Moral Particularism

The concerns raised by Moral Particularism demonstrate the inadequacy of any principled ethical theory.

In this essay I will provide an account of moral judgmentthat reconciles the apparent incongruity between two componentsusually included in ethical theories: generality andrelativity. In order to be effective in coping with elaboratemoral dilemmas, an ideal theory necessarily includessensitivity of judgment regarding the considerations relativeto any particular context. Often considered as equallyimportant are the roles of universally applicable generalisedprinciples that avoid excessive relativity. This essay providesan answer to the question regarding the extent to which weshould we include ethical generality into our understanding ofmorality. I argue that the generalised principles aredetrimental to the success of moral judgment; we shouldn’t relyon them in an ideal moral theory. Moral particularism is wellsummarized by the claim that what is most crucial to successfulmoral judgment is a sensitive attention to the particularfeatures relative to each individual case.1 To be a successfulmoral agent, one does not require a relevant set of trueprinciples and context specific judgments regarding particularfeatures take epistemic and methodological priority. Inopposition to this view are those who see the inclusion ofgeneralised principles as necessary, considering principles tobe the expression of true universalisable moral facts. I willinitially identify the type of ethical generality that Iconsider as objectionable. I will then propose a relativizedethical system, only requiring a certain type of ethicalgenerality that is far removed from traditional principles.

For the sake of clarity I have divided my discussion intotwo sections, each section discusses a different aspect ofethical thought over which one can be persuaded by theparticularist argument. 2 In the first section I will discuss

1 Dancy, J (2004)2 ‘Audi, R (2008)

only the methodological and ontological aspects of ethics. Iwill explain why I disagree with the commonly held non-cognitivist belief that certain identifiable naturalproperties, wherever instantiated, are linked consistently withmoral properties in a way that demands the inclusion ofprinciples. I will do this through comparing the moralpluralism of W.D. Ross and the similar beliefs propounded byhis later advocate Brad Hooker with Jonathan Dancy’s rivalexplanation. My main concern here is firstly whether Dancy iscorrect in his conviction that moral reasons functionholistically and secondly whether this revelation leaves nobetter alternative than moral particularism. I will concludethis section with my own thought experiment of a complexhypothetical moral dilemma that I believe reveals theshortcomings of any generalist conception of ethical judgment.

In the second section I will focus on the concerns ofmoral epistemology and the rationality of ethics. If an agentaccepts reason holism, how does this manifest itself as areliable means of ensuring right action when an agent onlyallows particular judgments to sculpt our moral knowledge? 3

One may be able to adequately negotiate moral decisions solelyusing particular judgments, yet still depend on law-likeprinciples to account for their justification and explanation.Dancy’s argument is ontological in character as it concerns thestructure of the moral domain, yet this has implications on thestructure of our knowledge of this domain. Dancy must show howthe particularist can have knowledge of action guiding moralrules without depending on generality. I will focus on theobjections raised by Taansjo and Crisp as well as discussingthe solutions offered by David Bakhurst. I will then return tomy own example used to conclude the first section, as I believeit presents a number of problems for any defender of the modelof ethical judgment as promoted by Ross. By providing anextensive analogy between the evaluative domains of aestheticsand ethics I will outline a suitable account of moral

3 Bakhurst, D (2000)

psychology that isn’t undermined by the problems raised.4 Iwill conclude this section by assessing and repairing the flawsin Dancy’s particularist epistemology as well as demonstratingits vital accomplishments. I will explain why I consider theseaccomplishments to demand we abandon all traditionalprinciples. We should adopt a particularist outlook as it themost accurate and practically useful way to incorporate ethicaltheory into everyday life, ensuring morally right action.

I will conclude by outlining a compensatory account ofparticularism, retaining its insights without condoning fullabstinence of all types of generality. In order for thisconclusion to avoid contradiction, I believe thegeneralizations that are indispensible to moral theory have afar more complex structure and are explanatorily distinct fromtraditional principles identifying duties and dictating what weought to do invariantly.5 I propose that ‘defeasible moralprinciple’ is the full extent to which an ethical systemrequires generality. Any moral principle that aims to make anexplicit and necessary connection between natural and moralproperties are those that constitutes a misleadingly structuredpicture of the moral domain. 6 Misleading insofar asprincipled theories cannot provide adequate action guidance dueto their inherent insensitivity to the open texture of themoral domain. They fail to emphasize the sensitivity ofjudgment that is most crucial moral thought and judgment.

