REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 01\118 No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining lhe data needed, and completing and reviewing lhe colleclion of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, Including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202·4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704·0188) Washington, DC 20503. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD·MM·YYYY) 3. DATES COVERED (From· To) 04-08-2010 12. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper Awgust 201 o- June 2011 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sa. CONTRACT NUMBER Movement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control (C2) N/A from logistical support to operation/maneuver support, within the· military organization. Sb. GRANT NUMBER N/A Sc. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A 6. AUTHOR(S) Sd. PROJECT NUMBER LCDR Lawrence E. Hall 1\J/A 5e. TASK NUMBER N/A Sf. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION USMC Command and Staff College REPORT NUMBER Marine Corps University N/A 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A N/A 11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A 12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited '' 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A 14. ABSTRACT This paper discusses the need to shift C2 of all services EOD from Combat Service Report (CSS) to Combat Support (CS) to support greater planning and execution against the number one battlefield threat, the Improvised explosive device (lED). A realignment of C2 for all services EOD forces form the logistical structure (CSS), to the operational/maneuver (CS) strucutre is required to effectively plan against improvised explosive devices and the enemy cells that build them and support the operations throughout the battle space. The paper discusses the history, traditional missions, C2, Theater organization of each services EOD. From there the paper discusses how the EOD services should eb restructured. 15. SUBJECT TERMS EOD, lED, -.IIEDDO, TROY, Palidan 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT uu a. REPORT I b. ABSTRACT I c. THIS PAGE Unclass Unclass Unclass 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University I Command and Staff College 19b. TELEPONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784·3330 (Admin Office) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI·Std Z39-18
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 01\118 No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining lhe data needed, and completing and reviewing lhe colleclion of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, Including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202·4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704·0188) Washington, DC 20503. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD·MM·YYYY) 3. DATES COVERED (From· To) 04-08-2010
12. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper Awgust 201 o- June 2011
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sa. CONTRACT NUMBER
Movement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control (C2) N/A from logistical support to operation/maneuver support, within the· military organization. Sb. GRANT NUMBER
N/A
Sc. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A
6. AUTHOR(S) Sd. PROJECT NUMBER
LCDR Lawrence E. Hall 1\J/A
5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A
Sf. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
USMC Command and Staff College REPORT NUMBER
Marine Corps University N/A
2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
N/A N/A
11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
N/A
12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unlimited
''
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A
14. ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the need to shift C2 of all services EOD from Combat Service Report (CSS) to Combat Support (CS) to support greater planning and execution against the number one battlefield threat, the Improvised explosive device (lED). A realignment of C2 for all services EOD forces form the logistical structure (CSS), to the operational/maneuver (CS) strucutre is required to effectively plan against improvised explosive devices and the enemy cells that build them and support the operations throughout the battle space. The paper discusses the history, traditional missions, C2, Theater organization of each services EOD. From there the paper discusses how the EOD services should eb restructured.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
EOD, lED, -.IIEDDO, TROY, Palidan
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT uu
a. REPORT I b. ABSTRACT I c. THIS PAGE Unclass Unclass Unclass
18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University I Command and Staff College
19b. TELEPONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784·3330 (Admin Office)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI·Std Z39-18
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
TITLE:
Movement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control (C2) from logistical support to operational/maneuver support, within the military
organization.
SUBMIT IED IN PARTIAL FULFILLJVIENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
LCDR Lawrence E. Hall
AY 10-11
Mentor and<Jtl~D~!:"r9M~: &;_~ C [ l. j}; tJ ~ Jo Approved: (Y~' QS / '-&1\ Date: 2d- f..~t~r vt_ry 2o((
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY PREPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCE TO TIDS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACT FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF TIDS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
1
Table of Contents
Page
D ISCLAMER .................................................................................................. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................•..................... 2
EXECUTIVE s u-:MMAR y ................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUcrl ON ............................................................................................ 4
HISTORY .............................. I ••••••••••••••••••• I ••• I •••••••••••• I ••••••••••••••••••• I •••••••••••••• 6
SERVICE EOD MISSION AND C2 STRUCTURE .................................................. 7
ENDN()TES ....... I. ft ••••••••••• II •••••••••••••• I ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I ••••••••••• I ••••••• •I •••••• 30
2
Executive Summary
Title: Movement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control (C2) from logistical support to operationaVmaneuver support, within the military organization.
Author: Lawrence E"Haii, LCDRUSN
Thesis: The current individual services Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces Command and Control (C2) structure is incorrect to support operational planning and execution against the number one battlefield threat, the improvised explosive device (lED). A realignment of C2 for all services EOD forces from the logistical structure (Combat Service Support), to the operationaUmaneuver structure (Combat Support) is required to effectively plan against improvised explosive devices and the enemy cells that build them and support operations throughout the battle space.
Discussion: The United States has been fighting a war against extremists for ten years with the weapon of choice being the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Throughout the war, leaders have attempted to defeat the IED through new commands such as JIEDDO, high dolfar equipment in the form ofMRAPs (mine resistant armored ... ), CREW (counter-radio electronic warfare) and new intelligence techniques. Military leaders have failed to effectively restructure command and control to better utilize their internal forces effectively, who are most capable to gain intelligence, develop plans and execute operations to reduce insurgent cells.
