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MONITORING OF RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:TRENDS AND CHALLENGES OF
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
No. 14(116) September 2020
1. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (AUGUST 15–30, 2020) Abramov A.,
Kosyrev A., Radygin A., Chernova M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. IMPROVING THE INSTITUTION FOR PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER
RIGHTS TO RAISE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION FIGHT AMID
COVID-19 Levashenko А., Koval А. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN H1 2020: REDUCTION OF THE TRADE
TURNOVER DURING THE PANDEMIC Knobel A., Firanchuk A. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Monitoring has been written by experts of Gaidar Institute for
Economic Policy (Gaidar Institute), Russian Presidential Academy of
National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).
Editorial board: Sergey Drobyshevsky, Vladimir Mau, and Sergey
Sinelnikov-Murylev.
Editors: Vladimir Gurevich and Andrei Kolesnikov.
Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook: trends and challenges
of socio-economic development. 2020. No. 14(116). September.
Edited by: V. Gurevich, S. Drobyshevsky, A. Kolesnikov, V. Mau and
S. Sinelnikov-Murylev; Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy,
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public
Administration. 22 p. URL:
http://www.iep.ru/files/text/crisis_monitoring/2020_14-116_Sept_eng.pdf
The reference to this publication is mandatory if you intend to
use this material in whole or in part.
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Abramov A., Candidate of Economic Sciences, Director of the
Center for Institutions Analysis and Financial Markets, IAES,
RANEPA;Kosyrev A., junior researcher, Center for Institutions
Analysis and Financial Markets, IAES, RANEPA;Radygin A., Doctor of
Economic Sciences, Professor, Head of the Center for Institutional
Development, Ownership and Corporate Governance, Gaidar Institute;
Director of the IAES, RANEPA; Director of the Institute of
Economics, Mathematics and Information Technology, RANEPA;Chernova
M., researcher, Center for Institutions Analysis and Financial
Markets, IAES, RANEPA
During the two weeks from August 15 to August 30, 2020, the
global and national stock and bond markets generally remained
stable, while the stock indexes continued their post-crisis
recovery. The business media switched over their focus of attention
to the discussion of the recovery rates being demonstrated by the
world’s top economies, the changes in the US monetary policies
(MP), and government debt growth. The pre-vailing point of view has
been that the USA and the other developed economies have so far
failed to display a V-shaped recovery trajectory.Although, in
August, the price of oil and the RTS Index continued to gradually
recover, the month-end rates for August 2020 of the ruble weakening
and the Index’s decline relative to their year-beginning values
placed these indices among the topmost losers in the group of
economies included in our review.
News and opinions over the two weeks 1. According to data
released by the IMF, as the WSJ pointed out, debt in the
developed economies rose, in July 2020, to 128% of world GDP
[1]. In 1946, it stood at 124% of GDP. Glenn Hubbard, who chaired
the Council of Economic Ad-visers under US President George W.
Bush, and now is Dean Emeritus at Columbia Business School,
believes that at the present moment, governments should not worry
about their rising debt, focusing instead on battling the
coronavirus pan-demic.
After World War II, the advanced economies quickly reduced their
debt largely due to their rapid economic growth. By 1959, the debt
to GDP ratio shrank by more than half, to less than 50%. This time,
it will probably be much more diffi-cult to resolve the debt
crisis, for reasons that have to do with demographics and
technologies. Besides, the public debt situation currently faced by
the developed countries (128% of GDP) differs from the WWII period
in that most of those coun-tries in the future are unlikely to rely
on high rates of economic growth.
In the present situation, low interest rates and the effects of
quantitative easing, alongside a strengthening business
monopolization, are facilitating the recovery process, but they are
fraught with low economic growth and low total factor productivity.
Therefore this time, the task of coping with the high public debt
problem will become very tricky for the developed countries. They
will pro-bably be compelled to employ some new means in the form of
tax hikes, cuts on government spending, allocation of the resources
of central banks to finance
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government debts, etc. It can be recalled, for example, that
shortly after WWII, the US FRS kept its key rates low for several
years, only because it wanted to facilitate the financing of budget
expenditures through the issuance of govern-ment securities.
2. At the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s annual Jackson
Hole policy symposium on August 27, 2020, Jerome H. Powell, the
chair of the Federal Reserve, officially announced the bank’s
monetary policy adjustment [1]. In his statement it is emphasized
that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) remains firmly
committed to fulfilling its previous mandate from the US Congress
of promoting maximum employment, stable prices and moderate
long-term interest rates [2].
The FOMC aims at making its decisions regarding monetary policy
as clear as possible to the public. This clarity will sustain
households and businesses in their well-founded decision-making,
reduce economic and financial uncertainty, and make monetary policy
more effective, as well as improve its transparency and
accountability.
As far as the maximum employment objective is concerned, the
Federal Re-serve chair noted that it depended mainly
on nonmonetary factors that strongly influence the structure
and dynamics of the labor market. For that reason, it is not
directly measurable and changes over time. Therefore, the Federal
Reserve removed from its monetary policy framework the median
natural rate of unem-ployment estimate of 4.4% and announced that
its policy decision would be in-formed by assessments of
the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level
rather than by deviations from it.
The FOMC confirmed that the main inflation-targeting goal in the
framework of its monetary policy was to achieve the 2% longer-run
objective. However from now on, instead of preventive measures
designed to maintain the specified 2% inflation rate, it would seek
to achieve inflation that averages 2% over time, at the same time
not officially tying itself to a particular mathematical formula
defining the period for measuring the inflation average and the
band for its de-viation therefrom. Later on the same day, President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Robert Kaplan explained that
annual inflation could vary from 2.25% to 2.5% [3], but this was
not an official figure recorded in the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy framework.
Meanwhile, the current monetary policy statement has been
augmented by a provision stipulating that ‘sustainably achieving
maximum employment and price stability depends on a stable
financial system. Therefore, the Committee’s policy decisions
reflect its longer-run goals, (…) including risks to the financial
system.’