Holism vs. Atomism in the theory of Reasons:

In this section I will discuss two opposing theories ofthe methodology required to conduct moral judgment. The purposeof ethical theory, it has been thought by some, is to provideus with a reliable and versatile strategy for locating whichnatural features are of moral relevance, how they form reasons

4 Garfield, J (2000)5 Lance, M and Little, M (2008)6 Little, M (2000)

for action and then how to respond to them in a correct andjustificatory manner. The particularist asserts that discerningthe particular natural properties relevant to each case is theonly way of determining their moral status. Conversely, thegeneralist believes we should use principles, as they are themost appropriate means of identifying natural properties thatare always morally relevant. The methodological discussionbecomes an analysis of how to establish the right course ofaction amongst competing yet seemingly equally valid moralreasons. The generalist contends our method should be a ‘trade-off’ between the general duties at play in each situation; weare obliged to act in accordance with the most pressing duty.This implies each principle must be recognizable in purelynatural terms. The overall moral status of an act is determinedby the competing principles, each of which always remains amoral reason in itself. 7 I will defend a particularistposition that states the true nature of moral reasoning to beholistic. This is a metaphysical thesis stating the particularnatural properties upon which moral properties supervene cannotbe helpfully made explicit in a principle.

I will also discuss the intimately related normativeconcerns. 2The ‘deontic valence’ of a set of natural propertiesshould be understood as whether it counts in favour of oragainst an action. I argue it is the particular features of anysituation that determine the valence of any consideration. Thisview is directly opposed to those who claim that general dutiesinvariantly retain their normative relevance. It is importantto recognise particularism to be asserting two separateconcerns: firstly, there is no means of neatly allocatingnatural properties that make an action accord with the relevantprinciple. Countless natural properties can be considered‘honest’. Secondly, the ‘valence’ of honesty, whether its‘being honest’ has a positive moral contribution to its moralstatus is also determined by its surrounding contextual naturalproperties, it does not do so invariantly. The natural

7 Dancy, J (1993)

properties which in case A, are that upon which ‘is honest’supervenes. These natural properties can appear in exactly thesame way in case B, yet because of additional naturalproperties present in this new case, fail to be ‘honest’ in away that contributes to a positive moral status, it can even bedetrimental to the acts moral status.

Dancy’s project of convincing us to abandon principlesfirst requires us to view moral reasons as functioningholistically rather than atomistically. I will assess theobjections to holism presented by non-cognitivist Brad Hookerin order to establish whether any natural properties do retaintheir normative basis atomistically. If successful then thiswill fatally wound the particularist position. 7 Therefore, ourinitial concern is whether Dancy is correct in his assertionthat the natural properties forming our moral reasons dependirreducibly on specific contextual natural properties and arecapable of variation in terms of their moral valence from caseto case.

Each situation, with which we are confronted, iscomprised of a multitude of potentially morally relevantnatural features forming important considerations. It is how weassess and respond to these features that is the point ofdeparture between the particularist and the pluralist. 6 Thegeneralist position suggests a belief in a structured moraldomain, allowing them to offer principles of the form ‘If Nthen M’ expressing law-like relations linking the instantiationof a natural property (N) to the necessary superveninginstantiation of moral property (M).8 W.D Ross consideredmorality to be structured by a plurality of principles, eachprinciple identifying a ‘prima facie’ duty (‘at first glance’).Each principle concerns a specific consideration reliablycounting either for or against an action. ‘Prima facie’ dutiesare usually expressed in the form of thick moral properties.Thick properties such as cruelty include a normative component

8 Ross, W.D (1930)

and invariantly contribute to an acts moral status. Conflictsoccur frequently between these duties and there isn’t one dutythat demands priority, this accounts for the demand for contextspecificity of moral judgment when choosing amongst principles.For Ross, this is the full extent to which he saw contextualrelativity as a necessary part of ethical judgement.9

Crucially, the moral valence of each natural feature identifiedin the principle is invariant; each consideration retains itsnormative weight despite it being potentially overridden by therelevance of others. Ross can admit to the exception of anyindividual principle if the demands of competing principlesoutweigh our duty not to lie, say lying will prevent the deathsof many; the act is still the worse for containing a lie. Anagent arrives at their ‘final duty’ by calculating the varyinginputs of each conflicting prima facie duty in a ‘trade-off’ inorder to establish which is most relevant.

6 Alternatively, particularists determine the moral‘valence’ or import of any feature through the complex networkof interrelating features instantiated by this specific set ofcircumstances. 10Blackburn described moral properties as‘shapeless’ in their connection to natural properties. There isno useful way of codifying, or providing principles for thevast number of natural properties upon which moral propertiescan potentially supervene. This complexity cannot be capturedin true and informative principles. We cannot use inductiveinferences from past experiences of natural propertiesinstantiating moral ones to reliably form moral reasonsrelevant to a new case. Both theories agree moral propertiessupervene on natural properties but the particularist deniesuniformity amongst these relations. Both theories requiresensitivity to the particular details of each case, forgeneralism still requires an agent to identify the variouscompeting reasons, expressed in ‘prima facie’ principles,present in this context. Particularism denies we need to take

9 Hooker, B (2000)10 Blackburn, S (1981)

the further step of abstracting beyond each particular instancein order to establish a consistent pattern between natural andmoral properties. All we require is that an agent is sensitiveto and able to discern the distinction between right and wrong.

