MR 1980-11 YugoslavGroundForces

Hungary! Czechoslovakia! Afghanistan! Yugoslaw”a? AfterTito, now what?A Sow-et takeover of Yugoslaw”a wouJdpro-vide the USSR with a warm-water port, and it wouldthreaten NATO’S Southern flank. CouJd Yugoslaw.a’s army

‘stop a Sow”et invasion?

T HE history of the Yugoslav groundforces can be traced to the “People’s

Liberation War” of 1941-45 where par-tisan detachments of the future People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) fought againstAxis occupiers and their domestic collabo-rators. Organized by the late Josip BrozTito, the partisane numbered some 80,000 ~men by the end of 1941.1 Their first“shock” brigade was formed in the smallvillage of Rudo in Bosnia on Stalin’sbirthday, 21 December. This date was

!g~ A Look at the Past/

and the PresentR*:

Milan N. Vem

. .

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

celebrated as the anniversary of theYugoslav armed forces (YAF) until Tlto’sbreak with Moscow in 1948. Thereafter,the anniversary date was changed to 22December.

When the PLA was formally organizedat the end of 1942, it had 150,000 fightersdivided roughly into two corps, 37 bri-gades, 34 partisan detachments and 12independent battalions.z Although thebrigades had more mobility and strikingpower, the partisan detachments re-mained an indispensable part of thePLA.3 During 1943-44, 44 additional di-visions were added.1

The PLA became a regular army in1945 when the Defense Ministry and theGeneral Staff were formed. Accordingly,it changed its name to the Yugoslavarmy. By May 1945, over 800,000 mencomprised the Yugoslav ground forces.5Substantial aidprovided by the WesternAllies and the Soviet Union during thelast two years of the war allowed the PLAto become atrulyviable force.6

The partisans suffered heavy casualtiesduring the war years, with 305,000 killedand 420,000 wounded.7 The Yugoslavsclaimed that the partisans pinned downsome 38 divisions during the war, 26 ofwhich were Germans They allegedly in-flicted 450,000 Axis casualties. Althoughthese c]aims are exaggerated, it does notdiminish the overall success enjoyedby Tito and his followers nor their con-tribution to the final Allied victories.

Developmentof the GroundForces, 1945-68

After the war in July and October 1945,the Yugoslav leadership ordered thedemobilization of all soldiers older than27, effectively cutting the army in half.It then began to reorganize itself after

the Soviet model. In the Yugoslav view,the Soviet army was not only the best,but, more importantly, it was a “social-istic” arrny.s

Under the terms of the Soviet-Yugoslav~eatyof Friendship, Mutual Assistanceand Collaboration signed on 12 April1945, it was stipulated that the Sovietswould provide military and economic aidto Yugoslavia. The Russians were reluc-tant, however, to deliver the promisedquantities of arms and equipment. Whatthey did deliver was usually in a deterio-rated state, and they charged exorbitantprices for it. There were also continuousproblems in the regular resupply of spareparts. The Russians wanted theYugoslavs to keep only a small armywhich could serve as an auxiliary to theirown. They justified this by saying theywould defend. Yugoslavia if necessary.

After the break with Moscow in 1948,the Yugoslav ground forces were de-ployed along the borders of neighboringCommunist countries to counter any pos-sible Soviet threat. The army at that timewas still suffering from serious defi-ciencies in armament, equipment, person-nel and combat readiness. It was stillprimarily a guerrilla force. The situationwas further complicated because it was inthe midst of its first postwar reorganize-tion.

In the 20-year period after 1948, theYugoslav army changed it,s name to theYugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and un-derwent numerous organizational andstructural changes. Bytheendof Decem-ber 1951, the army, consisting of 300,000men, was organized into four army areaswith staffs in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljanaand Sarajevo. Each of these army head-quarters commanded two corps.l” Theground forces were rearmed with USweapons and equipment, delivered in in-creasing quantities after 1951. A large

15

MILITARY REVIEW

number of US M4 Sherman andM47 Pat- ,ton tanks, half-tracked armored carriers

~ (the M2 and M3) and other heavy weap-ons were introduced into service. More-over, the United States transferred agreat many Soviet arms captured duringthe Korean conflict.

