Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation · Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation George Loewenstein Carnegie Mellon University Ted O’Donoghue Cornell

Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation

George LoewensteinCarnegie Mellon University

Ted O’DonoghueCornell University

Sudeep BhatiaUniversity of Warwick

Drawing on diverse lines of research in psychology, economics, and neuroscience, wedevelop a model in which a person’s behavior is determined by an interaction betweendeliberative processes that assess options with a broad, goal-based perspective, andaffective processes that encompass emotions and other motivational states. Our modelprovides a framework for understanding many departures from rationality discussed inthe literature and captures the familiar feeling of being “of 2 minds.” Most important,by focusing on factors that moderate the relative influence of the 2 processes, our modelgenerates a variety of novel testable predictions. We apply our model to intertemporalchoice, risky decisions, and social preferences.

Keywords: decision making, dual process, dual system, willpower, intertemporal choice, risk,social preferences

From the writings of the earliest philosophersto the present, there has been an almost unbro-ken belief that human behavior is best under-stood as the product of two interacting and oftencompeting processes. Many recent dual processperspectives have focused on the differencesbetween two different modes of thinking—for

example, controlled versus automatic processes(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), symbolic and as-sociative processes (Sloman, 1996; Smith &DeCoster, 2000), impulsive and reflective pro-cesses (Lieberman, 2003; Strack & Deutsch,2004), and System I and II (Kahneman & Fred-erick, 2002). In this article, we also propose adual-process framework; however, our focus ison choice behavior rather than judgment. Fol-lowing a long tradition of perspectives drawinga distinction between, for example, “passionversus reason,” “the id and the ego,” and morerecently, “emotion and cognition,” we arguethat choice behavior can be seen as the productof two motivational processes, one more delib-erative and focused on broader goals and theother more reflexive and driven by emotionsand other motivational states.

Although both affect and deliberation havebeen the focus of considerable research, when itcomes to formal modeling, one process—themore deliberative of the two—has received thelion’s share of attention. Considerable intellec-tual time and energy has gone into formulatingwhat are sometimes referred to as cognitive orrational-choice models of decision making,such as the expected-utility model and the dis-counted-utility model. Such models are conse-quentialist in character; they assume that people

George Loewenstein, Department of Social and DecisionSciences, Carnegie Mellon University; Ted O’Donoghue,Department of Economics, Cornell University; Sudeep Bha-tia, Department of Psychology and Warwick BusinessSchool, University of Warwick.

This work was supported by Integrated Study of theHuman Dimensions of Global Change at Carnegie MellonUniversity (NSF Grant SBR-9521914 to George Loewen-stein), the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0214043 to Ted O’Donoghue), and the Economic and So-cial Research Council (Grant ES/K002201/1 to SudeepBhatia). For useful comments, we thank David Laibson,Roland Bénabou, Andrew Caplin, Andrew Schotter, Anto-nio Rangel, John Hamman, Shane Frederick, JoachimVosgerau, and seminar participants at Princeton University,Duke University, New York University, UC Berkeley, Uni-versity of Chicago, MIT, Indiana University, University ofPittsburgh, University of Maryland, and the 2004 ASSAmeetings in San Diego. We also thank Christoph Vanbergfor valuable research assistance.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to George Loewenstein, Department of Social andDecision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,PA 15213. E-mail: [email protected]

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Decision © 2015 American Psychological Association2015, Vol. 2, No. 2, 55–81 2325-9965/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dec0000029

55

choose between different courses of actionbased on the desirability of their consequences.Attempts to increase the realism of such mod-els, many associated with the field of behavioraldecision research, have generally adhered to theconsequentialist perspective but modify as-sumptions about probability weighting, timediscounting, or the specific form of the utilityfunction.

A major reason for this focus is that the otherprocess—affect—has long been viewed as er-ratic and unpredictable, and hence too compli-cated to incorporate into formal models. In re-cent years, however, there has been a renewedinterest in emotion, which has revealed a num-ber of systematic properties of both the deter-minants and consequences of affect. New re-search by social psychologists (Epstein, 1994;Sloman, 1996; Wilson et al., 2000), neuroscien-tists (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp,1998; Rolls, 1999) and decision researchers(Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Loewenstein,1996; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers et al.,1997; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Pham, 1998;Slovic et al., 2002) has led to a better under-standing of the role that affect plays in decisionmaking, much of it lending new support tohistorical dual-process views of human behav-ior. As of yet, however, there have been fewattempts to develop formal models of behaviorthat incorporate these insights, and in particularto address how affect and deliberation interactto determine human behavior.

We propose a formal dual-process model inwhich a person’s behavior is the joint product ofa deliberative system that assesses options in aconsequentialist fashion and an affective systemthat encompasses emotions such as anger andfear and motivational states such as hunger, sex,and pain. The model provides a new conceptualframework for understanding many of the doc-umented departures from the standard rational-choice model discussed in behavioral decisionresearch, behavioral economics, and judgmentand decision making research. At the same time,it captures the familiar feeling of being “of twominds”— of simultaneously thinking oneshould behave one way while actually behavingin a different way (see, e.g., Milkman et al.,2008). Most important, by focusing on factorsthat moderate the relative influence of the twoprocesses, the model generates a number ofnovel testable predictions.

A Dual-Process Model of Behavior

In psychology, the dual-process models that areclosest in spirit to our own are Metcalfe and Mis-chel’s hot/cool model (1999) and Fazio andTowles-Schwen’s (1999) MODE model. Metcalfeand Mischel (1999) distinguish between a “hotemotional system” and a “cool cognitive system”and assume that a person’s behavior depends onwhich system is dominant at a particular moment.Fazio and Towles-Schwen’s (1999) MODEmodel similarly distinguishes two types of atti-tude-to-behavior processes, spontaneous process-ing and deliberative processing, with implicit,automatically activated attitudes guiding sponta-neous processing, and explicit attitudes guidingdeliberative processing.

Economists, too, have developed dual-processmodels of human behavior along these lines (Ben-habib & Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004;Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler,1988; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; and an earlier ver-sion of the current article, Loewenstein &O’Donoghue, 2004). While our model overlapswith these models in ways we will discuss, all ofthese models (except the one on which the currentmodel is based) focus exclusively on intertempo-ral choice. In this article, we apply our model to avariety of decision-making domains, including in-tertemporal choice, in which some of our assump-tions—particularly affective myopia—overlapwith those made by these other economic ap-proaches.

Our model is also informed and motivated byevidence from neuroscience on the functionalspecificity of different regions of the humanbrain. Evolutionarily older brain regions, suchas the limbic system, which includes areas suchas the amygdala and the hypothalamus, evolvedto promote survival and reproduction, incorpo-rate affective mechanisms (MacLean, 1990). Incontrast, the seemingly unique human ability tochoose deliberately, by focusing on broadergoals, relies on the prefrontal cortex (Damasio,1994; Lhermitte, 1986; Miller & Cohen, 2001),the region of the brain that expanded most dra-matically in the course of human evolution(Manuck et al., 2003). Indeed, these results haveled to dual-system frameworks for the neurosci-ence of decision making. These focus on thedistinction between valuation-based choicesand goal-directed choices, with the former be-ing processed primarily in areas such as the

56 LOEWENSTEIN, O’DONOGHUE, AND BHATIA

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amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cor-tex, and the latter being processed primarily inareas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex(Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Hare, O’Doherty,Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; see alsoBechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997for an alternate but complementary approach tostudying the role of emotions in decision making).Of course, there are many important distinctionsbetween different dual-process accounts, and boththe functional and neurobiological properties ofthese different systems are still up for debate (see,e.g., Kable & Glimcher, 2009).1

Our use of the term affect differs from manylay definitions, which tend to focus on the sub-jective feeling states associated with emotions.In our usage, the defining characteristic is thataffects carry “action tendencies” (Frijda,1986)—for example, anger motivates us to ag-gress, pain to take steps to ease the pain, andfear to escape (or in some cases to freeze). Thisperspective is consistent with accounts fromevolutionary psychologists (Cosmides &Tooby, 2000), according to which affects are“superordinate programs” that orchestrate re-sponses to recurrent situations of adaptive sig-nificance in our evolutionary past (see Loewen-stein, 2007 for a discussion of the utility of sucha definition).

Our use of the term affect is also related tothe distinction between expected emotions andimmediate emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner,2003; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rick & Loew-enstein, 2008). Expected emotions are emotionsthat are anticipated to occur in the future as aresult of decisions but are not experienced in themoment. As expected consequences of deci-sions, to the extent that they are taken intoaccount, therefore, expected emotions will enterinto deliberation. Indeed, one interpretation ofthe standard consequentialist model of decisionmaking is that people seek to create positiveexpected emotions and avoid negative expectedemotions. Immediate emotions, in contrast, areexperienced at the moment of decision andmight be completely unrelated to the decision athand, in which case they are referred to as“incidental” (Bodenhausen, 1993). Perhapsmost important, although they are experiencedwhile making a decision, immediate emotionsare not affected by the choice that is made, andthus, under the usual rational-choice perspec-tive, should be irrelevant to choices. But numer-

ous studies have found that immediate emotionsdo influence decision making (Ariely & Loew-enstein, 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerneret al., 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Wil-son & Daly, 2003). A natural interpretation ofthe affective system in our model is that itcaptures the influence of immediate emotions.

Finally, our use of the term affect (in contrastto deliberation) can be illustrated by the distinc-tion that Kent Berridge (1996) draws between“wanting” and “liking.” Wanting refers to an im-mediate motivation to acquire something or en-gage in some activity. Liking, in contrast, refers tohow much one actually ends up enjoying the goodor activity. Under this interpretation, our affectivesystem makes decisions based on wanting,whereas our deliberative system makes decisionsbased on liking. Berridge indeed finds that want-ing and liking are mediated by different, albeitoverlapping, neural systems.

