3207525.4 (27624-1) UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION IN RE: ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, INC., et al. 1 , Debtors. ) ) ) Case No. 16-07207-JMC-7A ) ) Jointly Administered MOTION TO QUASH, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MODIFY RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS Come now C. David Brown II, Jerry M. Cohen, Joanna T. Lau, John F. Cozzi, Samuel L. Odle, Thomas I. Morgan and John Vincent Weber (collectively, “Former Directors”), by counsel, and for their Motion to Quash, or in the Alternative, Modify Rule 2004 Subpoenas (“Motion”), respectfully represent as follows: I. INTRODUCTION. 1. On September 16, 2016 (“Petition Date”), ITT Educational Services, Inc. (“ITT”) and its affiliates filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Deborah J. Caruso is the Chapter 7 Trustee in this jointly administered case (the “Trustee”). 2. The Former Directors were formerly members of ITT’s Board of Directors. 3. On May 15, 2017, the Trustee filed seven (7) Notices [Docket Nos. 1647-1653] indicating her intent to issue document production subpoenas to each of the Former Directors pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 (collectively, the “Rule 2004 Subpoenas”). 4. On May 22, 2017, the Trustee issued the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, and counsel for the Former Directors accepted service of such subpoenas on behalf of the Former Directors. 1 The debtors in these cases, along with the last four digits of their respective federal tax identification numbers, are ITT Educational Services, Inc. [1311]; ESI Service Corp. [2117]; and Daniel Webster College, Inc. [5980]. Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 1 of 19
156
Embed
MOTION TO QUASH, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MODIFY RULE …omnimgt.com/cmsvol2/pub_47137/631072_1793.pdf · In ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena, ... 117 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The Rule
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
3207525.4 (27624-1)
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
IN RE:
ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, INC., et al.1,
Debtors.
))) Case No. 16-07207-JMC-7A)) Jointly Administered
MOTION TO QUASH, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,MODIFY RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS
Come now C. David Brown II, Jerry M. Cohen, Joanna T. Lau, John F. Cozzi, Samuel L.
Odle, Thomas I. Morgan and John Vincent Weber (collectively, “Former Directors”), by
counsel, and for their Motion to Quash, or in the Alternative, Modify Rule 2004 Subpoenas
(“Motion”), respectfully represent as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION.
1. On September 16, 2016 (“Petition Date”), ITT Educational Services, Inc. (“ITT”)
and its affiliates filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Deborah J. Caruso is the Chapter 7 Trustee in this jointly administered case (the “Trustee”).
2. The Former Directors were formerly members of ITT’s Board of Directors.
3. On May 15, 2017, the Trustee filed seven (7) Notices [Docket Nos. 1647-1653]
indicating her intent to issue document production subpoenas to each of the Former Directors
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 (collectively, the “Rule 2004 Subpoenas”).
4. On May 22, 2017, the Trustee issued the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, and counsel for
the Former Directors accepted service of such subpoenas on behalf of the Former Directors.
1 The debtors in these cases, along with the last four digits of their respective federal taxidentification numbers, are ITT Educational Services, Inc. [1311]; ESI Service Corp. [2117]; andDaniel Webster College, Inc. [5980].
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 1 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 2
Objections to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas are due by June 5, 2017. Copies of the Rule 2004
Subpoenas are attached hereto as Group Exhibit A.
II. THE TRUSTEE HAS ASSERTED FORMAL CLAIMS AGAINST THEFORMER DIRECTORS FOR DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF $50 MILLION;
THEREFORE, THE RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS SHOULD BE QUASHED ANDTHE TRUSTEE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT ANY DISCOVERYUNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RATHER THAN
UNDER BANKRUPTCY RULE 2004.
