Molyneux- Molization w:o Emancipaiton

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Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution inNicaraguaAuthor(s): Maxine MolyneuxSource: Feminist Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 227-254Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc.

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MOBILIZATIONWITHOUTEMANCIPATION?WOMEN'SINTERESTS,THE STATE,AND REVOLUTIONIN NICARAGUA

MAXINEMOLYNEUX

The fall of the Nicaraguan ictator,AnastasioSomoza,nJuly1979could not have been achievedwithout the mass urban insurrec-tions which broughtthe capital, Managua,and other key citiesunder the increasingcontrolof the revolutionaryorces. This wasthe culmination of a process of growing popular oppositioncharacterizedby the incorporation f a wide cross-sectionof thepopulation nto politicalactivity.Largenumbers of women from all social classes joined theyouth and the unwaged poor men who entered the realm ofpoliticsin the 1970s,many for the first time. Women'sparticipa-tion in the Nicaraguanrevolutionwas probably greater han inany other recent revolution with the exception of Vietnam.Womenmadeup approximately 0 percentof the FSLN's ombatforces,and at its peak in 1979, the women'sorganization f theFSLN, he Associationof WomenConfrontinghe NationalProb-lem, or AMPRONAC,had over 8,000 members.' Many more

womenwho were not involved n organized oliticsprovidedvitallogisticalandbackupsupport o the revolutionaryorces,andstillothersgave their supportsilentlyby refusingto denouncetheirrevolutionaryneighbors,or by hidinga fleeingcombatant.2The extent of women's participation n the struggleagainstSomozahas been regardedby manyauthorsas an obviousenoughresponseto the widespreadrepressionandbrutalityof the regimeon the one hand,andthe appealof the FSLN's isionand strategyon theother.3Thespecificways inwhich women becamepoliticalsubjects has not been subjected to rigorous analysis, partlybecause it seems obvious and partlybecause women'sextensiverevolutionaryactivism is seen as the effect of the universalizingFeministStudies 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985). ? by Feminist Studies, Inc.


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character f the opposition o Somoza. nthe wordsof one author,this process dissolved the specificityof politicalsubjectsin thegeneralized truggleagainst he dictatorship."utsimply,allwereunitedagainstthe dictatorship,and differencesof class,age, andgenderwere transcended. twas this unitythat accounted orthestrengthand ultimatesuccessof the oppositionmovement.However,much depends uponwhat is impliedby subjects"los-ing their specificity" nd goals being universalized.For the uni-versalization of the goals of revolutionary subjects does notnecessarilyentaila lossof theirspecific dentities,nd it is certainlydoubtfulwhetherthis canbe said to have happened n the case ofwomen. As faras women were concerned t would be difficult oargue that a loss of their gender identities occurred, exceptperhaps o a limitedextentamongthe front lineguerrillerosherea degreeof masculinization nd a blurringof genderdistinctionstookplace.'Rather,representationsf women acquirednew con-notations,ones thatpoliticizedhe socialroleswith which womenare conventionallyassociated,but did not dissolvethem.The participationof women in politicalactivitywas certainlypart of the wider process of popularmobilization,but it wasentered nto froma distinctive ocialposition o men,one cruciallyshaped by the sexual division of labor. Moreover,for differentclassesand groupsof women, the meaningof politicalparticipa-tion alsodiffered,whetherin the case of students,youngmiddle-class women, or the women in the barrios.6For many poorwomen, entry into political life began with the earthquakeof1972,when in the aftermath,he neighborhood ommitteeswereorganized o care for the victims,feed the dispossessed,and tendthe wounded. Theangerthatfollowed Somoza'smisappropriationof the relieffunds intensifiedas the brutalmethods used to con-tainoppositionescalated.Manyof these womenexperienced heirtransition rom reliefworkers to participantsn the struggleas anatural xtension,albeit n combative orm,of theirprotectiverolein the familyasprovidersandcruciallyas mothers.Thistransitionto "combativemotherhood" as assistedby thepropagandaffortsof the radicalclergy,the Sandinistas, ndby AMPRONAC,whichlinkedthese traditionaldentitiesto more generalstrategicobjec-tives, and celebratedwomen's role in the creationof a morejustandhumanitarianocial order.Therevolutionary ppropriationfthe symbol of motherhood has since been institutionalized in the


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FSLN'scanonizationof the "Mothers f Heroes and Martyrs,"support groupwhich remainsan active part of the Sandinistas'politicalbase.7However, if the revolutiondid not demand the dissolutionofwomen'sidentities,t did requirethe subordinationf theirspecificinterestso the broadergoals of overthrowingSomozaand estab-lishing a new social order. This raises an importantquestionwhich lies at the heartof debatesabout the relationshipbetweensocialistrevolutionand women'semancipation.For if women sur-rendertheir specific interestsin the universalstrugglefor a dif-ferentsociety,at whatpointare these interestsrehabilitated,egiti-mated, and respondedto by the revolutionary orces or by thenew socialiststate?Some feminist writingimplies that they areneveradequatelyreestablishedandthat this is why socialism'hasfailed to fulfill its promise to emancipatewomen. Such criticspointout that not only does gender nequalitystillpersist n thesestates,but also in some ways women could be consideredto beworse off than they were beforethe revolution.Far fromhavingbeen "emancipated"s the official rhetoric sometimes claims,women'swork load hasbeen increasedandthere has beenno sub-stantialredefinitionof the relationsbetween the sexes. To thetraditional olesof housewifeand motherhave been added thoseof full-timewage workerandpoliticalactivist,while theprovisionof childcareagenciesremainsinadequate.As one Sovietwomanrecentlysummed it up, "If his is emancipation, hen I'magainstit."1

Thenegative mageof socialiststatesin thisregards reinforcedbytheir ailure o establishanythingnearsexualparityntheorgansof politicalpower,andby the absenceof realpopulardemocracy.The conventionalexplanationsof these shortcomings-atleast inthe poorer states-in terms of resource scarcity, internationalpressure, underdevelopment,or the "weightof tradition,"aregreetedwith increasing kepticism.A feminist writerrecentlyex-pressedan emergingconsensuswhen she wrote:"ifa countrycaneliminatethe tsetse fly, it can get an equal numberof men andwomen on its politburo."10An even morenegativeview of the recordof socialiststatesseesthem as representingmerely another form of patriarchaldomi-nation. It suggests that the "revolutionaryquality"commonlyclaimedas the experienceof women and men freedomfighters n


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battle s replaced n thepostrevolutionaryeriodby the statusquoante with meninthepositionsof power.Asthe all-maleeadershipgrows increasinglyunconcerned about advancingwomen's in-terests,it appears hatwomen'ssacrifices n the struggle or a bet-ter societyhave gone unrewardedby those whom they helpedtobring o power.Women,like the workingclassin anotherconcep-tion, appearto have been "soldout"-only in this case, not by a"newbureaucratic ourgeoisie,"utby amorepervasiveand atthesame time analyticallyelusive entity,"thepatriarchy.""This articlefocuses on the Nicaraguanrevolutionand its pro-gress since the seizure of state power by the Sandinistasn July1979, in order to considerthe proposition hatwomen'sinterestsare not servedby socialistrevolutions.The articleexamines howwomen areaffectedby governmentpoliciesin the aftermathof asuccessful revolutionaryseizure of power in which they par-ticipatedon a mass scale.The firstpartof the discussionreviewssome of the theoreticalquestionsraisedby thisdebate,particular-ly the matterof "women'snterests."The secondsectiondescribes

and interpretshe policiesthatthe Sandinista tate hasadopted nrelationto women in order to determinehow women'sinterestsarerepresentedwithinthe Sandinistastate.'"Womenin Nicaraguahave certainlynot achievedfull equality, et alone emancipation.But the argumentset forth here takes issue with the view thatwomen'sinterestshave been deniedrepresentation r have beendeliberatelymarginalizedhrough he operationsof "patriarchy."'WOMEN'SINTERESTSTheconceptof women's nterests s central o feministevaluationsof socialistsocieties and indeed social policies in general.Mostfeministcritiquesof socialistregimesrest on an implicitorexplicitassumption hatthere is a given entity,women'sinterests,that isignoredoroverriddenby policymakers.However,the questionofthese interests s farmorecomplexthanis frequentlyassumed.Asthe problemsof deployingany theoryof interest n the analysisofpostrevolutionary situations are considerable, the followingdiscussion must be considered an attempt to open up debateratherthan to attainclosure.The political pertinenceof the issue of whether states,revolu-tionaryor otherwise,are successful in securingthe interestsof


