MONGOLIA BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, 1953-1965digitool.library.mcgill.ca/thesisfile47251.pdf · MONGOLIA BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, 1953-1965 by ... Empire and the northward retreating

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MONGOLIA BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, 1953-1965

by

Harvey Schneider

A thesis submitted tothe Faculty o~ Graduate Studies and Research in partial ~ulfillment o~ the requirements for the degree o~ Master o~ Arts.

Department o~ History

McGill University

Montreal

April, 1969.

Un ..... rp'U' Schneider 1969

AC KNOWLEDGEMENTS

l owe a debt of gratituda to several people

for help in the preparation of this thesis: To Professor

Paul T. K. Lin of McGill and Professor Joseph Fletcher

of Harvard for their assistance in gaining me access to

Mongolian and Chinese sources; to Messrs. J. Grant Purves,

Ed Laine, and to Miss Wilda Lossing ror having suggested

many necessary corrections and improvements; to Mr. and

~œs. B. Schneider for having helped proofread and type

this paper; to the staff of McLennan Library of McGill

University for their innumerable services; and especially

to Professor Milos Mladenoviè, my thesis director, for

his warmth and encouragement which proved invaluable

during the writing of this paper.

Abbreviations used in the footnotes

CDSP - Current Digest of Soviet Press.

SCMP - Survey of China Mainland Press.

NCNA - New China News Agency.

RCAS - Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.

FEER - Far Eastern Economie Review.

Footnotes for the CDSP ----------------~-----

The CDSP has been published each week since 1949. Each year the weekly issues are bound into four books. The volume number for 1949 is l, and the numbers increase with each year of publication. l have used the same citations as are used by the publishers of the Digest. After each citation, the date and name of the newspaper or periodical appears in parentheses.

e.g.

~, XI;13, vol. 1, p. 21. (Pravda, April 1, 1959).

XI is the eleventh year of publication, i.e. 1959. 13 refers to the thirteenth weekly issue of the year. vol. 1 is the first of the four volumes for the year. p. 21 refers to the page in issue thirteen.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1:

CHAPTER 2:

CHAPTER 3:

CHAPTER 4:

CHAPTER 5:

CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

• • • fi • • • • • • • • • • • ••• page

The Sovietization of Oute~ Mongolia • • • • • • • • • • •

The Re.aumption of Sino-Mongol

• •

Relations.. • • • • • • • • • • • •

Soviet'J Activi ty in the M:ongolian People's Republic, 1953-1.957 • • • The Implementation of the New Russian Policy • • • • • • • • • •

Mongolia and the Sino-Soviat Dispute • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The T.ermination of Sino-Mongol Relations • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

i

1

20

34

48

63

82

93

97

INTRODUCTION.

The_ purpose of this the sis i8 to study the

ways in which Mongolia's political, economic and cultural

ties with Russia and China were affected and changed by

the fluùtuation of Sino-Soviet relations between 1953 and

1965. This period was chosen to cover the time between

Stalin's death and Khrushchev's removal from power in

Russia, but it coincidental~y marked the resumption, after

a break of thirty years, and termination of Chinese ac­

tivity in Mongolia. Thus these years witnessed one com­

plete phase in the continuing historical process in this

area of the world. As yet, however, there is no scholarly

synthe sis which considers these years as a completed phase

in this process.

Few major works exist which treat the subject

of twentieth centur,y Mongolia. The period until 1946 is

reliably reported by Gerard Friters in his excellent work,

Outer Mongolia and Its International Position. 1 In it, he

traces the history of Mongolia's relations with both China

and Russia from the late ninèteenth century until the end

of World War Two. George Murphy provides an excellent

1. Gerard M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, with an Introduction by Owen Lattimore, London, 1951.,

i

economic history of the country from 1921 to 1960 in

his book, Soviet MOngolia. 1 Rober't Rupen' s three articles

in Pacifie Affairs2 offer the student both statistical

information and personal views about Mongolia from 1945

to 1,960. Rupen is the most prolific western wri te~ of

Mongolian affairs and hr.>.s visi ted the countrJ Geveral

tim0S~ Hupens's two volume work, Mongols of the Twentieth

century,3is an important addition to the English historiog­

raphy on Mongolia. However, in presenting a wealth of

information gleaned from Russian, Chinese, English and

Mongol sources, Rupen arbitrarily divided the time period

unà.er discussion into decades rather than historical

phases. His achievement was a work of encyclopaedic

rather than interpretive value.

The traditional sources of historical infor-

mation, such as diaries, personal correspondence, govern­

ment and diplomatie documents, were unavailable for so

recent a period of history. Since no Western journalists

or observers reside in Mongolia, the student must rely on

Soviet, Mongol or Chinese newspapers for knowledge of the

1. George G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, Berkeley, 1966.

2. Robert A. Rupen, "Notes on Outer Mongolia since 1945", Pacifie Affairs, vol.XXVIII, (March 1955), pp. 71-a 79; ifOûter Mongolia since 1955", Pacifie Affairs, vol.XXX, (December 1957), pp. 342-357; "Outer Mongolia 1957-1960", Pacifie Affairs, vol.XXXIII, (June 1960), pp. 126-143.

3. Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, 2 vols. Bloomington, ïridiana, 1964.

ii1

Mongolian scene. Reports by western visitors are en­

thusiastically greeted by scholars.

Russian newspapers and magazine articles are

edited and compiled in the Current Digest of the Soviét

Press, published by the Joj.nt Commi ttee on Slavic Studies

in Washington. Articles on Mongolia appearing in Russian

publications are wri tten by Russian °j.ournalists them­

selves or are reprinted from the Mongolian Party news­

paper,~. The Survey of China Mainland Press, printed

in Hong Kong by the American Consulate General is the

Chinese counterpart of the Digest. The British periodical

Far Eastern Economie Revi~, also published in Hong Kong,

frequently prints articles reporting the progress of

Mongolia's economic plans. The New York Times contains

more information on Mongolia than any other western news­

paper, although many of its articles are Russian stories

paraphrased by Times' reporters. Two of the most

valuable studies on Mongolia were written by correspondents

Jack Raymond in 19561 and Harrison Salisbury in 1959,2

both of whom visited and toured Mongolia.

This thesis treats the twelve years of 1953 to

1965 as a completed phase in the continuous struggle to

control this area. Two conclusions may be drawn from

1. The New York Times, August 27-31, 1956.

2. The New York Times~ August 3-7, 1959.

iv

this study. The iïrst is that Mongolia's position bet­

ween Russia and China was most acceptable when Russo­

Chinese relations were friendly and the controls on Mon­

golia were relaxed. Second, the author contends that

the international position of the Mongolian People's Re­

public underwent no change as a result of the history

of this period;

CHAPTER 1.

THE SOVIETIZATION OF OUTER MONGOLIA

The problem of Outer Mongolia in international

affairs is, historically speaking, of comparatively recent

origine When the Russo-Chinese frontier was dilineated by

treaties in the early eighteenth century, the Mongol lands

were partitioned. The Buryat Mongols fell under the

domination of Russia, and the provinces of Outer and Inner

Mongolia remained Chinese. When, in the la'te nineteenth

century, the interests of the eastward expanding Russian

Empire and the northward retreating Chinese Empire began to

coincide in Central Asia, the middle section of Outer Mon­

golia became contested territory.

Until the final decade of the nineteenth centur,y,

Outer Mongolia was free from foreign influences. Its size

was that of present day Western Europe, and it was in.­

habited by less than one million people, mostly nomadic

livestock breeders. It was ruled by an oligarchy of nobles

and Lamaist priests. Although a Chinese province, Outer

Mongolia was not threatened by assimilation. The Mongols

were free to speak their language and to practice their

religion. Colonization was forbidden in this area, so few

1.

2.

Chinese nationals resided there. The trading c3nter of

Urga, the Mongolian capital, attracted many Chinese merchants,

but few signs of Chinese influence existed. The Govern-

ment ~olicy of non-involvement in Mongol affairs lasted

until Outer Mongolia was threatened by Russian expansion ..

The Bcarcity of Mongols over such a large territory made

it impossible for them to defend their land alone against

foreign incursion.

While colonizing her Siberian lands àuring the

nineteenth century, Russia acquired considerable areas of

Chinese territory both in Central Asia and along the

Pacific coast. By 1885, Outer Mongolia had become the

next Chinese dependency to be coveted by Czarist Russia.

Until the turn of the century, Russia's activities in Outer

Mongolia were strictly commercial, but these interests

grew to the point of challenging China's dominant position.

China reacted by reversing her policy and encouraging

colonization and intermarriage in Mongolia. 1

The aim of the Czarist Government in Outer Mon~

golia was to protect Russian commercial interests and, at the

same time, to weaken China's hold on her province. In view

of the situation in Europe after 1900, however, RUBsia had

no desire to become embroiled in a Far Eastern crisis. An

independence movement emerged in Mongolia as a reaction to the

1. Friters, op cit, p. 157.

3.

new Chinese policies, and. although the Defense Department

in St. Petersburg secretly sent weapons to Mongol princes,

the Foreign Office claimed to be officially neutral. Vfuen

Outer Mongolia did declare its independence in 1,911, it was

due, not to Russian machinations, but to the cOllapse of the

Manchu Dynasty in Peking.

Between 11911 and 1,921, Russia was unable to pursue

her interes.ts in Outer Mongolia because of her preoccupation

with \Vorld War 1, the 1917 Revolutions and the Civil War.

Me anwhi le , a Chinese garrison reclaimed the province, but

was soon forced to withdraw when defeated by White Russian

Armies. In 1.921, they were in turn driven out by the Red

Army which established a new Mongol Government. It was led

by the spiritual leader of aIl Mongols, the Living Buddha.

When he died in 11924, the sovietization of Outer Mongolia

began.

Soviet policy was far more act~ve than that of the

Czarist Government because the Soviet Union regarded the

territory of Mongolia as strategie to her eastern defense

network. 1 For this reason, Russian activity in Mongolia was

1. T.J' .Betts, "The Strategy of Another Russo-Japanese War", Foreign Affairs, vol,XII, no.4, (July 1934), " ••• the potential theatre of war is dominated by what is called the Baikal region."(p.593). He concludes that "For. the Japanese, then, a successful war means the prompt capture of the Baikal region. For the Russians, the essentials of ultimate victory are contained in the defense of this territory. It is the decisive zone of a Russo-Japanese conflict."(p.594). Moreover, tlle Japanese interventionist" troops left Russian soil as late as 1.922.

aimed at the formation of a socialist state whose survival

w.ould depend on the Soviet Union. This was accomplishe.d by

first gaining control of the Government of Outer Mongolia by

suppor.ting the pro-Russian Mongolian People' s Revolutionary

Party. This step preceded the inaugul:ation of an economic

development pro gram closely patterned along Soviet linea, and

the establishment of an education system staffed almost

entirely by Russian teachers. The Russian maneuvera were.

facilitated by the total monopoly she ènjoyed, with regard to.

aIl forms of inter-relations with Mongolia. While China was

preoo.cupied by Chiang' s Northern Expedition and the attempts

to unite the country in the twenties, aIl Cbinese were ex­

pelled from Mongoli,a and lJomintern agents became the power

behind the Mongol Government. 1

The formation of a planned economy was first

attempted. during the early nineteen thirties, the same time

as the Russian drive towards industrialization and collee~

tti.'Viization. The pro gram , also in the form of_ a Five Year,

Plan, called for the rapid oollectivization of livestock.

This attempt was met with widespread nomad revolts and the

slaughter of livestock. Sinee Mongolia' s wealth was mea.sured

in terms of the numbers. of animaIs she possessed, the

collectivization experiment was called off. The threat posed

after 1931 by an expansionist J apan sharing a border wi th

Mongolia also encouraged a return to social and economie

1. Murphy, op oit, p. 117.

stability.

Despite the failure of collectivization, the

policy of economic change was not abandoned, but took on a

different direction. The attempt to collectivize revealed

that Mongolia did not possess the chief prerequisites for its

implementation. 1 Wells and stables were unnecessary for the

nomads. Farming and the production of fodder and hay were

equally foreign to their way of life. The immobility of

collective life, consequently, brought death to large numbers

of .. lives.tock which were~ stranded in their unprotected corrals

with no food or water during winter atorms~ The collec­

tivization experiment pointed out these failings to the

economic planners and it was postponed in 1932. Creating the

base for a planned economy becama the prio~ity task of the

Mongolian Government.

The Mongol leaders decided that the development of

an educated class.was. the first prerequisite of a successful

planned economy. Such a class did not exist in M0ngolia before

World War Two. Veterinarians, herders familiar wi th modern

animal. husbandry and other trained agricul turalists wera

necessary to increase the number and upgrade the quality of..

the livestock herds. Bookkeepers, statisticians and planners

1. Herold J. Wiens, "Geographical Limitations to Food Pro­duction in the Mongolian People's Republic", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. XLI, (December 1951), p. 35.4.

6.

were also needed to manage collectives and superyise the

various aspects of a planned economye

Producing skilled personnel was a difficult task

for two reasons: the lack of teachers, and the monopoly of

the Lamaist Church on education. These problems were solved

when the Government turned its attention towards the

elimination of the Church as a rival force in Mongol society.

It"was no.t only a competitive influence but also a source of

resistance to advances in education. Tibetan was the language

of the Church and since most schools in Mongolia were ad­

ministered by Lamaist monks, students learned to read only

this language. 1 :\'Iongol waD "~h~ spoken language so the

ability to read Tibetan had no application in daily life. In

the nineteen thirties, the Mongol Government excluded the

Church from the field o~ education. Church land was con­

fiscated and monks were forced to labour as other Mongols did,

for their livelihood. In 1937, the Army was used to destroy

the monasteries. 2 Boarding schools were set up to replace

them and Russian personnel and teachers came to administer them.

After World War Two, Russian-trained Mongol teachers became

available for the early school grades and began to replace

their Russian teachers.

1. Owen Lattimore, "Mongolia Revisited", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol.XLIX, (1962),pp. 290-291. (Hereâfter cited as RCAS). -

2. Charles R. Bawden, "Commentary on an Interview with the Hambo Lama", Ibid, pp. 178-179.

While consolidating her politieal position in

Mongolia, Russia also strengthened her military posture in

the face of Japanese expansion. Vlhen Japan emerged as a

mainland power after 1931, Russia relinquished her interes.ts

in Manchuria and made Mongolia her military stronghold in the

Far East. 1 A "Gentleman's Agreement ll on defense, concluded

in 1934, was formalized in March 1936, as the Soviet-Mongol

Protocol of Mutual Assistance. This provided for the

stationing of one country's troops on the other's soil "in

the event of a threat of an attack on the part of a third

state".2 This Protocol merely legalized existing conditions

since Soviet troops had been based in Mongolia since late

1934.3

Mongolia's strategie importance significantly grew.

after 1935 when border skirmishes were reported more

frequently. Tensions were not reduced batween Russia and

Japan even after 1937, by which time the Japanese High

Command should havabeen preoccupied with the war against

China. The troops of the Outer Mongolian Army became part of

the Soviet Far Eastern A:rmy and d,efended the flank of the

Russian positions along the Manchukuo-Mongolia-Russia border,.4

In 1939, a railroad track was built for defensive purposes,

1. John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, London, 1i962 , pp. 358-359, 397.

2. Quoted in Fr1ters, op cit, p. 143.

3. Erickson, op cit, p. 397.

4. ~, p. 397.

8.

linking the Trans-Siberian Railway with Eastern Mongolia.

From May to August 1939 fieroe battles took place in which

Soviet and Mongol troops, led by corps commander and future

Marshall, Major-General Zhukov, drove the Japanese out of

Mongolian territory after bloody fighting. 1 In April 1941,

the Sovièt-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, reducing

Mongolia's military importance somewhato Her support of

Russia's military activity continued during the Russo-German

War of 1.94 h .. 1945, when Mongolia supplied Russian t:r.'oops wi th

horses, meat and leather goods from her valltt livestock herds. 2

Outer Mongolia again became a factor in inter­

national rBlations during the closing days of World War Two.

Au the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Ruasia insisted that

the position of Mongolia between Russia and China be clarified

and included in any post~War settlement in the Far East.

Believing that Soviet military assistance was:necessary for

victory agains.t Japan., President Roosevelt agreed to Stalin' s

demanda: in northeast Asia. The Sovietwleader argued that he

needed concessions before he could justify the committal of

Russian troops for more fighting. Roosevelt raised no

objections to Stalin's conditions and it was. agreed that

Russia would enter the Eastern operations within two ta, three

months of victory in Europe. RUBsia was to be repaid by

1. Friters, op cit, p. t43.

2. Murphy, op cit, p, 1.56. During this period, Mongolian herda were.reduced from 27.5 million head to 20.9 million.

9.

leases to railroads in Manchur1a and to the harbours of

Port Arthur and Dairen, and by the guarantee that "the

&tatus quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved ll •1 Roosevelt

suggested that sinee these were speeifically Russo-Chinese

problema that they should be the subjects of separate Sino­

Soviet negotiations.

~~ though not 'the sole source of friction between

the two countries, the Mongolian question gave. rise ta new

difficulties at the Sino-Soviet Conference in July 1.945.

The questions of Russian support for the Chinese Communista,

Russian rights in Manchuria and Sinkiang, and cooperation

between the Chinese and Russians against Jap,gn were all

import3nt issues. Nevertheless, Mongolia becameca special

factor at these meetings because Russia called for Chinese

recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic as an

independent entity. This raised the ques~ion of the

definition of the statua quo in Outer Mongolia.

China and Russia had totally different views as to

the existing status of Outer Mongolia. In demanding that

the status qUO in Mongolia be preserved, Russia referred to

the ~ facto conditions, to the situation in existence. ChinaIs

conception of Mongolia's status was based on ~ jure

considerations, with legal treat1es as reference. This wide

divergence between the ~ jure and ~ facto interpretations.