5. The Trustee has delivered four demand letters to the Former Directors, describing
in detail the Trustee’s alleged claims for damages in excess of $50 million. The Trustee’s most
recent demand letter dated May 19, 2017 (3 days before the Rule 2004 Subpoenas were served)
acknowledges that she has
asserted formal claims for money damages against each of you former outside directorsof ITT… by my letters of October 11 and November 28, 2016, and my recent letters ofMarch 14 and March 20, 2017. As the direct result of wrongful acts you committed…money damages in excess of $50 million have been suffered by the bankruptcy estate.
(emphasis added).
6. The Trustee closes her May 19, 2017 letter with the warning that “[s]hould we be
unable to resolve the Trustee’s Claims, we will proceed with an adversary matter against you to
collect.” Copies of the Trustee’s May 19, 2017 letter, as well as the preceding letters from the
Trustee (collectively, the “Demand Letters”) are attached hereto as Group Exhibit B.
7. The Demand Letters speak for themselves and describe in detail the alleged facts
and circumstances that ostensibly support the Trustee’s claims against the Former Directors. The
last three Demand Letters (March 14, 2017, March 20, 2017 and May 19, 2017) conclude with
the statement that the Trustee is prepared to file an adversary proceeding against the Former
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 2 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 3
Directors should the parties be unable to resolve the Trustee’s claims for damages in excess of
$50 million.
8. Perhaps for tactical reasons, the Trustee has not yet filed a complaint against the
Former Directors; however, the Demand Letters leave no doubt that litigation is imminent.
Indeed, the Trustee states in her Demand Letters that she has already asserted “formal claims”
against the Former Directors.
9. Although discovery under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 is broad, it is not limitless.
Most courts recognize the “pending proceeding rule”, which provides that Rule 2004 cannot be
used as a substitute for the discovery rules located in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
in a pending adversary proceeding or contested matter. See, e.g., In re National Risk Assessment,
commenced, parties may not use liberal Bankruptcy Rule 2004 but must conduct discovery under
more restrictive Bankruptcy Rule 7026); In re 2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc., 223 B.R. 440, 455
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (collecting cases); In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 28
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he well-recognized rule is that once an adversary proceeding or
contested matter has been commenced, discovery is made pursuant to the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026
et seq. rather than by a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 examination.”). See also 2 Norton Bankr. L. &
Prac. 3d §35:1 (“The proper procedure is under Rule 7026 once a contested matter has been
commenced.”).
10. Admittedly, the Trustee has not yet filed a complaint against the Former
Directors. Nor has counsel for the Former Directors found a reported opinion applying the
“pending proceeding rule” to deny discovery under Rule 2004 where an adversary proceeding or
contested matter was not pending. Nevertheless, in this case the Trustee has made her intention
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 3 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 4
to file claims against the Former Directors so abundantly clear that the Court should apply the
“pending proceeding rule” to proscribe the Trustee from conducting discovery under Rule 2004.
11. This is not a situation where the Trustee seeks to properly use Rule 2004 to
discover possible assets and claims, prior to having made any decision to commence litigation;
rather, the Trustee has already asserted claims against the Former Directors by way of the
Demand Letters. For example, although the court in In Re Recoton Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 756
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) allowed the creditors’ committee to use Rule 2004 to obtain documents
from the debtor’s former directors, one of the decisive factors for the court was evidence that the
committee had not yet decided whether to pursue any litigation against the former directors. In
contrast, here, the Trustee has already decided to commence litigation and has explicitly advised
the Former Directors of as much.
12. Allowing the Trustee to proceed with discovery under Rule 2004 where litigation
is a foregone conclusion is an abuse of the discovery rules and places the Former Directors at an
unfair disadvantage. While the Trustee seeks to invoke Rule 2004 to gather documents to build
her case, the Former Directors are powerless to seek their own discovery to defend against the
inevitable onslaught of claims promised by the Trustee. Rule 2004 was not intended to provide
the Trustee a “head start” on litigation that has already been formally asserted, but not yet filed.
Furthermore, based on the Demand Letters, the Trustee no longer needs the aid of Rule 2004
because she has, apparently, already satisfied herself that claims exist against the Former
Directors. The Former Directors vigorously deny the Trustee’s claims, and they are entitled to
contest such claims on a level playing field where the same federal rules of discovery can be
utilized by both sides.
