MONITORING FOR IMPACT

MONITORING FOR IMPACT:LESSONS ON

NATURAL RESOURCES MONITORINGFROM 13 NGOS

VOLUME II: CASE STUDIES

CHRISTIAN OTTKE, PETER KRISTENSEN, DAVID MADDOX, ERIC RODENBURG

With Contributions from:

François Kpwang Abessolo, Keith Alger, Patrick Alley, Charles Victor Barber, MediniBhandari, Ian Bowles, Gustavo A. B. Fonseca, Sean Gordon,

William Horter, Dan Irwin, M. Mamani, John Musinsky, James Nations, SamuelNguiffo, Isaac Osuoka, Richard Payne, John Reid, Conrad Reining, David Ricalde, Rui

Rocha, Amy R. Sweeting, A. Ruwindrijarto, Steve Sader, Thomas Sever, RobertoSmeraldi, Hernan Verscheure S., Joe Vieira, Kris Wood

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PART II: CASE STUDIES

ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE (APEC), NEPAL................................................................. 4

CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (CED) CAMEROON ............................................................................................. 9

COMITÉ NACIONAL PRO DEFENSA DE LA FAUNA Y FLORA (CODEFF), CHILE ................................................................................. 14

CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL—BOLIVIA, MADIDI NATIONAL PARK, BOLIVIA ......................................................................... 19

CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL—GUATEMALA, THE PETÉN, GUATEMALA ................................................................................. 23

CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL (CI), WASHINGTON DC ................................................................................................................ 29

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACTION (ERA), NIGERIA........................................................................................................................... 32

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH—AMAZÔNIA PROGRAMME, BRAZIL ......................................................................................................... 36

GLOBAL WITNESS, A U.K. NGO FOCUSING ON CAMBODIA ............................................................................................................. 40

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF SOUTHERN BAHIA (IESB), BRAZIL .................................................... 44

LE POU D’AGOUTI, FRENCH GUIANA ................................................................................................................................................. 48

SIERRA LEGAL DEFENCE FUND (SLDF), CANADA ............................................................................................................................... 53

TELAPAK, INDONESIA .......................................................................................................................................................................... 62

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Editors:

Robert LivernashDavid Hosansky

Cover design by: Papyrus Design Group, Washington, D.C.

Cover photographs (top to bottom)

Forest Watch IndonesiaSusan MinnemeyerMarta Miranda

Each World Resources Institute report represents a timely, scholarly treatment of a subjectof public concern. WRI takes responsibility for choosing the study topics and guaranteeingits authors and researchers freedom of inquiry. It also solicits and responds to the guid-ance of advisory panels and expert reviewers. Unless otherwise stated, however, all heinterpretation and findings set forth in WRI publications are those of the authors.

Readers are free to photocopy and reproduce this material in whatever manner they desire.

Copyright © 2000 World Resources Institute, Conservation International. All rights reserved.

ISBN 1-56973-462-3 (Vol. II)

Library of Congress Card No.

Printed in the United States of American on chlorine-free paper containing 30% post-consumer recycled paper.

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PREFACE

This handbook, a project of the GlobalForest Watch network (GFW), is about thenatural resources and forest monitoringwork of 13 non-governmental organiza-tions (NGOs). Each of the organizationsprovided case studies describing lessonsthey learned from monitoring naturalresources, especially forests. We hope thishandbook will provide useful tips toimprove existing monitoring programs andguidance in designing new programs.

Conceived by the World Resources Insti-tute (WRI), GFW is an independent,decentralized network of NGOs, universi-ties, and other groups that monitor log-ging, mining, and other developmentactivities within major forest regions of theworld. GFW and its national affiliatesprovide early warning data on develop-ment pressures—information people canuse to protect the forests and plan ecologi-cally and socially sensitive developmentactivities that result in minimal damage toforest ecosystems.

This handbook benefits both from GFWand WRI’s experience in compiling globaltrends in environmental indicators, as wellas from Conservation International andother NGO’s experience with on-the-ground monitoring.

ABOUT THE TITLE

Every NGO that contributed to thishandbook has a conservation mission.They want to conserve natural forests,protect biodiversity, empower local popu-lations, or improve natural resourcemanagement practices. They want to havean impact. The title of this handbookreflects the underlying mission of thesegroups.

THE AUDIENCE FOR THIS HANDBOOK

Our primary goal is help NGOs create andimprove forest monitoring programsaround the globe, particularly in thedeveloping world. However, we hope thatNGOs interested in natural resources, andgroups such as government agencies andacademics, will also find it useful.

This handbook contains basic instructionon monitoring and principles that are vitalto any successful monitoring program. Itpresents an integrated framework forcreating and implementing natural re-sources monitoring programs. But, thehandbook also presents a way of thinkingabout monitoring. We hope that thisconceptual and methodological frameworkwill make current and future monitoringprojects more effective and moreefficient.

Many handbooks are prescriptive. Wewant this handbook to illuminate theissues through examples from the field.Our hope is that readers will “see them-selves” among the case studies. In thisway—recognizing common problems andexperiences—we hope readers will findinspiration, ideas, and methods for theirown work.

THE CONTEXT FOR NGO MONITORING

In theory, governments manage resourcesfor the public good. Environmental NGOspromote and encourage the stewardship ofnatural resources. Environmental NGOsand governments are sometimes at odds,but the relationship also can be synergis-tic, with both sides helping to improveenvironmental management. NGOs canprovide information and expertise toencourage or challenge governments tosucceed. By seeking and acting on goodinformation, both groups can succeed intheir respective responsibilities. Effectivemonitoring helps to ensure that the neces-sary information is gathered, communi-cated, and used.

Technological and social trends are makingNGOs increasingly important and effectivein conducting monitoring and providinginformation to drive better stewardship ofnatural resources. Tools for information

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collection, storage, and communicationare less expensive and more widely avail-able than ever before. Smaller organiza-tions have a greater opportunity to affectevents. And, the worldwide trend towarddemocratization is allowing societies toopen and maintain dialogues about socialissues—including environmental protec-tion and environmental justice—that werenot openly discussed before.

NGO monitoring has helped start thesediscussions and move them forward. If thistrend continues, governments and civilsociety will continue to improve resourcemanagement.

ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IN MONITORING

Some of the case studies portrayed in thishandbook include monitoring techniquesthat skirt the line between lawful andunlawful. We have not edited these ex-amples from the case studies. However,that does not imply that we advocate orcondone activities that may be illegal.Using unorthodox methods to collect datacan sometimes be advantageous. Illegalactivities, in our view, are neither appro-priate nor advantageous.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge thevaluable comments provided by JinhuaZhang at the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme, Yahya Msagani at theFranklin Conservation Trust in Tanzania,Patrick Alley at Global Witness, AranO’Carrol at Sierra Legal Defence Fund,Will Horter at Forest Alliance, MichaelLinddal at DANIDA, Jennifer Shopland atThe Field Museum of Chicago, MediniBhandari at the Association for the Protec-tion of Environment and Culture in Nepal,Hernan Verscheure at CODEFF in Chile,Roberto Smeraldi at Friends of theEarth—Amazônia Programme, SamuelNguiffo and François Abessolo at theCenter for Environment and Developmentin Cameroon, Kevin Kavanaugh at theWorld-Wide Fund for Nature—Canada,Roger Sayre at The Nature Conservancy,and Gyde Lund.

Our colleagues at WRI and CI have alsobeen generous with their time and support.Our thanks to Dirk Bryant, Daniel Tunstall,Tony Janetos, Peter Veit, Jake Brunner, SeanGordon, Conrad Reining, Joe Vieira, Chris-topher Rader, Claude Gascon, and JorgenThomsen.

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FOREWORD

Monitoring for Impact is a product of thecombined efforts of the World ResourcesInstitute’s (WRI) Global Forest Watch(GFW) program and ConservationInternational’s (CI) Monitoring andEvaluation program. GFW was launchedin 1997 by WRI with non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and local leadersfrom nations with significant forestresources. GFW links satellite imagerywith on-the-ground investigation by localgroups to assemble information aboutrisks to the world’s great forests. It usesthe Internet to make that informationwidely available.

CI’s Monitoring and Evaluation Programdevelops analytical tools and standards formonitoring of conservation impact ofprograms. The Program maintains anetwork of conservation managers in 17countries within the world’s biodiversityhotspots, and provides skills developmentin strategic management to CI programsand allied organizations.

Until recently, there was little systematicinformation about the condition of theworld’s forests. It was impossible to sayhow much forest had been lost and howmuch remained as frontier forest—large,intact, and fully functioning naturalecosystems. Frontier forests provide a

livelihood for millions of people, helpslow global warming, control flooding,purify water, and cycle nutrients and soil,ultimately influencing food productionfor billions of people. In 1997, WRI andits partners found that just 20 percent ofthe world’s original frontier forestsremain today. These forests continue tobe degraded or lost at a rate of about 14million hectares per year.

Local initiatives are proving to be the mosteffective means of reining in this continueddestruction. More than a decade of work byinternational governmental, non-govern-mental and development organizations hasshown that empowering citizen groupsgiving advice and holding governments andindustry to a high standard are vital toimproving forest management.

The Internet, satellite-gathered data, andtelecommunication are rapidly changingthe way forests are managed and pro-tected. These innovations provide moreaccurate and up-to-date informationabout forests as well as the means tomake that information available to allthose with a stake in those resources. Inaddition, these tools are increasinglyavailable to small and local citizensgroups, presenting them with unprec-edented possibilities to gather and share

information. Local NGOs use this infor-mation to gain an increasingly importantvoice in local and global debates on howtheir resources are managed and toeducate consumers about the productsthey purchase.

Having gained this voice, local NGOs nowneed the means to use these tools toconduct forest monitoring and communi-cate the results to a global audience. Thishandbook acts on Global Forest Watch(GFW) and Conservation International’s(CI) commitment to help local NGOsattain those means.

We are deeply grateful to the UnitedNations Environment Programme(UNEP), the AVINA Foundation, IKEAand the Turner Foundation for theirsupport of Global Forest Watch and toConservation International for makingthis handbook possible.

Jonathan LashPresident

World Resources Institute

Russel A. Mittermeier, Ph.D.President

Conservation International

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INTRODUCTION TO THECASE STUDIES

This is the second volume of Monitoringfor Impact’s two volumes. It contains thestories of 13 NGO’s monitoring programsand some lessons learned by the NGOs.The case studies are presented becausemany environmental organizations in theworld must solve similar sets of problems.These diverse organizations can provideadvice through common experience.

Volume one of Monitoring for Impact is ahands-on handbook on organizing andimplementing a natural resources monitor-ing program. The text of Volume 1 can befound in its entirety at http://www.globalforestwatch.org/ and http://www.conservation.org.

Some readers will benefit from reading allthe case studies in their entirety. Con-versely, the studies can be used as a sourceof information on only one aspect ofrunning a monitoring program. To facili-tate this approach, we have used a com-mon outline for each case study.

ASSOCIATION FOR THEPROTECTION OFENVIRONMENT ANDCULTURE (APEC), NEPAL

Address: APEC-Nepal; GPO Box No.12822; Katmandu; Nepal.Telephone: 977 1 277969Fax: 977 1 277969 or 977 1 261497E-mail: [email protected] Address: http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/Vines/9998

By Medini Bhandari

INTRODUCTION

The Association for the Protection ofEnvironment and Culture (APEC) wasfounded in 1988 by a group of people whohad been working together on environ-mental issues. In the years between 1985and 1988, the informal group carried out avariety of activities. They established treenurseries growing banyan and ficas trees,which are sacred in Hindu mythology andtherefore cut less often than other trees.They collected and transplanted seedlingsfrom inhospitable places and established aplantation from these seedlings. Theystarted a campaign to encourage people toplant these sacred trees on important dayssuch as the birth of a child. These effortsearned them a reputation as dedicatedconservationists in the area aroundBiratnagar City, where they concentratedtheir efforts.

As these efforts became established, thefledgling group diversified its activitiesand began using interviews to survey localforests and the associated animal, bird,and plant species in Jhapa and Morangdistricts, as well as both legal and illegalencroachment into these forests. In 1987,as the membership and activity of thegroup continued to grow, it was decidedthat an official forum should be created towork regularly and systematically. APECwas therefore officially established onJanuary 1, 1988. It is registered underNepal law and is also a member of theWorld Conservation Union (IUCN), ForestStewardship Council (FSC), and otherinternational organizations.

ORGANIZATION

Mission and ObjectivesAPEC’s mission is to move Nepal’s con-tinuing development toward a model freeof population growth and ecologicaldegradation, ensuring a minimum stan-dard of living on a sustainable basis.

The principal objectives to accomplishingthat mission are to

● Improve knowledge of conditions andpressures on the Nepali environment;

● Reduce the negative impact of poorresource-dependent people on localenvironments; and

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● Conserve and protect wild areas andrestore degraded areas.

Staffing and OrganizationAPEC is a nonprofit membership-basedorganization as defined by Nepali law. Ithas about 3,000 members. The organiza-tion is led by an executive committeeconsisting of seven full-time staff. Seven-teen part-time workers and seven techni-cal advisors provide support to this execu-tive committee. The rest of the organiza-tion is made up of volunteers, about 550 ofwhom work at least one day per week forthe organization, and an 1,800 or so workat least one day per month.

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Legal AspectsSince the government made the transition toa democracy in 1991, fear of intimidation—such as imprisonment on false charges orlegal technicalities—is no longer a constraintto APEC’s work. Other legal constraints arealso negligible. In Nepal, there is no lawagainst monitoring the condition of naturalresources. Different agencies are working inthis field in various capacities. However, onedoes need to ensure that the informationgathered is accurate and does not misrepre-sent the actual situation. APEC addressesthis issue by training its members to gatherdata in a rigorous and accurate manner.

Finances and EquipmentInitially, APEC’s expenses were borne by

the founding members. As more membersjoined, associated dues produced moreincome, and they are now the largest partof APEC’s annual budget. However,membership dues are not sufficient tocompletely fund APEC’s programs. Donoragencies such as World ConservationUnion (IUCN), Worldwide Fund forNature (WWF), United Nations Educa-tion, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) and HMG-Nepal help to makeup the deficit.

Despite the funding sources, APEC’sbudget is limited and a significant con-straint on activities. APEC has the humanresources to conduct regular monitoring andrecord keeping, but its ability to use othermethods to gather, analyze, and disseminatedata more effectively is limited by a lack ofsufficient funds. APEC has members trainedin remote sensing as well as in GeographicInformation Systems (GIS) software, but itlacks the hardware and software necessaryto access data and use it.

To raise more money, APEC is trying toincrease membership and get further institu-tional support from concerned agencies.

MONITORING PROGRAM

Work PlanningAPEC plans its activities annually, basedon the ideas of its members. During eachannual meeting, unit coordinators presenta summary of the condition of their re-

gions, explaining the major problems andthe steps needed to reduce them. Theideas are discussed and ranked based onthe following criteria:

● How does the project fit APEC’smission and objectives?

● How well can APEC handle theproject? Is it affordable?

● What is the specific time frame andhow does it fit with current projects?

● Will volunteers and staff have time towork on the project?

● Have similar projects succeeded?

If the project is thought to be viable,affordable, and acceptable, it is given ahigh priority. APEC sometimes receivesrequests from local residents to implementa program. We give these requests highpriority because they show the residents’dedication to conservation. Often APEC’sinvolvement in these projects is minimal andconsists mostly of mediation or facilitation.

Even after the projects are chosen, imple-mentation depends on a variety of factors.Availability of information, funds, part-ners, and volunteers are all important. Thetime of year is also significant because ofseasonal considerations. In the dry season,the work consists mainly of monitoringand educational programs. In the wetseason, the distribution of seedlings andother plantation work is added.

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When a good project is proposed but lacksfunding, APEC tries to find funds by goingto donor agencies and asking local residentsfor help. If it is unable to get support fromthese sources, it reevaluates the importanceof the project. If it finds it to be very impor-tant, the organization calls an emergencymeeting and collects funds from members.

MONITORING PROCESS

APEC has been involved in monitoring since1988, mostly using primary sources but alsousing secondary sources when applicable.APEC has developed its own proceduresand methods for collecting data.

APEC’s process for monitoring consists of

● Site identification;

● Identification of data needs;

● Fieldwork preparation (such as locationof study areas on maps and photos);

● Conducting fieldwork to ascertainconditions and people’s perceptions ofthem;

● Data compilation and processing; and

● Conclusions and recommendations.

DATA-GATHERING TOOLS

Field Surveys. Field surveys provideAPEC with most of its primary biologicaldata.

Rapid Rural Appraisal/ParticipatoryRural Appraisal. Perception data aregathered using Rapid Rural Appraisal(RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisalmethods as well as question-and-answersessions. APEC tries to foster an openatmosphere for the interviews in whichpeople feel free to express any ideas orviewpoints. Both questionnaires andinterviews are used so answers can becross-checked.

Interviews. Interviews are conducted togather information that can help guidesubsequent field surveys. They provide abaseline level of data and are also impor-tant for planning purposes.

Secondary Sources. Secondary sourcesare also used to inform APEC, especiallyabout larger areas where it is difficult forthe organization to gather its own informa-tion. Topographic, climatic, soil, andvegetation data are obtained in this man-ner. Maps made by the survey, soil, andforest departments are examples of dataproviders. Other secondary sources in-clude scientific journals, research by otherNGOs, dissertations by university stu-dents, and newsletters.

RRA APPROACH FOR INTERVIEWS

RRA is a relatively new approach toconducting action-oriented research indeveloping countries. It consists of a set oftools and techniques for acquiring infor-mation on many aspects of rural life,

including energy needs, use, supply, andproblems. The principles of RRA are to

● Optimize trade-offs between perfor-mance and cost, and speed and cost, aswell as the amount and detail of data;

● Avoid biases;

● Appreciate the value and legitimacy ofindigenous knowledge of local people;

● Listen and learn directly from localexperts, which include the inarticulatein rural society;

● Use triangulation (different methods,disciplines, and informants to approachthe same problem); and

● Rely on serendipity—listen and look fornew knowledge.

The central philosophy of RRA is thepursuit of “optimal ignorance” and diver-sity of analysis through the process oftriangulation.

The techniques used in RRA will dependto a large extent on the type of informationrequired and the objectives of the study.Various techniques can be used to acquiredata. The most common techniques aredirect observation, semistructured inter-views, secondary data review, analyticalexercises, diagrams, and workshops.

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DATA QUALITY CONTROL

For numerous legal and ethical reasons,APEC feels strongly that the data itgathers and publishes must be accurateand transparent. APEC therefore plans itsdata collection, calculation, and analysismethods carefully and employs a variety ofmethods to reduce errors resulting frompreconceptions and biases of the research-ers. These include taking baseline surveys,conducting random sampling, conductingRRA and Participatory Rural Appraisalmethods, and using remote sensing andGIS to reduce error and help corroboratefield-collected data. APEC uses the bookby J.H. McGarth, Research Methods andDesigns for Education, as a basis for itsdata collection methodology.

EXAMPLES OF MONITORING PROJECTS

Objective. Improve knowledge ofconditions and pressures on the Nepalienvironment.

Strategy. Monitor, analyze, and dissemi-nate information on the Nepali environ-ment and on the knowledge of indigenouspeople.

Program. Monitor, analyze, and publishinformation on the condition of forests,wetlands, wildlife, aquatic ecosystems,economic conditions in rural areas, andindigenous environmental knowledge.

EXAMPLES OF PROJECTS.

● Regular natural forestry monitoringprogram started in 1987.

● Monitor wetland animal species inKoshi Tappu and other wetland areas.

● A study of wildlife and forest areas ineastern Tarai.

Strategy. Establish forums to facilitatethe exchange of ideas and information.

Program. Bring scholars, social workers,and representatives of various rural com-munities together to work with APEC ondeveloping strategies for conservation anddevelopment.

Examples of projects. Evaluate andendorse articles, books, and other publica-tions on the conservation of natural re-sources.

Objective. Reduce the negative impact ofpeople on their local environments.

Strategy. Increase awareness of theimpacts of resource degradation and ofways that people can reduce these impacts.

Program. Hold seminars for local peoplein rural areas about conservation andpreservation.


● Meetings, talks, and other programs toeducate people about the benefits oflocal wetlands and resident animal andplant species.

● Education programs for illiterategroups in eastern Nepal.

● Wildlife, forest, and wetland conserva-tion education programs at secondaryschools and university campuses.

● Programs oriented toward women’sconcerns in conservation.

● Video, audio, drama, song, dance, andother forms of expression that canspread APEC’s message.

● Eco-clubs in schools across Nepal,including a club newsletter.

Objective. Directly conserve and protectwild areas and restore marginalized areas.

Strategy. Create alternative sources ofwood and other forest products.


● Establish plantations to help creategreenbelts and preserve biodiversity innatural forests.

● Establish and operate three largenurseries.

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Objective. Enhance the ability of organi-zations working within Nepal to improvethe environment.

Strategy. Work with other institutions,providing them information and advice.

Program. Advise government agenciesand local bodies about conservation anddevelopment.


● Report results of monitoring programsto HMG-Nepal and other governmentagencies.

● Consult with and provide informationto international NGOs.

Program. Participate in interagencyconservation undertakings, research, andseminars directed toward conservation anddevelopment.

Examples of projects. Organize educa-tional programs with WWF Nepal.

COMMUNICATION

APEC employs many methods of communi-cating its data to audiences. These includetraditional reports and newsletters. APECalso exerts a lot of energy communicatingdirectly with villagers, schoolchildren, andother groups that are not reached by themore formal communication strategies.

ReportsAPEC compiles an annual monitoringreport for the central committee. Thisreport is discussed and then released tothe media. Results of APEC’s individualstudies are published in reports or inAPEC’s local and national newsletters.

Direct CommunicationAPEC will share its information in anunpublished format with both national andlocal authorities when it is appropriate.Unpublished information is also sharedwith national and international NGOs anddonor agencies.

APEC makes strong efforts to communi-cate back to villagers the knowledge itgains from local residents. This givesvillagers the ability to make informeddecisions and maintain an interest insharing their knowledge. Discussionprograms, seminars, visual exhibitions, andlocal and national newsletters are all com-mon strategies for sharing information.

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CENTER FORENVIRONMENT ANDDEVELOPMENT,CAMEROON

Address: BP 8451 Yaoundé; Cameroon.Telephone: (237) 22.38.57Fax: (237) 22.38.59E-mail: [email protected] Address: www.cedcam.org

Written by Samuel Nguiffo and FrançoisKpwang Abessolo

INTRODUCTION

The Center for Environment and Devel-opment (CED) was established in 1994 inresponse to the lack of dialogue, monitor-ing, and advocacy on environmentalmanagement issues in Cameroon. CEDhopes to provide needed information andengender the public discourse necessaryfor an accountable society.

For a long period in Cameroon’s modernhistory, discourse and dissent were nottolerated. For the three decades before1990, free speech was subdued by a law torepress “subversion.” Punishment couldbe up to 20 years imprisonment in specialcamps. The law did not specify the activi-ties that constituted subversion, andjudges therefore had much discretion.

The activities that CED carries out as partof its monitoring and advocacy programwould have previously fallen into thesubversive category. Now, however, thecurrent political context is less hostile toopen expression. Many countries in west-ern Africa have undergone liberalizationand allow expression of opinions that runcontrary to government positions.

But this does not mean that the politicaland social climate is conducive to CED’sactivities. Corporations, politicians, localcommunities, and NGOs in Cameroon arenot yet used to advocacy activities. Whentheir actions and policies are challengedand publicized, they have a strong ten-dency to become defensive and personal-ize the debate. Criticizing an institution’sactivities as threatening to the environ-ment is still often perceived as attackingthe institution’s leader.

