Carl Schmitt on friends, enemies and the political (Andrew
Norris) Carl Schmitt on friends, enemiesand the politicalAndrew
NorrisIf the work that Carl Schmitt produced during the Weimar
Republic is of interest today, it is in large part because of his
insistence on the conceptual autonomy of the political. ike !annah
Arendt, Schmitt categorically distinguishes the political from the
economic, the technological, and the legal" and, like her, he also
critici#es liberalism for muddying and obscuring these
distinctions.$n%& As one might e'pect from an eminent (urist,
he places particular emphasis on the last ) the distinction between
the legal and the political. *he main lines of his argument are
clear enough+ the concept of law is defined by the criteria ofwhat
is and is not in accord with legal roles and norms" the concept of
thepolitical, by the criteria of friend and enemy. *he
identification of friend and enemy is an e'istential decision which
cannot be anticipated by law. ,oreo-er, the political is not simply
distinct from the legal but prior to it in that no system of norms
can be de-eloped or applied without a momentof decision that
e'ceeds the regulation of those norms. *hus the state as the
political actor cannot be reduced to a legal system, nor can what
legitimacy it has be deri-ed from law. .articularly in an emergency
or state of e'ception, a so-ereign /either0or1 decision must be
made, and this decision cannot be deri-ed or inferred from the
norms that obtain in the normal situation. 2ecause of the inherent
limitations of laws, rules, and norms, the political decision that
identifies friend and enemy must be made independently.*he main
complaint+ against this formulation is familiar enough+ Schmitt
allegedly emphasi#es the limitations of law only to glorify the
decision that e'ceeds the regulation of any law. Insofar as rights
are defined and guaranteed by law, Schmitt3s e'istential concept of
the political makes these rights -ulnerable to unregulated
political decision. *his is found to be all the more distressing,
since Schmitt stresses the decision3s role in the most e'treme
case, i.e., war, in the political identification of the e'istential
enemy. As he puts it+ /4nly the actual participants can correctly
recogni#e, understand, and (udge the concrete situation and settle
the e'treme case of conflict. 5ach participant is in a position to
(udge whether the ad-ersary intends to negate his opponent3s way of
life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preser-e
one3s own form of e'istence.1$n6& *he bellicose nihilism this
suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Schmitt3s own acti-e
participation in the Na#i mo-ement in the %789s. !is political
theory, it is alleged, is opportunistic,with only one consistent
commitment :to the irrational. *hus Richard Wolin claims that the
central roles played in Schmitt3s political theory by the political
decision and the threat of war are both moti-ated by a /-italism1
and a /politics of authenticity,1 with the aim of o-erturning
the-apid bourgeois order.$n8& *he result is a glorification of
-iolence.$n;& In the end, politics for Schmitt is a matter of
conflict and war, and the true criterion of the political is the
enemy. Who one3s political /friends1 are is determined only in the
encounter with the enemy, and they are -alued only insofar as they
allow for success in the resulting war. As ,artin needed to create
the solidarity of the homogeneous self.1$n?&*his reading of *he
Concept of the .olitical is unwarranted. While some might not be
surprised that Schmitt put his intellectual powers in the ser-ice
of the Na#i .arty when it came to power, although most of his
colleagues and students were shocked, it does not follow that
Schmitt3s concept of the political is itself necessarily
totalitarian.$n@& Schmitt3s attempt to characteri#e politics in
terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more
interesting than his critics suggest. In particular, his
pro-ocati-e formulations of the friend0enemy distinction should not
lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to a function of
war. Schmitt3s theoretical position reAuires a prior substanti-e
commitment to relations of /friendship1 and social solidarity. !is
accountof political authority, in particular, rests on an almost
!egelian understanding of the indi-idual3s relation to the
community and one3s own mortality. *he friend0enemy criterion
defines a particular form of life, one in which group identity is
-alued abo-e physical e'istence.$nB& *o properly understand
Schmitt3s work it must be considered not as a re(ection of an