I will compare Dancy’s particularism with the generalismintroduced by W.D Ross through the medium of his more recentadvocate Brad Hooker.7 I believe moral reasons, similarly topractical and theoretical reasons, function holistically asopposed to atomistically. Holism, when applied to moralreasons, may immediately cause alarm due to the dangerousconsequences this may have. Some natural properties seem to beinherently negative; lying and stealing intuitively seem toalways function as reasons to refrain from action. The moralstatus of each natural property is in each case determined byits contribution to a particular context. Therefore, even themost intuitively immoral natural properties are not necessarilygoing to count as a moral reason invariantly across allcontexts. What is even more concerning for the likes of Hookeris that those same features, in some contexts, will constitutea reason in favour of an action.

11 Brad Hooker considers certain natural properties,wherever instantiated as inherently right or wrong making. 12

Dancy is implored to demonstrate how there is no necessaryconnection between N ‘being a reason for’ M in one instance andN ‘always being a reason for’ M. His argument for holism claimsthe moral contribution of a natural feature to be determinedholistically by the whole set of natural properties specific tothis instance. 7 He defines the set of natural properties asone of the following: a contributory reason or an enabler, adisabler, an intensifier or an attenuator. In using thesedistinctions, Dancy is able to separate a reason from the restof the relevant natural properties that determine its moral

11 Hooker, B (2008)12 Vayrynen, P (2008)

status. It is this distinction I will later defend through useof my own example.

Imagine I have promised to meet my friend for dinner, onthe way I am flagged down by a woman whose husband has goneinto cardiac arrest and requires my assistance by driving himto the hospital. I will be unable to keep my promise if I do.Hooker sees our judgment to consist of two competing duties,keeping promises and to also benefit others. A conflict induties requires me to make an exception to at least one; I canonly override the negative valence of breaking a promise if Isee the demands of benefiting another to be my more pressingfinal duty. The generalist can admit of exceptions to anyindividual principle only for the sake of another. Despite theduty being outweighed if I choose to help the woman, thepromise retains some moral weight. In making a distinctionbetween a reason and other relevant conditions, Dancy is ableto explain why natural properties in one case can contribute tothe moral status of act whilst the same natural properties failto contribute, due to the addition of a disabling condition.

7 Dancy asserts ‘I promised’ is a contributory reason inthe initial case, before I was flagged down, but this isdetermined as such by the network of relevant naturalproperties affecting the normative force of this reason. It isthe other co-present features of this situation thatholistically determine the reason. For example when consideringthe initial reason as ‘I promised’, the enabling or disablingconditions for this reason are whether I was or was not coercedinto promising. An example of an intensifier would be it beingthe last chance to dine with them before they emigrate. Anattenuator would be that I am but one of fifty people invited.By separating reasons from enabling and disabling conditions,my initial reason loses all normative relevance due to thewoman more urgently requiring assistance. The importance of thenew reason is a disabling condition of the reason-giving forceof my initial promise. It is not the normative relevance of ‘I

promised’ being outweighed but disabled. The new reason is‘assisting those in need’; its enabling conditions are the factI own a car. A disabling condition would be not having enoughpetrol to reach the hospital. The intensifying condition ofthis new reason is the severity of this man’s situation. Thereason giving force any natural property is determined by thewhole complex set of relevant natural properties which arespecific to the context, making them impossible to capture inprinciples. Moral reasons function holistically because whatcounts as a reason in one context does not count in another.The consideration ‘I promised’ does function as a reason butnot in virtue of being subsumed by a principle stating keepingpromises is a consistently right- making natural property.

In order to be atomistic, thick concepts are used asprinciples in order to abstract away from particular judgments.They can only be of the highly abstracted nature such as ‘bejust’ or ‘be honest’ if one wants to claim reasons retain theirnormative weight atomistically. If ‘be kind’ is not the rightaction, say I am guarding a child-murdering prisoner, thisretains its valance but is outweighed by the demands ofjustice. It wouldn’t be just to tuck in the murder at night butit would be kind. 11 Hooker uses two strategies to explain whymoral reasons function atomistically. The first, as mentionedabove, is to create very abstract principles like ‘be just’.The second is to suggest principles contain within them animplicit list of subjunctive conditionals, by including theentire list then this principle will without exception. This ishow Hooker denies Dancy’s distinction between reasons,enablers, disablers etc. is really a distinction at all as heencompasses them as part of the true principle. The principleof fidelity or promise keeping contains within it conditionsfor its efficacy. The examples of conditionals he gives are: Iwasn’t forced into the promise, I wasn’t insane when I promisedetc.