Note that our distinction between affect anddeliberation does not imply that basic cognitiveprocesses, such as those involved in object rep-resentation, memory, and attention, are absentin affective decision making. It is clear thatthese processes must play a role in any type ofdecision. We use the labels deliberation andaffect primarily as labels to help organize twodifferent types of motivations. Human behavioris driven by many different motivations in thebrain, and restricting attention to two is clearlya simplification. Our point is that it can be auseful simplification to focus on two types ofmotivations, some that are more reactive andlong-term goal-oriented (which we label “delib-eration”), and others that are more reflexive andinfluenced by emotions and short-term drives(which we label “affect”).

To formalize our approach, we assume thatthere are two “objective functions” operatingsimultaneously. Specifically, consider an indi-vidual who must choose an option x out of somechoice set X. On one hand, the affective system

1 Throughout this article, we will use findings in neuro-science to motivate our framework of dual-process decisionmaking. However, it is important to note that brain pro-cesses do not always map one-to-one onto psychologicalprocesses or behaviors. A more rigorous link between thesefindings, and the framework that we propose in this article,needs to be based on a formal model of the neurobiologicalbasis of decision making (see, e.g., Yechiam, Busemeyer,Stout, & Bechara, 2005, for a discussion).

57MODELING INTERPLAY BETWEEN AFFECT AND DELIBERATION

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is motivated to engage in certain behaviors, andwe capture these motivations with a motiva-tional function, M(x, a). The variable a capturesthe intensity of affective motivation. If the aff-ective system alone were completely in chargeof behavior, the affective system would“choose” xA � argmaxx�XM�x, a�, which werefer to as the affective optimum. On the otherhand, the deliberative system evaluates behav-ior with a broader and more goal-oriented per-spective, and we capture the desirability of ac-tions as perceived by the deliberative systemwith a utility function, U(x). If the deliberativesystem alone were completely in charge of be-havior, the deliberative system would choosexD � argmaxx�XU�x�, which we refer to as thedeliberative optimum. Typically, however, nei-ther system is completely in charge of behavior.Hence, to make predictions, we must incorpo-rate sources of divergence between the two sys-tems, and explain how the two systems interactto generate behavioral outcomes.

Environmental Stimuli

Both systems are influenced by environmentalstimuli. In some cases, the two systems will re-spond to the same stimuli with similar motiva-tional tendencies. For example, during a break at aconference, the availability of a snack might cre-ate a surge of hunger in the affective system andbe perceived by the deliberative system as a wel-come opportunity to recharge before the next ses-sion. However, because the two systems operateaccording to quite different principles, in othersituations the same stimulus can influence the twosystems differently. If the conferee is on a diet, forexample, the availability of the snack might alsoremind her of that fact, leading to a divergence ofaffective and deliberative motivation.

Existing research points to a number of fac-tors that influence the strength of affective mo-tivations while affecting the goals of the delib-erative system much less if at all. Perhaps mostimportant is the temporal proximity of rewardand cost stimuli: Affective motivations are in-tense when rewards and punishments are imme-diate but much less intense when they are tem-porally remote. Deliberation is, in contrast,much less sensitive to immediacy. The impor-tance of immediacy for affect has been docu-mented in countless studies. Berns et al. (2006),for example, scanned the brains of subjects as

they were waiting to receive electric shocks ofdifferent intensities. They found that severalaffective regions known to respond to the expe-rience of pain (such as the posterior insula, theamygdala, and the caudal anterior cingulate cor-tex) also responded to the anticipation of pain,and that the activation of these regions in-creased dramatically as the shock approached intime. Ichihara-Takeda and Funahashi (2006)similarly found that the activity in the orbito-frontal cortex, an area associated with the ex-perience of affective reward, reached its peakimmediately prior to the arrival of the reward.In contrast, deliberative areas, such as the dor-solateral prefrontal cortex, did not show thistype of time dependence.

In addition to temporal proximity, variousforms of nontemporal proximity have similareffects (Lewin, 1951). Thus, for example, atempting snack is more likely to evoke hungerto the extent that it is nearby, visible, or beingconsumed by someone else. Early evidence onthe role of nontemporal proximity comes from aseries of classic studies conducted by WalterMischel and colleagues (see, for instance, Mis-chel et al., 1972, 1989, 2003). Children werepresented with a snack and told they couldreceive a larger snack if they waited until theexperimenter returned. In a baseline treatment,children had the larger delayed snack positionedin front of them as they waited for the experi-menter. Relative to this baseline treatment, chil-dren were able to delay significantly longerwhen the larger snack was not present, or evenwhen the larger snack was present but covered.Research on construal-level theory (Trope &Liberman, 2003) also documents a distinctionbetween proximate and nonproximate factorsand provides evidence that level of construalplays a role in the relationship between nontem-poral proximity and affective responses.

A third factor is the vividness of stimuli, bywhich we mean the ability to conjure the expe-rience in mind. Researchers who study the im-pact of incidental emotions have become in-creasingly expert at evoking emotion, and manyof the manipulations play on vividness by, forinstance, showing people movies of an emotion-evoking event (Lerner et al., 2004), having peo-ple write essays in which they imagine them-selves in a situation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000),playing music (Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Halber-stadt & Niedenthal, 1997), or even through the


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artful use of odors (Ditto et al., 2006; Zald &Pardo, 1997). The ability to evoke emotionthrough vividness suggests that vividness ofdifferent choice object and different experi-ences may play a crucial role in driving theresponses of the affective system (see, however,Taylor & Thompson, 1982, for a discussion oflimits on the impact of vividness on judgment).

To incorporate these three effects into ourmodel, the motivational function, M(x,a), incor-porates a variable a that captures the intensity ofaffective motivations. In general, the larger is a,the stronger will be the affective motivations. Inabstract terms, if the affective system prefers anoption x over an option x’, then an increase inaffective intensity increases affective motiva-tion in the sense that the difference M(x, a) –M(x’,a) increases with a. For some choice prob-lems, there will be competing affective motiva-tions, in which case a should be thought of as avector of good-specific affective intensities. Forinstance, if one must make trade-offs betweenmoney and cookies, it would be natural to as-sume that a � (aM, aC), where aM is affectiveintensity for money, and aC is affective intensityfor cookies. Each affective intensity influencesthe motivation for its associated good.2

Behavioral Outcomes

A range of evidence suggests that the affec-tive system holds a primacy in determining be-havior—that is, the affective system has defaultcontrol of behavior, but the deliberative systemcan step in to exert its influence as well. Forinstance, Joseph LeDoux and his colleagues(LeDoux, 1996) have demonstrated that fearresponses are influenced by two separate neuralpathways from the sensory thalamus to theamygdala (a lower-brain structure that plays acritical role in fear responses). One pathwaygoes directly from the sensory thalamus to theamygdala, and the second goes first from thesensory thalamus to the neocortex and fromthere to the amygdala. Moreover, they also dis-covered that the direct pathway is about twice asfast as the indirect pathway. As a result, rats canhave an affective reaction to a stimulus beforetheir cortex has had the chance to perform morerefined processing.

When deliberation gets involved, what deter-mines the extent to which it influences behav-ior? There is, in fact, compelling evidence that

deliberation does not easily take full control.Rather, when in conflict with affect, delibera-tive control, to the extent that it is possible,requires an expenditure of effort. The most im-portant evidence along these lines comes fromresearch by Baumeister and colleagues on will-power (for a summary, see Baumeister & Vohs,2003), by which they mean an inner exertion ofeffort required to implement some desired be-havior. Their basic contention is that such will-power is a resource in limited supply (at least inthe short run), and that depletion of this re-source by recent use will reduce a person’sability to implement desired behaviors.Baumeister’s basic willpower paradigm in-volves having subjects carry out two successive,unrelated tasks that both require willpower andcomparing the behavior on the second task tothat of a control group that had not performedthe first task. The general finding is that exertingwillpower in one situation tends to underminepeople’s propensity to use it in a subsequentsituation. In one representative study, for exam-ple, subjects who sat in front of a bowl ofcookies without partaking subsequently gave uptrying to solve a difficult problem more quicklythan did subjects who were not first tempted bythe cookies.

Because the target behaviors in Baumeister’sstudies— for example, not eating cookies ortrying to solve a difficult puzzle—typically in-volve pursuit of broader goals, whereas not do-ing these behaviors typically involves indulgingaffective motivations, we believe there is a nat-ural interpretation of these results for our mod-el. Specifically, it is attempts by the deliberativesystem to override affective motivations thatrequire an inner exertion of effort or willpower.Subsequently, if a person’s willpower is de-pleted by recent use, the deliberative systemwill have less influence over behavior. Consis-tent with this view, a related line of researchshows that simply making decisions can under-mine willpower (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003).

Hence, one situation in which affect will havemore sway over behavior is when the delibera-

2 Both here and in the section on risky decision making,we talk in terms of good-specific affective intensities. Thislanguage, however, should be viewed as a shorthand for anunderlying model with (a) multiple types of affects (e.g.,hunger, greed, fear, etc.) and (b) different types of goodsthat are differentially affected by different types of affect.


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tive system is “worn out” from past willpoweruse. A second, related, situation is when thedeliberative system is currently occupied byunrelated cognitive tasks. Research has shownthat having subjects perform simple cognitivetasks—an intervention labeled “cognitiveload”—undermines efforts at self-control. Inone study, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) had sub-jects memorize either a 7-digit number (highcognitive load) or a 2-digit number (low cogni-tive load) before presenting them with a choicebetween cake (a high-calorie food) and fruit (alow-calorie food). Fifty-nine percent chose thecake in the high-load condition, but only 37% inthe low-load condition.