1. The New. York Times, March 17, 1955, p. 77.

10.

of the status qUO in Outer Mongolia caused an impasse during

the July 1945 discussions.

As far as China was concerned, Mongolia's inter-

national position had been settled by the Sino-Soviet Agree­

ment of 1924, article V of which stated:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China ~d respects Chinais sovereignty therein. 1I

As an lIintegral part of the Republic of China ll , Mongolia had

no right to sign treaties with other nations, nor to have

foreign troops billeted on her land. Only the Nationalist

Chinese Government had legal pow'er to sanction such action.

In spite of her signature to this Agreement, Soviet

policy toward Mongolia was based on treaties dating back to

Czarist times. A 1912 Russo-Chinese agreement referred to

a Mongolia wi th Il aU'Gonomous rights Il .2 In N ovember 1913, a

Sino-Russian declaration recognized Mongolian autonomy.3 The

Soviet Union used these treaties as a guide in her dealings

with Mengolia even after she had formally recognized Chinese

sovereignty. Seven months after the Agreement of 1924, Soviet

Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin enunciated Russia's

1.. John M. Maki, Selected Documents~ Far Eastern Inter­.national Relations, Seattle, 195 , p. 206.

2. Friters, op cit, p. 71.

3. Ibid, p. 75.

11.

interpretation of the status guo. in Mongolia:

"We.recognize the Mongolian People's Republic aa.part of the Chinese Republic, but we recognize also its. autonomy in so far4 r~aching a sense that we regard it not only as. independent of China in its internaI affairs, but also capable of pursutng ita own foreign policy independently."

The reference. to Mongolia as "the Mongolian People's Republic" ,

moreover, emphasized that Russia considered her., 7 in fact, an

independent nation.

Sovie.t actions between 1,924 and 1945 tended to

disregard.Mongolia's legal position as a Chinese province. In

fact, their. dealings suggested that Mongolia was a Soviet,.

satellite or at least totally independent from China in spi te­

of the 1924 Agreement. When Russia tried to have China

acaept her conception of the status quo in Mongolia at the

1945 Conference, China refused and the talks wer~postponed.

The delay in a Sino-Soviet agreement at this time

created further complications. In return for the con~

cessions. made to Russia at Yalta, Soviet:J troopa wer.Πto be

committed against Japan by August 9, 1945. Chinese in­

transigence was blamed for the delay and the expected

American pressure on Chiang produced no change in his attitude.

The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th,

however, for~told of a more imminent end to the fighting

1. Quoted in Robert A. Rupen, "Notes on Outer Mongolia Since 1;945", Pacific Affairs, vol.XXVIII, (March 1955), p. 72.

1 than anticipated by the military experts at.Yalta. Russia

therefore, became anxious to concludaa Sino-Soviet treaty.

Feanful of losing the gains won a~Yalta, the Soviet Union

attacked Manchuria on August.. 8, 1:945, de a.pj_te. the. lack of

an accord with China. The. Soviet~action placed China in the

perilous position of having Russian troops .. on her soil wi th­

out any guarantee that these potentially hostile forces

would be withdrawn once the common enemy had been defeated.

The sudden necessity for a treaty with Russia forced China

to revise its position on certain issues. One auch.change

waa her consent to recognize Mongolian independence, but only

on the baaia of a plebiscite. The Ruasians. found this.

acceptable and the Sino-Soviet Alliance .Treaty wes aigned

on Auguat 1.4, 1945, the day Japan agreed to surrender. 2

The plebiscite was held on October 20, 1945. A

vote on the question of independence waa registered by a

signature, or in the case of the sixt Y percent of Mongolia's

popp.lation that was illiterate, -oy a thumbprint, in the "For"

or "Against" column. There waB no secret. ballot~ Of the

eligible votera, 98.4% appeared at the voting s.tations, and

everyone voted in favour.. of independence. 3 In apite of the

1. The New York Timea, March 17, 1955, p. 1.

2. For fuller treatment of this topie see G. F. Hudson's excellent article "The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 11945", St. Antony'S Papers, NOe 2, London, 1.957, pp. 13-33.

3. David J.Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, Philadelphia, 19611, p. 354.

13.

doubtful validity of the plebiscite, China had little choice

but to accept its outcome and so recognized the Mongolian

People's Republic on January 5, 1946. De facto independence

from China became de jure independence.

The results of the plebiscite had no immediate

impact on Mongolia. Rer role in the Soviet Far East re­

mained defensive. Although Japan had been removed as a

threat, the American-Ohiang Kai-shek alliance replaced

Japanese imperialism as the neVi encroaching enemy. In this

way, the maintenance of Soviet troops on Llongolian terri tOJ."'Y

for 211 e:·:tenc1ec1 period was justified. In 1946, the ten year

old Russo-liIongolian J?rotocol was renewed as the Treaty of

}'riendship and Liutual Assistance. A year later defense ex-

pendi tures of the Mongolian People' s Hepublic aIllo1lllted to

36.7% of her budget. 1 Refugees f:com ];~onbolia \ï110 reached

EOE';; Lone in 1948 revealed that the Ivlongolian People' s Arr;ry

m1ght number as many as one hundred thousand men, more than

one-t.enth of her population, and that 30viet advisors and

Army personnel were attached to it. 2 Thus the plebiscite

legalized lIongolia's separation from China, but did not 7-

[yc.r~ll1tee her j.nc1epender..ce f:r'om :--..ussü:c • .,I

-------------_._--_ .. _-'-,._.,--- ... - .• _-,,--_.-"-1. Table 22 in IïIurphy, op cit, p. 183.

2. A United Pre ss Interna ti onal rep ort of ES.rch 10, 1948, (~uoted in Cheng Tien-fong, A Iiistory of Sino-RussiaIl; Relations, Vlashington, 1957,. p. ·280.

3. This became a factor when Mongolia applied for acceptance into the United Lf:~tions CrG811izLtion. In this Anglo­American dominated body, Mongolia's status as a Soviet

14.

Russia continued to control events in post-War

Mongolia. The chief manifestation of this domination was

Russia's guidance of Mongolia's: economic growth alang Sovie~~

lin'es. The: mQai1. apparent feature of this influence was the

return to the Five. Yeax Plan system by Mongolia beginning in

in 1.948. The year previously, the Soviet Union had resumed,lher

Plans which had been interrupted by the War. The first Mongol

Plan was exemplary because, although its quotas we~e. very

high and in some case.s unrealistic, overnight social and

economic changes wer~not forced on the peopla. This caution

was the result of the unpleasant experiences of the original

attempt to create a planned economy in 1930.

The goals for the fir8.t,~ Five. Year Plan were for-

. - mulated at the Eleventh Congress of the Mongolian National

Revolutionar,y Party in December 1947. Although the main ob­

jective of the Plan was to increase the livestock herds, little

thought or energy was devoted to the problem of agriculture·

at this Congress. The reduction of defense spending afxer·

1.948 permi tted the alloca-~ion of more money for the

development of light industries such as handicrafts and meat­

packing, and for social welfare, health and education.

satellite was detrimental to her case. Her first application in 1946 was deferred until more information was learned about Mongolia's capacity to function as an independent nation within the United Nations' charter. Little was known about her, her independence was recognized only by Russia and China, and only Russia was diplomatically represented in Ulan Bator. The next time Mongolia's application was reviewed the cold war polarization had taken place and she was aga in refused. Mon­golia was finally accepted in 1961.

Collectivization was planned but soon abandoned, again

because the .. necessary educational and other prerequiei tes

had not been met. The building of' corrals and wells, hay

production and veterinary services received further attention

between 1948 and 1953. 1 Although none of. the quotas were

me.t and the number of li vestock increased only by two

million head in the five years, the Plan was noteworthy in

that it was the start of controlled economic development in

Mongolia. Many of the goals were. totally unrealistic,

creating an impression of overwhelming failure. 2 Thus, in

the second Plan of 1953 the quotas wera substantially reduced.

Mongolia was able to reduce her defense exp en­

ditures after 1948 because of the growing success of the

Chinese Communists in their battle to gain control of China.

The increase in strength of Mao's forcesmeant that Mongolia's

southern borders were, safe from the threatof the Nationalist

Chinese. This success was achieved despite the scarcity of

help from the Soviet Union and ran contrar,y to Russia's

predictions and advice.'

The activity of the Soviet Union in the northern

1. Murphy, "Planning in the Mongolian People' s RepubliLc" , The Journal of Asian Studies., vol.XVIII, (February 1959), p. 246.

2. The number of livestock, for example, wes to have been in­creased from twenty one million to thirty one million head in five. years.

3. Edward Kaxdelj quoted in Dallin, op cit, p. 71.

16.

provinces of China clearly revealed that Russia was not

satisfied with the gains made at Yalta and du~ing the

negotiations with China in 1945. Russia had always been

interested in the Ohinese province of Sinkiang which ahe

controlled between 1934 and 1943 and aga in between 1947 and

1:949: As late as May 1,949, when a Communist victory in

China was aIl but assured, Russia sought a trade and mining

monopoly in this province from the retreating but still

recognized Kuomintang Government. 1 In Ju~ 1949, the Soviet~

Union signed a tr&de agreement with the envoys of the

"Manchurian People's Republic n •2 The designation of Man­

churia as a People's Republic extended ~ facto recognition

0:[ thè, 'independence o:fc this: province from China. Since at-,

this stage in the Civil War, a Communist victory wes un­

avoidable, auch maneuvres muot havebeen designed to present

the future Government of Ohina with a fait-accompli of Russian

control of these two provinces. Although these undertakings

had no permanent result, they undoubtedly aroused suspicions

of Ruasian intentions among the Chinese leaders. These

suspicions assumed increased importance on the eve of the

conclusion of a Sino-Soviet friendship treaty.

A new treaty between Russia and éhina was necessar,y

for both countries. China had been a battlefield for twelve

ycars. Reconstruction was the first item on the agenda of

1. ~, p. 74.

2. CDSP, 1;31, vol. 3, p. 36. (Pravda, July 31, 1949).

1 •

17.

of th~new Chinese Government. Finanoial aid was necessary

and the Soviet Union was the only nation to which China

could turne The Chiang-American presence in Taiwan and

Japan prolonged the military daP..ger. China could not afford

reconstruction and renewed hostilities at the same time.

This forced her ~o depend temporarily on Russia. Further­

more, Russia still had thirty year leases on Manchurian

railways and harbours by virtue of her 1945 agreements. with

the Kuomintang. 1 China was anxious to terminate this

situation.

For the Soviet Union, a Mutual Assistance Pact

similar to those signed with aIl the East European satellites

would mean that China recognized Russia's leadership of the

Communiat movement. This was of special significance

because China had more than twice the population of ~~ssia,

since the Communist takeover had been engineered by a self­

made revolutionar,y theorist and leader, and in view of the

fact that the Soviet Union had contributed ver,y little

material help toward the victor,y.2 This was. a direct con­

trast to the East European Communist leaders who had aIl

been trained in, and received their orders from Russia. A

treaty with Chinawould signify Russia's unchallenged

position in the Communiat world, and would place a potential

1. Maki, op cit, pp. 242-244.

2. C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World, London, 1964, p. 60.

18.

rival on the same level as the other satellites.

China gained little from the Sino-Soviet Mutual

Assistance Pact, signed in February 1950. It was agreed

that the Changshun Railway and Port Arthur were to be re­

turned to China by 1953, ~Ld .that tha issue of Dairen would

be negotiated at that time. t RUBBia also offered China

a, loan of three hundred mtllion .American dollars at one

percent interest for five years. This was hardly enough

to meet ChinaIs oppressive needs. 2 Sinkiang was not men­

tioned in the Treaty but in March 1950, it was announced that

joint-stock camp&Lies had been formed to exploit the oil and

mineraI wealth of that province. Profits were to be divided

equally.3 By an exchange of letters between Foreign

Ministers. Vyshinsky' and Chou En-lai, the independence of the

Mongolian People's Republic was reaffirmed.4 Following the

lead of the other Communist satellites, the Chinese People's

Republic officially recognized Mongolia in 1950.

By mid-century, Russia's policies in Mongolia wera

beginning to make themselves manifeste Russian-trained

1. Maki, o~ cit, pp. 248-249. The 1945 Tr.eaty gave Russia half-in erest in these areas for thirty years.(~, pp. 242-244).

2. Dallin claims that China asked for 2.8 billion dollars. (Dallin, op cit, p. 83). The Marshall Plan appropriations had included four hundred million dollars for China in 1947. (See Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatie History .of the United States, New York, 1950, p. 921).

3. The New York Times, March 29, 1950, p. 32.

4. Dallin, op cit, pp. 80-81.

19.

Mongol teachers began to prepare native experts for leader­

ship roles in Mongolia's economic and social development.

The defense, growth and independence of the country was

wholly dependent on Soviet aid and friendship. After

Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet leaders were confronted by

a united, reawakened and energetic China, at peace for the

first time in more than twenty years. And although she

recognized Mongolia's independence, China did not abandon

all claims to her former province. The fact that China,

Mongolia and Russia were aIl membe~s of the Communist bloc

governed the history of Mongolia between her giant neigh~

bours for the next twelve years.

CHAPTER 2.

THE RESUMPTION OF SINO-MONGOL RELATIONS

By 1950, Mongolia's independence had been re­

cognized both by her two neighbours and the East Europ~an

satellites. Although other nations wanted to establish

relations with Mongolia, it was still only Russia which

engaged in any activity there. This monopoly continued

until after Stalin's death, when Russia adopted a pOlicy of

conciliation in foreign and bloc affairs. The new policy

altered existing relationships between Russia, Mongolia and

China, b:r enabling China and Mongolia to engage in activities

previously forbidden by the Russian Gover.nment. It seems

that as long as China remained a Soviet satellite and was

dominated by Moscow, she was not discouraged by the new

Kremlin leaders from playing a role in Mongolia's economic

development. Therefore it was with Soviet consBnt that China

finally penetrated Russia's exclusive sphere o~ influence in

Mongolia.

The Soviet policy of keeping Mongolia diplomatically

and commercially quarantined began during the nineteen

twenties. Nevertheless, even at that time, Grigory Zinoviev,

as leader of the COmintern, had recognized that China had

20.

21.

legitimate claims to Outer Mongolia. Russia, he said,

would discuss these claims only "when the Chinese will

liberate themselves from their oppressora", that ia, after

a, successful Communist revolution in China. 1 In his famoua

1936 interview wi th Edgar Snow, Mao Tse-Tung gave Zinoviev.' a

qualifications. a tone of finality by remarking that

"When the People's revolution has been victorioua in China, the <.m.ter Mongolian Republic will' automatically become part of the Ch~ese federation, at their own free will."

Post-World War Two events removed the likelihood that these

predictions would be realized. By 1950, China could only

rely on the economic penetration of her former province to

reverse the history of the previous twenty five years. It

was the effects of both the Korean V/ar and Josef Stalin' s

death on Sino-Soviet relations which enabled China to take

the first two steps toward resuming activity in Mongolia.

The hostilities in Korea involved China in a

war she did not want or initiate. North Korea was a Sovie.t~

satellite and her attack on South Korea in July 1950 was

planned by Russian advisors to fulfil Russian aims.3 It

was only when her own security was threatened by a United

Nations' victory that China committed her troo~ to battle.. 4

1. Quoted in Dallin, op cit, p. 75.

2. Quoted in Friters, op cit, p. 208.

3. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, New York, 1960, pp.42-46.

4. ~, pp. 154-157.

22.

Nevertheless, she was in effect salvaging Soviet foreign

policy from a humiliating defeat.

The war in Korea had two major effects on the

Chinese People,' s Republic. From the out set , i t meant that

Russia's use of Port Arthur and Dairen was prolonged, thereby

maintaining Soviet presence in Manchuria. Only the .Chang­

shun Railway was returned to China as agreed in January

1953. 1 Second, in order to wage war, China was forced to

divert money, men and materials from her economic recon-

struction which was necessitated by the Civil War. By

accep'~ing these burdens, China strengthened her bargaining

position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

A more immediate result for Sino-Soviet relations

was the reestablishment of contacts between China and Mon-

golia. Although reciprocal diplomatie recognition had taken

place in 1950, activity was restricted to an exchange of

ambassadors. The first direct Sino-Mongol negotiations in

more than thirty years occurred in September 1952 and

resulted in a ten year Cultural and Economie Agreement,

which set the guidelines for future activities between

the two COUI!tries. 2

1. CDSP, V~1., vol. 1, p. 19. (Prav<!.ê: and Izvestia, January ï;1"953J.

2. CDSP, IV;40, vol. 4, p. 15. (Pravda, October 6, 1952). WO-Clauses were made public at this time.

To be sure, the Agreement was concluded with the

tacit approval of the Kremlin. Although the official

signir.g took place in Peking on October 4, 1952, the meetings_

between Premiers Chou En-lai and Tsedenbal occur%L'êd::_1n::'Jlasoow~

And while cultural, assistanoe and friendship treaties wera

signed by the East European satellites with each other and

with the Soviet Union within a yean after each had become

a People's Republic,1 it was; three years after the Chinese

People's Republic was proclaimed, and two years after mutual

recognition, before the Sino-Mongol Agreement was finally

drawn up. This signi~icant difference in time suggests a

reluctance on the part ~f the Soviet Union to permit auch a

breakthrough in Sino-Mongol relations. Chinais sacrifice in

the Korean War and the consequent prolongation of the Soviet.

presence in ~~~churia may have forced Moscow to grant thia.

concession to the Chinese. Nevertheless, it was not until

after stalin died that China began to play any role in Mongolia.