6 The first objection stems from a biased attitudepreferring the methodology of the natural sciences and an over-estimation of the scope of the doctrine of supervenience. Everyprinciple requires it admit of exceptions. Every time anexception is identified by a counter example the principlistexplains this by expanding the range and complexity of thenatural properties upon which moral properties supervene. ‘Bejust’ may be atomistic in terms of its positive contributionbut this in no way identifies what we should find significantin terms of those natural properties upon which justicesupervenes. There may well be a small handful of exception-lesstrue principles, but they are useless in terms of providingadequate action as I’m only equipped with my intuition as towhat constitute justice. If I consider an act, in terms of itsnatural properties, to be a just action, it is true justice,being a right-making moral property, explains the moral statusof this act. I believe the natural properties, which in thisinstance make the action just, do not invariantly ground thismoral status. The way the moral status supervenes on thenatural properties is determined holistically by the context.Attempting to provide a list of true subjunctive conditionalsis to embark on a Sisyphean task, I will expand on this moreconclusively later when analogizing between ethics andaesthetics.

The duty of fidelity seems easier to capture in terms ofthe natural properties it identifies as inherently wrongmaking. For example, this principle can be understood in termsof natural properties such as intentionally misleading some ormaking promises without intending to keep them.6 True moralprinciples could possibly defy exception if one fixes them with‘ceteris paribus’ clauses (‘all things remaining constant’).The argument for atomistic moral reasons is strengthened if wethink of examples that isolate the natural propertiesconstitutive of a lie, change only this variable, and see if itaffects the overall moral status of an act. This aims toestablish the invariant normative valence of a lie by isolating

it and analysing the change in moral status this isolatedfeature causes. I consider this way of showing lying to have aninvariant normative valence to be unsatisfactory.

I will provide my own example which aims demonstrate whywe should accept the holistic nature of moral reasons in anumber of ways. Firstly, this dilemma aims to debunk thepractice of isolating individual natural properties from theiropen-textured background in the hope that altering thisproperty will indicate their invariant moral import. Itdemonstrates the inadequacy of ceterus paribus clauses, as onecan isolate and alter any one natural feature so it appears asthe inherently wrong making natural property. Secondly, I arguethe natural properties relevant to this moral dilemma are suchthat they cannot be subsumed under relevant ‘prima facie’principles. This is why I believe this example poses a problemfor the generalist position: if, as moral agents, they are onlysensitive to the moral relevance of natural propertiesidentified by principles, they may well disregard theimportance of other seemingly non-moral conditions if not‘prima facie’ in their apparent moral relevance. I will showthis insensitivity to be detrimental to moral judgment as thenatural properties being ignored are conditions crucial to themoral status of the act. This example aims to show that in thiscase, it is not that the negative contribution of a lie ispermissible only if it is outweighed by other more pressingduties. Instead it shows how the moral contribution of a lie isdetermined holistically by other natural properties that don’tappear as being obviously subsumed under a principle. Yet ifthese properties are altered, their variation demands we makean exception to the principle of honesty. Whether or not thelie is morally relevant depends not on the demands of anotherprinciple but instead on its particular contextual appearance:

Professor 1 has dedicated the majority of his life to thepursuit of solving theorem x. Theorem x, if solved willmassively improve our scientific understanding and will be

hugely beneficial to the scientific community. He and hisyounger assistant, professor 2 are the only two people deemedto possess both the intelligence and creativity required tosolve this abstract problem by the wider scientific community.Professor 1 has been attempting to solve the problem for farlonger than professor 2 and has only a year left before heretires. He calls a meeting with professor 2 to discuss howthey should plan to move forward with their research withouthim. Prior to this meeting Professor 1 spends an eveningcontemplating what to say in this meeting. He knows of thefollowing natural properties all of which are all relevant tohe will say in the meeting.

1). I cannot conceive of any avenue left unexplored inthe pursuit of solving Theorem x. Throughout my career Ibelieve I have explored all possible solutions of which I cancomprehend.

2). To my knowledge, this problem is unsolvable insofaras it would require someone of far greater intelligence even tothink of a possible way to solve it.

3). I believe Professor 2 is of far greater intelligencethan I ever was, there is every chance he could locate a newmeans of inquiry potentially solving theorem x

4). Having worked with professor 2, I know him to be veryinsecure about his own abilities and he thinks I am the onlyone capable of solving this issue.

5). The theory, if solved, will bring great joy toprofessor 2 as he will win a Nobel Prize as well as improvescientific understanding.

6). Despite having found no solution, my life as aprofessor has been stimulating and isn’t made overly negativeby the lack of solution.

