Module 2: Shaping the Contemporary Discourse

Crossing Borders 22 April 2013

This article, published 42 years ago in ‘The Australian’ echoes uncomfortably

familiar. Only in 2009 did Australia squirm over Blackface, and before that,

over the 2005 Cronulla riots. Every few years, the debate resurfaces with a

fresh face, but with the same, tired, meaningless distress: “Are we racists?”

Module 2: Shaping the Contemporary Discourse

Exploring Key Aspects of Australia’s Immigration Policy through History

From the First Fleet to the Vietnam War

Index

The Legacy of the Howard Government

2

4

Rudd Government – A New Humanitarian Era? 8

Figure 1. Front page of ‘The Australian’, 29 October 1971.1 The Gillard Government: 2010 -‐ present 9

Action & Further Reading 12

2 Crossing Borders. Module 2: Shaping the Contemporary Discourse [29 Apr 2013] Hui Ling Yeoh & Nishani Nithianandan

By no means a comprehensive thesis, this module does not aim to explore

the nuances of ‘racism’, its historical permeation nor its contemporary

manifestations. Instead, it hopes to allow readers an entry into the

patterns of xenophobia that litter our history – their historical contexts

and how these pivotal periods have shaped and distorted our discourse

regarding refugees and asylum seekers.

***

From the First Fleet to the Vietnam War

Ethnically-‐targeted immigration restrictions to Australia begin as far back

as the days of the Gold Rush, officialised by the Influx of Chinese

Restriction Act 1881.3 It is a Bill that violates an international treaty

between the Government of Great Britain and Emporer of China and leads

to the founding of the Federation.3

One of its first laws include the Immigration Restriction Act 1901.4 A key

component of this act is a dictation test designed to prevent ‘non-‐whites’

from entering Australia as immigrants, sowing the seeds of the White

Australia Policy.4 For 72 years, Australia’s Immigration Policy fluctuated

between a strict adherence to this policy and a merely technical one, until

it is dropped by then Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974.5

However, post-‐World War II, Australia’s ambitious post-‐war reconstruction

program demanded a migration scheme to provide the needed labour

workforce.6 European countries were chosen to negotiate migration

schemes, in the hope that the physical similarities of European nationals

would allow an assimilation that would buffer public resistance against

increased immigration.6

Fig 2. “White Australia [m

usic]: March of the

Great W

hite policy. Nau

nton

, W.E. 191

02

AT A GLANCE

1881: The first ethinically targeted immigration restrictions to Australia date back to the Gold Rush.

1901: The founding of the Federation was characterised by the White Australia Policy.


1

The needs of the time lead to a historic decision by then Immigration

Minister Harold Holt to allow 800 non-‐Europeans war refugees to

remain in Australia in 1950.7 The grip of the “White Australia Policy”

was beginning to slacken.

However, it is the high profile case of Nancy Prasad in 1965 that

characterises the public hostility against the ‘White Australia Policy.’ A

day before the deportation of the 5-‐year-‐old Indian Fijian, a kidnap to

expose the injustices of such a policy was staged.8 She was

nevertheless deported the next day as a sign of government strength,

provoking public outrage.8 With the abolition of the White Australia

Policy in 1973, Nancy Prasad returned to Australia, beginning anti-‐

racism advocacy and remaining a very public, human face for the

cruelty of this draconian policy.8

Circa 1975, the Vietnam War precipitated the Whitlam government to

accept Vietnamese refugees into Australia.9 However, a lethargic

refugee application process compelled some Vietnamese to flee to

Australia by fishing boat, which led to popular coining of the term,

“boat people”.9

Fig 3. Front page of ‘The Australian’, 25 Nov 1977.9

Post World War II reconstruction demanded an increased workforce. Migration schemes were negotiated with European countries.

1965: The kidnap of 5-‐year-‐old Nancy Prasad to deter her deportation marks public hostility against the “White Australia Policy”.

1975: Effects of the Vietnam War and sluggish application process compel the first “boat people”.