Another difficulty is the lack of a monitor-ing and advocacy tradition in Cameroon.There is no experience on which to build.CED is currently working to developeffective monitoring and advocacy prac-tices that are designed to work in thenation’s political and social climate. Al-though much work remains to be done, weare making progress

ORGANIZATION

Mission and ObjectivesCED’s principal objectives are to monitorthe environmental and social impact ofactions by corporations and governmentagencies in Cameroon and to publicize thenegative impact these practices are havingon the environment, local people, and theentire nation.

CED is attempting to stimulate a publicdebate on these issues. It supportsgrassroots communities, helping them tobecome more involved in the managementof forest resources.

The objectives and mission of CED cameinto existence after a two-year process.Many associations were established assoon as the 1990 law on the freedom ofassociation in Cameroon was enacted.Thanks to the Rio Summit, many of themexpressed an interest in the environment.However, very few were concerned withforest management.

The process of revising forestry law andpolicy, carried out with the help of theWorld Bank within the framework of astructural adjustment program, offered aunique opportunity for emergingCameroonian environmental NGOs toexpress their opinions on this sensitive

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topic. Unfortunately, many NGOs, notablythe young Federation of EnvironmentalNGOs in Cameroon, did not get involvedin the debate.

A few members of this network decided tomake an assessment of the forestry sectorin Cameroon to identify problems andareas of action. Two major areas emerged.First, CED had to work at the local levelwith the support of the population living inthe forest zone, paying particular attentionto the indigenous population. Second,CED had to work at the national andinternational levels, where decisions aremade that have a direct impact on thesituation at the local level.

THE MONITORING PROGRAM

CED’s monitoring and advocacy campaignconsists of eight steps:

1. Decide what issues to monitor.

2. Determine the desired outcomes of themonitoring campaign.

3. Analyze the problem, the partiesinvolved, and how they operate.

4. Choose targets and allies.

5. Choose methods of action and how toimplement them.

6. Gather the data.

7. Analyze the data and write the reports.

8. Communicate the results of the cam-paign and press for better environmen-tal and social policy and management.

EXAMPLE OF A MONITORING PROJECT

Stopping a SawmillIn 1997, the Hazim-Boitex lumber com-pany, which holds a logging permit in theLomie area, decided to build a sawmill onthe edge of the Dja Reserve. (At 500,000hectares, the Dja Reserve is the largestprotected area in Cameroon. The UnitedNations Educational, Scientific, andCultural Organization (UNESCO) hasclassified it as a world heritage forest.) Thecompany’s goal was to promote the localprocessing of rough timber fromCameroonian forests. However, the deci-sion was highly problematic because ofsawmill’s proximity to the Dja Reserve. Inaddition, the sawmill would be buildprecisely at the site of Adjela andNgoulemakong villages and an encamp-ment of Baka “pygmies” —an indigenouspopulation that is facing serious threats toits culture and lifestyle.

The Bakas were invited to attend meetingswith the chiefs of the two villages, localgovernment authorities, and loggingcompany officials. But the meetings didlittle to ensure true Baka representation.

The Bakas are reluctant to assert them-selves, in part due to generations ofdomination by their Bantu neighbors.(Bantus are the ethnic majority in much ofsub-Saharan Africa.) In this case, theBakas did not have the opportunity toexpress their point of view. The companyseemed to feel that the Bantus were theonly local stakeholders, and that only theirpoint of view mattered. The nonviolentand reserved nature of the Bakas led totheir marginalization.

The site chosen for the sawmill compriseda three-hectare area that overlapped thepygmy encampment and was less than 300meters from the waterway that marked theboundary of the Dja Reserve. This place-ment ensured that the Baka’s village wouldbe destroyed and that pollution wouldenter the river and the reserve. The Bakas,who generally have a harmonious relation-ship with nature, were quite surprisedwhen large machines came and destroyedtheir houses and crops. Many of themwere left homeless and had to cross thewaterway and settle in the reserve.

On April 8, 1998, the senior divisionalofficer for the Upper-Nyong Divisionpresided over the laying of the foundationstone of the future sawmill during agrandiose ceremony that drew a largecrowd. The Bakas looked stoically at thevast area that had been cleared, dug out,and made ready for construction. Remains

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of the Bakas’ destroyed crops and housessurrounded the area.

Problems Created by the Locationand Preparation of the Sawmill Site

The sawmill site created both ecologicaland social problems.

From an ecological perspective, the sitechosen for the sawmill was problematicbecause it was very close to the Djareserve. The development of the sawmillin that site had great potential to nega-tively impact the reserve. The Ministry ofthe Environment and Forestry had acknowl-edged the likelihood of an adverse impact.

From a social perspective, the Baka werenot given an adequate chance to partici-pate in the planning and decision-makingabout the placement of the sawmill. Inaddition, they were displaced from theirhomes and lost many of their crops.Although some compensation was made tothe inhabitants of the villages where thesawmill was located, none of the moneygot to the Baka peoples. Rather, it waseither given to, or intercepted by, theBantu villagers.

Step 1: Deciding what issues tomonitorThis case was chosen for a lobbyingprogram for the following reasons:

● More than 100 individuals belonging toa marginal group (the Bakas) weredisplaced and their crops destroyed.

● The decision to displace the Bakas wastaken without consulting them, and theBakas were not compensated.

● The establishment of the sawmill onthis site did not appear to conform withCameroon law 94/01, which stipulatesthat protected areas be surrounded by abuffer zone.

● The sawmill on this site presented risksto the natural environment, includingpollution, facilitation of poaching,destruction of community property, andnoise.

● Some local authorities seemed to becollaborating with the company, whichCED believed was partly due to insuffi-cient information on the potentialnegative impacts of installing thesawmill in Lomié.

Step 2: Determining the DesiredOutcomes of the MonitoringCampaignConcerning this sawmill project, CEDdefined the following objectives:

● Persuade government authorities tostop the project because of violations oflaw 94/01.

● Enable the communities whose prop-erty had been expropriated to exercisetheir rights to compensation for illegaltaking of property and livelihood.

● Protect the affected marginal commu-nities against the abuses of loggers andsome authorities. In this particularcase, the abuses included the right ofthe Baka community to freely choosewhere to settle and the right to use thenatural resources found in the immedi-ate neighborhood. CED’s aim was todraw public attention to this newviolation of the fundamental rights ofan oppressed people.

Step 3: Analysis of the problem, theparties involved, and how theyoperateCED’s analysis of the situation showed thatthe following parties were either affected bythe problem or could help resolve it:

● The Baka communities of the encamp-ment;

● The Bantu communities of Adjela andNgoulemakoung;

● The regional government official andthe mayor of Lomié.

● Officials of the Hazim-Boitex lumbercompany;

● The senior divisional officer for theUpper-Nyong division in Abong-Mbang

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and the divisional delegate of theMinistry of Environment and Forestry;

● The Ministry of the Environment andForestry and its sub-director of For-estry Exploitation;

● International NGOs and diplomaticorganizations;

● Major conservation programs, includ-ing World Conservation Center(IUCN) and the Dutch Developmentproject, Soutien au DéveloppementDurable dans la région de Lomié(Support for Sustainable Developmentin the Lomié region, or SDDL);

● Local NGOs, such as the CentreInternational d’Appui auDéveloppement Durable (InternationalCenter of Support for SustainableDevelopment, or CIAD); and

● Other environmental NGOs.

Step 4: Choosing targets and alliesThe following organizations were seen asour allies in this campaign:

● CIAD, which spearheaded the programand organized the field work;

● The IUCN-Dja project based in Lomié,which provided technical and financialassistance to CIAD;

● CED, which provided technical andplanning assistance to CIAD;

● The London-based Rainforest Founda-tion, which provided technical assis-tance to CIAD for activities in the field;

● The Environmental Defense Fund(EDF) in Washington, D.C., whichsupported CIAD in discussions withthe administration and with localcommunities;

● The Ministry of the Environment andForestry’s sub-director of protectedareas, based in Yaoundé, who helped inthe preparation of a ministerial deci-sion to stop the project.

It should be noted that, from the outset, itwas difficult to anticipate the role of thecentral administration. After receivinginformation relating to the project, someofficials of the central administration had apositive and encouraging reaction.

Step 5: Choosing Methods of ActionCED and its partners (mainly CIAD)identified four methods to reach ouridentified goals:

● Educate key groups by publishing aninformation document summarizing theproblems at hand;

● Establish contacts with NGOs, commu-nities, administration officials, andgovernment officials to have the funda-mental rights of the indigenous peopleinhabiting the sawmill site respectedand to uphold the provisions of theforestry law relating to protected areas;

● Publish articles and information inCED’s newsletter, Bubinga; and

● Hold educational information sessionswith the Baka and Bantu communitiesat the project site.

The aim of the educational sessions was toensure that the communities shared thesame perception as organizations active inthe project. Concerned organizationssought to convey the message that theywere not opposed to the development ofthe Lomié region and did not want to limitthe employment possibilities of localyouth. Their aim was simply to protect theBaka population and the reserve.

Step 6: Gathering the dataCED used the following sources for theinformation needed to conduct the campaign:

● The local community for informationconcerning the events that took placeon the site;

● The sub-department of Forestry Ex-

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ploitation, for the contents of thespecifications; and

● The statements and official documentsof the Hazim-Boitex company.

Step 7: Analyzing the data andwriting the reportsMeetings were held in Lomié betweenCED and CIAD, between CIAD andIUCN, and between CIAD and the af-fected communities. The aim of thesemeetings was to define the best strategy tobe adopted for the law to be enforced.

In addition, meetings were held inYaounde between CED, EDF, and CIAD;between CED, CIAD and the RainforestFoundation; and between EDF, CIAD,and the Subdirector of Protected Areas.

These groups are continuing to exchangeinformation.

Information about the issue was publishedin the form of a brochure by CIAD.Articles also were written in the Bubinganewsletter. The aim was to ensure that thisinformation was widely disseminated.

Step 8: Communicate the results ofthe campaign and advocate forbetter environmental and socialpolicy and managementSome 100 copies CIAD’s brochure wereprinted and distributed to local and centralauthorities, local and international NGOs,and diplomats. Two articles, a report, andan interview were published by CED inBubinga. Meetings were held with theBaka and Bantu communities at theproject site.

Step 9: Self-analysisThis step has not yet occurred.

RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN AS OF

DECEMBER 1998

The project was stopped in June 1998. Anew site for the sawmill was chosen onemonth later.

REMAINING CHALLENGES

Despite the success of the campaign, someproblems have not been addressed, includ-ing the question of compensating thecommunities whose houses and crops weredestroyed. Another unsettled issue is whatto do with the three hectares that werecleared, dug out, and then abandoned.

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COMITÉ NACIONAL PRODEFENSA DE LA FAUNA YFLORA (CODEFF), CHILE

Address: Av. FCO. Bilbao 691Providencia; Santiago; Chile.Tel: 2-2510262Fax: 2-2518433E-mail: [email protected] Address: www.chiper.cl/codeff/index.asp

By Hernan Verscueure S., translated intoEnglish by Ruth Nogueron

INTRODUCTION

Since its creation in 1968, ComitéNacional Pro Defensa de la Fauna y Flora(CODEFF) (The Fauna and Flora De-fense Committee) has been dedicated tothe conservation of the Chilean forests,particularly in four areas:

● Research and monitoring to generatepertinent, independent, and high-quality data;

● Information dissemination to keep localcommunities and general societyinformed about the state of Chile’sforests;

● Environmental education to encouragechanges in the attitude of societytoward the environment; and

● Environmental action to participate inenvironmental management decisionsand encourage other nongovernmentalgroups to participate as well.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT

MONITORING FOR CHILE’S FORESTS

The monitoring of forest resources shouldbe a state task through the National ForestCorporation (CONAF). Nevertheless, therole of general society and CODEFF inmonitoring is important because it

● Allows an objective and independentassessment of forest ecosystem conser-vation based on direct field observa-tions;

● Provides a tool to facilitate betterstewardship of the forest;

● Provides a means for society to partici-pate in the management and conserva-tion of the forests;

● Generates knowledge that is useful informulating forest-conservation poli-cies;

● Provides vital information for use byCONAF in managing Chile’s forests;and

● Furthers the ability of Chile’s popula-tion to determine the country’s affairs.

THE STATE OF THE FORESTS

Chile’s forests are experiencing a high rateof loss and degradation. Currently, 18arboreal and bush species are classified asvulnerable and 9 are endangered. Themain pressures on Chile’s forests are thesubstitution of natural vegetation byplantations; high-grading, or selectiveharvesting, in which only the best trees arecut; the expansion of agriculture-relatedactivities into forested areas; infrastructureprojects; uncontrolled grazing in forestinteriors; and fires. According to officialnumbers from the Forestry Action Plan,forest destruction and degradation totalsabout 120,000 hectares per year.

INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

BACKGROUND

The forestry sector is one of the mostactive in Chile and has recently experi-enced enormous growth in production andexports. Forest plantation land has grownon a par with the overall industry, with80,000 hectares of plantations addedannually during the last 10 years. The totalarea covered by plantations in 1997 was2.12 million hectares. Industrial facilitiessuch as wood pulp plants have grownsignificantly as well. To date, there are sixwood-pulp plants, with two more expectedin the near future.

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In addition to being an important tradecommodity for Chile, the forest sector isan important source of employment.Between 1980 and 1992, it provided anaverage of 78,580 jobs, including techni-cal, non-technical, and professional posi-tions. The development of Chile’s forestsector is a direct result of the nation’sliberal economic policies. Such policiesfavor the private sector and stimulateproduction of products for export.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was atransition in Chile’s economy from thestate to the private sector. In addition, alegal framework was developed to changethe government’s role from executingpolicies through legislation to promotingpolicies through financial incentives. Forexample, a 1974 bill established that 75percent of the expenses in the establish-ment of plantations would be financed bythe state.

Despite the gains made by forestry compa-nies, landowners, and workers, there arestill questions regarding the true contribu-tion of the forestry sector to Chile’s na-tional development. The environmentaland social costs are great enough to rivalthe economic gains. These environmentalimpacts include the substitution of pro-ductive and diverse native forests withmonoculture plantations. According toofficial data, 140,000 hectares were con-verted to plantations between 1985 and

1994. These conversions have alteredwater and nutrient cycles, reduced soilfertility, and increased soil erosion. Habi-tat necessary for wild fauna has been lost;the landscape has been sharply modified;and diversity has been reduced. Finally,plantations have generated serious pollu-tion, both directly through the use ofagrochemicals for the control of insectinfestations and disease, and indirectlythrough wood-pulp production processes.

Among the social impacts, the concentra-tion of forestland in the hands of relativelyfew people has increased migration tocities. Loss of access to the services andproducts generated by natural forests hasincreased unemployment and poverty, andaltered local cultures. CODEFF hasdocumented all of these trends.

Awareness of the situation facing Chile’sforests and the communities that depend onthem has been growing. This awareness hasnot spread to the private sector, however,and has had relatively little impact ongovernment officials. The political sector isvery important because many of the solu-tions to these problems will need to comeabout through the passage of forest-sectorlaws. The laws governing Chile’s forestsneed to emphasize sustainable managementof native forest and plantations.

Independent monitoring can play animportant role in bringing about improved

forest policies. Monitoring generatesinformation needed to determine forestrypolicies, increase the awareness of society,and stop the destruction.

ORGANIZATION

MissionCODEFF’s mission is to promote environ-mental conservation and achieve sustain-able development.

CODEFF’s Forestry Program ObjectivesCODEFF’s forestry program contributesto the overall mission by supporting therecognition of native forests as a vitalnational resource and promoting theimportance of forests as a vulnerablenatural resource that should be managedunder sustainable practices. To achievethis goal, a number of objectives (and sub-objectives) for the forestry program havebeen defined. These objectives constituteCODEFF’S Forest Program Action Plan.

The forestry program’s objectives are to

● Develop monitoring activities andpermanent control of the exploitationof the forests;

● Influence public and private sectorpolicies to promote sustainability;

● Improve the state’s role in planning andcontrolling activities in forested areas;

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● Promote sustainable management,especially among small- and medium-scale proprietors in forested areas; and

● Conserve relevant forest species.


SUB-OBJECTIVES

The general sub-objectives are to

● Create and enforce forest policiesfocused on sustainability;

● Increase awareness of forestry issues inChilean society and government;

● Create a technical base to inform andback up CODEFF’S policy initiatives;

● Stop the destructive uses of nativeforests; and

● Strengthen CODEFF’s ability as part ofcivil society to participate meaningfullyon issues of forest management.

Specific goals include issuing annualreports on the state of native forests anddeveloping methodologies to evaluatespecific cases of forest destruction.

NETWORKS

In order to promote society’s participationin monitoring forests, CODEFF createdthe Forests Monitoring Network(REMFO) with the sponsorship of theWorld Wildlife Fund-US and World

Wildlife Fund for Nature-InternationalThe network is open to the public and toinstitutions interested in collaborating inmonitoring actions. Also, the system has136 individual memberships and 80institutional memberships in severalregions in the country. Some memberssupport activities at the local level. Fur-thermore, REMFO publishes the bulletinBosques Templados (Temperate Forests) tospread relevant information on the issue.

FOREST ACTION PLAN

Monitoring is part of CODEFF’S ForestProgram Action Plan. The plan is createdfor a period of three years and is evaluatedevery year. Field data collection is plannedand executed systematically based on theNational Monitoring Plan, which is re-viewed once a year with the participationof the members of the forestry program.The forestry program includes all staffworking on forestry issues in seven of eightstate branches.


Identification of Plot AreasThe process of identifying plot areas isdone using 1:250,000 scale cartographiccharts from Chile’s Military GeographicInstitute. The selection of areas is basedon the amount of native forest cover andthe pressures they are experiencing. It isimportant to note that CONAFF andseveral universities have developed the

Native Vegetation National Cadastre(Catastro Nacional de la VegetaciónNativa) The cadastre, or register, containsdigital information maps at scales of1:50,000, 1:250,000, and 1:3,000,000.CODEFF has access to these maps, thanksto an agreement with CONAFF.

CODEFF commonly uses overflights toidentify areas where field monitoringshould be conducted. As seen from the air,it is easy to identify selective cuts,clearcuts, and burned areas (both thosefrom fires set after clearcutting and thosenot related to cutting).

IDENTIFYING AREAS WITH GPS

As part of the overflight process, areas thatappear to warrant field monitoring byCODEFF are marked using the GlobalPositioning System (GPS) and photographsof the areas. All the information related tothe photographs is recorded. This processrequires at least two persons in the air-plane. After the flight, the plots identifiedare drawn on the map according to therecorded points of reference and the GPScoordinates.

DATA GATHERED IN THE FIELD

The field visits enable the gathering ofmore detailed data, including:

1. The location and how it is accessed.

2. Name of the property.

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3. Name of the proprietor and enterpriseinvolved in the area.

4. Type of intervention (such as whetherthe area has been clear-cut to establisha plantation, selectively cut to producelumber, and so on).

5. Type of vegetation and fauna affected.These data are obtained from nearbyundisturbed areas.

6. Amount of wood and species harvested.This is calculated by establishinginventory plots in cut areas, usingstumps as the basis for the measure-ments. This method can be problem-atic, because accessing the stumps isdifficult if the vegetation has not yetbeen burned. Also, it can be difficult toidentify tree species using only stumps.However, reconstruction of the cut plotcan be accomplished by establishingplots in adjacent areas with similarvegetative cover. If none of thesetechniques can be applied, any avail-able data are collected even if they donot have statistical validity.

7. Topography of the area.

8. A description of the bodies of waterand how they have been impacted, aswell as development activities in theforests (roads, for example) are in-cluded in the data collected.

9. Design of logging roads.

10.Photographs.

COMMUNICATION

ReportsA standard format should be designed forall reports, especially periodic monitoringactivities. The format should assume thatthe audience includes readers who are notexperts on the issue. It should includegraphics and photographs. In order topresent the most current information,reports should be published within 30 daysof being completed.

CODEFF’s reports are read primarily bygovernment officials, the media, and thegeneral public. The reports should bewritten in a simple way without compro-mising the technical rigor. The informa-tion can be delivered through a technicalreport for dissemination complete withexcerpts referring to particular cases.Depending on the target group, the casesshould be as detailed and technicallycomplete as possible.

Along with the formal reports, pressreleases are prepared for distributionduring the press conferences, at which thereports are presented.

● The external reports should include, ata minimum, the name, location, andownership of the property; how theproperty can be accessed; the name ofthe contractor responsible for the work;the characterization of damage causedby logging; any laws that have been

broken; and recommendations foraction by the government or the com-pany involved in the work.

CODEFF’s internal report should alsoinclude an evaluation of the event, includ-ing the identification of obstacles andopportunities to be considered in furtheractions, and an expense report.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO

AUTHORITIES AND THE MEDIA

CODEFF delivers its reports directly toCONAFF. It disseminates the informationto the public through the media.

FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE

MONITORING

In assessing how to follow up its preliminarymonitoring, CODEFF considers the impor-tance of the case. Important cases usuallyend up becoming internal CODEFF cam-paigns, while lower priority cases are typi-cally left to the government to handle.

When CODEFF decides to embrace acase as an internal campaign, a plan ofaction is drafted. This plan includes theallocation of human resources and techni-cal and financial needs. Those cases left tothe Chilean government are usuallyfollowed up by CONAFF and local policeoffices. CODEFF will also monitor thesituation to determine whether the trans-gressions have ceased.

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EXAMPLE OF A MONITORING PROJECT

Interregional Monitoring, 1995Here is a description of a 1995 interre-gional monitoring project:

1. CONAFF located the routes to fly onthe Military Geographic Institute mapsusing a 1:250,000 scale. The areasidentified were the Precordillera de Lacosta y de Los Andes between the VIIand X administrative regions of Chile(35 to 42 degrees south latitude).

2. Two flights were conducted with thesupport of the U.S. Lighthawk organi-zation.

3. During the flights, the most relevantareas to monitor were identified andlocated with GPS. The areas weremarked on the map and photographswere taken. Access roads to the areaswere given special attention. In addi-tion, clearcutting areas, selectively cutareas, and burned areas were identi-fied.

4. Further details were gathered throughfield study. Thirteen previously identi-fied points were visited using a four-wheel drive vehicle. The trip coveredapproximately 3,000 kilometers over 15days.

5. After the field data collection, the datawere processed and the correspon-dents’ reports were prepared.

6. The report was presented to the publicat a press conference and delivered tothe political authorities, includingCONAFF.

7. CONAFF follow-up investigationsrevealed that 3 out of 13 cases docu-mented in the report were in violationof forestry laws.

8. The internal evaluation of this monitor-ing campaign plainly demonstrated theimportance of the pre-monitoringflights. Based on this evaluation, amethodology to take data during theflights was developed. In addition, themethodologies to collect data on theground, as well as the strategies tofacilitate access to the areas to bemonitored, were improved.

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CONSERVATIONINTERNATIONAL—BOLIVIA,MADIDI NATIONAL PARK,BOLIVIA

Address: Calle Macario Pinilla # 291;Esq. Av. 6 de Agosto; Zona de San Jorge;La Paz, Bolivia.Telephone and Fax: 01-59-1243-4058Internet Address:http://www.conservation.org

By Joe Vieira, Manuel Mamani, andDavid Ricalde

INTRODUCTION

This case study provides an example ofhow the Conservation International (CI)program in Bolivia is using monitoring aspart of its conservation investment inbiodiversity within the frontier forest ofMadidi National Park and IntegratedNatural Area. Many other institutions alsoare working in the area, including the parkstaff itself, the General Directorate forBiodiversity at the Bolivia Ministry ofSustainable Development, the NGOEcoBolivia, CARE International, theInstitute of Ecology at the UniversityMayor de San Andres in La Paz, and theBolivian Museum of Natural History at theNational Science Academy in Bolivia.