The Professor wants the meeting to produce the bestpossible outcome for everyone. In light of all these facts wecan use a Ceterus Paribus clause to indicate the moral importof lying. All aforementioned facts remain constant, the

question concerns which facts ought he lie or be truthfulabout.

I will negotiate the problem by initially adopting theposition of a generalist before using particularism to seewhich theory is more successful. For the generalist, lyingabout all seven would be morally wrong, as I would be making anexception to the principle of honesty whilst also failing tomeet the demand of the benefitting others. But would completehonesty about all seven be the right moral decision? It couldbe argued that complete honesty is right as it avoids tellinghim a lie ending in years of fruitless research (6, despite mebeing honest, could potentially not apply to the professor 2).For the generalist, this problem presents a trade off,potentially solved by two actions. We are able admit anexception to the principle of fidelity only because it isoverridden by the benefit to others caused by the solution oftheorem x. The first generalist response is to be honest aboutall seven and hope for the best results, my own hands areclean, as I haven’t made any exceptions to the principle. Ibelieve honesty about all seven would not be right, because nomatter how much I try to convince him of my belief in 3, 5, and6, 4 being true, means theorem x will remain unsolved because Ichose to be honest about 1, 2. This poses no threat to thegeneralist as they can make an exception to the principle bylying about few facts as it will be of great benefit to all ifhe solves theorem x. I believe this way of analysing thesituation to be mistaken. I argue that lying about 1-4, whilstremaining honest about 5 and 6, is the morally right course ofaction. Crucially, lies such as these aren’t only permissiblewhen justified by more important duties: these lies are not ofthe type that is negative in valence.

The moral status of a lie is determined by the co-presentnatural properties (1-6) being held constant. The thick moralproperties of ‘benefiting others’ and being ‘honest’ areidentified as distinct from the other natural properties by the

generalist. How we are to ‘trade-off’ these duties requirescareful attention to the contextual features, yet the ceterusparibus clause is holding the content of these features asconstant. Therefore, the particularist and the generalist canagree, the moral status of this example, as a given context, isdetermined by changing the lied about facts in order to promotethe solution of theorem x. Yet this trade-off only seems to bean effective means of establishing a moral reason for thisunique particular context. This is why ceterus paribus clausesare misleading and cannot show the moral import of any isolatedvariable. The variable we are changing from honesty to a lieseems to show lying to be the wrong-making feature as it iscapable of dramatically altering the acts overall moral status.Any one of the natural properties, if varied in this manner,has the same effect as when honesty is changed to lie: themoral status of the lie as positive or negative is shown to bedetermined holistically by the whole set of context specificfacts. If we change the conditions of 3 to:

3b). I believe Professor 2 is of far less intelligencethan I ever was, there is no chance he could locate a newmeans of inquiry to solve theorem x.

If we change condition 3, keeping the rest constant, themoral status of being honest about all seven is now definitelynegative; we are required to make an exception to theprinciple of fidelity. The morally right action is to lieabout or withhold information concerning 3b, 5 and 6 yet behonest concerning 1, 2, and 4. Choosing the lie to be thevariable we alter presupposes its moral significance, theabove example of a generalist solution seems effective butonly if one constructs the context in a certain way. Inchanging 3, the generalist solution of complete honesty aboutall seven is no longer a possibility. In this adapted context,our sensitive attention of 3b now seems to be the crucial non-moral feature, not the lie, which is responsible for the actsmoral import. The generalist can now only justify the lie for

the sake of benefitting others. However, if I don’t believe heis of great enough intelligence to solve theorem x, there isno benefiting others, as he will not provide a solution byvirtue of which I can justify my exception to the principle offidelity. Yet we should still lie to professor 2 about 3b, 5and 6. The lie is wrong making initially but changes moralvalence when we change 3 to 3b. This should be understoodholistically, lying being wrong making is determined by thecomplex and contingent natural properties, theseinterrelations cannot be helpfully captured in any codifiablelaw. This shows the inadequacy of claims that suggest bykeeping everything constant, we can measure the normativeweight of lying by changing it as a variable. This examplehopefully shows how any natural property can be made to appearas if it were the moral property of crucial relevance. It alsoshows how the moral imports of natural variables aredetermined by the other natural properties and not by virtueof a principle.