2

A year out from the 20th anniversary of mandatory detention

The introduction of the compulsory detention of ‘unlawful non-‐citizens’ who

arrive in Australia without a visa saw Australia become a favourite in the race to

the bottom. Whilst successive governments have brought various policies to the

table, mandatory detention has been a cornerstone of our treatment of asylum

seekers and Australia boasts being the only Western country to detain

indefinitely asylum seekers who arrive without a visa.10,11 Given the all-‐too-‐

common picture of refugees languishing for several years with an uncertain

future, it seems almost inconceivable that detention was only ever intended to

‘allow for health, identity and security checks to be carried out so as to mitigate

any potential risks to the community’.10

The UN, Amnesty International, and other prominent refugee advocacy groups

have repeatedly condemned Australia’s costly and inhumane policy of

mandatory detention and its utter disregard for the ‘International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, which outlaws arbitrary detention and the denial of

access to legal review of incarceration; and the UN Convention on the Rights of

the Child, which prohibits detention of children except as a last resort’.12

Temporary Protection Visas: the brainchild of Pauline Hanson

It was in 1998 that Pauline Hanson (yes, she does feature in this dark saga of

Australia’s policies on asylum seekers. I imagine the former leader of the One

Nation party would be bristling with indignation if she wasn’t given due

mention) proposed Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs). The Minister for

Immigration, Phillip Ruddock, poured forth his scorn in a surprisingly empathetic

comment, ‘Can you imagine what temporary entry would mean for them? It

would mean that people would never know whether they were able to stay

here... I regard the One Nation’s approach as being highly unconscionable in a

way that most thinking people would clearly reject.’12

One can only imagine his embarrassment when a year later, he had the honour

of announcing the introduction of TPVs.

Hardly deviating from the norm of hard-‐line policy making, TPVs required

refugees to apply for further protection after a period of three years or return to

their country of origin (RCA), and denied them family reunion rights, right of

return if they travelled out of Australia, and limited access to settlement

services.12

SPOTLIGHT ON THE HOWARD YEARS

(1996-‐2007)

1992: Mandatory detention (limited at 273 days) is introduced by the Keating Labor government for non-‐citizens who arrive in Aus

1999: Phillip Ruddock announces the introduction of Temporary Protection Visas.

1994: The 273 day limit is removed.


Arrival of the Tampa & The Pacific Solution

It seems strange that the arrival of ‘the

Tampa’ portends the arrival of something as

sinister as ‘the Kraken,’ yet MV Tampa itself

was merely a Norwegian vessel which at

Australia’s request, went to the aid of the

Palapa 1, a fishing boat that had become

stranded two days earlier north of Christmas

Island.12 Over 400 asylum seekers were

rescued from this boat licensed to carry 50.

En route to Christmas Island, the Tampa was

refused permission to enter Australian

territorial waters and the captain threatened with prosecution should he proceed,

leading to a precipitous standoff that continued for several days at the expense of the

declining health of those aboard.13,14

On 29th August, growing concern for the ill charges prompted Captain Rinnan to defy

orders and entered Australian waters, at which point the Special Air Service was

dispatched to seize the boat and prevent entry.13 Eventually Howard announced that

that those aboard the Tampa would be processed in New Zealand or Nauru.15 The

Norwegian government and UN High Commissioner for Refugees were foremost

amongst the international critics.

A moment’s pause as we consider two important points beginning with the Howard

government’s attempt to veil the events of Tampa in secrecy. Senior counsel in the

Tampa litigation, Julian Burnside QC, asserts that the press were denied access to the

ship, as were Australian lawyers, whilst Captain Rinnan ‘allowed only minimal contact

with the outside world’.14 Consequently, no photos of individual refugees were to

emerge from the Tampa incident. The rationale for this was brutal in its simplicity:

suppress their stories and prevent the sympathy of the Australian public being

evoked.14 Testimonies from key players attest to this:

‘The government’s handling of the Tampa “crisis” was a triumph of electoral cynicism over humanitarian need…[and] has betrayed a deeply unattractive element in the Australian character.’

Julian Burnside

‘And we were told that there was to be nothing in the public forum which would humanise these people.’

Jenny McHenry, Head of Public Affairs from the Department of Defence16

‘I can't help but feel the Prime Minister, John Howard, viewed the SAS as

something that would resonate politically to the message of border security. You can't amp it up more in the public's mind than saying, 'We're going to send in the SAS. We'll show you how tough we are on border security.'’

Major Peter Tinley, Counter Terrorism Squad, SAS16

Aug 2001: Norwegian ship MV Tampa rescues 439 Afghan asylum seekers from international waters near Australia. MV Tampa is barred from entering Australian waters and a diplomatic standoff ensues.