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social groupsand classes is generallyconsideredto be twofold.First, t is supposed o enablepredictionoratleastpoliticalcalcula-tion abouta given government's apacity o maintain he supportof the groups t claimsto represent.Second, t is assumedthat thenatureof the state can be deduced fromthe interests t is seen tobe advancing.'4Thus the propositionthat a state is a "worker'sstate," capitaliststate,or even a "patriarchaltate" s commonlytested by investigatinghow a particularclass or grouphas faredunderthe government n question.However,when we try to deploy similarcriteria n the case ofwomen a number of problemsarise.If, forexample,we concludethatbecausethe Sandinistas eem to have done relatively ittletoremovethe meansby which gendersubordinations reproduced,thatwomen's interestshavenot been representedn the stateandhence women are likely to turn against it, we are making anumberof assumptions:hatgender nterestsarethe equivalentofwomen's interests, that gender is the principaldeterminantofwomen's nterests,and thatwomen'ssubjectivity, ealorpotential,

is structureduniquely throughgendereffects.It is, by extension,also supposedthat women have certaincommoninterestsby vir-tue of their gender, and that these interests are primary forwomen. It follows then that transclassunity amongwomen is tosome degree given by this commonalityof interests."5Although t is true thatat a certain evel of abstractionwomencan be said to have some interests n common,thereis no consen-sus over whatthese interestsare orhow theyare to be formulated.This is in part because there is no theoretically adequate anduniversallyapplicablecausalexplanationof women'ssubordina-tion from which a generalaccount of women'sinterests can bederived.Women'soppressions recognizedasbeingmulticausalnorigin and mediated through a variety of different structures,mechanisms,and levels whichmayvaryconsiderably crossspaceand time.There s therefore ontinuingdebateover theappropriatesite of feministstruggleand over whetherit is moreimportant ofocus attempts at change on objective or subjectiveelements,"men" r "structures";aws, institutions,or interpersonalpowerrelations-or all of them simultaneously.Because a generalcon-ception of interests (one which has political validity)must bederived from a theoryof how the subordination f a determinatesocialcategory s secured,it is difficultto see how it would over-


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come the two most salientandintractable eaturesof women'sop-pression its multicausalnature,and the extremevariabilityof itsformsof existenceacross classandnation.Thesefactorsvitiateat-temptsto speakwithout ualificationf a unitarycategory"women"with a set of alreadyconstituted nterestscommonto it. A theoryof intereststhat has an application o the debateabout women'scapacity o struggle or andbenefitfromsocialchangemustbeginby recognizingdifferenceratherthanby assuminghomogeneity.It is clearfromthe extensivefeministliteratureon women'sop-pressionthat a numberof differentconceptionsprevailof whatwomen's nterestsare,andthat these in turnrestimplicitlyor ex-plicitly,upondifferent heoriesof the causesof gender nequality.Forthe purposeof clarifying he issues discussedhere,threecon-ceptionsof women's nterests,which arefrequentlyconflated,willbe delineated. These are women'sinterests,strategicgender in-terests,and practicalgenderinterests.Women's nterests.Although present in much political andtheoreticaldiscourse,the conceptof women's interests s, for thereasonsgiven earlier,a highly contentiousone. Becausewomenarepositionedwithintheirsocietiesthrougha varietyof differentmeans-among them, class, ethnicity,and gender-the intereststhey have as a groupare similarlyshapedin complexand some-timesconflictingways. It is thereforedifficult, f not impossible, ogeneralizeabout the interests of women. Instead,we need tospecify how the variouscategoriesof women mightbe affecteddifferently,and act differentlyon accountof the particularitiesftheir socialpositioningandtheirchosen identities.However,thisis not to deny that women may have certaingeneral nterests ncommon. These can be called gender interests to differentiatethem from the false homogeneity imposed by the notion ofwomen'sinterests.

Strategicgenderinterests.Gender interests are those that women(ormen, for thatmatter)maydevelop byvirtueof theirsocialposi-tioningthrough genderattributes.Genderinterests can be eitherstrategicor practical,each being derivedin a differentway andeach involving differingimplicationsfor women's subjectivity.Strategicnterestsarederived n the first nstancedeductively, hatis, from the analysisof women'ssubordination nd from the for-mulationof an alternative,moresatisfactory et of arrangementsto thosewhich exist.Theseethicaland theoreticalcriteriaassistin


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the formulationof strategicobjectives o overcomewomen'ssub-ordination, uchas the abolitionof the sexualdivisionof labor, healleviation of the burden of domestic labor and childcare,theremoval of institutionalized orms of discrimination, he attain-ment of politicalequality,the establishmentof freedomof choiceoverchildbearing, nd the adoptionof adequatemeasuresagainstmale violence and control over women. These constitutewhatmightbe called strategicgenderinterests,and they are the onesmost frequentlyconsideredby feministsto be women's "real"n-terests. The demandsthatare formulatedon this basisareusuallytermed"feminist"s is the level of consciousnessrequired o strug-gle effectivelyforthem.'6Practical ender nterests.Practicalgenderinterestsare given in-ductivelyandarisefrom the concreteconditionsof women'sposi-tioningwithinthe genderdivisionof labor.In contrast o strategicgender interests,these are formulatedby the women who arethemselveswithinthesepositionsrather hanthroughexternal n-terventions. Practical nterests are usually a responseto an im-mediateperceivedneed, andthey do notgenerallyentaila strate-gic goal such as women's emancipationor gender equality.Analysesof femalecollectiveactionfrequentlydeploythisconcep-tion of interests o explainthe dynamicandgoalsof women'spar-ticipation n social action. Forexample, t has been argued hatbyvirtue of their place within the sexual division of laboras thoseprimarilyresponsible or theirhousehold'sdailywelfare,womenhavea specialinterest n domesticprovisionandpublicwelfare."When governmentsfail to provide these basic needs, womenwithdraw their support;when the livelihoodof their families-especially heirchildren-is threatened,t is women who formthephalanxesof bread rioters, demonstrators,and petitioners.It isclear,however,from this examplethatgenderand classareclose-ly intertwined;t is, forobviousreasons,usuallypoorwomenwhoare so readilymobilizedby economicnecessity.Practicalnterests,therefore, cannot be assumed to be innocent of class effects.Moreover, hesepracticalnterestsdo not in themselveschallengethe prevailing orms of gendersubordination, ven thoughtheyarise directlyout of them. An understandingof this is vital inunderstandinghe capacityor failureof statesor organizationsowin the loyaltyand supportof women.Thepertinenceof theseways of conceptualizingnterests or an


