee, a replacement crew could take overthe intact tank and continue to fight withit. However, as the tqrget tank dietencefrom ground zero ehortens, the activationdose rate end integrated dose increase (in-versely as the square of the distance). Asthe target approaches the weapon effects

> Military Shielding MaterialsOne-Tenth Value Thicknesses

Density Thicknesses, Inches

Material Pound/Cubic Feet Enhanced Radiationl/Gamma Radiationz

Armor plate 491 7 5

Concrete 140 8 18

Damp soil 100 9 26

Permali3 84 3 30

,Permml mmmun, cat,on from %r, s narahal, m 7 March 1980 Calculmons based on neutron and secondary gamma Wecku. !or a lher. o.uclea! .8800. sourceR L French ma L C Moo.w. PrM,ct,on 01 Nuclear Weaoon NetitCo. t?admtlon E..mments Nuclear Technorow. M8fch 1971 UP 34865

%, [flacls of N,cl,,r W,WOS C,. D,IW ad Wiled b, S8.,,1 Glasslone and Ph(lm J DoI, US Dewr!mel ,1 0,1,,s, and US 0,0,,!.,! d [wWwngtm D C Th,rd [O,t,on 197~

,H,gh effiw.cy .wtro. Sh,erd,ng .Jfenal Bmsled Pernw Comm$,l,m .e,ghl wrcent hydrogen 6 boron 3. Owgen 49 carbon 38 sodium 2 balance.Stellaews

Table 4

30 January

NEUTRONWEAPONS

Soil Activation Dose Rate and Decay

I-Kiloton enhanced radlahon weapon,

height of burst 500 feet

@ Tme on target + 20 rmnutes@ Tme on target + one hour

25-

20

15 -

10

5 -

0 I I I J200 400 600 800 1,000Distance from ground zero, meters

S 1 Cohen lhe N,.,mn Bomb P,l,l?cal l,chnolwal ,nd M(Mw, r,,.,, Isttte for tore,m c%,, kmlw, Cmbr\d& h% and WaslW!mDC November 1978

Figure 4

radius forsevere etructoral damage (170meters), the activation dose increasesmore than thirtyfold. At such distances,the tank could be out of action for oneweek or more.

SomeCharacteristicsof OpposingTNW Systems

United States. During the 1960s,resesrchon ER weapona was under way.The weapon concept first came to publicattention during 1977 when appropria-tions were sought to develop a 155mmhowitzer proje ileandprOduce the W79

J8-inch how projectile and the W70-3

Larsce missile warhead.@ Tbe same year,after a stormy worldwide controversy,Preeident Jimmy Carter ordered themoderniaation of the 8-inch and Lancesystems, but Ieft open the installation ofER elements.e8

TMsorder was foZlowedin 1978 topro- ~

duce, but not assemble, the ER elements.This meant that the warheads could bedeployed some 18 months after a decisionto assemble ismade.9 Current status in-dicates that 34o Lance nuclear warheadswill be produced during 1981-83, the8-inch round is completing developmentand hae entered production, and the new155mm round (W82) is still in engineeringdevelopment.

1982,

31

MILITARYREVIEW

Characteristics of US EnhancedRadiation Weapon Systems

Characteristic 8-inch Howitzer Lance Missile

Model M11OA2 MGM52CRange,Maximum,kllometersJ 29 Rocket.assistedprojectiles 120Nuclearwarhead W79 W70-3Yield, kdotonsz 1 1

Nuclear response(assumedcharacterlstlc)qTime, mmutes 3 10Rate,mmutesper round 10 30

Accuracyat 20 kilometers,Circularerror probableProbableerror heightCirculardistnbut!on90

AssignedtoDeployment,number

per dmlon shce

/meters(assumedcharactermtlc)4

140 100$50 306

260

Division/Corps Corps

24 4

u? ted state% M,lh,arv Pobture a, ~V 1981 h OWV,P. b? Le.era 08,,0 C Jones US A,r Farce mama. of the Iomt ch,eh 01 stall %$tungmn 0 c 1q80,0 in, C L. O\We !?,,O ,, Otr,00rY 1979 Arm, 1919 P 1?4

~l.d, g,, w cdI,eld h!,,,,,, 1055 Ma,.,,? COolrd Oeoarimel 01 the Arm, Wa,h,rwh D C Iabl, H2 Oe,e(nb,r 1973IF,e,d Mm.,1 101 31 3 S,,,, 0/1!,,,s I,,,d M,,,, N.,lw w,am, [rim, win,., D,w,.,! 01 the L,., WaNmTOOn D C 15 f ,br,r) 1968l.d,~,rd,n, ,, rang, ,,, ,,g, @ d,,j .,,,,,, ,,, ,,,.,,, ,,,,, ~r,t,b,, da,, d, .,, agree ,Wm d,,, p,,,, ,, d by Sh,,, rl,, ..,.,,, Ooo t, 4s~ .,,,,, ,, .,x,