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 4 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 5
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD MODIFY THE RULE 2004SUBPOENAS TO ADDRESS THE OBJECTIONS DESCRIBED BELOW.
13. In ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena, a court is not limited to the remedy of
quashing a subpoena, but may also modify it to remove its objectionable features. Ghandi v.
Police Dept. of City of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The Rule 2004
Subpoenas are overly broad, unduly burdensome, have no date parameters, and contain other
substantial defects. If the Rule 2004 Subpoenas are not quashed altogether, they should be
modified consistent with the objections identified below.
14. When evaluating the burden imposed on nonparties in responding to a subpoena,
courts often consider the following factors: relevance, the requesting party’s need for the
documents, the breadth of the document request, and the time period covered by the request.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Veteran’s Support Org., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
The fact that a responding party is not a party to the action weighs against disclosure. Id. at
1310. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kirk’s Tire and Auto Servicenter of Haverstraw,
Inc., 211 F.R.D 658, 663 (D. Kan. 2003) (“the status of a person as a non-party is a factor that
weighs against disclosure”); Cohen v. City of New York, 255 F.R.D. 110, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“‘special weight [should be given] to the burden on non-parties of producing documents to
parties involved in litigation’”) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D.
111, 113 (D. Conn. 2005)).
A. The Rule 2004 Subpoenas are overly broad and burdensome, and lack anydate parameters.
15. The Demand Letters primarily contain allegations arising in 2016, the CUSO and
PEAKS Programs, and alleged demands for indemnification against the Former Directors for
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 5 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 6
specifically identified litigation. Despite the fact that the Trustee has founded her allegations on
specific acts or events, not one document request has a defined time period that correlates to the
acts or events of which the Trustee complains. The overbreadth and burdensomeness due to the
lack of time period is exacerbated by broad and generic requests for any documents relating to
ITT, ITT business affairs, finances, etc. See, e.g., Request No. 3 (seeking “[a]ny Documents and
Communications pertaining to any members of ITT’s Board or between You and anyone
employed by ITT”); Request No. 4 (seeking any communications about ITT or its financial
affairs); Request No. 7 (seeking all documents relating to “planned or anticipated use of funds”
for ITT); Request No. 8 (seeking all communications with the U.S. Dept. of Education).
16. The Rule 2004 Subpoenas should be limited to the time period from January 1,
2016 to the Petition Date of September 16, 2016. If the Trustee wants a different time period,
the Trustee should be made to demonstrate that a longer time period in a specific request
corresponds to a specific allegation in the Demand Letters. See, e.g., Chazin v. Liberman, 129
F.R.D. 97, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reducing the scope of subpoenas seeking documents “from 1980
to date” to 1987 to the date suit was filed when none of the allegations in the complaint predated
August 1987); Precourt v. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 280 F.R.D. 462, 466, (D.S.D. 2011)
(subpoena to nonparty food safety testing firm for a three year period prior to an E coli outbreak
was overly broad and, thus, was modified to two months prior to the outbreak). While the
Trustee’s failure to define an appropriate time period supports quashing the Rule 2004
Subpoenas altogether, at a minimum, the Court should modify the subpoenas to ensure the
requests relate to a relevant time period.
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 6 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 7
B. The Rule 2004 Subpoenas are unduly burdensome because they seek theproduction of documents that are likely in the Trustee’s possession.
17. Not only do the Rule 2004 Subpoenas lack any reasonable time period, the
requests largely seek documents generated during the daily business operations of ITT, which are
likely already in the possession of the Trustee. If the party seeking information from a nonparty
can obtain the information without burdening the nonparty, the court will quash the subpoena.
Precourt, 280 F.R.D. at 467. Particularly telling is the fact that only two of the twelve document
requests even include the Former Directors in the body of the request. Before the Former
Directors should be made to respond to any request, the Court should require the Trustee to
explain why the Former Directors should be required to go through the time consuming and
expensive process of locating documents that should be in the possession of ITT or the Trustee.