3 Sep 2001: Australian Defence Force commences ‘Operation Relex’. Navy vessels are deployed to intercept other boats and instruct them to turn around rather than enter Australian waters.


In the immediate aftermath, the tactic of dehumanizing the Tampa refugees was

bearing fruit. Strong voter approval for the government’s handling of the Tampa

was recorded in opinion polls; the Tampa crisis appeared to have improved

Coalition election prospects.17 Come November, border protection – both the

Tampa incident and the ‘war on terrorism’ – would cost Labor the election.18

Robert Manne, Professor of Politics at Latrobe University, argued that ‘after

Tampa, John Howard realised that he could appeal directly to popular instinct and

bypass the kind of fussy moral arguments advanced by the educated, left-‐leaning

section of society…’19

Secondly, the aftermath of Tampa took the form of legislative changes, which

provided the framework for the Pacific Strategy or Pacific Solution:15

v Legislative change #1 excised certain offshore places under Australian

sovereign territory from the migration zone – and here the motive is

glaring – for ‘limiting the ability of offshore entry persons to make valid

visa applications.’15,20 Now that is a direct quote from the Migration

Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001. For all intents and

purposes, Christmas Island is Australian territory, bearing Advance

Australia Fair as its anthem. Yet, to land on Christmas Island earns you the

label of an ‘offshore entry person’ and with it, the inability to apply for

refugee status via the process availed by asylum seekers arriving on the

mainland.15

v Legislation #2 (Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone)

(Consequential Provisions) Act 2001) allowed an OEP to be removed to

another country for processing.15

What ensued was the Pacific Solution, which saw asylum seekers being

transferred (with the aid of the navy) to ‘small Pacific nations without little if any

prior experience in [refugee status determination].’15 The horrors & inhumane

conditions that asylum seekers were subject to at Nauru and Manus Island are

well documented. The economic cost too was damning; according to a report

commissioned by Oxfam and A Just Australia, processing asylum seekers on Pacific

islands was seven time more expensive than processing them on Australian

mainland.12 At the time however, John Howard’s resolve, ‘We will decide who

comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come,’ was

unflinching.12

1 Sep 2001: Pacific Strategy is implemented.


The ‘Children Overboard’ deception

SIEV-‐4 was to achieve notoriety as the boat from which – according to senior

ministers of the Howard Government – children were allegedly being flung

overboard. In a deliberate attempt to dehumanise refugees, photos were released

by the Howard government as proof of this; these photos were later revealed to

have been taken during the rescue of passengers from the sinking SIEV 4.12,13

The subsequent Senate Select Committee for an inquiry into a Certain Maritime

Incident uncovered that Peter Reith’s office had expressly forbidding taking

photographs that could ‘humanise or personalise’ asylum seekers.12 ‘Deliberate

deception motivated by political expedience,’ it asserted, contributed to the

invention and persistence of these unfounded allegations.12,23

***

Howard’s time in power was characterised by a callous, heavy handed smear

campaign against refugees. Why did his government felt such an approach was

necessary? One possible explanation is offered by Julian Burnside:14

‘…Plainly, the Government understood that (with an election due shortly) a show of

toughness against helpless refugees would be electorally popular amongst the

large number of Australians who had responded positively to aspects of Pauline

Hanson’s unattractive platform…’

Excerpt from the transcript of the interview between Virginia Trioli and Defence Minister, Peter Reith:21

TRIOLI: Mr Reith, there's nothing in this photo that indicates these people either jumped or were thrown?

REITH: No, well you are now questioning the veracity of what has been said.

Oct 2001: Howard government officials alleged that asylum seekers aboard SIEV 4 threw children overboard to secure passage to Australia.

19 Oct 2001: An estimated 353 drown when SIEV X sinks. ‘Many of the women and children who died were attempting to reunite with husbands and fathers in Australia who were on TPVs, and thus unable to sponsor the resettlement of their families.’ 12

The Senate passes three resolutions calling for an independent judicial inquiry into the extent of Australia’s knowledge and involvement in the sinking of SIEV X. This never occurred.12

In 2007, the newly elected Labor government was quick to abolish

temporary protection visas and to close detention centres in Nauru and

Papua New Guinea.24 Counting 14 occasions over the last decade when

the UNHCR criticised Australia’s immigration policy, the Rudd government

condemned the “Howard government’s punitive policies” as having

“brought great shame on Australia.”24 Indeed, then Minister for

Immigration and Citizenship, Chris Evans lambasted the Pacific Solution as

a “product of a government who demonised refugees for their own

domestic political purposes.”25 If only such tactics had ended along with

the Howard government.