To formalize these ideas, we assume that thedeliberative system makes the final choice, but itmust make this choice subject to having to exerteffort—willpower—to control affective motiva-tions. We capture this cognitive effort by assum-ing that, to induce some behavior different fromthe affective optimum (i.e., to choose an x � xA),the deliberative system must exert an effort cost,in utility units, of h(W, �) � [M(xA, a) � M(x, a)].This formulation assumes that the further the de-liberative system moves behavior away from theaffective optimum, the more willpower is re-quired. The factor h(W, �) � 0 represents the costto the deliberative system of mobilizingwillpower—that is, the higher is h(W, �), thelarger is the cognitive effort required to induce agiven deviation from the affective optimum.

Based on our discussion, we incorporate twofactors that make it more costly for the deliber-ative system to exert willpower. The first is theperson’s current willpower strength, which wedenote by W. This variable is meant to capturethe current stock of willpower reserves; we as-sume that h is decreasing in W, so that as one’swillpower strength is depleted the deliberativesystem finds it more difficult (more costly) toinfluence the affective system. Our analysis inthis article will focus on one particular implica-tion with regard to willpower strength: Themore willpower a person has used in the recentpast, the more her current willpower strengthwill be depleted, and hence exerting willpowerbecomes more costly. The second factor thatmakes it more costly for the deliberative systemto exert willpower relates to competing cogni-tive demands (such as those induced by cogni-tive load), which we denote by �. Thus, we willassume that h is increasing in �: If a person’s

deliberative system is distracted by unrelatedcognitive tasks, exerting willpower becomesmore costly.

General Implications

We now combine the elements of our for-malization to derive general implications ofour model. To make a choice, the deliberativesystem trades off the desirability of ac-tions—as reflected by its utility functionU(x)—against the willpower effort requiredto implement them. Hence, the deliberative sys-tem will choose the action x � X that maximizesU�x� � h�W, �� * � M�xA, a� � M�x, a��. Becausethe affective optimum xA is not affected by theperson’s actual choice, this is identical to maxi-mizing:

V(x) � U(x) � h(W, �) * M(x, a) (1)

It follows that the person will choose anoption that is somewhere in between the delib-erative optimum and the affective optimum(when x is a scalar, either xD � x � xA or xA �x � xD). Exactly where behavior falls will de-pend on the cost of mobilizing willpower ascaptured by h(W, �). As the cost of willpowerdecreases, behavior will be closer to the delib-erative optimum, and as it increases, behaviorwill be closer to the affective optimum.

Although we interpret our model as reflectingthat the deliberative system chooses behaviorsubject to willpower costs, there is a secondinterpretation of our model that is more consis-tent with our discussion of affective primacy.Because the deliberative optimum xD and theaffective optimum xA, are not affected by theperson’s actual choice, maximizing V(x) isequivalent to minimizing � U�xD� � U�x�� h�W, �� * �M�xA, a� � M�x, a��. Hence, ourmodel can be interpreted as the minimization ofa weighted sum of two costs: a cost to thedeliberative system from not getting its opti-mum xD, and a cost to the affective system fromnot getting its optimum xA. In this interpreta-tion, h(W, �) captures the relative weights of thetwo systems.

While we have motivated our model as adual-process approach, in the end behavior isdetermined by a single “objective” function,V(x). What is the value, then, of the dual-process approach? One way in which the dual-


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process approach is useful is that it provides anatural interpretation of many behavioral out-comes. When evaluating risky prospects, peoplemight cognitively believe that they shouldweight probabilities linearly, but then makechoices that reflect an insensitivity to probabil-ities. When weighing some intertemporal indul-gence such as a tasty but highly caloric morselor a willing but forbidden sexual partner, peoplemight cognitively think that the indulgence isnot worth the future costs, but then indulgenonetheless. Our model provides a natural in-terpretation: People’s beliefs for what theyought to do reflect only the objectives of thedeliberative system, whereas actual behavior isinfluenced by affective motivations as well. Inother words, many deviations from the standardprescriptive models of decision making can beinterpreted as coming from the motivations ofthe affective system.

A second way in which the dual-process ap-proach is useful is that it provides a template forinterpreting research from neuroscience. Recentresearch in neuroscience, particularly in thesubdiscipline of neuroeconomics, often focuseson where we see brain activity when peoplemake decisions. And, while neuroscientists areoften interested in more fine partitions, a fre-quent focus is on the extent to which activityoccurs in the prefrontal cortex or in evolution-arily older brain systems, such as the amygdala,the hypothalamus, and other parts of the limbicsystem. To the extent that our deliberative sys-tem is roughly meant to capture activity in theprefrontal cortex whereas our affective systemis roughly meant to capture activity in the evo-lutionarily older brain systems, according to ourmodel such research can be used to shed insighton the different objectives of the two systems.Indeed, we have already discussed some neuro-scientific research in this way, and do so furtherin the discussion of specific applications.3

But perhaps the most important value of thedual-process approach is that it generates test-able predictions. These predictions are perhapsmost clear when a person faces a binary choicebetween two options. Suppose a person ischoosing between an option x and an option x’,where option x is the deliberative optimum (i.e.,U(x) � U(x’). According to our model, theperson will choose the former when U(x) �h(W, �)M(x, a) � U(x’) � h(W, �)M(x’, a), orU(x) – U(x’) � h(W, �)[M(x’, a) – M(x, a)].

First note that if option x is also the affectiveoptimum, i.e., M(x, a) � M(x’, a), then theperson will clearly choose option x. Hence, as-sume instead that option x’ is the affective op-timum, i.e., M(x’, a) � M(x, a). From the in-equality, two general predictions follow:

General Prediction #1: If a person faces a binarychoice between options x and x’ where option x is thedeliberative optimum while option x’ is the affectiveoptimum, then willpower depletion or unrelated cog-nitive demands such as cognitive load increase the costof exerting willpower [increase h(W, �)] and thereforemake it less likely that the person chooses the delib-erative optimum (option x).

General Prediction #2: If a person faces a binary choicebetween options x and x’ where option x is the delibera-tive optimum and option x’ is the affective optimum, thenif increased affective intensity increases the affectivepreference for option x’ over option x [i.e., if increased aincreases the difference M(x’, a) – M(x, a)], then affectiveintensity makes it less likely that a person chooses thedeliberative optimum (option x). If, instead, affectiveintensity decreases the affective preference for option x’over option x[i.e., if increased a decreases the differenceM(x’, a) – M(x, a)], then an increase in affective intensitymakes it more likely that a person chooses the delibera-tive optimum (option x).

In the next three sections, we apply ourmodel to three specific domains: intertemporalchoice, risky decision making, and social pref-erences. In each domain, we make specific as-sumptions about the objectives of the two sys-tems and use these to derive specific predictionsof our model. In some cases, we find existingevidence that supports these predictions, but inothers we propose them as testable, but as yetuntested, predictions of the model.

Intertemporal Choice

The most straightforward application of ourmodel is to intertemporal choices—decisionsthat involve tradeoffs between current and fu-ture outcomes. Suppose that each option x in thechoice set X generates a stream of payoffs x1, x2,

3 Note of course that many fMRI studies in neuroscienceare correlational, and that activation in a particular brainarea cannot always justify inferences regarding the under-lying psychological processes at play in observed behavior.That said, we believe that our approach is a desirable firststep in incorporating neuroscientific research into the studyof emotion and deliberation in preferential choice, and thatmuch of this research serves as a valuable complement tothe psychological and behavioral findings that we discuss inthis article.


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. . . , xT, where payoff xt is received in period t,and all payoffs involve the same type of choiceoption. For simplicity, and for comparison tostandard approaches in economics, we assumethat both the affective and the deliberative sys-tems display standard exponential discounting.However, we additionally assume that the af-fective system is more myopic than the delib-erative system (and sometimes consider the spe-cial case where the affective system cares onlyabout immediate outcomes), and we also as-sume that increased affective intensity makesthe affective system more myopic.4

Formally, we assume that the deliberativesystem’s utility function is U(x) � x1 � �D x2 �. . . � [�D]TxT; that is, exponential discountingwith discount factor �D. The affective system’smotivational function is M(x, a) � x1 ��A(a)x2 � . . . � (�A(a))TxT; that is, exponentialdiscounting with discount factor �(a). We fur-ther assume that �A(a) �D, and that increasedaffective intensity a implies a smaller �A(a) andthus more myopia. Putting these together, thedecision maker will choose x to maximize:

V(x) � [x1 � �Dx2 � . . . �[�D]TxT] � h(W, �)*[x1 � �A(a)x2 � . . . �[�A(a)]TxT]

(2)

Our assumption that the affective system isdriven primarily by short-term payoffs, whereasthe deliberative system cares about both short-term and longer-term payoffs is similar to thatmade by existing dual-process theories of inter-temporal choice in economics (Benhabib & Bi-sin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fuden-berg & Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988;Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). There is considerableevidence in support of this assumption. On thedeliberative side, Frederick (2003) asked sub-jects how they believed they should respond tooutcomes occurring at different times, and mostpeople generally believed that time discountingis not normatively justified—that outcomesshould receive the same weight regardless ofwhen they occur. This suggests that people per-ceive their own impulsivity as contrasting withwhat they believe to be reasonable.