After the death of Josef Stalin and the conclusion

of the Korean War, the Communist bloc focused its attention

on internaI problems. The prominent issue aggravating

Sino-Soviet relations was Ruasia's economic penetration of

China. This. was exemplified by the joint-atock companies

established in accordance wi th the 1.950 Mutual Assistance

Treaty. These companies included a ship repairing company

1. Zbigniaw K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1.960, p. 10"9':

24.

at Dairen, a civil aviation enterprise and two Sinkiang

based operations, one for mining rare mexals and the other

for extracting and refining oil. 1 The existence of the

Sinkiang companies was an especially sensitive subject for

China.. It signified the enforced renewal, in 1950, of

Russian mining rights sold to Stalin in 1,940 by the warlord

of that province, Sheng Shih-t'sai.2 Moreover, Soviet

occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen had persisted well

beyond the agreed date of transfer.

The necessity of removing the obstacles to closer

cooperation between RusBia and China caused Nikita Khrushchev,

First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and a can­

didate for the leadership of Russia, to travel to Peking

in October 1954 for the fifth anniv.ersary celebrations of the

Chinese People's Republic. He was at the same time seeking

the support of the Chinese leaders for his political

ambitions. Furthermore, Soviet relations with other bloc

countries between 1953 and 1956 were marked by a policy of

economic concessions as a means of maintaining political

harmony.3 As a result, during Khrushchev's meetings with

1. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, London, 1962, p. 146.

2. Whiting, "Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet:, Relations", China Quarterly, vol.III, (1960), p. 30. General Shellg was also responsible for the execution of Mao's brother, Mao Tse-min. (Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-t'sai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot, East Lansing, Michigan, 1958 i po 94, note 11.

3. Brzezinski, op cit,.p. 157.

25.

tha:Chinese, aIt Russian holdings were ceded to China. 1

The Soviet.Union agreed to vacate both Yellow Sea ports by

May 1.9552 and to ttransfer the joint-stock companies entirely

to the Chinese People's Republic by January 1, 1.955.'

Also announced at this time was the planned construction of

two railroads, one through Sinkiang and the other through

the Mongolian People's Republic, shortening the travelling

distance between China and Russia. 4 Direct financial aid

was also promised by the Soviet Union. 5

As Russia withdrew from Manchuria and Sinkiang

after 1954, she was replaced by China which assumed full

control of these axeas. The new Sinkiang railroad made this

province more accessible to settlement and d~velopment. After

1955, its official name became the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomaus

Region of the Chinese People's Republic, a change calculated

to increase cooperation between the Chinese rulers and the

largest nationality residing in that province. The Trans­

Mongolian Railroad had a similar effect on Inner Mongolia

1. John Gittings, "Cooperation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet Relations", International Affairs, vol.XL, (January 1964), p. 64.

2. The New York Times, October 12, 1954, p. 8.

3. CDSP, VI;41, vol.4, p. 6. (Pravda, October 13, 1954). Joint­stOëk companies were also tramsfered to the East European satellites at this time. (Brzezinski, op cit, p. 164).

4. The New York Times, October 12, 1954, p. 8.

5. ~, VI;41, vol.4, p. 6. (Pravda, October 13, 1954).

26.

which was rapidly becoming an industrial area. 1 Both rail

lines were labelled IIrailways for uniting the minority

peoples ll ,2 as they increased Chinese activity in these

heretofore remote areas of her territory.

Although the Economie and Cultural Agreement of

1952 and the reclamation of the northern parts of her

territory set the stage for the renewal of China's activity

in Outer Mongolia, it was the similar and concurrent economic

growth of both countries which led to direct Chinese in­

volvement in Mongolian affairs. Both countries began Five

Year Plans in 1953. Although Mongolia's main concern at this

time was to increase the number of livestock, the Plan also

called for the construction of buildings which would contain

the future industries envisaged by the Mongol leaders. 3

Similarly the Chinese had as their goal the transformation

of China from an agricultural to an industrial nation. 4 Her

willingness and capability to help Mongolia achieve her goals

was demonstrated by the rapid expansion of the scope of

ChinaIs activitj.es.

1. surve~ of the China Mainland Press, no. 1203, p. 17. (New hIria News AgenSl' January 4, 1955). (Hereafter scMP and NcRA respect~vely).

2. SCMP, no. 1201, :p. 38. (Kuang Ming Jih Pao, Peking, November 5, 1955).

3. Murphy, Journal of Asian Studies, vol.XVIII, p.242

4. Choh-Ming Li? "Economie Development", China Quartely, no. 1, (1960), pp.39-40.

27. ,~

Assistance was offered in three forms: trade,

labour and financial aide In April 1954, the first trade

agreement was signed between the two countries whereby China

provided Mongolia with manufactured leather goods made from

raw materials purchased from the Mongolian People's Republic. 1

By 1956, the trade volume had been doubled. 2 This form. of

economic activity was to outlast all other.

More essential to the indus trial growth of the

Mongolian People's Republic was a resource which China

possessed in abundance. The scarcity of manpower in Mon­

golia was a chronic problem which had forced the Government

to utilize foreign sources of labour on previous occasions.

In 1926, when the anti-Chinese policy of the Mongolian

Gover.nment led to the expulsion of Chinese merchants, an

eyewitness wrote, that Chinese labourers, especially skilled

ones, would still be welcomed. 3 Japanese prisoners of war

were_ used on new building projects after 1945.4 Russian

soldiers worked on the Trans-Mongolian Railway from 1954

to 1956.5 The nomad's objection to sedentary labour was

gradually overcome by the spread of education and modernization,

1. Rupen, Pacifie Affairs, vol. XXVIII, (March 1955), p. 72.

2. ~, no. 1227, p. 23. (!2!!, Ulan Bator, February 7, 1956).

3. Ma Ho-tien, Chinese Agent in Mongolia, translated by John De Francis, Introduction by Owen Lattimore, Baltimore, 1949, p. 76.

4. Bawden, "Mongolia Revisited", .!lQ!§, vol.XLVII, (1960), p. 129.

5. The New York Times, August 27, 1956, p. 1.

e

28.

but the fact reruained that a population of lese than a

million people could not support at the sarne time, both the

planned increase of livestock production and the transfer-'

of men from the countryside to provide the labour necessary

for Mongolia's industrial expansion. The continued in­

efficiency in livestock production prolonged the existence

of thia problem. When the Mongol Government complained that

Mongolia lacked a sufficient eupply of workers for her

building programs, China offered assiatance. 1

In May 1955, agreement wes reached over the

importation of Chinese labour into Mongolia. China had no

engineers or technicians to spare so few skilled workers ",

were among those who arrived. They were under contract for

five years, but if they wished they could remain and become

citizens of the Mongolian People's Republic. In 1956,

there were.ten thousand Chinese working in Mongolia, the

largest number in the country in thirty years.2 They wera'

used to build agricultural projects and indus trial and

commercial buildings, many of which wera also financed by

the Chinese Government.

China's financial aid to Mongolia helped the

latter to overcome the obstacle of a lack of capital needed

for the intended indus trial growth. In the first, of a series

1. Rupen, "Outer lüongolia since 1955", Pacific Af'fal:.!:ê., vol.XXX, (December 1957), p. 343.

2. The New York Times, August 28, 1956, p. 11.

29.

of financial agreemen"bB amlounced in A\l..gust~ 1!956, China

gave Mongolia one hund~ed: and sixt Y million tughrikS1 to

be uae.d ov:el'!. a thre.e year period. The .. money was earmarked

for the construction by the Chinese labourers of a textile

and a paper mill, a. plywood factory, glass works and a

sports: stad1lum. 2 In 1957, it was revealed that as part of

this. agreement, China was training two hundred appr.entioes

in the manufacture of ~extile8 and paper, and in the. tech­

niques of prefabricated construction. 3 In 1958, China

gran ted a loan of one hundred million tughriks to be dnawn

over fifteen years. This money was to finance the con­

struction of two electric. power. stations, three concrete

bridges, an alcohol and atRrch factory, a metal workshop

and housing developments. 4 An additional loan of two hund­

r.ed million tughriks was made part of the Friendship and

Mutual Assistance Pact signed in 1960.5

Accompany~g China's economic breakthrough into

Mongolia was a simultaneoua diplomatie courtship of that

country. This policy was firet revealed at. the Twelfth

1. The tughrik was at par with the ruble, which was worth one quarter of a dollar. (See The Stateaman's Yearbook, 1960, ed. S: H. Steinberg, New York, 1960, p. 1411).

2. ~, no. 1363, p. 26. (~, Peking, August 29, 1956).

3. ~, no. 1606, p. 44. (~, Ulan Bator, September4, 1957).

4 • .ê.Q!E., no. 1926, p. 45. (~, Peking, December 29, 1,958).

5. The New York Times, June 1:, 1960, p. 1. The Chinese loans, chXonological1y, were valued at fort y million, twenty five million, and fifty million dollars.

30.

Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in

November 1i954. Russia was represented by P. T. Komarov,

the Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Communist Party's Commission

on Party Control, and V. 1. Pisarev, Rus.sia' s Ambassador

to Mongolia. China, on the other hand, sent Ulanfu, the

leader of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, a sinicized

Mongol and a candidate member of the Central Committee of

the Chinese Communist Party. His career illustrated how

weIl treated the Mongols were.. in China, and that being a

member of a minority group in China was no obstacle to a

position of success and importance. At the Congress,

Mongolia's Prime Mînister Tsedenbal paid tribute to the

"inviolable friendshipll which was IIsteadily developing

and strengthening between the Mongolian People and the

great Chinese People.,,1

The Congress was followed by increasingly fraquent

state visits by leaders of both countries. In March 1956,

Chinese Minister. of Defense, Chu Teh, spent four days in

Ulan Bator visiting schools. an~ factories. 2 A military

delegation led by Mongolian Defense Minister B. Dorzh

visited Peking in 1958, and represEmtatives of the Chinese

armed forces reciprocated the following year with a four

1. ~,Vl;48, vol. 4, p. 48. (Pravda,November 26, 1954).

2. SCImP, no. 1261, pp. 33-38. (~, Ulan Bator, March 29-APrIl 1, 1 956) •

e

31.

day trip to Ulan Bator. 1 In August, 1959, members of the

Chinese National People's Congress we~e beg1nning a six day

tour of Mongolia, while Tsedenbal was being received in

Peking. 2 .,The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance,

which included China's third financial grant to Mongolia,

was signed in Ula.n Bator by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, who

were. comyleting a five d~ state visit. 3 A 1i957 cultural

agreement :for cooperation in scienca, education, health and

communications,4 was fol1owed by an accord to begin air

services between both countries.5

Chinese ties with Mongolia were. strengthened further

as China encouraged closer r.elations between the Inner

Mongolian Autonomous Region and the Mongo1ian People's

Republic. While a1l the Chinese people and the non-Chinese

minorities living in the southern regions of the main land

wera to change to the Latin alphabet in their language

simplification programs., Inner Mongolia was to adopt the

Cyril1ic script which was in use in Outer Mongolia. 6 This;

1. SCMP, no. 2032, pp. 3-0-31,. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, June 6, 1959). - -2. ~, no. 2090, p. 35 and p. 39. (MQ!!, U1an Eator,

Augus.t~ 28, 1959).

3. The Naw:York Times, June 11,1960, p. 1.

4. SCMP, no. 1488, p. 29 •. (NCNA, Ulan Eator, March 9, 1957). - -5. ~, no. 1696, p. 35. (!Q!f!, Ulan Bator, January 18, 11958).

6. Paul B. Henze, "Alphabe.t Changes in Soviet Central Asia and Communist China", RCAS, vol. XLIV, (1,957), pp. 130-132. ----

32.

f'acili tated journalistie exehanges and li terary c.ontaots

across the border. Although the Peopla's Republic pro­

hibited emigration to the more populous and economically

advancad Autonomous Region,1 the Sino-Mongol border was

no longer guarded. 2 As a result of the warmer relations

between the two countries, agreement was reached whereby

Chinese and Mongolian liveatock herds could cross the Sino­

Mongol boundary in orde~to escape winter atorms. 3 By

January 1.957, three hundred and fifty thouaand cattle .. which

belonged to China had crossed the border into eastern

Outer. Mongolia. 4 That~yaa.:o, the Mongolian People's Republic

received the approval of the Chinese Government fo~ the

establishment of a consulate-general in Huhéhot (Kukhe

Khoto), the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous

Region. 5

China's economic activitiea in Mongolia helped

the latter modernize within a very short time. The financial

aid enabled the Mongol Gover.nment to undertake projects

whieh it eould not have afforded otherwisa. The Chiness;

labourers welle. "to be seen working on any ente~ris.e of_

1. The New York Times, August 4, 1.959, p. 10.

2. Rupen, Pacifie Affaira, vol.XXX, p. 344.

3. SCMP, no. 1447, p. 33. (!Q!!, Ulan Bator, Deeember 30, 1956). -4. SCMP, no. 1453, p. 33. (NCNA, Hailar, January 15, 1,957) • - -5. SCMP, - no. 1.521, p. 35. (.CNA, - Peking, April 29, 1957).

'l'.

8

33.

importance in Ulan Bator and elsewhere.,,1 The appreciation

of the,MQngolian Government waa expressed in the medals

and honours awarded to the workers. 2 This rapid trans­

formation of Mongolia could not have.been achieved in so

short a time wi thout the aid of Chines.e capital and man-

power.

By 1i957, Chinese involvement in Mongolia had

~ached its peak. Participation by China in Mongolia's

development continued but did not expand. It was; offset

by renewed Russian concern for her oldest satellite, caused

bythe rapid growth of Chinese intexest there sr,J. also by

a shift in Sino-Soviet relations resul ting from Khrushchev.,' a

de-Stalinization program. The Russian reaction effectively

limited and ultimately reduced Chinese activity in Mongolia

and inaugurated a new phase in Russo-Mongol relations.

1. Bawdan, "Economie Advance in Mongolia, tI The World TOday, vol.XVI, (1960), pp. 265-266.

2. SCMP, no. 1381, p. 23. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, September 29, 195b); no. 2129, p. 38, (NCNA, Ulan Bator, October 27, 1959). ----

CHAPTER 3.

SOVIE~ ACTIVITY IN THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE 1 S REPUBLIC, 1953-1957.

Soviet policy in Mongolia was. aimed at the con­

trol, but not the annexation, of the country. He~ strategy

in this regard was to modernize the Mongolian People's

Rapublic along Soviet linea. with the objective.- of having

the Mongols. themselves aasume the leadership of the de­

veloping socialist country. Sovi~t influence would be

present in the form of the institutions established during

the modernization. The execution of this long term plan

was carried out slowly and gradually, and was beginning to

reach fruition at mid-century.

One of the most widespread manifestations of.

Sovâet influence was in.the field of education. The Russian

imprint on Mongol education became evident very soon after

the Communist takeover. It waa a Russian, Ivan Korostovetz,

who had established the first secular school in Outer Mongolia

in 1.91-3. liter 1921, educatd.on became a major government

concerne Although there were few pupils, education was

free and reaident students had their room and board paid

35,

for by the State. 1 The increase in student population

over the years did not change this policy. The 1.937 purge

of the Lamaist Church erased its influence from the school

system and gave total control of education to the Government.

The Russian educational system provided the

framework for the Mongolian schools. As in the Soviet

Union, there wera. "incomplete" and "complete" school pro-

grams. Four years of elementary school for the ages of

seven to eleven we~compulsory for aIl. Three more years

of high school gave a student an "incomplete" seven year.

education, ralegating him to life as an unskilled labourer.

Those who qualified to continue through the last fo~Y years

of high school and complete the ten year curriculum were,.

entitled to enter Choibalsan University or Teachers' College.

Trade schools, called Tecbnicum, were; also available to

the high school graduate. 2

By the mid-fifties progress in education stood as

the "major result of Communist rule in Outer Mongolia.,,3 The

firat~Mongol teachers received their education in Russia

or from the Russians residing in Mongolia. By the nine-

1. Ma Ho-tien, op cit, pp. 82-94.

2. For a full treatment of this subject, see John R. Krueger, "Education in the Mon~olian People's Republic," comtarative Education Review, (New York), vol.IV, (Fe ruary 1961.), pp. 1S3-1ar

{.

3. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia 1957-1960," Pacifie Af.tairs, vol.XXXIII, (June 1960), p. 1,39.

36.

teen fifties, the firs~ generation of Mongol-trained

teachers were.leading the drive toward modernization. 1

Total literacy was accomplished in 1954. 2 While a shortage

of univer~ity trained specialists did exist, past~effonts

in the field of: education were:vindicated somewhat during

the second Five Year Plan, when a lack of labourers, rather

than of experts, proved to be a major obstacle to its

success.3

The second Five Year Plan begun by the Mongolian

People's Republic in 1953 turned out to be a two stage.

undertaking. The,Plan was first formulated with the di~

couraging experience.s of the previous Plan in mind. Few

new enterprises wera undertaken and the- quotas were reduced.

The livestock objectives wene cut down to the more sober

figure of twenty seven and a hall million hea.ci_, the number

of animals in 1941. 4 In the industrial sector, the Plan

emphasized increased production from existing facilities,

rather than embarking on new ventures. This was dictated

by the Mongolian Government's lack of investment capital.

The general stress_ was again on the prerequisites: of a

planned economy, protection for animals during storms and

drought, acientific stockbreeding, public health and education

1. The New York Times, August 3, 1959, p. 6.

2. Krueger, op cit, p. 183.

3. Above, p. 27-28.

4. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 169. See also Table 117, p. 1:64.

~ w

ct

37.

and a large public works program. When the first yean'

of the Plan produced few of the improvements anticipat~d,

objectiveawere reassessed .and the Plan was overhauled.

The new elements of the Plan attested to the

Russian influence in Mongolian affairs by their resemblance

to the Khrushchev agricultural pro gram of 1953-1954. 1 The

same methods and aims existed in both cases, excapt that

the emphasis was on agriculture in Russia and on the live­

stock industry in Mongolia~ Greater and more efficient

production was_ the objective in bath countries~ After 1954,

collectivization of the ars;tïs, or the livestock breeders,

became a prime objective. Concessions rather than force

induced the breeders to join collectives in this post~

Stalin periode Taxes were lowered for the low and middle

income arata and raised for the "kulaks,1 2 a policy

directed toward the economic ruin of the latter while

making collectivization more attractive to the former. As

was begun in the Soviet Union after_ September 1953, Mongolia

increased Government procurement prices in order to en-

courage greater production. Gfoods sold to the nomads, on

the other hand, were.cut in price.3

The Soviet concept of otgonnyi was adopted afte~'

1. Informatio:m. U. S. S. R., ed. Robe:c."t~ Maxwell, New. York, t962, pp. 317-318.

2. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 172.