Following Stalin’s death in 1953, thethreat of Soviet invasion was perceptiblydiminished, and the state of militaryemergency proclaimed in 1948 was fi-nally lifted in October 1954. TheYugoslav leadership felt that with thenewest reorganization, it could mobilize29 fully equipped divisions within twoweeks and have 15 more ready within sixweeks.

The attempts to modernize the armedforces continued throughout the remain-der of the decade and well into the 1960s.In 1965, however, the YPA was still not amodern or efficient force. The combatunits possessed neither adequate fire-power nor mobility. The most serious defi-ciencies could be found in their antitank,antiaircraft and antiairborne assaultdefenses.

The All-People’sDefenseand the Roleof the GroundForces

The turning point in the postwar de-velopment of Yugoslavia’s army came inAugust 1968 in the aftermath of the So-viet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Sud-denly, the Yugoslav leadership wasrudely awakened by the real possibility ofa similar occurrence involving their owncountry. Moreover, they realized the YPAwas not capable of defending the countryby itself. This worsening of relations withthe Soviet Union provided the Yugoslavleadership with an opportunity to mobi-lize public support for a series of mea-

sures designed to strengthen thecountry’s defense posture. As a result, theunique concept of the All-People’s De-fense (APD) was introduced.

The Yugoslav concept of the APD is, intheory, the most universal and compre-hensive national defenee system ever de-vised. The APD envisages a total andsystematic preparation of the entireYugoslav society for the country’s de- .fense. This system calls for the active par-ticipation of all citizene and politicalorgans in the resolution of problems con-cerning national defense.

The primary function of the APD wouldbe to mobilize all available human andmaterieI resources in the event of armedaggression. Further, the idea of the APDdemands a continued armed struggle toprevent the occupation of Yugoslavia andto ensure the ultimate victory over an in-vader. Therefore, all components of thenational defense must be permanently de-ployed in peacetime and must be main-tained at the highest level of combatreadiness.

Although this concept was developed in1966, it encountered strong resistancefrom both the senior military and partyleadership. Neither group wanted to di-lute the role of the YPA. The Soviet in-vasion of Czechoslovakia, however,provided the necessary impetus for thequick adoption of the APD concept by thecountry’s leadership.

The YAF is only one of four componentsupon which the country’e APD systemrests (Figure 1). The other three are civildefense, internal security and the ser-vice of early warning and alarm-raising. 1~The federal constitution of 1974states that the main role of the YAF is todefend the country’s “territorial integrity,independence and the constitutionalorder.” The YAF constitutes “a simpleunified whole” and consists of the YPA,

16‘ November

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

Yugoslav National Defense System

I National S@curAy

I

1I I I I

[ Polmcal System Internal Policy . A1l.People’sDefense Fore,gnPOIIcy Economy I1.

[ I IService of Early Warning

CIVIIDefensesnd Alerrn.Rabslng

Yugoslav Armed Forces I Internal .%cunty

iI

I

Yugoslav People’s Army

I ~T’’r’’OrrD’TFOrcrslsl m

E=lGround FOJCPS

AIr FOICe

and Ant(atrctaft Detense

@ ‘stem

.Wo.ld become. pan.1 the Y.gosla. armed lorces m war

..~oc,a~ ,e,,.oro~ec,,on ,, “o, , ,,p.ra,. ~.rl al ,mtw”a, sec”r,ty

D.: %s. . lmlewal pan of ..W% c.am.?onent o! the Nat,ona! 0!+1..s.

Figure 1

or operational army, and the TerritorialDefense Forces (TDF).

When the idea of the APD was adopted,the YPA remained, as it was earlier, con-trolled and financed by the central gov-ernment. The Territorial Defense Forceswere formed in all constituent republicsand autonomous provinces during the pe-riod 1969-70.]Z They represent locally re-cruited, financed and organized forces ofthe “armed national resistance.”