ORGANIZATION

Conservation International—Bolivia (CI-Bolivia) is one of 23 CI country programslocated in Latin America, Asia, Oceania,and Africa. CI-Bolivia’s program andindividual project activities have largelycomplemented the work of the Boliviangovernment as well as donors and NGOsin the protected area.

PROJECTS, OBJECTIVES, AND ACTIVITIES

Since 1990, CI-Bolivia’s programs andprojects have focused on the southernportion of the Tropical Andes hotspot andadjacent wilderness area, and the 1.8million hectare Madidi National Park andIntegrated Natural Area. Since 1993, CI’shigher objective has been to promoteconservation biodiversity and sustainabledevelopment within and adjacent to frontierforests of the Madidi National Park.

CI’s institutional objectives in the regionhave focused on documentation of biologi-cal diversity, park advocacy, assessment ofcultural conditions, and support of Boliv-ian protected area policy through socio-economic investment in a pilot communitywithin the protected area. Activitiescompleted under CI financing haveincluded conservation training, transporta-tion pro-jects, sustainable agriculture,ecotourism, handicrafts, strengtheninglocal institutions, promoting health careaccess, developing potable water andpublic sanitation, and building local

capacity in wildlife monitoring


Monitoring for LearningAs part of an institutional learning systemlaunched in 1996 under the CI Monitoringand Evaluation Program, we are assessingour investments of time and money andhow they have impacted on the state ofthe ecosystems and socioeconomic condi-tions in four hotspot areas. Through ouractivities, we hope to strengthen team-work, improve our strategic planning,and focus on future investment, as wellas benefit the interested members of thepublic. Since February 1997, CI-Boliviahas focused on the following monitoringquestions within the Madidi NationalPark region:

● How do we best perform objective,cost-efficient monitoring of our invest-ments and our work?

● How do we link monitoring of ourconservation investments with themonitoring of the ecological status andtrends within the forest where we work?

● Which indicators tell us the most aboutthe health of landscapes and wildlifepopulations, and the processes that linkthem in the ecosystem under study?

● What are appropriate analytical tools?

● What time frames adequately portraynatural versus human-induced trends?

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● How do we account for socioeconomicfactors, natural resource use, andpolitical indicators to clarify threats andtrends influencing the health of ecosys-tems under study?

● How do we finance and establish abaseline for conservation trend analysesin future assessments?

● How do we educate ourselves in theprocess?

● How do we expand the capacity of ourpartners and other beneficiaries of theinvestments to continue the work ofmonitoring when we leave?

● Finally, how do we use the informationthat we generate to improve the work wedo and influence the behavior of others?

The following overview of Rapid Biologi-cal Assessments (RAPs) and investments inChalalan, San Jose Uchupiamonas, and thegeneral Madidi area touch on some ofthese questions. In this case study, empha-sis is placed on monitoring as it relates toconservation trends and impacts in thestudy area.

INITIAL BASELINES AND BIODIVERSITY

THREATS (CIRCA 1990)

In 1990, CI performed an RAP of the AltoMadidi, establishing a qualitative andquantitative inventory of various taxonomicgroups in the core of this tropical wilderness(Parker et al. 1990). Scientists performed

species inventories along elevation transectsadjacent to a 30-year old abandoned loggingcamp and airstrip, covering no less than1,000 hectares. By all measures of bird,plant, and mammal diversity, the area wascharacterized as a pristine and globallyimportant refuge of biodiversity.

It was both the pristine status and isolatedwilderness conditions in 1990 that drovethe Parker team to recommend the cre-ation of a park in the Alto Madidi water-shed. In addition to documenting AltoMadidi’s biodiversity in 1990, the RAPteam of scientists also conveyed a qualita-tive warning of regional developmenttrends threatening biodiversity among theregion’s 1.8 million hectares of upland andfloodplain forests. Prevalent economicforces threatening the Alto Madidi andTuichi watersheds included poverty,logging, colonization, and road develop-ment (Parker et al. 1990).

COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST

CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS

(1993-1994)

Three years later, CI anthropologistsvisited the then-proposed Alto Madidiprotected area and completed a needsassessment. They documented the lowimpact of indigenous forest dwellers, aswell as the human forces of povertydriving demands for road construction andlogging activities by the 62-family commu-nity of San Jose Uchupiamonas. Reports

and investment recommendations weresubmitted to the Bolivian government andinternational donors.

In 1994, CI’s follow-up investments in AltoMadidi were launched in the communityof San Jose Uchupiamonas. This indig-enous community is situated inside theMadidi National Park and has largely beenliving off the natural resources providedby the forest. Agroforestry, river transpor-tation, and socioeconomic project financ-ing occurred at the same time as aregionwide commercial logging andhunting boom that spilled over from theadjacent Pilon Lajas Indigenous Territoryand Biosphere Reserve to the proposedMadidi National Park.

ECOTOURISM INVESTMENT,CONSERVATION ACTION, AND LOGGING

(1995-1996)

In August 1995, a crew of CI projectplanners, newly hired staff, and a journal-ist passed six logging camps en route tothe Lake Chalalan and the community ofSan Jose Uchupiamonas (Vieira 1996a ).One month later, Conservation Interna-tional and San Jose Uchupiamonaslaunched a high profile sustainable devel-opment and ecotourism lodge project (theChalalan Project) funded by the Inter-American Development Bank in the TuichiRiver valley (Rioja and Atkinson 1995).This was followed seven days later by theBolivian government’s creation of the

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Madidi National Park and IntegratedNatural Area (DNCB 1995).

In 1993 and 1994, representatives fromthe Bolivian government had met withlocal community leaders in San Jose andelsewhere. Nevertheless, when the projectwas launched in 1995, most local commu-nities (including San Jose) were largelyunaware of the proposed protected area’sstatus. In San Jose, communal distrust ofgovernment and outsiders was based onnearly 300 years of self-reliance and defacto resource control (Limaco 1994). InNovember 1995, CI’s president visited thesite of Chalalan and San JoseUchupiamonas and attended a communitygeneral assembly. The president, a prima-tologist discussed the importance of theMadidi National Park to Bolivia, theregion, and San Jose’s own future (Vieira1996b). Community leaders of San Josecriticized the park and stressed the impor-tance of their socioeconomic needs, butrecognized the value of biodiversityinvestment.

One week after the CI November 1995president’s, three colonist and logginginterests were hosted by San JoseUchupiamonas (Vieira 1996b). Eachvisiting group offered the community ofSan Jose Uchupiamonas financing for roadconstruction, a sawmill, electricity, andpotable water, in exchange for exclusiveaccess to Mahogany stands in the Pavi,Tachiapo, and Isiliamas watersheds. SanJose Uchupiamonas formally declined

external timber offers in December 1995following a general assembly attended byCI Bolivia (Vieira 1996a).

SYSTEMATIC BIODIVERSITY AND IMPACT

MONITORING (1995-1998)

Monitoring “Limits of AcceptableChange”In August 1995, CI began systematicmonitoring of biodiversity indicators,resource use, and project impact withinthe Madidi National Park at Chalalan Lakeunder Inter-American Development BankFinancing (Parker et al. 1990). From 1995to 1996, biological monitoring focusedprimarily on establishing a concept of “limitsto acceptable ecological change” within a3,500-hectare community ecotourismconcession at Lake Chalalan (Vieira 1996a).Baseline data were collected on severaltaxonomic groups prior to and duringconstruction of the Chalalan ecolodge.

Park-scale monitoring performed by CIand its partners included aerial overflightsand low-tech analyses of satellite imageryacquired by the RAP. Landsat imagery ofthe area was compiled to evaluate trendsin forest cover at landscape-scale, compar-ing dates prior to and following CI invest-ment (Vieira 1996b).

LOCAL MONITORING

By October 1995, the intensity of loggingand hunting in portions of the Madidi—

within the estimated 600,000 hectares ofthe lower Tuichi tributaries and humidAndean foothill forests that surround LakeChalalan—were clearly affecting floral andfaunal biodiversity. Uncontrolled loggingand hunting activities at the scale describedwere recognized as direct threats to theChalalan ecotourism lodge investment.

San Jose Uchupiamonas launched locallymanaged resource monitoring, focusing onhunting and logging activities. For nearlytwo years, the Chalalan community tookthe initiative and conservation responsibil-ity for a conservatively estimated 25,000hectares (Vieira 1996a). Staff patrolled theTuichi river margin forest in the ChalalanLake vicinity. Attention initially focused onthe forests between Lake Santa Rosa, theYariapo river, and the Atarisi canyon.Mahogany accumulation, river distribu-tion, and illegal vehicle use at armedcommercial logging camps also was ob-served and documented (Vieira 1996b).

The CI-Bolivia staff used baseline indica-tors to examine ecotourism impact (includ-ing trail condition, pre-project forestclearing, and pre-project trash accumula-tion) and initial lake water quality (chemis-try, turbidity, and coliform counts). Moni-toring information was used to directinvestment in trail construction, site newbuildings, and launch trash recycling andcomposting in the lodge.

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WILDLIFE MONITORING

CI-Bolivia project staff contracted withbiologists to work with community mem-bers from San Jose Uchupiamonas tointiate regular monitoring of wildlifepresence (Hennesy 1996). San Jose com-munity members and CI project staff haveconducted continuous habitat monitoringfor three years along the floodplain forest(300-380 meters in elevation), forest lakemargin (380 meters), Rayamayo andEslabon gallery forest (380- 420 meters),and Andean foothill forest (400-750 meters).

RESOURCE USE MONITORING

Throughout 1996, CI-Bolivia staff recordedan average of 21,000 cubic feet of mahoganyper boat on the Tuichi river. CI documentedtimber flows and hunting trends in the June1996 Tuichi Report and launched an envi-ronmental education campaign as anotherlong-term strategy in June 1996.

ECOTOURISM MONITORING

Tourism use by San Jose Uchupiamonasand Rurrenebaque at Lake Chalalanbegan in the 1970s. In 1996, baselineindicators of existing trail conditions,pre-project forest clearing, four-yearforest regeneration, pre-project trashaccumulation, and initial lake waterquality (chemistry, turbidity, and coliformcounts) were documented by CI-Boliviastaff.

RAPID BIOLOGICAL APPRAISAL AND

CONSERVATION

CI planned a RAP training session inMadidi National Park in 1997 to increasenational attention on the park.

In March 1997, Madidi National Parkguards began an inventory of downedtimber, posting signs along the Tuichi riverand informing logging crews about thepark’s legally protected status. In the samemonth, San Jose leaders and lodge workersexpelled loggers from two logging campsin the Eslabon river, seven kilometersfrom Lake Chalalan. They also constructedscience facilities for an upcoming fieldworkshop for Bolivian and Peruvianbiologists.

ECOTOURISM TRAINING, OPERATIONS,AND CONSERVATION

Three years of monitoring have shownmeasurable positive change in wildlifepopulations at Chalalan, including speciesparticularly disturbed during the pre-projectperiod of 1993-1995. Most notable is thefrequency of two populations of white-lipped peccaries, and a gradual return ofblack spider monkey populations that mostlikely are from refuge groups in the SerraniaRidge. Since the inauguration of theChalalan Ecolodge in June 1998, manyclients have paid premium prices forbirdwatching, wildlife viewing, and adven-ture tourism.

REFERENCES

Direccion General de Biodiversidad (GDB).1995. Decreto Supremo 2413. Declaraciondel Parque Nacional de Madidi y AreaNatural de Manejo Integrado. La Paz:Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y MedioAmbiente.

Hennessy, B. 1996. TREX: final consultantreport. La Paz: Conservation International-Bolivia.

Limaco, Z. 1994. Historia de San JoseUchupiamona. La Paz: Conservation Inter-national-Bolivia.

Mittermeier, R. et al. 1998. Megadiversity. (Wash-ington, DC: Conservation International).

Parker, T. et.al. 1990. A Biological Assessmentof the Alto Madidi. Washington DC, Conser-vation International.

Rioja, G. and D. Atkinson. 1995. CooperacionTecncia: Programa de Desarrollo Sostenibley Ecoturismo en San Jose Uchupiamonas yParque Nacional Madidi. La Paz: Conserva-tion International-Bolivia and Inter-Ameri-can Development Bank

Vieira, J. 1996a. Informe semestral delCoordinador: Programa de DesarrolloSostenible y Ecoturismo en San JoseUchupiamonas y Parque Nacional Madidi.La Paz: Conservation International-Bolivia.

Vieria, J. 1996b. Informe Tuichi: impactos deecoturismo y actividades madereras en elParque Nacional Madidi; Informe delCoordinador (CI-Bolivia/BID ATN-ME-4757-BO)

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CONSERVATIONINTERNATIONAL—GUATEMALA, THE PETÉN,GUATEMALA

Address: PROPETEN; Calle Central;Flores; Petén, Guatemala.Telephone: 011-502-926-1370Fax: 011-502-926-0495E-mail: [email protected] Address:http://www.conservation.org

Conrad Reining, Peter Kristensen, DanIrwin, Steve Sader, John Musinsky, CarlosSoza, James Nations, and Thomas Sever

INTRODUCTION

This case study is an example of thesuccessful application of high-tech remotesensing monitoring tools.

Remotely sensed data—especially satelliteimagery and aerial photos—have played animportant role in conservation for decades.Simple black-and-white or color compositeimages often have great scientific andpolitical utility. Because much remotelysensed data can also be obtained in digitalform, scientists and natural resourcemanagers have many ways of processingand analyzing data to gain a greater under-standing of land use and land change in agiven area. The emergence of powerfuland inexpensive computers and software inthe late 1980s made digital processing

much more accessible to land managers.This case study documents the use ofremotely sensed data that was collectedfrom Guatemala’s Petén region from 1986to 1997; the evolution in the use of suchdata; and the broad social, political, andscientific impacts of its use.

The change detection image and associ-ated statistics produced in 1996 made itpossible to see where, when, and how fastchange was occurring throughout theMaya Biosphere Reserve. Because changedata are digitally based, it is possible toview change data at many scales, rangingfrom the 2 million-hectare reserve to the687-hectare Biotopo Cerro Cahui. Changedata can be obtained for any managementunit—such as a national park or commu-nity resource management concession—that can be defined with a GeographicInformation System (GIS). Important linearfeatures, such as roads, waterways, pipelines,and international boundaries can be de-tected and monitored with this technology.

In 1988, Thomas Sever, then with the U.S.National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration’s Stennis Space Center,brought to Guatemala the first black-and-white LANDSAT image of the northwest-ern corner of Guatemala, where theDepartment of Petén borders the Mexicanstates of Tabasco and Chiapas. The imageclearly shows the political boundary ofGuatemala, because Tabasco farmers andcattlemen have cleared the forest up to the

international boundary (National Geo-graphic 1988. James Nations, then a seniorFulbright research scholar in Guatemalaand technical advisor to the Guatemalangovernment’s fledgling environmentalagencies, showed this photo to a half-dozen Guatemalan conservationists. Whenhe showed it to Andreas Lehnhoff, thenthe executive secretary of the NationalCouncil on Protected Areas (CONAP),Lehnhoff asked if he could have it to taketo a meeting the next day with GuatemalanPresident Marco Vinicio Cerezo. Nationsgave him the image. During his meetingthe next day in the National Palace,Lehnhoff spread the image out on thetable and gave the president a quickexplanation of what it was. Cerezo,shocked and amazed, called his secretaryover and said, “get the Mexican ambassa-dor on the phone, I need to talk to him.”Years later, Cerezo pointed to that satelliteimage as one of the factors that promptedhim to sign the 1990 law that created theMaya Biosphere Reserve.

THE MAYA BIOSPHERE RESERVE

The great lowland forests and wetlands ofnorthern Guatemala, southeastern Mexico,and northern Belize—collectively theSelva Maya—are under enormous threats.The threats stem from logging, ranching,oil development, and small-scale agricul-ture, combined with rapid populationgrowth, little high-level political supportfor conservation, and sociocultural prob-

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lems dating back hundreds of years. Theproblems are especially severe inGuatemala’s northern Petén region.

In 1989, to help address the problems ofwidespread deforestation, the GuatemalanCongress created a framework for acountrywide system of protected areas. In1990, the Maya Biosphere Reserve, whichspans much of the northern Petén and, at1.6 million hectares, occupies nearly 15percent of Guatemala’s land mass, wasdeclared a protected area. The reserve’smany ecosystems harbor a wealth ofbiodiversity, act as a carbon sink of globalimportance, nurture a well-establishedforest society, and provide employment tothousands of families.

In 1991, the United States (through theUnited States Agency for InternationalDevelopment) and Guatemala agreed toestablish the Maya Biosphere ReserveProject. The project’s goal is to conserve thebiodiversity, culture, and natural resourceeconomies of the reserve. The measuresneeded to achieve this goal include (afterSchwartz 1994):

● A coherent set of environmental poli-cies on issues ranging from oil develop-ment to timber harvesting;

● A strengthened, decentralized nationalpark service with local, regional, andnational political support;

● Resolution of land tenure problems

within the reserve (and the Peténgenerally);

● Collective, community-based control oflocal natural resources; and

● Environmentally sound economicalternatives, including mainstream andnature tourism, tailored to benefitpeople living in and near the reserve.

THE MONITORING PROGAM

Conservation International (CI) joined theMaya Biosphere Reserve Project in late1991. By early 1992, CI had opened officesin the Petén’s capital, Flores, and startedrecruiting staff. Its initial task in theproject was to help develop community-based natural resource management sys-tems, together with economic alternatives.

At the start of the Maya Biosphere Re-serve Project, there was little systematicinformation on the location and rates ofdeforestation in the reserve. There wereseveral efforts to characterize deforesta-tion in the region, but they were either toobroad in scope (covering the entire Peténand thus without sufficient spatial resolu-tion); too narrow to give a sense of whatwas happening in the entire reserve; or notaccurate enough to provide useful infor-mation. Also, important physical featuressuch as protected areas, roads, and com-munities were not combined with defores-tation analyses in any systematic way.

Data availability was also a problem.Guatemala’s Planning Secretariat, the oneinstitution in the country with significantamounts of satellite data before 1996, wasreluctant to grant CI, other NGOs, or evenother government agencies access to theirdata. The satellite data were not availablein digital format, but only as very largeformat prints that were difficult to use.

As a result, even though the governmentaland nongovernmental institutions respon-sible for carrying out the Maya BiosphereProject knew more or less where defores-tation was occurring, they were unable toaccurately pinpoint, quantify, and monitorthis deforestation. Given the need for abasic measure of landscape-level land useand land cover change at several scales, CIsought to develop a system to monitorchanges in the forest cover The objectivesof that system were to

● Improve both the overall and site-specific understanding of deforestationtrends;

● Establish a forest cover baseline forspecific dates that could be periodicallyupdated to track changes in forest cover;

● Create a communications tool for usewith both policymakers and the generalpublic;

● Provide a management tool for theMaya Biosphere Reserve project andother efforts dedicated to conservingthe resources of the reserve;

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● Compare deforestation rates and trendswithin the reserve to those within thebuffer zone, which provides someindication of the protection status andthreats to the reserve borders; and

● Widely disseminate deforestation trendinformation to governmental andnongovernmental institutions.

CHOOSING A METHODOLOGY

CI initiated the change detection projectin late 1995, and decided to use widelyavailable and relatively high-resolution(30m) Landsat imagery. According toSader (1996), time-series analysis ofsatellite imagery offers the best opportu-nity to visualize and quantify forest-clearing patterns in the remote northernPetén region, which was practically undis-turbed prior to the mid-1980s.

DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS

Landsat imagery for 1986, 1990, 1993, and1995 (covering about 90 percent of theMaya Biosphere Reserve) was acquired in1996. A Normalized Difference VegetationIndex (NDVI) was calculated for all fourdates using ERDAS-Imagine imageprocessing software. Field visits wereconducted to observe ground conditionsand confirm the sensitivity of the changedetection classification method. Thechange image was also compared with a1995 Landsat color composite of the area.Cloud and seasonal flooding contamina-

tion of the images were edited out usingGIS. The boundaries of protected areas,major roads, towns, rivers, and othergeographic features were also added. Achange detection image for the 1986-1995period was produced and distributed tothe public in November 1996. In early1998, 1997 imagery was acquired andadded to the image. The resulting imagehas eight classes of information: wetlands,forest, water, pasture/agriculture/urbanareas, and forest change 1995-97, forestchange 1993-95, forest change 1990-93,and forest change 1986-90.

RESULTS OF THE CHANGE DETECTION

ANALYSIS

The data confirm and quantify what resourcemanagers have known all along, but have beenunable to determine or track precisely until theadvent of this change detection technique.Most deforestation is occurring along theTabasco-Petén border, the Rio San Pedro nearEl Naranjo, the road to Melchor de Mencos,the southern and eastern portions of Sierra delLacandon National Park, and the area sur-rounding the oil-related infrastructure inLaguna del Tigre National Park. These areareas where it has been very difficult to estab-lish and maintain government or NGO conser-vation presence, in part because they do nothave adequate all-weather roads or decent riveraccess.

The NDVI change detection processproduces both a visual change detection

image and statistics for change and landarea that correspond to the eight differentclasses of information. Estimates of forestchange are reported as rates in percent peryear. Rates of change are computed basedon the total area of recent forest clearingin the time period divided by the total areaof forest and wetland classes at the begin-ning of that time period. Thus, the changereported is relative to the undisturbed forestand wetland base that exists at the beginningof a time period. This area is almost alwaysless than the size of the protected areaunder the May 1990 law that created theMaya Biosphere Reserve, and, in most cases,has been decreasing over time.

There are several important conclusions todraw from the data. First, relative rates ofecosystem change are much higher for thebuffer zone than for the multiple-use zonethroughout the period of the analysis. Forthe 1990-93 period, yearly change wasnearly 17 times higher in the buffer zonethan in the multiple-use zone. For the1993-95 period, change was 15 timeshigher in the buffer zone, and for 1995-9713 times higher. In an encouraging sign,rates of change decreased in the bufferzone during 1995-97, after increasingthroughout the 1986-95 period, while themultiple-use zone and core-zone changeheld steady, also after having increasedconsistently during the 1986-95 period. Inthe case of the buffer zone, change may bedecreasing because the amount of remain-ing forest is dwindling.

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COMMUNICATION

The release of the maps depicting defores-tation in the Maya Biosphere Reserve hada dramatic impact on the country and themanagement of the reserve. In November1996, CI hosted a press conference withCONAP and Guatemala’s National Com-mission on the Environment (CONAMA)to unveil the 1986-1995 change-detectionimage of the Maya Biosphere Reserve.This was the first time a satellite image ofthe entire Maya Biosphere Reserve hadbeen put on a single page of paper.

The “wow factor” is one of the strengths ofmapped remote-sensing data. Politicians anddecisionmakers almost always have a strongreaction when they see an objective illustra-tion of what the situation looks like fromspace. The news of the maps made the frontpages the next day of the major Guatemalannewspapers. Prensa Libre, Siglo 21, and ElGrafico, leading to a spate of articles on thestate of the reserve. The images clearlyserved to raise awareness on the part of themedia. One editorial writer remarked, “Icame away amazed. Though I had a vagueidea of what was happening in the Petén, Ihad not imagined the extent of the damage,nor how much change had occurred in 10years in the forests and savannas of theMaya Biosphere Reserve” (Villatoro 1996).Many other articles also expressed alarm atthe level of deforestation in the Petén andcalled on the government to take decisiveaction (Castro 1996).

