Motions - PA - IN LIMINE- 2015002683 - GOCH, ALYSSA MICHELE - 11-12-2015.pdf

STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

PLAINTIFF,

V FILE NO. 15-0919-ST

ALYSSA MICHELE GOCH, HON. THOMAS J. PHILLIPS

DEFENDANT. /

Kit Tholen (P76948) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 324 Court Street Traverse City, MI 49684 (231) 922-4600

Jesse L. Williams (P69264) Attorney for Defendant 2899 Benzie Hwy. — PO Box 30 Benzonia, MI 49616 (231) 929-8340

/

PEOPLE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO MRE 402

The People of the State of Michigan respectfully request that This Court preclude

Defendant from seeking to admit evidence at trial which is not legally relevant "to the

determination of the action." In support of this Motion, The People state as follows:

Facts

Defendant is charged with two counts of Moving Violation Causing Death, violations of

MCL 257.601d. These charges arose from a traffic crash that occurred on August 2nd, 2015

along M-37. The People allege that Defendant was driving southbound in her passenger vehicle

1

and that the victims, Anthony and Deanna Erving, were traveling northbound on a motorcycle.

The People allege that Defendant entered a curve and failed to maintain control of her vehicle.

The result of this loss of control was that Defendant crossed the centerline, collided with

Anthony and Deanna Erving, and the Ervings were killed.

A speed calculation could not be reliably performed due to several factors and Defendant

did not have a GPS module in her vehicle. There was an Electronic Data Recorder in her vehicle

but it did not record her speed at or near the time of the collision.

Shortly before the collision Ms. Goch had passed a man named Brandon Collins. Mr.

Collins was traveling the same direction as Defendant and had his cruise control set at the speed

limit-55. Mr. Collins can therefore infer that Defendant was traveling above the speed limit at

the time she passed him but he does not, however, know her speed when she crossed the

centerline.

Mr. Collins as well as his wife and another gentleman did witness Defendant's vehicle

travel left-of-center and cause the collision. Defendant admitted to Deputy Nick White that she

did drive left-of-center. Based on roadway evidence Sergeant Charles Jetter of the Grand

Traverse County Sheriff's Office, a crash reconstruction expert, determined that Defendant was

left-of-center at the time of the collision.

On October 30th, 2015, defense counsel sent a letter to the Prosecuting Attorney's Office

and to This Court as part of a stipulation between the parties to adjourn the jury selection and

trial. In this letter defense counsel states "included is a FOIA request that I sent to Michigan's

Department of Transportation today requesting data that is crucial to my defense strategy in this

matter." This letter is attached as Attachment 1. The referenced FOIA request is attached as

Attachment 2 and requests the following items, all in relation to M-37 at or near the location of

2

the crash: (1) information related to a recent changes to the roadway surface; (2) information

related to other times that changes to the roadway were considered since "the 1980's;" (3)

information related to other crashes at the portion of road in question, and; (4) information

related to plans to change the road's path in the future.

The People contend that none of the requested information is admissible at Defendant's

trial.

Law

The crime that Defendant is charged with states: "A person that commits a moving

violation that causes the death of another person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by

imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $2,000, or both."1

The Court of Appeals, interpreting this statute, stated: "We conclude that the Legislature

impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense."2

"Moving violation" is defined as: "an act or omission prohibited under this act or a local

ordinance substantially corresponding to this act that involves the operation of a motor vehicle,

and for which a fine may be assessed."3

Moving violations relevant to this case include: "When a roadway has been divided into 2

or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent

with this act apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single

lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the operator has first ascertained that the

movement can be made with safety."4

Also, "The state highway commission and county road commissions shall determine

2 People v Pace, Unreported, Docket No. 322808, 2015 WL 3511912 (Mich Ct App June 4, 2015). The People are not aware of any published cases which address this issue. This case is attached as Attachment 3. 3 MCL § 57.601d(4). 4 MCL § 257.642.

1 MCL § 257.601d(1).

3

those portions of a highway under their jurisdiction where overtaking and passing or driving to

the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous, and by appropriate signs or markings on

the roadway shall indicate the beginning and end of those zones . . . ."5 "A person who fails to

obey the traffic-control devices installed pursuant to this section is responsible for a civil

infraction."6

Argument

There is no reasonable doubt regarding whether Defendant crossed the centerline and

caused the deaths of Anthony and Deanna Erving. As is often the case, however, there could be

doubt regarding the "mens rea" of Defendant at the time that she committed the "actus reus." No

one contends that the crash was intentional on the part of Defendant, but whether it was reckless,

negligent, or neither is open to dispute.

At the trial of criminal case, however, the degree of Defendant's culpability is not legally

relevant. Nowhere in: the charged statute, Standard Jury Instruction 15.18, or the relevant

Legislative History is there a requirement that the accused be found negligent or otherwise.

Consequently, MCL § 257.601d is a "strict liability" offense and evidence that Defendant was

not negligent has no bearing on any element of the offense or "fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action."' (It is, however, relevant at sentencing.)

The People's statutory interpretation is supported not only by the statute, jury instruction,

and Legislative History8 but is also the holding of People v Pace, an unpublished 2015 Michigan

Court of Appeals case9. In Pace the defendant was charged with Moving Violation Causing

5 MCL § 257.640(1). 6 MCL §257.640(3).

MRE 401. 8 Bill analyses from the House and Senate attached as Attachment 4. The relevant Legislative History is also contained in Footnote 1 in Pace. 9 Pace, supra.