3. Murphy, Journal of Asian Studies, vol.XVIII, p. 253.

38.

i~ had succeded in Sovia~Central Asia. Thia:system

united the essential e~ements of collectivization with

nomadisme Tha aollective~centre functioned as a vallage,

providing food and shelter for the nomadts family. The

anat himself led the live stock to distant pastures, where.

he remained with his flock until new grazing land became

necessary. Although this disrupted family life, the

favourabl~;economic results warranted ita. implementation. 1

To help institutathese changes, members of the Mongolian

People's Revolutionary Pa~ty followed the example of their

Soviet counterparts,2 and became collective directors and

local administrators. 3

To ensure the success of the economic acce~eration,

Russia granted concessions to Mongolia. This aid took

the form of agreements which were heavily balanced in the

latter's favour. In 1.954, Russia lowered the priee of

exports to Mongolia while paying a higher price for goods.:

imported from there. 4 Two years lat.e~ Anastas Mikoyan

stopped in Ulan Bator during an Asian tour, and concluded

a Sov-iet~aid agreement. Russia was to provide the plans,

machinery and advisors for public works programa, such as

housing, water worka and factories, heating and sewage

1. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, pp. 149-150.

2. Information U. S. S. R., p.318.

3. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 172.

4. Ibid, p. 173.

39.

sys~ems tor the modernization of Ulan Bator. 1 Long texm

credit was granted to help finance these projecta.2 In

December 1956, a reciprocal trade agreement was. signed

whereby Mongolia would provide Russia with livestock

products and reaeive in return consumer gooda and machinery

for industry and agriculture.3

The .. poli tic al repercussions resul ting from Stalin' Si

death in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also affected

the leader.ship of the Mongolian People's Republic. In

April 1i954, Tsedenbal, successor to Khorloin Choibalsan

as Party and State leader,4 was relieved of his position

as Firsù Secretary of the Mongolian People.' s Revolutionary

Party and replaced by Dordj Damba. 5 Pravda announced that 6 this was done at" Tsedenbal' s request, .and ensuing events ..

suggested that it was an administrative'shakeup rather than

a purge. No other officiaIs lost~their positions and

Tsedenbal remained the most important figure on the Mon­

golian scene. It was his speech and not Damba's which was

1. CDSP, VIII;15, vol. 2, p. 27. (Pravda and Izvestia, April 1.0, 1,956).

2. ~, no. 1267, p. 2. (~, Peking, April 10, 1956).

3. CDSP, VIII;50, vol. 4, p. 21. (Pravda and Izvest±at, Dëëëmber 1i6, 1956).

4. Choibalsan was· Mongolia's Stalin, having been both State and Party leader since 1.939. He died in February 1,952.

5. The New Yoxk Times, April 7, 1954, p. 28

6. CDSP, VI;14, vol. 2, p. 21. (Pravda and Izveatla, April 1;"'1954).

40.

dabated at the Twelfth Party Congress in liovember li954. He

gave the major reports and his name dominated the Sovieü

press coverage of the event. 11

The accession of Damba to the post of FirstL

Sac~etary of thaParty has been attributed to the riaing

influence of a pro-Peking faction in Ulan Bator. 2 ~is ia

supported by the coincidence of the period of Chinese strength

in Mongolia with Damba's tenure of offi~e. It is quite

unlikely, however, that .. there existed so s:trong a Chine se.

voice in Mongolia in early li954. That., Chinese influence

in the Mongolian People's Republic was never powerful

enough to influence political activity is proven by the

inability of Damba to retain his post in 1958, when China

WeB more firmly established there. than in 1954.

The change_ in the leadership positions in Mon­

golia w~ in fact, linked to political events in Moscow.

The death of Stalin placed the Soviet Union in the hands

of a collective.leadership. It soon became the practice

in Eastern Europe to separate the positions of State and

1. CDSP, VI;48, vol. 4, p. 5-9. (Pravda and Izvestia, November 20-26, 1954).

2. P. H. M. Jones, "Mongolia Between Two Fires," Far Eastern Economie Review, vol.XXXIII, no. 7, p. 300. (Hereâfter cited as FEER); Richard A. Geisler, "Recent~ Davelopments in Outen Mongolia," Far Eastern Survey, vol.XXVIII, (December 11959), p. 183.

·e

41.

Par.ty lead~. and fill them with two people instead of

one. 1 Most leaders opted for the Paxty position because

their power base lay there. Tsedenbal was one of the

few satellite leaders who chose the Premiership of his

country. 2

Tsedenbal's ohoice suggested that he considered

hÜ"i position to be secure, enabling him to relinquish,

what was considered to be the most powerful office in a

Communist country. Moreover, i t was. a poli tically adroite,

decision. Since the Mongolian People's Revolutionary

Party assumed direct charge of the economic acceleration

in 1954, Tsedenbal ensured increased èffâciency by giving

up the position of First Secretary of the Party to a man

who could devote complete attention to the execution of

the Plan. In this way too, Tsedenbal shifted the respon­

sibility for failure to Damba and retained the real powe~

in Mongolia for himself.

As. the extent and str~ngth of Russian influence

in Mongolia grew, the need for Russian nA.tionala to protect

Sovietinterests was proportionally diminished. This led

to a decrease in the number of Russians living in Mongolia

and to their replacement by trained SJld skilled Mongols.

1. The policy of the separation of powers was especially intended to reduce the power of the Hungarian leader, Matyas Rakosi. (See Brzer..inski, op cit, pp. 158-1161).

2. For a list of leaders and their choices, see Ibid, p. 161 n.

42.

In 1:956, the Soviet-Mongolian Railroad was transf'ered

entirely to the Mongolian Government,1 and the last of'

the Russian soldiers, who had been working on its cons­

truction, lef't Mongolian territory.2 There were_no Russian

settlements and technicians returned home when their jobs~

were.;completed. 3 The bi-national companies came under

Mongolian control by 1957. 4 The British scholar, Ivor

Montagu, visited Mongolia in 1957 and noticed almost no

Russians during his trip, even at centres where advisors

wou Id normally be f'ound. 5

Although the withdrawal of' Russian personnel

f'ollowed the increase in Chinese activity and the arrivaI

of' her workers in Mongolia, the f'ormer was not a result of'

the latter. The aim of' the Mongolian school system was to

train Mongols to perform the tasks being done by the

Soviet advisors. The exodus of' Russians, theref'ore, sig­

nif'ied a measure of' success of' this objective, and dis-

played the confidence Russia had in the allegiance of the

Mongols.

1. CDSP, VIII;15, vol. 2, p. 27. (Pravda and Izvestia, April 110, 1956).

2. Rupen, "The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino-Soviet Competition," Communist Strategy in Asia, ed. A. Doak Barnett, New York, 1963, p. 265.

3. Rupen, Pacific Affairs, vol.XXX, p. 346.

4. Dallin, op cit, p. 431.

5. Letter to Robert Rupen quoted in Rupen, "Mongolian Nationalism," Part 2, ~, vol. XLV, p. 267, note 99.

43·.

Chinais activities in Mongolia were nevertheless

closely watched by the Kremlin leaders, who noticed that

her importance was simultaneously increasing within the

entire Communist bloc. By mid-1957 China could no longer

be considered a Soviet satellite. This change in Sino-

Soviet relations directly affected Chinais position in

Mongolia. What had begun as economic assistance by one social­

ist country for another suddenly appeared as a challenge

to Russia's long established position. In 1957, lVIongolia

was still no more than an area of Chinese interest, but

the Soviet Union began to take steps to limit the extent"

and to reduce the importance of Chinese involvement in

Russia's oldest satellite.

Russia's concern for her position in Mongolia

did not stem from China's activities there, but rather

from the shocks which emanated from Eastern Europe in the

autumn of 1;956. The eventa. in Poland and Hungary caught

Russia unprepared1 and forced her leaders to accept Chinese

. advice indealing with the situation.2 Furthermore, by

criticizing the Soviet~Union forpracticing "chauvinism

by a big cc;>untry" and sympathizing wi th the Hungarian and

Polish demands during the cri sis., 3 China appeared to be

1. Braezinski, op cit,pp. 225-229.

2. Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War, Moscow versus Pekin, Harmondsworth, Midd!esex, Eng!and, 196;, pp. 53-54.

3. Brzezinski, op cit,p. 227.

44.

challenging Russia for leadership of the Communist move~

ment. Although the Chinese emphasized their loyalty to

Russia, the Poles continued to hope for Chinese support

in their struggle against Russian domination. 1 Chou En-lai

travelled to Eastern Europe in January 1957 to help find

a solution to the Russo-Polish impasse In April 1957,

Premier Cyrankiewicz went to Peking, wher~ he-and Chou

signed a joint declaration on socialist solidarity.2 It

waa Chinais emergence from satellite status to a position

of independence in the Communist world which prompted the

Soviet Union to pay closer attention to Mongolia.

The first act in this direction was a Joint

Statementvissued by Premiers Bulganin and Tsedenbal in

May 1957.3 In it, the Soviet Union diseloaed the extent of

her aid to Mongolian economic development since World War

Two, and also announced new agreements for rinancial

assistance. It mentioned that it was Russian geological

exploration which provided an oil industry for Mongolia.

For the first time it was made public that during the period

of her two Five Year Plans, 1947-1957, the Mongolian

People's Republic received nine hundred million tughrika

1. ~, p. 296.

2. Ibid. p. 281 • ............

3. Unless otherwise stated, quotations from the Statement are taken from CDSP, IX;20~ v01. 2, pp. 27-28. (Pravda and Izvestia, May 17, 1957).

45.

from the Soviet Union. 1 Russia also announced that an

additional two hundred million tughriks wene,to be loaned

for the Three Year Plan of 1958-1960.

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement indicated a

further withdrawal of RUBsia from direct participation in

the running of Mongolian industries. Although three hun­

dr~d million rubles wera spent to set up the Mongolneft

011 enterprises:, they wer.e.., to be given to the People' s

Republic "wi thout compensation'J. Sovmongolmetal , the

joint stock company for prospecting and mining minerals,

was alsQ transfered completely to Mongolia for an interesü

free sum to be paid over a thirty year periode Two Sovie~

airports located in Mongolia were also relinquished along

wi th some planes and airport equipment "wi thout charge".

This.was done "in order to help the Mongolian People's

Republic establish its own civil aviation system".

Projects announced for the future included aid

for coalmining, publie works and agriculture. Equipment,

financial and technical assistance waa to be provided for

thfJSe. undertakings. Tractors and amcessories, combines,

trucks and generators were to be supplied in abundance.

For livestock production, ten thousand purebred cattle

were sent.· Russian advisors and capital were helping to

build flour mills, housing projects, sewage and heating

1. Rupen, Pacifie Affairs, vol.XXX, p. 346.

46.

systems in Ulan Bator. The Soviet Union also agreed to

pay for half thé cost of public health measures called

for in the Three Year Plan.

A ve~ obvious feature of the Bulganin-Tsedenbal

Statement was the omission of the role of the Chinese

People's Republic in developing the Mongolian economy.

The bulk of the capital, the majority of the blueprints

and aIl the adviaors for the projects under construction,

were in fact supplied by Russia. Yet ChinaIs contributiona

of financial aid and laboureDS working on many of the

structures mentioned in the Joint Statement were totally

ignored. 1 ChinaIs only recognized function was to have

"created even more favourable conditions :f.or the building

of socialism in the Mongolian Peoplels Republic", because

being surrounded by socialist states ensured "peace and

tranquili ty on the Mongolian People" s Republic borders ••• ".

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement was wI;i tten

to be read by the Chinese. It was not a declaration of

agreement or policy, but rather a list of projects to be

carried out with Russo-Mongol cooperation. The message,

however, was directed at Peking. By omitting any reference

to Sino-Mongol relations, the Statement wrote off any im­

portance attached to them. The transfer of Russian holdings

in the Mongolian People's Republic to its Government

1. Above, pp. 27-29.

47.

exhibited Russia's confidence in the allegiance of her

satellite. Of greatest importance was the implication

that Mongolia's interests were bast served by Russia, and

not by China.

The publication of the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement

marked a new stage in Soviet policy to Outer Mongolia.

~he creation of a developing socialist Mongolia administered

by her own people had been accomplished, albeit with some

help from China. Minimizing China' s contribution t.o

Mongolia's growth was the tirst step toward aime Russia's

objective became closer cooperation and interdependence

between Mongolia and the western sector of the CommuDist.

bloc.

o

CHAPTER 4.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW RUSSIAN POLIf~Y.

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement of 11957

inaugurated a new.phase in Russo-Mongol relations.

Soviet aid was increased, contacts and visits between

the two countries became more numerous, and the East

European satellite countries began, for the first time,

to send industrial equipment and geological exploration

teams to Mongolia. Mongolia's economic.;development in­

creasingly depended on the help received fram the western

sector of the Communist bloc.

One of the first manifestations of intensified

Soviet interest"in Mongolia was the appointment of Vya­

cheslav M. Molotov, former Premier and Foreign Affairs'

Minister of Russia, as "Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni­

po tentiary " to the Mongolian People's Republic in August

1951. Since this followed his removal froJp. important,

Party and Government posts, the appointment to so remote

a location was regarded as the traditional punishment of

exile for Russian political undesirables. Nevertheless,

consigning so renowned a diplomat to this office in Mon-

1. CDSP, IX;35, vol. 3, p. 19. (Pravda and Izvestia, August 31, 1951).

48.

49.

golia suggested a further Soviet. effort to tighten her

control ovenher oldest satellite.1

Little is knO\vn o~ Molotov's role or actions

in Mongolia. Coincident events hint that he may have

been a factor behind the large purge of leading members

of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party between

November 1958 and March 1959. Stnce seant evidence is

available concerning this new power shift in Mongolia,

i t is difficult" to assess Molotov' s role. It is significant

that this large scale purge, the first in the Mongolian

People's Republic since 1939, occurred only one year after

Molotov's arrival.

This political shakeup came in two stages.

In November 1958, Dordj Damba asked to be relieved of his

position as First Secretary of the Mongolian People's

Revolutionary party.2 He was replaced by Tsedenbal who

once again assumed leadership of both the Government and

the Party. In March 1959, Tsedenbal launched a general

purge of the Party's Politburo, in which half its members

lost their Positions. 3 Damba became "manager of a live stock

breeding and tractor station in a remote northwestern

1. His. equally renowned colleagues., Kaganovich and Malenkov, also purged by Khrushchev in May 1957, were relegated to minor administrative posts in Siberia. (The New York Times, August 31., 1957, p. 2).

2. Geisler, Far Eastern Survey, vol.XXVIII, p. 184.

3. Bawden, The World TOday, vol.XVI, p. 270.

50.

province. ,,1

Scholars have pointed to two possible reasons

for the purge of Damba. One was that he tried to set

China against Russia in order to win more independence for

Mongolia. 2 The fact that Damba was First Secretary of

the People's Party while China's influence was at its

height was cited as evidence. The lack of Chinese press

coverage of this purge was seen as a sign of Chinese

displeasure. 3 If fear of China was the chief cause, how­

ever, then surely Damba would have been removed long

before the end of 1958, at which time his position seemed

ta be rather secure,4 and after nearly two years had

elapsed since the Eulganin-Tsedenbal Statement.

Other accounts suggest that Damba's removal

resulted from a clash over economic policy with Tsedenbal. 5

Again there are inconsistencies in this theory. By being

labelled pro-China, Damba was said to admire the self­

sacrificing zeal displayed by the Chinese in carrying out

their economic development. 6 Moreover, it was during Damba's

1. "Modern Mongols", ~, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, (1961), p. 494.

2. ~, p. 494; Geisler, op cit, p. 187.

3. Geisler, op cit, p. 187.

4. Rupen, Pacifie Affairs, vol.XXXIII, p. 142.

5. FEER, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 494; Bawden, The World TOday, vol.XVI, p. 270.

6. ~, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 494.

51.

tenure of office that the indus trial goals of the second

Five Year Plan were met. Yet it was Tsedenbal who was

given credit as·being the driving force behind Mongolia's

economic advances. Bawden inter.preted the purge as "the

victory of those who wanted to press forward with a Sovie~­

supported socialization at all costs.,,1 Harr.ison Salisbury

described Tsedenbal's program as "full speed ahead in a

plan to change a nation of nomads into a nation based on

the agriculture of the plow and the industry of the pro­

duction line. i,2 There could be little difi'erence in economic

policy, therefore, since both Tsedenbal and Damba espoused

the same goals.

It seems·that political rather than economic or

diplomatie considerations were_the prime factors in this

purge. There was no disagreement over policy. The all-

encompassing, unspecific crimes of which Damba was accuaed

suggested a power struggle within the leadership, rather

than a break over specifie issues. He was purged

"for lack of principle and dishonesty to the Party, for profound ideological and political backwaniness, for conservatism and inertia, for concei t and a·, lack of a critical attitude toward himaelf and for opport~istic tolerance of3distortions and shortcomings in work."

The return of both the State and Party leaderships to

1. Bawden, The World Today, vol.XVI, p. 270.

2 •. The New York Times, August 3, 1959, p. 6.

3. CDSP, XI;13, vol. 1, p. 21. (Pnavda, April 1, 1959). -

52.

~edenbal manked the abandonment of collective leadership

in Mongolia. Molotov's presence in Olan Bator gives rise

to the speculation that Khrushchev'a.termination of col­

lecti ve leadership in Russia was a maj or influence in the ..