These changes in the monetary policy make it possible to keep
the federal funds rate at a low level, without it being affected by
a rising inflation. In addi-tion, the FRS secures its function of
safeguarding the financial system sustain-ability through the
mechanisms of effective lower bound on interest rates and
quantitative easing.
Another new point is the FOMC’s promise of a thorough public
review of its monetary policy strategy, tools and communication
practices roughly every 5 years.
Given the available historical data series for the past 30
years, the task of pursuing an average inflation target set at 2%
per annum is by no means a dif-ficult one. According to the WSJ
[4], the core inflation average over the period
1 URL: https://www.youtube.com/user/KansasCityFed.
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from July 2009 to July 2020 was 1.6%; from January 1993 to March
2001, it stood at 2.1%; and from December 2001 to November 2007, at
1.9% per annum. The inflation peaks over the period 1993–2020 were
observed in May 1993 at 2.9%, in February 2012 at 2.1%, and in June
2018 at 2.1%. The current situation in the US economy is unique in
that the very low core inflation of 0.9% per annum in July occurred
alongside a high unemployment rate of 10.2%.
3. After Mr. Powell announced on August 27 a major monetary
policy shift, the yield on US government bonds increased,
reflecting a slight decrease in the demand for them [5]. By the end
of the trading session on August 27, the yield on the benchmark
10-year U.S. Treasury note had climbed to 0.744%, from 0.686% at
the previous day’s close. However, this reaction appeared moderate,
because in the statement of the Fed chair the market heard two
mutually contradictory messages. On the one hand, the FRS was going
to keep its rates low for a long time to come, while on the other,
it did not commit to buying more longer-term Treasury debt. Adding
more uncertainty for investors on the market, the officials were
vague about the methods of calculating the inflation average and
the per-missible deviations of actual inflation from its 2% average
objective.
After Mr. Powell’s announcement, the yield curve for government
bonds be-gan to change [6]. Alongside small changes in short-term
rates, long-term yields began to rise sharply (Fig. 1). The relaxed
control over inflation and its average objective set at 2% pushed
up the market risk premium. As of August 28, the spread between
30-year bonds and 5-year bonds increased to 121 b.p. vs
100 b.p. as of 24 August.
4. The author of an article in MarketWatch wonders how the
long-term low interest rate policy of the FRS is going to affect
the retirement savings of Ameri-can citizens [3]. The main takeaway
is that the new monetary policy impact on retirement savings could
be negative, because low Fed rates translate into low bond
yields.
According to Eric Walters, managing partner and founder of
Summit Hill Wealth, many retirement planners would need to review
their plans for retire-ment using lower return assumptions. He
explained that many annuity savings plans rely on average
historical rates of returns, which could be between 4% and 5% for
intermediate bonds. ‘Using these assumptions now for
a retirement plan could be disastrous when
actual interest rates for 10-year Treasury bonds
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2 years 5 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
Fig. 1. The US government bond spreads in 2020, %
Source: Bloomberg.
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are 0.74%’. Low rates could affect pension buyout offers
and single premium an-nuities, which could be locked into
permanently low rates. Investors may turn to stocks to compensate
for their bond interest loss, said Michelle Buonincontri, a
financial adviser with ‘Being Mindful in Divorce’. She emphasized
that ‘this po-tentially motivates a greater commitment to stock
market instruments and the associated risks for investors.’
5. The speed of economic recovery in the USA can actually
strongly impact the outcome of the presidential election in that
country. In this sense, an interesting article by H. Torrey
appeared in the WSJ on August 28. The author argued that US
consumer spending rose more slowly in July and for some time in
August [7].
She wrote that US consumers indeed boosted their spending in
July, but more slowly than in prior months, as new coronavirus
infections rose and the e xpiration of enhanced unemployment checks
loomed. Personal consumption expenditure of households, after
having dived in March and April by 6.7% and 12.9% on the previous
month, respectively, thereafter began to climb again by 8.6% in May
and 6.2% in June. However, in July its growth amounted to only
1.9%.
Economists believe that over the coming months, after the
federal additional weekly unemployment benefits of $600 expire on
July 31, the growth rate of consumer spending could slow down even
further. The negotiations between Democrats in Congress and
representatives of the White House stalled over dis-agreements over
the size of unemployment benefits and the amount of funding under
the relief package for states and cities.
On August 8, President Donald Trump signed an executive order
for distribut-ing an additional $300 in weekly unemployment
benefits from the federal bud-get, and urged states to pay an
additional $100 per week. The US Department of Labor estimates that
those states that join the program would need three weeks on
average to transfer these funds.
On August 28, the University of Michigan reported that its
consumer senti-ment index for the current month climbed to 74.1,
which was only slightly up from July’s 72.5 score.
6. Renowned for the accuracy of his forecasts, including the
prediction of the 2008 crisis, economist Nouriel Roubini, professor
of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business,
said that ‘the European system of greater social cohesion gives you
better economic outcomes than the one of the United States that is
just Wild West capitalism. That’s why the unemployment rate barely
went up in Germany or even in Italy, while in the US we’ve had
double-digit unemployment rate and actually even worse, considering
underemploy-ment and so on’ [8]. Roubini also noted that the
V-shaped bounce ‘is becoming a U, and the U could become a W if we
don’t find a vaccine and don’t have enough stimulus.’
7. According to Rob Arnott, another respected economist, the
founder and chairman of the board of Research Affiliates – a global
asset manager [9], the world’s major economies are at risk of
making bigger mistakes than those made during the financial crisis.
‘The big issues are the lockdowns, and the resulting trillions in
fiscal and monetary stimulus, fueling asset bubbles. The lockdown
has inflicted a human toll that dwarfs the damage of the virus,’ he
said.’ When asked whether the global economy was at risk of
repeating mistakes of the 2008 financial crisis, Arnott went on to
say as follows: ‘No, it’s much worse than that.’ Arnott then warned
against heavily relying on the concept of Modern Monetary Theory,
the idea that countries that issue their own currencies can never
run out of money in the same way a business or person can. ‘We’ve
already embraced
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MMT on steroids,’ he said. ‘If we don’t step back and take a
fresh look, the conse-quences of this spending binge and money
printing will be devastating.’