. . . ,,Pg, R G s,,,),,,, 1,, !+,,,, Eomb to, NhTO Del,,!, A Mhmal,,e Orb,, Volume 21 Number 4 ti,nter 1918 OO 95967vb,d

Table5

Some known and assumed cheracteris-tice of the firet two eyeteme appear inTable 5. Becauee the 8-inch howitzereystem will be armor protected with crewshelters, hae larger numbere deployed,hae more rapid nuclear delivery timee andsatisfactory accuracy, tbie eystem wasselected as the baeie for the proposed im-

proved NATO nuclear war-fighting

capability. Lance ie considered ordy as abackup eyetem or for lon+er range inter-diction fires.

Soviet Union. Duringithe.early 1950s,experiments were conducted with verylow-yield fission explosivee.~i As early as1961, the Red army understood the baeicmecheniem and effects of ER weapone.7XAt the height of the neutron bomb con-

32 January

troversy during 1978, Chairmen LeonidBrezhnev announced that the USSR hadtested E R weapons but had not startedproduction. 7$ Furthermore, other state

ments were made that the USSR haddeveloped tanks protected against E Rweapohe.

While many might consider such wordsbravado typical of Pravda, this author isinclined to give the Soviets the benefit ofthe doubt after seeing a recent descrip-tion of the new T72S MBT.75 The tank isdescribed as the T72 with cavity armor.The old turret appears to have been en-cased in a box etructure of welded plates,the cavity being filled with plasticmateriets capable of limiting the effectsproduced by hollow chsrges. 78

Considering our foregoing discussion ofshielding effectiveness and those byChairmen Brezhnev and Mershsf Rotmis-trov, it appears that they are not ran-domly coincidental. Even though thepractical upper limit for en ER weapon is

approximately 1 kiloton and thesmallest Soviet TNW may have a yield of5 kiloton, . . . it seems quite possible thatsome time ago the Soviets embarked onen ER warhead program of their own. ,8This report assumes that the Sovietshave euch a capability!

Nuclear-capable artillery systems com-parable to US 155mm end 8-inch howitzersystems are not organic to Wsreaw Pactdivisions or armies. The only nucleardelivery means organic to division com-mander are four unarmored, self-pro-pelled FROG7 launchers for free-flight(unguided) rockets with a range of 16 to70 kilometers.7g Starting in 1978, this

system ie being replaced with the follow-on SS21 missile which has improved ac-curacy and range.

Artillery divieion assets available tothe front commander include en artillerybrigade of eeversl 12-piece battalions of

.

NEUTRON WEAPONS ..

towed S23 180mm gune, 203mm howit:zers end M240 heavy mortars which arenormally detached down to augment thepool of army artillery group assete onthe basis of one battrdion of each per com-bined arms or tank army. While therange of the 180mm gun is longalmost44 kilometers with rocket-assisted projec-tilethe 240mm mortar range is less than10 kilometers.si To date, the latter is

deployed only in the USSR. Latestpublications have dropped all referencesto the S23 as being nuclear-capable.

Assuming that the accuracy andnuclear responsiveness of FROG 7 arecomparable to Jfonest John, and that the180 and 203mm weapons are comparableto our 8-inch howitzer, one can believe, in-tuitively, that the US TNW systems willbe more responsive to tactical needs dur.ing covering force/meeting engagementsthan the opposing Soviet systems.

Effects Analyses of Some Typical Pact Targets

During the march to contact or meetingengagement in the CFA, the character-istic tactical march formation of amotorized rifle division is organized intothe advance guard, division main forceend second echelon, if any. This forma

ftion pr sents three typical battalion-sizetargets of intereetnsmely, the rein-forced motorized rifle battalion acting asa regimented advance guard in a deployedattack configuration, and the followingmotorized rifle end tank battalions inmarch column on a single route.

Figures 5 and 6 show selected, un-protected, effects radii of a l-kiloton ERweapon with an HOFt of 500 feet andground zero centered on an off-centercompany for each of these targets. Attackfrontages and column spacing are based

1982 33

MILITARY REVIEW

I-Kiloton Enhanced RadiationEffects Analysis, Advanced Guard

Motorized Rifle R,egiment

~ @

AIll,!,,,, , 8,,,,,,0Ill IllL_T_-i7

Sin,, w.,

Figure 5

l-Kiloton Enhanced RadiationEffects Analysis, Combat Arms

Battalions, Main Body

Commnd GmD200 Rad,

00

.. Command Group

[J

-%7Rads _ _ Armored

_/ Personnel

OQB

Car,,,, Blast

lank CmnLMny + Rdte ComOany

)

on

- - tank Blast

lank CmnWy. -

Rtlle Corwany

- --

lank Batta ,,,

oR,tle CompanyD

Mo,tar Battwy

D

Rear ServWeS

Mo!o,,ztwJ R,*le Battal,on

I !00 ? 040

Figure 6

34 January

NE.UTRONWEAPONS

l-Kiloton Enhanced Radiation Weapon Effectson Typical Warsaw Pact Targets

Target .;