On a negative note, the event souredrelations between CI and CONAP, becauseCONAP officials began taking heat in thepress for “not doing their job” to protectthe reserve. CI had involved CONAP andCONAMA in the preparations for thepress conference, and had shared advancecopies of the change images with officialsfrom these institutions. CI had viewed theevent as an opportunity to raise awarenessat the national level concerning problemsin the Maya Biosphere Reserve and,perhaps naively, thought that this mighthelp strengthen the hands of CONAP andCONAMA. Indeed the top officials ofCONAP and CONAMA had eagerlyagreed to participate in the press confer-ence. CONAP officials became verydefensive, however, once the press andothers began criticizing them for theproblems in the Petén.

The press conference sparked a great dealof interest in the uses of remote sensing,particularly on the part of NGOs andgovernment agencies working in thePetén. CI was besieged by requests fordata in late 1996 and early 1997. Theorganization had not anticipated such astrong demand and was unable to satisfyrequests in an orderly and systematic wayfor some months after the presentation,resulting in criticism of CI-Guatemala.(One lesson from this experience is thatthere must be a distribution strategy andcapacity in place before high-profile dataare presented to the public.)

The change detection images made clearthe utility of remote sensing and associ-ated products, but CI was not the idealplace for a centralized repository ofinformation on the Maya BiosphereReserve. This task is best carried out by agovernment natural resource agency thatgenuinely allows easy access to data or byan NGO dedicated to this purpose. Realiz-ing this, CONAP in mid-1997 established adata monitoring and analysis center in thePetén (CEMEC) with U.S. Agency forInternational Development funds andtechnical assistance from CI and otherNGOs in the region. This monitoringcenter has done very well. For example,shortly after its establishment, CEMECproduced maps that showed how proposedoil concessions would overlap with corezones of the reserve. These maps wereinstrumental in persuading the govern-ment to withdraw these concessions fromthe international bidding round held inHouston in November 1997. Thus, as adirect result of the change detectionimages, local capacity to acquire, process,and analyze remotely sensed data hasincreased dramatically.

Part of CEMEC’s responsibility, along withits NGO partners, other national govern-ment agencies, and local governments, willbe to establish a long-term monitoringscheme for the reserve. Remotely senseddata and change detection products forman essential part of this monitoring system.Sader (1996), for example, proposes a

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system for ongoing monitoring based on astandardized 100-km2 UUTM grid. Long-term monitoring based on managementunits (such as parks, community conces-sions, and corridors) is also possible.

COMMUNITY-LEVEL IMPACTS

Change detection images and other re-mote sensing products also have manyuses at the community level. Well beforethe change detection images were pre-sented to the press in Guatemala City, CIstaff in the Petén were using images tohelp communities inside the Maya Bio-sphere Reserve understand where they fitinside the reserve. A particularly usefultechnique is to identify waterholes andother landmarks that can be seen easily onthe images. These are then presented tocommunities, often as part of a slide showdescribing the Maya Biosphere Reserveand the activities of CI. In many instances,rural people have never seen a satelliteimage or aerial photo, and certainly notone where they can recognize the land-marks. CI field staff say it is like “lightbulbs going off” when people suddenlyunderstand the broader context in whichthey live. This understanding leads directlyto greater environmental awareness andsupport for conservation activities. Inthose communities in the reserve whereCI has been active, environmental aware-ness had grown dramatically since 1992(Schwartz et al 1996).

CHANGES IN PARK MANAGEMENT

The images instantly became an essentialpart of the strategic management of thereserve. In 1996, the U.S. Agency forInternational Development began reorga-nizing the Maya Biosphere ReserveProject to reflect a “results framework”loosely based on the logical frameworkapproach that the agency pioneered in thelate 1960s.

The results framework helped focusproject efforts in specific geographic areasand established a set of progress indicatorsto be shared by all project participants.The change images supported this processby highlighting areas of rapid deforesta-tion. The statistics on forest change pro-vided accurate and timely information fora key indicator: deforestation.

In early 1997, the U.S.Agency for Interna-tional Development organized a series ofmeetings with project participants de-signed to produce an “integrated” yearlyworkplan based on the results framework.A large-format version of an image show-ing changes from 1986 to 1995 was promi-nently displayed at those meetings. It wasimpossible to ignore the rapid change inand around Laguna del Tigre and Sierradel Lacandon national parks.

THE MONITORING PROGRAM, PHASE Ii

Settlement MosaicsAs part of CI’s work in Laguna del Tigre in1998, several mosaics of newly establishedsettlements were created from photosobtained during July overflights. These areuseful for demarcating boundaries, estab-lishing management plans, and creatingenvironmental awareness.

Aerial Photos in Conjunction withSatellite ImagerySader (1995), in a study of forest clearingaround roads in the Petén, found thatabout 90 percent of forest clearing be-tween 1986 and 1990 took place withinthree kilometers of established roads.Combining aerial photos with satelliteimagery is useful for quantifying andmonitoring these indirect effects (espe-cially colonization) of oil and road devel-opment in tropical forest areas.

CI-Guatemala created an aerial photomosaic of 36,000 hectares of the mostheavily affected land around the oil infra-structure in Laguna del Tigre. A detailedchange-detection analysis was conductedusing this mosaic overlaid on 1995 satellitedata. The analysis revealed that over 4percent of this 36,000-hectare area wascleared from 1995 to 1997. Nearly all theclearing took place near the oil road andpipeline corridor.

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The BenefitsA major benefit of change detection arethe data showing where the roads andcolonization points are, what kinds offorests are out there, and where environ-mentalists need to concentrate forces.

This information is important both in areasundergoing rapid change and in large,remote areas where field data collection isdifficult and expensive. The techniquedescribed in this paper provides a land-scape-level perspective as well as detailedinformation about changes at the commu-nity and even farm level.

Change detection data are easy to useonce image processing has been com-pleted. Although best done in a well-equipped remote-sensing laboratory,image processing can be accomplished atthe field level if appropriate equipmentand personnel are available, especiallyonce initial procedures have been estab-lished. Manipulation and analysis ofprocessed data can certainly be done atthe field level. Increasing computingpower, new software, and better telecom-munications should continue to lower thebarriers to country and field processing,manipulation, and analysis.

REFERENCES

Castro, Haroldo. The Maya Biosphere ReserveFrom Space: A National Emergency Issue.Internal Report.(Washington, DC: Conserva-tion International, 1996).

Sader, Steven A. Forest Monitoring and Satel-lite Change Detection Analysis of the MayaBiosphere Reserve, Petén District, Guate-mala. (Final Report submitted to Conserva-tion International and the US Agency forInternational Development, 1996).

Sader, S.A. 1995. “Spatial characteristics offorest clearing and vegetation regrowth asdetected by Landsat Thematic Mapperimagery.” Photogrammetric Engineering andRemote Sensing 61:1145-51.

Schwartz, Norman B. et al. 1996.SocioeconomicMonitoring and Evaluation of ConservationInternational/ProPetén Project in the MayaBiosphere Reserve Project, 1992-1996.(Flores, Petén, Guatemala: ConservationInternational, 1996 internal report)..

Schwartz, Norman B. private communication,1994.

Villatoro, Eduardo P. 1996. “Cuando no hayapeces” (editorial). Guatemala City: PrensaLibre, Nov. 30, 1996.

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CONSERVATIONINTERNATIONAL (CI),WASHINGTON DC

Address: 2501 M Street, NW; Suite 200;Washington DC 20037; USA.Tel: 202.429.5660Fax: 202.887.0193E-mail: [email protected] Address:http://www.conservation.org

By Amy R. Sweeting and Ian Bowles

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, we have seen a changein the nature of threats to conservation inthe areas in which we work. Although theprimary concerns of conservationistsformerly included the threats of agricul-tural expansion, migration, and slash andburn deforestation, the ecosystems we areworking to protect now are under growingthreat from large-scale industrial develop-ment such as natural resource extractionthrough oil and gas exploration, logging,and mining. Developing countries areharvesting their natural resources at arapid pace to meet the growing globaldemand for fossil fuels, timber, minerals,and other resources, and for their ownneed for foreign capital and economicdevelopment.

ORGANIZATION

CI’s Policy DepartmentThe Conservation International (CI)Conservation Policy Department wasformed in 1993 to provide technicalsupport to field projects in four majorprogrammatic areas: conservation policyand law, natural resource economics,innovative conservation financing mecha-nisms, and reform of and collaborationwith international development agencies.In addition to working closely with otherCI programs to implement individualprojects in the field, the department alsofocuses on a number of global-level issues(such as resource extraction) that affectevery region in which we work.

Objective of the ExtractiveIndustries ProjectThe objective of the extractive industriesproject is to promote the best practicespossible by extractive industries. Thisdemands that we understand these indus-tries and become informed participants inthe debate over whether and how resourceextraction should proceed in certainsensitive ecosystems.

For each extractive industry, our approachvaries slightly based on economic, techni-cal, political, and scientific factors.

Oil, Gas, and Mining. The oil, gas andmining strategy has been to make relevanttechnical information available to allstakeholders concerning best technologiesand practices, to work directly with se-lected companies, and to encourage aregional planning approach that will steerdevelopment away from ecologicallysensitive areas.

Timber Extraction. With timber extrac-tion—a form of resource use typicallycharacterized by a larger “footprint” ofactivity—we have been rigorously docu-menting the overall trend in large-scalelogging, particularly by multinationalfirms, and communicating our findings todecision makers and the media.


The monitoring program has focused ontracking the presence of oil and gas,mining, and timber concessions. Thisinvolves compiling information on thecompanies that hold these concessions andthe basic processes and impacts of eachindustry. This information serves twocomplementary purposes. First, it helps tohighlight both the degree and the imme-diacy of the threat to conservation, in-creasing our ability to attract both supportand funding for conservation activities.

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Second, it makes us better informedparticipants in the negotiation process,giving us more credibility with govern-ments and industry, and a greater ability toeffectively assist our partner NGOs andcommunities in the field.

GATHERING BASIC INFORMATION

The first step in tracking natural resourceextraction is acquiring a fundamentalunderstanding of the industries that we areplanning to monitor. We used a deliberateprocess to acquire this understanding.

1. The investigations began with researchusing books, industry journals, thepress, magazines, company reports, andother printed materials, as well aselectronic sources such as databasesand the Internet, to gain a generalunderstanding of each industry.

2. Equipped with this basic knowledge,we then interviewed experts in the fieldfrom organizations ranging from theWorld Bank to national governments toindividual companies.

3. In several cases, we supplemented ourresearch with site visits to oil, mining,or timber operations in order to gain afirst-hand understanding of the pro-cesses.

4. We then input the information on mapsshowing the exact locations of indi-vidual concessions.

5. Finally, we researched which companyor consortium of companies had rightsto each concession.

FINDING THE OWNERSHIP OF

CONCESSION RIGHTS

For the oil, gas, and mining industries, thisresearch is relatively straightforward.Governments generally offer concessionsin public bidding rounds, whereas compa-nies—at least the large internationalones—are usually forthcoming withinformation about which concessions theyare working (although the exact spotwhere exploration is focused may be moreconfidential). Oil, gas, and mining compa-nies also often have web sites that detailtheir concession locations or present mapsin their annual reports

However, tracking the activities of loggingcompanies has proven much more of achallenge. The large international compa-nies are often very secretive, even hidingbehind local company names. Neverthe-less, it was possible to find the responsiblecompanies through extensive research. Weused sources such as the U.S. Library ofCongress databases, electronic informa-tion services such as Lexis/Nexis, pub-lished and unpublished materials, andannual reports. Using these sources, wewere able to identify most of the majorforeign logging companies active in keyconservation areas in the tropics.

COMMUNICATION

We used maps, reports in the forms ofpolicy briefs, and a database. These prod-ucts have given CI tools to impress upongovernments and other target audiencesthe extent of the problem, even helping toinspire the creation of a national park inSuriname. The project has also allowed CIto improve the effectiveness of some of itsother activities

MapsGlobal Maps. It was decided that mapswould be the most effective and simplestway to communicate findings on theseextractive industries. We developed twomapping techniques to show both the rateand scale of increase in oil, mining, andtimber concessions.

Our first map project was a large-scale“Extractive Industries in the BiodiversityHotspots” map. This world map usedcolored dots to show the approximatelocation and number of existing oil, gas,and mining exploration and developmentsites, was well as proposed or currenttimber concessions, within the tropicalbiodiversity hotspots and wilderness areaswhere CI works.

For each section of the map, we developednumbered guides to the individual dotsthat corresponded to a database of com-pany names, concession names, geographiclocations, size of concessions and, in the

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case of mining, which mineral was beingdeveloped.

This global map was not designed torepresent a complete analysis of thedistribution of these industries throughoutthe world, nor the degree of coincidencewith biodiversity hotspots. Rather, iteffectively illustrated the specific occur-rence of these concessions in key conser-vation areas. We plan to continue refiningthis map over the next several years.

Time-Series Maps: The global maps aremeant to highlight overall trends and theneed for broad-scale regional planning ofresource extraction. However, showingconcession locations, effective project, andlocal-level conservation requires morespecific detail on each country, includingthe size and shape of concessions and therate of expansion. To meet this need, wehave developed several sets of “time-series” maps.

These maps show existing timber, mining,or oil developments in various incrementsover the last several decades—for ex-ample, 20 years ago, 10 years ago, andtoday. Like the global map, the time seriesare accompanied by databases that offermore detail on companies, concessions,and activities. By showing the rapid andrecent increase in investment in areas thatwere previously virtually untouched, wecan demonstrate the urgency of the threatsto these areas. To date, we have developed

time-series maps of mining and timberconcessions in the Guianas (Guyana,Suriname, and French Guiana) and oilconcessions in the Petén region of northernGuatemala. We plan to complete more setsof time-series maps in the coming years.

Policy BriefsFinally, to more widely disseminate thesemaps as well as to raise awareness ontrends in natural resource extraction, wepublished a CI policy brief on the threeextractive industries entitled NaturalResource Extraction in the Latin AmericanTropics: A Recent Wave of InvestmentPoses New Challenges for BiodiversityConservation. The document presents arefined map of timber, oil and gas, andmining concessions in key Latin Americanconservation areas, as well as the timeseries of timber and mining in the Guianasand oil development in northern Guate-mala. The text of the document includesbroad introductions about trends in eachof the three extractive industries andpresents recommendations for conserva-tionists and other stakeholders.

This policy brief was intended as a tool foruse by NGOs, conservationists, localcommunities, development agencies,governments, and other stakeholdersconcerned with the future of conservationin Latin America. Although it offersseveral concrete recommendations forhow to think about resource extraction and

how to approach the threat, it is intendedmainly to raise public awareness aboutthese trends and to aid in the search fornew solutions to address them.

Because the policy brief focuses on LatinAmerica and may potentially be used bymany small community and environmentalgroups, as well as national and localgovernments, we have commissioned aSpanish translation of the brief. We plan toprint and distribute it in Spanish.

IMPACT

CI’s tracking of the expansion of extractiveindustries into important biodiversityareas has been well-received by NGOs,governments, development agencies,media organizations, and other stakehold-ers that are trying to demonstrate theoverlap of development and conservationpriorities. A version of our map waspresented to World Bank President JamesWolfensohn and was reprinted in TheWashington Post. The policy brief hasbeen featured on National Public Radioand in The Miami Herald and severalLatin American publications.

Having this information available increasesour flexibility as a department and anorganization, heightening our ability torespond quickly and effectively to emerg-ing threats to conservation. An example isthe recent creation of the CentralSuriname Nature Reserve in Suriname.

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ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTSACTION (ERA), NIGERIA

Address: Environmental Rights Action[Era]/Friends Of The Earth Nigeria; #214,Uselu-Lagos Road; P. O. Box 10577;Uselu-Lagos; Benin City; Nigeria.Telephone/Fax: 234 52 600165E-mail: [email protected]

By Isaac Osuoka

INTRODUCTION

Environmental Rights Action (ERA) is aNigerian environmental advocacy organi-zation established in January 1993 by threehuman rights activists based in the South-ern Nigerian town of Benin City. ERA isdedicated to the defense of people’s rightsto live within an environment conducive totheir survival. Because people depend onthe endowments of nature, any activitythat threatens the integrity of the naturalenvironment violates the basic right ofpeople and communities to survival.

ERA was established in response toinformation from inhabitants of the nearbyOkomu community that a Frenchtransnational rubber corporation plannedto cut down parts of the Okomu forestreserve and convert it into a monoculturerubber plantation. This developmentthreatened local populations dependent onthe forest for their survival. It reflected acommon trend of human rights violations

in Southern Nigeria, where 75 percent ofcases reported to human rights organiza-tions are related to ecological degradation.In response, activists began working withcommunities like Okomu to monitornatural resource exploitation by thegovernment and private companies.

CONSTRAINTS ON ERA’S EFFECTIVE

OPERATION

Repressive Government Decrees.Many government officials see governmentservice as a means to accumulate wealth.Decrees that encourage unsustainable use ofnatural resources are common. The regimeconsiders advocates of environmentalhuman rights as enemies and troublemakers,and it treats them accordingly.

Government Support of PolluterActivities. The central government is inpartnership with transnational corpora-tions in some environmentally damagingactivities such as oil extraction. Govern-ment agencies responsible for the monitor-ing and regulation of environmentalstandards therefore lack the political willand resources to be effective. In addition,independent monitoring is discouraged bythe government and its business part-ners—the oil and mining corporations.

Community Distrust of Outsiders.Lack of trust is often a problem whenworking with local communities. Residentswho have been cheated by governments,

companies, loggers, and others under-standably do not always trust outsiders.Fortunately, ERA’s experience is thatbuilding trust can occur quite quickly.ERA’s use of indigenous volunteers whospeak the language of the area beingmonitored helps aid communication andenhance the trust-building process.

Logistical Constraints. ERA workersare often hindered by transportationproblems in remote forest and wetlandsareas. In the Niger Delta area, mosttransportation is on water, but boat trans-portation is very expensive and irregular.This constraint, coupled with limitedresources, can be crippling.

Lack of NGO Experience and Capac-ity. Some ERA monitors have limitedtechnical knowledge and experience. Goodtraining can ease this problem, but train-ing all the monitors would be expensive.

Staffing Constraints. The large amountand frequency of information and datafrom the monitors sometimes becomes aproblem. Project officers do not alwayshave the time or the resources to respondto all the alerts. In addition, the relativelyhigh frequency of publications such asfield reports makes follow-up of all casesdifficult because of the limited number ofproject officers and resources available.ERA project officers try to consider this achallenge instead of a burden.

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Funding Constraints. In the past fiveyears, funding for ERA activities hasimproved. ERA receives donations fromorganizations and individuals both withinand outside the country. These donationsare for specific ERA activities. However, itis difficult to raise money for monitoringbecause some funding organizationsconsidered it an intangible activity. ERAwill often link monitoring to other activi-ties with clearer and sometimes predeter-mined outputs.

ORGANIZATION

MissionERA formally describes its mission as“The defense of human ecosystems interms of human rights, and the promotionof environmentally responsible govern-ment, commercial, community and indi-vidual practice in Nigeria through theempowerment of local people.”

ObjectivesERA has a number of objectives related tothe above mission and philosophy. Theobjective most closely related to monitor-ing is very straightforward: “Monitornatural resource exploitation by govern-ment and private companies.”


Monitoring: A Tool for ResistanceERA feels that monitoring is an important

means of achieving its goals. The taskinvolves being on the alert to identifyproduction activities or laws and policiesthat pose a threat to the integrity of thenatural environment. When such activitiesor policies are identified, they are exposedto a public that include policymakers andcommercial interests. Publicly revealingenvironmentally harmful activities is ameans of pressuring policymakers andtransgressors to stop the activity.

Monitoring strategies will not succeed iflocal communities are not actively involvedin the processes. In addition to seeking topressure government and industry to stop orreform particular development projects, weare working to transform the social realitythat encourages the unsustainable exploita-tion of natural resources.

As logging, plantation development, andoil and gas extraction activities are mainlycarried out in rural areas, the local popula-tions have better on-the-ground knowl-edge of project activities. Their participa-tion in monitoring makes the ERA processmore effective. In addition, their participa-tion in the process helps prepare localinterests to engage in protest activities.Monitoring therefore becomes a tool forresisting environmental injustice.

DATA GATHERING

The process of monitoring primarilyconsists of volunteers and field officers

receiving information on a proposed orexisting activity with potentially damagingconsequences to the natural environmentand local populations. The monitors thenalert the national coordinator, who in turnidentifies and contacts relevant volunteersto visit the area in question.

SOURCES OF ERA DATA

During monitoring, ERA gathers data thatexpose threats to the natural environmentand local populations. Such data includegovernment legislation, policy statements,and corporate documents. Other datainclude photographs, videotapes, andmaps, which may be obtained from rel-evant government departments and evenfrom companies. However, the mostimportant data ERA collects is frommembers of nearby communities.

Participatory Research. In conductingparticipatory research, ERA field officerstry to immerse themselves in local life tounderstand the perspective of the people.Rural communities usually have a pro-found knowledge of their ecosystems.Tapping local knowledge is an importantaim of participatory research.

Field Research. Field visits are meant toobtain a more or less general picture ofthe extractive activity and the existing orpotential threat to the natural environ-ment and local populations. Volunteerssent to do field research usually have some

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knowledge of the local language spoken inthe area as well as technical knowledge ofthe particular exploitation activity or theecological dynamics of the affected area.

Documents and Other Data onCorporations or Government. Dataare also collected from sources within thecorporation or government agency respon-sible for the activity in question. Collec-tion of such data in a country like Nigeria,where the state does not encourage open-ness, is difficult, but concerned sourceswithin companies and government agen-cies are sometimes willing to make papersavailable.

DATA ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

Data are synthesized by project officers tofit into the ERA format for reports forpresentation to the public. This stage mayinvolve relevant data from ERA’s participa-tory research, fieldwork, government andcorporate sources, the media, and previouspublications of ERA and other researchorganizations. The format for ERA reportsis designed to portray how degradation ofthe natural environment affects the condi-tion of local populations.

Data Verification. A major responsibil-ity of project officers is to verify theauthenticity of information from themonitors and other sources. ERA backs upits claims whenever possible with docu-ments and photographs. Names and

descriptions of information sources aresometimes also documented if appropri-ate. This is usually the case with commu-nity sources, but if the source is a civilservant or industry employee whoseposition might be at risk if he or she isexposed as the source of information, weusually keep the identify private. Also,some sources of information would not liketo be identified as such because of fear ofreprisals from the military dictatorship.

ERA also encourages company or govern-ment agency reviews of their reports. ERAgives its information more credibility byallowing the government and corporationsto respond to its allegations. If the infor-mation is inaccurate, the corporation has achance to defend itself. If the informationis correct, the company must admit it orimplicitly admit its guilt by not respond-ing. A transparent methodology allowsERA to back up its claims with honestlyobtained information.

COMMUNICATION

AudiencesThe General Public. A component ofthe monitoring process is the communica-tion of the data to the public. Such com-munications are intended to raise aware-ness and galvanize public opinion topressure relevant authorities and forcethem to terminate or change an environ-mentally damaging project.

Media. Newspapers and radio stations areanother ERA target. ERA issues pressstatements and releases its publications tothe press, where they are frequently citedin stories on the environment. ERAorganizes press conferences to addressparticularly serious issues.