8. The concentration of issuers on the US stock market is
growing: the move-ment patterns of its main indices are shaped by
the top five technology compa-nies, whose combined share in the
total market cap of the S&P 500 is about 25%. In this
connection, on August 20, Apple Inc. reached $2 trillion market
cap, and by August 28 it further jumped to $2.14 trillion.
Previously, such a high market concentration index had been
observed only in the 1960s, but at that time the biggest companies
represented a variety of industries: technology (IBM),
tele-communications (AT&T), automotive industry (General
Motors), the oil industry (Exxon), and ‘other’ (Kodak). The
coronavirus pandemic only increased the exist-ing gap between tech
companies and the rest of the stock market, as the popula-tion
during the quarantine began to increasingly rely on social
networks, online cinemas, and so on. Besides, against the backdrop
of falling interest rates, tech stocks became the most popular
alternative for investors, and so they will suffer most in case of
their growth, thus dragging along the entire stock market [10]. As
far as the rising interest rates are concerned, their growth may be
caused both by the spread of faith among investors in a speedy
economic recovery and by the Fed’s policy (as it happened on August
27). In August, the usually positive correla-tion between bond and
stock yields switched over to negative values, with a par-ticularly
strong inverse correlation between the movement patterns of the
yields on 10-year government bonds and those on tech stocks (Fig.
2); this phenomenon increases investor risks in a situation where
the latter dominate the market, and the market is becoming
increasingly dependent on government relief measures.
9. The period of rising gold prices is not yet over, and the
precious metal still has some potential for increasing its
investment value because real interest rates are staying at a low
level, according to PIMCO’s experts (Pacific Invest-ment Management
Co) (Fig. 3) [11]. The experts believe that gold remains
at-tractive and even cheap. In August, the price of gold hit its
record high, jumping above $2 000 per ounce as investors
sought alternatives amid the coronavirus pandemic, while central
banks launched their unprecedented monetary stimulus measures. Real
yields on 10-year Treasury bonds dived below zero, thus
strength-ening the investment attractiveness of gold and boosting
the cash inflows into
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Technology companies and yields on 10-year government bonds
S&P 500 and yields on 10-year government bonds
Fig. 2. The correlation, over the last 20 trading days, between
the yields on 10-year government bonds and technology-sector and
S&P 500 stocks, 2020
Source: own calculation based on data released by Bloomberg.
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gold-backed exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Goldman Sachs Group
Inc. also ex-pects an increase in gold prices: its updated forecast
for the next 12 months indicates a gold price surge to $2 300 per
ounce [12].
10. The value of US stocks relative to US output has hit its
historic high, exceeding even its level shortly before the dot-com
crisis, and so the sustain-ability of that growth is doubtful (Fig.
4) [13]. The combined market cap of the Wilshire 5000 Index stood
at $36.8 trillion on August 26. This amounts to 190% of US GDP,
which was $19.4 trillion in Q2 2020. The previous record high of
167% was reached in March 2000. In December 2001, before the onset
of the dot-com crisis, Warren Buffett said in an interview that ‘if
the percentage relationship falls to the 70% or 80% area, buying
stocks is likely to work very well for you. If the ratio approaches
200% (…), you are playing with fire.’ [14] The current closeness of
the ratio to this mark may mean that in the future, the yield on
shares may become significantly lower than in the previous 10
years. One of the reasons for such a sharp rise in stocks was the
extremely low yield on sovereign bonds.
11. In spite of the complicated trade relations between the USA
and China, the US biggest financial companies retain a strong
interest in developing their businesses in China. The WSJ reports
[15] that the largest US investment man-
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Gold, USD per ounce Real yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds
Fig. 3. The price of gold in USD and the real yield on 10-year
US Treasury bonds, p.p., 2019–2020.
Source: Bloomberg.
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
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180
200
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Fig. 4. The Wilshire 5000 Total Market Full Cap Index to nominal
US GDP ratio, %, 1970–2020
Source: Bloomberg.
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agement company BlackRock Inc. received a regulatory approval
from China to launch its mutual fund business in that country. This
allows BlackRock to become one of the first (if not the very first)
foreign investment firms to start indepen-dently managing money for
Chinese individuals. This year, Chinese regulators have allowed
foreign asset managers to apply for mutual fund licenses, thus
abolishing limits on foreign ownership of fund management
companies. Neuber-ger Berman and Fidelity International have filed
similar applications.
In recent years, Larry Fink and other CEOs of BlackRock have
made China their business development priority. In an attempt to
expand its activities in China, the global investment management
corporation held talks with various poten-tial partners. The China
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission recently paved the way
for BlackRock to establish a joint venture with China Construction
Bank Corp. and Singapore-based Temasek Holdings. ‘I continue to
firmly believe China will be one of the biggest opportunities for
BlackRock over the long term, both for asset managers and
investors, despite the uncertainty and decoupling of global systems
we’re seeing today,’ Fink wrote in an email to the company’s
shareholders earlier this year.
Traditional asset managers in China are projected to manage
about 90 tril-lion yuan (about $13 trillion) in assets by 2023,
according to consulting firm Oliver Wyman. The Asset Management
Association of China reported that as of July 2020, there were more
than 140 Chinese mutual-fund managers, oversee-ing more than
17 trillion yuan in assets.
Vanguard Group, another big asset management company in the USA,
also recently announced its extensive development plans in mainland
China [16]. Al-though Vanguard has been reducing its presence in
the Asian markets, China remains its major priority. In 2018,
Vanguard closed its Singapore office, and is currently shutting
down its businesses in Japan and Hong Kong. On August 26, the
company announced that it would leave Hong Kong, where its
operation ‘primarily serves institutional clients, and not the
individual investors that are our primary strategic focus.’ ‘Our
future focus in Asia is on Mainland China and our primary office in
Asia will be in Shanghai,’ a Vanguard spokeswoman said in an
email.