4

Serious Impairment of a Bodily Function, in violation of MCL 257.601d(2). The statutory

language in subsection (2) is no different than subsection (1) as it pertains to any mens rea

requirement for criminal liability. The Court analyzed the statutory language, reviewed the

Legislative History, discussed the history and legality of strict liability offenses in Michigan, and

concluded that "the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability

offense."I°

As support for the conclusion in Pace the Court of Appeals also cited to People v Jones, a

published Court of Appeals case." In Jones the defendant had been ticketed for disobeying a

stop sign. He argued that since the roads were icy he had not been negligent in sliding through

the stop sign. It seems that this fact was not in dispute and The People did not believe that the

defendant had been negligent. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant

was liable for the violation. "Courts in this country have almost universally held that traffic

violations are strict liability offenses, in which the motorist's negligence or lack of intent to

commit the infraction is irrelevant."I2

Based on the statute, case law, and Legislative History, it is clear that the Legislature

intended MCL 257.601d to be strict liability. Consequently, evidence which tends to show that

she was not negligent, or perhaps less negligent, is not relevant at trial. This would include not

only evidence of roadway surface changes or plans to change the roadway's path but also

evidence of other crashes at that location. None of that evidence has any bearing on the elements

of the charges, namely:

(1) First, that the defendant committed the following moving violation [describe the moving violation].

10 Pace, supra, at *1. 11 People v Jones, 132 Mich App 368 (1984). 12 Jones at 370.

5

(2) The moving violation of [describe the moving violation] was a cause of the death of [name deceased]. To "cause" the victim's death, the defendant's operation of the vehicle must have been a factual cause of the death, that is, but for the defendant's operation of the vehicle, the death would not have occurred. In addition, operation of the vehicle must have been a proximate cause of death, that is, death or serious injury must have been a direct and natural result of operating the vehicle. 13

Those two elements are the sole elements of the charged offense and the evidence at trial should

be limited to what is relevant towards proving or refuting them.

Conclusion / Relief

Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.601d creates a strict liability criminal offense for

motorists who commit a moving violation, and that moving violation is the cause of either death

or serious impairment to another person. This conclusion is supported by numerous sources, all

persuasive, but not least of which is the well-reasoned Court of Appeals case that is directly on

point.

Consequently, evidence that tends to minimize how negligent or culpable Defendant was

should be barred at trial. Such evidence is relevant to determining an appropriate sentence but it

does not go to any element of the charged offense or "fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action."

Respectfully submitted,

November 12, 2015 Kit Tholen (P76948) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Grand Traverse County

13 CJ12d 15.18.

6

ATTACHMENT 1

JESSE L. WILLIAMS JESSE L. WILLIAMS, PLLC 2899 I3enzie Hwy — P.O. Box 30

Benzonia, MI 49616-0030 231-929-8340 Office / 231-944-4911 Cellular

231-929-8341 Facsimile j I [email protected]

October 30, 2015

Hon: Thomas J. Phillips 86111 DistrictCourt for Grand Traverse County 280 Washington Street Traverse City, MI 49684

Sent via fax: (231) 922-4454

RE: People v ALYSSA GOCH Case No.: 15-0919-ST

Dear Judge Phillips,

Included with this fax is my proposed stipulation and order adjoining the status conference and jury trial scheduled on November 4, 2015. Also included is a FOIA request that I sent to Michigan's Department of Transportation today requesting data that is crucial to my defense strategy in this matter. I've mailed the copy, with my original signature, to the court.

Mr. Tholen has agreed, in principle to the requested adjournment in this matter and I believe he will be signing it and submitting it to the court for your endorsement. I have forwarded a copy of this letter to him along with said FOIA request. I'm estimating that it will be several weeks before I obtain the data I'm seeking from MDOT and then. I'll need additional time to analyze the information and potentially consult with an expert to assist me in this matter.

1 also want you to be aware that I will be vacationing out of state from November 12 through December 7.

For these reasons, I'd ask that you set this matter for a two-day jury selection and trial in late January or early February, 2016.

Thank you,

CC: Christopher Kit Tholen, via email, at: [email protected]

ATTACHMENT 2

JESSE L. WILLIAMS JESSE L. WILLIAMS, PLLC 2899 Benzie Hwy — P.O. Box 30

Benzonia, MI 496164)030 231-929-8340 Office / 231-944-4911 Cellular

231-929-8341 Facsimile j lwdelense(thgmail.com

October 30, 2015

To: Michigan Department of Transportation's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Coordinator

Attn: Richard E. Liptak, Manager

Sent via fax: 231-941-1512

Attn: James Lake, Communications Representative

Sent via e-mail: [email protected]

I am hereby requesting under Michigan's FOIA the following:

1. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices related to the curve

on M37 and Center Rd. in Grand Traverse County where road crews recently applied

a high friction surface on the roadway, which is a layer of epoxy and small stones.

For reference, see: UpNorthLivc article: littp://upnorthlive.cominews/locallindot-!ix i rig-dangerous-curve-to-improve-safety -conditions.

2. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices regarding

Michigan's Department of Transportation looking to improve the safety conditions of

said curve on M37 since the 1980s..

3. All public records, writings, emails, conununications and invoices regarding the 27

crashes including four fatalities that occurred in the vicinity of said curve on M37 that occurred within the last five years.

4. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices regarding any

discussions or plans to realign said curve on M37 in the future.

1 am requesting that, whenever possible, all responsive materials be provided in scanned,

digital format (i.e. PDFs) and emailed to me at: jlwdefensaD,gmail.com. Any responsive

materials that cannot be provided in digital format can be mailed to my above address.