On the affective side, when animals are pre-sented with intertemporal choices, they are ex-tremely myopic. There is a long literature thatdemonstrates extreme myopia in pigeons and

rats. Indeed, it has been found that species ofNew World monkeys are willing to wait lessthan 20 s for a food reward that is three times aslarge (Stevens et al., 2005). Monkeys that arecloser, evolutionarily, to humans show less al-though by human standards still extreme levels,myopia (Tobin et al., 1996). In a related vein,children have been shown to be more myopicthan adults, with children and teenagers exhib-iting much steeper discount functions that indi-viduals in their 20s and 30s (Steinberg et al.,2009). To the extent that animal and child be-havior can be used to shed insight on the moti-vations of humans’ affective system, this evi-dence suggests that the affective system ismyopic, and that concern for longer-term out-comes are a product of the deliberative system.

More convincing evidence comes from neu-roscience. McClure et al. (2004, 2006) scannedsubjects’ brains using fMRI while they madechoices between smaller-sooner rewards versuslarger-later rewards. All of these choices pro-duced activation in prefrontal regions associ-ated with deliberation (such as the dorsolateraland ventrolateral prefrontal cortex); however,when one of the options involved an immediatereward, brain regions associated with affectiveprocessing, such as the ventral striatum andmedial orbitofrontal cortex, also became acti-vated. Moreover, in situations in which an im-mediate reward was one of the options, higherrelative activation of the affective regions in-creased the likelihood that the subject wouldchoose the immediate reward.

Similar results are suggested by Bjork et al.(2009), who found that delay discounting can bepredicted by the size of the decision maker’slateral prefrontal cortex. Figner et al. (2010)also found that experimentally disrupting pre-frontal areas associated with deliberation (par-ticularly the lateral prefrontal cortex) led to anincreased choice of immediate rewards overdelayed rewards. This disruption did not, how-ever, alter choices between delayed rewards,suggesting that deliberative processing plays a

4 Our key predictions, I-1 and I-2, rely only on the as-sumption that the affective system is more myopic than thedeliberative system, and not on the assumption of exponen-tial discounting. We assume exponential discounting tohighlight how our framework can give rise to hyperbolicdiscounting, even if neither system exhibits hyperbolic dis-counting (as we discuss later).


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fundamental role in directing nonmyopicchoice.

Last, considerable research on addiction andself-control has documented a discrepancy be-tween an addict’s short-term desires (involving,e.g., the consumption of an addictive sub-stance), and an addict’s long-term goals (whichseek to regulate cravings and stop the use ofthese addictive substances; see, e.g., Goldstein,2001 for a discussion). This pattern of behaviorstrongly supports the assumptions of affectivemyopia and deliberative far-sightedness that wepropose in this article.

Equation 2 yields several important predictions.First, maximizing Equation 2 is equivalent tomaximizing V�x� � x1 � �t�1

� D�t�x1�t with:

D(t) �(�D)t � h(W, �)��A(a)�t

1 � h(W, �).

Note that D(t) is a discount function reflect-ing the discounting associated with a payoffwith delay t. This formulation (with �D � �A(a))implies both discounting (i.e., that D(0) � 1 �D(1) � D(2) . . .) and declining discount rates(i.e., D(0)/D(1) � D(1)/D(2) � D(2)/D(3) . . .).In addition, in the special case where �A(a) � 0,maximizing Equation 2 is equivalent maximiz-ing x1 � ��x2 � . . . � ��TxT, where � �1/(1�h(W, �)) 1. This is the well-knownbeta-delta function used by Laibson (1997) andothers, as an analytical tractable simplificationof hyperbolic discounting.5

Hence, our model, with the assumption thataffective discounting provides a natural inter-pretation— or reinterpretation— of (quasi)hyperbolic discounting. Specifically, even ifthe deliberative system discounts exponen-tially, because behavior is also influenced bya more myopic affective system, people willbe more impatient when facing now versusnear-future trade-offs than they will be whenfacing future versus further-future trade-offs—which is the essence of hyperbolic dis-counting. This formulation also implies that adecrease in willpower, increase in cognitivedemands, or increase in affective intensitywill lead to a higher value of � withoutchanging the effective �. The quasi-hyper-bolic form defined here is consistent with anumber of intertemporal preference reversals(e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, 1997), with de-

clining (average) discount rates (e.g., Ben-Zion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Thaler,1981), as well as with evidence (e.g., Freder-ick et al., 2002) suggesting that the magnitudeof discounting is based on the distinction be-tween now and the future—and in particular,that people exhibit nearly constant discount-ing when facing two future trade-offs.

Beyond providing an alternative account ofhyperbolic time discounting, Equation 2 alsogenerates testable predictions by applying thetwo general predictions of our model:

Intertemporal Choice Prediction #1 (I-1): An increasein h(W, �) will lead to more myopic behavior.

Intertemporal Choice Prediction #2 (I-2): Any factorthat increases the intensity of the affective motivationfor the immediate payoff will lead to more myopicbehavior.

The increases to myopic behavior listed inPredictions I-1 and I-2 will affect choice onlywhen the decision involves tradeoffs betweenimmediate and future payoffs. Willpower, cog-nitive load, or affective intensity will not altertradeoffs involving two or more future payoffs.In addition, note that Predictions I-1 and I-2also hold for the more general model, whichallows the affective system to discount expo-nentially (but with a lower discount factor thanthat displayed by the deliberative system).

There is existing evidence on Predictions I-1and I-2. For instance, Vohs and Heatherton(2000) investigated how willpower depletionaffects the amount of ice cream people eat whenasked to taste and rate three flavors. To theextent that eating ice cream involves immediatebenefits and future costs, eating more ice creamcan be taken to reflect increased myopia. Insupport of I-1, they found that, among dieters,willpower depletion led subjects to eat more icecream. However, they found no effect amongnondieters. In addition, Vohs and Faber (2007)found that willpower depletion led to increasedimpulse buying, and Vohs et al., (2008) found

5 Mathematically hyperbolic discounting is describedwith the discount factor 1/(1�kt). The beta-delta approxi-mates this formulation in discrete time. For � and � between0 and 1, the decision maker will be present biased whenchoosing between immediate and delayed rewards, but willdiscount exponentially when choosing between differentdelayed rewards. Note that some scholars have arguedagainst discounting models, in favor of attribute tradeoffmodels (Scholten & Read, 2010).


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that willpower depletion increased procrastina-tion. Finally, more direct evidence of the impactof willpower depletion on delay discounting isdocumented by Vohs et al. (2013). Individualswho performed depletion tasks prior to makingintertemporal choices were more likely tochoose smaller, immediate rewards over larger,delayed rewards.

The Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) study earlierin this article provides support for the cognitivedemands Prediction of I-1—specifically, cogni-tive load makes subjects more prone to choosecake over fruit, reflecting increased myopia.Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013) providemore direct evidence. They asked Chilean highschool juniors to make a series of short-termtrade-offs and long-term trade-offs for mone-tary payoffs. Relative to control subjects, sub-jects who answered these questions while undercognitive load showed nontrivial reductions inshort-term patience. In contrast, cognitive loadhad no effect on long-term patience.

I-2 captures a host of predictions based onthe different factors, discussed above, thatincrease affective intensity. Most straightfor-wardly, our model predicts that nontemporalproximity of immediate outcomes should playa large role in elicited discount rates. Thus,for example, the extent that an immediatereward can be seen or smelled will affect themagnitude of discount rates that people’s be-havior reveals, which is consistent with theresearch by Mischel and colleagues describedearlier in this article. Note that Mischel’sresults are puzzling when viewed from theperspective of hyperbolic discounting. Astime passes, and thus the delay between theimmediate smaller snack and the delayedlarger snack shrinks, children become lesswilling to wait (which is why many childreninitially decide to wait, but then “bail out”)—exactly the opposite of what hyperbolic dis-counting would predict. Willpower depletion,however, provides a natural explanation. Spe-cifically, as time passes and the person’s will-power is slowly depleted, eventually they nolonger have enough willpower to support fur-ther delay.

Indeed, our framework provides a natural for-malization of this behavioral pattern. Specifi-cally, let � denote the time for which a child hasbeen waiting, let W(�) denote the willpowerremaining at time �, and make the natural as-

sumption that have dW/d� 0—because wait-ing takes willpower and thus willpower declinesover time. Letting x denote the deliberative op-timum (waiting) and x’ denote the affectiveoptimum (getting the snack now), the personwill wait only if U(x) – U(x’) � h(W(�), �)[M(x’, a) – M(x, a)]. As time passes (� in-creases) and willpower depletes (W(�) de-clines), this condition becomes less and lesslikely to hold.

Our framework can similarly explain whydecision makers are more likely to succumbto temptation when they are repeatedly con-fronted with tempting choices. Not only aretemptation and willpower likely to fluctuateover time, allowing for more opportunities fortemptation to overcome willpower, but alsobecause resisting temptation depletes will-power, and doing so repeatedly depletes itproportionately.

Giordano et al. (2002) provide additionalevidence in support of I-2. They measured thetime discounting of heroin addicts for bothmoney and heroin, both when the addictswere satiated (after they had received treat-ment with an opioid agonist) and when theywere deprived (before receiving treatment).They observed greater time discounting forheroin than for money, and greater discount-ing of both types of reward when the addictswere opioid-deprived than when they weresatiated. Johnson et al. (2007) similarly foundthat smokers discount cigarettes more thanthey discount money or health, and Rosati etal. (2007) found that individuals are moreimpatient for food relative to money. Theseresults are consistent with our framework aslong as heroin, food and cigarettes havehigher affective intensity than money (andhave even higher affective intensity when de-cision makers are in a state of craving orhunger).