The Systemof Commandand Control

Marshal Josip Broz Tito, former presi-dent of the republic, was also the supremecommander of the YAF and president ofthe League of Communists of Yugoslavia.All three posts were constitutionally tiedto Tito’s personality. When he died, all ofhis duties were taken over by the Social-

1980t

17

MILITARY REVIEW

ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(SFRY) Presidency.

In existence since October 1971, theSFRY Presidency is charged with com-mand and control of the YAF. It advisedTito concerning the organization, equip-ment and cadre policy of the YPA. A por-tion of its responsibilities was transferredto the 31-member National DefenseCouncil. Until his death, Marshal Titowas president of this council. In 1979,the council was decreased to 11 members,of which six are generals.

The Federal Secretariat of NationalDefense (hereafter called the DefenseMinistry) is the highest staff and pro-fessional body of the SFRY Presidency.It has the major responsibility for alladministrative work pertaining to mat-ters of defense at the federa! level. TheDefense Ministry is headed by a four-star general who serves simultaneously

as a member of the Federal ExecutiveCouncil (Cabinet) and the SFRY Presi-dency’s National Defense Council.

The General Staff is the YPA’s higheststaff organ. Among its most important re-sponsibilities are those dealing with theformulation of national strategy andoperational/tactical doctrine for thearmed forces. Further, it is responsible fororganizing, force structuring and deploy-ing the army. It prepares the mobilizationplans and coordinates and supervises theplans for combat operations.

The most important directorates of theGeneral Staff (Figure 2) are those of oper-ations, organizations and mobilization,intelligence, security service (counter-intelligence), political sector and person-nel. It is a uniquely integrated staff bodyin which all three YPA services are repre-sented. There is, however, an inor-dinately great influence of the groundforces in the organization and functioningof the General Staff.

TheGroundForces,1969-79

Since 1968, the ground forces have un-dergone significant changes regarciingboth their organizational structure andarmament. After the new doctrine of APDwas adopted in 1969, it was found that alarge army was not suitable for theYugoslav conditions. It was then resolvedto build a numerically smaller army, butbetter trained and armed with the mostadvanced weapons. Emphasis was givento the improvement of antitank, anti-aircraft and antiair assault defenses. 13

In addition to the introduction of newarmament and equipment, the groundforces are presently undergoing signi&cant organizational changes. The trend isaway from divisions and toward brigade-

[ YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

GeneralI

Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army

r

Chief of the General Staff I

of the Yugoslav People’sArmy

Deputy Chlet at SfaO

Iv 7 vDeputy Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff

for G.ound Forces for Tertlforlal Defense

r---+=nI Infantry Ututs ++-+ Organzato”andMOblzaton I

1 J I I 1

I

Armored tJn,t~!ntelhgence (2d)

I 1

L t

Operahons (30)Antiaircraft ArlIllerY Un(ts

[Signal Units

Securdv Service and Mildary Pollee

I Engineer Umts

Chemical, B,olog!cal

and Rad)ologlcal Defense Unds

Irammg and Educatmn

Fronher Guards

Personnel

4 Arms Supply and ProcurementI

Iechnrcal Service

Quartermaster

IransportallOn Service

I

Mater! al-Fmanc]al Management IAdmmtrat]on I

Medical Service ,,

i 1

Figure 2

1980 19

MILITARY REVIEW

size units. All tactical units will have amixed structure depending on their role’in the combat operations and the type ofterrain where they would be deployed inwar. i4

The realization of the APD alsobrought significant changes in the war-time logistical support of the groundforces. They would be, except for arma-ment, ammunition and special equip-,ment, dependent upon the existinginfrastructure of sociopolitical commu-nities, a common term for the constituentrepublics and autonomous provinces andmunicipalities.