Mongolien purge.

The third Five Year Plan, begun in 1961" fln .. ther

strengthened Russia's role in Mongolia's economic develop­

ment. While the goals for the indus trial and livestock

sectors of the economy remained relat1vely unchanged, new

impetu3 was given to agricultural growth. Meagre attempts

had been made to improve the agricultural situation in

the past, but during the third Plan, the major emphasis

l~ in this direction. The sown acreage was to be trebled

and more aid was given to state farms. A new industrial

priority, electri~ication, was expected to accelerate

agricultural growth by making the electrically serviced

collectives more attractive to settlers.1

Agriculture in the Mongolian People!s Rapublic

faced one~ser1ous obstacle, the shortage. of water. No

more than ten inches of rain fell in Mongolia annually,2

and water found within its boundaries was generally salt y

and difficult toutilize as it was located in marshlands. 3

1. Colina MacDougall, "Plans and Prospects", ~, vol. XXXIII; no. 9, (1961), p. 394.

2. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 52.

3. Paul F. Bondy, "Desert H20n, ~, vol.XLIX, no. 1, (1965), pp. 12-13.

53.

The rivers were too few and far apart. The ever-continuing

search for usable water encouraged nomadism, which was

in direct contradiction to Government policy. -.1

Connected with the new agricultural drive, con­

sequently, was a search for water in the Gobi Desert. In

fact, this area resembled a dry prairie more than a desert,1

and since archeological research uncovered traces of

previcus agriculture in Mongolia,2 the prospect of finding

water underground was not as remote as had been believed.

By 1965, one hundred and eighty wells had been discovered

in the Gobi Desert, facilitating the reclamation of un­

used land and the settling of nomads close to steady,

guaranteed water supplies. 3

The live stock industry, despite three economic

plans over fourteen years, continued to fall below ex­

pectations. Added to inability to meet objectives was the

failure to at aIl increase the total number of animals

over this periode There were twenty three million

head of livestock in Mongolia both in 1948, at the start

of economic planning, and in 1961. The third Plan pro-

duced no improvement. The Mongol Government pointed to

bad weather and careless administration as the chief

1. Wie~s, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol~' XLI, pp. 350-351.

2. Bawden, "Mongolia Revisited", RCAS, vol. XLVII, (1960), pp. 132-133. ----

3. Bondy, op cit, pp. 12-13.

54.

causes. 1 Peasant discontent with collectivization and

incentives also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the

measures taken to increase the amount of livestock. 2

Adverse weather continued to plague the economic plan.s

of Mongolia as fierce widespread snowstorms in Iv'ray 1.9623

and early 19644 were responsible for the deaths of several

hundred thousand animaIs. This forced several readjustments

in the goals for the Five Year Plan. 5

Augmented Soviet aid during this economic plan

reflected Russia's increased concern for this area. The

1957 economic decentralization begun in the Soviet Union

was designed to promote the role of the local Par~ func-

tionaries and industrial managers in economic decision­

making. 6 This was especially significant in the areas

east of the Volga River, which accounted for most of

1. ~, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 492.

2. P. H. M. Jones, "Jenghiz over Mongolia", ~, vol. XXXVII, no. 4, (1962), p. 166.

3. Rupen, Mongols of the Twent1eth Century, 2 vols. Bloomington, Indiana, 1964, vol. I, p. 326.

4. ~, no. 3182, p. 27. (~, Peking, March 16, 1964).

5. As early as 1951, the American economic geographer, H. J. Wiens, criticized the enlargement of livestock herds as an unreasonable aim in the first place. He argued that "the Mongolian grasslands have reached a point of saturation" and that "a reduction of the total number of animaIs, rather than the increased numbers" would serve Mongolia better. This policy was never adopted by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. (See Wiens, op cit, p. 361). .

6. Information U. S. S. g., p. 278.

,.

55.

Russia's industrial production. 1 By giving a greater

voice in economic planning to the inhabitants of the

Russian lands closest to the Chinese frontier, the Soviet

Government intended to strengthen the allegiance of the

people to their country. This was also Russia's aim in

Mongolia. After 1960, the drive toward economic success

in Mongolia was accelerated with the help of the SovietJ

Union. This was due to the further deterioration of Sino-

Soviet"relations after the withdrawal of all Russian

technicians and advisors from China that sarne year.

Mongolia's lack of success in increasing her livestock

herds and her first serious venture intothe field of

planned agriculture necessitated even more Soviet aide

Soviet,economic assistance took the traditional

forms of outright financial aid, trade agreements balanced

in Mongolia's favour, and technical aid of different kinds

and in diffcrent fields. Loans totalling three hundred and

fifty million dollars were granted to cover the new Five

Year Plan, while the repayment of outstanding debts of

sixt Y millilJn dollars was deferred beyond 1965. 2 Further

agreements were announced in 1964, although no figures

were released. 3 By the middle of the Plan, Russian aid,

according to published accounts, totalled nine hundred

1. Ibid, p. 265.

2. The New York Times, Decemher 17, 1961, p. 32.

3. The New York Times, September 1, 1964, p. 10; Octeber 7, 1964, p. 4.

56.

million dollars.

Trade increased during this period as weIl.

Mongolia continued to receive material dictated by he~

economic needs, such as agricultural and industrial tools,

transport equipment and electric power plants. 1 In return

she sold textiles and glass, which now joined leather by­

products as Mongolia's chief export commodities. Toward

the end of the Five Year Plan, much greater quantities of.

consumer goods were imported, indicating a certain measure

of economic success.2

Russia's technical aid was in the form of both

men and materials. She provided the plans and the or­

ganizers to build grain elevators, oil pipelines and a

furniture plant, in addition to the electrification under­

taken during this periode The Soviet Union also provided

agricultural equipment in the form of five thousand tractors

and nine hundred combines.' In 1962, there were three

hundred combine ODerators and eight hundred construction

specialists ,\!orking in Mongolia. One.'thousand thorough-

bred cattle were sent to improve livestock production.

During this period fourteen hundred Mongols were in Russia

1. ~, XVII;31 , vol. 1, p. 19. (Pravda, August 5, 1965).

2. Daniel and Lois Dongan Tretiak, "Moscow's Trade with Asia", ~, vol.LI, no. 5,(1966), p. 201.

,. ~, vol. XXXIV, no. 11, p. 496.

57.

learning agricultural skills. 1

Following Russia's lead, the East European

satellitecstates also began to do business with Outer

Mongolia. The groundwork for economic cooperation was

laid during the third eoonomic Plan of 1958-1960 when

the first trade agreementa between Mongolia and East

Europe were signed. The Mongolian People's Republic

received little in the way of monetaL"y grants frem. the

the East European satellites, but she was the recipient

of much valuable technical assistance from these countries~

Of aIl the satellites, only Rumania was not a participant

in these ventures.

Mongolia's relations with Eastern Europe began

in 1:958 and immediately expanded rapidly. Uter 1.958, the

number of Czech and East German technicians in Mongolia

multiplied. Czechoslovakia furnished the Ulan Bator

Rotel, supplied the machinery for tanneries and a shoe

factory, and sent Skoda buses for use in publie transport. 2

East Germany sent electrifiaation equipment ~hile her

advisors gave instructions in operating a printing press;3

Polish cameras, Czech radios and German motorbikes were on

1. Rupen, "How the M. P. R. is Real~ Ruled", China News !nalysis, no. 516, (May 15, 1964). pp. 3-4.

2. ~, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 496.

3. Bawden, The World Today, vol.XVI, p. 268.

58.

sale in the new Univermag Department Store. 1 Poland lent

Mongolia'ten million dollars for geological exploration,2

and provided street lights for Ulan Bator. The reclamation

of the. Gobi Desert was being carried out under the guidance

of Hungarian geologists, who hoped to find an additional

two hundred and fifty wells between 1966 and 1970.3

Trade agreements were signed with each country during both

the Three Ye~ and the Five Year Plans.

Facilitating the growth of these ties was the

Eastern European economic organization, the Council for

Mutual Economie Assistance, more popularly known as Comecon.

Organized in 1949, its purpose was

"to organize extensive, economic, scientifio and technical cooperation among member countries in order to make the most rational use of their natural and economic resources and to p~omote the growth of their productive forces."

The Council coordinated economic activity in the same

countries for which the Warsaw Pact organized defense.

After attending Comecon meetings as an observer in 1958,

trade relations between Eastern Europe and Mongolia were

initiated. In 1959, the amount of exchange with this area

1. FEER, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 492.

2. The New York Times, July 16, 1961, p. 20.

3. Bondy, op cit, p. 12-13.

4. Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal, "Economie Cooperation of the Socialist Countries - A Vital Necessity", World Marxist Review (Toronto), vol.VII, no. 9, (1964), p. 5.

59.

overtook the quantity of Mongolia's trade with China.

The Chinese People's Republic had also attended meetings

as an observer but withdrew in 1961. The benefits to

Mongolia encouraged her to join the Council in June 1962. 1

She thus became the tirst Asian member of the organization.

This action has been called lia direct RUss..ian

slap at.China. 1I2 Such an interpretation is extreme, since

trade with China was not cut back as a consequence.

Furthermore, items arriving from East Europe and China

were not competitive. China was in no position to export

cars and electrification equipment, while Czechoslovakia

and Hungary could not supply labourers. Joining Comecon

merely formalized for Mongolia the already existing business

activity being carried on with Eastern Europe.

Politically, the desire of the Mongolian People's

Republic to join the Council was indicative of the shift

in Mongolia's position since 1957. At the time, China

was her only other trading partner besides Russia. The

Soviet Union had pulled out aIl but a skeleton staff of

advisors from Mongolia, while China's economic influence

was reaching its peak. By 1962, the Eastern European

1. ~, XIV;23, vol. 2, p. 3. (Pravda, June 9, 1962).

2. Rupen, "Recent. Tre:g,<is in. the M. P. R.", Asian Survey, vol. IV, (AÎ>ril--1'964r~L p. 815; See also Oleg Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviat Economie Relations 1959-1962", Annals of the American Academy of PoliticaL and Social Science, vol.CCCXLIX, (September 1963), p. 102.

ct

60.

countries had dislodged China from her favourable position

and Mongolia had been drawn firmly into the western section

of the Communist bloc.

To cement this new relationship, high level

visits became more common between the two areas. In

1961, the Fourteenth Congress of the Mongolian People's

Revolutionary Party was attended by Mikhail Suslov of. the

Soviet Politburo, and both the Communist Party leader

Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Premier Joseph Cyrankiewicz

of poland. 1 In July of the next year, President Z. Sambu

of Mongolia visited President Leonid Brezhnev of Russia.

In the autumn of 1964, Tsedenbal made an extended trip

to the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. 2

Re made additional trips in the spring and summer of

1965. 3 In 1965, Ulan Bator received visits from Alexander

Shelepin and several generals of the Soviet Army and Air

Force. The following January, Communist Party Secretary

Brezhnev, made Mongolia the first Asian country he visited

since he assumed his new position. 4

During the early nineteen sixties, Mongolia

also won increasing acceptance, even among non-Communist

1 • The New York Times, July 8, 1961, p. 2.

2. The New York Times, October 22, 1.964, p. 1.6; October 29, 1.964, p.1.

3. The New York Times, .April 12, 1965, P .10; June. 22, 1965,

4. P.R.M. Jones~ "Moscow and the Mongols", ~, vol.LI, no. 7, (1966 , p. 326.

p.2.

61.

countries, as an independent entity. The major step

was the entry after five unsuccessful attempts, of the

Mongolian People's Republic into the United Nations in

October 1961. 1 This was made possible only through Soviet

diplomatie maneuvers, which succeeded in reducing Taiwan's

veto to an abstention. 2 The United States did not re­

cognize the Mongolian People's Republic,3 but Great

Bri tain and France did. In January 1963, the United

Kingdom-announced that relations would be established ato

the ambassadorial level, although the Chargé d'Affaires

in Peking was to function for both countries. 4 Credentials

were..presented on May 20. Canada extended recognition in

1964; and France followed in April 1965. 5 This diplomatie

acti vi ty occurred during tht~ marked improvement in Soviet,..

Western relations following the Cuban missile crisis, and

was accompanied by a similar increase in trade between

Western and Soviet~bloc countries. 6 By 1965, thirty two

1 .. Applications. were filed in 1946, 1.947, 1949, 1955, and 1960.

2. United Nations Review, vol.VIII, no. t1, (1961), pp. 25-27 and 52.

3. Although the United States did initiate recognition proceedings when John Kennedy became President, op­position by Taiwan and cert~in Congressmen led to their cancellation. Fear that Communist China would be recognized next motivated this opposition. (See The New York Times, June 10~ 1961, p. 2; June 13, 1961, p. 2; June 17, 1961, p. 9).

4. The. New York Times, January 24, 1963, p. 3~

5. The. New York Times, April 28, 1965, p. 4.

6. C. L. Sulzberger, however, attributes the French move to General de Gaulle's geo-political views. "He indicates the belief that someday the Soviet Union is going to

62.

countries recognized the Mongolian People's Republic,

of which nineteen were non-Communist nations. 1

This avalanche of economic and diplomatie ac­

tivity involving Mongolia accomplished the result desired

by the Soviet Union. Chinais activity there was diminished

as was her influence. Mongolia became increasingly in­

debted to Russia and Eastern Europe for their economic

assistance and progressively more independent of the

Chinese People's Republic. Contacts with China were not

eut off entirely. In spite of the rise of European in­

fluence in the Mongolian People's Republic, Mongolia con­

tinued to accept Chinese financial aid, to sign trade

agreements with her, and to employ Chinese labour. It

was the Sino-Soviet dispute which eliminated from Mongolia

these remaining vestiges of Chinese influence, and pro-

vided the test which proved that Mongolia's allegiance

was entirely to the Soviet Unio~.

be partitioned with its Slavic components reaffirming closer ties with Europe and with the vast trans-Ural area, including Siberia and the Turkmenian republics, eventually falling under Chinese suzerainty ••• lt is thus indicated that in hie long term view, de Gaulle seemsto hold that China's destiny is to eventually amputate Asiatic Russia and thereby impel Slavic Russia westward toward the Europe which de Gaulle envisions. as a vague but coherent future force. fi (See The New York Times, July 9, 1965, p. 28). France reco~ized the dhiriese People's Republic in January 1964. (See KeeSin,'S Contemporary Archives, (1964), February 1-8, p. 198 7).

1. M. T. Haggard, "Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer", AsiaLl Survey·, vol.V, (January 1965), p. 18.

CHAPTER 5.

MONGOLIA AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

The_ Sino-Soviet dispute, ":,as far as the Mongolian

~eople's Rapublic was concerned, went through two stages.

The.first consisted of a difference in the interpretation

of Communist ideology by the two major Communist powers.

This dialogue over the implementation of Marxist-Leninist

doctrine was, after several years, replaced by the his­

torical reason for disputes between these countries:

conflicting claims to the territory that lay between them.

Much of this disputed land, such as the provinces of Sin­

kiang and Manchuria, was now controlled and governed by

China, but had for long periods been under Russian and

Soviet economic and political domination. China was not

satisfied that all the land she now ruled was all that

belonged to her. Included in the territory she claimed

was the Mongolian People's Republic.

Only the second problem was of any real concern

to the Mongol Government. A threat to her borders could

mean danger to her independence from both sides. Mongolia

had no desire to return to Chinese rule, but at the sarne

time feared that Chinese pressure might lead to outright

63.

Russian annexation. The :Mongolian People' s Republic, .

virtue of her geographical position, was also threatened

by the possibility of partition, the fate suffered by

Poland in 1939.

The Mongols showed little interest in the ideo­

logical aspect of the dispute. They could contribute

nothing to the theories of peaceful coexistence or wars

of liberation. For as long as she could, Mongolia tried to

remain silent about these questions, Her major worry

was the danger inherent in her geo-political position,

a position which had heretofore been very profitable.

Before she was forced to take an open stand on the ideo-

logical issue, Mongolia's attitude was described by a

Mongol diplomat this way:

"We don't want to get mixed up in what we don't unde,stand. Anyway, both sides give us aid."

"'.

Even after Mongolia, not unexpectedly, stated

her support for the Soviet Union, she avoided any discussion

of ideology. Generally, Mongolia simply praised Soviet

foreign policy, attacked the Chinese Communist leaders

for splitting the world Communist movement, and emphasized

the extent of economic aid she received from the Soviet

Union. No independently conceived polemics against the

Chineee People's Republic appeared in Mongolian newspapers. 2

1. Quoted in The Economiet, vol.CCIV, p. 543.

2. Rupen, "Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet Disputen , China Quarterly, vol.XVI, (1963), p. 75.

The.period of increased Russian and East European

activity in Mongolia, inaugurated by the Bulganin-Tsedenbal

Statement of 1957, was motlvated by the rapid growth

of Chinese influence both in Mongolia and in the Communist

world. The climax of this new Soviet policy came in

July 1961, when the Mongolian People's Re'Volution~y

Party held i ts Fourteenth Congress in Ulan Bator. At,.

boththe Twelfth and Thirteenth Congress, China was rep­

resented by Ulanfu. Russia sent P. T. Komarov in 1954,

and N. G. Ignatov in 1958. Both were relatively un­

important Soviet officiaIs who were not calculated to

make a major impression on the Mongols. Ulanfu came again

in 1961.

On this occasion the Soviet Union sent Mikhail

Suslov, the third most important man in the Kremlin and

the acknowledged ideologist of the Russian Communist Party.

This action was aimed, not so much at attracting.the<Mongols

aaat belittling the Chinese who were celebrating the

fortieth anniversary of their Communist Party. There was

no Russian representative in China for this event.'

Russia published a letter of best wishes to the Communist

Party of China,2 but reported the celebrations on the

back page of Pravda along with other news items of the

1. "Placating Russia", ~, vol.XXXIII, no. 3, (1961), p. 87.