Evans promised a reformation that would be more humane, and would

reflect “the compassion and tolerance of the Australian people.”24 Evans

explicitly rejected “the notion that dehumanising and punishing

unauthorised arrivals” as a long-‐term solution.24

Significant to the new government’s strategy was the closure of the

infamous Baxter and Woomera centres, while expanding and opening

facilities on Christmas Island.24 Importantly, the Rudd Government

retained boundaries of the excision zone and justified offshore processing

on Christmas Island as a “signal that the Australian Government

maintain[ed] a very strong anti-‐people-‐smuggling scene.”24

The lesson for the new Labor government was clear: that Australians

would no longer tolerate “punitive policies”24 and were demanding a more

humane solution. Yet fears of border security still loomed large and the

government needed to show that it would still be “characterised by

strong border security [and] firm deterrence.”24

The political and strategical shift was best marked by the government’s

response to the 2010 Christmas Island boat tragedy.

On 15 December 2010, 30 asylum seekers drowned when an Indonesian

wooden fishing boat crashed at Rocky Point on Christmas Island.26 Chris

Evans released the following statement:

“I think that terrible tragedy steeled our resolve to have a debate about measures to dissuade people getting on boats. We’d said it

was a dangerous way to come to Australia and I think that was the

starkest possible reminder...There is nothing humanitarian about a

policy which says that your best chance of getting resettled in

Australia is to risk your life to get here.”27

RUDD GOVERNMENT 2007

New Labor government was quick to condemn Howard era policies.

Offshore processing on Nauru and Manus Island, some detention centres and temporary protection visas were abolished.

Public discourse demanded humanitarian and compassionate solutions. This needed to be reconciled with the new Labor government wanting to assert its commitment to border security.

30 asylum seekers drowned in the 2010 Christmas Island boat tragedy.


Unyielding from its deterrent rationale, the Australian government

purported a new compassionate, humanitarian justification for offshore

processing – that it would deter asylum seekers from risking their lives on

perilous sea journeys.15, 28

The Rudd government now assumed a protective role – to save asylum

seekers from exploitation.28 Indeed, asylum seekers were no longer the

villians, now the target was on the people smugglers – a sentiment most

memorably articulated by Kevin Rudd’s declaration that people smugglers

were the “vilest form of human life,” who should “rot in hell.”28

***

However, in 2011, the Gillard Government signed the Malaysia

Arrangement.29 Under this policy, intercepted vessels carrying offshore

entry persons (OEPs) would be transferred to Malaysia where their

refugee applications would be processed. In return for accepting 800 such

persons (“transferees”), Australia would resettle 4,000 refugees (as

determined by the UNHCR) from Malaysia.29 It would last four years but

would not be legally binding to the Australian or Malaysian

governments.29

The primary aim of the Malaysia Arrangement was to send a stern

message that there were would be “no processing advantage.”30 Their

application would be processed in Malaysia, rendering transferees

indistinguishable from the thousands of other refugees and asylum

seekers in Malaysia.15

Distinct from the Pacific Strategy, the Malaysia Arrangement was designed

as an exchange, rather than a “delay [in] resettling” into Australia.31 While

the UNHCR welcomed the resettlement of 4,000 refugees from Australia,

whether this commitment was a truly viable alternative is questionable,

given that 97,000 refugees were registered by the UNHCR in Malaysia.32,33

Many criticisms of this policy can be made. The Malaysia Arrangement

directly targets OEPs as its primary focus in aiming to bolster border

security, reinforcing the fallacious implications of “boat people” as “queue

jumping” the “resettlement queue.”15 Moreover, it misleadingly purports

to meet Australia’s humanitarian obligations toward refugees through the

offshore component.15

The Malaysia Arrangement was never put into action. In August 2011, as

16 asylum seekers were to be sent to Malaysia, the High Court found its

jurisidictional power to be invalid.34 Australia would not be allowed to

transfer the asylum seekers to Malaysia.34

Asylum seekers’ safety was used as the new justification for offshore processing. The villains in this issue moved away from asylum seekers to people smugglers.

2011: Gillard government signs the Malaysia Arrangement. In exchange for resettling 4,000 refugees from Malaysia, Australia would send 800 offshore entry persons (transferees).