Vanguard has set up a joint venture with Ant Financial Services
Group, China’s most valuable technology startup, and since this
year’s beginning it has been providing investment advice to the
hundreds of millions of Chinese consumers who use Alipay, a popular
mobile app that Ant owns. For a small fee, the company helps its
users to create investment portfolios by choosing from thousands of
mutual funds managed by various asset managers and listed on the
Ant platform. Within 100 days after the project launch in April
2020, about 200 000 users in-vested a total of 2.2bn yuan ($319mn),
Ant said in a statement.
The experience of China’s interaction with the world’s largest
asset managers in localizing their services for private investors
in its domestic market is an effec-tive model that could be of
interest to any large developing country.
The crisis indicators in the Russian financial marketOver the
period from August 16 to August 28, the oil price growth amounted
to 0.4 p.p. As of August 28, the average monthly price of Brent
crude reached 66.8% of its December 2019 level (Fig. 5).
Between August 15 and August 29, the USD-to-ruble exchange rate
plunged from 73.22 to 74.64. Over the period from December 2019 to
August 28, the ruble plunged by 20.6% overall (Fig. 6).
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41.732.3 27.4
66.8
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25
Peak
= 1
00%
Months 1998 2008 2014 2020
Note. The average monthly price of Brent for August 2020 is
calculated relative to the period August 1–28, 2020.Fig. 5.
The average monthly movement of the price of Brent crude oil
relative to its peaks of December 1996 (prior to the 1998 crisis),
July 2008, June 2014, and December 2019, as % (peak value =
100%)
Source: own calculation based on data released by Thomson Reuter
and Finam (URL:
https://www.finam.ru/profile/tovary/brent/?market=24).
396.8
150.5
205.0
120.6
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Peak
= 1
00%
Months
1998 2008 2014 2020
Note. The USD-to-ruble exchange rate in August 2020, as of
August 16, 2020.Fig. 6. The average monthly movement of the
USD-to-ruble exchange rate relative to its peaks of May 1998, May
2008, July 2014, and December 2019, as % (peak value = 100%)
Source: own calculations based on data released by the Bank of
Russia.
8.721.8
51.1
81.7
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Peak
= 1
00%
Months
1998 2008 2014 2020
Note. RTS Index in August 2020, as of August 16, 2020.Fig. 7.
The average monthly movement of the RTS Index relative to its peaks
of July 1997 (prior to the 1998 crisis), May 2008, February 2014,
and December 2019, as % (peak value = 100%)
Source: own calculations based on data released by the Moscow
Exchange.
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Over the past two weeks, there has been a slight drop in the RTS
Index. As of August 28, its value was 81.7% relative to its
December 2019 level; this is 3.8 p.p. below its value as of August
16 (Fig. 7).
World stock quotes and forex ratesAs before, the highest growth
has been demonstrated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite
Index, which gained 33.8% since year-beginning (2.16 p.p. from
August 1 to August 28). The deepest plunge occurred in the stock
exchang-es of Cyprus and Greece (since the beginning of the year,
their indexes lost 30.2% and 30.8%, respectively).
Table 1
The movement of national stock exchange indexes in 2020,
%Growth
Over 2020 Over August 2020 China – Shenzhen Stock Exchange 33.8
2.16USA – NASDAQ (composite index) 30.3 8.84Denmark – Copenhagen
Stock Exchange (KAX) 12.2 2.54China – Shanghai Stock Exchange 11.6
2.83Argentina – Buenos Aires Exchange (MerVal) 11.3 -5.80USA –
S&P 500 Index 8.6 7.24Republic of Korea – Korea Exchange
(KOSPI) 7.1 4.64Finland – Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMXH) 2.3
6.79USA – Dow Jones 0.4 8.42Sweden – Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMX)
0.3 4.05Canada – Toronto Exchange (TSE 300) -1.5 3.37Germany –
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (DAX) -1.6 5.85South Africa – Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (All Share) -1.8 0.60Russia – Moscow Exchange
(IMOEX) -2.2 2.36Japan – Tokyo Stock Exchange (Nikkei 225) -3.3
5.40Turkey – Borsa İstanbul (ISE – 100) -3.8 -2.34Malaysia –
Malaysian Stock Exchange (KLSE) -4.0 -4.90Switzerland – Swiss
Exchange (SIX) -4.3 1.58India – Indian Exchange (NIFTY) -4.3
5.18Portugal – Lisbon Stock Exchange (Euronext) -5.5
0.90Netherlands – Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX–25) -7.9
2.11Australia – Australian Exchange (AS30) -8.0 3.34Poland – Warsaw
Stock Exchange (WIG) -9.7 3.51Hong Kong – Hong Kong Exchange (Hang
Seng) -9.8 3.36Norway – Oslo Stock Exchange (OBX) -10.1 4.03Brazil
– Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) -11.7 -0.75Mexico – Mexican
Exchange (IPC) -13.2 2.09Belgium – Brussels Stock Exchange (BEL –
20) -14.6 3.21Italy – Italian Stock Exchange (FTSEMIB) -15.6
3.92Thailand – Thailand Exchange (SET) -16.2 -0.39France – Paris
Bourse (CAC 40) -16.3 4.58Chile – Santiago Stock Exchange (IPSA)
-17.0 -3.57Russia – Moscow Exchange (RTS) -18.3 2.53UK – London
Stock Exchange (FTSE 100) -20.9 1.12Singapore – Singapore Exchange
(Straits) -21.2 0.39Hungary – Budapest Stock Exchange (BUX) -24.4
0.43Philippines – Philippine Exchange (PSE Comp) -24.7 -0.75Spain –
Madrid Stock Exchange (Ibex 35) -25.3 3.72Cyprus – Cyprus Exchange
(CSE) -30.2 -2.26Greece – Athens Exchange (ATHEX) -30.8 2.73
Note. Quotes as of July 30, 2020.
Source: Stock exchange indexes are denominated in national
currencies (except the RTS Index) – Bloomberg.
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As seen by the period-end results for the first 8 months of
2020, an increas-ing number of currencies are strengthening against
the US dollar. The highest growth indices since the beginning of
the year to August 28, 2020 have been observed for the Swedish
krona and the Swiss franc (8.6% and 7%, respectively). The euro
likewise continues to strengthen, having gained 6.2% from the
begin-ning of the year. Over the same period, the US dollar
(Bloomberg index) has con-tinued to decline, having lost 2% as of
August 28. The deepest plunge since the beginning of the year has
been observed with regard to the Argentine peso and Brazilian real
(19.2% and 25.4%, respectively).