The conditions identified in 3 can be also be describedas a right/wrong making feature of moral significance if itsvariation can dramatically alter the overall moral status ofthe act. I believe my example shows the complexity amongst thenatural properties morally relevant to a decision and how theyholistically determine our reasons. Moreover, there is no‘prima facie’ general principle to apply to 3 or 3b; itdoesn’t appear as intuitively morally relevant, yet it is aconsideration that calls for us to make an exception to theprinciple of fidelity. Any position similar to Ross’s cannotadequately negotiate my example, despite being able toinitially establish a clear trade-off, when we alter thevariables which are initially kept constant we can see howsuddenly the telling of lies becomes right-making. There is nogeneral principle to guide action concerning 3, yet is amorally significant natural property capable of demanding webreach our principle of fidelity. Exceptions to moralprinciples are not always due to their being outweighed by a

more prevalent duty as seemingly amoral natural facts can beof overriding moral relevance. Only through use of Dancy’sdistinctions between contributory reasons, enablers, etc. canwe understand the holistic formation of our moral reasons.

Dancy’s position can successfully negotiate the initialset of conditions as well as being able to adapt with thevariations amongst these conditions. Our contributory reasonin this example is ‘benefitting others by solving theorem x’.1, 2 and 4 are disabling conditions for this reason, 3 is anenabling condition, 5 is an intensifier and 6 is anattenuator. Understanding these natural features as suchexplains the great importance of 3; a lie should be deployedto preserve the enabling conditions. The disabling conditionsare the ones to lie about in order guide our action inaccordance with our reason. When 3 is changed to 3b, thischange determines a change in the whole set of conditions. Mycontributory reason now becomes ‘informing professor 2 of mypessimistic outlook without harming him’: 1 and 2 now becomeenabling conditions, 3b and 4 are now disabling conditions,whilst 5 and 6 are intensifiers which ought to be lied about,If I believe 3b then 5 and 6 will only serve to encourage himtoward a goal I believe to be unreachable, thus intensifyingthe potentially negative outcome. I have chosen a deliberatelycomplex and subtle example, as I believe it best reveals theshortcomings of a Rossian position. The valence of thecontribution made by lying is dependent on the context; givensome contextual backgrounds the ‘trade-off’ technique seemsapplicable, yet it remains insensitive to holistic nature ofthe moral domain as the differences can be subtle additionswhich are also defeating conditions. As we complicate thenatural conditions outlined in the example, the generalist wayof responding to them also becomes less and less satisfactory.The two situations only need to differ very subtly in orderfor the moral valence of any natural property to switch.

Epistemological Particularism: An analogy between Ethicsand Aesthetics

So far, I’ve demonstrated how one can holisticallydetermine reasons and moral judgment doesn’t require beingsubsumed under a relevant principle. The force of thisconclusion will be minimal unless Dancy can also provide aparticularist account of explanation, moral knowledge andjustification. 7 Dancy’s own account of explanation by‘resultance’ is unsatisfactory and quite rightly attractscriticism, he is ultimately wrong to claim there are no moralrules.13 Roger Crisp argues moral knowledge can only consistof knowledge of universal moral rules. He, like Hooker,believes the ontology of moral reasoning is governed byprinciples; therefore our moral knowledge must be structuredin a similar fashion. If morality is uncodifiable, no moraloutlook could plausibly be rational since rationality requiresconsistency. Crisp claims Wittgenstein’s rule-followingconsiderations to have no implication concerning which ethicaltheory to accept, I’ll argue it does. 14 Torbjorn Tannsjo’sdenies the internalist position cannot sufficiently define thestructure of moral justification. 3 The disposition prescribedby Dancy must include a subset of invariantly forbiddenactions; a constraint of certain acts such as ‘rape’ mustrequire some form principle. I will defend a particularistaccount of moral knowledge and justification; one can knowjustifiable and explanatory moral rules without the inclusionof principles.

15David Bakhurst combines the thoughts of virtue theoristMacIntyre with Dancy, providing the particularist with aplausible structure of moral justification in the form of acoherent self-narrative. We shouldn’t search for justification

13 Crisp, R. (2000)14 Torbjorn, T. (1995)15 MacIntyre, A. (1981)

in terms of objective moral facts acting as foundations uponwhich we justify moral knowledge. MacIntyre points out that inevery contextual moral dilemma, of the type we’ve beendiscussing, it’s not only a matter holistically determiningwhat I have reason to do, but also how my action reflects onthe type of agent I am. We can therefore justify any moraljudgment by providing a narrative, what natural properties Isaw to be of moral significance and why. Moral justificationcan only occur contingently in terms of being consistent withmy own past actions as well as the moral culture in which weare situated.