All services EOD forces come from the same history of people willing to take the long walk to disarm a bomb to protect civilian populace, property and fellow servicemen. EOD is the most joint community throughout the military service. All services EOD attend training at Explosive Ordnance Disposal School in Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. They all wear the same coveted EOD badge and have currently fought on the same land battlefield under a joint command. The difference lies. in how the.y: are aligned in the chain of command within their parent services-..
Explosive Ordnance Disposal forces are key to all areas of success, whether it be defeating the device~ destroying the network. or the training of the force. All the services except the Navy align their forces under the combat logistics or engineering command structure and therefore do not use their expertise to develop plans for the neutralization of terrorist cells that develop the IEDs or the plans to maneuver throughout: fue battlefield. Some may say that when this war· is
. over those service EOD forces will return to their historic roles within their parent services such as route clearance, range clearance and airfield support. The lED has been designated the weapon of choice for all future wars, which means all services EOD forces will be conducting joint operations across the battle space for the near and far future of military operations; from Yemen to Africa
Conclusion: EOD forces across the services have a unique ability to not onfy prosecute tlie IED so that forces may advance throughout the battle space, they also collect evidence and provide a trail to the individual cell or bomb builder that allows SOF forces to prosecute the correct target. The change in command and control from logistical to operation/maneuver will allow service EOD to more effectively align their training, procurement and support to meet the objectives of the_ commander they support_ on. the. battlefield...
3
Introduction:
It starts with a cloud of dust and then the horrific shock to the vehicle and sound of crushing
metal around you. An EOD team will arrive on the scene and commence the intense search for
any remaining_ lmQrovised exglosive devices (IEDs) and then will analyze the crater and vehicle
that remain from the lED explosion. This process may take the use of a robot and possibly a
long walk in a bomb suit that weighs over 80 pounds and does not get lighter when the
temperature surrounding it is an oppressive 130 degrees. Tbis scene is inAfghanistan ... or lraCL ..
but one theme in common is it is EOD forces doing the work. EOD ensures the maneuver forces
acce!')s to its objectives. EOD has come to the forefront of this war and bas no single service that
owns it. When the bomb suit is manned, it is manned by EOD, but that could be from Navy,
Army, Marines or Air Force ... all are playing in this war, and supporting each service, notjust
their own.
Though all the services have EOD, they are not aU structured the same. After nihe years or
fighting wars, developing new commands and equipment, the services have not reorganized
EOD forces to better support the operational commander against the number one weapon ofthis
war, the Improvised ExiJlosive Device. The current individual services EOD forces Command
and Control (C2) structure is improper to support operational planning and execution against the
number one battlefield threat, the lED. A realignment of C2 for EOD forces from the logistical
structure (Combat Service Support), to the operational/maneuver structure (Combat Support)
would allow more effective planning against improvised explosive devices and the enemy cells
that build them and support operations throughout the battle space.
The best and most current example ofthfs is the Relfeflh Place!Transfer ofAuthorfty that just
occurred in theater in the fall of201 0. A Navy EOD Mobile Unit was operating as the battalion
4
level command over EOD forces supporting efforts in Iraq. The relieving command was an
Army EOD Battalion. During the transfer there was a stark difference in priorities of effort and
relief. The Navy EOD command supported and emphasis on S-2 (intelligence) and S-3/5
(operations and planning), while tlie Army commandpfacedtheir emphasis on S-4 (logistics).
The Navy component had focused on supporting the maneuver and operations element which
is where they fall within the Navy structure, but the Army component had focused on the
logistical portion of its deployment which matched its C2 structure within its service. The Army
EOD conducted the RIP/TOA not trying to understand the complex dynamics in the fight against
the bomb maker and the cell that places them, but in performing a materiel and property
inventory and ensuring all the equipment serial numbers matched.1
EOD forces are one of the most joint force within the military. All services send their
prospective candidates to Explosive Ordnance Disposal school in Fort Walton Beach, Florida at
Eglin Air Force Base. The Navy manages the joint service school. All services send their
candidates through eight months of combined training. The structure ofthe training builds on
knowledge and then practical exercises that ensure the member understands how to perform the
render safe procedures (RSP) on all aspects of ordnance. Though Navy EOD tends to start in
Navy centric classes, many inherently roll back and are in classes that are comprised of all
services. Navy EOD candidates attend dive school prior to EOD School, and have an additional
2.5 months of training during EOD school that other services are not required to attend.
Additionally Navy EOD attends jump school, expeditionary training and tactical training after
the completion ofEOD School.
5
EOD School is comprised of multiple areas oftraining, Core (learn basic understanding of
explosives and computer programs), Tools, Methods and Demolition (T~), Reconnaissance
(RECON), Ground (artillery shells, landmines, booby traps), Air (missiles, rockets and
Brown, Dave, et al, From Maintenance to Civil Engineering, Available from https:/lwww.afcesa.af.mil/ceb/cebh/CEEOD4.htmL
Bush, Elizabeth K. America"s F'rrst Frogman: The Draper Kauffman Story. Maryland: Naval Institute Press., 2004.
Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 8027.16, Interservice Responsihilltiesfor Explosive Ordnance Disposal, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992).
Deremer, Kevin 1\'1. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal and· Army Transformation: Is Army EOD Prepared to Support Forces In The Emerging Environment". Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College.
Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, l.TP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces". California: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006.
Evans, MichaeTD. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support OfSpecial Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required". Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2004.
Fleck, Dale. "Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EO D) Command: The Key To Effective and Efficient Use ofEOD Forces". Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2001 .
.JointPublication 3-0, Joint Operations, March 2010
Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications Of The U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities". Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2008.
Smitli, Irene. "The Continuing War Agaiilst Improvised E'xplosive Devices: An Overview Of The Joint lED Defeat Organization." WSTIAC Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2.
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow, November 2008.
---~--. ''DOTMLPF Change Recommendations For Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Joint Staff J-8 Protection Assessment Division, Jun 2006.
28
------. "EOD-MU.Itiservice Procedures For Explosive Ordnance Disposal In A Joint Environment, Feb 2001.
------. "The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow, Nov 2008.
------. CombatingTllrrorisfs Use OfExptosiVes (GlobalExplosive Ordnance Disposal Conference and Exhibit), Power Points by CDR Eugene Rathgeber, USN, "EOD Forces Update, April2010", Power Point by LtCol Marc Tarter, USMC, "USMC EOD, April 2010", Power Point by LtCol Laurie Richter, USAF, "USAF EOD, April 2010"
29
Endnotes
1 Information received during interview with Executive Officer and Operations Officer of Navy EODMU TWO on 29 December 2010. 2 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Division website, http://www.navsea.navv.mil/nswc/eodtechdiv/pages/program.aspx, accessed 15 l'llovember 2010. 3 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Division website. 4 Riemer, Christopher F. HOrganizationallmplications Of The U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities". Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2008, 41. 5 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications Of The U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 42. 6 Evans, Michael D. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support Of Special Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required". Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2004, 11. 1 Evans, MkhaetU. "'Army ExplOsive Ordnance DisposatO'perations tn SupportOfSpeciarO'peratrons Forces: What Changes Are Required", 11. a Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 8027.16, lnterservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992}, 2. 9 Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, UP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces". California: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006, 28. 10 EW.O-WI*, Dave, et aL,. from Maintenance to.CWU.Iing.ineeliUlg-,. Available tr0m https:/ /www.afcesa.af.mil/ceb/ceb h/CEEO D4.htm I. 11 Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, UP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces", 29. 12 OPNAVINST8027.1G, 2. 13 Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, UP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces", 30. 14 Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, UP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces", 30. 15
OPNAVINST 8027.1G, 2. 16 Draper, Stephen R. "EOD, UP! How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces", 31. 17 OPNAVINST8027.1G, 2. . l!!..Mfll'ER MESSAGE' Nt.J'MBfR: 07-35'1 AI'I'RC-OPC lOGTSlTCS BR'AN'Cfl' IMPlEMENTATION'- MESSAGE" 1.0~ Fssuecf: [12/27 /2007] 19 Author visually read Memorandum in theater while Deputy Commander Task Force Troy, but could not retrieve copy. 20 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications Of The U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 4. 21
Riemer, Chr~stopher F. "OfgantzatieMt-lcm.plk:ations. Of The IJ.. S.. Anny! s-I.Mreas4flg. Demand Fef Expl.osi->Je·
Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 4. 22 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications OfThe U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities",38. Statement comes from Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 04-13, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF} CAA T II Initial Impressions Report, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/caii_04-13_chap03-c.htm. 23 Subcommittee on Oversigjlt & lnvestigptions, U.S. House of Re~;~resentatives Committee on Armed Services,. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow, November 2008,9. 24 Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow_ 37. 25 Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, U.S. Hpuse of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow, 44.
26 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications OfThe U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 47. 27 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational implications Of The U.S. Army's Jncreasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 35. 28 Evans, Michael D. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support Of Special Operations Forces: What Changj:!s Are Req_uired",. 66. 29 Evans, Michael D. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support Of Special Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required", 31. 30 Evans, Michael D. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support Of Special Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required", 35. 31 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications OfThe U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 43. Statement originally from Department of the Army, Field Manual (Interim) 4.3fJ-50'; Mocfutar Exptosive Ordnance fJisposatOperations, (Washington Er.C:: uovernment Printing Office, Juty 2006) 32 Riemer, Christopher F. "Organizational Implications Of The U.S. Army's Increasing Demand For Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities", 44. 33 Evans, Michael D. "Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations In Support Of Special Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required", 68. 34 Subromrnittee 00. Ol.te~signt & l~\lestigations. u. s. Hous.e ot Rept:esern:a.ti\les. Committee 00. Al;rned.Serukes.,. r~ Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against lEOs Today and Tomorrow, 39. 35 Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, The
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against lEOs Today and TomorroW,t 40.