established moral order but as a response to a culture of nihilism
in which meaning ) rather than -alue ) is ebbing away.*here are a
number of reasons to be wary of accepting the interpretation of
Schmitt as, in Alan ,egill3s phrase, /a prophet of e'tremity.1 *o
begin with, Schmitt is no 5rnst power o-er the physical life of men
=that> thepolitical community transcends all other associations
or societies.1$n69& Since the enemy is defined as a threat to
those relations of /friendship1 internal to the state, it follows
that the latter are not entirely a function of the e'ternal
relation to the enemy.$n6%& If Schmitt is at all coherent, then
Wolin must be wrong in claiming that Schmitt3s /e'istential
definition of politics in terms of the primacy of the friendGenemy
grouping necessitatesthe relinAuishing of all claims to the Hgood
life3 and instead to rest contentwith Hmere life3 ) namely,
e'istential selfGpreser-ation.1$n66& If an oftenintemperate
writer is also capable of subtlety, one might see Schmitt3s
dedication to *he Concept of the .olitical as a clue to this. It
reads /In memory of my friend, August Schaet# of ,unich, who fell
on August 6C, %7%B, in the assault on ,oncelul.1At this point,
howe-er, this may seem to be making e'tremely hea-y weather out of
a few turns of phrase. 2ut Schmitt e'plicitly states that+ /*he
politicalE does not describe its own substance, but only the
intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose
moti-es can be religious, national $in the ethnic or cultural
sense&, economic, or of another kind and can effect at
different times different coalitions and separations.1$n68& *he
plainest reading of this is as follows+ groups define themsel-es in
a -ariety of ways. *he conflicts that emerge between these -arious
groups are not political until they reach a certain le-el of
intensity ) until they pose a threat to the group3s e'istence. *he
so-ereign decision is then made whether or not to go to war in
order to resol-e the conflict, at which point the conflict becomes
political. What is distincti-ely political, then, is entirely a
matter of the conflict with the enemy" the relation with the friend
is only a prete't+ for this conflict. If the final step of this
interpretation were correctly taken, in-iew of Schmitt3s claim that
the political has an e'istential priority o-er all other forms of
association, Wolin would be Auite right to conclude thatSchmitt is
committed to the -iew that /all the energies of modern life stand
in the ser-ice of war.1$n6;& !ow then can Schmitt assure his
readers that /War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor e-en the
-ery content of politics1F$n6?&/In case of need,1 Schmitt
writes, /the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life.
Such a demand is in no way (ustifiable by the indi-idualism of
liberal thought.1$n6@& What does (ustify, such a demandFIn the
longer of the two passages (ust Auoted, Schmitt is wholly
unconcerned with the substance or moti-es of the association that
enters into the political conflict. Iet something connected to
these moti-es, which are said to ha-e no specifically political
substance, is strong enough to lead men and women to offer their
li-es for the group. ,ore, it is strong enough that men and women
ought to recogni#e as legitimate the /right1 of the state to
/demand1 their li-es. Di-en the political indifference of the
content of the group3s moti-es and beliefs, it can only be this
recognition itself that makes the group political. When one, for
whate-er reason, pri#e the integrity of one3s way of life o-er
one3s own li-es, then he has become political. *he threat to human
life does not make one political, but ser-es only as a reminder of
one3s commitment, ofthe fact that one3s way of life is -alued abo-e
one3s life. Compare, in this regard, the Auotation at the beginning
of this paragraph with Schmitt3s pre-iously cited claim+ /If
physical destruction of human life is not moti-ated by an
e'istential threat to one3s own way of life, then it cannot be
(ustified.1 *he decisi-e conflict is between political solidarity
and apolitical, liberal indi-idualism+ /*he negation of the
politicalE is inherent in e-ery consistent
indi-idualism.1$n6B&Indi-idualism is an understanding of human
freedom at home in a /modern economy,1 in which /a completely
irrational consumption conforms to a totally3 rationali#ed
production. A mar-elously rational mechanism ser-es one or another
demand, always with the same earnestness and precision, be it for a
silk purse or poison gas or anything whatsoe-er.1$n6C& In an
indi-idualistic society, /.ublic life is e'pected togo-ern itself.