2. ~, XIII;26, vol. 2, p. 17. (Pravda, July 2, 1961).

66.

day. The Mon.golien Congress was given f'ront page coverage. 1

In his speech to the Congress, Suslov reiterated

the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement by emphasizing Russia's

role in Mongolia's economic development and he avoided any

ref'erence to China's contributions. Tsedenbal's address

also neglected to mention China while i"l; heaped praise

on the Soviet Union.

"In the hearts of' the working people of' the Mongolien People's Republic ••• there lives eternally a sense of' deep and most sincere gratitude and warm appreciation f'or the glorious motherland of' Lenin and Leninism ••• f'or aIl they have done f'or the liberation of' the Mongolian people f'rom the yoke of' national and social oppr2ssion f'or the creation of' a happy lif'e ••• "

He made no mention of' the widening Sino-Soviet split.

Suslov signif'icantly touched upon the dispute

in an oblique way. In their ef'f'orts to justif'y their respective

ideological positions, China and Russia tried to win the

support of' the poor, uncommitted nations of' the so-called

Third World. Suslov used this- occaion to attack the Chinese

method of' building socialism, not by direct ref'erence

but by advertising that the Russian process, exemplif'ied

by Mongolia, was the better one :for emerging nations to

adopt and f'ollow.

The use of' mongolia as an example to the Third

1. ~, vol.XXXIII, no. 3, p. 871.

2.~, XIII;27, vol. 3, p. 18. (Izvestia, July 5,1961).

~ ~

67.

World suggested a new importance for the People's Republic,

that of a lever in Soviet foreign policy. Suslov said in

his speech that

"Mongolia's experience in bUilding socialism acquires particular practical significance today when the face of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is changing, when aIl the large nations whose life is marked by feudalism or even a pre-feudal system are, acquiring national independence and taking the destinies10f their countries into their own hands.o."

Rusaia could not point to her Eastern European satellites

as examples of the success ofher brand of socialism, since

capitalism and industrialization were_well advanced in

these countries before the imposition of socialism. Mon­

golia clos.ely fi tted the pattern of the emerging nations

and was therefore an asset to Soviet ~oreign policy during

the dispute.

The Mongolian People's Republic sided openly

with the Soviet Union later in 1961 at the Twenty Second

Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October. This

was the first of the few times that ,the Mongolian leaders

spoke out on ideological matters. At this conference,

Chairman Khrushchev inaugurated the practice of attacking

the Albanian Party of Labour when, in fact, he was criti­

cizing the Chinese Communist party.2 The majority of

1. ~, p. 18.

2. Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War, Moscow versus Pekin, iIarmondsworth, Middlesex, Erigland, 1963, p. 133.

68.

Communist Parties represented at the Congress joined in

the condemnation of Albania, and according to Harrison

Salisbury of ~e New York Times, few did it more outspokenly

than the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party through

its leader, Tsedenbal. 1

Mongol support for the Soviet Union also extended

to Party affairs at home. Between the Twentieth Soviet

Party Congress of 1,956, which had condemned the Stalin

personality cult, and the Twenty Second in 1961i, which

added Voroshilov to the anti-Party group 'of 1957-1958,

there was no independent condemnation of._these crimes in

Mongolia. Although Mongols had been purged during this

period, it was not for these reasons. This situation

was rectified soon after the 1961 Moscow Congress.

Vfuile reporting to the Central Committee of the

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in January 1962,

Tsedenbal emphasized again that Mongolia gave Russia her

unqualified support.

"We are in complete agreement with the frank and principled criticism of the anti~M8rx1àt positions of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist Parties and can­no·t agree wi th the reservations expressed in this matter at the Twenty Second Party Congress by t~e Communist Party of China, for example."

1. The New York Times, January 1., 1962, p. 6.

2. ~, XIV;5, vol. 1, p. 29. (Pravda, February 3, 1962).

Leaf 69 omitted in page numbering.

70.

During this report, Tsedenbal launched his de-Stalinization

campaign..

Mongolia's Stalin was Marshall Khorloin Choibalsan,

who had been Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic

between 1939 and his. death in 1.952, a year before Stalin

died. At different times during his premiership, he was

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior. He

was head of state longer than Stalin, who only assumed

the ·ti tJ.e of Premier in 1941. Tsedenbal had served

Choibalsan as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party from 1940 to 1952.

At the Central Committee Plenum in January

1962, Tsedenbal accused Choibalsan of practicing the cult

of the individual, and of terrorism and excesses. His

crimes were not considered as grave as Stalin's, however,

because

"Comrade.Choibalsan felt responsibility to the Party for the errors he committed in the past and ••• he tried to le~ the appropriate lessons from them."

Tsedenbal took a certain measure of the blame for fostering

the personality cult, citing a speech he made in praise

of Choibalsan on his fiftieth birthday in 1945. The

Party apparatus, he said,now guarded against the repetition

of these crimes.

1. ];lli, p. 29.

71.

Criticism of Choibalsan was not as thorough

as the de-Stalinization in Russia. Choibalsan's body

was not removed from the mausoleum it shared with that of

Sukhe Bator. Nor were place names in Choibalsan's honour

changed. No widespread purge followed, and members of the

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party who served with

Choibalsan were not suddenly implicated and criticized.

Choibalsan alone was charged with practicing the personality

cult, and the condemnation was very mild in comparison

with that delivered against his Soviet contemporary.

Tsedenbal accomplished three important things

by launching this campaign. In the first place, he de­

monstrated his loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the

Russian Communist Party policy. Secondly, he now had an

available accusation to level at any rival for his position

or at opposition to the Revolutionary Party's policy.

L~stly, by chastising Choibalsan with relatively little

publicity, the door was not shut to continued good relations

with the Chinese People's Republic, although Mongolia

sided with Russia in the dispute. A widely publicized

attack on Choibalsan would have been interpreted as being

specifically hostile to China, while the policy pursued

appeared more as a token gesture to appease the Soviet

Union without alienating China.

It seems, however, that appeasement of Russia

was not enough. A more obvious commitment to Soviet

72.

policy was necessary. In September 1962, Professor

Dar~~y Tumur-Ochir, Secretar.f of the Central Committee

of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, a member

of its Politburo and Director of the Party's Historical

Research Institute, was removed fro~ aIl positions. His

positions in the Party dated from March 1959. 1 No other

Party memberswere involved in this purge.

The campaign against ~~ur-Ochir was intense.

On September 12, Pravda, in reporting the third plenary

session of the Party's Central Committee, said that he

was removed because "he has.not justified t:p.e Party's

high trust". The article noted thFtt

"his dogmatic approach to Marxist-Leninist theory and such negative personal traits as conceit, vanity and rudeness contributed to his vicious actions."

The worst crime of aIl was that

IIComrade Tumur-Ochir attempted to use the Party's struggle against the consequences of the cult of the individual for his own far-reaching careerist aims and for under- 2 mining the authority of the Party leadership."

The condemnation at the plenary session was unanimous.

In November, Pravda reprinted a long editorial

from~, tha organ of the Central Committee of the

Mongcli~~ Peo~le's Revolutionary Party. The article

elaborated on the reasons for Tumur-Ochir's purge. His

1. Rupen, Pacifie Affairs,vol. XXXIII, p. 141.

2. Quotations from CDSP, XIV;37, vol. 3, p. 16. (Pravda, September 12, 19b2):

crimes were threefold. As a Party leader

"his purpose was by playing up the fact of the Party's condemnation of some of the serious mistakes committed by Kh. Choibalsan ••• to achieve the removal from the Party leadership of older-generation cadres who had worked with Comrade Choibalsan, and to do s~ by using this device unscrupulously."

As the Party historian he expressed

"a nihilistic attitude that consisted in deprecating the role of the Party and belittling the successes and victories won by the Mongolian peo~le during the years of people's ruIe ••• he depicted in dark colours thehistorical path traver­sed by the Mongolian people and engaged in slanderous attacks upon the Party and the working class of the Mongolian People's Republic."

The edi torial elaboration of his third offense was aimeo.

at China, which together with Inner Mongolia, was plan­

ning large scale.festivities in honour of the birth of

Genghis Khan. 2

"D. Tumur-Ochir supported nationalist efforts to glorify and idealize the role of Genghis Khan in Mongolian history and to play down and gloss over his reactiona.~ role. He fiercely sought to have an elaborate celebration of the eight hundredth· anniver­sary of Genghis Khan's birth."

Until this avalanche of criticism wa~published,

~rofessor Tumur-Ochir was unknown. The on~ others im­

plicated with him were fellow historians, whose names

were not mentioned. Although his Party positions were

1. Quotations from CDSP, XIV;44, vol. 4, p. 6. (Pravda, November 1, 1962;:--

2. P. H. M. Jones, "Jenghiz Rides Again," FEER, vol.XXXVIII, no. 7, (1962), p. 368. ----

74.

impressive, his name had rarely appeared in the news.

Yet this relatively unimportant man was the object of a

far more. hostile campaign than was directed at the former

General Secretary of the Party, Dordj Damba, in 1,958.

Two inter-connected factors explain the inten­

sity of the attack. First, since he stood for close

relations with the Soviet Union, the weakening of Tse­

denbal t·s po si tion 'Rould loosen the .Russian hold on Mon­

golia. Opposition to Tsedenbal was a threat to his con­

trol of the Party. During this period of tension with

China, any undermining of his strength could not be

tolerated by Russia. Mongolia's existence would consequently

be jeopardized. Tsedenbal's actions took into account

Russia's presence and dominance in his country, and he strove

by insisting on total loyalty to him, -to ensure Soviet

trust and satisfaction with his policies*

Secondly, Tumur-Ochir was probably chosen because

of his limited association with other important Party

members, who would not be implicated along with him. This

is suggested by the localization of the purge to him and to

several of his historian colleagues. No other Party

members were affected at this time. Purging people for

having supported Choibalsan might have meant removing

many men on whom Tsedenbal relied for support~ Therefore

the condemnation of Tumur-Ochir contained praise for

Choibalsan in spite of his acknowledged practice of the

75.

cult of the individual.

" ••• 0ur Party does not and never will forget the tremendous revolutionary accomplishments of Comrade Choibalsan, one of the founders of our Party and of the Mongolian People's democratic state, an ardent champion of internationalist friendship of peoples, a person who gave aIl his efforts to the struggle for the Mongolian People's freedom and independence, 1 for the triumph of socialism in our country."

Advocating the policies of Tumur-Ochir - nationalism,

ambition, and any opposition to the Party line - was a

charge which Tsedenbal could level at his rivala without

implicating himself or his supporters.

This beoomes evident when one considers the

reasons for two subsequent purges, one in November 1964,

and another a year later. In 1964, one of the most im­

portant men in Ulan Bator, L. Tsende, was removed from the

Politburo and from his position as Second Secretary of the

Party. He was lmown to oppose China2 and had made a

speech in 1961 a"ttacking her for slandering the Soviet

Communist Party. Yet he was accused of having "conspired

wi th D. Tllmur-Ochir", of having spent"excessive sums on

statues erected to commemorate the eight hundredth anni­

versary of the birth of Genghis Khan", and of having

"sought his own aggrandizement.,,3 In December 1965, two

1. ~, XIV;44, vol. 4, p. 7. (Pravda, November 1, 1962).

2. Rupen, Asian Survey, vol.IV, pp. 812-813.

3. P. H. M. Jones, "Tactful Retreat", FEER, vol.XLV, no. 5, ( 1964), p. 187.

76.

civil servants and one local Party leader were purged

for being

"disguised supporters of Tumur-Ochir and Tsenda, who had earlier been exposed as violent nati~nalists and political intriguers."

Thus the Mongolian People's Republic displayed

her allegiance to Russia during the Sino-Soviet dispute

by attacking Albania from timc to time and by keeping

strict control over Party discipline. Prompted by Chinese

statements about Russia's position in Asia, Mongolia

finally raised the issue of territorial integrity

in 1964.

During preliminary discussions and meetings to

plan the March 1965 Afro-Asian Conference, Chen Yi and

other spokesmen objected to Soviet participation on the

grounds that she ~as essentially a European power. AI­

though two thirds of her territory was in Asia, her pop­

ulation, they argued, was three quarters European. This

made her a European and not an Asian power. Renee, she

had no right to attend a Conference of African and Asian

nations. The Bandung Conference of 1955, at which Russia

was not represented, was cited as a precedent. 2

The Soviet Union, of course, claimed that since

1. CDSP, XVII;5, vol. 1, p. 4. (Partinaya Zhizn, January 1965).

2. ~, no. 3231, pp. 35-41. (NCNA, Peking, May 30, 1964).

77.

she was geographically an Asian country, she was entitled

to attend a conference involving Asian countries. Rere

Mongolia supported Russia's arguments by calling the

Chinese attitude "not only groundless" but "an extremely

harmful one." A vic tory for the Chinese over this issue,}

would mean, in Mongol.ia.·s eyes, the reduction of Soviet

influence in Asia, and the subsequent increase of Chinese

domination of that continent. The likelihood of Russia.

abandoning Asia to China and turning her total attention

to Europe was extremely remote. But a stronger Chineae

position in Asia and a relatively weakened Soviet presence

there would force Russia to redress the balance by en­

forcing stricter political and military control over

her Asian possessions. This could become a threat to

Mongolia's existence. The official attitude of the Govern­

ment of the Mongolian People's Republic, therefore, was

that

n ••• the Soviet Union, two thirds of whose ter­ritory is in Asia, has aIl grounds and an indisputable right to take part tn the Second Afro-AsiQll. Conference ••• "

An event which caused a fierce newspaper reaction

in the Soviet Union and Mongolia was the interview granted

by Mao Tse-tung on June. 10, 1964 to a group of visi ting

Japanese socialists.. During this meeting, Mao referred

to Mongolia as being dominated by Russia, and discussed

1. Quotations from Mongolia Today (New: Delhi), May-June, 1964, p. 1.

78.

historical Chinese claims to former terxitories, in-

cluding the Mongolien People's Republic. This brought

an immediate response from~, the Mongolian Party

newspaper. It also touohed off a series of anti-Chinese

articles in Russian and other Mongolian newspapers which

lasted from September to late October 1964.

The first ~ response avoided any ~ention

of the Mao interview. Instead it attacked the Chinese

for ""their splitting aotivities among the fraternal parties,"

and because they were "in their own country developing a

great-power chauvinism"-I marked by the oppreGsion of

minori ties and especially of the IImer Mongols. Other

articles described the 1.'Uthless establishment of communes

and their detrimental effect on the Mongols of China, who

were exiled to distant parts of the Inner Mongolian

Autonomous Region. Unt1l Moscow pUblished her own official

statement in Pravda concerning 11ao's interview, Mongolia

confined her polemics to the minority policy of the Chinese

People's Republic.

On September 2, 1964, Pravda published a long

article attacking Mao's statements point by point. Several

paragraphs were devoted to the remarks about Mongolia.

The Soviet Union denied that it dominated Mongolian affairs,

calling the country lia sovereign socialist state" which

1. Bawden, "Mongolian Review", ~, vol.XLII, (1965), pp. 295-296.

"enjoys all the rights of an independent country." It

wes the Chinese who voiced the complaints, not the Mongols.

IIThe whole point i8 that the existence of an independent Mongolian which main tains i'riendly relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics rold other countries o~ socialism cloes not suit the Chinese leaders. They woulrl like to üeprive it of independence and make it 2. Chinese province."

This was !?ev\3éüed, "the artic le saicl, ùuring Khrushchev' s

visi t, to Peking in 19.54, ';')~1r:::n the Chil1ese leaders raised

the lVLongolia.l1 qur::;:rt.:Li):tl ;Lu o~'d(n:' ·~ü cOllclude an agreement

on it.

"N<:;;:l;u:cally, Iii. S. iU.ll.'ushchev refused to discuss this tluestion anel -told the Chinese leaders that 'the destiny of the Mongolien pe~ple is determined not in Peking &ld not in Mosoo'n, but in Ulan Bator, and that only -I;he country 1 s worldng people them­selves and no one else could decid, the qurastion of Mongolia 1 s statehood.1!

Chinese design::; on l1iIongol:ian -terri tory were tree,ted as

serious but no-GuJ"Jl.sue.l b;'i' :Hussia.

to Russia l Z. ~;:.hl:.?: itlost promi:uent argument was that the

"great-power ctl8.uvi:!:.!.:Ls][l!!sho·w:Lng its face in China' s

campaigTl agaüu3t hEll' lnin(iri ties, c(Iu1d also extend to

neighbouring countries. One ;:::rt:i.cle wa:a::'lled that "we.

have a friend who stands on gnard v>fi th us in the defense

1. Quotations from CDSP, XVI;34, vol •. 3, p. 5. (Pravda, September 2, 196~

ct

80.

of the interests of our country.,,1

This was further emphasized when a new Mutual

Defense Pact was concluded between Mongolia and Russia

in 1964. This renewed similar agreements signed in 1936

and 1946. In those years, the enemy had been Japan in

the first case and the United States-Nationalist China

partnership in the second. In 1964, Communist ehina be­

came the target for a defense treaty between two other

aocifJ,1:.L1i3't :f.l.i::::I;j,OllS. l'I; VIas assumed' tha t Soviet troops

... vould ce st;.l?:,";;iüHed 011 lvlongolian soil in case of danger.

Mo:ngo}j,ç',' ,:l b,rd;:l.vi.i:;y dlU'illg ·the Sino-Soviet

dispute f)v.ggested thp..t Sl:l.0 was ·'G.rying to prevent in-

creased Russian involvement in Mongolian affairs. There

were no illusions about 'the necessi ty of dependence on

Russia for economic aIld poli'cical survi val, but as li ttle

Russian presence as possible was desired. The occasional

anti-Albanian speeches and Party shakeups were thus de­

signed to ensure Soviet confidence in the Mongol leader­

ship. The progressive inte!lsification of the Sino-Soviet

dispute made the success of that policy problematic.