Table 2
The movement of national currencies against the US dollar in
2020, %Growth
Over 2020 Over August 2020 Swedish krona 8.6 1.8
Swiss franc 7.0 1.0
Euro 6.2 1.1
Bulgarian lev 6.1 1.0
Philippine peso 4.7 1.5
Japanese yen 3.1 0.5
Polish zloty 2.9 1.7
CNY 1.4 1.6
British pound sterling 0.7 2.0
Vietnamese dong 0.0 0.0
Norwegian krone -0.2 3.5
Kuwaiti dinar -0.8 0.1
Hungarian forint -0.9 -1.8
US dollar (Bloomberg Index) -2.0 -1.5
South Korean won -2.1 1.1
Indian rupee -2.8 2.3
Chilean peso -3.4 -2.8
Thai baht -4.4 0.5
Indonesian rupee -4.6 1.3
Kazakhstani tenge -7.7 0.0
Mexican peso -13.0 2.4
Ukrainian hryvnia -13.3 1.1
South African rand -15.6 2.9
Russian ruble -16.3 0.1
Turkish lira -18.9 -4.9
Argentine peso -19.2 -2.2
Brazilian real -25.4 -3.1
Note. Exchange rates of national currencies, as of August 28,
2020.
Source: Bloomberg.
* * *For two weeks – from August 15 to August 30, 2020 – the
global and national
stock and bond markets generally remained stable, and the
post-crisis recovery of stock indexes followed its course. The
prevailing point of view has been that the USA and other developed
countries are not yet displaying a V-shaped reco-very
trajectory.
In the USA, there have been signs of a significant slowdown in
the pace of consumer demand recovery, as well as inconsistencies in
the measures under-
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taken by the authorities to extend the anti-crisis relief
packages for businesses and households. Fears have been growing
over the US stock market bubble.
In spite of the troubled trade relations between the USA and
China, major US investment management companies are confidently
expanding their presence in mainland China’s financial market. For
its part, China is steadily increasing its openness.
As of the end of August 2020, the ruble depreciation rate and
the RTS Index decline remain significant relative to their
year-beginning levels. Over the last two weeks of August, the ruble
continued to weaken in absence of any obvious fundamental factors
that could provide an explanation for this phenomenon.
References1. Zumbrun Josh. Coronavirus Lifts Government Debt to
WWII Levels-Cut-
ting It Won’t Be Easy // The Wall Street Journal on-line. 2020.
Aug. 23. 2. Guide to changes in the Statement on Longer-Run Goals
and Monetary
Policy Strategy // FRS. 2020. URL:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/mon-etarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communica-tions-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm.
3. Malito Alessandra. What the Federal Reserve inflation policy
means for your retirement savings // The MarketWatch on-line. 2020.
Aug. 28.
4. Timiraos Nick. Fed Weighs Abandoning Pre-Emptive Rate Moves
to Curb Inflation // The Wall Street Journal on-line. 2020. Aug.
2.
5. Goldfarb Sam and Pellejero Sebastian. U.S. Government Bond
Yields Rise After Fed Policy Shift // The Wall Street Journal
on-line. 2020. Aug. 27.
6. Greifeld K., Hajric V. Stocks Hit Highs, Bonds Tumble After
Powell Pivot // Bloomberg. 2020. Aug. 27.
7. Torry Harriet. U.S. Consumer Spending Rose More Slowly in
July // The Wall Street Journal on-line. 2020. Aug. 28.
8. Langlois Shawn. ‘Dr. Doom’ says Europe is better positioned
for economic recovery than the U.S. and its ‘Wild West capitalism’
// The MarketWatch on-line. 2020. Aug. 24.
9. Chopra Shruti. Rob Arnott: We’re making worse mistakes than
the 2008 financial crisis // Financial News on-line. 2020. Aug.
28.
10. Mackintosh J. In This Tech Market, Beware Rising Bond Yields
// Wall Street Journal. 2020. Aug. 24.
11. Pimco Hails Gold in Low-Yield World, Saying Metal Is ‘Cheap’
// Bloom-berg News. 2020. Aug. 25.
12. Mazneva E., Pakiam R. Goldman Raises Gold, Silver Targets;
Sees Bullion at $2,300 // Bloomberg. 2020. Aug. 28.
13. Ram V. Forget the Dotcom Bubble. This Time It’s Even Bigger:
Macro View // Bloomberg. 2020. Aug. 28.
14. Buffett W., Loomis C. (2001). Warren Buffett On The Stock
Market // For-tune magazine. 2001. Dec. 10. URL:
https://archive.fortune.com/maga-zines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/12/10/314691/index.htm.
15. Lim Dawn and Xie Stella Yifan. BlackRock Gets Go-Ahead for a
Mutual-Fund Business in China // The Wall Street Journal on-line.
2020. Aug. 29.
16. Xie Stella Yifan. Vanguard Scales Back in Asia. 2020. Aug.
26.
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2. IMPROVING THE INSTITUTION FOR PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER
RIGHTS TO RAISE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION FIGHT AMID
COVID-19Levashenko А., Senior researcher, Head of RANEPA
Russia-OECD Center; Koval А., Junior researcher, Expert, RANEPA
Russia-OECD Center
The institution for protection of whistleblower rights plays a
key role in the effective-ness of systemic anti-corruption flight.
The pandemic made the issue of protection of whistleblowers,
disclosing facts of corruption and other wrongful acts, even more
evident.
OECD recommendations and the situation in member-countriesThe
institution for protection of whistleblowers rights plays a key
role in the effectiveness of systemic anti-corruption fight. Over
40% of corruption cases are detected due to whistleblower reports;
this percentage can be increased by effective protection of
whistleblowers. The COVID-19 pandemic made the issue of
whistleblower protection, i.e. those disclosing information about
corruption and other wrongful acts, even more evident.