ATTACHMENT 3

People v. Pace, — N.W.2d (2015)

2015 WL 3511912

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

PEOPLE of the State of

Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Joshua Matthew PACE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 322808. I June 4, 2015.

Washtenaw Circuit Court; LC No. 14-000272-AR.

Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave granted an order entered by the Washtenaw Circuit Court

denying plaintiffs application for leave to appeal a district court order which granted defendant's motion for a specific

jury instruction. We reverse and remand.

The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. On June 5,

2013, as Michael John Bly, walked across Church Street in

Ann Arbor along a pedestrian crosswalk, defendant made a left-hand turn onto Church Street, striking Bly with his

vehicle in the process. As a result of the collision, Bly suffered head trauma that left him permanently disabled. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of committing

a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function pursuant to MCL 257.601d(2).

Prior to trial, defendant moved the district court for a jury instruction requiring the prosecution to prove, as an element

of the charged offense, that defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle. The prosecution argued, in

contrast, that the applicable jury instruction, M Crim JI 15.19, provides that to prove the charge of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, the

prosecution is required to prove only (1) that the defendant

committed a moving violation; and (2) that the defendant's operation of the vehicle caused a serious impairment of a body function to the victim. According to the prosecution, this standard jury instruction accurately stated the law and that there was no requirement that the prosecution also prove that defendant was negligent in his actions. The district

court granted defendant's motion, citing People v, Tombs,

472 Mich. 446; 697 NW2d 494 (2005) and reasoning that

the Legislature did not expressly indicate that it sought to

dispense with negligence as an element of the offense.

The prosecution subsequently filed an application for leave

to appeal the district court's order in the Washtenaw

Circuit Court, which denied the application. We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal the Washtenaw Circuit Court's denial of its application. In addition to the

issue of whether negligence is an element of the offense of

committing a moving violation causing serious impairment

of a body function, this Court directed the parties to address two additional issues: "(1) if negligence is not an element of

committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, 1vICL 257.601d(2), then what, if any, mens

rea is required for conviction of this offense; and (2) if no

mens rea is required, is the statute constitutional?" People

v. Pace, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered

October 7, 2014 (Docket No. 322808).

On appeal, the prosecution contends that MCL 257.601d

encompasses a pre-existing negligence component such that the district court's requirement of proof of negligence as

a separate, distinct element was superfluous and contrary to legislative intent. Alternatively, the prosecution contends

that the statute is a constitutional, strict liability offense. We conclude that that the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense.

Matters of statutory construction are questions of law, which

this Court reviews de novo. People v. Williams, 491 Mich.

164, 169; 814 NW2d 270 (2012). Determining the elements

of a crime is also a question of law that we review de novo.

People v. Hollschlag, 471 Mich. 1, 4-5; 684 NW2d 730

(2004).

MCL 257.601d(2) provides:

(2) A person who commits a

moving violation that causes serious impairment of a body function

to another person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93

days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.

MCL 257.601d(4) states:

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As used in this section, "moving

violation" means an act or omission prohibited under this act or a local

ordinance substantially corresponding to this act that involves the operation of a motor vehicle, and for which a fine

may be assessed.

Thus, MCL 257.601d(2) clearly requires the prosecutor to

prove (1) the commission of a moving violation; (2) another

person suffered a serious impairment of a body function; and

(3) a causal link between the bodily injury and the moving

violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation. The statutory

provision is silent with regard to fault or intent. However, "the failure to include a fault element in the statute does not

end our inquiry. Where the statute does not include language expressly requiring fault as an element, this Court must focus on whether the Legislature nevertheless intended to require fault as a predicate to guilt." People v. Adams, 262 Mich.App 89, 93; 683 N W2d 729 (2004).

In Tombs, 472 Mich. at 452- 453, our Supreme Court noted that criminal offenses that do not require a criminal intent

are disfavored. "The Court will infer the presence of the element unless a statute contains an express or implied indication that the legislative body wanted to dispense with it.

Moreover, the Court has expressly held that the presumption in favor of a criminal intent or mens rea requirement applies to each element of a statutory crime." Id. at 454455.

According to Tombs, if there were no mens rea element in a criminal offense, "the statute could punish otherwise innocent conduct." Id. at 458.

However, as Justice Cooley early observed in People v. Robv, 52 Mich. 577, 579; 18 NW 365 (1884):

I agree that as a rule there can be no

crime without a criminal intent, but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high

crime of manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence, and there are many other cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them, the purpose being to

require a degree of diligence for the

protection of the public which shall render violation impossible.

Our Supreme Court still recognizes that there are

circumstances where the lack of criminal intent does not

preclude a criminal prosecution. In Holtschlag. 471 Mich.

1, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the mens rea associated with manslaughter when the prosecutor

proceeded on a theory of gross negligence. Citing to People v.

Townsend, 214 Mich. 267. 273-274; 183 NW 177 (1921), and

its discussion regarding the proofs necessary to demonstrate

the "unlawful-act" theory of involuntary manslaughter and

the "lawful-act" theory, the Holtschlag court noted that under

the "unlawful-act" theory:

[I]f the defendant committed an unlawful act that resulted in death, it is

sufficient to allege the commission of

the unlawful act and the resulting death whereas, if the defendant committed

a lawful act resulting in death, the prosecutor must specifically allege

the manner in which the defendant's

actions were grossly or culpably

negligent. That is, under Townsend,

lawful-act manslaughter requires that

the defendant acted with a mens rea of culpable negligence; whereas unlawful-act manslaughter does not

require that the defendant acted with a specific mens rea-all that is required is that the defendant committed the

unlawful act. [Holtschlag, 471 Mich.

at l7](emphasis in original).