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understanding f women'sconsciousness s a complexmatter,butthree initialpoints can be made. First,the relationshipbetweenwhat we have calledstrategicgender nterestsandwomen'srecog-nition of them anddesireto realize hem cannotbe assumed.Eventhe lowest common denominatorof interestswhich might seemuncontentious and of universalapplicability such as completeequalitywith men, control over reproduction,and greaterper-sonalautonomyand independence rommen)arenot readilyac-cepted by all women. This is not just because of "false con-sciousness" s is frequentlysupposed although this can be a fac-tor-but because such changes realizedin a piecemeal fashioncouldthreaten he short-termpracticalnterestsof some women,orentaila costinthe lossof formsof protectionwhich are not thencompensated or in some way. Thus the formulationof strategicinterestscan onlybe effective as a formof interventionwhen fullaccount s taken of thesepracticalnterests.Indeed,it is the politi-cization of these practical nterestsand their transformationntostrategicinterests that women can identify with and supportwhich constitutesa centralaspectof feministpoliticalpractice.Second,the way in which interestsare formulatedwhether bywomen or politicalorganizations-will vary considerablyacrossspaceandtime andmaybe shaped n differentways by prevailingpoliticaland discursiveinfluences. This is important o bear inmind when considering he problemof internationalismnd thelimits andpossibilitiesof cross-culturalolidarity.Finally,becausewomen'sinterestsare significantlybroader han genderinterests,andareshapedto a considerabledegreeby classfactors,women'sunityandcohesionon gender ssuescannotbe assumed.Althoughthey can form the basis of unity around a common pro-gram,such unity has to be constructed-it is never given. More-over, even when unity exists it is always conditional,and thehistorical record suggests that it tends to collapse under thepressureof acuteclassconflict.It is alsothreatenedby differencesof race,ethnicity,andnationality. t is thereforedifficultto argue,as some feminists have done, that genderissues are primary orwomen, at all times."Thisgeneralproblemof the conditionality f women'sunityandthe fact thatgender ssues are not necessarilyprimarys nowheremoreclearly llustrated han by the exampleof revolutionaryup-heaval. In such situations, gender issues are frequently displaced


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by classconflict,principallybecausealthoughwomen may sufferdiscrimination n the basisof genderandmaybe aware thattheydo, they nonetheless sufferdifferentiallyaccording o theirsocialclass. These differencescruciallyaffect attitudes toward revolu-tionarychange, especiallyif this is in the directionof socialism.This does not meanthat,becausegenderinterestsare an insuffi-cientbasisforunityamongwomenin the contextof classpolariza-tion, they disappear.Rather,they become more specificallyat-tachedto and definedby social class.An awarenessof the complex issues involved serves to guardagainstany simpletreatmentof the questionof whethera state isor is not actingin the interestsof women, that is, whetherall orany of these interestsarerepresentedwithin the state. Beforeanyanalysiscan be attempted t is necessaryto specifyin what sensethe term"interest"s being deployed.A statemay gainthe supportof women by satisfyingeithertheir immediatepracticaldemandsorcertainclassinterests,orboth.Itmaydothiswithoutadvancingtheir strategicobjectiveinterests at all. However, the claims ofsuch a stateto be supportingwomen'semancipationould not besubstantiatedmerelyon the evidencethatit maintainedwomen'ssupporton the basisof representing ome of their morepracticalorclass interests.With these distinctions n mind,I shallturnnowto the Nicaraguanrevolution,and consider how the Sandinistashave formulatedwomen'sinterests,and how women have faredunder their rule.

THE NICARAGUANREVOLUTIONThe Nicaraguanrevolutionrepresentsan extreme case of theproblemsof constructinga socialistsocietyin the face of povertyandunderdevelopment, ounterrevolution,nd external nterven-tion. It could therefore be seen as an exceptionalcase, and itsusefulness as an exampleconsequently imited.Yet althoughtheSandinistasace a particularlyevereconstellationof negativecir-cumstances, most socialist revolutions have encountered dif-ficultiesof a similarkindand even degree.One has only to thinkof the encirclement and internal disruptionby enemy forceswhich the Bolsheviks acedafter1917; he conditionsof direscar-city prevailing n postrevolutionaryMozambique,China,or SouthYemen; the blockade of poor nations such as Cuba;or the devasta-


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tion throughwar wreakedon Vietnamto realizethatsuch condi-tionsare morecommon thannot in the attempts o build socialistsocieties.Yet the fact that Nicaraguasharescertaincircumstanceswiththe statesreferred o above does not imply that it belongsto thecategoryof revolutions hat these countriesrepresent.Theywere,or became, for the most part avowedly communist in theirpoliticalideology, and anticapitalistn their economic practice,moving rapidly o placetheirmain resourcesunderstate control.Mosttoo, alignedthemselvesdirectlywith the Soviet Union or atleast maintained a distance from the North Atlantic TreatyOrganizationlock of countries n theirforeignaffairs.All of themare one-party tatesin which dissentis allowedlittle, if any, freeexpression.By contrast,the forces which overthrewAnastasioSomoza nJuly of 1979 distinguished hemselvesby theircommitmentto asocialismbased on the principlesof mixed economy, nonalign-ment, and political pluralism. An opposition was allowed tooperatewithin certainclearlydefined limits, and more than 60percentof the economyremained n privatehands,despitethe na-tionalizationof Somocista assets. "Sandinismo"romisedto pro-duce a different kind of socialism, one that consolidatedtherevolutionary verthrowof the old regimethrough he creationofa new armyand its controlof otherorgansof statepower,butwasmore democratic, ndependent,and "moderate"han many otherThirdWorld socialisms had been. Throughits triumphand itscommitment o socialistpluralism,Nicaraguabecamea symbolofhopeto socialists,not onlyin LatinAmerica,butaround he worldas well. It was thisperhaps,rather hanits "communism,"hatac-counted for the ferocity and determinationof the Reaganad-ministration'sffortsto bringthe processto an end.19The Nicaraguanrevolutionalso gave hope to those who sup-portedwomen's liberation, or here too, the Sandinistaswere fullof promise.The revolutionoccurredin the periodafter the up-surge of the "new feminism"of the late sixties, at a time whenLatin American women were mobilizingaround feminist de-mandsin countries ikeMexico,Peru,andBrazil.The Sandinistas'awareness of the limitationsof orthodoxMarxismencouragedsome to believe that a space would be allowedfor the develop-ment of new social movements such as feminism. Some members


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of the leadershipseemed aware of the importanceof women'sliberationand of the need for it in Nicaragua.The earlyissues ofSomosAMNLAE, ne of two newspapersof the women'sorganiza-tion, containedarticlesabout feminist issues and addressedsomeof the ongoingdebateswithin Western eminism.Unlikemanyofits counterparts lsewhere,the FSLN, he revolutionary arty,didnot denounce feminismas a "counterrevolutionaryiversion,"ndsome women officials had even gone on record expressingen-thusiasmfor its ideals.Inpractical ermstoo,there was promise.TheFSLNhad shownitselfcapableof mobilizingmanythousandsof women in supportof its struggle.It had done this partly throughAMPRONAC,hewomen'sorganizationhatcombineda commitment o overthrowthe Somozaregimewith that of strugglingor women'sequality.Atitspeakin 1979,two yearsafter t was founded,AMPRONAC adattractedover 8,000members. Feministobserversnoted the highlevel of participation f women in the ranksof the combat orces,epitomized n DoraMariaTellez'sroleas CommanderTwo in theseizureof the PresidentialPalaceby the guerillasn 1978,andtheydebated how the Sandinistacommitmentto women's equalitywould be realized f they triumphed.Once they were in power, these hopes were not disappointed.Only weeks after the triumph,article 30 of decree number 48banned the media'sexploitationof women as sex objects, andwomen FSLNcadres found themselvesin seniorpositionsin thenewly establishedstate as ministers,vice-ministers,and regionalcoordinators of the party. In September, AMPRONAC wastransformed into the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Association ofNicaraguanWomen(AMNLAE)o advancethe causeof women'semancipationand carry through the programof revolutionarytransformation. ublicmeetingswere adornedwith the slogan"Norevolution without women's emancipation: no emancipationwithoutrevolution." he scene seemed to be set for animaginativeand distinctivestrategy or women'semancipationn Nicaragua.Butafterthe first few yearsin power,the FSLN'smageabroad

beganto lose some of its distinctiveappeal.The combinedpres-sures of economicscarcity,counterrevolution,ndmilitary hreatwere takingtheir toll on the Sandinistaexperiment n economicand political pluralism,placingat risk the ideals it soughtto de-fend. In the face of mounting pressure from U.S.-backed counter-