It should be go-erned by public opinion, the opinion of pri-ate
indi-iduals. .ublic opinion, in mm, should be go-erned by a
pri-ately owned press. Nothing in this system is representati-e"
e-erything is a pri-ate matter.1$n67& Schmitt defines
/representation1 in 2urkean terms, as an indi-idual3s ability to
embody the body politic, and not to act as a mere functionary for
one3s constituents.$n89& Schmitt in turn identifies the body
politic with the constitution ) a collecti-e decision about the
nature of political unity and identity. Schmitt is criticalof legal
positi-ism, in part because a legal system cannot itself generate a
constitution, but must always act in the ser-ice of one. *he
essence of politics, for Schmitt, is a homogenous form of identity
that both allows for the transcendence of pri-ate, physical life
and opens the possibility of a particular form of -iolent
conflict.$n8%&Compare this interpretation with eo Strauss3s
reading of Schmitt+ Strauss concludes that, in the absence of an
independent moral affirmation of the political, /the affirmation of
the political is the affirmation of fighting as such, wholly
irrespecti-e of what is being fought for.1$n86& *his still
places too much emphasis on actual combat. As Schmitt put it+ /*he
political does not reside in the battle itselfE but in the mode of
beha-ior which is determined by this possibility.1$n88& *hat
mode of beha-ior is a solidarity that makes possible both
selfGsacrifice and political authority. In a passage often Auoted
by his detractors, Schmitt insists that /*he high points of
politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in
concrete clarity, recogni#ed as the enemy.1$n8;&
/Simultaneously,1 because such high points of politics are not
identical with the recognition of the enemy. It is not that groups
need to be constantly at war with one another to be
political,$n8?& but that the people belonging to them see war
and what it demands as a real possibility, i.e., that they are
reminded of their commitments, of their willingness to gi-e their
li-es when the so-ereign demands they do so. *he relation of friend
is not defined by the emergence of the enemy, but it is brought
into -iew in its true significance. *his should make it plain why
Schmitt suggests that a loss of meaning and significance attends
the eclipse of the political.$n8@& ife will lack meaning unless
it contains commitments cherished abo-e mere physical
e'istence.$n8B&,uch of the drama and the danger of Schmitt3s
work is a function of this attempt to use politics to counter
nihilism. *hough Schmitt3s polemical political theory sets itself
against the presuppositions of what he finds to be today3s
/indi-idualistically disintegrated society,1$n8C& he is hardly
a latterGday *ocAue-ille or a communitarian a la ,ichael Sandel.
Where *ocAue-ille contrasts indi-idualism with a public life of the
sort that (ury duty might encourage, Schmitt contrasts it with
solidarity in the face of the potential enemy.$n87& If
*ocAue-ille seeks to broaden personal interests and to temper /the
habits of the heart,1 Schmitt seeks to change the concept of who
one are.$n;9& .olitics pa-es the way for this in such a way
that. it makes sense to sacrifice one3s life, because of the
awareness that there will be some other form of sur-i-al. Where
Schmitt adds decisi-ely to the analysis of *ocAue-ille et. al. is
in his emphasis on authority $and hence commitment& and
mortality. Schmitt aligns himself with the Dreeks in his insistence
that politics be a response to the fragilityand futility of human
life. !e is hostile to indi-idualism., not simply because of his
authoritarian tendencies, but also because the form indi-idualism
has taken in contemporary society, manifest in the consumption of
images, pleasures, and commodities, is simply incapable of
addressing this issue.*his helps to understand the significance of
Schmitt3s almost cryptic note on !egel in *he Concept of the
.olitical. /!egel remains e-erywhere political in the decisi-e
sense.1 !e /also offers the first polemically political definition
of the bourgeois. *he bourgeois is an indi-idual who does not want
to lea-e the apolitical riskless pri-ate sphere.1 Jinally+ /!egel
hasE ad-anced a definition of the enemy which has in general been
e-aded by modern philosophers. *he enemy is negated
otherness.1$n;%& *he first two of these claims become clear in
light of an e'plication of the third. !egel argues that war is a
fundamental possibilityof political life, one that is actually
beneficial. It is a fundamental possibility, because the state is,
-isGaG-is other states, an indi-idual, /and indi-iduality
essentially implies negation. !ence e-en if a number of states make
themsel-es into a family, this group as an indi-idual must engender
an opposite and create an enemy.1$n;6& It is a beneficial one
because, by pro-iding the necessary conte't for martial courage,
war allows the indi-idual to transcend the limited perspecti-e of
his place in society+ /the important thing here is not personal
mettle but aligning oneself with the uni-ersal.1$n;8& As !egel
acknowledges, e-en /robbers and murderers bent on crime1 sometimes
demonstrate a willingness to risk their li-es. Such bra-ery has a
merely negati-e worth because /it is the negation of e'ternalities,
and their alienation, the culmination of courage, is not
intrinsically of a spiritual character.1$n;;& *hat is to say,
courage e-en in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips
away or /alienates1 the inessential baggage of life $e.gE the
obsession with property&. *his worth, howe-er, is only negati-e
because it is found in remo-ing or negating the inessential,