Thus, as observed in Holtschlag, under some circumstances,

the fact that a defendant committed an unlawful act has been found sufficient to form the basis of a criminal charge, even

where a specific mens rea is absent.

This Court also noted in People v. Janes, 302 Mich.App

34, 42; 836 NW2d 883 (2013), that the Legislature can

constitutionally enact offenses that impose criminal liability without regard to fault and that whether the Legislature

intended to enact such an offense is generally a matter of statutory interpretation. These offenses, called strict liability offenses, are ones "in which the prosecution need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed

the prohibited act, regardless of the defendant's intent and regardless of what the defendant actually knew or did not

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know." Janes, 302 Mich.App at 41-42 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The distinction between a strict-liability

crime and a general-intent crime is that, for a general-intent

crime, the people must prove that the defendant purposefully

or voluntarily performed the wrongful act, whereas, for a

strict-liability crime, the people merely need to prove that the

defendant performed the wrongful act, irrespective of whether he intended to perform it. People v. Lardie, 452 Mich. 231, 241; 551 NW2d 656, 660 61 (1996), overruled on other

grounds by People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005).

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246; 72 S. Ct 240, 246; 96 L. Ed 288 (1952) discusses the origin of criminal offense charges which disregard any intent. Citing to the

industrial revolution, increased traffic, congestion of cities, and wide distribution of goods, the Morissette Court noted that as dangers increased so did duties and regulations and that lawmakers sought to make the duties and regulations more

effective by imposing criminal sanctions in some cases. Id. at 252-255. These "public welfare offenses" do not necessarily

result in a direct or immediate injury to person or property "but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256.

[W]hatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence,

legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The

accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care

than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might

reasonably exact from one who

assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does not grave

damage to an offender's reputation.

Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and

regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime. [Id. at 256.]

The purpose of imposing criminal penalties in this class

of regulation is "to require a degree of diligence for

the protection of the public which shall render violation

impossible." Id. at 257. Examples of such strict-liability

offenses include narcotics laws, traffic laws, adulterated food

or drug laws, criminal nuisances, and liquor control laws.

People v. Nasir, 255 Mich.App 38, 42; 662 NW2d 29 (2003).

"Courts in this country have almost universally held that traffic violations are strict liability offenses, in which the

motorist's negligence or lack of intent to commit the infraction

is irrelevant." People v. Jones, 132 Mich.App 368, 370; 347

NW2d 235 (1984). For example, the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals addressed an Ohio statute defining involuntary manslaughter as causing death during the commission of a misdemeanor driving offense, without a separate mens rea

requirement in Stanley v. Turner, 6 F3d 399 (CA 6, 1993).

The Sixth Circuit noted that:

[w]here a criminal statute prohibits and punishes conduct not innocent or

innocuous in itself, the criminal intent

element may be dispensed with if the criminal statute is designed for the

protection of the public health and safety and if it has no common law background that included a particular criminal intent. Because citizens are

presumed to know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that violating them is dangerous and wrong, Ohio's

involuntary manslaughter statute, as applied in this case, is based on the

obviously wrongful and blameworthy

conduct of violating traffic safety laws. [Id. at 404.]

As the Court in Stanley recognized, our Legislature is entitled to enact public welfare statutes, such as those regulating

traffic, that dispense with the requirement of mens rea on the basis that citizens are presumed to know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that violating them is dangerous. Id.

Based upon the above, it may be inferred from the Legislature's use of the term "moving violation," without

any reference to a mens rea requirement, that it intended to dispense with the criminal intent element and make committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function a strict liability offense. The Legislature

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People v. Pace, --- N.W.2d (2015)

is presumed to be aware of and to legislate in harmony with

existing jurisprudence. People v. Cash, 419 Mich. 230, 241;

351 NW2d 822 (1984). The requirement that a defendant have

committed a moving violation in order to be charged with and

convicted of a violation of MCL 257.601d clearly indicates

that public welfare is at issue. "[I]it is the motorist's duty in the

use and operation of his automobile to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and

caution which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would

exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Zarzecki

v. Hatch, 347 Mich. 138, 141; 79 NW2d 605 (1956). The

commission of a moving violation indicates that the motorist

failed to do so, regardless of intent, and, as previously indicated, the violation of a traffic law is typically a strict-

liability offense. Nasir, 255 Mich.App at 42. Thus, MCL

257.601d is strict liability offense. 1

Because the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense, the prosecution is required

to prove solely (1) the commission of a moving violation;

(2) another person suffered a serious impairment of a body function; and (3) a causal link between the bodily injury and

the moving violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation.

The prosecution is not required to also prove that defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent manner, and the trial court erred in so concluding.

After reaching the conclusion that the prosecution is not

required to prove negligence, we next consider whether

MCL 257.601d is constitutional. Constitutional questions are generally reviewed de novo by this Court. People v. Conat,

238 Mich.App 134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999).

"[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized as a

general matter that the constitution does not preclude the

enactment of even strict liability criminal statutes." People v. Quinn, 440 Mich. 178, 185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992), citing

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225; 78 S. Ct 240; 2 L. Ed 2d 228 (1957). See also Janes, 302 Mich.App at 42, citing Quinn, 440 Mich. at 188 ("Our Supreme Court has recognized

that the Legislature can constitutionally enact offenses that

impose criminal liability without regard to fault."). This is especially the case with public welfare regulations, as previously discussed. There does not appear to be a well-settled test for determining when such a strict liability crime

offends due process. However, this Court has previously stated that " '[t]he elimination of the element of criminal

intent does not violate the due process clause where (1) the

penalty is relatively small, and (2) where conviction does not

gravely besmirch.' " People v. Olson, 181 Mich.App 348,

352; 448 NW2d 845 (1989), quoting United States v. Wulff

758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (CA 6, 1985). See also Lardie, 452 Mich.

at 255 (noting that penalties for public welfare offenses are

generally "relatively small" and do no "grave damage to an

offender's reputation").