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revolutionariesn 1982,a furthercasualtyof these difficultiesap-pearedto be the Sandinistacommitmentto the emancipationofwomen. AMNLAE,he women'sunion, reduced its public iden-tificationwith "feminism"nd spoke increasinglyof the need topromotewomen'sinterestsin the context of the wider struggle.Already,at its constitutiveassemblyat the end of 1981, it haddefined its role as enablingwomen to integrate hemselves as adecisiveforcein the revolution.AMNLAE'sirstprioritywasgivenas "defense f the revolution." utit was only in 1982,as the crisisdeepenedand the countrywent ontoa warfootingthat the priori-ty reallydidbecome(as t hadto)therevolution'survival,withalleffortsdirected o militarydefense.AMNLAEbecameactivelyin-volved in recruitingwomen to the armyand militia.Under suchcircumstances t is hardlysurprising hat the efforts to promotewomen'semancipationwere scaleddown or redefined.Emancipa-tion was to come aboutas a by-productof makingand defendingthe revolution.Yet, even before the crisis deepened, little hadbeen achieved to tangiblyimprovethe positionof women, andFSLNcadres considered hatprogress n this areawas necessarilylimited.Inthe firstmajor peechonwomen'sstatussincetheover-throw,the ministerof defense,Tomis Borge,acknowledged hatalthoughcertainimportantadvanceshad been made, "allof ushave to honestlyadmitthat we haven'tconfronted he struggle orwomen'sliberationwith the same courageand decisiveness [asshown in the liberation struggle]. . . . From the point of view ofdailyexertion,women remainfundamentallyn the same condi-tions as in the past."20Was it the case then thatwomen'sspecificinterests had not been adequately representedin Sandinistapolicies?

SANDINISTA POLICY WITH REGARD TO WOMENAs a socialistorganization,he FSLNrecognizedwomen'soppres-sion as somethingthat had to be eliminated n the creationof anew society. The FSLNgave supportto the principleof genderequalityas partof its endorsementof the socialist deal of socialequalityforall.The 1969programof the FSLNpromised hat"theSandinistapeople'srevolutionwill abolishthe odiousdiscrimina-tionthatwomen havebeen subjected o comparedwith men"and"willestablisheconomic,politicaland culturalequalitybetween


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women and men."This commitmentwas enshrineda decade aterwithin the EstatuoFundamental,he embryonicconstitution hatproclaimed"theunconditional qualityof allNicaraguanswithoutdistinctionof race, nationality,creed,or sex."It went further npledging the state to "removeby all means available. . .theobstaclesto achievingit."This providedthe juridicalcontextforfuturelegislativeandpolicy measures aimedat securingsome ofthe conditionsenablingthis equalityto be achieved.Mostcontemporarytateshave enshrinedwithin theirconstitu-tions, or equivalents,some phrasewhich opposesdiscriminationon the groundsof race, sex, or creed.Whatdistinguishes ocialiststates such as Nicaragua s their recognitionof the specificityofwomen'soppressionandtheirsupport ormeasures hatcombinea concernto promoteequalitywith a desireto remove some of theobstaclesto achieving t. Someof the strategicnterestsof womenare thereforerecognizedand, in theory,are advancedas partofthe processof socialist ransformation.n its essentials, he FSLN'stheoreticalandpracticalapproachowomen'semancipationbearssome resemblance o that found in those state socialistcountriesthat espouse Marxisttheory.They sharean approachthat linksgenderoppression o classoppressionandbelievewomen'seman-cipationcan only be achieved with the creationof a new, socialistsociety and with the further development of the productivecapacityof the economy. In the meantime, however, measurescan be takento alleviate he considerablenequalitiesbetweenthesexes and begin the task of '"humanizingife and improvingthequalityand contentof humanrelations.""21According o officialviews andpartydocuments,this involvesimplementing he principlesof the classic socialistguidelinesforthe emancipationof women as formulatedby the Bolsheviksandbroadlyadheredto ever since by socialiststates."Someof theseguidelineshave been incorporatednto AMNLAE's fficial pro-gramwhich lists its maingoalsas (1)defending he revolution; 2)promotingwomen'spoliticaland ideologicalawareness and ad-vancingtheir social,political,and economicparticipationn therevolution;3)combattingegaland other nstitutionalnequalities;(4)encouragingwomen'sculturalandtechnicaladvancementandentry into areas of employmenttraditionallyreservedfor men,combinedwithopposingdiscriminationn employment; 5) oster-ingrespect ordomestic aborandorganizinghildcare ervicesfor


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workingwomen;and (6)creatingand sustaining inks of interna-tionalsolidarity.The 1969programof the FSLNalsomadespecialmention of eliminatingprostitutionand other "social ices,"help-ingtheabandonedworkingmother,andprotectingheillegitimatechild.Eachof these issueshas been addressed n subsequent egis-lationand socialpolicy.There s alsoofficialconcern forallowinggreater reedomof choiceto women in the matterof childbearing,by makingcontraceptivesmore widely availableand by not pro-secutingthose who carryout abortions,exceptin a few cases.23Although these goals, if realized, would be insufficient toachievethe completeemancipationof women, basedas they areon a somewhatnarrowdefinitionof gender nterests, hey do em-body some strategicconcerns, in that they are directedtowardeliminatingsome of the fundamentalinequalitiesbetween thesexes. However,progress n Nicaraguahas so far been uneven.There is officialsupportfor the implementationof the full pro-gram,but only some of the guidelineshave been translated ntopolicy and then only with limited effect. Employmentoppor-tunitiesin the formal sector have been slightly expandedbut re-main restrictedboth in number and scope. Most Nicaraguanwomen continue to eke out a living as petty commodity pro-ducers,small tradersor house servants,remainingat the bottomof the income structure.24"The socializationof childcare anddomestic labor has affected only a minority of women: bymid-1984, forty-three childcare centers were able to absorbaround4,000 children,and furtherexpansionwas not envisagedbecause of mountingfinancialdifficulties,caused by the contrawar.25 The embryonicFamilyLaw, the Ley de Alimentos,passedby the Council of Stateat the end of 1982, aimed to establishamore democratic,egalitarian,and mutually responsiblefamily,but it was not ratifiedby the Junta,and publicdiscussionof theissues it raisedall but ceased in 1983. The greatestbenefitsthatwomen received were fromthe welfareprogramsand from cer-tainareasof legalreform.Women alsofelt the impactof change nthe realmofpoliticalmobilizationnwhichthey playedanincreas-

ingly activepart. Despitethese advancesit was evident that thegapbetween intentionand realizationwas considerable.Beyondthe obvious problemof lack of time, there are threeotherconsiderations o be examined.The first concernsthe prac-tical limitations, which restricted the state's capacity for social