See Cohen, 255 F.R.D. at 122 (modifying a subpoena to exclude videotapes that were already in
the possession of the party serving the subpoena). The Trustee’s overreach in the Rule 2004
Subpoenas by seeking documents she should already have must be curtailed regardless of
whether the subpoenas are a legitimate effort to discover new claims or assets, or (more likely)
whether the Trustee is seeking to gain a litigation advantage by engaging in unilateral pre-suit
discovery.
C. Objections to Definitions.
18. The Former Directors object to the term “document” in definition no. 8 to the
extent it requires documents to be produced in native format including all metadata. Native
production precludes the Former Directors’ from bates-labeling the physical document (as
opposed to merely labeling the load file) to retain document control or redact portions of a
document for privilege or other reasons. In addition, native production results in the production
of hundreds or even thousands of fields of metadata associated with a particular file, nearly all of
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 7 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 8
which would have no relevance to the case and could be manipulated once produced. Finally,
production in native format may be impossible for email or large databases due to the manner in
which data is stored, requiring some form of conversion from native format to be extracted and
reviewed en masse.
19. The Former Directors object to the definition of “You” in definition 10 to include
the term “attorney” to the extent it is construed to mean that counsel for the Former Directors are
a party to the request or are participating in the response in any capacity other than counsel. In
addition, the Former Directors object to the inclusion of “attorneys” and “insurance company” to
the extent it is construed to mean that communications by or between the Former Directors and
its “attorneys” or “insurance company” should be included in responsive documents (i.e.,
Document Request No. 3). Such communications are privileged and will not be produced.
D. Objections to Instructions.
20. The Former Directors object to each instruction given the overbroad and unduly
burdensome nature of the requests.
21. The Former Directors object to instruction no. 18 requiring the Former Directors
to provide intricate detail about any document “destroyed, lost, discarded, or otherwise disposed
of.” Because the Trustee has provided no date parameters to narrow the document requests, the
Former Directors would be obligated to recreate documents that were destroyed in the ordinary
course years ago pursuant to document retention policies, automatic electronic destruction
policies, etc. The Trustee’s demands in this respect far exceed the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and binding authority concerning the scope of discovery.
22. The Former Directors object to instruction no. 19 to the extent that the Trustee
seeks to dictate what form a privilege log must take, and to the Trustee’s demands that the
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 8 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 9
Former Directors provide information that goes beyond what is necessary to determine what has
been withheld and why, which is the legal standard. See, e.g., Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No. 09 C
4530, 2009 WL 10628293, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2009).
23. The Former Directors object to instruction no. 20 in that the Trustee demands “a
copy of the computer or electronic tape, disc, or other electronic medium on which the
Document is stored, including all backups and archives of such computer database.” The
Trustee’s demand to take physical custody of the actual computer or other electronic medium (as
opposed to just the documents housed thereon) is patently unreasonable, unduly burdensome,
and goes far beyond the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or customary
discovery practice. If the Trustee can demonstrate a need for a mirror image of a hard drive or
other electronic medium, the Former Directors demand that the Trustee pay for any such mirror
image and reimburse the Former Directors for all legal fees and other costs associated with
removing extraneous and irrelevant data.
24. The Former Directors object to instruction no. 22 in that the Trustee demands
“original Documents; photocopies are not acceptable.” The Trustee’s demand is unreasonable,
unduly burdensome, and goes far beyond the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or reasonable discovery practice. True and accurate photocopies are exchanged every
day during discovery without objection. Indeed, photocopies are accepted and admissible in
federal court proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as
the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the
circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”). There is no basis for the Trustee to
demand a more stringent production protocol in pre-suit discovery than a federal court requires at
trial.
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 9 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 10
E. Document request no. 4 is not only overly broad and unduly burdensome,but appears to improperly seek the discovery of attorney-client privilegedcommunications.