Finally, I-2 predicts that people who haveparticularly strong affective reactions to stim-uli will exhibit more myopic behavior. In fact,direct support for this prediction comes fromresearch by Hariri et al. (2006), who foundthat people who exhibited larger affective re-actions to random monetary gains and lossesin one experimental session (as measured byneural activation in the ventral striatum) alsoshowed increased myopia when trading off


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immediate versus future monetary payoffs ina different experimental session.

Risky Decision Making

A second natural application of our model isto choices between risky prospects. To applyour two-system approach to risky decision mak-ing, we must make assumptions about how thetwo systems respond to risks. For the delibera-tive system, a natural assumption is that risksare evaluated according to their expected utility(or perhaps expected value). Indeed, most re-searchers, as well as knowledgeable lay people,agree that expected-utility theory is the appro-priate prescriptive theory to use for evaluatingrisks (for a discussion, see Bleichrodt et al.,2001). It is less obvious what drives the affec-tive system, but we suggest that insensitivity toprobabilities and loss aversion—two prominentfeatures in many descriptive theories of riskpreferences (Starmer, 2000)—derive from theaffective system.

Suppose that each option x in the choice set Xis a lottery x � �x1, p1; . . . ; xN, pN�, where out-come xi occurs with probability pi. We assumethat the deliberative system’s utility function isU(x) � � piu�xi�. In some subsequent analyses,we assume that u(xi) � xi (i.e., the deliberativesystem cares about expected value) wheneverchoosing between monetary gambles. This doesnot affect any of our results; it only makes iteasier to illustrate the effects of incorporatingthe affective system into a model of riskychoice.

The affective system, in contrast, has moti-vational function M(x, a) � �w�pi� v�xi, a�,where w(pi) is a nonlinear probability-weightingfunction, and v(xi, a) is a value function thatincorporates loss aversion. For simplicity, weassume the value function is v�xi ,a� � au�xi� ifxi is a gain, and v�xi, a� � a u�xi� if xi is a loss,where the variable � 1 reflects the degree ofloss aversion. For the probability-weightingfunction, many of our results don’t require aspecific assumption, and thus we often use ageneric w(p). However, we believe that the keyfeature is that the affective system is less sen-sitive to probabilities than the deliberative sys-tem, that is, dw/dp 1 for p � �0, 1�. In ouranalysis, we sometimes use the specific exam-

ple of w(p) � c � bp for all p � �0, 1�, w(0) �0, and w(1) � 1, where c � 0 and c 1 � b.6

Incorporating these functions into Equation1, the person will choose the option x thatmaximizes

V(x) � � piu(xi) � h(W, �) * �� w(pi)v(xi, a)�.(3)

The assumptions underlying Equation 3come from diverse lines of research from arange of disciplines and resemble some of theassumptions made in Mukherjee (2010). Thereis strong physiological evidence that supportsour contention that the affective system exhibitsinsensitivity to variation in probabilities. Stud-ies that measure fear by means of physiologicalresponses such as changes in heart rate and skinconductance—which primarily reflect activityin the affective system—find that reactions to anuncertain impending shock depend on the ex-pected intensity of the shock but not the likeli-hood of receiving it (except if it is zero; Bankart& Elliott, 1974; Deane, 1969; Elliott, 1975;Monat et al., 1972; Snortum & Wilding, 1971).Other evidence supports the idea that emotionalresponses result largely from mental images ofoutcomes (Damasio, 1994). Because such im-ages are largely invariant with respect to prob-ability—one’s mental image of winning a lot-tery, for example, depends a lot on how muchone wins but not that much on one’s chance ofwinning—emotional responses tend to be in-sensitive to probabilities.

There is also evidence that supports our con-tention that loss aversion derives from the af-fective system. For instance, Chen et al. (2006)introduced a currency into a colony of capuchinmonkeys, presented the monkeys with gambles,and found that the monkeys displayed loss aver-sion. To the extent that animal behavior is in-dicative of the output of the human affectivesystem, this result suggests that loss aversion,and the behaviors that it generates, derives fromthe affective system. Of course, there are manyother differences between human and animalrisk taking that are attributable to factors other

6 Note that our assumption dw/dp 1 for all p � �0, 1�will require a discontinuity at p � 0 and at p � 1, much aswas suggested in the original version of prospect theory(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).


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than affective strength. For example, Weber etal. (2004) found that some differences betweenhuman and animal behavior in the domain ofrisk disappear when differences in reward learn-ing are controlled for.

There is also neuroscientific evidence. Tomet al. (2007) collected fMRI data while subjectsdecided whether to accept or reject gambles thatinvolved a chance to win or lose variousamounts of money. The gambles differed in themagnitudes of the gains and losses, and theresearchers found that affective regions, such asthe striatum and medial orbitofrontal cortex,react to these changes. Moreover, these regionsdisplay a neural loss aversion: The increase inactivity when the gain amount increases issmaller than the decrease in activity when theloss amount increases. Similar results have alsobeen documented by Weber et al. (2007), whofound that the amygdala is differentially activewhen decision makers are parting with goods.In addition, Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, andPhelps (2013) found that the reappraisal ofchoices involving loss aversion generates in-creased activity in the dorsolateral and ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex and reduced activity inthe amygdala. Regulating loss aversion, accord-ing to this research, involves the suppression ofemotion by the deliberative system.

The relationship of affect with loss aversionhas also been shown to be responsible for non-risky reference dependence anomalies, such asthe endowment effect. Particularly, Knutson etal. (2008) found that activity in limbic systemregions, such as the nucleus accumbens, whichplay an important role in loss averse behavior,also predict individual susceptibility to the en-dowment effect. Individuals who showed in-creased affective sensitivity to losses were alsomost likely to display discrepancies betweenacceptable buy and acceptable sell prices.

Another piece of neuroscientific evidence forthe role of affect in loss aversion comes from astudy by Shiv et al. (2003), who compared healthypeople; patients with brain lesions in regions re-lated to emotional processing, such as theamygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex (they werenormal on most cognitive tests, including tests ofintelligence); and patients with lesions in regionsunrelated to emotion. Patients with emotion-related lesions were more likely to select riskygambles (involving losses) than other subjects—that is, they exhibited less loss aversion—and ul-

timately earned more money, suggestive of theidea that the emotional processing regions thatwere damaged play a role in loss aversion. More-over, whereas normal people and patients withlesions unrelated to emotion were influenced bytheir outcomes in previous rounds, patients withemotion-related lesions were not. These resultshave also been documented by De Martino, Ku-maran, Seymour, and Dolan (2010). De Martinoand coauthors estimated loss aversion coefficientsfor two individuals with amygdala damage. Usinga series of gambles with gains and losses rangingfrom $20 to $50, they found that estimated lossaversion coefficients for the two patients werevery close to one, indicating an absence of lossaversion.

Predictions

The general model presented earlier willyield predictions that reflect three rough intu-itions. First, because insensitivity to probabili-ties and loss aversion derive from the affectivesystem, willpower depletion or unrelated cogni-tive demands, such as cognitive load, will mag-nify these behavioral tendencies. Second, if aperson faces a choice between lotteries forwhich all outcomes involve the same type ofgood and thus the same affective intensity, thenan increase in that affective intensity will alsomagnify insensitivity to probabilities and lossaversion. Finally, if a person faces a choicebetween lotteries that involve different goodsand thus different affective intensities, then theeffects of affective intensity are good-specific.To translate these rough intuitions into specificpredictions, we apply our model, as specified inEquation 3, to specific risky choices.

Monetary Certainty Equivalent forMonetary Gambles

Suppose a person faces a simple gamble ($Z,p; $0,1–p) with Z � 0, and we elicit the per-son’s monetary certainty equivalent—that is,the certain amount $CE such that the person isindifferent between the gamble and that certainamount. Tests for nonlinear probability weight-ing often focus on these types of choices, and inparticular on how overweighting of small prob-abilities should lead to CE � pZ, whereas un-derweighting of large probabilities should leadto CE pZ.


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This type of choice has two simplifying fea-tures. First, because all outcomes involve amonetary payoff, the same affective intensityfor money, which we denote by aM, is applied toall outcomes. Second, because Z � 0 and there-fore CE � 0, and because we assume for mon-etary outcomes that u(x) � x, we can ignore lossaversion, and the value function merely be-comes v(xi, a) � aMxi. Hence, according to ourmodel, the monetary certainty equivalent is de-termined by CE � h(W, �)[aMCE] � pZ �h(W, �)[w(p)aMZ], which yields that CE �w(p)Z where

w(p) ��0 if p � 0

p � h(W, �) aM w(p)1 � h(W, �) aM

if p � (0, 1)

1 if p � 1

Much as in expected utility and prospect the-ory, the certainty equivalent is derived frommultiplying the magnitude of the outcome by aweight that is a function of the probability ofthat outcome. However, the probability weight-ing function for each of the three models isdifferent. Under expected utility with linear util-ity for money, CE � pZ (i.e., linear weightingof probabilities), and under prospect theory witha linear value function in the gain domain,CE � w(p)Z, where w(p) is prospect theory’sprobability-weighting function. Figure 1 pres-ents an example of an effective weighting func-

tion implied by our model when the affectivesystem’s weighting function w(p) is assumed tobe linear with a positive intercept and a slopeless than 1 (reflecting an insensitivity to proba-bility changes). In particular, it depicts (a) theweight used by the deliberative system (p), (b)the weight used by the affective system, w(p),and (c) the effective weight used for decisions,w(p). Notice that our model is closer in spirit toKahneman and Tversky’s original formulationin being ill defined at the extremes (in fact,Barseghyan et al., 2013 estimates probabilityweighting from data on insurance deductiblechoices and seems to find support for Kahne-man and Tversky’s original formulation).