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transformation,he second involves factors of a generalpoliticalkind,andthe third concernsthe natureof the policiesthemselvesand the way in which the Sandinistas' ommitment to women'semancipationwas formulated.Alltheseissueshave tobe taken n-to account when assessingthe positionof women in postrevolu-tionaryNicaragua, or they help to explain why the socialpolicyinitiativesof the Sandinistas o improvethe position of womenhave been diluted, and why the governmenthas on occasionadopted different priorities- sometimes ones which are atvariance with the goalof emancipatingwomen.The problems of material scarcity in an underdevelopedeconomy, or the tolls of militarythreat do not requireextensivediscussionhere. Details can be found elsewhere of the parlousstateof the Nicaraguaneconomy,the ravagesof war and naturaldisasters, he effect of thecontras ndU.S.pressure,and the sizeofthe external debt. What is most strikingin all of this was thegovernment'success in shieldingthe population rom the effectsof these difficulties hroughout1982 and much of 1983.However,the combinedeffects of materialscarcityand the destabilizationefforts of internal and external forces limited the availableresources,which had to satisfythe militaryrequirementsof thestate,but also were crucialforinvestmentin long-termeconomicprograms,meetingshort-termconsumerneeds and fulfillingthepopularexpectation o expandsocialservices.It is not difficulttosee how these factorsreduced the scope of planningobjectives,channelingscarceresourcesof botha financialandtechnicalkind,as well as human potentialaway from social programs nto na-tional defense and economic development.By 1984 more thanone-thirdof the nationalbudgetwas beingchanneled ntodefense.These two factors,scarcityand threat,explainthe restrictionsplacedon the fundingavailable or such projectsas buildingandstaffingnurseriesandexpanding emaleemployment,andthey gosome way towardexplainingwhy the emancipation f women, ex-cept within a rathernarrowinterpretation,was not consideredapriority.

Even where the resource base existed, the government stillfaced problems of implementationin the form of political op-position to some of the proposed reforms. The Nicaraguanrevolution is a clear illustrationof the truism that the acquisi-tion of state power does not confer on governments absolute


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power either in formulation or implementationof policies evenwhen they might have widespreadpopularsupport. The over-throw of SalvadorAllende in 1973 was a dramatic demonstra-tion of the ever-presentthreat of counterrevolutionand of thediversity of sites within the state and civil society throughwhich it can be organized.The Sandinistaswere in a strongerposition internally than the government of Popular Unity inChile even if they faced a more determined threat from theUnited States and its allies in the region. They dismantledSomoza's repressive apparatus, replacing it with their ownmilitary and police forces, and established control over anumber of state and governmentinstitutions. In the five yearssince the fall of Somoza,the revolutionarygovernmenthas alsosucceeded in consolidating ts power basethroughthe establish-ment of the "massorganizations,"he populardefense commit-tees, the militia, and the FSLN itself. Moreover, the opposi-tion -both civilian and military -was unable to offer a crediblealternative,in partbecause of its links to the United Statesandto the Somocistas.Despite the strategicand political advantageswhich accruedto the Sandinistasas a result of these transformationsof thestate and of its institutions,they did not include the eliminationof the opposition. The constitutionalcommitment to the prin-ciples of economic and political pluralism allowed a space,albeit a restricted one, from which oppositional forces couldoperate.The FSLNattemptedto maintain,as far as the situationpermitted, a broad multiclass base of support. It tried to winover a sector of the capitalist class, and on the whole it alsosoughtto maintaina conciliatoryattitudetowardits opponents,sometimes in the face of considerableprovocation.The opposi-tion thereforehad the rightto make its views heard and couldorganizeto protect its interests, providingthese did not jeopar-dize the government'soverall survival or place the interests ofthe majorityat risk. When these were considered threatened,the Sandinistas ntervened.The Stateof Emergency,declaredin1982, allowed the state to curb some of the opposition'sac-tivities and imposed censorship on the main oppositionpaper,La Prensa. By international standards, these moves weremoderate ones, especially given the conditions of war whichhave increasingly prevailed since 1983.26 Moreover, the govern-


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ment liftedthe State of Emergencyto allow for the preparationsof the late-1984elections, and the oppositionwas encouraged ocontest them.The commitmentto allow dissent and oppositionpartiesandpress representsan importantprincipleof socialistdemocracy.Toomanysocialistcountrieshave interpreted ocialismas merelythe socialization f the economyandhavefailed to implement heother sideof the equation the democratizationf politicalpower.In this, the Sandinistas t least tried harder han most. However,as with most attemptsat compromise, here was a price; he com-mitmentto "pluralism"nd to maintaininghe supportor at leastneutralityof the capitalistclass hadas one of its necessaryeffectsthe impositionof certain imitson the transformativeapacityofthe state in some areasof policy. This was especiallyclearwithregardto the government'sprogram o improvethe position ofwomen.The maintenanceof a sizableprivatesector (78 percent of in-dustry,60percentof commerce,76percentof agriculture)nd thegrantingof a measureof autonomyto it allowedsomeemployers,especially in the smaller nonunionized enterprises, to evadelegislationdesigned oprotectandimprovetheworkingconditionsof women, as well as to pursue discriminatoryemploymentpolicies.Therearemanyotherexamplesof thiskind. But the mostpowerful ideological orce and that which offered the most sus-tainedresistance o Sandinista eformswas the conservativewingof the Catholicchurch.Its extensiveinstitutionalpresence,formsof organization, ccess to the media (ithad its own radiostation),andbasewithinasubstantialectionof thepopulationmade ta for-midable opponent. Its impact on slowing reform in the areasdirectlyconcernedwith women, was considerable.Conservativeclergy actively opposededucationalandfamilyreforms,enforcedbans on weekend work (which made it difficult for voluntarylabor schemes to achieve much), opposed the conscriptionofwomen, and were strongadvocatesof traditional amilylife andthe division of labor which characterizest.27The conservativechurchalso opposeddivorcereform and urgedadherenceto thepapal encyclical stating that it is sinful to employ "unnatural"methods of birth control. It has also opposedthe legalizationofabortion, orcingthousandsof women to remainin the hands ofback streetpractitioners."


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What was thereforea positivefeatureof the Sandinista evolu-tion -its democraticcommitment-did have the effect of dilutingpolicymeasuresandweakening he government's apacity orim-plementation. It is therefore erroneous to imagine that justbecausea statemighthavea coherentset ofpoliciesanda unifyingideology that is has the capacityto be fully effective in socialpolicy terms. It should be clear that the most favoredsolutionhistoricallys a problematic ne to saythe least: he subjugation fthe oppositionand the strengthening f the state.A second politicalfactorof a very differentkind, but equallycrucial to the success or failure of governmentpolicies is that ofthe population's egreeof support or orresistance o the policies.Asfaraschanges n thepositionofwomenareconcerned, he San-dinistaswere limitedin what they could do both by the conser-vativeinfluenceof the Catholicchurchandby the relatively mallsocial base of supportfor feminism. Therewas no historyof apopularand militantfeminismin Nicaragua(asthere was for atime in Argentina,for example),with the result that the San-dinistashad to contendwith deeplyentrenchedmachista ttitudesand considerablehostility amongmuch of the population o theidea of women'semancipation.Nevertheless, he revolutionarywarprovided he initialcontextforthe weakeningof the traditional tereotypesand conventions,and itwas on this basis that the Sandinistas eganto buildpopularsupport orAMNLAE'sampaigns.Thesetended to be successfulwhen sufficient imeandenergywas devotedto explaininghe ob-jectivesandlearning romthe women'sresponses-thatis, creatingandreproducing n organic inkbetweenthe organization nd thepeople it was representing,a process which amountedto syn-thesizingthe practicaland strategicaspectsof women'sinterests.Yet, as we shall see shortly, the campaignssuffered from anumberof limitations, ncludingthe fact thatthey were directedmostly at women and did not seek to make radicalchanges inmen'sattitudesand behavior.Asthepressureof the warmounted,AMNIAEabandoned he more feminist themes in the belief thatthey would alienatepopular support.How far this was a risk,however, could not be establishedin the absence of extensiveresearch nto both attitudesand concreteconditionsto establishthe likely effectsof the proposedreforms.Only in this context is it relevant to discuss the third factor