3 The importance of sensitivity of judgment emphasized byDancy must be understood as practical skill developed overtime; a disposition to discern what is the most virtuous wayto influence proceedings. The skill of being able to discernwhich particular natural properties are relevant toholistically determine a moral reason is analogous toaesthetic knowledge. Aesthetic judgments are capable ofswitching valence; natural properties in one instance can beconsidered as ugly, yet in another context actively contributeto the beauty of the work. If we consider the ‘The Snail’ byHenri Matisse, this work consists of cut out blocks ofcoloured paper loosely representing the helix of a shell. Atthe time, visual arts were considered as governed by rules ofsymmetry and exactness; art was dominated by accuraterepresentations. ‘The Snail’ defies these rules yet is still ajudged to be beautiful artwork, the audience of this work wereforced to revaluate the aesthetic valence of crude blocks ofcolour. Blocks of colour sharply contrast with his previousartworks as well as popular art of the time causing it beconsidered as a new category with its own aesthetic qualitiesdetermined by its location in the social and cultural contextof what qualifies as good art. If crude blocks of colourappeared in da Vinci’s ‘Virgin Of The Rocks’ they would bedetrimental to its beauty, but in this new context theycontribute to ‘The Snail’s beauty. I believe these

observations to assist Dancy’s position, as natural propertiesin both aesthetic and ethics, are capable variation invalence. When we recognise the aesthetic beauty of ‘The Snail’we do not suddenly consider our previous judgments of daVinci’s work to have been irrational. To deem something asmorally good is crucially similar to the psychologicaljudgment involved in deeming a painting as aesthetically good.In the same way our aesthetic judgments require an attentionto particulars, as opposed to applying rules of significantform, we should also attend the particular features withinethics, refraining from mechanically applying generalisedprinciples.

Through the analogy to aesthetics we can see how valenceswitching is entirely non-problematic. Therefore, I believethe case to be entirely similar for ethics, Dancy’s suggestionthat moral valence is capable of variation isn’t undermined asirrational. We only need to look at how judgments arerationally capable of switching valence in the domain ofaesthetics. The aesthetic analogy also extends to thejustification of our moral judgment through a narrative. If‘The Snail’ had been created in the seventeenth century therewould be no means of providing a justifying narrative as towhy this new artwork is has aesthetic worth. The narrative of‘why this is a good piece of art’ of can be criticised orpraised but must cohere the aesthetic knowledge absorbed fromour culture in terms of viable categories of artwork. If theart world hadn’t been focused on accurate representation thenthe justificatory narrative for why ‘The Snail’ is a goodartwork doesn’t exist. It is justified as being aestheticallyvaluable only by providing a narrative, the criteria ofassessing it requires it to be coherent in terms of all artpreceding it.

3 I believe the analogy to aesthetics shows why Tannsjo’sobjections no longer damage the strength of the particularistdoctrine. Similarly to aesthetics, in ethics we are able to

make rational judgments about natural properties that don’thave a consistent valence. In aesthetics, we are at no pointenticed into deeming this judgment or our contrary pastjudgments as irrational. We are able to justify and debate ouraesthetic judgments by means of a narrative. I argue we shouldconsider Dancy’s particularism similarly. The particularistcan have the wealth of background knowledge necessary to beable to discern moral reasons; he is also able to justifythose judgments. I will now analyse Dancy’s own unsatisfactoryaccount of explanation and justification by ‘resultance’. Thesolution to these criticisms can be found by utilising aWittgensteinian account epistemology.5 Dancy’s mistake is toclaim there aren’t any moral generalisations that play anindispensible epistemological role in moral judgment. His ownaccount of particularist epistemology suggests naturalproperties function as reasons when they stand in a ‘primitivemetaphysical relationship’ he calls ‘resultance’

On his account, moral knowledge is discerned from theparticular complex interrelation amongst the naturalproperties relevant to a specific case. Why is ‘The Snail’ ofaesthetic value? His ‘resultance’ seems to state we discernthis relation between the relevant natural properties and thebeauty of the work. It just pops out at us as a reason; A isreason for B as a result of discerning A and B. It seems ifthis is to play the epistemological role of a genuineexplanation it has to be generalizable to some degree. Notnecessarily of the type all A’s are reason for B’s, but thereis an important difference between one of infinitely manysubjective explanations and an one that genuinely explains Abeing the reason for B. Dancy cannot explain in an isolatedcase why dishonesty explains why it makes the act morallywrong. His ‘resultance’ seems to be just like stating it ‘itjust does’. ‘Resultance’ adequately accounts for one entirelysubjective reason yet; in the case of an artwork’s aestheticvalue it could be the result of any number of reasons. Theinterplay of light and dark colour, the varied brushstrokes or

the fact I’m not colour blind. In order to establish which, ofmany resulting reasons, are capable of playing theepistemological role of genuinely explaining its aestheticvalue. The solution to these criticisms can be found inutilising Wittgenstienian epistemology.