without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Kuite
different is patriotically moti-ated selfGsacrifice+ /*he intrinsic
=or positi-e> worth of courage as a disposition is to be found
in the genuine, absolute, final end, the so-ereignty of the
state.1$n;?&*he affinities between this position and Schmitt3s
are ob-ious.$n;@& 2ut where !egel3s commitment to the -iew that
reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual -irtuous
conduct of war, Schmitt ne-er praises war as such and remains
silent on the -alue of courage. Jor !egel, the modern state is the
highest form of ethical life, and the sacrifices it demands are
part of that life. *hus war /is not to be regarded as an absolute
e-il,1 as it itself contains an /ethical moment1+ courage.$n;B&
Jor Schmitt, war is essentially a political matter" as such, it is
as little ethical as it is e-il. /If there really are enemies in
the e'istential sense meant here, then it is (ustified, but only
politically, to repel them and, fight them physically. E or any
combination of other antitheses, not can it be traced to these.1
Jurther, /it would be senseless to wage war for purely religious,
purely moral, purely (uristic, or purely economic
moti-es.1$n??& 4n what, then, will the solidarity of the group
be basedF What do they ha-e in common if it is neither economic,
aesthetic, religious, or moralF *he answer is a shared identity,
the homogeneity of the group. !ence the only /sensible1
(ustification for waging war is the selfGdefense of the
group.$n?@& *he homogeneity that defines the group may well
ha-e its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral
-alues. 2ut politically this content is irrele-ant. *his would seem
to sAuash most public debate and deliberation. ,oral, economic and
e-en religious matters are things aboutwhich one can argue. 2ut
shared identity, if there is one, appears to be nothing more than a
fact. Indeed, it is not e-en that because this identity is so
formali#ed, so thoroughly drained of content, that is nothing more
than a shared commitment. ike the so-ereign decision, it is neither
a factnor a norm.$n?B&*his does not completely preclude
political deliberation. 2ecause solidarity is based on a shared
identity, there is little room for the multiplicity of perspecti-es
reAuired if debate is to emerge at all. 2ut there is still the
possibility to differ about the interpretation of political
identity. In a discussion of %BthGcentury theories of natural law,
Schmitt writes+ /.ublic order and security manifest themsel-es -ery
differently in reality, depending on whether a militaristic
bureaucracy, a selfGgo-erning body controlled by the spirit of
commercialism, or a radical party organi#ation decides when there
is order and security and when it is threatened.1$n?C& *his
suggests that there is no distinction between the regime and the
so-ereign. 2ut the basic point remains rele-ant+ different regimes
will be threatened by different things and in different ways, and
these threats will not be selfGe-ident. Consider the LS, which
today still has a slim claim to being /a selfGgo-erning body
controlled by the spirit of commercialism.1 *he men who led the
country into war against IraA could argue with at least some
plausibility that they were /defending1 the concrete way of life
characteri#ed in this way. 2ut it was ob-iously open to others to
deny this, and to claim that the /self go-erning1 and /commercial1
spirit in no way reAuired this war. Such a debate can be conducted
on at least two le-els. 4n the first, it is largely a matter ) in
this case ) of economics" on the second, it is a matter of whether3
something poses an /e'istential1 threat to a political entity that
merely happens to be guided by a /commercial1 spirit. 4n this
second le-el the debate would concern the interpretation of
identity and, as such, be a purely political one.Schmitt himself
demonstrates an easy confidence in his own ability to make the
reAuired distinctions+ /*o demand seriously of human beings that
they kill others and be prepared to die themsel-es so that trade
and industry may flourish for the sur-i-ors or that the purchasing
power of the grandchildren may grow is sinister and
cra#y.1$n?7& Such a remark might well be made in a debate o-er
/4peration Mesert Storm.1 !ere the claim might be that Americans
are committed to and united in a democratic freedom that has only
contingently been aligned with capitalism3s interests, and that
,iddleG5ast oil is not one of this polity3s -ital interests. .ut
this way, the reply is easy enough to imagine. 4n the face of it,
such a debate about the nature of shared identity and the focus of
mutual commitment would not seem to be in conflict with Schmitt3s
strictures. Nonetheless, he does not permit for political decisions
to in-ol-e public debate and deliberation, e-en of the minimal sort
his theory will allow. In his constitutional theory, the populace
is accorded the right to e-aluate the performance of the state only
in the form of acts of acclamation.*his limitation is a result of
Schmitt3s decisionism. Schmitt understands the political decision
as an alternati-e to the law ) one necessitated by the law3s own
limitations. *he rationality that characteri#es the normal
situation is, in his eyes, that of a norm or law go-erning that
situation. In its absence, there is no indication, in Schmitt3s
te'ts of the %769s, of any rational guidance whatsoe-er.$n@9&
*his is why Schmitt has no faith in public debate. If the only
rational guidance that can be found is that of a norm, and if that
will not apply in the case of an e'ception, it is plain that open
debate will ser-e no purpose but that of undermining authority.