Remtorced motor,zedr,fle bat[al,on (JeDloyed

Motor,zed r)tle battal,onmarch column

Tank battal,on (motor,zedrdle d,ws, on), march column

Prompt Losses

Atmored ArmoredTank Personnel Personnel Deaths Firepower

Crews Carrlel Crews Tanks Carriers P~Ompt Delayed Loss. Percent

5 14 2 10 165 18 48

0 16 0 8 107 940

16 1 ~3 o 80 13 40

onanuclem war-fighting posture.Table 6 shows the weapon effects with

HOB optimized for maximum blastdamage. These include prompt losees toarmor crews, armor vehicles destroyed,prompt radiation deaths, delayed radia-tion deaths and prompt loseee in targetfirepower. Ae previously discussed, rzds-ingthe HOB topreclude severe collaterrdblast damage to nearby built-up areasmeans that no armored vehicles will bedestroyed, but radiation deaths are urvchanged. Note that, in aIl casee, weaponeffects affect more than one companywhile decreasing battalion firepower by40 to 45 percent.

The 8-inch howitze; hae a circulardistribution 90 of approximately 260meterefor example, 90 percent of therounds fail within a circle of that radius.Therefore, delivery accuracy does notsignificantly affect attrition as long as

the target company M nearly centered atdesired ground zero end as long as it andthe battery firing position have been ac-

curately surveyed. What affects attritionmore significantly ietheability to fireata march column travefing at 20 to 30 kilo-meters per hour in the daytime or 15 to 20kilometers per hou~ at night$ with thewarheads time of flight nearly oneminute duration. At 25 kilometers perhour, the target center can move morethan 400 meters and another 7 meters forevery second the fire commend is delayed.

To attack a moving target with successwill be much like a turkey shooti thetarget will have to be keenly observed,the observer will need Kentucky wind-age to lead the target, end response toobserver fire commands will have to bespIit-second. The onfy other recourse is tohave the warhead laser guided with theobserver using a designator, even though

1982 35

MILITARY REVIEW

such means may be ineffective in rain, o To be cost-effective and to minimizesnow, dust or emoke, collateral damage, it follows that E R fires

The implication of the foregoing are must be selectively directed at combatthat: arms, battelion-eize targets which result

. Intrinsically, the l-kiloton ER in the greatest attrition of pact firepower.weapon is flexible, accurate and deadly. . A suitable man-weapon-communica-

. The weapon must be skillfully con- tions syetem may provide the desiredtrolled by direct observers and integrated force multiplier to deter or defeat Warsawwith the delivery means by reliable com- Pact aggression. Such a system conceptmunications. will be discussed in Part II.

NOTES

1 NA1O Center Tl)e Feoerm RWUDI!C of Gwrrwy ,.., of ,..Elbe RWW Lv. embourg %WJI .0 !., Netherlands Forth, sarI!cle Schle.w g Ho!,!,! orlh 01 lhe E,5,, has been !cluded. adthe Dleowzl a.reew.t 01 French ,.,ort s, a,sumea 10 Q,honored

2 Se. a!or, Sam N.. .0 Dewey F 8arttet! NATO anti ,.,Neti Sovdet ,hrea! R?Qort to I., Gornm,,lee o. Armed S,rvILesUS Senale !WIsb(ngto? D C 24 January 1977

3 War,?,. Pact Soviet ,0 Czech o,w..i, a Germanmrnocratx Repuwc arm wand In I,, context of th)s ar,,c)e.fi. ngav B.lqar, a and Roman,. have been e.clu aed

4 N. and Elartle?t . . ,, ,4 Co)..,, 0.. e, G,.. F,@tO.lumt@ red ,0 W, Aga!nst What Odds> Mrr, tar, %.,,.Part I December 1980 Par, tl anuarv 1981

5 JOw?. D Dogla.s ,r so,, ! $,4+!8, Sra?eg, , E.rczlePergwnon PC,,, Elm, fmo N V 980

6 !b,., ttor SIZaterW S?..,.S Lo60 Eng >980

10 Douglass 0,7 cl, 1 !0,012 rb)d73 SOv>. fM,l(f8S 0.e?a!rO, , 6.,,, IJP Area, OD, ?>00 15577

Dere. se In!ell, ge.ce ReDorf De f.nse Inte, hge.. e Age..,w.sh, nQton D C J.IY 1977 D 5