Preliminary research evaluation by Shengjie Lai, Nick
W.Ruktanonchai, Li-angcai Zhou et al.1, published in Nature, prove
that number of infections in China could have been reduced to 95%
if restrictive and easing measures of impacts (testing, social
distancing, travel restrictions) have been implemented earlier. As
governments take action to contain the pandemic, there are reports
of attempts to silence those health workers and journalists wishing
to warn on existing dangers. If these early warnings have been
answered and whistleblow-ers protected, it would allow resisting
the spread of the viral infection more effectively.
In response to the pandemic, the governments, international
organizations, companies and non-profit organizations (NPOs) have
launched massive, urgent funding for measures to contain the
coronavirus. Given the urgency of such measures, transparency and
accountability standards are not always fully implemented,
undoubtedly leading to the growth of corruption risks.
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is
already preparing reports on corruption related to the pandemic.
Thus, for instance, among them is the waste of EU research funds in
Greece, and winning the public procurement tender for supply of
equipment to combat COVID-19 in Slovenia by a company having no
experience in the healthcare sphere, etc. Governor’s chief of staff
in the Saratov region resigned voluntarily after the prosecutor’s
office started checking the purchase of disposable non-sterile face
masks at Rb 425 a piece by regional authorities. Such examples
in Russia are far from being isolated.
1 URL:
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2293-x#citeas.
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The global health and economic crisis caused by the COVID-19
pandemic has demonstrated the importance of the whistleblower
institution as a key mecha-nism for early detection and remedy of
defaults. Whistleblowers are often the first to discover corruption
and fraud. For example, healthcare employees re-porting medical
developments that could be used for unlawful purposes, or facts of
theft or embezzlement in healthcare institutions; government
officials reporting fraud or waste in healthcare procurement;
company employees re-porting bribery aimed at obtaining lucrative
deals in medical supplies or equip-ment, etc.
Organized criminal groups and corrupted government officials
often find new opportunities to consolidate illicit wealth and
power during a pandemic. At the same time, existing corruption and
crime makes it much more difficult for governments to respond to
the COVID-19 threat1.
The most advanced current laws for protection of whistleblowers
allow them to report directly to the general public or the media
about cases presenting health or safety hazards for the population.
However, there is a relative legal vacuum at both international and
national levels when it comes to whistleblowe r protection
standards. The first detailed, legally binding document governing
whistleblowers protection was the EU Directive on Whistleblower
Protection, 2019. The Directive applies to a wide range of areas,
including the health sector.
The directive imposes the obligation on member states to
introduce into their legislation the requirements binding legal
entities to set up channels and procedures for internal reporting
in private and public sectors. The require-ments to set up a
reporting channel apply to private companies with more than 50
employees.
In accordance with the directive, any form of reprisal against
whistleblowers is prohibited, including dismissal, demotion or
refusal to promote, changing jobs, reducing wages, changing working
hours, applying any disciplinary action or other punishment,
including financial, coercion, intimidation, discrimination, early
termination of a temporary employment contract, harm, including
per-son’s reputation, especially in social media, early termination
of a contract for provision of goods or services, revocation of a
license or permit, etc.
The directive has been included in the national legislation of
EU member states. For example, a law on protection of
whistleblowers has been in force in Latvia for a year. The law
provides for setting up the channels for protection of
whistleblowers in private and public sector. A website has been set
up for filing applications online.
In the year the law was in force, over 400 applications have
been received in the public sector. According to OECD experts, the
Directive could change the situation in Europe, as it involves
large-scale reforms aimed to facilitate filing of applications by
whistleblowers.
There are other international initiatives highlighting the
importance of whis-tleblower protection striving to effectively
fight against corruption: the 2019 G20 High Level Principles for
Effective Protection of Whistleblowers and the OECD Recommendation
on State Integrity, appealing to countries to maintain a
transparent corporate culture in the public sector, including
through reliable whistleblower protection mechanisms.
Protection of whistleblowers is a priority isubject that the
OECD intends to address in the course of revision of the 2019
Anti-Bribery Recommendation. This
1 URL: https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/.
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Recommendation is a key OECD tool adopted to develop the
Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
exercising international business transac-tions by further
strengthening the anti-bribery campaign in foreign countries.
Situation in RussiaRussia is a full party to the Convention,
however, not many key provisions of this international treaty have
been implemented into national legislation, which significantly
complicates Russia’s transition to the next phases intended to
monitor the fulfillment of the Convention.
At this stage, there is no any comprehensive law to protect the
rights of whistleblowers in Russia, which would embrace both the
public and private sectors. Only common framework has been
established for the protection of participants in criminal
proceedings in accordance with the Federal Law ‘On State Protection
of Victims, Witnesses and Other Participants in Criminal
Pro-ceedings.’
However, they concern only those who have notified the law
enforcement bodies on the corruption crime, while those individuals
who have informed on the corruption infringement, have no state
protection. Moreover, the existing legislation lacks the provision
on protection of whistleblower employment rights.
There were attempts to adopt a law on the protection of
whistleblowers in Russia. However, the draft law providing for
measures to protect those individ-uals who have notified the
employer, the prosecutor’s office or the government institutions
about corruption offenses committed in government agencies, local
governments or organizations (submitted to the State Duma back in
2017) was rejected last year in June. Unfortunately, effective
whistleblower protection is not a priority.
Proposals for Russia In view of the above, it is proposed:
1. The Ministry of Justice together with the Ministry of
Economic Develop-ment and other relevant bodies, to develop a draft
federal law on the protection of whistleblowers, taking into
account OECD standards in terms of mechanisms and guarantees of
protection (this draft law should target both the public and the
private sectors).
2. The Ministry of Justice together with the Ministry of
Economic Develop-ment and other relevant bodies, ensure the
development of recommendations for the private sector aimed at
creating a mechanism for providing information on the facts of
offenses, determining the responsible structural company unit for
being in contact with whistleblowers and conducting internal
investigations, determining a policy to protect whistleblowers
within the company, communi-cating policy of whistleblower
protection to employees, defining whistleblower protection measures
(reimbursement of judicial and medical expenses, change of
employee’s position, etc.), defining measures against persons who
take re-venge on whistleblowers, etc.