25. The Trustee’s document request no. 4, as with all of the Trustee’s document
requests, is extraordinarily overbroad and unduly burdensome because it involves any document
that relates to ITT. In addition, the term “business affairs” is vague and undefined. The request
is also confusing because “Communications between” logically means communication between
x “and” y, but that modifier is not present.
26. Document request no. 4 could arguably be construed as requesting documents
between undersigned counsel and the Former Directors. To the extent this is in fact what the
Trustee intends, the requests improperly seek attorney-client privileged communications, which
are not available under FRCP 45 or any other discovery rule. Leve v. General Motors Corp., 43
F.R.D. 508, 510 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.1967). Although the Trustee has no basis to obtain privileged
communications, the very request creates an extreme burden on the Former Directors if they are
required to produce a costly privilege log. Undersigned counsel was hired by eleven Former
Directors to represent them soon after the Trustee sent the first demand letter on October 11,
2016. As of the date of filing this Motion, over a thousand emails alone have been generated
between undersigned counsel or between counsel and the eleven Former Directors that relate to
the issues in the Demand Letters.2 Because the Instructions state the requests are ongoing, the
Former Directors will be required to continuously update any privilege log, adding to the burden.
And all of this to log communications that are clearly sacrosanct and protected from disclosure.
27. To the extent the Former Directors are required to respond to the Rule 2004
Subpoenas in some form, the requests should be deemed to exclude attorney-client
2 Bose McKinney & Evans Chief Information Officer performed an analysis to determine thenumber of privileged emails that have already been generated.
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 10 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 11
communications after the Trustee sent her first demand letter on October 16, 2016. With respect
to any attorney-client privileged communication prior to October 16, the Former Directors
request that the issue be reserved until the Court rules on all aspects of this Motion. Indeed, the
Trustee’s insistence upon the production of an extensive privilege log is another factor that
warrants the quashing of the subpoena in its entirety. E.g. Great Am. Ins. Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d
at 1311 (the substantial burden of preparing a privilege log was a factor in court’s decision to
quash subpoenas). Moreover, if the Former Directors are required to produce a privilege log,
then the Trustee should pay for all attorneys’ and paralegal fees incurred in preparing such a log.
E.g. Precourt, 280 F.R.D. at 467 (“[T]he court … can shift the financial burden of retrieving the
information to the requesting party.”) (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller Federal
Practice and Procedures § 2459 (3d ed. 2008).3
F. The Rule 2004 Subpoenas do not allow a reasonable time for the productionof the requested documents.
28. Lastly, the current potential deadline to respond of June 6, 2017 is wholly
unreasonable given the number of Former Directors and the overbroad nature of the requests.
WHEREFORE, C. David Brown II, Jerry M. Cohen, Joanna T. Lau, John F. Cozzi,
Samuel L. Odle, Thomas I. Morgan and John Vincent Weber respectfully request that the Court
enter an order quashing the Trustee’s Rule 2004 Subpoenas or, in the alternative, modifying such
subpoenas consistent with the objections raised herein, and granting such other and further relief
as is just and proper.
3 If the Trustee claims a need for a privilege log for the time period after the Demand Letterswere issued, then presumably the Trustee will have no objection to logging all of her owncommunications with counsel that occurred at any point, including all communications thatoccur after an adversary proceeding is filed against the Former Directors.
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 11 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 12
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James P. MoloyGregory F. Hahn, Attorney No. 10547-49James P. Moloy, Attorney No. 10301-49V. Samuel Laurin III, Attorney No. 11607-53BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS LLP111 Monument Circle, Suite 2700Indianapolis, Indiana 46204(317) 684-5000(317) 684-5173 (FAX)[email protected]@[email protected]
Case 16-07207-JMC-7A Doc 1793 Filed 06/05/17 EOD 06/05/17 10:22:19 Pg 12 of 19
3207525.4 (27624-1) 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of June, 2017, a copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to the following parties through the Court's
Electronic Case Filing System. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.