The international media are also part ofthe ERA audience. Most of the time, ERAinformation is given to the internationalpress by one of several organizations inother countries that regularly receive ERAinformation via e-mail. These organiza-tions are mostly European and NorthAmerican groups involved in campaignsagainst environmental injustice.

International NGOs. ERA benefitsfrom the solidarity of partner organiza-tions. These international NGOs are animportant means through which ERA getsits information distributed internationally.

Government. Various levels of Nigeria’sgovernment are also a prime target ofERA communications. Governmentofficials have rarely responded except toharass ERA staff. However, ERA continuesto share its publications with government.

COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS

Monitor Reports. ERA monitor reports,which are the organization’s major reports,highlight information gathered from

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intensive monitoring campaigns. Monitorreports contain ERA’s analyses of thecauses of ecological problems. Thesecauses include methods and technologiesused by unsustainable developmentactivities and the legal framework govern-ing such activities.

Field Reports. ERA field reports arecompiled from the monitoring fieldtrips byproject officers. They are mostly follow-ups or updates to activities highlighted inmonitor reports, but they may containfresh data on an ecologically threateningactivity.

Environmental Testimonies. Environ-mental testimonies consist of interviewswith local residents about environmentallydamaging activities. They are recordedand presented without alterations. Thegoal is to highlight the plight of the victimsof ecological damage. Environmentaltestimonies are obtained by project offic-ers and monitors through taped interviewswith community leaders whose names arepublished as testifying to the revelationsthat ERA makes in its field reports. Forexample, ERA’s monitoring of a MobilCorp. oil spill that devastated the entirecoastline of Nigeria resulted in environ-mental testimony demonstrating thatclean-up claims by the company werefraudulent.

Action Alerts. Action alerts call for localand international actions against environ-mentally destructive projects. They areissued through mass distributions ofleaflets and published in local newspapers.Action alerts were issued against Michelinin 1994 when the tire company planned tocut down the Okomu forest reserve toestablish rubber tree plantations.

Niger Delta Alert. The Niger DeltaAlert is published monthly by the DeltaInformation Service of ERA. It highlightsoil industry and logging activities, whichcause damage to the mangroves andrainforests, as well as human rights abusesagainst members of local communities.Niger Delta Alerts are printed on paper forlocal distribution and are also distributed toorganizations around the world via e-mail.

React Program. ERA has designed theReact Programs to promote the twinobjective of ecological monitoring andcommunity empowerment. The ReactProgram involves conducting open forumsin villages in which members of the com-munity and ERA representatives discussperceptions of the natural environment. Inthese forums, local people express whatthey consider to be environmental prob-lems. Such forums support and strengthentraditional community institutions relevantto monitoring and regulating of forestexploitation.

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FRIENDS OF THEEARTH–AMAZÔNIAPROGRAMME—BRAZIL

Address: Av. Brigadeiro Luis Antonio,4442 CEP; 01402-002 -Sao Paulo- SP;Brazil.Tel: (55-11) 38.87.93.69Fax: (55-11) 38.84.27.95E-mail: [email protected] Address: www.amazonia.org.br

by Roberto Smeraldi1

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes how the Friends ofthe Earth–Amazônia Program (FOE-AP)developed a five-year process to monitorillegal logging and timber trade in theBrazilian Amazon. The monitoring hasbeen instrumental in fostering a betterunderstanding of the problems affectingthe timber sector, the need for forestconservation, and the conditions forsustainable development in Brazil.

FOE-AP began in 1989 as a small unitwithin the Friends of the Earth Interna-tional network. The program was startedafter some European Friends of the Earthgroups had conducted campaigns relatingto the Brazilian Amazon, including oppo-

sing the Xingu dams, World Bank loans forother projects, and the creation of extrac-tive reserves. These groups becameconvinced that a local chapter in Brazilwas needed. Since 1989, FOE-AP hasprogressively changed from a unit of aninternational NGO to an active BrazilianNGO. It was legally incorporated in Brazilin 1993.

ORGANIZATION

The MissionFriends of the Earth International is a world-wide federation of national environmentalorganizations. This federation aims to:

● Protect the Earth against furtherdeterioration and restore past damage;

● Preserve the Earth’s ecological, cul-tural, and ethnic diversity;

● Increase public participation anddemocratic decision making;

● Achieve social, economic, and politicaljustice, as well as equal access toresources and opportunities; and

● Promote environmentally sustainabledevelopment at the local, national,regional, and global levels.

ObjectivesIn 1993, FOE-AP decided to focus onmonitoring the occurrence, magnitude,dynamics, and regional distribution of illegallogging activities. Logging was rapidlyreplacing agro-ranching as the driving forcebehind the expansion of the colonizationfrontier. Given that trend, it was clear thatFOE-AP should focus on logging.

At the time, most existing campaigns andinitiatives by environmental groups fo-cused on urging governments to takestricter measures to limit or ban logging,or to restrict trade in timber products (orboth). But FOE-AP felt that this regula-tory approach was misguided. Strengthen-ing the legal apparatus without improvingits implementation was creating an evenlarger gap between the law and the reality.Instead, FOE-AP would use monitoring toshow the extent of illegal logging and thusbring pressure to bear on the governmentto uphold the laws.


The Monitoring StrategyFOE-AP believes that the most powerfulmonitoring strategy is a combination offield monitoring and legal research. Theseaspects of monitoring should always becombined in order to discover the unex-

1 Roberto Smeraldi is the Coordinator of Friends of the Earth–Amazônia Program in Brazil. A journalist by training, he was chairperson of the International NGO Steering Committee forUnited Nations Conferece on Environment and Development from 1990 to 1992. He serves on several boards and advisory committees of environmental programs and institutions.

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pected mechanisms that permit illegalresource extraction.

The organization applies this strategy bybuilding a thorough knowledge of existinglegislation and rules, as well as previousjudicial decisions, before deciding on itsfield monitoring activities. This is espe-cially relevant when analyzing manage-ment plans and government authorizationof them, because illegal logging is oftenmade possible by loopholes in the law orthe misuse of official licenses.

DEVELOPING THE MONITORING PLAN

In planning the illegal logging and timbertrade monitoring campaign, a very prag-matic, factual, case-by-case approach wasused. FOE-AP avoided relying on a prede-termined methodology, which might haveinfluenced the scope of the research. Theorganization instead started with theassumption that all groups involved in thetimber trade should be heard from inorder to fine-tune the scope and directionof the investigation. The ensuing discus-sions included representatives fromenvironmental, social, labor, and humanrights groups, as well as both private andpublic individuals and organizations.

This was an important learning process forFOE-AP. Listening to the views of allinvolved sectors, including those who werecarrying out the illegal activities, was

crucial to understanding the mentality andrationale behind the environmentallyharmful practices. This helped narrow thescope of the research, establish priorities,and improved interpretation of the results.

The best way to conduct the investigationwas to use field observations to check theinformation provided by federal sources inBrasilia. Demonstrating the inconsisten-cies between the official information andthe reality on the ground was a keymethod of exposing the illegal practices.

FOE-AP had no official plan. We neededto be flexible and learn as the programproceeded, particularly since there weremany differences among the nine states inthe Brazilian Amazon as well as internaldifferences within the states. Had weestablished a fixed procedure, we mighthave been less receptive to analyzingcertain local information that was incom-plete or did not include the needed back-ground. Some less-than-perfect informa-tion proved to be important.

DATA COLLECTION

Government DataThe Brazilian constitution establishesgeneric rules on transparency in publicadministration. However, there are nospecific “freedom of information” regula-tions requiring the release of information.In FOE-AP’s experience, different govern-

ment bodies could be either forthcomingor secretive. Even the same organizationsswitched their attitudes, depending on thesituation. Their responses were rarelybased on legal obligations, but instead ontheir understanding of how the informa-tion request could help or hurt them.

A good example of FOE-AP’s relationswith government and its ability to obtainpertinent government information can beseen in the interactions between FOE-APand IBAMA, the official federal environ-mental agency. At the beginning of theillegal logging and timber trade monitor-ing project, IBAMA was very helpful dueto its hope that FOE-AP’s research wouldcontribute to a higher profile for their ownwork. Over time, however, relationsbetween FOE-AP and IBAMA worseneduntil, in 1997, IBAMA abruptly stoppedreleasing any relevant information due to agradual deterioration in the relationshipsbetween the director of IBAMA and mostmajor environmental organizations.

Field DataWe used planes to fly over critical areas tocheck on certain things, such as whethermanagement practices were really con-ducted or if logs were transported along acertain trail. Pictures were taken in orderto document such things as environmentaldamage or the movement of logs toward asawmill.

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InterviewsInterviews at sawmills were conducted byour colleagues from Imazon, a partnerorganization based in Belém. They werenot part of the investigation of illegallogging, but focused on the identificationand description of trade flows in order todescribe domestic consumption. FOE-APcontributed to this work with some localcollaborators and helped with the analysis.

The interviews relied on standard ques-tions that were tailored to four differentcategories of sawmills (based on size).Specific questions were added based oncharacteristics of particular areas (thewhole Amazon was divided into 74 main“timber poles”).

Due to the absence of any reliable figures ondomestic consumption, 1,370 field inter-views were conducted with employees atsawmills and local people living nearby. Thisprocess gave a reliable picture of the timberflows from the producing areas in nineAmazon states to the highest consumingstates, which are mostly in southern Brazil.

In conducting interviews and using infor-mation from informants, we had to con-sider the safety of those who assisted us.In most cases, local people who providedFOE-AP with information could be threat-ened and suffer various forms of retalia-tion. This was a problem even if they werenot directly quoted; the simple fact that

“somebody” spread information wassufficient reason for intimidation. In somecases, the circulation of confidentialinformation could be enough to identifythe source. Therefore, FOE-AP oftenneeded to create artificial situations toexplain how some information was ob-tained without compromising or jeopardiz-ing the source.

FOE-AP found that hiring reliable investi-gative journalists could be a cost-effectiveway to quickly get some information for aproject. The use of journalists also hadother benefits like improving mediaoutreach. For example, this techniqueoften led to exclusive articles that stimu-lated interest in our reports.

DATA ANALYSIS

The initial data were checked against allpossible existing sources of information.Usually, these sources were related only toa specific subregion or timber species, butthey were useful for detecting possibledistortions or inconsistencies. Such existingsources included studies, official reports,trade statistics from public institutions,industry information, and other analyses.

It is important to look deeply into theinformation you are monitoring. Forinstance, FOE-AP was surprised to dis-cover that IBAMA guards in certain areasissued a large number of fines. This might

have led us to either conclude that en-forcement activities were more effective inthose areas or that illegal activities weremore concentrated there. However,through further investigation we were ableto verify that the transgressors usedcomplex legal loopholes and actually paidless than 6 percent of the fines. FOE-APconcluded that informal agreements areoften made between loggers and guards inthese areas so that the former can con-tinue their illegal activities and the lattercan show they are active in enforcement.

COMMUNICATIONS

The main targets of FOE-AP’s communi-cations strategy are the government, localand international NGOs, local and interna-tional corporations, Brazilian and interna-tional media, and Brazil’s civil society,including the very isolated villages deep inthe Amazon. To reach these differentgroups, FOE-AP has adopted numerouscommunications tools.

In addition to issuing reports, the organi-zation releases information to the mediathrough both verbal communications ande-mail, engages in direct dialogue with theBrazilian government, and maintains aradio network that broadcasts into remoteareas of the Amazon.

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Advance Briefings to the Media andE-mail ReleasesUsually, just sending a news release is nota good way to obtain good coverage. It ismuch better to strike an agreement with aspecific journalist that you will provideexclusive information and organize anadvance briefing session in which youexplain all the details. The reporter willwrite a more accurate article, probablygetting more space in the newspaper. Thejournalist also becomes a kind of specialistwho, in the future, will be more likely tofollow up with other articles. In addition tothis traditional method of reaching audi-ences, FOE-AP periodically sends releasesto electronic mail lists. The lists includemedia and other interested parties.

Judicial ActionFOE-AP increasingly believes that judicialaction may be an effective way to achieveits mission. This has not yet begun inearnest, but as individuals, corporations,and government agencies have shownthemselves to be unwilling to upholdBrazilian law, taking them to court is oneof the best remaining options to force theissue. This is a strategy that environmen-talists have used successfully in manycountries.

Radio AmazôniaRadio Amazônia is a project aimed atproviding radio communication for iso-lated forest dwellers. This is important forseveral reasons. It provides valuableinformation to FOE-AP regarding illegallogging in very remote areas of the forest,where information is extremely hard toobtain. The communication also gives thecommunities information that supportssustainable development. It does this byproviding ideas for dealing with incursions byloggers and other threats to their areas andtheir traditional means of livelihood. In addi-tion, radio is a source of education aboutappropriate development of local areas.

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GLOBAL WITNESS:A U.K. NGO FOCUSINGON CAMBODIA

Address: PO Box 6042; London N19 5WP.Tel: 0171 282 6731Fax: 0171 272 9425E-mail: [email protected] Address:http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/

Written by Christian Ottke, based on aninterview with Patrick Alley

INTRODUCTION

Global Witness is a British group based inLondon and founded in 1993. It is a smallorganization that specializes in investiga-tive monitoring, primarily in Cambodia.Global Witness’s main concern is breakingthe link between the exploitation ofnatural resources and the continuation ofwars and other social unrest. In particular,it wants to stop the theft of forest re-sources by armies in Cambodia.

Global Witness was founded by threeindividuals who had worked for the Envi-ronmental Investigation Agency, whichdeveloped many of the investigativemonitoring techniques Global Witnessemploys. Global Witness has remainedsmall, with a total of six employees in1998, supplemented by volunteers both inLondon and in the countries where itconducts its monitoring activities.

ORGANIZATION

MissionThe mission of Global Witness is to breakthe link between the exploitation ofnatural resources and the continuation ofwars and other social unrest.

ObjectiveGlobal Witness was founded on the con-cept that solid information is a powerfultool that can lead to dramatic results. Itsmain objective is to gather and effectivelydisseminate incontestable informationregarding illegal resource exploitation andto use this information to lobby for posi-tive change.

Maintaining Staff SafetyBecause of the issues and the areas wherethey work, the people who conduct GlobalWitness’s monitoring programs can facedangers. In countries where Global Wit-ness works, they prefer to visit everyrelevant province so that they learn thesituation firsthand. To minimize risk, theyassess the situation by talking to localpeople, nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), and embassies. If the situation inan area they had planned to visit is toodangerous, they cancel the trip. While inthe capital of a country, they minimize thedanger by meeting with ministers andarmy officials and making their presencewidely known. Any incident would thusbecome an internationally embarrassing

event. In the provinces, however, GlobalWitness does not make its presence widelyknown. As there are few people in thecountryside, recognition is easy and wordtravels fast. It would be difficult for themonitors to get information if everyoneknew that Global Witness was around.

In regard to personal safety, Global Wit-ness is especially concerned about theKhmer or Thai people who give theminformation or work with them. Localpeople unfortunately are at greater risk ofviolence than foreigners. Global Witnessencourages and needs contacts but advisespeople to remain low-key. In the past,local people wishing to leak information toGlobal Witness have come directly to themonitors’ hotels without thought thatthere might be danger involved. NowGlobal Witness actively discourages anyopen interactions other than those dic-tated by basic daily life. Similarly, theorganization’s local collaborators won’t besent into any dangerous areas or to do anyof the more dangerous data collection.

This concern has led to a difference in thetype of work that the London–based staffand their local Thai or Cambodian counter-parts are assigned. Although local people insome situations were inconspicuous andtherefore able to obtain information withmuch greater ease and effectiveness, atother times their efforts placed them inphysical danger. Foreigners have a compara-tive advantage getting information in some

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situations, and they are almost always in lessdanger due to their status as foreigners.

OBTAINING FUNDING

Global Witness has received most of itsfunding from development NGOs workingwithin Cambodia. Because Global Witnessinvestigates the links between resourceexploitation and continuing social andeconomic problems, NGOs concernedwith both social and resource issues arewilling to fund its efforts. Most donorsprefer to remain anonymous becauseGlobal Witness is controversial.


Project PlanningSecondary source research. Asdiscussed in the data collection section,Global Witness conducts extensive sec-ondary source research prior to going toCambodia. This gives it the ability toplan based on timber sales records andnews accounts.

Global Witness reviews historical data toidentify where most activities typicallytake place. These data usually illustrate apattern of events. For example, the organi-zation hears rumors that logging trucks arebeing moved to a certain location near theVietnamese border, or that a big loggingcontract has been awarded from theCambodian government, or that cuttinghas taken place in a certain location.

Global Witness then uses these clues toput all the information together and focusits investigation on a key issue or area.While the field investigation is being con-ducted, the search to obtain documentsfrom existing or new sources continues.

Global Witness’ monitoring plans.The monitoring plans depend to a certainextent on seasonal constraints, becauselogs can move only by land in the dryseason and by river in the wet season, andbecause access is difficult for the loggersin the wet season. Another importantfactor is the timing of national and inter-national events (for example, Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)meetings and national elections). This isimportant because Global Witness usuallypublishes a report after an investigation,and the release is timed to have thegreatest impact.

Fieldwork. The investigators “hit theground running.” They visit the provincesincognito and are extremely reactive towhat they see and hear. This part of theprocess is necessarily ad hoc. The investi-gators never know what they will find onthe ground. In every case, Global Witnessassesses whether its own staff or localcontacts should make the visit.

Choosing specific areas. Global Wit-ness finds it is worthwhile to focus onspecific areas. A small organization cannotdo everything at once. In 1995-96, theThai-Khmer Rouge trade was a major

focus. But Global Witness also worked onexposing illegal logging sanctioned by theRoyal Cambodian Government, makingthis activity a major donor concern. In1997, Thailand became a lower prioritywhile Global Witness focused on the RoyalCambodian Government. In late 1997 andearly 1998,Vietnam became a major focus.

DATA GATHERING

Global Witness gets its data from a varietyof sources using two main methods: paper-based research and investigative fieldresearch. An important aspect of GlobalWitness’ monitoring is its investigativeapproach. Monitoring illegal trade be-tween guerilla armies and corrupt govern-ments is by nature a potentially dangerousundertaking. This has forced GlobalWitness to adopt specific methodologies toconduct monitoring safely and effectivelydespite the hostile circumstances.

PAPER-BASED RESEARCH

Global Witness begins its process of datagathering in London. It undertakes anextensive process of looking throughofficial trade statistics and talking withjournalists, NGOs, donor agencies, andother sources. After arriving in the countryof concern, the investigators repeat theprocess, and also talk with governmentofficials. This process gives them a goodsense of what is going on. Based on thisknowledge, they then go into the areas

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where they expect to find illegal loggingthey can document.

INVESTIGATIVE FIELD RESEARCH

Global Witness’ fieldwork encompassesnumerous aspects. These include inter-views, receiving leaked documents, re-cording Global Positioning System (GPS)coordinates, taking photographs and videofootage, and simply observing and record-ing information. The strategy upon begin-ning a monitoring campaign in the field isto find any evidence of illegal logging andto record it.

Data gathering upon arrival in Cambodiabegins in the capital city. Monitors an-nounce their arrival, set up meetings withministers, hope that people will supplythem with government documents, and tryto obtain information from other NGOs.When the monitors head into the field,their activities become quite broad be-cause this is where most of GlobalWitness’s information is gathered. Some-times the monitors feel the need to goundercover, but often they do not. Whenthey go undercover, they generally pretendto be “in the business” — either journalistsor researchers. Whether they are workingundercover or openly, their monitoringactivities are often quite similar. Theyrecord GPS coordinates, take video andstill photographs, seek documentationthat people are willing to give them, andtake personal testimony — although they

require that the same story be confirmedby three people before it is consideredvalid. The GPS information has proveninvaluable in backing up Global Witness’sstatements, since their audience can usethe coordinates to locate precisely wherethe logging has taken place.

The Global Witness monitors also gatherdata by other means, such as countingtrucks. This involves sitting by the roadcounting trucks for a number of hours ora day, asking local residents how manytrucks go by and asking truck drivers howmany other trucks they know about.This process gives monitors a way ofcross-checking their estimates withconfirmed figures. It is worth noting thattruck drivers’ information can often bemore valuable than the informationprovided by a company boss. The driversknow exactly where they go, how oftenthey go there, and what and how muchthey carry — and they usually talk freely.A company doesn’t buy much loyalty at afew dollars per month.

An interesting aspect of Global Witnessmonitoring is that it doesn’t have to besecretive nearly as often as one mightexpect. Not only can the monitors oftenvideotape or photograph openly, becauselocal people generally don’t mind thetaking of photographs, but the monitorscan often be very free and obvious even inthe middle of an illegal logging camp orheadquarters. In fact, the organization

generally considers it safer and moreeffective to keep a high profile.

For a long time the monitors would actobtuse, trying not to call attention tothemselves as they quietly traveled aboutrecording information. In contrast, theynow announce their presence through thepress and meet openly with governmentministers and NGOs. If anything were tohappen to them, the government wouldreceive some of the blame and the eventwould become a large international event.By being obvious, the monitors alsoadvertise their presence to people whowould like to leak documents to them.

The monitors use a different type ofdirectness when they are undercover,pretending to be journalists or representa-tives of a timber company. Instead ofhanging around near a logging camp andfirst assessing the situation, which canarouse suspicions, they have found it to bemore effective to boldly drive up to thechief person’s building, get out, hand overa card, and begin a conversation. Thiskeeps the interviewee from becomingsuspicious and can often give GlobalWitness access to a whole region if thechief administrator gives the monitors hisblessing. Recognition of the local culture’senjoyment of conversation has beeninstrumental in this aspect. Global Witnessgleans large amounts of information in thecourse of enjoyable conversation.

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COMMUNICATION

Global Witness has evolved over time frombeing just an information gathering organi-zation to being an expert in the field. Itsadvice is sought and offered on variousissues. Global Witness tries to avoid impos-ing Western ideas on sovereign nations butinstead, in the case of Cambodia, simplypoints out the country’s legislation and howthe actions of various people contravene it.

Global Witness’s communications strategyis broadening. The organization formerlyfocused on communicating its findings todecision makers and those who influencedthem: politicians, donors, NGOs, and thepress. Global Witness felt that the rela-tively low level of government accountabil-ity in Cambodia demanded that it focus on“quick hits” rather than broad awarenessbuilding. This situation has been changing,however, and Global Witness now isincluding the broader public in its commu-nication strategy to a greater extent.Global Witness published its March 1998report in Khmer as well as English anddistributed it widely in Cambodia. It is thefirst time such detailed information hasbeen available to Cambodian politicians,NGOs, government officials, journalists,and the public in their own language.There was strong demand for the reportand much local cooperation among NGOs.After the election, the Cambodian People’sParty stated that the Global WitnessKhmer report had hurt its popularity and

contributed to its electoral loss in theheavily logged Kratie province. In general,public awareness is growing and is crucialto swaying the actions of the leaders.

As good information is its main strength,Global Witness jealously guards its reputa-tion for providing only accurate informa-tion. The organization never sensational-izes or exaggerates. Global Witness prefersto let the facts speak for themselves. Itbelieves that it is better to publish aneasily defensible underestimate than anestimate that is probably more accuratebut lacks complete supporting data. Forexample, a recently published GlobalWitness estimate of the illegal Cambodiantimber harvest was considered too low bythe organization, but it was one it coulddefend. The World Bank later published anumber that was twice that of GlobalWitness’s. Regardless, Global Witness washappy to have published a number basedon data that it had and could defend.