Like prospect theory, if affective motivationsgenerate an overweighting of small probabili-ties and underweighting of large probabilities,as reflected in w(p), then our model predictsCE � pZ for p � and CE pZ for p � �.However, unlike expected utility and prospecttheory, which assume fixed probability weight-ing functions, our model generates novel test-able predictions for factors that should alterprobability weighting and hence the certaintyequivalent:

Risky Choice Prediction #1 (R-1): When generating acertainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, anincrease in h(W, �) will increase CE when CE � pZand decrease CE when CE pZ.

Risky Choice Prediction #2 (R-2): When generating acertainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, anincrease in the intensity of affective motivation for

Figure 1. Effective probability weighting function w(p) predicted by our model for certaintyequivalents for monetary gambles when the affective system has probability weightingfunction w(p) � w0 � (w1 � w0) � p with w0 � 0 and w1 1.


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money will increase CE when CE � pZ and decreaseCE when CE pZ.

Intuitively, because deliberation argues forCE � pZ, if CE � pZ then the affective systemis dragging CE upward, and therefore whenwillpower depletion, cognitive load, or affectiveintensity for money give more sway to affect, itwill drag CE further upward. Analogously, ifCE pZ, then the affective system is draggingCE downward, and therefore when willpowerdepletion, cognitive load, or affective intensitygive more sway to affect, it will drag CE furtherdownward. Hence, our model generates sharppredictions for these simple decisions; unfortu-nately, we know of no existing evidence onsuch effects.

Monetary Certainty Equivalent for SimpleNonmonetary Gambles

Suppose a person faces a simple gamble (x,p;0, 1 � p), where x is a nonmonetary goodsuch as a plate of cookies, and again we elicitthe person’s monetary certainty equivalent forthis gamble. Because this choice involves twodistinct goods—for example, money versuscookies—we must distinguish between affec-tive intensity for money, aM, and affective in-tensity for x, which we denote by ax. Accordingto our model, the monetary certainty equivalentis determined by CE � h(W, �)[aMCE] �pu(x) � h(W, �)[w(p)axu(x)], which yields thatCE � w(p)u(x) where

w(p) ��0 if p � 0

p � h(W, �) aX w(p)1 � h(W, �) aM

if p � (0, 1)

1 if p � 1

Figure 2 depicts the effective weightingfunction w(p) here using the same affectivesystem’s weighting function w(p) from Figure1. While the effective weighting function herehas the same qualitative shape as that in Fig-ure 1, there is one important difference:whereas in Figure 1, w(p) p for p closeenough to one, in Figure 2, it is possible tohave w(p) � p for all p 1. Intuitively, thereare two forces at work. First, just as for thecertainty equivalent for simple monetarygambles, the affective system overweighssmall probabilities, which tends to drag the

CE upward, and the affective system under-weights large probabilities, which tends todrag the CE downward. Second, and uniquefor this case, affective intensity for the non-monetary good might be larger than affectiveintensity for money, which tends to drag theCE upward. For low probabilities, these twoeffects reinforce each other, and thus affectdrags the CE upward. For high probabilities,in contrast, the two forces oppose each other.If the former dominates, affect drags the CEdownward (panel A of Figure 2); if the latterdominates, affect drags the CE upward (panelB of Figure 2). Because the impact of will-power depletion and unrelated cognitive de-mands, such as cognitive load, depend onwhether affect is dragging the CE upward ordownward, our model yields somewhat dif-ferent predictions for the certainty equivalentfor simple nonmonetary gambles than forsimple monetary gambles (we are not awareof any existing evidence on these predic-tions):

Risky Choice Prediction #3 (R-3): When generating acertainty equivalent for simple nonmonetary gambles, anincrease in h(W, �) will increase CE when p is small, butwhen p is large, the effect is ambiguous.

Because the choice is between money versusa nonmonetary good, the implications of affec-tive intensity are good-specific. In particular, anincrease in the affective intensity for x willincrease the affective system’s motivation for xwithout changing its motivation for money, andthus increase the certainty equivalent. Analo-gously, an increase in the affective intensity formoney will increase the affective system’s mo-tivation for money without changing its moti-vation for x, and thus decrease the certaintyequivalent.

Risky Choice Prediction #4 (R-4): When generating acertainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, anyfactor that increases the intensity of the affective mo-tivation for the non-monetary good will increase CE,whereas any factor that increases the intensity of theaffective motivation for money will decrease CE.

The excessive reaction to affectively chargedbut unlikely outcomes that is predicted by ourmodel can be seen in numerous domains ofbehavior, from gold rushes to market manias tothe mating behavior of young adults. Less an-ecdotally, Ditto et al. (2006) offered partici-pants choices between gambles for the chance


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to win chocolate chip cookies and various fixedoutside options. Half of the participants wereonly told about the cookies, whereas for theother half the cookies were freshly baked in thelab and placed in front of participants as theymade their decision. Just as our model (R-4)predicts that increased affective intensity forcookies will increase the monetary certaintyequivalent, it also predicts that increased affec-tive intensity for cookies will make people morelikely to accept the gamble over an outsideoption. This is exactly what is found by Ditto etal. (2006, though their results hold only for thehigh risk gambles).

Another study (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)compared certainty equivalents for simple gam-bles that involve affect-rich outcomes (such as

vacations and electric shocks) with certaintyequivalents for simple gambles that involve af-fect-poor outcomes (such as money). In eachcase, they found that the certainty equivalent forthe affect-rich outcome was larger than the cer-tainty equivalent for the affect-poor outcomewhen the probability was very low (1%), butthis result was reversed when the probabilitywas very high (99%). From these results, theyconcluded that probability-weighting for affect-rich outcomes is more S-shaped than probabil-ity-weighting for affect-poor outcomes. In ourmodel, affective intensity for the nonmonetarygood does not directly translate into an effect onthe probability-weighting function. Even so,these results are consistent with our model. Inparticular, according to our model, the increase

Figure 2. Effective probability weighting function w(p) predicted by our model for certaintyequivalents for nonmonetary gambles when the affective system has probability weightingfunction w(p) � w0 � (w1–w0)�p with w0 � 0 and w1 1.


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in probability from 1% to 99% will have abigger effect on the affect-poor outcomes thanon affect-rich outcomes as long as the deliber-ative system, which is the system influenced bythe probability change, has a stronger reactionto the affect-poor outcome. For the case ofgains, this means the deliberative system mustprefer the affect-poor outcome (i.e., the utilityof the affect-poor outcome is more positive),and in the case of losses, it means the deliber-ative system must prefer the affect-rich outcome(i.e., the utility of the affect-poor outcome ismore negative). For the gambles studied byRottenstreich and Hsee, both seem plausible.

Risk Preferences for Mixed (Gain-Loss)Gambles

Suppose a person must choose whether toaccept a gamble ($G,1/2; –$L,1/2) with G,L�0.Unlike the previous decision, such gambles in-volve both gains and losses, and thus loss aver-sion becomes relevant. According to our model,the person will accept when �1

2�G� � 12

��L�� h�W, ��aMG� � ��aML�� 0,where � � w(1/2) here. This generates thefollowing predictions:

Risky Choice Prediction #5 (R-5): When facing 50–50gain-loss gambles with L G L, an increase inh(W, �) will make it more likely that the person rejectsthe gamble.

Risky Choice Prediction #6 (R-6): When facing 50–50gain-loss gambles with L G L, any factor thatincreases the affective intensity for money will make itmore likely that the person rejects the gamble.

If G � L then both systems prefer to reject,and if G � L then both systems prefer toaccept, and so in either case willpower deple-tion, cognitive load, and affective intensity areirrelevant. The interesting case occurs whenL G L—when the gamble has a small butpositive expected value—in which case the de-liberative system prefers to accept while theaffective system prefers to reject. In such cases,willpower depletion, cognitive load, or affectiveintensity all increase the influence of loss aver-sion and make it more likely that the person willreject the gamble. For simplicity, we have re-stricted the previous example to the settingswhere both the gain and the loss outcomes areequally likely. However, these insights hold formore general gambles as well (in which the

effect of willpower depletion, cognitive load, oraffective intensity will depend on gain and lossprobabilities, in addition to gain and loss mag-nitudes).

Although we are not aware of any evidenceof the impact of willpower depletion on risk-taking behavior, Benjamin et al. (2013) providesome indirect evidence on the effects of unre-lated cognitive demands, such as cognitive load.In addition to asking the time preference ques-tions described previously, they also asked theirsubjects to make a series of risky choices. Rel-ative to control subjects, subjects who answerthese questions while under cognitive loadshowed substantial reductions in risk taking be-havior. Similar results have also been docu-mented by Whitney et al. (2008) who found thatthe probability of choosing a risky gamble overa safe gamble reduced under cognitive load. Tothe extent that small-stakes risk aversion derivesfrom loss aversion (Rabin, 2000; Rabin &Thaler, 2001), these results are consistent withthe prediction that increasing cognitive loadwill lead to increased loss aversion (PredictionR-5).7

The Endowment Effect

Even though it is not an example of riskydecision making, the endowment effect—thetendency to value an object more highly whenone owns it—is commonly attributed to lossaversion (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1991),and thus our model has implications for theendowment effect. Suppose, as in many ex-perimental demonstrations of the endowmenteffect, that we elicit two reservation values:(a) The selling price PS is the price such that,if the person is initially endowed with anobject, she will be indifferent between keep-ing the object and receiving $PS. (b) Thechoice price PC is the price such that, if theperson is initially not endowed with an object,she will be indifferent between gaining theobject and receiving $PC. The typical finding inexperiments is that, even though the choices are

7 Rabin and Thaler note that the preference for small-scale safe outcomes over small-scale risky outcomes ob-served in many laboratory experiments is inconsistent withthe type of risky behavior observed for larger real-worldstakes. Loss-aversion is a mechanism that can resolve thisinconsistency.