There is no question that the Legislature has the constitutional

authority to enact MCL 257.601d as a strict liability offense

concerning public welfare. Lambert, 355 U.S. 225; Quinn,

440 Mich. at 188; Janes, 302 Mich.App at 42. We are satisfied

that imposing strict liability for the offense of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body

function does not offend due process. First, the offense is

a misdemeanor; that is, despite the severe harm that such an offense inflicts upon the victim, it is punishable only by

imprisonment for not more than 93 days and/or a fine of not more than $500. The penalty is thus relatively small.

See People v. Adams, 262 Mich.App 89, 98-99; 683 NW2d

729 (2004) (upholding a strict liability crime of failing to pay child support despite a potential four-year jail term); People v. Motor City Hosp. & Surgical Supply, Inc., 227

Mich.App 209, 210; 575 NW2d 95 (1997) (upholding a strict

liability crime despite a potential punishment of four years' imprisonment and a $30,000 fine). Second, because the crime is a misdemeanor only, it is far less likely to "besmirch" the defendant. Cf Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125 ("[A] felony

conviction irreparably damages one's reputation[.]"). Thus, we conclude that it does not offend due process to hold individuals strictly liable for committing moving violations that cause serious impairment to a body function in another

individual.

In sum, MCL 257.601d imposes strict liability upon a

motorist who commits a moving violation causing serious

impairment of a body function to another person and the statute is constitutional. The prosecution is not required to

prove that defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent

manner, and the trial court erred in so concluding.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

All Citations

---N.W.2d 2015 WL 3511912

.3stliavvNexft' 2015 Thom ,on Ret tiers No or ;'n to onginal U.S. ,over-, nerd Works.

People v. Pace, --- N.W.2d -- (2015)

Footnotes

1

This conclusion is also supported by the legislative history. We recognize that Legislative bill analyses "are 'generally

unpersuasive tool [s] of statutory construction' " and "do not necessarily represent the views of any individual legislator."

Kinder Morgan Mich, LLC v. Jackson, 277 Mich.App 159, 170; 744 NW2d 184 (2007) (citation omitted). However, they

"do have probative value in certain, limited circumstances." Id. MCL 257.601d was added to the Motor Vehicle Code by 2008 PA 463, effective October 31, 2010. At the same time that MCL 257.601d was added, the offenses of Felonious Driving, MCL 750.325, and Negligent Homicide, MCL 257.626c,

were repealed. The Legislative bill analyses, attached to the prosecution's brief, suggest that the changes were made

in response to concerns by legislators that [t]he current standard for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent homicide or felonious driving is

ambiguous, based on whether the person operated the vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner. The

language prescribing those offenses is antiquated and based on common law notions of negligence. Applying

those concepts to criminal law creates some uncertainty about what constitutes a violation, leading to inconsistent enforcement of the law. For example, a driver who loses control of a car on an icy overpass and is involved in a

fatal accident could have foreseen the possibility that the bridge might be icy, and therefore could be charged with

negligent homicide, although most people would not consider that to be appropriate in such a case. The bill would remove that ambiguity, and instead enact prohibitions under which a person would not be guilty of a criminal offense

unless a moving violation had occurred. This would reduce inconsistencies in the application of the law and clarify proscribed conduct.[Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 104 (as passed by the senate), August 5, 2008, available at http://

www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/ billanalysis/Senate/htm/2007—SFA-0104—B.htm (accessed March

26, 2015).] The above analysis supports a conclusion that in enacting MCL 257.601 and repealing the Felonious Driving and Negligent Homicide statutes, the Legislature sought to erase uncertainty as to what conduct was punishable by

removing any consideration of whether a motorist's conduct was careless, reckless, or negligent, and instead focusing

solely on whether the motorist committed a moving violation.

•-•

End of Document (c) 2015 1 homson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Next''© 21 ,:;11 Reuters. No cia. to in Gover, ,rent Work_

ATTACHMENT 4

Legislative Analysis

MOVING VIOLATIONS: DEATH OR INJURY

House Bill 6627 as enrolled Public Act 444 of 2008 Sponsor: Rep. Fred Miller

House Bill 6629 as enrolled Public Act 466 of 2008 Sponsor: Rep. Frank Accavitti, Jr.

House Bill 6630 as enrolled Public Act 467 of 2008 Sponsor: Rep. Paul Opsommer

Senate Bill 1576 as enrolled Public Act 468 of 2008 Sponsor: Sen. Valde Garcia

House Committee: Transportation Senate Committee: Transportation Complete to 7-24-09

Mitchell Bean, Director Phone: (517) 373-8080 http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa


Senate Bill 1580 as enrolled Public Act 446 of 2008 Sponsor: Sen. Michael Switalski

Senate Bill 1581 as enrolled Public Act 465 of 2008 Sponsor: Sen. Jason E. Allen


A SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILLS 6627, 6629-6630, AND SENATE BILLS 104, 1576, 1578, 1580-1581 AS ENROLLED

Each of the House bills is tie-barred to Senate Bill 104, which would amend the Michigan Vehicle Code to establish penalties for moving violations that seriously injure or kill another person, and would repeal existing sections of law that provide penalties for felonious driving and negligent homicide. (Senate Bill 104 is described in more detail later.)