Schmitt is Auite frank about this+ /*he decision becomes instantly
independent of argumentati-e substantiation and recei-es an
autonomous -alue.1$n@%& In the end /*he e'ception in
(urisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.1$n@6&*he
rele-ant point here is that this characteri#ation of the
irrationality or arationality of the political decision is not
necessarily connected with Schmitt3s characteri#ation of the nature
of political community. Schmitt3 s-ersion of identity politics is
largely deri-ed from his reading of Rousseau. As he emphasi#es
again and again, according to this model, democracy is not a matter
of popular participation, re-ocable consent, or liberal0
parliamentary institutions" instead, it is a Auestion of the
identity of the ruler and the ruled.$n@8& Such identity is not
at all irreconcilable with a form of dictatorship that denies to
the populace the right to debate political issues.$n@;& *his
much is clear in Rousseau3s own infamous references to the
possibility of forcing the citi#enry to be free when they
misunderstand their own $general& will. 2ut it does not
necessitate dictatorship. As *he Social Contract again makes clear,
a Rousseauian polity that rests on the homogeneity of the
commitments of its members is compatible with a -ariety of
political structures and institutions.$n@?&If the proper
interpretation of *he Concept of the .olitical has been established
here, this hardly neutrali#es Schmitt because, like !eidegger,
Schmitt did not always appreciate his own best insights. *he fact
that he put his theoretical system in the ser-ice of the Na#is
should draw attention to the disturbing, if conceptually necessary,
lack of content he gi-es the political form of life. ,any detect
antiGSemitism in Schmitt3s references to the political enemy as
/alien and E. of a different type.$n@@& 4thers disagree $though
Schmitt is blatantly and offensi-ely antiGSemitic in some of the
writings he produced under the Na#is&. 2ut there iscertainly no
reason why a political form of life could not re-ol-e around such
bigotry. Indeed, Schmitt3s own attempt to sta-e off nihilism is
clearly compatible with the nihilistic fren#y tearing apart regions
like the former Iugosla-ia, where ethnic solidarity is rife.No
doubt, this interpretation shifts the grounds of the debate on
Schmitt in an important way. *oo many of Schmitt3s critics take him
to task for warGmongering. If this were true, it would make him an
easy target. It is far more uncomfortable to recogni#e his close
relation to the currently fashionable identity politics. *he
assertion of identity need not follow from nor lead to a -iolent
conflict. Schmitt is Auite right when he insists that /=w>ar is
neither the aim nor the purpose nor e-en the content of politics.1
2ut it would be nai-e or disingenuous to maintain that a
politicsthat defines itself in terms of a shared identity did not
raise this and other dangers. As Schmitt rather chillingly puts it
/=M>emocracy reAuires Efirst homogeneity and second ) if need
arises ) elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.1$n@B&If
this suggests that the essentially Aristotelian0.latonic appeal to
the primacy of the political whole o-er the political part is
problematic, Schmitt3s work suggests similar limitations to the
appeal to the whole in terms of the indi-idual3s own life.
*hroughout his work, Schmitt is centrally concerned with
commitment. *o commit oneself to a political authority that can
then make decisions concerning one3s life and death is, in a sense,
an absolute commitment. It does not allow for the whimsical changes
of mind Schmitt associates with romanticism and aestheticism. 2ut,
in itself, this hardly seems to (ustify the close connection
Schmitt establishes between mortality, authority and meaning. If
the point is to gi-e meaning to .life and not, like Aristotle, to
ensure that death be kalos ) why bother with death at allF Surely
some other /absolute1 form of commitment is possible, say, marriage
without the possibility of di-orce, or the bearing of children whom
one will /absolutely1 refuse to abandon or disown. Schmitt3s utter
disregard of such banal alternati-es suggests that the commitment
reAuired in-ol-es a life in its entirety. Schmitt here appears to
be working on precisely the same principle that defines his concept
of the political the part finds meaning only in assuming its
rightful place within the whole.