The republics and the autonomousprovinces bear the responsibility for plan-ning and organizing the logistic supportof YPA units deployeci on their territory.In coordination with army region com-mands, they must provide logistical sup-port in regard to supply, transportation .and medical and veterinary care. 15 Themunicipalities would provide food andveterinary care for the units operatingwithin their territories. 16

The infantry is the most numerous andthe most important part of the groundforces. It consists of mechanized, field,mountain and alpine units. Since 1971,the infantry units have undergone sig-nificant organizational changes. The im-provement in organization was aimed atachieving greater flexibility in the em-ployment of smaller units. Another goalwas to achieve a higher integration levelbeginning with battalion-size units. In-creased operational-tactical mobility wasachieved with the introduction of largenumbers of armored personnel carriers(APCS) and greater firepower through theintroduction of advanced armament andequipment.

The present five-year (1975-80) mod-ernization program of the ground forcescalls for the mass introduction of auto-

matic rifles and light mortars into all in-fantry units. The antitank defenses weregreatly strengthened by new artillerypieces, ammunition of greater lethalityand effectiveness, antitank grenadelaunchers, third-generation missiles,modern infrared equipment and laserrange finders. The main emphasis in anti-aircraft defense is in vehicle-mounted andman-portable surface-to-air missiles andlight antiaircraft guns At present, the in-fantry divisions have firepower varyingfrom 50 to 71 tons per minute.17

The armored units have also been ex-tensively reorganized and modernizedsince 1971. Instead of the former tank di-visions, the largest operational-tacticalarmored unit is the tank brigade. R is or-ganized into two to three tank battalions,one or two mechanized infantry battal-ions and combat support units,’s Currentplans envisage greater introduction of themechanized infantry units into the ar-mored forces.

Because of numerical inferiorityagainst potential aggressors, the mainemphasis in modernizing the armoredforces is on improving their overall capa-bility in antiarmor and antiaircraft de-fenses. The increase in strength ofarmored and mechanized units had as aconsequence the transformation of the en-gineer service into a combat branch of theground forces.

In the past few years, modern vehiclesand equipment for water-fording oper-ations, armored recovery vehicles and an-titank defensive mine devices have beenintroduced into service. It should be em-phasized that the Yugoslav ground forces,similar to other East European armies,pay extremely close attention to the prob-lem of chemical, biological and radio-logical defense. All units are provided.with a great variety of equipment for per-sonal and collective protection.

20 , November

ForceStructure

The operational chain of command ofsix army regions (mvrzijska obhzst), anaval region (uojrzo-pomorska oblast) andan independent military region (rrojrzopodrudje) is directly subordinate to theGeneral Staff (Figure 3). In peacetime,

1. YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

only the staffs of the six armies are fullystafTed. The army region normally coversthe territory of one of the constituent re-publics (Figure 4). There are two excep-tions, howeve~ Serbia where two armyregions are located (Belgrade and Ni5)and Montenegro where there is only anindependent militsry regional command.The Split Naval Region command isunique because its naval units include all

The Yugoslav People’s Army Operational Chain of Command

w

RFederal Secretaryof Nabonal Defense

Federal Secretariat 01Naf\onal Defense [Belgrade)

I I

IeGeneral Statf ot the Yugoslav

People’s Army (Belgrade]

[Liubljana Army Region SaIaIevo Army Region

I I

NIX Army Regmn [N$$)Ihe AIr Forceand Anbamraft

(Llublpna) (Sarqevo) Defense Command /Zemun)

[Zagreb Army Region Belgrade Army Reg!on

I(Zagrab] (Belgrade)Spht Naval Reg!on [Split)

I

1980

Figure 3

21

MILITARY REVIEW

Army Region Commands in Yugoslavia

Austria~ <. A..-’”

/

%““”-k.. )

~.. . a-. k$!h%b? Pa’”Adriatic Sea ~;

Q

3

A1)00!1,,2Army RegwnB Zweh Arm Rem.c Spl$tNavalRegbonD Saraw. Amy RwonE Wrade AmtYRwoni W: Army RWO.G.Skew Army RwonH Ttto~radMIMary Regron

Figure 4

ground troops deployed in the littoral many administrative responsibilitiesarea. such as the registration of draftees and

