Miyasaki_Can Nietzsche’s Noble be Moral and Just.doc

8/11/2019 Miyasaki_Can Nietzsches Noble be Moral and Just.doc

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Can Nietzsches Noble be Moral and Just?

ABSTRACT

Nietzsche endorses a positive value system rounded in his concept o! the "ill to po"er# a

$noble alternative to the $slavish# li!e%denyin values he believes characterize modern &uropean

morality' This value system is usually interpreted as an alternative to morality and social (ustice#

rather than as the basis o! a competin morality or conception o! (ustice' Because Nietzsche

!ounds his values in the a!!irmation o! po"er# they appear to be incompatible "ith the

responsibility to others that characterizes any authentic morality or theory o! (ustice' )n this

paper# ) arue# on the contrary# that Nietzsches values are not only !ully compatible "ith

morality# but also *"hether intentionally or not+ conducive to an ealitarian conception o! social

(ustice' ) de!end this vie" by re(ectin t"o common misconceptions, -+ the vie" that the "ill to

po"er is inseparable !rom domination and .+ the vie" that the noble mode o! evaluation

presupposes and promotes social hierarchy' ) arue that Nietzsches values do not promote

po"er in a sense that necessitates moral harm or social ine/uality# and that his analysis o! slave

morality entails that its overcomin is possible only throuh the achievement o! social e/uality'

0ey"ords, Nietzsche# morality# (ustice# domination# ealitarianism# e/uality


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-' Introduction

)n On the Genealogy of Morals# Nietzsche distinuishes bet"een t"o !undamental types

o! value systems that he calls $noble morality and $slave morality' The Genealogyis a "or1

larely concerned "ith tracin the historical oriins o! one speci!ic instance o! the slavish type,

namely# modern &uropean morality# "hich Nietzsche believes oriinates "ith the birth o!

Christianity as a !orm o! spiritual revene aainst the political oppression o! the Roman &mpire'

&uropean morality# on Nietzsches vie"# is an indirect spiritual insurrection# made necessary by

the practical impossibility o! true political retaliation' )t is a revolt that ta1es the !orm o! a ne"

morality created throuh the inversion o! the oppressors value system# one that identi!ies the

noble class# and its values# as $evil rather than $ood'

2hile this account purports to be an historical in/uiry# it is also a criti/ue' Nietzsche

vie"s modern &uropean morality *and the slavish !orm o! values in eneral+ as essentially li!e%

denyin and detrimental to human !lourishin' 3o"ever# the Genealogyis not only a critical

"or1' )t also the beinnin o! a less e4plicit# and o!ten inored or dismissed# positive pro(ect in

Nietzsches "or1, to articulate alternative values to replace those that dominate the modern

"estern "orld# values that embody the li!e%a!!irmin character he attributes to the noble !orm o!

values' This is# it should be stressed# a demand !or a return to aform o! value%system5and not a

return to the speci!ic values o! any particular historical people'

6! course# Nietzsche is a sel!%proclaimed $immoralist' So the alternative to &uropean

morality he presents# a noble value system rounded in the primary values o! po"er and the "ill

to po"er# is not a morality in the conventional sense' 7et he does clearly endorse a ne" set o!

values' And "hile he has no intention o! producin a ne" morality# he need not# and never

e4plicitly claims to# re(ect morality as such' 3is criti/ue o! morality is# !irst o! all# a criti/ue o!

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one particular historical morality and the !orm o! value%system it represents' - )t is a criti/ue that

depends not on that value%systems status as moral# but upon its neative conse/uences !or

human !lourishin "hich# !or Nietzsche# is e/uivalent to the !lourishin o! humanitys hihest

individuals'

)n this paper ) "ill arue that Nietzsches alternative set o! values in the noble mode5

thouh rounded in the valorization o! po"er and not intended as a moral system5are

nonetheless compatible "ith morality and conducive to an ealitarian conception o! social

(ustice' That is to say# Nietzsches sel!%proclaimed noble values can round a morality that is

also conducive to the promotion o! social e/uality5a surprisin suestion# to be sure' And )

should stress that ) do not claim Nietzsche does or "ould endorse such a morality or such a

notion o! (ustice# only that he may consistently do so' My intention is !irst and !oremost to

de!eat the common assumption that Nietzsches philosophy is inherently anti%moral and anti%

ealitarian# and that# conse/uently# his principal interest to moral and political thouht is as

nothin more than a provocative critic aainst "hich our ethical intuitions and ideals are to be

tested' There are# beneath the cruel rhetoric and o!ten blind pre(udice o! Nietzsches moral and

political declarations# positive possibilities that have been overloo1ed not only by his

interpreters# but also by Nietzsche himsel!'