Global Witness has found proof of high-level involvement in illegal logging opera-tions by obtaining documents with thesignatures of high government officials,and by videotaping interviews with loggerswho name them. Such documents areirrefutable and invaluable. There is no onestrategy to getting them; rather, themonitors have to be lucky. The documentscome from mid- to senior-level officialswho are disgusted with the actions of theirleadership. If they cannot use the docu-

ments themselves because it would be toodangerous, and they trust the monitor notto reveal the source, then they may leakthem. Sometimes the monitor’s best policyis simply to ask outright for the docu-ments. This sometimes works.

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT

Global Witness also recognizes that in thegeographic area where it is working, muchif not most change comes about as theresult of prodding by a foreign politicalentity during bilateral talks, rather thanthrough strident criticism by activists. Ittherefore focuses on exposing governmentwrongdoing to the media, NGOs, andforeign governments, while accepting thatthe problem may not be addressed by thegovernment of the country of concernuntil there is additional prodding byanother government entity or a majorfunding organization. This recognitionkeeps Global Witness from feeling theneed to become too strident in its de-mands for change.

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INSTITUTE FOR SOCIALAND ENVIRONMENTALSTUDIES OF SOUTHERNBAHIA (IESB), BRAZIL

Address: C.P. 84; 45.650-000 Ilheus – BA;Brazil.Tel: 011-55-73-231-2179E-mail: [email protected]

By Keith Alger, Gustavo A. B. Fonseca,John Reid, and Rui Rocha

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1990s, conserva-tionists urgently wanted to know whydeforestation was still occurring in the lastforest patches in Brazil’s Southern Bahia, aworld-renowned center of endemism inthe mostly decimated Atlantic CoastalRainforest. In 1990, the BiodiversitasFoundation, a Brazilian NGO, togetherwith the World Wildlife Fund (WWF),Conservation International (CI), andWildlife Preservation Trust International(WPTI), purchased and donated a keypiece of land to consolidate the UnaBiological Reserve, the only area protectedfor fauna in Southern Bahia. It was clear,however, that if the surrounding forest onprivate lands were destroyed, the UnaReserve’s 7,000 hectares would not guar-antee the survival of the golden-headedlion tamarin, the area’s key charismaticspecies. Thousands of other endemicspecies would also be in danger. About 95

percent of the land in the area surround-ing the Una Biological Reserve was al-ready deforested, and logging and pastureclearing was accelerating.

Conservationists were interested in whetherthey could successfully protect SouthernBahia’s last private forests, and its hundredsof dependent species, through landholdercooperation instead of purchasing land orresorting to zoo management.

A PROFILE OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS

Brazilians in general, and especially thosein rural areas and interior towns, havelittle experience with nongovernmentalpublic interest associations. When civilrights were established in the 1980s,thousands of new organizations bloomed.However, meager individual and corporatephilanthropy has left most of the over1,000 existing Brazilian environmentalNGOs insufficiently funded and unable toattract paid professional staff (MaterNatura/WWF 1996).

Most environmental NGOs consist of ahandful of activists working to raise localconsciousness about environmental prob-lems. They use three main strategies:

● Denounce government malfea-sance. This approach is relativelyinexpensive and can demonstratepower by driving someone from office.

● Conduct environmental surveys.

Surveys are usually done under con-tract with state and local governments.This approach is not intended toachieve policy impact.

● Provide independent public inter-est advocacy based on scientificand technical research. This ap-proach was probably first exemplifiedby organizations such as the BrazilianFoundation for Nature Conservation(FBCN), Assistance and Services forAlternative Agriculture Projects(ASPTA), and the Federation of Orga-nizations for Social and EducationalAssistance (FASE).

Finding a solution to the deforestationproblem surrounding the Una Reserverequired a coordinated analysis by biolo-gists, economists, foresters, agronomists,and lawyers. These analyses could be usedfor coordinated advocacy and conservationof the most private land at the least cost.Because governments and universities inBrazil failed to take this approach, a smallnumber of research and public interestNGOs had to step in. In addition to con-ducting the research, these NGOs are alsocapable of implementing demonstrationfield projects. The principal examples ofthis type of organization in Brazil areBiodiversitas, IMAZON (Institute for Manand the Environment in the Amazon),PESACRE (Agroforestry Research andExtension for Acre), ISA (The Sócio-Environmental Institute), and IESB(Institute for Social and Environmental

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Studies of Southern Bahia).

INTERVENTION AND MONITORING

The goal of IESB and other NGOs was toencourage landholders near the reserve toinstitute forest conservation measures.Achieving this goal required research,public policy, and demonstration compo-nents. The research showed that SouthernBahia’s economy was changing from asingle-product economy based on cocoa toa mixed economy of diversified agricultureand tourism. It was therefore clear that theconservation strategy would have toinclude players other than the cocoafarmers (Alger 1998; Hardner 1996). Theproject chose instead to demonstrate thatfarmers can stabilize their income byintercropping tree species, and that forest-related ecotourism attractions can boostthe value of forest remnants.

In many situations, basic data about anissue to be monitored were poor. In thesecases, NGOs had to conduct basic scien-tific research to clarify policy issues.However, the NGOs were careful toinstitute research goals and methodologiesthat were constant over time and did notchange with the comings and goings ofresearch staff.

It should be noted that a flexible strategyfor biodiversity conservation can work onlyif attention is focused on the ends insteadof the means. Although improving agricul-ture and tourism may be a means to

conservation, fixation on these tools canbecome an organization’s identity, therebyreducing its effectiveness. Periodicallyreviewing the history and economicconditions that cause the threats tobiodiversity can help a team stay focusedon the ends (Dean 1995). Funding sourcesshould also be scrutinized to ensure thatthey are not inhibiting the NGO fromreaching its goals.

WHEN SUCCESSFUL MONITORING

MEANS IGNORING YOUR PROGRESS

INDICATORS

One of the best examples of flexibility andperipheral vision is the nearly 180-degreestrategy shift taken in Una when thecreation of a new public conservation unitbecame a real possibility in 1996. Asoutlined above, tourism policy was key tothe existing strategy for Una. Research hadshown that tourism was a comparativelybenevolent economic alternative for theregion’s biodiversity. But this depended onwhether government policies helpedelevate the value of forested landscapes asa part of tourism development policy.While monitoring the state government’stourism policies, however, CI and IESBdiscovered that one of the state’s key priori-ties was a road construction project openingup the forested coastline from Ilhéus toItacaré. In glossy presentations, state tour-ism officials spoke of attracting Caribbean-resort style hotels to this region.

A complex set of political and institutionalfactors confronted the CI/IESB team(Reid 1998). Municipal elections werecoming up and the road enjoyed stronglocal support. The state government’s planwas part of an elaborate regional develop-ment scheme backed by the Braziliangovernment and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB). Only one localenvironmental group, the Black Dolphin,had openly criticized the road plan. Poli-tics aside, there was a fairly solid economicrationale for the road. Pavement wasneeded to draw tourists in passenger carsinto a region whose stunning beauty andbeaches made tourism a logical economicdevelopment choice.

At first the CI/IESB team merely alertedstate officials and the IDB of the biologi-cal resources at risk in the region, andreceived assurances that a proper environ-mental impact assessment was beingprepared. Next, the team consulted IDBdocuments and experts to see, in the likelyevent the road could not be stopped, whatmight constitute a credible plan to avoidor mitigate its environmental impacts.Those inquiries indicated the need tocounter the deforestation potential of theroad directly by protecting what was left ofthe forest in an official reserve.

The finished environmental impact assess-ment made no reference to the threat tohabitat, focusing instead on the typical setof direct impacts of moving around largequantities of dirt and rock. It made no

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mention of the forest through which theroad would pass, which was found by agroup of scientists in 1993 to have thehighest per-hectare diversity of plantspecies on Earth, with a dozen species newto science (Thomas et al. 1998). The NGOteam began the task of selling the idea of aroad and a park to the state, the IDB, localmayors, and environmentalists like thoseat the Black Dolphin. The IDB’s environ-mental officer visited the area, criticizedthe quality of the environmental impactassessment, and seconded the park as acondition of approving the road funding.Within the state government, a newlyformed and active forestry agency, whichwould oversee any park created, steppedin and also backed the idea. Local environ-mental activists endorsed the plan as well,after realizing the inevitability of the roadand the small window of opportunity toacquire and protect the surrounding forest.

That combination of supporters wassufficient to overcome reluctance in otherquarters of IDB and impatience within thestate road-building agency. While the IDBproceeded to shuffle funds to enablepurchase of the land, the state forestrydirector set to work to win the governor’sapproval. The CI/IESB team carried outmapping and technical design tasks for thenew park. When the state needed inter-preted satellite images to show the forest’slocation in relation to the road and otherstate conservation units in the region, theNGOs were able to supply these rapidly.The state’s forestry director found allies in

the state’s tourism sector that helpedconvince the road department that theNGO involvement was not obstructionist.Early in 1997, the governor of Bahiaannounced the creation of Serra doConduru State Park and construction ofthe road began.

This experience highlighted an unexpectedgap in the conservation strategy that hadbeen developed for Una. The strategy hadnot anticipated that the creation of newprotected areas could be politically popu-lar. Once the government realized that theIDB would offer more funding to the roadproject to make the park a reality,biodiversity conservation was seen as apositive complement to its tourism devel-opment plan. NGOs that were famous forobstructing development became thechampions of the government’s plan.Famous conservationists and their organi-zations went on record acknowledging theenvironmental leadership of Bahia, bring-ing international prestige to a state hungryfor this recognition. Suddenly, NGOcooperation with the state government toslow logging and forest conversion aroundUna began to show progress. In 1997, theBahian state environmental agency (CRA)supported NGOs in a successful petition tosuspend out-of-control logging around Una.

We should recognize that the creation ofthe Conduru State Park did not directlyaugment habitat for the golden-headedlion tamarin, and it did not invalidate thestrategy to promote conservation on

private lands near the Una reserve.Though scientists have no explanation, thehistorical record shows no evidence ofgolden-headed lion tamarins in theConduru forests that are only 60 kilome-ters from the Una Biological Reserve(Pinto and Tavares 1994). The strategy ofhitching a ride on government tourismpolicy in order to gain a protected areaincreased the chances for survival ofhundreds of species. It built confidence inthe potential for future cooperationbetween the government and NGOs, butdid not otherwise contribute to the sur-vival of golden-headed lion tamarins.

The spirit of cooperation reached a highlevel, but some precautions were stillnecessary. Though the state proposed tohire the NGO’s chief proponent of theConduru Park as its manager, this offerwas turned down. It was important toassign full credit and responsibility to thestate for the creation and the consolidationof the park, and communicate clearly thatthe NGO role is to facilitate and monitorprogress. Without creating rivalry orantagonism, it is important that the stateknow that NGOs cannot do their job ifthey are subsumed into the bureaucracy. Ifthe state co-opted the NGOs to run thepark, the government could attributeglitches to their participation, while theNGOs would have neither the authoritynor the IDB funding to make the park areality. Instead, CI/IESB facilitated thehiring of a park manager. Even though thestate was undergoing a hiring freeze,

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DDF, the Bahian forestry agency, signed acontract with CI-Brazil for managementassistance, which CI-Brazil uses to paypark managers who are subordinates ofDDF.

CONCLUSION

The experience related here demonstrateshow the shortest distance between twopoints may not be a straight line. Monitor-ing the potentially benevolent effects ofgovernment tourism policy was part of astrategy, which included estimates of thenumber of hectares of private forest inUna that might be leveraged from thispolicy. But the potential for a new publicconservation unit might have been over-looked if attention had been exclusivelyfocused on these indicators. If, on theother hand, monitoring had been con-ceived as confronting badly designed stateinfrastructure projects, the resulting state-NGO conflict might have yielded noconservation benefits. Because of thecross-disciplinary research underlying theoriginal strategy, which identified tourismpolicy as a potential partner in conserva-

tion, and the organization of cross-disci-plinary teams encouraged to maintaintheir “peripheral vision” with respect toobjectives, this opportunity was not lost.

For local NGOs with no baseline data,limited operating resources, and fewadequately trained professionals, the bestway to initiate biodiversity monitoring is toencourage rigorous ecological studiesinvolving advanced students from theregion that specifically address conserva-tion policy. Finally, conservation organiza-tions should not forget that protectedareas in themselves can be a contributionto social and economic development, andthat governments are willing to be proudsponsors of these and other NGO objec-tives when they can add resources andprestige to economically justifiable devel-opment projects.

REFERENCESAlger, Keith. “The Reproduction of the Cocoa

Industry and Biodiversity in SouthernBahia,” Paper prepared for the Workshop onSustainable Cocoa Production, Smithsonian

Migratory Bird Center, Panama, March 29,1998.

Dean, Warren. 1995. With Broadax andFirebrand: The Destruction of the BrazilianAtlantic Forest. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Hardner, Jared. 1996 O Uso da Terra e aEconomia Cacaueira no Sul da Bahia,Institute for Social and EnvironmentalStudies of Southern Bahia

Pinto, L.P de S., and L.I. Tavares. 1994.“Inventory and conservation status of wildpopulations of Golden-Headed Lion Tama-rins, Leontopithecus chrysomelas,” Neotro-pical Primates 2 (suppl.): 24-27.

Mater Natura/Worldwide Fund for Nature1996., Ecolista Cadastro Nacional deInstituições Ambientalistas. Curitiba: WWF

Reid, John. 1998. “Roads and Tropical Forests:From White Lines to White Elephants,”

Thomas, Wm. Wayt et al. 1998 “Plant Ende-mism in Two Forests in Southern Bahia,Brazil,” Biodiversity and Conservation 7311-22.

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LE POU D’AGOUTI,FRENCH GUIANA

Address: Le Pou d’Agouti; B.P. 194;97393 St. Laurant du Maroni Cedex;Guyane Francaise.Tel: (594) 34 20 97Fax: (594) 34 18 87Internet Address: http://www.mdi-guyane.fr/pouagouti/Index.asp

By Christian Ottke, based on an interviewwith Kris Wood

INTRODUCTION

The Pou d’Agouti (a local word for chig-gers) is a French Guianese environmentalprotection NGO founded in 1990 topromote sound and sustainable resourcedevelopment in French Guiana and theGuiana Shield region as a whole. One of itsearliest campaigns was to fiercely criticizeFrance’s decision to build a large hydro-electric dam on the Sinnamary River atPetit Saut. Other dams were planned onthe Mana, Oyapok, and Approuague rivers.In 1997, EDF, the French electricitycompany, officially declared it would buildno more large dams in the province. In1994, opposition to the construction of aroad to the east, linking the province toBrazil, resulted in the withdrawal ofEuropean Union financing for the project.Later in 1994, the Pou d’ Agouti met with

regional NGOs from Suriname and Guyanato discuss the environmental situation in theGuiana shield area and strategies to influ-ence it. This meeting led to the creation ofthe “Itiulu” network and the beginning ofthe organizations’ monitoring activities.

In 1995, the Pou d’Agouti worked closelywith other groups in Suriname and on theMaroni River in order to thwart SoutheastAsian timber concerns, which were movinginto neighboring Suriname. In 1996, thePou d’Agouti’s outspoken criticism of theinadequate design a proposed nationalpark in the south of the country was one ofthe factors that caused this project to beoverhauled. In 1997, the organizationreceived a grant from the French Ministryof Agriculture to study the problemsassociated with the protected White SandsForest area, which was threatened byillegal human occupation. In 1998, theInternational Fund for Animal Welfare(IFAW) provided funds for a continuationof the White Sands Project and WorldConservation Union (IUCN)–NetherlandsCommittee agreed to finance a study ofthe social and economic impacts of a roadto be built to the south of the province. InJuly 1998, a group of members purchasedthe building that houses the offices of thePou d’Agouti, preparing the organizationfor continued activity into the 21st century.

POLITICAL CLIMATE

The situation for the Pou d’Agouti isunusual among developing areas becauseFrench Guiana is an overseas province ofFrance. This has led to a different politicaland economic climate than many othercountries in the vicinity. Among thesedifferences are high salaries and a longtradition of respect for an open politicalprocess. The high salaries have loweredthe profit margin of logging in FrenchGuiana, causing most timber companies tofocus their interest elsewhere. The forestsof French Guiana, therefore, have beenunder comparatively low threat. Thiseconomic situation, along with the openpolitical climate that allows the Poud’Agouti and other NGOs to participateeffectively in the political debate, hasslowed the pace of forest development.

French Guiana is a relatively stable de-mocracy. As an overseas province ofFrance, French Guiana has a multipartypolitical process and a free society. Theprovince is liberally showered with devel-opment funds, in part because it containsthe launching base for the EuropeanSpace Agency’s Ariane satellites.

Although the government does not openlyoppose dissent, some people who previ-ously worked for the government andprovided environmental organizations withinformation damaging to the government

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suspect that they lost either their jobs orthe prospects of promotion as a result ofthe leaks.

ORGANIZATION

MissionLe Pou d’Agouti’s mission is to promotedebate on the development process, topromote sound and sustainable resourcedevelopment, and to instill an ecologicalethic in the people of French Guiana.Monitoring is not the Pou d’Agouti’s primarymission, but it is a tool to provide informa-tion that supports its broader activities.

CHANGES IN THE FOCUS OF THE POU

D’AGOUTI

Le Pou d’Agouti has become more dedi-cated and consistently professional overthe course of its eight years. For much ofthat time, Pou d’Agouti employees wouldconduct ecotourism trips into FrenchGuiana’s interior forests as both an envi-ronmental education effort and a means toearn money for the organization. A seriesof meetings and changes over time led to ashift away from the ecotourism trips.

The vast majority of the organization’stime now is spent on advocacy and moni-toring activities. This was made official in1994 with the decision to include monitor-ing among Pou d’Agouti’s activities. Large-scale logging had not been a major factor

in French Guiana. In the neighboringcountries of Guyana and Surinam, how-ever, such transgressions were much moreapparent. In response to increased threatsagainst the forests in all three countries,environmental, indigenous, and humanrights NGOs representing the threecountries held a meeting at Paramaribo,Suriname sponsored by the WorldRainforest Movement. The Pou d’Agouticame away from this meeting recognizingthe need to track and disseminate informa-tion about forest and mining activities inFrench Guiana, especially on the MaroniRiver on the border with Suriname.

NETWORKS

As the environmental movement hasgrown, the government has selectedpolitically moderate NGOs for inclusionon committees and other bodies. Inresponse, the major environmental NGOsin French Guiana have gotten together toform a federation. The federation has beenselected to represent the NGOs, thusensuring the Pou d’Agouti and otherNGOs access to government informationpresented in the meetings.

International networks have also beenimportant to the Pou d’Agouti’s develop-ment. Conservation International andWorld Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) havehelped build greater awareness within thePou d’Agouti of the organization’s compe-

tency and mission. An onsite adviser fromthe World Rainforest Movement-ForestPeople’s Programme has greatly helpedthe Pou d’Agouti in its planning process.Representatives from these organizationscome to meet with the Pou d’Agoutiperiodically in order to discuss strategiesand ways to help strengthen and focusactivities. With these representatives, thePou d’Agouti has developed its communi-cations through the Internet and madecontact with numerous internationalNGOs concerned with the Guianas.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SENIORITY

The competency of the Pou d’Agouti isalso linked to its eight-plus years of exist-ence, which provides it with some histori-cal perspective about the situation inFrench Guiana. As early as 1991, the Poud’Agouti applied for membership on theCommission of Sites, a body of expertsthat reviews all proposals concerningmajor landscape and planning changes,protected sites and buildings, and naturereserves. French law assures representa-tion by “Environmental Protection Asso-ciations” on such bodies. In the earlynineties, there was no real environmentalmovement in French Guiana; the Poud’Agouti was therefore a vital representa-tive on this body.

Presence on such bodies gives the Poud’Agouti access to documents long before

54

their public viewing. The group dissemi-nates this information to those who canprovide an informed criticism of theproposals.

FUNDING

The Pou d’Agouti has been successful inwinning grants. In 1991, WWF gave it a$10,000 grant, which it used to purchaseoffice equipment. Its Nature Center waslargely financed by the Ushuaia Founda-tion (now Foundation Nicolas Hulot) andis now run as a separate organization.Likewise its Wild Bird Recovery Centerreceived $10,000 funding from the AnimalAssistance Foundation in 1996. Regularsmall grants from the Ministry of Youthand Sports and the Ministry of the Envi-ronment help pay for events during Na-tional Environment Week, Earth Day, andother significant dates. More recently, theorganization received an $8,000 grant in1997 from the Ministry of Environment tofund the purchase of new computers forits magazine. Also in 1997, the Ministry ofAgriculture awarded the Pou d’Agouti agrant to study the White Sands area.

The organization now has the funding tomaintain some skilled full-time staff,though all staffers still have to spend aconsiderable part of their time raisingfunds. Projects are planned at least oneyear in advance in order to find the neces-sary financing. Being “French” makes it

difficult to gain access to many fundingsources that focus on developing coun-tries, but because the Pou d’Agouti isbased on the border with Suriname, agrowing number of projects are planned thatinvolve both sides of the Maroni River.

Personal contact with members of grant-giving bodies is essential. The Poud’Agouti’s large number of publicationshelps convince donors of its ability toundertake and complete projects.


Project PlanningSomewhat paradoxically, a challenging socialissue in French Guiana is that wages arehigh and social aid is generously funded.The Pou d’Agouti sees this as a problembecause it reduces incentives for people toembrace small-scale entrepreneurial activity.Most people would rather be paid by socialservices to do little work than labor hard attheir own business for uncertain returns.This leaves job creation as the responsibilityof the government, which favors top-down,overblown schemes (such as building roadsthrough a forest) that are often environmen-tally destructive by design.

The main questions the Pou d’Agouti mustpose are:

● What are the likely impacts of a pro-posed project?

● What small-scale projects can be imple-mented instead of the grand ones peren-nially suggested by local politicians?

The Monitoring GoalThe Pou d’Agouti determines a monitoringprogram by posing questions about gov-ernment activities. Why is a site proposedas a reserve? Where are mining activitiesoccurring? Are government reports accu-rate? Are environmental impacts of pro-posed projects reasonable or underesti-mated? What would be the impact of fiveor six potentially large Canadian and U.S.gold mines? Is the new mining lawadapted to the province or adapted tospecial “arrangements”? Who is reallyresponsible for applying regulations?

The Pou d’Agouti’s projects usually inten-tionally include a human element. It ofteninvestigates both environmental and socialproblems created by non-indigenoushuman occupation or activities in therainforest. The organization’s location in afrontier town inhabited largely by indig-enous Amerindians and Maroons—as wellas its collaboration with human rights,Maroon, and indigenous NGOs withinFrench Guiana and from Suriname—hasmade this approach necessary.

DATA COLLECTION

The Pou d’Agouti gathers its informationprimarily from four sources: the govern-

55

ment, organization members or associates,NGO networks, and (recently) someecological fieldwork.

These data collection methods developedorganically. At this point, the Pou d’Agoutifeels that these methods are most appro-priate to its situation. A scheme to employFrench Guianese youth will give muchneeded stability to the Pou d’Agouti’s staff,and at least one member will then be ableto concentrate on structuring the monitor-ing process, undertaking field trips toverify or disprove data and rumors, andregularly consulting with all sources.

Government InformationOfficially, the government must make itsrecords public. However, it was initiallydifficult to get hold of government docu-ments, primarily because of such agencyevasive tactics as being perpetually out ofdocuments. One of the first documents thePou d’Agouti used was the environmentalimpact study of the dam at Petit Saut.More recently, the Pou d’Agouti obtaineda government report on mercury poisoningin the interior. When the official reply torequests at the prefecture was that therewere no additional copies of the reportremaining, the Pou d’Agouti promptly made100 photocopies for distribution to its allies.