The House bills, and a set of accompanying Senate bills, would amend other acts to make complementary amendments, including requiring background checks that would prohibit the employment of individuals in certain kinds of health care facilities if they have been convicted of a moving violation that caused the death of another person within the previous five years. Most of the bills take effect October 31, 2010.

The main bill in the package is Senate Bill 104, which amends the Michigan Vehicle Code to establish penalties for moving violations that seriously injure or kill another person, as follows:

o A moving violation that causes serious impairment of a body function of another person is a misdemeanor punishable by up imprisonment for to 93 days or a maximum fine of $500, or both.

o A moving violation that causes the death of another person is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov Page 1 of 4

o Reckless driving that causes serious impairment of a body function of another person is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of between $1,000 and $5,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization.

o Reckless driving that causes the death of another person is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of $2,500 to $10,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization.

Senate Bill 104 also does the following:

o Requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to assign six points to a person's driving record for any of the above offenses, and four points for a moving violation resulting in an at-fault collision.

o Requires a person convicted of any of the above offenses to pay a $1,000 driver responsibility fee each year for two consecutive years.

o Requires the SOS to revoke a person's license if he or she is convicted of reckless driving that causes the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person.

o Requires the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year if he or she is convicted of a moving violation that causes the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person.

o Eliminates the offenses of felonious driving and negligent homicide. o Requires the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year if he or she is convicted

of operating a vehicle which a blood alcohol content of 0.17 grams or more. --Permits the SOS, 45 days after suspending a person's license under that provision, to issue the person a restricted license to operate a vehicle with an ignition interlock device.

o Requires the civil fine for a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision to be increased by $25, not to exceed $100.

For additional information on Senate Bill 104, see the documents from the Senate Fiscal Agency (including the summary of the bill as enacted dated 6-29-09 and an earlier, more detailed explanation of the issue and of the Senate-passed version of the bill dated 8-5-08.)

The following are the associated House and Senate bills.

House Bill 6627 amends the Public Health Code (MCL 333.20173a), to prohibit certain health facilities and agencies, psychiatric hospitals, and intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation from employing, independently contracting with, or granting clinical privileges to an individual who provided services to or had regular access to patients or residents in the facility or agency, if the individual had been convicted of a moving violation that caused the death of another person within the previous five years.

House Bill 6629 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure (MCL 769.1t) to permit the court to order reimbursement to the state or local unit of government for related expenses incurred in relation when an individual is convicted either of either a moving violation that caused the death of or serious injury to another person or of reckless driving that caused the death of or serious injury to another person.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov Moving Violations package Page 2 of 4

House Bill 6630 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure (MCL 777.12g and 777.16p) to revise sentencing guidelines for violations involving the operation of a motor vehicle, creating two new crimes having statutory maximum penalties of 5 and 15 years in prison, respectively.

Senate Bill 1576 amends the Insurance Code to require the automobile insurance placement facility, as part of its merit-based insurance plan, to include a surcharge for a moving violation that causes the death of another person.

Senate Bill 1578 amends the Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act to prohibit an adult foster care facility from employing or contracting with an individual who provides services to or has regular access to residents of the facility if the individual was convicted of a moving violation that caused the death of another person within the previous five years.

Senate Bill 1580 amends the Mental Health Code to prohibit psychiatric hospitals and intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation from employing, independently contracting with, or granting clinical privileges to an individual who provides services to or has regular access to patients or residents, if the individual was convicted of a that caused the death of another person within the previous five years.

Senate Bill 1581 amended Part 821 (Snowmobiles) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) to require the SOS to order a person not to operate a snowmobile for one year if he or she has been convicted of reckless driving that causes the death of or serious injury to another person.

Senate Bill 1581 took effect on January 1, 2009. The remaining bills will take effect on October 31, 2010.

FISCAL IMPACT:

In general, the bills would not appear to have a significant fiscal impact on the state or local units of government. House Bill 6629 would have an indeterminate, but likely positive, fiscal impact on state and local government.

For Senate Bill 104 and House Bill 6630, the bills' fiscal impact on state and local justice systems would depend on how they affected numbers of misdemeanor and felony convictions and severity of sentences. Statute establishing the two-year misdemeanor of negligent homicide would be repealed, as would the provision for the two-year offense of felonious driving. New felonies associated with reckless driving causing death or serious impairment would be created, as would new misdemeanors for moving violations that caused death or serious impairment.

Changes in the number of felons sentenced to prison or probation would affect the Department of Corrections (MDOC). The average annual cost of prison incarceration is about $32,000 per prisoner, a figure that includes various fixed operational and administrative costs. Annual costs of parole and probation supervision (exclusive of any costs of electronic tether) average about $2,100 per supervised offender. Changes in the numbers of felons sentenced to jail would affect counties; those costs vary by county.


Generally, misdemeanor sanctions are a local responsibility; costs associated with increases in the number of misdemeanants sentenced to jail or misdemeanor probation supervision are borne by local units and vary with jurisdiction. Unlike other misdemeanors, however, two-year misdemeanors are subject to sentencing guidelines and offenders placed on probation for two-year misdemeanors are supervised by MDOC probation agents; counties can incur costs, however, if such offenders are sentenced to jail.

There are no data to indicate how many offenders might be affected by new misdemeanors and felonies to be created by the legislation. However, in 2007, there were 93 sentences for negligent homicide and 35 sentences for felonious driving. Of the 93 sentences for negligent homicide, 18 were to prison, 53 were to probation, 13 were to jail, and 9 were to some other sanction such as the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. Of the 35 sentences for felonious driving, 5 were prison, 24 were probation, 3 were jail, and 3 "other."