) "ill bein "ith a brie! e4planation o! Nietzsches distinction o! noble and slavish

values# !ollo"ed by a discussion o! Nietzsches suestion o! alternative values in the noble

mode# values !ounded in the a!!irmation o! po"er' ) "ill claim that Nietzsches noble# po"er%

a!!irmin values are compatible "ith morality and discuss t"o 1ey ob(ections to this claim, -+

the ob(ection that because po"er is inseparable !rom domination# values rounded in the

-8or e4cellent discussions o! the e4tent o! Nietzsches criti/ue o! morality# see 9eiter .::., ;


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a!!irmation o! po"er are incompatible "ith moral concern !or others# and .+ the ob(ection that

noble values are inseparable !rom social hierarchy' ) "ill then propose that Nietzsches noble

values are both compatible "ith and conducive to ealitarian !orms o! (ustice' ) "ill !irst

respond to the possible ob(ection that ealitarian values are an e4pression o! slave values'

8inally# ) "ill sho" that Nietzsches conception o! (ustice provides a noble motivation to

promote e/uality# because it is only throuh the achievement o! social e/uality that slavish

values can be overcome'

2. Noble and Slavish Values and Nietzsches Value of Power

Throuhout his later "ritins# Nietzsche attempts to articulate a positive# evaluative

concept o! nobility# one that is independent o! political connotation# and desinatin a

psycholoical type rather than a social or political position' 2hile he !ails to clearly de!ine "hat

counts as nobility o! character5he usually relies on overly eneral# ambiuous re!erences to

spiritual strenth# !ree%spiritedness# responsibility and the li1e5he does /uite clearly identi!y the

oriin and !orm o! noble values'

The desination o! these values as $noble is not accidental since# !or Nietzsche# both the

noble as a psycholoical type# and the noble !orm o! values# oriinate historically in a politically

privileed people or class' A noble peoples values# he tells us# directly re!lect the success and

privilee o! that roup by havin sel!%a!!irmation as the !oundation o! their concept o! oodness'

These values simply celebrate the achieved "ell%bein o! a people# identi!yin# preservin# and

enhancin an already%attained level o! "ell%bein' Noble values are# then# primarily a!!irmative

in character' The noble concept o! the ood is a direct a!!irmation o! a positively%evaluated


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condition# producin "hat Nietzsche calls a morality o! $sel!%lori!ication *B@& .:+' . Such a

morality beins "ith the nobles positive evaluation o! their o"n po"er# success# and happiness#

and secondarily derives its concept o! the $bad relative to that primary sel!%a!!irmin value' 6!

the noble mode o! evaluation he says, $)t acts and ro"s spontaneously# it see1s its opposite only

so as to a!!irm itsel! more rate!ully and triumphantly5its neative concept $lo"# $common#

$bad is only a subse/uently%invented# pale# contrastin imae in relation to its positive basic

concept *@M ), -:+' This noble !orm o! values and o! value creation is# in turn# directly opposed

to the !orm that values ta1e amon an oppressed class or people# the !orm o! value system that

Nietzsche labels $slave morality' )n slave morality# oodness is de!ined as the neation#

reduction# or elimination o! the bad or $evil,

2hile every noble morality develops !rom a triumphant a!!irmation o! itsel!# slave

morality !rom the outset says No to "hat is $outside# "hat is $di!!erent# "hat is $not

itsel! and thisNo is its creative deed ' ' ' in order to e4ist# slave morality al"ays !irst

needs a hostile e4ternal "orld it needs# physioloically spea1in# e4ternal stimuli inorder to act at all5its action is !undamentally reaction' *@M ), -:+

So# in Nietzsches attempt to trace the oriins o! modern &uropean morality# he has also

identi!ied t"o basic and opposed !orms that value%systems may ta1e, noble or slavish' These are

not speci!ic moralities# but basic cateories into "hich Nietzsche believes every value%system

must !all' Noble values have their !oundation in the identi!ication and promotion o! positive

conditions o! happiness# !rom "hich the concept o! the bad is then derived secondarily as the

privation o! the ood' Slavish values# in contrast# are !ounded in the identi!ication o!

unhappiness and conditions o! unhappiness# !rom "hich the concept o! the ood is then

secondarily derived as the neation o! evil' Nietzsche spea1s loosely o! these cateories as