The Malaysia Arrangement was found to be jurisdictionally invalid, and was never put into action.

GILLLARD GOVERNMENT 2010


“We recommend a policy approach that is hard-‐headed

but not hard-‐hearted, that is realistic not idealistic, that is

driven by a sense of humanity as well as fairness.”35

– Angus Houston

On 13 August 2012, the Report on the Expert Panel on Asylum

Seekers (the Houston Report) was released.36 The independent Panel was headed by the Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, former chief of the ADF, and considered to be an important document in

breaking the political deadlock that was mounting.36 It contains 22 recommendations, all of which the government has, in principle, accepted.36

The recommendations are expected to cost A$1 billion a year if adopted,

but this would offset the current expenditures incurred from managing

the increasing numbers of unauthorised arrivals.38

Key recommendations from the Houston Panel are as follows37:

-‐ Establishment of offshore processing on Nauru and Papua New Guinea

-‐ The adoption of a ‘No Advantage’ Policy

o Removal of family sponsorship concessions for proposers who arrive through irregular maritime voyages

o No guarantee of resettlement in Australia

-‐ Increase of 4,000 places in the family migration program, designed to incentivise “regular pathways” over perilous maritime routes.

-‐ Increasing current humanitarian program from 13,000 to 20,000 immediately, expanding to 27,000 within 5 years

-‐ Strengthening regional cooperation and bilateral arrangements, particualrly with Indonesia on issues including increasing the number of humanitarian program resettlement places for Indonesia and enhanced surveillance operations.

2012: The Houston Report was published. It was needed to break the mounting political deadlock. It contains 22 recommendations, all of which the government has, in principle, accepted.

THE HOUSTON REPORT 2012


The Houston Report has since precipitated bipartisan action on asylum

seeker issues, with the quick adoption of a ‘No Advantage Policy’ and re-‐

opening of the Nauru and Manus Island processing centres.39 The re-‐

opening of a processing centre in Nauru has been largely influenced by

current Australian politics. The unyielding pressure with which the Liberal

opposition party has imposed on the minority Labor government (to re-‐

open the Nauru processing centre) was only affirmed by this report.

While the proposed increases in intakes have been welcomed, offshore

processing has been condemned by humanitarian groups as a breach of

international obligations masquerading as humane and practical

solutions.40

Significantly, its recommendations effectively resurrect the old “Pacific

Solution.”40 It prioritises deterrance, rather than acknowledging the

political and global dynamics influencing irregular maritime routes.40

Ramifications for Australia’s reputation are international.39,41 Criticisms

launched at the Houston Report call for a re-‐focus away from deterrance

and onto establishing safer, official migration options through regional

cooperation.40

***

A less than light-‐hearted edition but the tone reflects Australia’s history of

appalling policies under both Labor and Coalition governments,

concerning vulnerable people fleeing persecution. Nonetheless, we end

on this optimistic note –

‘Australia awaits its Independence Day still…when that time

comes we have a rare opportunity to renew ourselves as a nation and thereby redefine ourselves as a country ready to extend

established democratic commitments, to promote equality and

abolish caste distinctions, to our present day treatment of

asylum seekers and refugees…conceiving of Australia as a place of asylum…ruled by the spirit of "cosmopolitan friendship and

sympathy…’ 42

Marilyn Lake, Charles La Trobe Professor of History, La Trobe University

Release of the Houston Report and the politcal context of a minority government led to the re-‐establishment of offshore processing in Nauru.

Humanitarian groups have welcomed increased intakes, but condemned offshore processing.

Policies based on the Houston Report effectively resurrect the Howard-‐era “Pacific Solution.” It focusses on deterrance rather than establishes safer, official migration routes.


• An interactive website that demands to be shared! Step into the shoes of an asylum seeker and find out what impossible decisions they must make along their journey to Australia. http://roadtorefuge.com/

• Rally at the Broadmeadows Detention Centre at 1pm, Sunday 28 April, in solidarity with the National Convergence through the Refugee Action Collective. Find out more at: http://rac-‐vic.org/?p=485

• Attend the film screening of Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea and panel discussion at Deakin University, Geelong on 7th May. Organised by Crossing Borders Deakin and Diversitat Geelong http://www.facebook.com/events/503335759713549/

• Meet the Refugee Action Collective – Every Monday at 6.30pm (except the first Monday of the month) – ANF, Elizabeth St (Nth Vic Markets). Find out more at: http://rac-‐vic.org/