What are the benefits of the proposed changesEstablishing a
legal framework for whistleblower protection is an important step
to ensure facilitated reporting during and after the COVID-19
crisis. Many companies in Russia and abroad set up mechanisms for
providing information on offenses (for example, a hotline, online
application forms, etc.). Nevertheless,
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it is critical to possess real mechanisms to protect
whistleblowers. Adoption of the Whistleblower Protection Law will
help establishing an effective legal framework to protect
whistleblowers, whose information is a key source for detecting
corruption.
Companies will get a viable tool to raise the corruption
awareness, as whis-tleblowers will benefit from state-guaranteed
protection mechanisms when they report on corruption offenses.
However, there are actual risks associated with abuse and
inappropriate reporting of corruption. Therefore, liability shall
be provided for deliberately false corruption reports implying
significant dam-age to the company’s reputation.
Another, far more challenging path is to build confidence in
compliance with whistleblower protection standards. Having even the
utmost legal pro-tection, whistleblowers still have to overcome
significant fear and threats to their careers or even their lives
in order to report wrongdoing, including serious crime.
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3. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN H1 2020: REDUCTION OF THE TRADE
TURNOVER DURING THE PANDEMIC Knobel A., Director of the Center for
International Trade Studies, RANEPA; Director of the Institute of
International Economics and Finance, RFTA; Head of the
International Trade Department, Gaidar InstituteFiranchuk A.,
Senior Research Associate, Center for International Trade Studies,
RANEPA
In H1 2020, exports of fuel and energy commodities decreased by
34% because of a drop in global prices of energy commodities. The
non-oil and gas exports increased in value terms by 2.8% as a
result of the decrease in global prices of some commodi-ties of
this group (6.5%), however, it was made up for by twofold growth in
supplies of precious stones and metals. Imports fell by 6.5% owing
primarily to the reduction of Russian GDP caused by the
pandemic.
Dynamics of Exports and ImportsIn Q1 2020, in value terms
exports fell by 14% as compared with the relevant period of the
previous year, while in Q2, by 30.9%; overall in H1 the decrease
was equal to 22.3% (up to $160bn). Such dynamics were related to
the reduction of 20.6% and 49.1% of exports of fuel and energy
commodities in Q1 and Q2, respec-tively; consequently, in H1
exports of such commodities decreased by 34.1% to $87.8bn. The
share of fuel and energy commodities in exports fell to 62% and 46%
in Q2 and Q2, respectively. Such a substantial reduction was
related to the pricing environment on global markets, rather than
actual decrease in export volumes.
Exports of other goods were stable (-0.5%) and amounted to
$72.2bn (Fig. 1). Monthly fluctuations of overall exports, except
for fuel and energy commodities (as compared with the relevant
periods of 2019) did not exceed 5%, which is evidence both of
exports’ resilience to the shock caused by the pandemic and the
absence of breaks in production chains.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
048
121620242832364044
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Apr May June
2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
bln
doll
Exports of fuel and energy commodities, left-hand axis
Exports of other goods, left-hand axis
Exports, % change compared with the corresponding month of the
previous year, right-hand axis
Fig. 1. Exports’ dynamics in Russia in 2019–2020
Source: own calculations based on the data of the Federal
Customs Service.
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For this reason it can be assumed that in H2 2020 exports’
dynamics will depend primarily on fluctuations of global prices of
energy commodities, while exports of other goods is going to be
relatively stable.
In Q1 2020, in value terms imports were quite stable (+0.4%),
but in Q2 they fell considerably by 12.5%; overall in January-June
2020 imports of goods fell by 6.5% and amounted to $105.6bn. Such
dynamics of imports were caused primar-ily by the reduction of GDP
in months with nationwide non-working days (Fig. 2).
In H1 2020, exports of goods amounted to 63% of the level of the
relevant period of 2013. Specifically, exports of all goods, except
for fuel and energy com-modities, returned to the level seen in
2013 as far back as 2018 and fluctuated after that within the range
of 5% of this indicator (Fig. 3). Though the extent of decrease in
imports in 2016 and 2020 was almost the same, the factors which
caused it were different. In 2016, it was mainly driven by the
depreciation (12.8%) of the Russian ruble against the US Dollar
amid stable GDP. In H1 2020, the main factor was a 4.2%1 reduction
of GDP because of non-working days and other con-sequences of the
pandemic. The depreciation of 3.8% of the real exchange rate of the
ruble to the US Dollar can explain only for one-third the observed
reduction of imports.2 Such a situation is sooner an exception
because the exchange rate of the ruble in the short-term prospect
is more volatile than the GDP index, while the elasticities of
consumption of imports in value terms based on the exchange rate
and the GDP volume have got similar absolute values. For that
reason, the short-term dynamics of imports have been determined of
late by exchange-rate fluctuations. So, if we assume that the
lockdown regime is not introduced again it can be predicted that
imports’ dynamics will continue to follow the ruble ex-change rate
fluctuations.
Export PricesIn H1 2020, a greater part of large export
commodity groups (defined by the FCS) saw a substantial
depreciation of export prices. The reduction of volumes
1 As per the preliminary estimate by the Ministry of Economic
Development.2 For estimates of the ruble exchange rate-based
imports elasticities, see Bussière M, Gaulier G,
Steingress W. Global trade flows: Revisiting the exchange rate
elasticities // Open Economies Review. 2020.
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%110%120%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Apr May June
2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
bln
doll
Imports, left-hand axisImports, % change compared with the
corresponding months of the previous year, right-hand axis
Note. Data comparison for H1 of each year.Fig. 2. Imports’
dynamics in Russia in 2019–2020
Source: own calculations based on the data of the Federal
Customs Service (FCS).
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of exports took place in the “machinery and equipment” and
“metals” commodity groups.