Territorially, each of the army regions the construction and maintenance of mil-comprise three to four military regions. itary installations. Their main re-The latter, in turn, consist of several mil- sponsibility, however, is the planning anditary districts (uojuz obktat). The military execution of mobilization in theirterritorial commands are charged with territories. :

22’ November

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

In 1980. the stren~h of the m-oundforces were estimate~ at 190,0;0 men(130,000 conscripts). They were organizedin the following manner:lg

● Eight infantry divisions.● Twelve infantry brigades.● Onemarine infantry brigade.● Twelve field artillery regiments.o Six antitank regiments.. Seven tank brigades.. Two mountain brigades.. One airborne assault battalion.● Twelve antiaircraft regiments.

Beyond these, 24 antiaircraft regi-ments and 25 coastal artillery batterieswere under the operational control of theair force and the navy. In addition to com-bat troops, the ground forces have a con-siderable number of diverse estab-lishments, military-scientific institutes,schools, academies and training cen-ters.

Armsmentsnd Equipment

The inventories of the ground forcescomprise a motley collection of Soviet,US, ex-German and domestically pro-duced armament and equipment (Figure5). Significantly, almost all heavy and ad-vanced arrhament and equipment are ofSoviet origin. Some 60 M47Pattorr, 400M4 Sherman and 250 Soviet T34185 tanksare maintained in reserve status. Themechanized units comprise a large num-ber of Soviet-produced BTR40PBIBRDM2reconnaissance vehicles, BTR50PUcom-mando vehicles and BTR60 and BTR152APCS.

There are still in service 300 domes-tically produced M60 APCS. Their designwas based on Soviet SU76 self-propelled

(SP) guns. The M60 is powered, however,by an Austrian engine built under licensein Yugoslavia. This vehicle, first publicIyrevealed in 1965, is fully amphibious. TheM60s are now being replaced by a newfully amphibious M980 mechanized in-fantry combat vehicle (MICV). The M980is also of Yugoslav design and was seenfor the first time in May 1975. The M980is similar in appearance to the SovietBMP1 but has the same engine and othercomponents of the French AMXIOF’MICV. Some 200 M980s are in service,and an additional 500 will be eventuallyacquired by the ground forces.zo

The artillery units are equipped witha great variety of weapons acqtired fromseveral foreign sources. The most recentacquisitions included Soviet 130mm M46field guns, 152mm M55 (D20) gun/how-itzers and 122mm D30 howitzers. Thecoastal artillery batteries are equippedwith Soviet SSC2C Sam let antiship mis-siles, 122mm M37 guns, ex-German88mm Flak-36 and 150mm LFH18 guns.The antitank artillery consists mostly ofSoviet-produced guns such as the 100mmSUIOO SP, 100mm T12, 57mm ASU57 SPand 85mm ASU85 SP.

In the 1950s, the Yugoslav army re-ceived some 300 US 76mm M18 Hellcatand 90mm M36 J,ackson SP antitankguns, almost all of which serve in reserveunits. In wide use are Soviet antitankguided missilee (ATGMs)—the AT1Snapper and AT3 Sagger. A new third-generation ATGM of domestic design ispresently under development. Since 1975,antiaircraft defense has been greatlystrengthened by the introduction of So-viet surface-to-air miesiles and radsr-con-trolled, self-propelled antiaircraft guns.

In the last few years, heavy emphasishas been given to advanced commu-nication and target detection equipment.Although a portion of the combat support

1980 23

Ground Forces: Table of Organization and EquipmentCountry of Origin

Weapon$ystem/Equtpmen’

Medmm tanks

llght tanks

Armored personnel camem

Commando armored veh,cles

Recormalssance cars

BalOeheld wow rockets

S“rtm to surface nl,ssles

Mu[tlDle,ocket launchers

Guns

coastalg“”s

G.nlhowtzm

Antwcr#! guns

l,t,ta,k g.,ded m,,sz)es

a“t,ta”kg“”s

BTR40PB/BRDM2

40 [ro~ 7(1““a)