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that accounts for the limited achievements of the Sandinistarecord on women -that of their conception of the place ofwomen's emancipation within the overall context of theirpriorities.It is clear that the FSLNwas able to implementonlythose partsof the program orwomen'semancipationthat coin-cided with its generalgoals, enjoyedpopular support,and wererealizablewithout arousingstrong opposition.Thepolicies fromwhich women derived some benefit were pursued principallybecause they fulfilled some wider goal or goals, whether thesewere social welfare, development, social equality, or politicalmobilization n defense of the revolution.Thisis, in effect, whatthe Sandinistasmeantby the need to locatewomen'semancipa-tion within the overall strugglefor social reform and survivalagainst intensifying externalpressure.This kind of qualified support for women's emancipationisfound in most of the states that have pursuedsocialistdevelop-ment policies. Indeed,the guidelinesthatformthe basis of theirprogramfor women's emancipation (discussedearlier)all haveuniversalistic as well as particularisticgoals, in which theformer is the justification for the latter.Thus, women's eman-cipation is not just dependent on the realizationof the widergoals, but it is pursuedinsofaras it contributeso the realizationof those goals.There is therefore a unity of purposebetween thegoals of women's emancipation and the developmental andsocial goals of revolutionarystates.29Revolutionarygovernments tend to see the importance ofreforming he positionof women in the firstperiodof social andeconomic transformation n terms of helping to accomplish atleast threegoals:to extend the base of the government'spoliticalsupport,to increase the size or qualityof the active laborforce,and to help harness the family more securely to the process ofsocial reproduction.The firstaim, of expandingor maintainingthe power base of the state, is pursued by attemptingto drawwomen into the new political organizations such as thewomen's,youth, and laborunions;the party;and neighborhoodassociations. There is a frequently expressed fear that unlesswomen arepoliticizedthey may not cooperatewith the processof social transformation.Women are seen as potentiallyandac-tually more conservative than men by virtue of their placewithin the social division of labor, that is, as primarilylocated


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outside the sphere of production.More positively, women arealso regardedas crucial agents of revolutionary change whoseradicalizationchallengesancient customs and privilegeswithinthe family, and has importanteffects on the next generation,throughthe impacton theirchildren.The politicalmobilizationof women supposes some attemptto persuadethem that theirinterests as well as more universal concerns (national,humanitarian,and so forth)are representedby the state.3"The second way in which the mobilizationof women is re-gardedas a necessarypartof the overallstrategy s moredirectlyrelevant o the economy.Theeducationof womenandtheirentryinto employment ncreasesand improvesthe available aborsup-ply, which is a necessaryconcomitantof any successfuldevelop-ment program.In most underdevelopedcountries,women formonly a small percentageof the economicallyactive population(usuallyless than 20 percent),and althoughthe figurestend toconceal the real extent of women's involvement,by registeringmainlyformalrather han informalactivities, he workthey do isfrequentlyunpaidand underproductive, onfined to family con-cernsin workshopsorin the fields,andsubject o the authorityofmale kin. Governmentpolicies have thereforeemphasizedtheneed for both education and a restructuring f employmenttomakebetteruse of the work capacitiesof the femalepopulation.The thirdaimis to bring he familymoreintoline withplanningobjectivesandto placeit at the centerof initiativesaimed at socialreconstruction.Postrevolutionaryovernmentsregardwomen askey levers in harnessing he familymore securelyto stategoals,whether these be of an economic or an ideologicalkind.Thepre-revolutionaryamilyhas to be restructuredo makeit more com-patible with the developmental goals of revolutionarygovern-ments. Once this has been accomplished, he reformed amily isexpected to function as an importantagent of socialization, n-culcatingthe new revolutionary alues into the next generation.Women are seen as crucial n both of these processes.Although these considerationsare shared by most socialiststates,the peculiarcircumstancesof Nicaragua'sransitionhavedeterminedhe relativeemphasisplacedon thesepolicyobjectivesand have shapedthe state'scapacityto implementthem. Forex-ample, in Nicaraguahereis no absoluteshortageof labor,nor isproductionbeing greatly expanded.Thereis as yet thereforeno


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urgentrequirementorwomento enteremploymentdespitesomeexpansionin state sector demand. Initially,women were calleduponto supplya considerable mountof voluntary aboras healthworkersand teachersin the popularcampaigns(healthin 1981,literacy n 1982).Buttherewas no strongmaterialncentiveto pro-vide widespreadnurserycarewhile the economydid not dependupon a mass influx of female labor. Moreover,because mostwomen worked in the informalsectorit was assumed that a sub-stantial percentage of these jobs were compatiblewith theirdomestic responsibilities.This situation might be expected tochange if there is a significantescalationof militaryactivities,necessitatinghe entryof women intojobsvacatedby men servingin the armedforces.3'As noted earlier,the emphasisof the governmentwas on twootherstrategies,hatof politicalmobilization ndlegalreform.Thenew lawsregardinghe familywere designedto strengthenhe in-stitution,promotegreater amilycohesion,andremove thegenderinequalities that prevailed. The high rate of male desertion,migrancy,andserialpolygamy eftlargenumbersof womenasthesole providers ortheir children:34 percentof Nicaraguanhouse-holds were female headed -in Managua, it was 60 percent -a fac-tor which contributeddirectly to the high incidence of femalepoverty."The new ProvisionLawmadealladultmembersof thefamily, on a three-generation asis, legallyliable for maintainingthe family unit which includedtakinga sharein the householdtasks. In additionto these changes,the health and safety provi-sions of women workerswere improved,and new legislationgaveruralwomenworkersanentitlement o theirown wagesto redressa situation n which a family wage was usuallypaidto the malehead of the household."33As faras the politicalmobilization f women was concerned,by1984thereweremore womenmobilized han atanytime since themonths leadingup to the overthrow.AMNLAEclaimeda card-carryingmembershipof 85,000,and women made up 22 percentof FSLN'smembershipandmorethanone-third,or 37 percent,ofthe leadership." Women's participation in the other massorganizations nd in the organsof populardefensealsoexpandedwith the deepeningof the crisis. Approximately ne-halfof themembersof the Sandinistadefense committees,a type of neigh-borhoodassociation,were women,andwomen madeup a similarproportionof the militia.


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Thesethen,were the areas n which the greatestadvanceswereregistered n relationto achieving policy objectiveswhich con-cerned women as such. Yet more women benefited, and havebenefitedmore,from the implementation f measuresdesigned osecuregeneralobjectives.Chiefamongthese was welfare.A detailedanalysisof the impactof Sandinista ocialpoliciesisbeyondthe scopeof thispaper."Instead,I will brieflysummarizesome of the relevantconclusionsby considering he effectsof thereformsin terms of the three categoriesof interest referredtoearlier.If we disaggregatewomen's nterestsand considerhow differentcategoriesof women fared since 1979,it is clear thatthe majorityof women in Nicaraguawere positivelyaffectedby the govern-ment'sredistribution olicies.Thisis so even thoughfundamentalstructuresof genderinequalitywere not dismantled.In keepingwith the socialist characterof the government,policies weretargetedin favor of the poorest sections of the populationandfocusedon basicneeds provision n the areasof health,housing,education,and food subsidies.Inthe shortspanof onlyfiveyears,the Sandinistas educedthe illiteracyratefromover 50 percentto13percent;doubledthe numberof educational stablishments,n-creased school enrollment, eradicated a number of mortaldiseases,providedthe populationwith basic healthcareservices,and achieved morein theirhousing program han Somozahad inhis entireperiodof rule.36 n addition,the land reform canceledpeasants'debts and gave thousandsof ruralworkerstheir ownparcelsof landor securedthem stable obs on the statefarmsandcooperatives."3Thesepolicieshave been of vitalimportancen gaining he sup-portof poorwomen. According o governmentstatistics,womenform more than 60 percent of the poorest Nicaraguans;n thepoorest category n Managua incomesof less than 600 cordobasper month),there are 354 women for each 100men.8 It is thesewomen,by virtue of their classposition,who havebeenthe directbeneficiaries f Sandinista edistributivefforts,as havetheir malecounterparts.Of coursenot allwomen were to benefitfromtheseprograms;women whose economic nterests ayin areasadverselyaffectedby Sandinistaeconomicpolicies (imports, uxurygoods,and so forth) have suffered some financial loss, as have mostwomenfrom the privilegedclasses as a resultof higher axation. t