4 Principles articulating universal moral rules are not,as Crisp suggests, the solution to this problem. Moral rulescan rationally guide action without being considered as theconsistent application of a principle. Wittgenstein shows twodifferent ways a rule can be applied, ones with determinatecontent capable of mechanical application. Rules candetermine action in this sense but are far removed for theindeterminate structure of moral rules. In order todemonstrate the crucial implications of Wittgenstein’s rulefollowing considerations I will use an analogy between twotypes rule, both of which are able to adequately guide theaction of Premier League referees whilst being different intheir determinate content. The first type concerns thedisciplinary action taken in the occurrence of fouls andmisconduct. The second type of rule those rules entrusted untothe linesman. If Crisp believes Wittgenstein’s insights tohave no implication on the normative ethical theory we accept,he has to assimilate moral rules to the latter. I willdemonstrate how moral are in fact of the former type.

A red card is issued if a defending player commits a fouldenying an obvious goal scoring opportunity to an opponent.This rule seems to have determinate content; however, playershave been known, on occasion to score from inside their ownhalf. What is a goal scoring opportunity for a playerespecially adept at scoring from long range is different toanother more defensively orientated player. This rulecrucially requires sensitivity of judgment on behalf of thereferee; he must develop a disposition to discern whichparticular features are relevant to the rules application.Conversely, the rule of whether the ball crossed line is a

different type of rule it terms of its applicability. Thelinesman could well be replaced by technology. We can clearlysee how this type of rule is different in how they adequatelyguide the action of officials.

4 If we treat moral rules as the former type, attempting,as Hooker does, to provide a list of true subjunctiveconditionals would be to embark on a Sisyphean task. Such alist would be almost infinitely long. Conditions influencing agoal scoring opportunity would require the inclusion of thetechnically ability of each individual player, theirconstantly changing spatial locations etc. This list would inno way afford the referee with a better grasp of the rule, howto apply it and how to let it adequately guide his actions.One can gain full knowledge linesman rule without every havingwatched a football match whilst the other crucially depends onexperiencing particular instances of goal scoringopportunities in order to comprehend its counterfactualconditions. Both types of rule have seemingly determinatecontent yet require entirely different rule-followingconsiderations. A referee can rationally discriminate betweeninstances through similarity judgments in comparison to aparadigmatic instance. Rules of this type can be appliedrationally and respond to the complex open-textured domainthey are supposed to govern. Wittgenstein provides aparticularist epistemological structure of how moral rulesoperate successfully within ethical interaction withoutrequiring being subsumed under a universal rule; the epistemicpriority is of judgment of particular instances. Crisp’sconsistency is the same way consistency is established bylinesman. I argue this is dissimilar to how moral rules areknown and applied by moral agents.

Conclusion

In this essay I have provided an account of moraljudgment that reconciles the discordance between generalityand relativity. My answer to the question regarding the extentto which we should we include ethical generality into ourtheory is: minimally. Generalised principles are detrimentalto the success of moral judgment as they aren’t versatileenough to reliably negotiate the open textured moral domain.The type of ethical generality that I consider asobjectionable is that of W.D Ross. The ‘Two Professors’demands subtlety of judgment unavailable to the generalist,only using particularism can the seemingly amoral, yet crucialnatural properties be appropriately included in our reasoning.We should be particularists and utilise the distinctionbetween reasons and enabling conditions etc. to explain theexception-ridden nature of our generalised principles far moreconvincingly than suggesting exceptions are solely permittedby other overriding duties.

5 Despite this success he ultimately strays into error byfailing to provide an account for the important epistemologicalrole of genuine explanation.5 Defeasible principles have adistinct epistemological role. They allow of exceptions in away that is preferable to the ‘trade-off’ between generalduties that can only outweigh each other. We conceive of aparadigmatic example, understood as the ‘privilegedconditions’. I argue that this is the full extent to which weare required to include generality in an ideal ethical system.It is through deviation away from the paradigm or itsprivileged conditions that allows us to make exceptions to anydefeasible principle. This provides the only type of generalitythat is appropriately sensitive the holistic structure of themoral domain. I believe it is a fundamental mistake try to baseethics on rationality, as defined by Crisp, Hooker and Ross,abstracting from our intuition about cases and universalizingthem will make us insensitive to what is most crucial toethical judgment. Unlike ethics derived as from principles ofpure reason or a plurality of principles, particularism forces

responsibility upon our decision-making ability and us asagents.

As well as beneficial insofar as it encourages ethicalresponsibility, it also strikes me as a theoretically anddescriptively accurate as to the nature of moral judgment.6Some reasons, like the reason not to murder another, seeminvariant due to the likely scenarios anybody in our societyencounter, meaning the privilege conditions are robustly inplace. We shouldn’t let this imply, like it did for Ross, law-like morality. The culture we live in is unavoidablycontingent, if for some awful reason we reverted back to aviolent state of nature of the type be or be killed, theprivileged conditions for this reason and its seeminginvariance would sadly diminish. The generalism that promotesinvariant valence is misleading and should be replacedpredominantly by a relativized particularist understanding.

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