Any changes in collections of penal fine revenues could affect local libraries, which are the constitutionally-designated recipients of those revenues.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

These bills address concerns that the standards for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent homicide or felonious driving are ambiguous, leading to inconsistent enforcement and uncertainty among members of the public as to what the penalties for certain actions will be. Further, it has been recommended that driving offenses causing death or serious injury should carry higher penalties than exist currently, to discourage reckless behavior while operating a vehicle and to reduce the number of fatal or injurious accidents. Concerns have also been expressed that the language describing those two offenses is outmoded and should be replaced with updated language in the Vehicle Code that would be consistent with other provisions of that statute.

For additional information on Senate Bill 104, see the documents from the Senate Fiscal Agency (including the summary of the bill as enacted dated 6-29-09 and an earlier, more detailed explanation of the issue and of the Senate-passed version of the bill dated 8-5-08.)

Legislative Analyst: J. Hunault Fiscal Analyst: Ben Gielczyk

Margaret Alston Kevin Koorstra Marilyn Peterson

■ This analysis was prepared by nonpartisan House staff for use by House members in their deliberations, and does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.


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TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS: PENALTIES S.B. 104 (S-3): ANALYSIS AS PASSED BY THE SENATE [Please see the PDF version of this analysis, if available, to view this image.]

Senate Bill 104 (Substitute S-3 as passed by the Senate) Sponsor: Senator Valde Garcia Committee: Transportation

Date Completed: 8-5-08

RATIONALE

Reckless driving, which involves operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of people or property, is a misdemeanor under the Michigan Vehicle Code. Felonious driving under the Vehicle Code, and negligent homicide under the Michigan Penal Code, are similar violations that involve the serious injury or death of another person, respectively. Some are concerned that the standards for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent homicide or felonious driving are ambiguous, leading to inconsistent enforcement and uncertainty among members of the public as to what the penalties for certain actions will be. In addition, some have suggested that the language describing those two offenses is outmoded, and should be replaced with updated language in the Vehicle Code that would be consistent with other provisions of that statute. Further, it has been suggested that driving offenses causing death or serious injury should carry higher penalties than exist currently, to discourage reckless behavior while operating a vehicle and to reduce the number of fatal or injurious accidents.

CONTENT

The bill would amend the Michigan Vehicle Code to establish penalties for moving violations that seriously injured or killed another person, as follows:

-- A moving violation that caused serious impairment of a body function of another person would be a misdemeanor punishable by up to 93 days and/or $500. -- A moving violation that caused the death of another person would be a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both. -- Reckless driving that caused serious impairment of a body function of another person would be a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of at least $1,000 but not more than $5,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization. -- Reckless driving that caused the death of another person would be a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of at least $2,500 but not more than $10,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization.

Also, for the offenses described above, the bill would require the Secretary of State to do the following:

-- Suspend or revoke the offender's driver license. -- Assess a driver responsibility fee of $1,000 each year for two consecutive years. -- Record six points on the offender's driving record.

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In addition, for a moving violation resulting in an at-fault collision with another vehicle, a person, or any other object, the bill would increase the civil penalty from $100 to $125 and require the SOS to record four points.

The bill would repeal sections of the Vehicle Code and the Michigan Penal Code that prescribe penalties for felonious driving and negligent homicide, respectively.

The bill would take effect October 31, 2010, and is described in detail below.

Reckless Driving

Under the Michigan Vehicle Code, a person who drives a vehicle on a highway, parking area, frozen lake, stream or pond, or other place open to the public, in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of people or property is guilty of reckless driving, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to 93 days or a maximum fine of $500, or both.

Under the bill, if a person operated a vehicle in violation of this provision and by the operation of the vehicle caused serious impairment of a body function to another person, the violator would be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of not less than $1,000 or more than $5,000, or both.

If a person who operated a vehicle in violation of the reckless driving provision and by the operation of the vehicle caused the death of another person, the violator would be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of at least $2,500 but not more than $10,000, or both. In a prosecution under this provision, the jury could not be instructed regarding the crime of moving violation causing death.

In either case, the judgment of sentence could impose the sanction permitted under Section 625n of the Code. (Under that section, a sentence for certain violations may require the forfeiture of the vehicle if it is owned by the defendant, or the return of the vehicle to the lessor if the defendant leases the vehicle.) If the vehicle were not ordered forfeited, the court would have to order vehicle immobilization in the judgment of sentence.

In addition, the SOS would have to record six points on the person's driving record.

Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment

Under the bill, a person who committed a moving violation that caused the death of another person would be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both. A person who committed a moving violation that caused serious impairment of a body function to another person would be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to 93 days or a maximum fine of $500, or both.

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As used in these provisions, "moving violation" would mean an act or omission prohibited under the Code or a substantially corresponding local ordinance that occurred while a person was operating a motor vehicle, and for which the person was subject to a fine.

These provisions would not prohibit the person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law.

In addition, the SOS would have to record six points on the person's driving record.

Suspension & Revocation

The bill would require the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year upon receiving a record of the person's conviction for a moving violation that caused serious impairment of a body function to another person or the death of another person.

Currently, the SOS must suspend a person's license for one year for a violation of the reckless driving provision (Section 626 of the Code). The bill would retain that provision, although the SOS would have to revoke a person's license and deny issuance of a license to a person who had been convicted of reckless driving that caused serious impairment of a body function to another person or the death of another person.