More recently, as an environmentalprotection organization officially recog-nized by the Ministry of the Environment,

the Pou d’Agouti has gained access tocertain official records such as urbanplanning project documents. Also, bysupplying the local members of theFrench parliament with useful unofficialinformation, the Pou d’Agouti oftenreceives other documents in exchange.

Leaks by government employees to thePou d’Agouti are quite common. Careneeds to be taken, though, as some leakedinformation is inaccurate.

Ecological Field WorkData collected for the White Sands projectin 1997 and the roads project in 1998involved extensive fieldwork and consulta-tion with local populations, politicians,NGOs, and traditional leaders.

Remote SensingSince much of the extractive activity inFrench Guiana is small in scale (such asmining camps), many of the new ap-proaches to data gathering and analysisbased on remote sensing are not veryapplicable. The Pou d’Agouti thereforedoes not anticipate incorporating thesetools into its data management, thoughflying over agricultural and mining areas isbecoming a valuable backup to fieldwork.

COMMUNICATION

The Pou d’Agouti has a number of com-munication strategies, each aimed at a

different combination of audiences andmeant to disseminate information fromone of its activities. The principal targetaudiences for the Pou d’Agouti are govern-ment officials on the national and provin-cial levels, international conservationorganizations, other local organizations,schools, and the general public.

GovernmentThe Pou d’Agouti publicizes its monitoringinformation in a variety of ways, depend-ing on the audience and goal. The infor-mation it receives about illegal activity inthe interior is forwarded by telephone, fax,or letter to the agencies and ministriesresponsible for enforcement in thoseareas. The government has respondedpositively to these reports, even sendingthe army to disperse miners who wereoperating illegally. Other information isaimed at influencing provincial politicianswho are enthusiastic about grandiosedevelopment schemes aimed at “openingthe frontier.” The Pou d’Agouti may dothis through letters addressed to thepoliticians making reference to othersimilar and failed experiences in neighbor-ing countries, an analysis of new laws, orby open letters and press releases pub-lished in the local press or media. It alsoresponds to numerous individual requestsfor information.

By establishing a reputation for effectivelyreporting good information, the Pou

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d’Agouti has gained stature and the re-spect of government. When a recentgovernment report inaccurately concludedthat the satellite launcher ARIANE 5 waspollution-free, the organization protested.The protest was relayed to a leadingscientific magazine and a scientific boardwas appointed to review the document’sconclusions.

The Pou d’Agouti is careful to maintaingood government relations as long as itdoes not compromise its independence.For example, the Pou d’Agouti compli-ments government efforts worthy ofpraise, such as the sustainable forestryproject, which envisions a 40-year rotationof managed plots.

Schools and the General PublicThe Pou d’Agouti targets schools and thegeneral public with its environmentaleducation publications. It maintains awebsite with numerous links and publishesa magazine three times a year, as well asspecial issues on such themes as Ariane 5,mercury, mining, and deforestation.Audiocassettes for illiterate populationsare produced on specific subjects in locallanguages and are distributed to local radiostations. Plans are underway to co-producevideos, CDs, and even CD-ROMs.

The Pou d’Agouti also supports the pro-cess of developing locally appropriateschool materials. Most school materials arecurrently imported from France and have

limited impact because of geographicaland cultural differences.

The Pou d’Agouti MagazineThe Pou d’Agouti made its first symbolicaction on Earth Day 1990. Actions on suchsymbolic dates continue, as does theproduction of its journal, Le Pou d’Agouti.A recent issue had a print run of 2,400.Planning for the communications productsstart well in advance. For example, eachissue of the Pou d’Agouti magazine con-tains a special report on a specific theme.The choice of theme depends on thepresence of a specialist to write the reportand the need to address a particular issue.

Electronic CommunicationAt the Rio conference in 1992, the need toform networks was repeatedly empha-sized. The Pou d’Agouti has helped to setup a network with local and regionalNGOs in order to share information.Through this network, it shares informa-tion with its partners and receives infor-mation in return. Although this is helpful,the local lack of local electronic communi-cation capability means that it is simplerto communicate with groups in Europe orNorth America than it is to communicatewith other groups in French Guiana orneighboring countries. The Pou d’Agouti,through partnership projects, is helping todevelop this capacity for communicationamong its partners. Communication withinternational conservation organizations isprimarily through e-mail.

NETWORKS WITH OTHER NGOS

The Pou d’Agouti has been invited to attendmany government discussions on develop-ment issues. These are valuable opportuni-ties to affect policy. In this regard, the Poud’Agouti finds it very important to maintainstrong ties with other NGOs. If the govern-ment were to exclude the Pou d’Agouti, it islikely that at least some NGOs would beincluded. Therefore, communication be-tween these organizations allows the Poud’Agouti to stay informed.

Being the environmental protection NGOwith the best developed infrastructure inFrench Guiana, the Pou d’Agouti tries topublish or make its data available for otherorganizations that are trying to develop aregional presence. As such, the Poud’Agouti coordinates the network “ItiuluRégion Guyane,” (the Itiulu Region ofGuyana) which circulates informationamong local and regional (Guiana Shield)environmental, human rights, indigenous,and Maroon organizations. This effort hasrecently been reinforced by the GuianaShield Media Project website.

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SIERRA LEGAL DEFENCEFUND (SLDF)—CANADA

Address: Suite 214; 131 Water Street;Vancouver, B.C.; Canada, V6B 4M3.Tel: 604.685.5618Fax:E-mail: 604.685.7813Internet Address: http://[email protected]

By Will Horter, Aran O’Carroll, andRichard Payne

INTRODUCTION

The Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF)was founded in 1990 as a nonprofit envi-ronmental organization. SLDF’s initialgoal was to provide free legal services tothe Canadian environmental community inorder to promote the conservation andsound, sustainable management of thecountry’s natural resources.

Over the years, SLDF has conductedextensive monitoring of the environmentalimpacts resulting from natural resourceextraction. SLDF has been involved in avariety of issues, including toxic pollutionfrom mining and sewage, the environmen-tal impacts of dam construction, and therights of citizens to protest against corpo-rate activities that threaten the environ-ment. Many of Canada’s significant envi-ronmental legal precedents are a result ofSLDF’s efforts. For example, SLDF won

court victories that forced the Canadiangovernment to carry out environmentalimpact assessments of hydroelectric andlogging projects in Quebec and Albertaand halted clearcutting in Wood BuffaloNational Park in Ontario.

A considerable portion of SLDF’s work inBritish Columbia (BC) is focused onforestry. Forest Watch is one of its majorprojects.

SLDF is completely separate from theSierra Club of Canada. It is supportedby over 17,000 individuals across Canada,and it also receives funding from founda-tion grants.

ORGANIZATION

MissionSLDF’s mission is to use legal remedies toprotect the natural environment throughthe promotion and enforcement of thelaws of Canada.

Based on the above mission, SLDF hasthree objectives for its overall work,including Forest Watch:

● “Level the playing field” for environ-mental groups that simply cannotafford to go to court against largeinstitutions when important wildernessvalues are at stake;

● Bring carefully selected cases to courtin order to establish a body of strong

legal precedents that recognizes thevital importance of environmentalvalues; and

● Provide professional advice on thedevelopment of environmentallegislation.


BC Forest WatchThe British Columbia Forest WatchNetwork was born out of the realizationthat the government was failing to providegood stewardship over BC’s public forest-lands. Forest Watch is based on the ideathat people in every town and valley ofBritish Columbia can work togethercooperatively to uncover and crediblydocument what is happening in their ownforests. Since its inception in 1997, BCForest Watch has sought to unite a net-work of concerned citizens to systematicallyhighlight the reality of forestry practicesoccurring in their communities. The mainlesson learned from the BC experience isthat public scrutiny is a powerful tool.

Credibility is paramount in this process.The success of the BC Forest WatchNetwork has been its ability to presentirrefutable evidence of inadequate andillegal forestry practices in British Colum-bia. The often painstaking work of gather-ing evidence and reviewing complex planshas proven to be effective only because ofthe reputations of the individuals involved

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and, increasingly, the reputation of thenetwork as a whole. To ensure the effec-tiveness of the work that forest watchersdo, this credibility must be maintained.This requires that forest watchers distin-guish between their advocacy work andtheir investigative work.

Separating advocacy from investigativework is an often difficult challenge formost groups working on forestry issues. Itrequires a conscious effort to ensure theobjectivity of investigative research. Whenwe advocate improved forestry practices,we risk the credibility of our investigativework. Courts, administrative tribunals,Ministry of Forest officials, and certainlythe logging industry give less credence togroups that simultaneously advocate acertain policy viewpoint and then attemptto audit and document facts. Regardless ofthe accuracy of the audit, it will be dis-missed as partisan. It is not that investiga-tive work and advocacy are incompatible–far from it. Instead, to achieve our indi-vidual goals, we can be most effective bycollecting and effectively utilizing credibleevidence of current illegal and unsustain-able forestry practices. By choosing theright questions to answer with credibledata, we can provide the platform foreffective advocacy that is missing in BC.

HOW DO SLDF AND FOREST WATCH

CONDUCT THEIR MONITORING WORK?

SLDF and Forest Watch use amultidisciplinary team of lawyers, scien-tists, technicians, and knowledgeable localpeople to assess whether forestry laws andpractices are compatible with environmen-tal conservation and sustainability. Theseteams generally use a two-step approach toforest monitoring.

SLDF prepares for an investigation byexamining all relevant laws, regulations,and policies in order to get a sense ofwhich activities are legally sanctioned andwhich are not. Based on its extensiveknowledge of the legislative scheme andavailable resources, Forest Watch hasfocused monitoring activities on a few keyissues: roads, stream protection, cuttingboundaries, terrain and soil issues, plan-ning accuracy, and compliance with plans.SLDF and Forest Watch focus on theseissues because 1) legal remedies exist tohold violators accountable; 2) these issuesresonate with the public; and 3) theseissues have ecological significance and canbe objectively measured and documentedusing available resources.

In addition to studying the law, SLDFreviews the documents that forest conces-sionaires are required to submit to thegovernment as part of the planning pro-cess. It makes use of Canada’s extensiveprovincial and federal freedom of informa-

tion laws. To be an effective forestwatcher, it is important to know whatinformation exists, who has it, where it islocated, and what the various options arefor getting it. In areas like BC, whichrelies on extensive planning of land uses,understanding and accessing the plans is afundamental requirement.

A forest watcher could randomly roamlogging roads looking for violations.However, considering the limited re-sources available to SLDF, Forest Watch,and most concerned citizens, this is not aneffective use of resources. Instead, SLDFtrains forest watchers to initiate fieldworkonly after doing their homework.

The first step in the homework is toidentify the problem you want to solve orthe question you want answered. What areyou trying to accomplish? Is there aparticular bad company you want to focuson, or are there systemic problems withinthe industry? Are you looking for rogueactors or for government duplicity?

This is a key step. If you are not clearabout your objectives, it will be difficult todetermine an appropriate strategy.

Next, forest watchers must identify a goal.Is it to:

● Publicize the activities of one companyor hold them legally accountable?

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● Identify the systemic problems of acompany, individual, or governmentministry?

● Document violations for legal action?

● Document problems for the media andpublic consumption?

● Write a report to publicize the activitiesof one company or the industry as awhole?

At SLDF, we always try to find the easiest,most cost- and time-effective method toserve our purpose. If it is possible tocredibly frame the issue through ananalysis of planning documents, we do so.One lesson we have learned is that field-work costs money and can be dangerous. Itshould only occur after preliminary analy-sis has been completed.

Ultimately, we encourage all forest watch-ers to clearly identify their goals even if itseems easy and inexpensive to commencemonitoring in an area. We have only somany human resources and it is imperativewe use them wisely. As we tell forestwatchers, “We will show you all the poten-tial tools in your toolbox belt, but you aregoing to have to know when and how tomost effectively use them.”

The next step in our process is to identifythe available resources. How many peoplecan work on this? What kind of transporta-tion can they use? How much money is

available for expenses? The answers tothese questions will frame our methodol-ogy and set limits. For example, it isimpossible to access some remote areas ifyou have no boat or you cannot afford thecost of a flight. It is imperative to berealistic. There is no sense designing amethodology that is beyond your re-sources. Each tool has advantages anddisadvantages in terms of the financialcosts and human resources necessary.Regardless of the newsworthiness of theviolation or problem, it does no good todesign a media strategy targeted at theevening news if you do not have videotapeor access to a video camera. Each part ofyour strategy needs to be assessed inrelation to your resources. This shouldsignificantly narrow your options.

“WHY ARE WE DOING THIS TRIP?”

If we can’t answer that question, a tripmay not be the best use of our time. Wehave to make sure we have a clear purposein mind. It could be as simple as “check upon the company to let them know we’rewatching.” Most often, a forest watchershould have a specific concern or suspi-cion that requires field verification (forexample, you got a tip that the companydumped oil into fish-bearing waters).

As discussed previously, SLDF preparesfor fieldwork by identifying a specificissue, problem, or question. If it appearsthat fieldwork is the best method to

answer this question or gather this infor-mation, then we consider what informa-tion is accessible given our resources. InBC, this usually involves acquiring andanalyzing the details of industrial forestmanagement plans prepared by compa-nies. Based on our experience, we canusually make an educated guess aboutwhether the road or cutblock (logged area)in a plan creates significant environmentalproblems. After gathering as much infor-mation as possible and focusing our effortson geographic locations where there is ahigh probability of success, SLDF goesinto the field to attempt to confirm itsinitial assessments. Our findings aredocumented in a way that supports theproject’s purpose. That is, the sophistica-tion of the data collection process variesdepending on whether the information willbe used to prepare a report or to prosecutesomeone for breaking the law.

Based on experience, we have determinedthat when writing a report it is best to dealwith only a single indicator or series ofrelated indicators. For example, SLDF isoften concerned with whether the forestrylaws are being followed. By reading thelaws, we can identify numerous easilymeasured variables, such as the size ofbuffer zones left along streams or theamount of logging carried out on steepslopes that are prone to landslides. Byaddressing specific indicators of environ-mental quality in this way, SLDF is able toprovide highly detailed and specific

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information to support the findings intheir reports.

HOW DOES SLDF CONDUCT PAPER

RESEARCH?

In a planning-based management regimelike BC, effective forest watching ispossible by just looking at plans. The poorlevel of plan compliance with the lawmeans that significant faults can be uncov-ered before logging takes place. Actually,this is the point of the planning-basedprovincial code.

Getting access to plans and other informa-tion is a skill that must be learned. Infor-mation gathering is probably the mosttime-consuming and trying aspect of forestwatching. Finding out what is happeningin BC’s public forests is sometimes likepulling teeth. Getting even one documentcan be difficult. All the information youneed is rarely contained in the samedocument. However, information providesknowledge, and knowledge is power, so itis important to persevere.

Before embarking on a mission to uncoverthe facts about activities in a local forest,forest watchers should bear in mind thatthey are about to become embroiled in acomplex issue. Forest watchers must knowspecifically what they are interested in;otherwise they could get lost in a swamp ofinformation. With a clear objective and apatient approach, they are much morelikely to be effective.

Having determined what sort of informa-tion we want, our next step is determiningwhat documents will provide us with thisinformation. Our basic source of informa-tion is the operational plans and theassessments of key environmental valuesused in their preparation. They tell us whois logging, what sort of logging is occur-ring, and where and when the logging istaking place.

For information that is not in plans, weconduct research to determine what addi-tional documents are needed. The morespecific we are, the better people are able tohelp us. Most of the ministries and organiza-tions we deal with are large. Many civilservants are just as in the dark as many of usare about information, if not more so. Forgovernment information, the government’sown telephone directory, which usually liststhe title and department of every civilservant, can be a useful way to ensure we getto speak to a knowledgeable person.

Our knowledge of the planning regime andgovernment filing systems provides us withinsight into where relevant information islocated. To develop this knowledge, wehave learned to always ask for a tour ofrelevant government and company offices.The more you know about how agenciesand companies work and how and wherethey keep information, the better you cando your job.

Information from government or industryinsiders can also be invaluable. Unsolicitedtips from insiders are often the best sourceof information, so we try to cultivate thoserelationships. Many people within govern-ment, industry, consultants, and unions arevery concerned about the same issues.They can be reluctant to share informationbecause they are worried that it will beused out of context or misunderstood, orthat their confidence will be compro-mised. As your reputation for credibilitygrows, your informants will increase. Hereare three important rules:

● Credibility is paramount.

● Always protect your sources.

● Always take the time and care to under-stand the issues as fully as possibly.

HOW DOES SLDF DO ITS FIELD

RESEARCH?

Rule 1: SafetySafety must be the number-one consider-ation in all aspects of a field investigation.Whether you are simply driving to aremote government office or headed outon a weeklong investigation of isolatedhelicopter logging, your personal safetyand the safety of those you are workingwith is the top priority.

There are innumerable risks involved inForest Watch and it is imperative that we

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train to deal with them. Forest watchersmust pack a good first aid kit and makesure that everyone is familiar with itscontents and knows how to use them.Volunteers should be made aware of therisks involved with backcountry work.Field investigators should consider wilder-ness first aid training

Rule 2: Goal settingBefore embarking on any investigation it isvital that forest watchers identify forthemselves their particular local goal. Witha clear goal in mind, it is possible to setobjectives for their investigation and thesort of follow-up that they will undertake.There are innumerable possible issues toinvestigate and making clear choicesbetween them requires a goal.

Once forest watchers have identified a goal,they keep it uppermost in our minds. Theytry to refer all our plans back to the goal andask themselves whether the investigativework they are undertaking advances thatgoal. They try to stay focused.

Rule 3: PreparationThe more forest watchers prepare, thesafer and more effective they will be. Wedon’t want to end up at a cutblock that waslogged years ago if we are looking forrecent problems. Forest watchers try toprepare so they know what they are after,where they are going, how they are goingto get passed the locked gates, what thelocal logging company radio frequencies

are, how they can recharge their videorecorder’s batteries, how they will measurethe stream buffer width, and so on.

We try to be realistic about what we cando in a day. Is it summer (long hours ofdaylight) or winter (short hours)? It takesabout two to three hours to completelyexamine a 10 to 20 hectare cutblock, so weneed to make sure we plan accordingly.Forest watchers need to ask how far apartare the areas they are examining—in hoursand minutes.

Forest watchers should bring what theyneed. If they are using a camera or video,they make sure the batteries are strong andthey have backups. They bring adequatefood and water. It is important to park thecar facing an escape route so they can leavewithout turning around if there is a fire.

It is important to remember the purposeof the trip. Forest watchers should try tokeep priorities in mind and make surethey achieve those goals in the time theyhave. Are they going to walk straight tothat steep section of road that looks likeit could slide? Are they going to place fishtraps at the beginning of their investiga-tion and then measure stream buffers?We try to use a 1:5000 map to save timein the field.

Forest watchers also have to plan theaccess route and determine how muchtime they need. It is important to remem-ber to allow time for travel, getting lost, or

dragging the boat off the rocks becausesomebody miscalculated the tides.

If we are going to look at specificcutblocks, we try to understand what thecutblock or road should look like on theground and in relation to the surroundinglandscape.

COMMUNICATION

Tools for Getting ResultsThere are three major groups of tools:legal, media, and political.

● Legal tools include the law itself,Ministry of Forests’ Compliance andEnforcement, administrative actions,civil actions, prosecutions, and judicialreview.

● Media tools include e-mail newsgroups, personal contact with themedia, web-based publicity, newswor-thy events, press releases, reports,letters to the editor, open house for thelocal community, and print and televi-sion media stories.

● Political tools include building strategicalliances, involving senior Ministry ofForests staff, making a presentation toyour town council, contacting yourmember of Parliament and preparingyour findings for international audi-ences.

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STRATEGIZE

Once forest watchers have well-documentedfindings, they face the choice of which toolsto pick and how to employ them.

The strategy can be simple or complex.Whatever it is, forest watchers should mapit out so it is clear to themselves and otherforest watchers. It is important to besensitive to issues of timing, which canmake or break a strategy. Forest watcherskeep their goal and message in mind andmake sure they are using the strategy toreach the audience they believe canimplement changes.

If you allow yourself to be ignored, youprobably will be. Follow-up is the key tosuccess. Following up includes making afew phone calls, making some personalvisits, writing more letters, or issuing pressreleases. This process can be tiring, but itmakes the difference between a campaignthat is merely noticed and one that has animpact.

REPORTS

SLDF usually chooses to address only oneenvironmental issue with each report. Inpart, this is because the media in BritishColumbia are not sympathetic to theenvironmental point of view. It is difficultto get media coverage of any environmen-tal issue unless it is from a business angle.Therefore, SLDF attempts to keep its

reports focused on a single issue. Complexissues simply are not reported in BritishColumbia newspapers.

Research reports. Reports are usuallywritten to present the results of a monitor-ing project and are aimed at civil society.Their object is to educate people aboutforestry operations in Canada and inspirethem to demand better management oftheir public lands. The reports are writtenin a simple and straightforward mannerand are brief in order to appeal to a massaudience.

SLDF reports must be absolutely accu-rate. When a report was published incooperation with another organization afew years ago, the other organizationinserted a photograph of a cutblock takena few years before the period quoted bythe report. This one minor mistake gave thecorporations and government ammunitionto claim that the report was inaccurate.

Propaganda-busters. Sometimes areport is produced to specifically addressthe rhetoric of the major forestry compa-nies operating in the province. This can bevery important, since large corporationsspend a lot of time and energy cultivatingcertain images. It can be a great blow to acompany or to the industry in general ifclaims that are central to its image can bedisproved. For example, the BC govern-ment and the logging industry spentmillions of dollars in 1995 and 1996

convincing people that clearcutting nolonger occurred in the province. Foreignjournalists were given tours of selectedlogging areas, and BC politicians toldnewspapers, “We’ve stopped the Chop.” Infact, little had changed and clearcuttingremained the silviculture system of choice.By auditing the largest forest companies ineach of the 43 forest districts, we wereable to show that the method for 92.5percent of logging in BC remainsclearcutting.

Similarly, government claims of radicallyimproved stream protection measureswere belied by our report showing 83percent of streams were being clearcut tothe banks, including a majority of fish-bearing streams.

Using data to inform and improvelawmaking. SLFD also tries to use itsexpertise with both forestry law andmonitoring to help shape new laws thatwill be more effective in protecting theenvironment. SLDF is in a unique positionto take on this challenge, as it is involvedin investigating how corporations circum-vent regulations. Knowing this can helpeliminate those loopholes.

This approach also has its difficultiesbecause corporations and hostile govern-ment officials do not want meddlesomeNGOs to have a part in creating laws thatwill reduce the timber companies’ abilityto mismanage the land with impunity.

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SLDF must therefore approach this andall its communications with care. If itappears to be too liberal and unable tocompromise at all, it reduces its chancesthat it will be able to participate in thisprocess. The data generated through itsreports and the insights gained by thehands-on experience of regional coordina-tors have been instrumental in gatheringinformation and in negotiations for theentire BC environmental community.

AN EXAMPLE OF A MONITORING

PROJECT

Report on logging on steep slopesMuch of British Columbia is mountainous,with steep hills covered by old-growthforest. Unregulated logging on such steepslopes increases the chances of soil erosionand soil substrate instability, both of whichlead to an increased probability of land-slides. Logging steep, landslide-prone,unstable slopes greatly increases thenumber and frequency of landslides.Studies in BC by the Ministry of Forestshave documented that logging these precipi-tous slopes increases the risk of landslides to15 to 20 times the natural rate.