• Get involved in AMES Volunteer English Tutoring:

What’s the idea? For medical students to provide free English lessons to refugees in the Melbourne and Morwell/Churchill area Do I need any special training to teach? Not at all! All training and materials will be provided What time commitment am I looking at? You only need to tutor 1 student for 1 hour/wk at a time convenient for both you & the student When do we all get started? Training is estimated to start mid May Sounds fantastic! How I do get involved? Shoot an email to [email protected] with your name and year level

• Watch Leaky Boat, the ABC doco on the Tampa crisis http://www.abc.net.au/tv/programs/leakyboat.htm

• If you’ve yet to see it, check out season 2 of Go Back To Where You Came From ft Peter Reith, Defence Minister at the time of the ‘children overboard’ controversy. http://www.sbs.com.au/goback/

• Join our Crossing Borders 2013 facebook group for updates on the refugee & asylum seeker debate and upcoming events http://www.facebook.com/groups/278217082272861/

• Stay tuned for details of Workshop #3: Legal and ethical issues, to be held on an auspicious date in May!

Action

Further Reading

• From Nothing to Zero is a collection of edited excerpts from letters written by refugees held in Australia’s detention centres

• Julian Burnside QC’s thoughts on refugees & human rights, our past and a future where supporting actor climate change demands the lines of the lead as well http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/Future_Justice/Julian_Burnside.php

• Professor Manne, Professor of Politics at Latrobe University’s opinion piece on the impact of Tampa on the political landscape http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/12/29/1040511254630.html


1. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/356/october-‐1971-‐we-‐re-‐not-‐racists

2. National Library of Australia. Digital Collections Music [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: NLA; [updated 2010; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://nla.gov.au/nla.mus-‐vn3118296

3. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/216/chinese-‐immigration-‐restricted

4. Immigration Restriction Act 1901. In: Wilson J, Thomson J, McMahon A, editors. The Australian Welfare State, Key Documents and Themes. Melbourne: MacMillan Education Australia Pty Ltd; 1996 [cited 21 Apr 2013].

5. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/146/white-‐australia-‐policy-‐beginning-‐of-‐the-‐end

6. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/176/populate-‐or-‐perish

7. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/171/non-‐european-‐immigration-‐begins

8. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/311/nancy-‐prasad

9. SBS. Immigration Nation [homepage on the Internet]. AUS: SBS; [updated 2012; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.sbs.com.au/immigrationnation/resources/article/331/november-‐1977-‐boats-‐arrive

10. Refugee Council of Australia. Mandatory detention [internet]. 2012 [updated 2012 May; cited 2013 Apr 22]. Available from: http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/f/rhp-‐time.php

11. Samplenukes. John Howard Children Overboard…remember this? [video online] YouTube; 2007. Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas

12. Refugee Council of Australia. Timeline of major events in the history of Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program [internet]. 2012 [updated 2012 May; cited 2013 Apr 22]. Available from: http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/f/rhp-‐time.php

13. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Timeline: Tampa to Children Overboard [internet]. 2011 Jul 5 [cited 2013 Apr 22]. Available from: http://blogs.abc.net.au/abc_tv/2011/07/leaky-‐boat-‐timeline.html

14. Burnside, J. Refugees: the Tampa case. Postcolonial Studies. 2002; 5(1):17-‐28. 15. Ariyawansa S. Most anywhere but here: Australia, Offshore Processing and “Safe Third Countries” [dissertation].

[Melbourne]: Monash University; 2001. 16. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Ten Views on Tampa Ten Years On [internet]. 2011 Jul 5 [cited 2013 Apr 22].

Available from: http://blogs.abc.net.au/abc_tv/2011/07/leaky-‐boat.html 17. Tampa issue improves Coalition election prospects. Australian Broadcasting Corporation [internet]. 2001 Sep 4 [cited 2013

Apr 22]; Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s357998.htm 18. McAllister I. Border protection, the 2001 Australian election and the coalition victory. Australian Journal of Political

Science. 2003;38(3):445-‐463. doi:10.1080/1036114032000133985. 19. Manne R. How Tampa sailed into 2002. The Age [internet]. 2002 Dec 20 [cited 2013 Apr 21]; Available from:

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/12/29/1040511254630.html 20. Australia. Parliament. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001. Canberra: Department of