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the same—leaving the experiment with an objector with some money—the selling price is signif-icantly larger than the choice price. To formal-ize this situation within our model, we assume,as done previously, that the deliberative systemvalues money P as P and values the object x asu(x). The deliberative system is not influencedby one’s endowment. The affective system, incontrast, is sensitive to one’s endowment. Spe-cifically, when endowed, the affective systemviews the choice as [gain PS, lose u(x)] versus[no changes]; and when not endowed, the af-fective system views the same choice as [gainPC] versus [gain u(x)]. Hence, the selling pricePS and the choice price PC are determined byPS � h(W, �)[aMPS – axu(x)] � u(x) � h(W,�)[0] and PC � h(W, �)[aMPC] � u(x) � h(W,�)[axu(x)], which generates PS/PC � �1 � h�W, �� ax� ⁄ �1 � h�W, �� ax�. Given � 1, notsurprisingly our model yields an endowmenteffect (PS/PC � 1). More important, our modelmakes several predictions with regard to theendowment effect.

Endowment Effect Prediction #7 (R-7): Any increasein h(W, �) will increase the magnitude of the endow-ment effect (increase PS/PC).

Endowment Effect Prediction #8 (R-8): Any factorthat increases the intensity of the affective motiva-tion for the object will increase the magnitude of theendowment effect (increase PS/PC).

Because the endowment effect is driven bythe affective system, willpower depletion orunrelated cognitive demands, such as cogni-tive load, will magnify the endowment effect.Moreover, because affective intensity for theobject will magnify the impact of the affec-tive system, it will also magnify the endow-ment effect. We know of no evidence for R-7.But there is support for the role of affectiveintensity for the object, Prediction R-8. Con-siderable research suggests that the endow-ment effect is more pronounced for outcomessuch as changes in health status (see, forinstance, Thaler, 1980). In one meta-analysis,Horowitz and McConnell (2002) found that,whereas the mean ratio of willingness to ac-cept relative to willingness to pay for ordinaryprivate goods was 2.9, this ratio was 10.1 forgoods involving health and safety. Whilehealth outcomes differ from other outcomesin many ways, they are frequently associatedwith strong emotional reactions, and are thus

more vulnerable to the effect of loss aversionand related features of the affective system.

Discussion

Taking account of the interplay between affectand deliberation helps to make sense of severalimportant behavioral effects in the literature ondecision making under risk, and it also leads tonovel predictions about specific behaviors. Be-yond the phenomena and predictions just outlined,the same framework could potentially shed lighton and generate novel predictions concerning avariety of risk-related phenomena. For instance,the model can be used to understand the effects oftemporal proximity on risk-taking. There is a greatdeal of evidence that temporal proximity is animportant determinant of fear responses. As theprospect of an uncertain aversive event ap-proaches in time, fear tends to increase even whencognitive assessments of the probability or likelyseverity of the event remain constant (Loewen-stein, 1987; Roth et al., 1996). Similarly, after themoment of peak risk recedes into the past (e.g.,after a near-accident), fear lingers for some period,but dissipates over time. Evidence that temporalproximity can influence risk behaviors comesfrom studies wherein people initially agree to dovarious embarrassing activities in exchange forpayment, but then closer to the time when theactivity has to be performed, change their minds(Van Boven et al., 2005). Moreover, consistentwith changes in the affective state of fear being thecause, subjects who were shown a film clip de-signed to induce fear (from Kubrick’s “The Shin-ing”) right before they made their initial decisionwere much less likely to choose to perform, andhence less likely to change their minds when theso-called “moment of truth” arrived.

Social Preferences

Humans experience a wide range of socialemotions, from powerful empathic responses,such as sympathy and sadness, to more negativeemotions, such as anger and envy. To give aflavor for how our two-system perspective canbe applied to social preferences, in this sectionwe apply our model to one specific social mo-tive—altruism—and its associated affect—sympathy. The perspective we suggest is thatthe deliberative system has a stable concern forothers driven by moral and ethical principles for


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how one ought to behave. The affective system,in contrast, is driven toward anything betweenpure self-interest and extreme altruism depend-ing on the degree of sympathy that is triggered.8

Suppose that each option x in the choice set Xis a pair of payoffs x � (xS, xO), where xS is apayoff for oneself and xO is a payoff for anotherperson. The deliberative system puts some sta-ble weight � on the other person’s payoff, andso its utility function is U(x) � xS � �xO. Theaffective system, in contrast, puts a variableweight on the other person’s payoff that de-pends on the degree of sympathy that the personcurrently feels toward the other. Because thedegree of sympathy is naturally interpreted asthe intensity of affect, the affective system’smotivational function is M(x, a) � xS � axO.

Incorporating these functions into Equation1, the person will choose the option x thatmaximizes

V(x) � [xs � xo] � h(W, �)[xs � axo]. (4)

One motivation for the assumptions in thissection comes from studies of other-regardingbehavior in animals, which, again, we take asevidence for what drives the affective system.Animals, including monkeys and rats, can bepowerfully moved by the plight of others (for anoverview, see Preston & de Waal, 2002). At thesame time, other-regarding behavior is not al-ways observed in animals. Masserman, Wech-kin, and Terris (1964), for instance, found thatprosocial behavior in primates (aiding anotheranimal that was being subjected to electricshocks) was more likely in animals that hadexperienced shock themselves, was enhancedby familiarity with the shocked individual, andwas nonexistent when it was a different speciesof animal. Perhaps stretching the terminologyused in this article we can interpret these find-ings as a decrease in proximity leading to re-duced concern for others.

Research by Joshua Greene and colleagues(Greene et al., 2001, 2004) provides neural evi-dence on our perspective. They compared howpeople react to “personal” moral judgments,which involve doing personal harm to another—for example, pushing a person in front of atrolley to stop it from hitting five other people—with how they react to “impersonal” moraljudgments—for example, flicking a switch sothat the trolley turns to another track and only

hits one person instead of five. They proposedthat such judgments are made using a combina-tion of cognitive processes that argue for utili-tarian judgments and emotional processes thatdeter one from doing direct harm to others.Consistent with this view, they found that af-fective regions of the brain, such as areas of thetemporal sulcus and posterior cingulate, are ac-tivated more for personal moral judgments thanfor impersonal moral judgments, whereas delib-erative areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontalcortex, are activated more in the opposite set-ting (and it has long been known that people areless likely to make the utilitarian judgment forthe personal moral dilemma).9 In the same vein,more recent research has shown that patientswith brain damage to affective regions, such asthe ventromedial prefrontal cortex, are morelikely to make utilitarian, impersonal moraljudgments, even in highly personal settings(Koenigs et al., 2007).

Predictions

Maximizing Equation 4 is equivalent to max-imizing V(x) � xS � �a�xO, where �a� �� h�W, ��a� ⁄ �1 � h�W, ��. Hence, the per-son’s choice will reflect an effective concern forothers that is a weighted average of the delib-erative concern � and the affective concern a.Moreover, the affective system can push behav-ior toward more or less concern for others rel-ative to the deliberative optimum. In situationswhere there is very little sympathy triggered inthe affective system, the affective system willpush behavior closer to pure self-interest—asreflected by a � implying �a� �. Incontrast, in situations where there are very highlevels of sympathy triggered in the affectivesystem, the affective system will push behaviortoward more altruism—as reflected by a � �implying �a� � �.

8 Note that in general, sympathy and altruism are notidentical: Altruism may stem from sympathy, if behavior iscontrolled by the affective system, or it may stem frommoral principles, if behavior is controlled by the delibera-tive system.

9 Though note that Greene et al. (2004) suggest that therelationship between cognition and emotion may not be thissimple; that is, certain limbic areas, such as the anteriorcingulate cortex, may also be involved in detecting conflictbetween emotion and cognition, and in recruiting prefrontalcortex control of emotional regions to resolve this conflict.


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To generate testable predictions, we apply thegeneral predictions of our model.

Social Choice Prediction #1 (S-1): An increase in h(W,�) will increase �a� when affective intensity is high(a � �) and decrease �a� when affective intensity islow (a �).

Social Choice Prediction #2 (S-2): Any factor thatincreases the intensity of the affective motivation willincrease �a�.

S-1 reflects that the effects of willpower de-pletion or unrelated cognitive demands, such ascognitive load, depend on the degree of sympa-thy experienced. Specifically, when a personexperiences little or no sympathy our modelpredicts that willpower depletion or cognitiveload should reduce the likelihood of an altruisticact. In contrast, when a person experiences highsympathy our model predicts that willpowerdepletion or cognitive load should increase thelikelihood of an altruistic act.

Gailliot et al. (2007) provide support for theeffects of willpower depletion when sympathyis low. Specifically, in a task involving hypo-thetical questions about charitable giving andhelping behavior toward strangers—both argu-ably low-sympathy situations—they found thatsubjects with higher willpower depletion wereindeed less altruistic. There is also evidence onthe effects of affective intensity (S-2). Perhapsthe most direct evidence comes from a study byBatson et al. (1995) on empathy-induced altru-ism. They manipulated subjects’ empathy to-ward a target individual by having them read ashort description of that individual’s need whiletaking an objective perspective (low empathy)or while trying to imagine how that individualfeels (high empathy). They then gave subjectsthe opportunity to help the target despite the factthat doing so would violate some moral princi-ple of justice such as random allocations orallocation based on need. Consistent with S-2,they found that subjects in the high-empathytreatment were much more likely to help thetarget individual.