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is alsothe casethat while poorwomen benefitedfrom the welfareprovisions, hey were also the mostvulnerable o the pressuresofeconomic constraintsand especiallyto shortages n basic provi-sions.39In terms of practicalgenderinterests,these redistributivepoli-cies have alsohadgenderas well as class effects.Byvirtueof theirplace within the sexual divisionof labor,women are dispropor-tionatelyresponsible orchildcareandfamilyhealth,andthey areparticularlyconcerned with housing and food provision. Thepolicymeasuresdirectedat alleviating he situation n these areashas, not surprisingly, licited a positiveresponsefrom the womenaffectedby them as borne out by the availableresearch nto thepopularityof the government.Many of the campaignsmountedby AMNLAEhavebeen directedatresolvingsome of the practicalproblemswomen face, as is exemplifiedby its motherand childhealthcareprogram,or by its campaignaimed at encouragingwomen to conservedomesticresources o make the family ncomestretchfurther and thus avoid pressurebuilding up over wagedemands or shortages.'0A featureof this kind of campaign s itsrecognitionof women's practical nterests,but in acceptingthedivisionof laborandwomen's subordinationwithin it, it may en-tail a denial of theirstrategic nterests.With respect to strategicinterests, the acid test of whetherwomen'semancipations on the politicalagendaor not, the pro-gress which was made is modest but significant.Legalreform,especiallyin the area of the family, has confrontedthe issue ofrelationsbetween the sexesandof maleprivilege,by attemptingoend a situation n whichmostmenare able to evaderesponsibilityforthe welfareof theirfamilies,and becomeliablefor a contribu-tion paid in cash, inkind, or in the form of services. This alsoenabled the issue of domesticlabor o be politicized n the discus-sions of the needto sharethis workequallyamongallmembersofthe family.The LandReformencouragedwomen'sparticipationand leadership n cooperativesand gave women work for theirwagesandtitlesto land.Therehas alsobeen an effortto establishchildcareagenciessuch asnurseries,andpreschoolservices.Someattemptshave been made to challengefemalestereotypesnotjustby outlawing he exploitationof women in the media,but alsobypromotingsome women to positions of responsibilityand em-phasizing he importanceof women in the militiaand reservebat-


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talions.'1Andfinallytherehas been a sustainedeffortto mobilizewomen aroundtheir own needs through he women'sunion,andthere has been discussionof some of the questionsof strategicn-terest,although his has been sporadicand controversial.To sum up, it is difficult o discuss socialistrevolutions n termsof an undifferentiated onceptionof women's interests and evenmore difficult to conclude that these interests have not beenrepresentedin state policymaking.The Sandinistarecord onwomen is certainlyuneven,andit is as yet too earlyto make anycomprehensiveassessmentof it, especiallywhile it confronts n-creasingpolitical,economic,andmilitarypressures.Nonetheless,it is clearthatthe Sandinistashave gone further han most LatinAmericangovernments (except Cuba) in recognizingboth thestrategicandpracticalnterestsof women andhavebroughtaboutsubstantial mprovements n the lives of many of the most de-prived.When AMNLAE tates that its priority s defense of therevolutionbecause the latterprovides he necessaryconditions orrealizinga program or women'semancipation,t is, with certainqualifications, orrect.Yet these qualificationsare importantnonetheless,and have asignificancewhich goes beyond the Sandinista evolutionto thewider question of the relationship between socialism andfeminism.Three of these issues can be listed here in summaryform. The first is that what we have called strategicgenderin-terests-althoughrecognizedn the officialtheoryandprogramofwomen'semancipation- remains rathernarrowlydefined,basedas they are on the privilegingof economic criteria.Feministtheoriesof sexual oppression,or the critiqueof the familyor ofmalepowerhave had littleimpacton official hinking,and indeedare sometimessuppressedas beingtoo radicalandtoothreateningto popularsolidarity.42here is a need for greaterdiscussionanddebate aroundthese questionsbothamongthe peopleand withinthe organsof politicalpower, so thatthe issue of women'seman-cipationremainsalive andopen,and does not become entombedwithinofficial doctrine.

The secondissue concernsthe relationship stablishedby plan-ners between the goalof women'semancipationand othergoals,such as economicdevelopment,which have priority.It is not thelinkage tself that constitutesthe problem-principles like socialequalityand women'semancipationcan only be realizedwithin


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determinateconditionsof existence. So linkingthe programforwomen'semancipation o these wider goalsneed not necessarilybe a cause for concernbecausethese widergoals may constitutethe preconditionsfor realizingthe principles.The question israther, he natureof the link. Aregender nterestsarticulatedntoawiderstrategyof economicdevelopment forexample)oraretheyirretrievablyubordinatedo it? In the first case we would expectgender nterests o be recognizedas being specificandirreducible,andrequiring omethingmorefortheirrealizationhan is general-ly providedfor in the pursuitof the widergoals.Thus,when it isnot possibleto pursuea full program or women'semancipationthis can be explainedand debated.The goal can be left on theagenda,andeveryeffortmadeto pursue twithin the existingcon-straints. nthe lattercase,the specificityof gender nterests s like-ly to be deniedorits overall mportanceminimized.Theissues aretrivializedor buried;the program or women'semancipationre-mains one conceivedin termsof how functional t is forachievingthe wider goalsof the state.It is difficultto say how these issueswill be resolved n Nicaraguan the longrun.Forthe moment,theintensepressureswhich the Sandinistas reundermakeit difficultto resist the patternwhich has emergedelsewherein the socialistbloc of countries, hat of subordination ather han linkageor ar-ticulation.And this raises the thirdgeneral ssue, which is that of politicalguarantees.For if genderinterests are to be realizedonly withinthe contextof widerconsiderations,t is essential hat the politicalinstitutionschargedwith representing hese interestshave themeans to preventtheirbeing submergedaltogether, nd action onthembeingindefinitelypostponed.Women'sorganizations,he of-ficialrepresentatives f women's nterests,should not conformtoLenin'sconceptionof mass organizations s mere "transmissionbelts of theparty."Rather,heymustenjoya certain ndependenceand exercisepowerandinfluence overpartypolicy,albeit withincertainnecessaryconstraints. n otherwords,the issue of genderinterestsand theirmeansof representationannot be resolved nthe absence of a discussion of Socialistdemocracyandthe formsof stateappropriateo the transition o socialism; t is a questionthereforenotjustof what nterestsarerepresentedn thestate,butultimatelyand criticallyof howthey are represented.