For Mongolia the major results of the Communist split were

a preliminary build-up of Russian defenses in the are a., the

exodus of Chinese personnel, and. the overall deterioration

of Sino-Mongol relations. Between 1957 and 1962, Chinais

1. Quoted in Haggard, Asian Survey, vol.V, p. 19.

81.

influence was offset by the rise of Russian and East

European activi ty. J>...f"te;!:' 1962, Chinese activi ty was

brought to a hal t by <the Govex:.nment of the Mongolian

People's Republic.

CF..APTER 6.

THE IfERlvLINN~ION O:I!' SINO-MONGOL RELATIONS.

The dete~lioJ:'ation of Slno-Soviet relations in

the ninetaen sixties letl to the systematic x'eduction of

Cllinese acti vi ties in lVIon.golia. In spi'~e of thebenefi ts

of Chinese actiYity ta her cotmtryls economic development,

the Mongoli811 Government; carried out this policy, ras-

ponding to the pos81bili ty of Russj,an action tf i t did

not.. 5e'hween 1960 and '1965 Chinese contacts in Mongolia

were severed one by one, lU'ltil onl;v- a trade protocol for

'1966 remained. 1 Aid agreements wi th China were not re­

ne.wed after 1965, leaving China's total in economic aid

grants at Olle hundred and fifteen million .à.merican dol­

lars.2 Trade wi th Ghina declined in yolumt:; as business

frOID Russia and }~8,ste:rn Europe displaced it. Il:he strained

relations ce.tlsed by Mongolia 1 S sUPIlor't; of Rusf3ia in the

tiispute were E':xeceI'bated by ...,arious di-plomatic illcidents

betw~en 1962 and 1965~

After having los·t the trust of many Asian countries

'1. The Mongolian Societ) Bulletin, (Bloomington, Indiana), vo1.IV, no. 2, (1965 , p. 45.

2. ~, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, (1961), p. 494.

82.

ct

~ e

due to her border clashes with India, China adopted the

policy of. settling border questions with other neighbours

in order to reestablish g~od relations with them. Such

border treaties we:r:e s:'t.gl1·3d wi th BU1'ma, Nepal and Pakistan. 1

i t nevertheI8:J~:; rP,Btü"te0.. :i.n \jüe ~; !irengthening o:f Tsedenbal' a

of that i:nfJ_u~'::1·.C8., C;~"j.n~:l. ;;.;ig;nad 8. ;.lorde:c treaty with

China .li1<:id8 e-r.re.I.7! ~.üÎox.'t to :eeap as much benefi t

from this agreement as possible. Teedenbal was invited

"to Peking where IIhundreds of thousands of people of the

Chinese capital came out on 'the s'!;reets to give a rousing

\lelcoffie ·to UI!ljagin Tsedenbal. u2 peng Chen of the Chinese

Comm.unis·t Party Poli tburo ~ said that the treaty "signified

a furthel.' strengthening and develop:llent of fraternal

friendehip between the peoples of China and Mongolia,,,3

and called it na major task of historie significance.,,4

1 • Jones, ~, vol.XXXIX, no. 2, ( 1963), p. 56.

2. §2!v1!, no. 2889, p. 28. (NCNA, Peking, December 25, 1962). -3. .QQêR, XIV;52, vol. 4, p • 35. (Pravda, December 27, 1962).

4. "Mongolia The Free", The Economist, vol.CCVI, (January 5, 1963), p. 23.

The Chinese press praised thB treat;y a.s an example of'

. l' 1· t' 1 s()c~a l S·~ coopera l011.

of peaceful coe}:istence, which Mongolie. Sl:tPPol:ted. ..

Il ••• the policy Qf peacei'ul coexistence has vi ta1 ~,.trength, ful1W meets the iJ:ltel.~estB of the peop1e8 and i8 :f'inding Viarm sUPPo:l:'t among aIl progressive mankind.. This can be seen in the exemple 01' the J.. .. ece;-G crisis in the area of 'Ghe Caribbean Sea. Il-

This policy, he proclaimed a't a rally of ten thousend

people in Peking, should be followed in other trouble

spots, such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, which

"should be settled only 'by peaceful means - tha.t is,

through negotiations. 1I He went on to say that

Il ••• the development of the Cuban event shows once again that. it te possible and necessary to make wise compromise in our policies a:f·t;er objectively considering the whole situation and speSific conditions in international life. 11

The Soviet retreat f:r'om Cuba had been ridiculed cu!d con-

demned by China. Tsedenbalis suggestion that Ohina learn

from Russia's actions, therefore, could only have irritated

Sino-Mongol relations. Tsed.enbal,t s perfor.m.a:nce, in addition,

1. SCMP, no. 2889, pp. 32-40. (NCNA, Peking, December 2'b;-1962). '

2. Paraphrased in CDSP, XIV;52, vol. 4, p. 35. (Pravda, 27, 1962). ----

3. Quoted in Mongolia Today, November-December, 1962, p. 2.

85.

succeeded in minimizing the expected pl'opag;anda ei'i'ect

of the Border Tret',1.ty·.

ln ;:3eptember 1963, a nev" incic101Ü fu:r:ther ag-

gravated 8ino-lilongol relations. Chinese stuclents, re-

turning to Moscow for the sohool year, we~'e gi ven an armed

escort out o:f Russia, after anti-Soviet documents and

newspapers in their possession wel.'e confiscatedLy Russian

bord.er guards. The Hus:,:;ians claimed, tha t the studen ts

and the Ohinese creVi oi' the train on VJhich they we'J.1 e

travelling had loclœd up

train from continuing. l 'l'ho Ghinef';G 'bl:::)Jned the Russia.:;.'1s

for detaining the Chin'.:::::;€: for .l'ii'ty hours before sending

ouments 8Xld newsLJa'per~:.~, C]:,lin:::, prute~:djeél, V<1e1':8011 inter-

national Communist pl'o·olems t'J.nd Viere :?or personal use, 2

'This incident t001: pJ.2.C0 2.t the Nauski border

railway station on the Hl.1SSO-WIongoli8J."1 frontier. 'l'he bJ:'ain

involved was the r'eking-Ulall Bator-I,,·1oscov. line, élnd 'the

whole ai'fair. was Ci source of em~barassment to the l'iiongolian

Governmen t becs.use the Ohinese had ùeen permi tted te

travel throv,gh her territory carrying anti-Soviet pro-

paganda. ~llhe next spring, Mongolia vva:r:ned t1:F3 Ohinese

Embassy and i ts officials ta cease h:;1.l1ding out anti-Russian

1. ODSP, XV;36, vol. 3, pp. 20-21. (P~~vd~, September 9;"1.963) •

2. SOMP, no. 3062, pp. 34-35. (~, Peking, September ~1963).

86.

material on l\IIongolia.n terrj. tory. This was a repeat of

earlier warni:n .. gs to t;,he Ciünese People' s E.epublic about

1

i:n. t (8 :~':':;:~~,:'~~~, D,,-:f":f~ .'E!~~l, :c~· ',. ~

1)

1;~~1;:::: (~:L8:.r~1.~tç~ 8, •. -

lÙ:"2:1GtÙis. ce.lIed. i i; 8. viol8,tion of her

--_._._-,,-_ .. --_ ..•. _----_._._--------------

2. The New York :Vill1es, l\'i.a.rch 28, 196 il-, :p.

87.

the officiaIs. 1 The Hevolutionary Party"s newspaper,

~, printed an article b;y e. iVlongol s"C1J.dent who had re­

turned from his study in China. He revealed that the

map of' Asia used in CJhinesc histor.·,y classes showed the

Chinese :.?eople ';:1 HerJublie i:nri; no't J:longolia, vII11ieh had

come into 0xistencc i'iJ:i:)t. No ·)ji.G -r,voulà. 8l1S\Ver him in

r!Lh ... l·~.·.'.·_.C.,. ",he-"" 'CI(;;' ·"' ... ·r·l·'·:!.· 'r"''-' ':-h'j 'C· r.l"·J' .:l ... -.... e·f,··arlcy· 2 'J 1. ~ YJ _ ...... ..L.1 .l......... L.......... lJ U_._I...; _" t;J.~ ...... ~.' ~ ..... U.J....:..J , •

ment oi" '''Y] 195-0 J._~ ./ , they

a high v\1()oc1en 'iJO;ij(;[1'-:~!)1N~l' w:Lt}'~ Gonrmygunners. lI ,) flle Mongols

claira 1.;:l:u-lt this ::'8;j;rep;i"·.tioE :n'lf:! ini tiated 'b;y the Chinese

viously ha.à (;ome 'GO fl'ee ;::illcl easy nüngling of the Chinese

with the l\ilongols. ,,5

1. Bawde~, RCAS, vol.LII, ~. 296.

2. CDSP~ XVI;31, vol. 3, p. 10. (PravQ§ ffild Izvestia, July 30, 1964) •

3. Harrison Salisbury, "Mongolia Revisited", Mongolia Society Newsletter, vol.I, no. 2, (Spring 1962), pp. 20-21.

4. The New York Times, January 1, 1962 f p. 6.

5. Salisbury, Mongolian Society Newsletter, vol.I, no. 2, p. 21.

88.

The estimateu. nWllber of Chincse workers in

Nlongolia. at any' one time varies from correspondent to

correspondent. George iVlurphy, however, refers to con-

versations he nad with lVIongolian economists whereby he

learned "Chat fift8en thousand Ghinese labourers were

• ".n· 1" 1 ln J.Y!.ongo la. J'ack Raymond had reJ)ol'ted in 1956 that

these workers had the right to become citizens when their

term expired,2 but tIlis clause was revoked sometime later, 7.

probably in 1960.) After 1961, only depe.rtures of labourers

were reported, but this exodus only involved workeI's who

had fulfilled their contract 81' tb.ree, five or six ye8.I's. 4

iJntil 1964, only those Viiorkers Vlho h;:1.d se:cved the time of

cheil.' agreements returned to China, a1'tel.' recei ving heroes'

::3endoffs from the Mongols. The nml1ber of workel's was

'chus gradually reduced sinee those leaving were not 1.'e-

01aced after 1961.

Ai'ter April '196L~, there was li ttle doubt that

i:;hf; Ghinese, who were now leaving, Viere doing so at the

ri:;Quest of the l'ilongolicm Jovernment. üüs action coin-

cided '\t'Ii th the street brawl, the distribution of anti-

;joviet propag::mda, and the ne\vspaper campaign against

1. Murphy, Soviet t/19ngolia, D. 177, note 92.

2. Above, p. 28.

3. The New York Times, l:ilay 22, 1964, p. 12. . -..

4. ~, no. no. no.

2325, p. 37. lNCNA, Peking, June 20, 1961). 2743, p. 28. NCNA, Ulan Bator, M~ 1" 1962). 2769, p. 37. NTINI, Peking, June 25, 1962).

ct 88.

The estimated number of Chinese workers in

Mongolia at any one time varies from correspondent to

correspondent. George lYlurph;y, however, refer:s 'to con-

versations he had wi-t;h l1wng:oliarl economists 1,tvhereby he

learned that :fifteen thousand cnünese labourers were

in Mongolia. 1 ,Jack Eaymond had repoL''tf3d. in 1956 tha t

these workers had the right to ;)8COme ci tizens when their

term eXl)ired, 2 but this clause 'NaiS l?t;;Y0~~eù sometime later,

probably in 1960. 3 Aîter 1961, onl} ri.';:ji,q;i:;l1.:CGB of labourers

were reported, but this e:::odn8 ŒJ1,y

Until 1964, only tho,se 'Nol'lcel.';:: :;h,):~

their agreements retnrned. to Ghin:.1, '''-'.: L:e:r.' l.'''::Qeiving heroes t

sendoffs from the Mongols. l'he YllDüh:n' O:L' 'i.'orkers was

thus gradually reduced sinee '(:;1l030 ·h;(:~v~i.ng were not re-

placed after 1961.

After April 1964, there ';.las li ttle dov"bt that

the Chinese, vlho "vere now le8.ving, vrere doing so at the

request of the Mongolian Government. 'rhis action coin-

cided with the street brawl, the distribution of anti-

Soviet propaganda, and the nevvspaper campaign against

1. Iilurphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 177, note 92.

2. Above, p. 28.

3. The New York Tim~, May 22, 1964, p. 12.

4.~, no. 2325, p. 37. !NCNA, Peking, June 20, 1961). no. 2743, p. 28. NCNA, Ulan Bator, M~ 15, 1962). n.o. 2769, p. 37. IrnNI, Peking, June 25, 1962).

89.

Chinese policy in Inner lvJ.ongolia. By this time, Sino-

Mongol relations had reacll.ed thei:c Imv0s-c point since

Vie·tnam, ancl Jap~m. ;fa reac.h thEd . .T' .1~!:!·i::;.:;i.~:J:t:j()11, the goods

had to cross Chinese tex'ri tory. ~ihiJ..e Dino-Mongol relations

were cordial, China freel~i gavE:; p·arrllission for these

goods to pass through 11er land. Ai'ter the successful

e 1. SCM.P, no. 3208, 1-'. 40. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, April 24, 1964)." - -2. Rùpen, Asian Survey,vol.IV, p. 817.

90.

Japanese-r,1ongolic-:u: t:ca.de -G8,11:s tn 196 '!, China offered

the port of TimlGsi.U9..8 ;j~tï:'a:ru:;ship1ilent; c.entre between

landlocked Mongoli6', 'Jnô. ,jCl.p~,"t1. TnlJla~/ '1964, in retaliation

callcelled 1ihis service, fm:'cin.b- ~·llo"ügvl:L;., ... !ïCJ send he~'

d . t . th 'w. • t. • • '1 commo ~ ~es rouga x\.USS:L8.11 ·\J<:'1.'l~l·tG~L·y.

lected dues on the t:l.'aws runlüng th:!.>.)ugh her J.~:'.nd, Dut

'began to lose this reve!lue ai-~ -Che- Œ:1.81Jl.lte 1)etvleen RUBsia

and China intensified anül;h(j j:'"l'0q',.1.8ncy oX i;rain '[;rips

declined. In the :fall. 0:1:') 9b l l· ~ S.US~:Ü8~ :'E'omis~{l more

amount was not disclosed .. 2

cooperation was made neceSSi:l.J-':rl)~,. '[;110 c.c"ii01.'ioration of

Sino-lvlongol relations. 'The :-:.i.1.t1SCl-!"IongoJ.. Eutual Defense

Raat was reneVled in 196..1(, end e,~ '1;~10 same time reports

of border incidents rea(}!"!ed th.e West. In 1962 and 1963,

there were frequent v/arnings .;oJlec:l'ning frontier violations,

but these were restrie'lied .~() the Sino-Soviet boundary in

Sinkiang. The next yce.:r, . tb.e Yugoslav News Agency cor-

-------------------.--- ---_. 1. The New York T:Lmes September 1, 1964, p. 13. =;..;:.......;;.;.;;..;.;......;;;.;;.;:._._ .. - - • ,

2. Jones, IITb.e Chines6 Leave ll , ~,vol.LXIV, no. 9, (1964), p. 419.

91.

respondent in Moscow wrote of Chinese troop movements

along the Sino-fiiongolian "oorder. 1 Military infiltration

by Chinese tl'.'OOpS was also reJ.)orted. 2 At a mili tary

parade celebrai;ing thG i'orty third annivE:I'sary of the

~,~or..golian Revolution, the Î,o[on{~olian Axrrry 1 s Senior Poli tical

GOIDmissar warned IJhius. -tLla"t she f9.ced li Mongolian Arrny

which collaborH-Gect c: 106e1;:/ Y.'i th Russiaü troops.. China' s

l'ole as Jei'oncll;}l~ and J)l'O G'.:;(,' j~Ol.' 0:::' ;"longolia' S southern

:t'rontier froID impe:ci,:",list g~:Cl.>e88io:c, é:'S s-cated in the

Bulganin-Tsedenba1 S·bl-:ç~~OmG.n ~ 01' 1957, ~18.c1 ;)'''-;8n tr'2ken over

by the Soviet Union.

A:fter havil!.g ~eE;:E 'j.'t.?:Lù()l:led ta the 21ongolian

People' s Republic as liheJ:8:~8d l.'6"ïolutionary 'Jhinese

people, as socialist comrade;,J, 2....YlÙ 2.2 cUlltributors to

Mongolia' s economic developLi.en~ ten .yGa:cs ea..rlier, the

Chinese 1eft as trai tors '.~:) socialim!'!., e.8 oppressors of

minori ties, and as a thre,).;J ïj:: .\iioùeü1ia 1 s independe:nce.

China exhibited, in Mongolia f:, \::.yes, .~jl>G2.t power chauvinism

and revanchism, as illus-eJ:2,teù t)~, \Jnin(~se claims to Soviet-

contl.'olled tor~cit.o:r..';ï G!l::.t 0!'!.C8 :w".d ·u[:;l.onged to China,_

Since Mongolia was inclucled i21 ~~hi8 léUld, China was sean

as a mili taI'Y danger. 'L1he l'i:;''lal step in this tllrnabout

was the renewal of -the ~I/il.ltual Dei'ensc Pact, which had

1. The New York Times, September 11, 1964, p. 2.

2. Jones, "Iniler Quiet", ~, vol.XLVIII, no. 4, (1965), p. 149.

92.

been aimed first against Japan and then at Nationalist

China. When this alliance became directed against Com­

munist China, the position of Mongolia reverted to its

pre-1949 status.

CONCLUSION.

The period between 1953 and 1965 was one of the

most eventful in recent Mongolian histol.'y. The prominen'l;

features of these twelve ye~t;S W8re the attempts by

China to regain a position 0:1:' :Lnf11.H·)!lC8 :1,n h81:' former

province and the Soviet reucdj:i.onsGo '~hese G:f.':fo:cts.