Immigration and Citizenship; 2001 Sep 27. Act No. 127 21. Reith vs Trioli on 'Leaky Boat' Tampa interview. Australian Broadcasting Corporation [internet]. 2011 Jul 7 [cited 2013 Apr

22]; Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/07/07/3263420.htm 22. Forbes M, Taylor K. Refugees denied human face. The Age [internet]. 2002 Apr 18 [cited 2013 Apr 21]; Available from:

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/04/17/1019020661365.html 23. Australia. Senate. Select Committee for an inquiry into a certain maritime incident. A Certain Maritime Incident: Executive

Summary. Canberra; Senate; 2002 24. Chris Evans. ‘New Directions in Detention – Restoring Integrity to Australia’s Immigration System’ [speech]. Canberra:

Australian National University; 29 Jul 2008 [updated 11 Feb 2010; cited 21 Apr 2013] Available from: http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/speeches/2008/ce080729.htm

25. Foster M. Refugee Obligations Violated. The Age. 13 Apr 2010 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/refugee-‐obligations-‐violated-‐20100412-‐s40l.html

26. Joint Select Committee on the Christmas Island Tragedy, Parliament of Australia, Joint Select Committee on the Christmas

References


27. Australian Broadcasting Corporation News Radio, ‘Anniversary of Christmas Island boat tragedy, Malaysia Arrangement, Nauru, Cabinet reshuffle’, Drive; 15 December 2011 (Christ Bowen MP); [updated 15 Dec 2011; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb181339.htm.

28. Aly W. The Australian Solution. The Monthly. Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.themonthly.com.au/comment-‐australian-‐solution-‐waleed-‐aly-‐5858

29. Julia Gillard, Chris Bowen. ‘Australia and Malaysia sign transfer deal’ [press release]. Canberra: Parliament House; 25 Jul 2011 [updated 25 Jul 2011; cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb168739.htm

30. Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement, signed 25 July 2011 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-‐ releases/_pdf/20110725-‐arrangement-‐malaysia-‐aust.pdf>, cl 12(2) (‘Malaysia Arrangement’).

31. Yuko Narushima, ‘Nauru backs Pacific Solution revival plan”, The Age (online) 1 June 2010 <http://www.theage.com.au/national/nauru-‐backs-‐pacific-‐solution-‐revival-‐plan-‐20100531-‐wrcc.html>, citing then Immigration Minister Chris Evans.

32. UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Statement on the Australia-‐Malaysia Arrangement’ (Press Release, 25 July 2011) <http://www.unhcr.org/4e2d21c09.html>.

33. Figures current at end of January 2012: UNHCR, Figures at a Glance (2012) <http://www.unhcr.org.my/About_Us-‐@-‐Figures_At_A_Glance.aspx>.

34. ‘High Court puts brakes on first Malaysia swap’ ABC News (online), 8 August 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-‐08-‐07/lawyer-‐court-‐malaysia-‐swap-‐deal/2828196 >.

35. Houston A, Aristotle P, L’Estrange M. Overview: The Approach Underpinning this Report – Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers. Canberra: Australia Government; 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_overview.pdf

36. Australia Government. Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers. Canberra: Parliament; 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/report

37. Houston A, Aristotle P, L’Estrange M. Summary of Recommendations – Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers. Canberra: Australia Government; 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_summary_of_recommendations.pdf

38. Palmer C. Houston report: hard heads deliver $1 billion asylum seeker plan. The Conversation (online), 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://theconversation.com/houston-‐report-‐hard-‐heads-‐deliver-‐1-‐billion-‐asylum-‐seeker-‐plan-‐8804

39. Grubel J. Australia reopens asylum detention in Nauru tent city. Reuters (online), 14 Sep 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-‐australia-‐asylum-‐idUSBRE88D07120120914

40. Thom G. Houston report a major setback for refugee rights. The Drum Opinion (online), 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4195746.html

41. Rourke A. Australian refugee plan criticised by human rights groups. The Guardian (online), 13 Aug 2012 [cited 21 Apr 2013]. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/13/australian-‐refugee-‐plan-‐criticised

42. Lake M. A place of asylum? Australia's history with unwanted immigrants. Australian Broadcasting Corporation [internet]. 2012 Nov 2 [cited 2013 Apr 22]; Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/11/02/3624658.htm

Module 2: Shaping the Contemporary Discourse

Documents

white australia policy

white australia music

australia date

australia squirm

great white policy

increased immigration

immigration restriction

contemporary discourse