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NOTES

This article is based on research carried out in Nicaragua with the help of the NuffieldFoundation. It is part of ongoing research into state policies, women, and the family inpostrevolutionary societies. Many thanks to the readers of an earlier version of this text,especially to Anthony Barnett, Ted Benton, Hermione Harris, and Azar Tabari. Ashorter version was published in Critical Social Policy (London), no. 10 (Summer 1984):59-75.1. The Association of Women Confronting the National Problem was founded in 1977to counter Somoza's excesses and promote gender equality. Its general secretary wasLea Guido, now minister of health. See AMNLAE, Documentos de al Asamblea deAMNLAE, Managua, 1981, for an account of AMPRONAC's history and its list of aims;and Margaret Randall, Sandino'sDaughters (London: Zed Press, 1982).2. For firsthand accounts of these activities see Randall; Jane Deighton, RossanaHorsley, Sarah Stewart, and Cathy Cain, Sweet Ramparts (London: War on Want/Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, 1983); and Susan Ramirez-Horton, "The Role ofWomen in the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Nicaragua in Revolution, ed. Thomas Walker(New York: Praeger, 1982).3. The women writers have been more interested in this question. See especiallyElisabeth Maier, Nicaragua, La Mujer en la Revolution (Mexico: Ediciones de CulturaPopular, 1980).4. Jose Luis Corraggio, "Posibilidades y limites de la politica en los procesos de tran-sici6n: el caso de Nicaragua" (Paper presented at the Amsterdam Latin American Centre[CEDLA]Conference on Nicaragua, 1983). The paper will be published in a forthcom-ing collection edited by David Slater, CEDLA.5. Margaret Randall, Inside the Nicaraguan Revolution (Vancouver: New Star Books,1978); and Sandino'sDaughters.6. This is usually translated as "poor neighborhoods."7. This organization is involved in various anti-imperialist and propeace campaigns andgives support to the bereaved and those anxious about daughters or sons in the battlezones.8. The term "socialist" s used here for the sake of brevity. In relation to most of thesestates, some qualification is required along the lines suggested by Rudolf Bahro ("actual-ly existing socialism"), for the reasons he advanced in his The Alternative in EasternEurope (London: NLB, 1979). Others have not reached the level of economic socializa-tion that qualifies them for inclusion in this category.9. See, for example, the attitudes of women to this in Carola Hansson and Karin Liden'sbook of interviews, Moscow Women (New York: Pantheon, 1983).10. Quoted in Catherine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: AnAgenda for Theory," Signs (Spring 1982). For critical discussions, from differing perspec-tives, of the record of socialist states, see Maria Markus, "Women and Work: Emancipa-tion at a Dead End,"in The Humanisation of Socialism, ed. A. Hegedus et al. (London:Alison & Busby, 1976); and Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).11. This position is a logical extrapolation of its premises, and is one frequently ex-pressed at meetings and discussions within the women's liberation movement.However, there does not exist, to my knowledge, any written theoretical elaboration of it.


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12. This discussion necessarily leaves out the specific situation of women inNicaragua's ethnic minorities. The Miskito Indian communities in particular requireseparate consideration because they have, and have had historically, a very differentrelationship to central government than that which is described here.13. Male power-whether institutionalized or interpersonal-and the essentialist ornaturalist arguments which legitimate it, do play a part in the explanation of women'scontinuing subordination after revolutionary upheavals; but the importance of suchfactors should not be exaggerated. There are differing definitions of patriarchy, butmost of them agree that patriarchy describes a power relation existing between thesexes, exercised by men over women and institutionalized within various social rela-tions and practices, including law, family, and education.14. There is a third usage of the term "interest" ound in Marxism which explains collec-tive action in terms of some intrinsic property of the actors and/or the relations withinwhich they are inscribed. Thus, class struggle is ultimately explained as an effect of therelations of production. This conception has been shown to rest on essentialist assump-tions and provides an inadequate account of social action. For a critique of this notion,see Edward Benton, Realism, Power, and ObjectivePhilosophy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982); and Barry Hindess, "Power, Interests, and the Outcome ofStruggles,"Sociology 16 (1982): 498-511.15. Zillah Eisenstein, editor of Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), has produced a sophisticated version of theargument that women constitute a "sexual class" and that for women, gender issues areprimary. See her "Women as a Sexual Class" (paper presented at "A Marx CentenaryConference," Winnipeg, Canada, 1983).16. It is precisely around these issues, which also have an ethical significance, that thetheoretical and political debate must focus. The list of strategic gender interests notedhere is not exhaustive, but is merely exemplary.17. See, for example, Temma Kaplan, "Female Consciousness and Collective Action:The Case of Barcelona, 1910-1918," Signs 7 (Spring 1982): 546-66; and Olwen Hufton,"Women in Revolution, 1789-1796," Past and Present, no. 53 (1971): 90-108.18. This is the position of some radical feminist groups in Europe.19. One of the best accounts of the Reagan administration's policy of destabilizing andattempting to overthrow the Sandinistas is Allan Nairn, "Endgame,"n NACLA 18 (May/June 1984): 19-55.20. Borge's speech was delivered on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of AMNLAE.It was published in the newspaper Barricada on 4 October 1982, and is available intranslation from Pathfinder Press, 1982.21. Ibid.22. These principles were laid down at the 1921 Comintern Congress and stressed sixmain goals: to encourage the entry of women into wage labor; to socialize domesticlabor and childcare; to provide juridical equality; to provide greater protection formothers and the family; and to promote the mobilization of women into political activi-ty and public administration.23. In the first three years, only one case had been tried and this was of an abortionistaccused of gross malpractice.24. Approximately 20 percent of economically active women are in agriculture, withsimilar percentages for personal services and marketing activities. Women account foronly 15.25 percent of the formal sector urban work force. See Deighton et al.25. Figures from the Oficina de Mujer, the office which coordinates the activities ofAMNLAE with the FSLN.


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26. Supporters of the White House view of Nicaragua as "totalitarian" orget that theWestern liberal democracies suspended certain civil liberties and normal democraticprocedures (including elections) during wartime.27. Substantial numbers of women were in favor of conscription and bitterly resentedthe council of state's decision in 1983 to exempt women. AMNLAE fought a popularcampaign to revoke the decision which resulted in women having the right tovolunteer.28. In 1981 one Managua hospital was admitting an average of twelve women a day asa result of illegal abortions. The main maternity hospital there records four to five ad-missions weekly of women following abortions. In press reports in 1982, the number ofabortions was said to be rising. Quoted in Deighton et al.29. For a fuller discussion of socialist policies with regard to women and the family, seemy "Women's Emancipation under Socialism: A Model for the Third World?' WorldDevelopment 9 (1981): 1019-37. Also published in Monthly Review 34 (July 1982): 56-100;and in Magdalena Leon, ed. Sociedad, Subordinaci6n y Feminismo (Colombia: ACEP,1982).30. This viewpoint has to be compared and contrasted with many nationalistmovements that call for the sacrifice of women's interests (and those of other oppressedgroups) in the interests of the nation.31. In agriculture this is already evident. In some of the regions most affected by thewar (Matagalpa, Jinotega), where male conscription is high, women had come to repre-sent as much as 40 percent of the work force by February 1984. (Interview with MagdaEnriquez, a member of AMNLAE's national directorate, March 1984.)32. Data are from figures supplied by the Oficina de la Mujer and the central planningagency MIPLAN.33. These provisions were contained in decrees 573 and 538.34. Data are from Oficina de la Mujer, 1984.35. For a fuller account of Sandinista social policies see Thomas Walker, ed., NicaraguaFive YearsOn (New York: Praeger, 1985), and for their policies on women, see my arti-cle "Women,"chap. 6 in the same volume.36. See Walker.37. For a discussion of the agrarian reform and its effects on women, see Carmen DianaDeere, "Co-operative Development and Women's Participation in Nicaragua's AgrarianReform,"AmericanJournal of Agrarian Economics (December 1983).38. Data are from the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, December 1981.39. Basic provisions were rationed and heavily subsidized until 1983 when it becameincreasingly difficult to peg prices due to mounting economic pressures.40. AMNLAE argued that the implications of women conserving resources under asocialist government were radically different from those under capitalism because inthe first case the beneficiaries were the people, and in the second, private interests.41. Although there are no women in the nine-member junta that constitutes the FSLNleadership, the vice-president of the council of state (until the elections of November1984) was a woman, and women assumed many key positions in the party at theregional level. On three occasions after 1979, women filled ministerial posts.42. This argument was put forward to quash the new Family Law in the council ofstate. See reports in the national press during November 1982.

Molyneux- Molization w:o Emancipaiton

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