The economic competi tian \Yh:i,cl-~ 'J.il,:'.j.'alJ ;;br:!.zç:;(L';his struggle

brought many benefi ts tG Llol1goJ.l'5, U~(Ü pl!:i\)';l.l:':G8:tOl':ed t.o

endanger her existence. rrh(3 ]{,-:.'ngol:i.è-'.!,.I. l Géi.,'lJ.:'l..:.'::: 81;:!:'llggl(~d

to maintain friendly reJ.a:iï:1.o!:f\ ~·.ji th Gil'i.Y.l.;J, ','ri tllOU'i; il'1-

curring the wra th of ti:H~ 00'.':i,j'; iT·'.',i 0::~, ~\;~,~n[-;I) l.h'), 1;; <; ;ü:;-)i'

benefactor.

o:f economic penetration u:f ;'i,.;:~;-S J.:,:~,~\. 'rhi~l '/';'1,t; j:'acil.i tated

by the latter' s labour and :fj..:né~Î,Gio.,l, lLeeds è1:nd China! s

preparedness to satisi'y them. A thz'ee decade lapse in

acti vi ty across the Sino-Iviongol border was replaced by

a flurry of economic, cultural and political exch8~ge.

This did not concern Russia because Mongolian allegiance

was assured by her reliance on the Soviet Unipn for

economic development and defense. IvIongolia's economic,

educational and political institutions were patterned

93.

o 94.

closely on the Russian model. At the same time, China

leaned heavily on Russia for technical advisors and in­

dustrial aid and was not expected to challenge Russia's

entrenched position in Mongolia.

The cause of Russie. f H offensive in IAongolia

did not result froID. (Jh-L:~c;_J ':: .. :)/~~·r,:i.om:l l:ïh'3re but rather

from her acti v:i:i:y :i.~,'.H;:.',(:rÎ~(?:rn ~tl~:0gc~. AlthOl1.eh she e~­

joyed a preferl.'ed I)0;?i~Ji(Y(2 :i:~el:.~_-t::1.vrj :;0 R1J.ssia wi chin

the Cornmunist bloc, m·.:.}.I1-.::. ~i78.F :);;,;- ';:'C ~(:8P.l1S TIussia' s :;?c­

li tical equal. Rer dub>Joqu.:mt ,:cvle 23 mediator be'GWec-':E

Russia and Easte~>n E1U'Og<:: :ce·,.l"l.weù 'i';)'(ssi,';1 J s importance iL,

the Communist world 9Xld ri:r(~atl;~/:1.1,tgm8T1tec1 China' f3 •

the Soviet Union st:'i.?OV0 i;\~·:;,].Y..i.!.7rd,i-;':; ·Jhin8-';J role il1 t;l'~(';;

building of Socicüi0m.

The manifest;a:;'i011 0i' 'tIlis l,olicy in Mongolie.

was -the Bulganin-Tse(:;J,':,"(Jie}~::o~_llb :) ij.'~I"~;(~Elei:l'i::; of Febr'..lary

1957. In this reviev:J ù,~;.~ hlongo IL!;.!.:::;, ,:lQI).!lom:lc r:lèvelopmen-L

and future plans, China f.,~; :~!:i.g:,(l.l:r:':1..~,:';;>J::i.';,: Ij()!l'Gributicns we:L'(:

ignored while only Russir,,\,n :B_(.;~J:;5.I[:l.ty ï';;~S'!.S acknowledged.

China was credi ted wi th sirn:pJ.y keeping Uongolia' s sotitheJ.'1l

borders sa.fe from aggressio21, enSl1.:c,:Lng 'the safety and

stabili ty necessary for economic grovlth. The publication

of the Joint Statement we.s f'ollowed by a rapid influx into

95.

Mongolia of East European technicians and commodities,

which fortified the gri.p of the Soviet Union on the Mon­

golian People's Republic.

The ensuing Sino-Soviet .. dispute led to the

end of Chinese activity in Mongolia. Although she tried

to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict, Mongolia

feared that her ovm independence would be in jeopardy

if she did not open~' support the Soviet Union. Never­

theless, even after condemning China's position in the

dispute, the Mongolian Government tried to keep Sino­

Mongol relations as cordial as possible. This policy

VIas continued until mid-1964, when the Mongolian People's

Republic was implicated for the first time in the most

hostile polemics exchanged betvv-een Russia and China. .iL

series of violent street melées in Ulan Bator involving

Jhinese workers in Mongolia finally led to their expulsion.

Although diplomatie relations were not severed, by 1965

trade was the only survi ving acti vi ty bet"veen Mongolia

and China.

Mongolia herself underv:lent many cha.l1ges during

these tVlelve years. n:.e availabili ty of Chinese 'Ivorkers

and money enabled Mongolie. to undertake an indus trial

development program which charlged the face oi' the country.

The increased Soviet aid at this time contributed te bath

accelerated economic growth and to social vlelfare. One

96.

benefit of East European activity was the introduction

of modern consumer goods into Mongolia. This period

also witnessed the international acceptance of the Mon­

golian People's Republic as an independent entity and

member of the United Nations.

Despite the many events of the years 1953-1965,

the po si tion of Iilongolia between Russia 'and China remained

essentially the sarne. In 1953, Mongolia was wholly do~

minated by Russia and dependent on her for defense and

economic progresse Rer only contact with China was an

Economie and Cul ture.l Agr8erilon t. In 1965, r.Iongolia' s existence

depended cOI!l.pletely on the Soviet Union, and a trade

agreement v/as aIl that remained of Sino-Mongol relations. The

only dii'ference was that in 1953 the Communist Government

in China removed the necGssity of the Russo-Mongol

defense alliance. In 1965, th:?,t sarne Government was the

ce,use of i ts renev!al.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Washington, 1949-1967.

Maki, John M., Selected Documents§ Far Eastern Inter-national Relations (168 -1951), Seattle, 1957.

lViongolia Toda.y, New Delhi, 1961-1964.

Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, 1955-1966.

The New York Times, 1950-1966.

The A Translation of, Peo lels Liberation

•

Books and Monographs

Badour, Viilliam, Factors Shaïing the Foreign POliCt of the Peop!e's Repub ic of China, unpublis ed M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1965.

Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, New York, 196î.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960.

Cheng Tien-fong, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, Vlashington, 1957.

China: Representation in the U.N., ed. A. G. Mezerik, New York, 1962.

Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. A. Doak Barnett, New York, '1963.

Crankshaw, Edward, The New Cold War, Moscow versus Pekin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1963.

Dallin, David J., Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, Philadelphia, 1961.

97.

98.

__________ , Soviet Russia and The Far East, New Haven, 1948.

------ , The Rise of Russia in ASia, London, 1950.

Erickson, John, The Soviet High Command, London, 1962.

Fitzgerald, C. P., The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, London, 1964.

Floyd, David, Mao Against Kbrushchev, London, 1964.

Friters Gerard M., Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, with an Introduction by Owen Lattimore, London, 1951.

Jackson, W. A. Douglas, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands, Princeton, N. J., 1962.

Lattimore, Owen, Communisill, Mongolian Brand, Boston, 1962.

_______ .' Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, London, 1962.

Ma Ho-tien, Chinese Agent in Mongolia, transe John De Francis, with an Introduction by Owen Lattimore, Baltimore, 1949.

Mackintosh, J. M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, London, 1962.

Murpby, George G. S., Soviet Mongolia, Berkeley, 1966.

North, Robert C., IVloscow and the Chinese Communists, Stanford, 1963.

Richardson, Astrid, Chinais National Interest: A Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Views, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1963.

Rupen, Robert A., Mongols of the Twentieth Century, 2 vols. Bloomington, Indiana, 1964.

Sino-Soviet MilitF. Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff, New Yor , 1966.

Tashjean, John E., Vfuere China Meets Russia: An Analysis of Dr. Starlinger's Theory, vol. II of Cen~ral Asia COllectanea, ed. Rudolf Loewenthal, Washington, 1959.

Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu, New York, 1960.

__________ and Sheng Shih-t'sai, General, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot, East Lansing, Michigan, 1958.

o

99.

Articles and Periodicals

Ballis, William B., "The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties, 1945-1950", .Annals of the American AcadeVï of Political and Social Science, vol. CCLXX I, (September 1951).

_____ , "The Political Evolution of a Soviet Satellite: The Mongolian People's Republic" , Western Political Quarterly, vol. IX, (June 1956).

_____ .' "Soviet Russia's Asiatic Frontier Technique", Pacifie Affairs, vol. XIV, (March 1941).

Bawden, Dr. Charles R., "Mongolia Revisited", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLVII, (1960).

, "Commentary on an Interview with the Hambo ------.:.Lama" , Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,

vol. XLIX, (1962).

_____ , "Mongolian Review, October 1965", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. LII, (1965).

_____ , "Economie Advance in Mongolia", The World TOday, vol. XVI, (1960).

, "The Mongolia People's Republic", China News --------Anabysis, no. 445, (November 16, 1962).

Betts, T. J., "The Strategy of Another Russo-Ja:panese War", Foreign Affairs, vol. XII, (July 1934).

"Bone in Mao's Throat", The Economist, vol. CC, (July 8, 1961).

Burke, James, "China's Losing Game in Mongolia", Far Eastern Survey, vol. XVII, (July 7, 194ET:

"Chinese Expansion: Asian Communism on the IV~arch", The Round Table, vol. L, (December 1960). ---

Choh-Ming Li, "Economie Development li , China Quarterly, no. 1, ( 1960) •

Erickson, John, Review of Unit y and Contradiction, ed. Kurt London, China Quarterly, no. 15, (1963).

Far Eastern Economie Review, vol. XXXI-LII, Hong Kong, 1961-1966.

100.

Field, A. R., "Strategie Devel0L'ment in Sinkiang", Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXIX, tJanuary 1961).

Fisher, Harold H., "Soviet Policy in Asia since Stalin", Annals of the American Academ of Political and Social Science, vol. CCCIII, January 195 •

Gallois, le Général C. R., "Chine contre U.R.S.S.: ce que serait une guerre", Réalités, no. 255, (April 1967).

Geisler, Richard A., "Recent Developments in Outer Mongolia", Far Eastern Survey, vol. XXVIII, (December 1959).

Ginsburgs, George, "Mongolia's 'Socialist' Constitution", Pacifie Affairs, vol. XXXIV, (June 1961).

Gittings, John, IICooperation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet Relations", International Relations, vol. XL, (January 1964).

Glubb, O. Edmund, IIArmed Conflict in the Chinese Borderland, 1917-1950", Sino-Soviet Military Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff, New York, 1966.

Griffith, Samuel B. II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make \Var", Foreign. Affairs, vol. XLIII, (January 1965).

Guins, George C., "Challenge to the Soviets:~in Asia and Africa", Russian Review, vol. XXIII, (October 1964).

Haggard, M. T., "Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer", Asian Survey, vol. V, (January 1965).

Hazard, John N., "The Constitution of the Mongol People's Republic and Soviet Influences ll , Pacifie Affairs, vol. XXI, (1948).

"Heirs of Genghis Khan", The Economist, vol. CCIV, (August 11, 1962).

Henze, Paul B., "Politics and Alphabets in Inner Asia ll,

Journal of the Ro}al Central Asian Society, vol. XLIII, (1956 •

___ , "Alphabet Changes in Soviet Central Aeia and Communist China", Journal of the Royal Gentral Asian Society, vol. XLTV, (1957).

c~ence, vo •

Hudson, G. F., IIThe Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1945", St. Anto~y's Papers, no. 2, (1957).

e 101.

_____ .' "The Nationalities of China", St. Anton.y's Papers, no. 7, (1960).

Jackson, W. A. Douglas, "The Chinese Population Problem", Current HistoEY, vol. XLIII, (September 1962).

Krueger, John R., "Education in the Mongolian People's Republic" , comyarative Education Review, vol. IV, (February 1961 •

Laqueur, Walter Z., "The Shi~ting Line in Soviet or~entol0f.'" Problems of C ommunJ. sm , vol. V, (March-AprJ.l 1956 •

Lattimore, Owen, "Mongolia Revisited", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLIX, (1962).

~ ____ , "Mongolia's Place in the World", Introduction to Friters, Gerard M., Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, London, 1951.

_____ ~, "Satellite Politics: The Mongolian Protot;ype" , Wès·tern Political Quarterl.Y, vol. IX, (1956).

Lowenthal, Richard, "Factors of Unit y and Factors of Conflict", Annals of the American Academ of Political and Social Science, vol. CCCXLIX, September 19 3 •

Mackintosh, J. :Malc 0 lIn , "The Soviet GeneraIs' View of China in the 1960's", Sino-Soviet Military Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff, New York, 1966.

Mandel, William, "Outer Mongolia's Five-Year Plan", Far Eastern Survey, vol. XVIII, (July 15, 1949r:-

Mansvetov, Fedor S., "Tsarist and Soviet Policy in the Far East", Foreigp. Affairs, vol. XII, (July 1934).

_____ , "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia", Foreign A~fairs, vol. XXIV, (October 1945).

Miksche, O. Ferdinand, "Sino-Soviet War in 19xx?", Sino­Soviet Military Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff, New York, 1966.

"Mongolia the Free", The Economist, vol, CCVI, (January 5, 1963).

Montagu, Hon. Ivor, liA Recent Visit to IvIongolia", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLVI, (1957).

l'iJ.urphy, George G. S., "Planning in the Thlongolian People' s Republic", The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XVIII, (February 1959).

102.

_____ , "On Satelliteship", Journal of Economie History, vol. XXI, (1961)

Nemzer, Louis, "The Status of Outer Mongolia in Inter­national Law", American Journal of International Law, vol. XXXIII, (1939).

North, Robert C., "The Sino-Soviet Alliance", China Quarterly, no~, 1, ( 1960) •

Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXIV-LXXX, New York, 1949-1965.

Poppe, Nicholas N., Review of Ma Ho-tien, Chinese Agent in Mongolia, transe John De Francis, and Friters, Gerardflî., Outer Mongolia and Its International' Position, The Yale Review, vol. XXXIX, (1949-1950).

, Review of The Mongolian People's .tî.epublic, A ---------Collection of Articles, ed. I. Y. Zlatkin,

Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. XVII, (1954).

Pringsheim, Klaus H., "New Dimensions in China's Foreign Policy", China Quarterly, no. 4, (1960).

Rupen, Robert A., nHotes on Outer Mongolia since 1945", Pacifie Affairs, vol. XXVIII, (March 1955).

______ , "Oute:r Mongolia since 1955", Pacifie Affairs, vol. XXX, (December 1957)a

, "Outer Mongolia 1957-1960", Pacifie Affairs, ---------vol. XXXIII, (June 1960).

______ , "Russo-Chinese Rivalry in Outer Mon~olia", Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. XXXIX, tAugust 1, 1960).

_______ , "Recent Trends in the Mongolian People's Republic", Asian Surv~, vol. IV, (April 1964).

______ , "The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino­Soviet Competition", Communist Strategy in Asia, ed. A. Doak Barnett, New York, 1963.

_______ .' "Inside Outer Mongolia", Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXVII, (January 1959).

_______ , "Mongolian Nationalism", Parts 1 and 2, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLV, (1958).

, "Russo-Ivlongol-Chinese Conference"~ Journal of ------Asian Studies, vol. XVII, (May 1958).

103.

__________ ~, "First International Congress of Mongolian Philologists", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIX, (February 1960).

__________ " Review of Lattimore, Owen, Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXII, (February 1963).

_______ , "How the M.P.R. is Really Ruled" , China News Analysis, no. 516, (May 15, 1.964).

_______ , "Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet Dispute", China Quarterly, no.o XVI, (1963).

Salisbury, Harrison E., "~'1ongolia Revisi ted", The Mongolia Society Newsletter, vol. l, no. 2, (1962).

Schwartz, Benjamin, "Sino-Soviet Relations - A Question of Authority" , Annals of the American Academ,y of Political and Social Science, vol. CCCXLIX, (September 1963).

, Soviet Military Review, Moscow, 1965-1966.

"Soviet Political Strategy in ASia", The \Vorld TOday, vol. XII, (1956).

Soviet Studies, vol. I-XVI, Oxford, 1949-1965.

Strausz"!'"Hupé, Robert, "Ivlanchuria and Mongolia: Red and White Imperialism", Current History, vol. XIX, (August 1950).

Sun, E-tu Zen, "The Pattern of Railway Development in China", The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. XIV, (February 1955).

The Mongolian Society Newsletter, New York, 1962-1964.

The Mongo:Lia Society Bulletin, Bloomington, Indiana, 1965-1967.

The Mongolia Society Occasional pa~ers, ed. John R. Krueger, Bloomington, Indiana, 19 4-1965.

"The Periphery of China", The New Statesman, vol. XV, (April 26, 1958).

Thornton, Thomas Perry, "Foreign Relations of Ghe Asian Communist Satellites", Pacific Affairs, vol. XXXV, (Winter 1962).

Tsedenbal, Yumzhagiin, "From Feudalism the Socialism", World Marxist Review, vol. IV, (March 1961).

104.

_____ , "Economie Cooperation of the Socialist Countries -A Vital Necessity", World Marxist Review, vol. VII, (September 1964).

United Nations Review, vol. VIII, (November 1961).

Vernadsky, George, "Russian Interests in Mongolia and Manchuria", Proceedings of the Institute of International Relations, vol. VI, (1930).

vVelch, Holmes, "An Interview wi th the Hambo Lama", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLIX, (1962).

Whi ting, Allen S., "SinkiF.l..ng and Sino-Soviet Relations", China Quarterly, no. 3, (1960).

Wiens, Herold J., IIGeographical Limitations to Food Pro­duction in the Mongolian People's Republic", Annals of the Association of American Geo ra hers, vo • XLI, December 1,951. •

Wint, Guy, "China and Asia" , China Quarterly, no. 1, (1960)~

Yin Lin, "Through the Gobi: A New International Railway", People's China, no. 4, (February 1956).

Zagoria, Donald S., U:M:odels" , Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. A. Doak Barnett, New York, 1963.