S-2 also helps to explain why people treatstatistical deaths differently than identifiableones, since foreknowledge of who will die (orwhich group deaths will come from) creates amore vivid—and evocative—image of the con-sequences (see Schelling, 1968; Bohnet & Frey,1999; Slovic, 2007, Small & Loewenstein,2003, for an experimental demonstration).

A recent study by Small et al. (2007) pro-vides further support for our perspective on therole of identifiability. Small et al. provided sub-jects with the opportunity to donate to a charity,and manipulated whether subjects were shownan identifiable victim (a picture and a descrip-tion of a little girl) or a statistical victim (factualinformation about the overall problem). Theyalso manipulated the extent to which peoplewere primed to think more deliberatively. Theyfound that deliberative thought decreased dona-tions to the identifiable victim, but did not affectdonations to the statistical victim. Under theplausible assumption that the affective systemplays a major role in donations to the identifi-able victim and but not in donations to thestatistical victim, these results are what ourmodel (Prediction S-2) predicts.

While we have focused our analysis solely onthe simple social motive of altruism, researchershave discussed other social motives as well. Forinstance, there is a large literature that focuseson people’s concerns for relative payoffs(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,1999; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Messick & Sen-tis, 1985). In principle, our model could beapplied to these concerns as well; however,because both concerns would seem to have botha deliberative and an affective component, it isnot entirely obvious what to assume about themotives of the two systems. Similarly, anotherarea our approach could be applied to is gametheoretic decision making. Groups of decisionmakers are frequently able to avoid rational, butinefficient, outcomes, such as defection in pris-oner’s dilemma type games. While there aremany reasons why decision makers cooperate inthis manner, affective impulses, that are espe-cially pronounced with close others, may playan important role in explaining this behavior.

Discussion

There is a great deal of evidence that people’sdecisions are influenced by both affective anddeliberative processes. Whereas standard con-sequentialist models focus, for the most part, ondeliberative processes, our main contribution inthis article has been to develop a formal modelto incorporate affective processes. In particular,we have modeled the impact of affective pro-cesses using a motivation function that is myo-pic, that displays loss aversion and is insensitive


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to probabilities, and that is influenced by sym-pathy and empathy concerns. The impact of thismotivation function on behavior is increasing inthe affective intensity of the stimuli in consid-eration, increasing in unrelated cognitive de-mands, such as cognitive load, and decreasingin the willpower possessed by the decisionmaker. We have shown that our model canexplain a range of psychological, behavioraland neuroscientific results regarding intertem-poral, risky and interpersonal decision making,and generates some new predictions that havenot yet been tested.

Ours is not the first dual-process model ofdecision making. Metcalfe and Mischel’s(1999) hot/cool model and Fazio and Towles-Schwen’s (1999) MODE model, for example,propose that behavior is the product of twosystems: one emotional and the other cognitive.Metcalfe and Mischel use their model to under-stand the effect of willpower, and Fazio andTowles-Schwen apply their model to attitudeformation and other aspects of social judgment.Our model differs from these two important andinfluential approaches in its focus on preferen-tial choice and its ability to make quantitativepredictions in this domain.

These properties make our model similar toformal dual-process theories of intertemporalchoice in economics (Benhabib & Bisin, 2005;Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg &Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler &Shefrin, 1981). Indeed some of our assump-tions—such as those of affective myopia—resemble those made by these approaches, andmany of the insights presented by these ap-proaches hold for our model as well. What isunique about our model is its ability to makepredictions across a number of different do-mains, including both intertemporal and riskychoice, as well as social choice. These predic-tions rely on a small set of fundamental princi-ples—such as the sensitivity of emotion to prox-imity and vividness, the consequentialist natureof deliberation, and the role of willpower inresolving the conflict between these two sys-tems—principles that are firmly grounded inpsychology and neuroscience. Our model canthus be seen as generalizing these existing ap-proaches, and subsequently extending the de-scriptive and conceptual scope of dual processtheory for preferential choice.

Our model also resembles a prior dual-process theory in psychology. ParticularlyMukherjee (2010) builds upon an early versionof our model (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue,2004) to study risk preferences in detail. As inLoewenstein & O’Donoghue (2004), Mukher-jee assumes a deliberative and an affective sys-tem interact to determine behavior, where eachhas its own objective function, and behavior isdetermined by a weighted sum of the two ob-jective functions. Also as in Loewenstein &O’Donoghue (2004), for the domain of riskpreferences, Mukherjee assumes that the delib-erative system focuses on expected valuewhereas the affective system is influenced byloss aversion and a complete insensitivity toprobabilities (Mukherjee further assumes thatthe affective system is also influenced by dimin-ishing sensitivity). Mukherjee then investigatesthe implications of this model for a number ofwell-known decision problems that haveemerged in the prospect theory literature: vio-lations of stochastic dominance, the nature ofrisk attitudes, ambiguity aversion, the commonconsequence effect, the common ratio effect,and the isolation effect. However, Mukherjee’sanalysis does not focus on the impact of will-power, cognitive load, or affective intensity,which is a primary focus of our article. Moreover,when we apply our model to risk preferences, wefocus on implications for a completely differentset of risk contexts—specifically, for four fre-quently studied experimental paradigms: elicitingmonetary certainty equivalents for monetary gam-bles, eliciting monetary certainty equivalents fornonmonetary gambles, decisions whether to ac-cept or reject mixed (gain-loss) gambles, and theendowment effect.

There are a number of directions in which tofurther expand upon our framework. Perhapsthe most important is to more fully explore thedynamics of willpower. We have provided anoutline of how willpower can change during thetime course of the decision process, leading toswitches midway through choice; however,there are even more nuanced willpower dynam-ics. For instance, some, albeit preliminary, stud-ies have found support for the idea that, inaddition to being depleted in the short-term byexertion, willpower, like a muscle, may becomestrengthened in the long-term through repeateduse (Muraven et al., 1999). More importantly,people’s behavior might also reflect their at-


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tempts to manage their use of willpower. Thereis in fact experimental evidence, in a version ofthe Baumeister paradigm, that people do havesome awareness of the dynamic properties ofwillpower and take these into account in a stra-tegic fashion (Muraven, 1998).

A second direction in which to expand ourframework is to study people’s assessments oftheir own behaviors. Because such assessmentsare an inherently cognitive task, they will nat-urally tend to exaggerate the role played bydeliberation. In effect, one could say that thedeliberative self egocentrically views itself as incontrol and commensurately underestimates theinfluence of affect (see Wegner & Wheatley,1999). This failure to appreciate the role ofaffect in behavior can have a negative impact onefforts at self-control.

An implication of failing to appreciate therole of affect is that people will exaggerate theimportance of willpower as a determinant ofself-control. People who are thin often believethey are thin because of willpower, and thatthose who are less fortunate exhibit a lack ofwillpower. However, it is far more likely thatthose who are thin are blessed (at least in timesof plentiful food) with a high metabolism or awell-functioning ventromedial hypothalamus(which regulates hunger and satiation). Indeed,obese people who go to the extraordinary lengthof stapling their stomach to lose weight oftenreport that they have a sudden experience of“willpower” despite the obvious fact that sta-pling one’s stomach affects hunger rather thanwillpower (Gawande, 2001). It is easy and nat-ural for those who lack drives and impulses fordrugs, food, and sex to condemn, and hence tobe excessively judgmental and punitive, towardthose who are subject to them—to assume thatthese behaviors result from a generalized char-acter deficit, a deficiency in willpower. Simi-larly, the rich, who are not confronted with theconstant task of reigning in their desires, arelikely to judge the short-sighted behaviors of thepoor too harshly. There is in fact recent evi-dence that people who are in elevated affectivestates tend to have a much more acute appreci-ation of the power of drives and the limitationsof self-control than those who are affectivelyneutral states (Nordgren et al., 2007).

A third direction in which to expand ourframework is to take it to specific domains inorder to develop more detailed model specifi-

cations and quantitative predictions. Mathemat-ical models have two types of goals: (a) devel-oping precise qualitative predictions, and (b)developing precise quantitative predictions. Ouranalysis in this article has focused exclusivelyon the former—for example, deriving precisequalitative predictions for the directional impactof cognitive load, willpower depletion, and af-fective intensity on various behavioral out-comes. As such, we have imposed relativelylittle general structure on the deliberative utilityfunction U, the affective motivational functionM, and the cost function h for mobilizing will-power. But if researchers take our framework tospecific domains, it will be natural to im-pose—or better yet estimate—a more fullyspecified model, and to use that model to gen-erate more quantitative predictions. Such aquantitative analysis would also help in com-paring our model with the nested baseline ra-tional model (which would involve only thedeliberative utility function, U).

After decades of domination by a cognitiveperspective, in recent decades affect has cometo the fore as a topic of great interest amongpsychologists. In this article, we attempt to in-tegrate many of the findings from research con-ducted by psychologists and decision research-ers interested in affect by proposing a formalmodel of interactions between affect and delib-eration that can both explain existing findingsand also generates testable but as yet untestedpredictions. If further testing substantiates thesepredictions, and hence the model, this couldconstitute the first step toward a formal theoret-ical perspective that integrates two major sidesof human judgment and behavior.

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Received June 10, 2013Revision received September 22, 2014

Accepted December 17, 2014 �

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Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation · Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation George Loewenstein Carnegie Mellon University Ted O’Donoghue Cornell

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