Driver Responsibility Fee

The Code requires the SOS to assess a driver responsibility fee of $500 each year for two consecutive years for an individual who is found guilty of reckless driving. The bill would retain that provision but require the SOS to assess a driver responsibility fee of $1,000 each year for two consecutive years for reckless driving or a moving violation that caused the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person. (The $1,000 fee currently applies to negligent homicide, manslaughter, or a felony resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.)

Vehicle Immobilization; Prior Conviction

Under the Code, the court must order vehicle immobilization for a minimum of one and a maximum of three years for a conviction of certain violations related to driving while intoxicated, driving while visibly impaired, or driving after ingesting a Schedule 1 controlled substance, within 10 years after two or more prior convictions. The bill would remove the 10-year limit for the prior convictions, and would include as a "prior conviction" a conviction for reckless driving or a moving violation that caused the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person.

Such a conviction also would be considered a prior conviction in provisions concerning license suspension or revocation, and penalties for drunk driving offenses.

At-Fault Collision

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Under the Code, if a person admits responsibility for a civil infraction "with explanation", the judge or district court magistrate may order the person to pay a civil fine of up to $100 and court costs.

Under the bill, if the civil infraction were a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision with another vehicle, a person, or any other object, that fine would be increased by $25.

Also, for a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision with another vehicle, a person, or any other object, the SOS would have to record four points on the operator's driving record.

Chemical Testing

Under the bill, a person who was arrested for reckless driving or a moving violation that caused the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person would be considered to have given consent to chemical tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance in his or her blood or urine.

Currently, this applies to a person arrested for felonious driving or negligent homicide, terms the bill would replace.

Repeals

The bill would repeal Section 626c of the Vehicle Code, which provides that a person who operates a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, carelessly and heedlessly in willful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner that endangers or is likely to endanger any person or property, that results in the serious impairment of a body function of a person but does not cause death, is guilty of felonious driving punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

The bill also would repeal Sections 324 and 325 of the Michigan Penal Code. Section 324 establishes a penalty for negligent homicide. Under that section, any person who causes the death of another, by operation of a vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not willfully or wantonly, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

Under Section 325, the crime of negligent homicide must be deemed to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle, and in any case in which the defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the jury finds the defendant not guilty of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide.

MCL 257.303 et al.

ARGUMENTS (Please note: The arguments contained in this analysis originate from sources outside the Senate Fiscal Agency. The Senate Fiscal Agency neither supports nor opposes legislation.) Supporting Argument The current standard for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent

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homicide or felonious driving is ambiguous, based on whether the person operated the vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner. The language prescribing those offenses is antiquated and based on common law notions of negligence. Applying those concepts to criminal law creates some uncertainty about what constitutes a violation, leading to inconsistent enforcement of the law. For example, a driver who loses control of a car on an icy overpass and is involved in a fatal accident could have foreseen the possibility that the bridge might be icy, and therefore could be charged with negligent homicide, although most people would not consider that to be appropriate in such a case. The bill would remove that ambiguity, and instead enact prohibitions under which a person would not be guilty of a criminal offense unless a moving violation had occurred. This would reduce inconsistencies in the application of the law and clarify proscribed conduct.

The penalties under the bill also would be an increase over the current penalties for felonious driving and negligent homicide, which could deter drivers from driving recklessly. The current penalties are too low and do not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offenses. Injuries sustained in an automobile accident can have a life-changing impact on the injured party, while the person responsible for the accident might be subject only to a traffic citation. Motorcyclists in particular are at risk of serious injury or death in an accident, and although there have been various initiatives to alert drivers to motorcyclists, one effective way to reduce the incidence of accidents would be to make drivers aware that they could be subject to significant criminal penalties for a traffic violation that resulted in the serious injury or death of another person.

The penalties under the bill also would be consistent with the enhanced penalties for drivers who cause injury to or the death of a highway construction worker in a work zone or agricultural worker moving farm equipment on a highway, enacted under Public Acts 103 and 104 of 2001.

Legislative Analyst: Curtis Walker FISCAL IMPACT The bill would have an indeterminate fiscal impact on State and local government. Local units would incur the cost of misdemeanor probation and incarceration in local facilities, which vary by county. The State would incur the cost of felony probation at an average annual cost of $2,000, and the cost of incarceration in a State facility, at an average annual cost of $31,000. Penal fine revenue would benefit public libraries.

There would be minimal programming costs to update the Secretary of State's computer systems in order to code them for the violations in question. The bill could generate license reinstatement fee revenue. The $125 reinstatement fee remains within the Secretary of State's budget to be used at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

Fiscal Analyst: Joe Carrasco Lindsay Hollander

Analysis was prepared by nonpartisan Senate staff for use by the Senate in its deliberations and does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent. sb104/ 0708

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STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

PLAINTIFF, File No.: 15-0919-ST Hon. Thomas J. Phillips

ALYSSA MICHELE GOCH,

DEFENDANT.

PROOF OF SERVICE

KIT THOLEN (P76948) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 324 Court Street Traverse City, MI 49684 (231) 922-4600

JESSE L. WILLIAMS (P69264) Attorney for Defendant P.O. Box 30 Benzonia, MI 49616 (231) 929-8340

I certify that on the date below, I served a copy of PEOPLE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO MRE 402, via e-mail, upon Jesse L. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, at jlwdefenseggmail.com.

I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

November 12, 2015 Nancy E. S dlacek, Misd Legal Secretary Grand Traverse County Prosecutor's Office 324 Court Street Traverse City, MI 49684 (231) 922-4601

Motions - PA - IN LIMINE- 2015002683 - GOCH, ALYSSA MICHELE - 11-12-2015.pdf

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