SSC2CSdmk14

tWJ?132{32,128)f3@M63[32,1281Plamens7 I ba, re!r

76mI M486141IBld2 100mm M1955 130mm M46

155mm A42 76mmSU765P W18)

122mnl M37 88mm Ftak 36,150mm LFH18n

152mm M55 (0201157mm M374

I05mm M56q 122mm M38 105mm M7E2155mm A463 122mm 030

130mm M54aSA6 Gdroful

,

SA9 Gaskm

S47 Grad LS/relaJ

70mm M55 Ismglt’ and lFICW’: 23mmZSU234 5P Shdkd 40nun L,60 Bolors

20mm M57 30mm M53i59 SPL, 88mm Flak 36J37min M38/39 12 7mm kf5557mm M5057mm SU572SPfS68J “85mm A444a

,,,. 1 !,0, !“ ,,,,!,, ..,,,4( 21, bereP!a,eO.!lb,O, M980MlLV MO = Mechan,zeo,,,,,,,, comb,, w,,,,

$,,”, ,B,,g,ad,)

haro,maArnma(8dwa3e)

14Mo081@d1J485,,,,,,,

Figure 5

November

I YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

vehicle inventory is of Soviet or Czech ori-gin, a major part was domestically pro-duced under Western licenses. On theother hand, heavy engineering equip-ment is primarily Soviet-made.

Problemssnd Conclusions

Since 1945, the system of commandand control over the YAF, and particu-larly of the ground forces, has closely fol-lowed all changes in the country’s defensedoctrine. There were too many, and oftenunnecessary, organizational changeswhich drained already scarce financial re-sources. The ground forces lagged behindmost of the European armies because, fortoo long, emphasis was upon quantityrather than quality of personnel and sr-mament. As a result, the peacetimestrength of the ground forces was main-tained at a consistently high level.

The biggest change in the organizationof the ground forces came during the im-plementation of the last two five-yearplans of the YPA’s development (1970-80). During this time, the highest prioritywas given to organizational-technicalmodernization and to the personnel of thearmed forces, the ground forces in partic-ular. Although the progress in the mod-ernization of the ground forces wasuneven in some areas, the results thathave been achieved so far are very im-pressive.

At present, the Yugoslav ground forcespossess many strengths and some seriousweaknesses. The trend toward having anumerically smaller, but better armedand trained, YPA is undoubtedly a posi-tive one. The emphasis on strengtheningthe antitank, antiaircraft and anti-airbome assault defense came as a resultof the realistic assessment that the poten-

ti 1 enemy would come from the Eaet

1ra her than the West. The etressed rolea~d importance of infantry units also ap-pears to be realistic because the groundforces would never be capable of matchingthe armored strength of a potential ag-gressor. The trend toward smaller oper-ational-tactical units signifies perhaps abelief that ground forces have to be capa-ble of conducting guerrilla-type combatoperations from the very beginning of thewar.

Although significant results in themodernization of the ground forces havebeen achieved since 1968, some seriousproblems and deficiencies still remain tobe eolved. The armored forces appear tobe numerically and qualitatively inade-quate for allotted tasks. The Soviet tankscurrently in service are obsolete and mustbe replaced soon. Because of heavy em-phasis on the infantry, it is the best or-ganized and armed. The massintroduction of automatic infantry weap-ons and portable infrared and laser ter-geting devices made the infantry unitsfully capable for combat under allconditions.

The antiarmor defense, although eig-niticantly improved during the last fewyears, is still based largely on light anti-tank weapons. There is an urgent need forthe introduction of longer ranged and ad-vanced (“tire and forget”) ATGMs. A simi-lar situation, despite a great etride madein recent years, exists in regard to troopantiaircraft defense. However, there is aproblem in regard to quantity rather thanquality of recently acquired mobile andman-portable surface-to-air missiles andradar-controlled antiaircraft guns. It ap-pears that the only solution to offset thenumerical superiority of a potentialenemy in both men and materiel can befound in the mase introduction of pre-cision guided munitions in the combat

1980 25

MILtTARY REWEW

units of the ground forces.Perhaps the greatest single deticieBcy

is the fact that extraordinarily largenumbers of arms and equipment were ac-quired from too many foreign sources. Itshould be noted that most of the ex-US/West arms, although in the inventory, areno longer in service or are maintained inreserve. The great heterogeneity of armsand equipment in the inventories wascaused by many factors.