,4 Do..,.,, 0. ,?,

43 da,, am w some tame Doug!.%, OD !1Presumably I,, ,urr)r,$e uc,ear Phase starts vol. the attack tope.emele me ma,. ba!t,. a.e.a v.... the m.at, o.or the. ey mob,,..,arget,which . ,DlaLed O!lq the alerl LWr!Od have bee f!.edKey m!mob,le tarQet. S.ch a. ore Cms>l,o.,.g of m.tw, el c..,,q. re. ,. u.,, ,,, s ,POMCI, S, s,,,s NATO ,,, oases .,,,.,$Io, age area. mamr command and co.lrol !ac+l,l,es and ammw,!0 SUDQ,Y Do!,, .. b, $Ir. c, ,, a,mos, a, ,* I, HOW,.,,Iam.re to-mowmekey moble targets d.r, ng the. +ert oha$eco.latemm the So. !el, to open tee .11.,, w!, ,,, ,U?pr!,e ., lea,@ase Po,, t,c,l Ge,, smn 0, mdec,,>on .818 make me arffewn,eNo, to mob,,,,, and ,3, PIOY Promp?,, w., L), 0,s.,,,..,3

,6 Tfie M!,,,,,, Saran,. 1980 ,981 OD c,,17 GE T., o. c),,8 ,.,.,6 ;h; M,!

NEUTRON WEAPONS

40 Stevka. theheaOq.ar!er, of the S.n,eme So,,et H,gh Corn.mane

41 Gans, oP mt62 Doug18ss, op Ctt.43 10,s44 IO,d45 Ibid46 AI I VI.. Marshal Stew.,, W B Menaul, NATo ,. the

Elghl!es AWa.Wbnlg StraleQy:C olfrc,S,.dies. Ao,,,,98047 Lieutenant Colonel Frank E Owen, Force Mu,t,p,, e,,,

Army, J., 1977, LID 16.17.i w,,.. ----

49 F W W,nterbot ham, The U!fr3 Secret, HarPe? & RowPublW!erSi C, NY, ,974

50 The Effects of N..!.., weep..., ..mp,lea and edmed bySam.el Glass! onea.d Ph$ltDJ Dola., US Department olDete.sea.a US Department of Energy, Wa.h, ngton, DC, Thwd Edmmn,~377

51 F..!.. react#ons By .Wnbln!ng a q..nttty .1 de.tert.m,t,, t,um 0,. ml,t,e 0! both w,!h a f,,,,.. tie,,ce, ,! ,S cms$, b,e to ,.!tlateo.e ormorethermon.cl.. treactlonsa! temmrat.rasoflheO,Ger Of ,eerel m,ll! on degrees Theea,,es, ,e.c!,o. ,oa.h,ev. a,the lowest temperatures Is the Irm.mae. tertum ceact, on wn, cn,e,.a,eS 0.35.Me helluma,Om.d Oe ,4 1 M., ...,,. Al, olthe Pro!. energy !, .LW.Wbr?d t the I,rebatl, earl al! .1 UT.eutro ewtl leaks, hro. oh the,,,ebal,

52 Howard MorlwW, .+ H Bomb Secret, The Progres s!..,November 1979, P 23

53 Cell I H.dso. d, ..0 Peter H Hazm, New W.h.ologmsThe P,o, D,c1$,. Beyond N.c,ew Deterrence New A,ms, New4rms, edited QyJ.hn J Hoist anouwe Ner,$ch, crane, R.ssa.k &Co, NY, January 197S, Chamer 5.0141

54 R L French 80 L G M.... Pred,.t,on o, Nuclearweapon N, Ut,O. R.dl,t,O En., ronmenls, N.,.., Technology,M=,.. ,07,. . .

55 S T Cohen, The Neutron Bomb Po!lt!cal Tecrmolog!c.l. anoMt)ttary !$, ,s, ln,t,tule for Fo,e$g PO1, CY Analy, (s, Cwnbr,dge,Mass, and Washington, DC. November 1978

56 Te Effec,$ oIN.cle.rweaPOS OP c,t57 Jelfrey Reco,o, US N..,,., W.aDOn, tE.rODe 1,, ,, .90

Al fe,af!e, T.e8rook#g, l,l>!ul?o WW,QIO DC ,974 D37 ar,d L,euteant Colonel 4$.x A Vardam,s Nuclear WeaD. nSand FOW9. Polrcy Fa.lty R.monale for current Practrce NavalWer Co#fege RevCeti, F%ll 1978..99

58 HudsOanfl Haa, OP ,,1 Fwr.34. D13959 Cohen . . M60 !b,O61 IW62 Chauarue, .a. .