A dramatic decrease (34%) in exports of fuel and energy
commodities was dri-ven by the depreciation of export prices of
oil, petrochemicals, coal and piped gas (21–41%) amid stable
volumes of exports of oil and petrochemicals and the reduction of
supplies of coal (-13%) and piped gas (-18%). The trend of
reduction of crude oil export supplies (-3%) and growth in
petrochemicals supplies (+5%) observed throughout the past few
years has continued. Exports of condensed natural gas keep growing,
too (12%); its share in the overall exports is equal to 2.4% (+0.27
p.p. compared with H1 2019).
Exports of food products and agricultural primary products
increased by 19% in value terms despite a slight reduction of the
price index (-2.7%), Table 1. In H1, exports of grain amounted to
12.4mn tons.
Exports of chemical products fell by 13% owing to the
depreciation of export prices amid weak growth in volumes of
exports (+1.5%). Exports of synthetic rub-ber saw a substantial
decline (-15%).
With export prices of the main items of timber and paper
products falling up to 30%, exports decreased by 9% in value terms
amid weak growth in the physi-cal volumes of exports (+2%). The
downward trend of exports of unprocessed timber observed in the
past few years has prevailed (-16%).
The value of exports of metals decreased by 16% owing both to
the de-preciation of prices of those products (-10%) and the
reduction of supply volumes (-6%). The export prices of ferrous
metals depreciated by 12%–20%, while export volumes remained at the
level of the first six months of the previous year (-3%). In case
of nickel and aluminum, the situation was quite the opposite:
exports’ volumes fell sharply (36% and 28%, respec-tively) amid
stable prices.
The overall exports of the most high-tech commodity groups:
“machinery, equip-ment and transport vehicles” and “other goods”
decreased in value terms by 18%. The main items of household
appliances, machinery, heat-producing elements, turbines and rail
cars saw a decrease in supply volumes. The exports of cars and
open-top cars fell twofold and tenfold, respectively.
Non-Oil and Gas Exports In H1 2020, the non-oil and gas exports
increased in value terms (without taking into account secret
commodity groups) and in volume terms by 2.8% and 10%,
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Exports of fuel and energy commodities Exports of other goods
Imports
Fig. 3. Dynamics of exports and imports in Russia in
2013–2020
Source: own calculations based on the data of the Federal
Customs Service.
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respectively. The dynamics of exports of non-oil and gas
commodities in the breakdown by groups did not have a common trend
(Table 1).
Taking into account the volatility of global prices amid the
pandemic, vo-lumes of exports should be considered as a more
reliable index of the dynamics of non-oil and gas exports. Among
large commodity groups (over $5bn within a half year), there was
growth in exports of food and agricultural products (+23%),
chemical products (+1.5%), timber (+1.8%) and precious stones and
metals (2.1-fold), while exports of metals and fabricated metal
products and machines and equipment decreased by (-6.5%) and
(-16%), respectively.
The US Dollar price index of the non-oil and gas exports
declined by 6.5%: all commodity groups saw a decrease (from 0.8% to
14.8%), except for precious stones and metals (+34%). Such a
situation is typical of the crisis period and growing uncertainties
because of higher demand on reliable assets, including monetary
gold.
Table 1
Dynamics of non-oil and gas exports in H1 2020 by commodity
groups **
Export positions of non-oil and gas commodities by
commodity groups
Volume of supplies, billion USD
Change in January-June 2020 on January-June 2019, %
January- June 2019
January- June 2020
In value terms Price index
In volume terms
Food products and agri-cultural primary products (except for
textile)
10.35 12.38 19.6 -2.7 23.0
Chemical products and rubber 12.37 10.69 -13.6 -14.8 1.5
Rawhide, furs and articles thereof 0.07 0.07 -11.9 -5.0 -7.3
Timber and pulp and paper products 5.65 5.20 -7.9 -9.6 1.8
Textile, textile products and footwear 0.60 0.66 10.5 -0.8
11.4
Precious stones, precious metals and articles thereof* 3.74
10.37 177.0 34.1 106.5
Metals and fabricated met-al products 18.60 15.65 -15.9 -10.0
-6.5
Machinery, equipment and transport vehicles ** 9.24 7.39 -20.0
-4.7 -16.0
Other goods (without arms) 1.29 1.22 -5.1 -4.4 -0.7
Total** 61.94 63.66 2.8 -6.5 10.0
* The data on group 710229 “Industrial Diamonds” and group
710820 Monetary Gold” are una-vailable.
** Without secret commodity groups: arms, aircraft, diamonds,
monetary gold and other.
Source: own calculations based on the data of the Federal
Customs Service.
Comparison of the Pandemic with the Global Recession In 2009,
the reduction of global GDP was equal to 1.67%, while a drop in
Russian exports of all commodities, to 37%. In H1 2020, global GDP
decreased by 4.1% on H1 20191, while Russian exports, by 23%.
Accordingly, the reaction of Russian exports to changes in global
GDP in 2020 turned out to be four times weaker.
In comparing dynamics by individual commodity groups, it can be
stated that the reactions by most of them during the crises of 2009
and 2020 were similar.
1 The Crisis Like No Other One, An Uncertain Recovery // The
IMF. “The World Economic Out-look Report” June 2020. URL:
https://www.imf.org/ru/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.
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For example, in 2009 as well as in H1 2020 there was growth only
in exports of food and agricultural products (11% and 19%,
respectively). Seven commodity groups defined by the Federal
Customs Service saw a decrease in exports both in 2009 and 2020
(Fig. 4). Specifically, only in the “other goods” commodity group
exports fell more substantially in 2020 than in 2009. It is
noteworthy that ex-ports of the “precious stones and metals”
commodity group increased consider-ably (110%) in 2020, while in
the global crisis of 2009 they fell (-24%).
Food and agricultural products
Mineral products
Chemical products
Rawstock
Wood
Teхtile
MetalsMachinery and
equipmentOther goods
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
-60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20%
Chan
ge in
jan-
jul 2
020,
%
Change in 2009, в %
Note. As regards 2020, the comparison is made with H1 2029. The
“precious stones and metals” commodity group is not shown in the
figure.Fig. 4. Dynamics of Russian exports in the crises of 2009
and H1 2020
Source: own calculations based on the data of the Federal
Customs Service and COMTRADE.