First, there exists a conservative atti-tude within the top military leadershiptoward the timely introduction of modernweapons into the armed forces. Second,there exists a lack of systematic armssupply and procurement policy for theground forces. Third, the YPA, similar tothe Soviet army, retains for Iong periodseven the most obsolete weapons andequipment in its inventories. Such a situ-ation makes the problem of standard-ization next to impossible. Also, too greata number of types and models of weap-onry aggravates the problem of spareparts.

There is still a very great and lamen-table dependence of the ground forces onSoviet-produced heavy and advancedarms. Although this situation can, to adegree, be justified, it is not clear whyYugoslavia came to depend on a militarybloc which, at the same time, represents

the greatest potential threat to its securi-ty. Moreover, khe supply of spare parte forSoviet-made armament is very irregularand inadequate.

Perhaps the most impressive result ofthe past decade was achieved in regard tosupply of arms and equipment from do-mestic defense industries. Great progresswas made to free the ground forces fromthe arms purchases abroad and then to in- ,crease its overall combat readiness. Al-though the ground forces still depend onforeign sources for many heavy and ad-vanced arms such as tanks and surface-t.o-snrface and surface-to-air missiles, thedomestic defense industries are alreadycapabIe of satisfying the greater part ofthe needs of the armed forces. The highestdegree of self-sufficiency is achieved withrespect to the infantry units which repre-sent the backbone of the ground forcesand the territorial defense.

The ground forces have traveled a1ong and difficult road since the early ‘days following the end of the war. Great ‘advances have been made, particularlyconsidering ,conditions at its beginning.Despite some rather serious problems, theYugoslav ground forces should not be un-derrated. Their defensive capabilities, es-pecially in unconventional warfare,would most likely deny a quick victory toany potential aggressor.

NO1

1 colonelSogdan G!edov!ch. Ufog. J.gost8vvG . DnwomSvetskom Rat.. [me Role 07Y.goslawa (. WorldWw III, Odbrana iZ.W1. [Defense and Pmtecoom. Jan.afv.Febru.w, 1971. D 55

2 lb,a3 1. 1942.43, the strength of a Paft,san aw,s!on was on average

WOO fgh!ws end, m 194445, was beIween 5,W0 m 6,GW f!ghlers ACOIVS.suallv mmonsed Iwo or three WM... and some independentC&bat ““ii

4 Voma Encmopedva lMdmw’ EncYcl.P.d!aJ, Sswmd Edmon.VOJ.. EncikloPed,Ia. S.19rade, Y.go, 1972, Volume 4, p Izs

5 East E.mP. DaIIv, Fore,gn Broadcast Infonnal,on Sewlce, 23 May1975. P 112

‘ES

6 Sehvee. October 1943 and May <945, m. Peoples LiosTaiIO.Army WC3wecifrom tho Umted stales a.d Ihe Umad Kingdom [email protected],388 gun% 2,6ECImonius, ?3,447 mach,nquns and 137,9CiI nflns TheSOwet Union !. the penca 1944.45 provided 65 tanks 995 g.”s, 3,354mortars, 6s,w mechtnegu”s ano 96,CiW rifles MJlrt31VE.qmloperia,OD C!t