The enactment of the BC Forest PracticeCode in mid-1995 mandated new require-ments to prevent landslides. SLDF’sinterdisciplinary forest team employedlegal and technical research, supple-mented by field verification, to determine

whether BC’s “world class standards” forlogging were likely to lead to a decrease inthe number of landslides caused eitherdirectly or indirectly by logging. Thisresearch was documented in a 1997 reportentitled Going Downhill Fast: Landslidesand the Forest Practices Code availableonline at http://www.sierralegal.org/reports/landslide_toc.html.

The report attempted to answer simplequestions:

● What has the Forest Practices Codedone to reduce the likelihood of land-slides due to logging?

● Are the risks associated with logging onsteep slopes being well-managed? Forexample, are companies fulfilling theirterrain requirements, and is this terraininformation accurate?

● Is the government enforcing theprovisions of the code relating tolandslides?

OVERVIEW OF THE LAW

The code uses mandatory planning re-quirements as a mechanism to preventlandslides and erosion on steep slopes. Inorder to reduce the likelihood of land-slides, the code requires logging compa-nies to assess terrain and landslide issuestwice during the planning process. Theseplanning requirements essentially involve

ensuring that forest companies describewhere hazardous slopes exist in a map ondifferent scales of detail.

The first step in the process requirescompanies to map unstable sensitive areason a broad scale in a Forest DevelopmentPlan (FDP). This step is the first line ofdefense against landslides because it actsas a trigger for further steps. This step isessentially an office exercise involving theinterpretation of aerial photographs. Oneof the logging company’s primary planningresponsibilities is to identify all the sensi-tive terrain around its area of operation inits FDP. Failure to accurately completethis mapping leads to significant problemslater in the process because key preven-tive measures and assessments will notbe triggered.

At each step, logging companies aresupposed to adapt their logging and roadactivities to the terrain. The second step,performing on-site “terrain stabilityassessments” of landslide-prone areasidentified as sensitive in the first step, is acritical part of effectively fulfilling thisfunction. This step involves on-site investi-gations of the area. This is the second lineof defense. Again, accuracy is essential.

The third line of defense, and perhaps themost significant section of the code ad-dressing terrain issues, is the section thatexplicitly prohibits clearcutting in areasthat are “subject to a high likelihood of

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landslides.” Ostensibly, this section pro-vides explicit limitations on the types oflogging that can occur on vulnerableslopes. The inclusion of this section in thecode reflects the lesson learned from pastlogging practices—that clearcutting inareas prone to sliding is unwise and shouldbe avoided. Unfortunately, like most provi-sions in the new law, there is a loophole: agovernment forestry official can exempt acompany from the provision and allowlogging on the most landslide-prone slopes.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used for the streamreport was modified slightly and usedagain to assess the likely impacts of indus-trial logging on the probability of land-slides in BC. In fact, we conducted thepaperwork audit in district offices for thelandslide report at the same time as wedid the paper audits for the stream report.Since both audits looked at all cutblocksapproved since the new law came intoeffect, we were able to save considerabletime by combining our auditing efforts. Thesynergy between the two paper audits alsoallowed us to save money on travel expensesto the relevant forest district offices.

Our forestry team audited thirteen forestdevelopment plans from nine districts. Asin all our investigations, we undertookmany steps before our teams of biologists,lawyers, and data specialists actually wentinto the field.

In this case, we wanted to know how muchof the proposed harvesting was on steepslopes in order to determine if the newlegal protections were being implementedto decrease the risk of landslides. Sinceeach development plan created by atimber company is legally required tocontain a terrain stability map of theconcession area, we examined these mapsto determine the number and location ofcutblocks identified by companies as beinglocated in landslide prone areas.

Our next step was to analyze the accuracyof the terrain information supplied bycompanies in their plans. To do this, weused a variety of methods, including paperauditing and fieldwork. First, using theinformation in the terrain stability mapsprovided in the timber companies’ man-agement plans, we double-checked theaccuracy of the companies’ terrain desig-nations by simply measuring the slopes ofland in various cutblocks from the contourlines found on the maps themselves. Wethen compared these results with themapping layers provided by the companiesto determine if there were inconsistencies.

The slope measurements derived from themap contour lines were then verified byfield measurements made in two of thecutblocks surveyed. Slope measurementwas carried out using a clinometer. Thesemeasurements were then compared withthose made by using the map-contourlines. This field verification showed a good

fit between the clinometer measurementsmade in the field and those made from themaps. Our ability to verify our contouranalysis in the field was limited by weatherconditions. Most of the cutblocks wesurveyed in our paper audit were locatedat higher elevations and, at the time of ourfieldwork, were under numerous feet ofsnow, inhibiting our ability to use a cli-nometer accurately.

As we began investigating terrain-relatedissues, informants within governmentindicated to us that the ministry officialsalso had concerns about the accuracy ofterrain information in company plans. Infact, a study had been commissioned todetermine their accuracy. Through provin-cial freedom of information laws weobtained independent internal assess-ments of the quality of terrain studies.

One peer-reviewed document revealedmajor and endemic problems with thequality of terrain mapping. For example,the peer-reviewed study determined thatall seven reconnaissance-level assessmentswere “judged to be poor to very poor.” Aseparate Ministry of Forest review of 34on-site assessments found that over halfwere judged to be of poor or fair qualityand none was considered excellent.

FINDINGS

Our research showed that, despite thesevere long-term consequences, the code

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had failed to adequately regulate loggingon steep and unstable slopes. Our auditrevealed that 45 percent of logging pro-posed by companies were slated for areasthe companies had identified as having amoderate or high risk of landslides. Thepaper audit showed that 4 of the 13 plansstudied had almost 80 percent of theirlogging planned on landslide-prone slopes.Almost all the proposed logging wasclearcutting.

More than one-fourth of this logging (28percent) was in areas that the companiesthemselves identified as Class V terrain,the areas mapped as having the highestrisk of landslides. Given the regulationspreventing clearcutting on such slopes, wewere surprised to discover that 97 percentof the cutblocks slated for logging in thesehighly sensitive areas were being clearcut.Numerous studies have shown that clear-cutting in these areas is the most destructivemethod of logging and greatly increases theprobability of landslides and soil erosion.Some of the companies in our audit pro-posed clearcutting 100 percent of theircutblocks in these highly unstable areas.

Our research showed that the prohibitionon clearcutting these highly landslide-prone areas was clearly being ignored byboth logging companies and the Ministryof Forests. Since clearcut logging on ClassV terrain is only supposed to proceed if anexemption is given by a governmentforestry official, we wanted to look at the

rationales for allowing this destructivepractice. In the majority of forest districtswe audited, Ministry of Forests officialseither “were not familiar “ with this sectionof the law or “did not use” the section intheir districts. In the district that had thegreatest incident of landslides in BC, theQueen Charlotte Forest District, the re-sponsible government official issued ablanket exemption to all licensees authoriz-ing them to ignore this section of the code.

The combined results of the field- andmap-based assessments demonstrated thattimber companies were under-represent-ing the amount of land in their concessionsthat was on steep, landslide-prone slopes(defined as being greater than 60 percentslope). In addition, several of the mapsprovided in the logging company‘s devel-opment plans had inadequate and missingterrain information, as well as terraininformation that appeared to be highlyinaccurate. Six plans, located in two forestdistricts, contained no information andhad to be excluded from the analysis.

In the Chilliwack district, the loggingcompany Interfor had identified 28 per-cent of its 114 cutblocks as containinglandslide-prone terrain. Yet in this samedistrict, SLDF’s investigations showed thatas much as 63 percent of the 114 cutblockscontained slopes greater than 60 percent,and many were greater than 70 percent.

The results were even more dismal for

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.’s concessions inthe Port Alberni district. Of the 174cutblocks examined, only 9 percent wereidentified by the company as having agreater than 60 percent slope. The SLDFassessment, however, found that 80 per-cent of these 174 cutblocks were on landwith a slope steeper than 60 percent.

CONCLUSIONS

The disturbing reality of the “manage-ment” of terrain stability risks in BC’sforest is that there are routine failures inevery stage of planning and enforcementprocesses. Our report provides compellingevidence that BC’s Forest Practices Codeis failing to protect terrain. The code fallsfar short of creating the “world-classstandards” so frequently touted by govern-ment and industry. Furthermore, careless,inadequate, or nonexistent planning,failure to rigorously enforce provisions ofthe law, and cynical evasions of the law bygovernment and industry in the face ofknown hazards will result in increasedlandslides in the future. The cost ofdevastation to our forests and rivers isborne not by those causing the damage,but by all the people in BC.

Although the laws at the time of the reportwere obviously flawed, it is both ironic andunsettling that since the report the BCgovernment has amended these laws toweaken, rather than strengthen, terrainprotection and companies’ accountability.

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TELAPAK, INDONESIA

Address: Jl. Semput Kaler No. 16; Bogor16154; Indonesia.Tel: (62) 251 320-792Fax: (0251) 351069E-mail: [email protected]

By Charles Victor Barber and ChristianOttke, with A. Ruwindrijarto

INTRODUCTION

Telapak was first created in 1995 by agroup of NGO activists and universitygraduates in the natural resources manage-ment field. In 1997, it was formally estab-lished as a legal entity. Telapak is head-quartered in Bogor, and it operates incollaboration with a wide-ranging networkof NGOs and other institutions withinIndonesia and internationally. This net-work gives Telapak access to a variety oftypes of information, ranging from localfield reports on activities affecting foreststo satellite-derived and other macro datafrom international sources.

THE ORGANIZATION

Mission and ObjectivesTelapak believes that all of Indonesia’sterritory is a conservation area.Biodiversity conservation, natural re-source-based production, and the empow-erment and livelihood security of re-source-dependent communities must be

integrated in a way that encompasses allaspects of the land and seascape, from themost remote forest and reefs to farmers’fields and fishing grounds.

Telepak’s objectives include

● Strengthening transparency inIndonesia’s natural resource manage-ment policies and practices by develop-ing an independent system and networkto monitor the status of, and trends in,the country’s forest and coastal/marineecosystems;

● Supporting and strengthening the localeconomic systems and natural resourcesmanagement institutions of Indonesia’straditional communities; and

● Promoting new policies and practicesto combat environmental degradationand support rehabilitation of forestsand biological diversity in Indonesia.

PERSONNEL

Telapak is a small organization, relying oncollaborations with other local and inter-national NGOs to provide much of thedata it uses and to help disseminate itsinformation.

NETWORKING

As mentioned above, Telapak works withother NGOs, relying on them to conductmuch of the monitoring fieldwork andinvestigation. This is an effective program

design for Indonesia, with its many ethnicgroups and huge geographic area. As arule, Telapak and its partners share thesame objectives and needs with respect tothe promotion of sustainable and equitablenatural resources management. Thisconfluence of goals and interests forms thebasis for the development of mutuallyagreed upon and equitable relationshipsbetween Telapak and its partners withrespect to the exchange of data and infor-mation. The division of functions betweenTelapak and its partners is as follows.

Telapak:

● Catalyzes local funding and providescapacity-building for local partnersthrough training programs;

● Collects (and provides its partnerswith) national-level data and informa-tion such as forest and other resourcemaps from the National MappingAgency (Bakosurtanal);

● Promotes and sponsors policy dialoguesand carries out advocacy at the nationaland international levels;

● Coordinates the exchange of informa-tion among various partners; and

● Works to strengthen political and legalsupport for the work of local partners.

Partner organizations:

● Determine the targets and key issues for

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investigation and monitoring activities;

● Carry out field investigations andmonitoring;

● Assist and strengthen the capacity oflocal communities in the investigationand monitoring processes;

● Facilitate the exchange of informationwith local communities; and

● Manage the data and information thatresults from field investigation andmonitoring activities.

In order to build the capacity to fulfill theseroles, Telapak provides technical assistanceto local partners through training workshopsin field investigation and monitoring,information management, and advocacycampaign development and management.Telapak also functions as the main nationalnode for the monitoring and investigationnetwork, as well as managing the communi-cations network among its partners. Inselected cases, Telapak staffers themselvescarry out field investigations, particularly incases in which there is a pressing, time-sensitive issue to be investigated that isoutside the partners’ working area.

Currently, Telapak’s three main regionalpartners are the Irian Jaya EnvironmentFoundation (YALI), the Leuser Conserva-tion Foundation (YLL) in northernSumatra, and PLASMA, an NGO based inEast Kalimantan province. Through itspartnership with these three NGOs,

Telapak taps into a much broader networkin each of these regions, since each of thethree partner organizations acts as a nodefor many local NGOs in its region. In IrianJaya, for example, YALI works in variousregions of that vast province with theAsmat Traditional People’s Foundation,the Irian Jaya Rural Community Develop-ment Foundation (YPMD), the WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF) Irian Jayaprogram, and various other groups. In thisway, there are at least 20 institutions that aredirectly and closely connected to Telapak inthe Indonesian forest-monitoring network.

Telapak uses its expertise and centralposition to coordinate and improve theefforts of its partner NGOs. By puttingtogether training manuals and providingtraining to the local people who collect thedata in the field, Telapak is instrumental inensuring high-quality data from the nu-merous NGOs spread through a widegeographic area.


Based on the above mission, vision, andobjectives, Telapak monitors the followingissues:

● Logging policies and practices;

● Coastal and marine resources manage-ment and exploitation policies andpractices;

● Trading and poaching of wildlife andother biological resources;

● Plans for large-scale developmentprojects and the conflicts that result; and

● Cases or conflicts involving naturalresources and traditional communities.

Telapak initially gathers secondary data(government reports, maps, and statistics,news media accounts, and the like), as wellas anecdotal stories and reports from thefield. Fieldwork is then conducted toverify and fill out the information obtainedfrom secondary sources. This process isdivided into six stages:

1. Identify the purpose of the investigation.

2. Collect and understand the secondaryinformation.

3. Develop the data collection methodol-ogy and train the data collection crew.

4. Collect the data.

5. Analyze and disseminate the data.

6. Develop an action plan.

1. Identify the purpose of theinvestigation.It is very important to have a clear purposefor an investigation. For example, a par-ticular field investigation might be in-tended to provide compelling evidencewith which to pressure the government torevoke the license of a particularly de-structive and lawbreaking timber conces-sion operator. Alternatively, the investiga-tors could be participating in a timber

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certification exercise, or they might becollecting evidence to gain wider recogni-tion for a particularly successful commu-nity forest management system.

After identifying what the investigation ismeant to accomplish, it is necessary toidentify the data that will best achieve thoseends. Telapak looks for specific indicatorsthat are relatively simple to investigate,measurable, and will best provide evidenceregarding the topic at hand. To investigatethe legality and quality of logging on timberconcessions, for example, Telapak hasutilized indicators such as the size of treesharvested and the steepness of slopes wherea road was built or trees cut. Monitors alsonote the geographic location of the loggingactivities, particularly with respect to neigh-boring protected areas, communities, watercatchment areas, and the like. Relatedindicators in such a situation might includethe existence of illegal sawmills, evidence ofmining or poaching, and accounts of humanrights violations.

2. Collect and understand thesecondary information.Secondary research is an important part ofTelapak’s investigation and monitoringstrategy. Before investigators undertakethe investigation of a logging concession,for example, they obtain the company’sannual work plans for cutting blocks,maps, and other data that cast light on theconcession’s planned and actual activities.This is formally supposed to be public

information, but in reality is often keptsecret by both the logging firms and forestrybureaucrats as a matter of course. Obtainingaccess to this vital information, therefore,often demands making contacts with sympa-thetic individuals within relevant govern-ment agencies. Indeed, cultivation of goodrelationships with sympathetic officials oftenleads to a great deal of other information,such as leads on illegal activities that aconscientious official may wish to expose butdoes not feel he or she can do within thestructure of the present bureaucracy.

Secondary legal research is also important.If the objective of an investigation is toprovide evidence that a concession-holder isbreaking the law, it is important that theinvestigators have a good working knowl-edge of the applicable laws and regulations,so that field observations can be accuratelyconnected to clear legal violations.

In addition to providing importantbaseline information for the investigationand monitoring of ongoing activitiesaffecting forests, secondary research iscrucial in meeting Telapak’s objective offorward-looking, proactive monitoring thatcan prevent forest degradation before itstarts. Much of what passes for forestmonitoring and information worldwide isessentially an assessment of damagealready done. Telapak therefore stressesthe importance of obtaining secondarydata—such as the government’s many five-year plans for various sectors and regions,and private-sector investment plans—that

can serve as the basis for working againstdestructive activities and investmentsbefore they cause damage.

3. Develop the data collectionmethod-ology and train the datacollection crewThe next step is to plan the methodologyand make preparations for the investiga-tion team to go to the field. This is a veryimportant step that is not as easy as isoften thought.

In preparing the data collection methodol-ogy, the team works together to analyzevarious options and scenarios for datacollection. Team members identify therelative weaknesses and strengths of eachscenario and prepare themselves for theworst possibilities, ranging from badweather and travel conditions to threatsand obstacles from the party or partiesthat are the subject of the investigation.

Methodological decisions must also bemade at this point about how the data willbe collected. Choices include conductinginterviews in local communities, livingtemporarily with the local people, orworking directly in the timber concessionoperations area in the forest, which isoften far away from human settlementsand impossible to reach on foot.

After deciding on a data collection strat-egy, the members of the investigation teamare prepared for their work. They have the

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equipment and provisions that will beneeded in the field. The members havetheir identity cards and any letters ofintroduction or transit. Preparation alsoincludes skills training (such as refreshersessions with investigation manuals andother materials) and review of communica-tions and health and safety procedures.

A guiding principle for field data collec-tion is that the information collected mustalways, at a minimum, include accuratelocational information (with Global Posi-tioning System coordinates wheneverpossible) and the date and time of allobservations and interviews. Documenta-tion should be as complete as possible(comprising photographs, video footage,audio recordings, and written documents).It should include the names of all infor-mants and parties involved in the mattersunder investigation, and accurate andcomplete descriptions of all cases ofconflict pertinent to the investigation.

4. Data collectionTelapak’s overarching data-gatheringstrategy is to use secondary sources suchas documents and people who have sec-ondhand knowledge of a situation toinform the collection of primary data. Theprimary data include field observationsand interviews with primary informants.

Telapak is careful to ensure that all itsmonitors use the same methods in collect-ing data, enabling their findings to be

compared. To this end, Telapak has foundit necessary to produce a series of hand-books and manuals for its members to use.These handbooks help ensure that themonitors efficiently gather high-qualitydata that, because they are gathered withsimilar methods everywhere, can becompared regardless of which organizationhas produced them.

There are a number of rules that investiga-tors follow regardless of the type of informa-tion they are engaged in collecting. First,they should continue an investigation only ifthey feel safe and secure. If the situation istoo tense, the investigation is called off.Second, they should gather any data that fillin some gaps in the “big picture.” This isimportant because, although investigationscarried out for Telapak are well-planned andorganized, the necessary data may beunavailable or impossible to obtain. Therewill always be problems, but remainingflexible will enable the gathering of somegood information instead of none. Finally,Telapak tells its monitors to behave ethicallyand to keep a sense of humor.

Gathering data from informants:Telapak receives information from manypeople in Indonesia with knowledge ofillegal and unethical company and govern-ment activities. Depending on who theyare, the approach in gaining this informa-tion takes different forms. There aregeneral principles that apply across theboard. Informants give the investigatorsinformation because they want to tell

someone and because they trust the investi-gators. In training its investigators, Telepakstresses the need to nurture their relation-ships with informants. Investigators shouldstress that they will not mention names inassociation with the data. Investigators alsotry to present the informant with a letter ofintroduction or a card from a local villager asa means of establishing trust. If the investi-gators assume a false identity, they willassume one that is not threatening to thepeople they are interviewing.

Field data collection: Telapak usesinvestigation and observation extensivelyas data-gathering tools. Employees oflogging companies, local villagers, andgovernment officials all serve as informants.Information is written and recorded usingcameras and video recording equipment inboth open and covert ways. A monitor willsometimes sign on with a company as a daylaborer, working for a number of weekswhile taking pictures and notes.

Although some of these undertakings needto be covert, others can be quite open.Many of the people interviewed by investi-gators are very happy to talk. Villagersoften have grievances to voice due to theloss of their traditional land. Workers mayfeel resentment toward their company.Government officials may feel that theactions of their superiors are immoral.Knowing how to present yourself to peoplein different situations is an importantaspect of this work.

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DATA ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION

Usually, a team of people other than thefield investigation team carries out theanalysis of the data and information ob-tained from the field. This is importantbecause the skills needed for field datacollection are not the same as those neededfor analysis. In addition, this allows for anautomatic cross-checking and review pro-cess that better guarantees the objectivity ofthe whole investigation and analysis process.

Analysis is carried out through a series ofdiscussions and consultations that involvea wide range of experts, including special-ists in forestry and natural resourcesmanagement, activists for communitiesand indigenous peoples, and experts inforestry and natural resources laws andpolicies. This broad process of consulta-tion and input is based on the belief thatthe process of advocacy related to theresults of an investigation must begin atthe time that the results of field investiga-tions are obtained and communicated tothe various parties mentioned above.

For maximum effectiveness, Telapak be-lieves that the continuing development offield investigation capacities and resultsmust be combined with and integrated intogeographic descriptions. To that end,Telapak and its forest monitoring partners inthe field are increasingly utilizing Geo-graphic Information Systems (GIS) tools andother spatial (mapping) data in the analysisand presentation of monitoring results.

COMMUNICATION

Telapak uses a variety of media to dissemi-nate its information. It relies on two basicstrategies: private and open. The privatestrategy is used in situations in whichTelapak knows that it has an ally in a minis-try who can accomplish more with theinformation than Telapak can by goingpublic. This has often been the case becauseof Indonesia’s political climate. Ministersbecome defensive if attacked, but are oftenwilling to exert pressure on the wrongdoersif information is provided to them quietly.

When this private method does not workor if the type of information is meant to bedisseminated widely, Telapak uses manymedia. These include publications, videos,films, slide shows, art, and music. Due tothe executive director’s former profes-sional involvement with media, Telapakhas a very sophisticated understanding ofmedia and many connections withinIndonesia’s media circles.

Telapak has drawn up guidelines for itspublications. Basic to these is the need toremain nonjudgmental when presentingthe information gathered by the monitor-ing—that is, a “just the facts” approach.

ACTION

Action on the basis of Telapak’s investiga-tions, monitoring, and analysis is carriedout by other organizations. This strictdivision of labor ensures that Telapak’s

information-related activities remainrelatively neutral—and are perceived thatway. Accordingly, Telepak provides otherinstitutions with the results of its investiga-tions and analysis for use as the basis ofcampaigns on specific issues or cases, andother advocacy activities. In this way, themonitoring network can also concentrateits energies on the production of high-quality data, information, and analysis.Nevertheless, Telapak does provide rec-ommendations for action in the areas ofpolicy reform, community organizing,advocacy campaigns, lawsuits, and dis-semination of information to the public. Inpractice, Telapak provides the results of itsinvestigation and monitoring work togovernment forestry and land use agen-cies, provincial government agencies,other NGOs, protected areas managementunits, and the mass media.

Community organizing is one area ofaction that receives a good deal of atten-tion from Telapak. It is carried out throughthe communication of the results ofinvestigations and monitoring and theholding of workshops on monitoring forcommunities themselves. This kind oftraining also helps build the capacity oflocal communities to document their ownnatural resources management practices;evaluate them based on ecological, eco-nomic, and socio-cultural criteria; andpromote community-based natural re-source management alternatives.