7 fb(d P 139.3 Yugostav,a, edtied by Robed F. Symes, Prawer Publ,shws, N.Y

1957, p 1%9 MIl!tarY EIIC”CIOPSdla,0P Clt P :40

10 Fmdn.h VJener, PcWW311e”kampfsmSslkan DIeRc4e de. Parb-$.nenkamp: m Oer iu90sJawKche La.de...fle,a!n9n9. Wrlag C.fl

26 ‘ Novsmber

Ueberrmfthw, Vmn.a, P,.*, *976, p IC13i i %Mar totheomcapt.1 theAf-People,sDefensa,ffw Y.wslav !n-

temalsecunlysystem,Sunlversdand QmvxehensweIt !ndud= no!Oniyprcdessnma!ssc.rr& oqms (PUMCandslateswurdySSNIC=3S),bulalsoall Cnlzens.WO!XWS,busmess%smm pdmcal organmattons Brhny,lh8 Mfw am e.c2w,F@ti 10mpnll Imnwd,.stely any s,g” of hos”le 8CIIVWwhich,accordingto.fhcal ,nterpmtwo.,bmvotvese,nytmghamsteahgpubbcPmp=mv1. ,“anbslate,cronesandtmonst m!s.

12 me Y.@av fsdwatm. CV.W,!S of the fcllowmg ax rep.bl,csBasn,a and Herzegovina, Cmatm, M.qcaaoma, Montenegro, SetbM anaSIowama, me two auionomo.s provmms, Kosovo ma Vo)vcdha, howrlh,. mo rep.tim of Semm

13 East E.mDe Dmly, 24 December 1975, II 12014 Lfeu!e”a.t General Raik.a Tanasko,(ch, oKopnem deo VO,.ti,

(“me Ground Forcss”), Fm”t, 9 May 1975,0 to16 Colonel MiIenko Radwo@ti, ,Neke Pita.M iozadmskog obe.

zblod@”@ jedmr.a ,“ga%venske enn@ r’SonM Oussbo”s on the f.c-g!st!cal S.pptt d the Y.gosm. Amy,), Vo/no Ekonomsk .mgled(M,lrrary Ecmmmy S“IV.”J, No”mIiDer.Decamber 1975, P 9S.

,. ,,+!.!“ !...

17 East EumPe Daly, 5 December 1975. P IN ami 8 Jan”q ?976, g110.

18 Winner, op cm. p 11619 The M,lflary Wafanca 1978.79, The hltemaim”d Insiflule for Sba.

tfwc st.d,~. ~.ti.. E.g.. 1979, P ss20 NA70, Europe, w.ga%wa). Cafenss Meet Sefvira, Greenmch,

CQnn, 1978, P 7

Milan N. Vego u a Ph.D. candidate at GeorgeWa.shmgton Uniuers@. He m a 1961 graduate ofthe Yugosluv Naval Academy and received a BA.and an MA. in modem histo~ from the Philo-sophy Faculty, Belgrade, Yugoslnu ia. His asmgn.ments as an officer m the Yug0s15u navy fmm1961 to1973 include serving as a naval adviser tothe Royal Cambodum Navy and as commanderof lhggms PT boats and the Shershen torpedoboat group.

Advanced Antiarmor Vehicle Evaluation. Since July 1980, the USArmy Combat Developments Experimentation Command, Fort Oral,California, has been assisting the US Marines in a Department ofDefense test called Advanced Antiarmor Vehicle Evaluation, orARMVAL for short. Using realistic tactical scenarios, the ARMVALevaluation consists of a number of two-sided, force-on-force experi-ments. These are designed to evaluate the contribution of lightweightcombat vehicles (LCVS) to the effectiveness of forces engaging incombat missions.

To make this assessment, friendly combined arms forces conductcombat operations, first using current antiarmor systems to obtainbaseline data and then with the LCVS substituted for current sys-tems. The “enemy” forces use conventional tanks and simulatedWarsaw Pact weapons systems to try to counter the punch of the”friendiies and their LCVS. In addition to LCVS, the Marines are usingtheir own LVTP7 amphibious personnel carriers. Both forces are.composed of both Army and Marine Corps personnel.

Major issues of the test include an analysis of the contributions theLCV can make to force effectiveness on the battlefield, and whetherLCVs—which trade off heavy armor protection for high agility andmobility-will be survivable as members of combined arms forces onthe battlefield.

The collected data and the experience gained through plarr~ng,instrumentation, conduct and analysis of this test may provide, for afuture Joint Operational Test and Evaluation Phase for an LCV astechnology evolves,

1980 21