.All re!erences to Nietzsches "or1 use the standard abbreviations !or the &nlish titles, A- The Antichrist#BGE%

Beyond Good and Evil# DDaybreak# &3 DEcce Homo# @M On the Genealogy of Morality# @S- The Gay

cience# 33 DH!man All Too H!man# T) T"ilight of the #dols# and E Th!s $oke %arath!stra'

F


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$noble morality and $slave morality5ho"ever# it should be noted that the basic distinction is

one o! values enerally# rather than speci!ically moral values'

This distinction o! noble and slavish values is the !oundation not only o! Nietzsches

criti/ue o! modern &uropean morality# but also o! his positive pro(ect o! producin an alternative

to those values' Althouh he does not e4plicitly present his alternative as a !ully !ormed value%

system# all o! his "or1 a!ter the Genealogyassumes a conception o! the human ood rounded in

the Genealogys criti/ue o! the harm!ul e!!ects o! slave morality upon human !lourishin'

Throuhout his later "ritins he ma1es consistent use o! an evaluative lanuae o! ood and bad#

healthyGstron and decadentG"ea1# noble and slavish#

distinctions that reveal Nietzsches

commitment to a set o! primary values correspondin in !orm to those o! the noble type' 9i1e

the historical value%systems he associates "ith political nobility# Nietzsches positive values

bein "ith the identi!ication o! the condition o! human happiness as the ood# and the secondary

derivation o! the concept o! the bad as the privation o! that condition' 8or Nietzsche# that

condition and primary value is the value o! po"er'

This identi!ication o! Nietzsches values is most e4plicit in one o! his !inal ma(or "or1s#

The Anti-&hrist' There he presents a eneral claim about the human ood rounded in his

concept o! po"er *die Macht+' )t is po"er that rounds human "ell%bein# and it is the

promotion o! po"er that constitutes human !lourishin, $2hat is ood? Hg!tI D All that heihtens

the !eelin o! po"er Hdas Gef'hl der MachtI# the "ill to po"er Hden (illen )!r MachtI# po"er

itsel! in man' 2hat is happiness? D The !eelin that po"er increases D that a resistance is

overcome *A .+' The $bad *schlecht+# on the other hand# is simply the lac1 o! the ood as he has

de!ined it it is $all that proceeds !rom "ea1ness' Conse/uently# the bad e4ists only relative to

6n ood and bad# see @M ), -; on nobility# strenth# and "ea1ness# see B@& .::# .-.# and Chapter =# $2hat is

Noble? on health# sic1ness# and decadence# see T) ., -%-. F, .#


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an independently determined# primary conception o! the ood' 2ithout the comparison to states

o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er# there "ould be no basis !or the (udment o! $bad'

So the Nietzschean concept o! the ood is# enerally# the a!!irmation o! po"er as

intrinsically valuable and the promotion o! the increase o! the !eelin o! po"er' ) "ill no" arue

that this basic value identi!ication o! oodness "ith po"er is# in principle# compatible "ith

morality' Admittedly# Nietzsches conception o! the ood is not a moral one' )t is# !irst o! all# not

clearly normative' Nietzsche relies upon these values !or the evaluation o! persons and actions#

but does not claim that human beins have a moral duty to promote the ood or resist the bad'See# !or e4ample# anto -=F, .-F 3ollindale -=F, -F>% and 0au!mann -=F:, ->F%' &ach vie"s the "ill to

po"er as intrinsically a !orm o! domination o! or violence upon the outside "orld' 2hile this is the common vie"#

the essential connection o! "ill to po"er to domination has usually been ta1en !or ranted "ithout e4plicit

arument# since Nietzsche o!ten spea1s o! the "ill to po"er in connection "ith violence and domination' This is noaccident, Nietzsche does indeed believe that these are common conse/uences o! the "ill to po"er# but the /uestion

!or our purposes is "hether or not they are a necessaryconse/uence o! the "ill to po"er' ) arue belo" that they are

not'

=


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$li!e%a!!irmin *@M ))),->+# and $creative *B@& .--+' )n every case the emphasis is upon

po"ers positive etymoloical oriin in the verb $to ma1e or $to do *machen+, po"er is

identi!ied and measured as the production o! e!!ects# not measured neatively as the limitation or

control o! other po"ers'

Admittedly# the !act that the "ill to po"er is !undamentally determined as positive

activity does not mean that it does not have neative e!!ects' &very e!!ective action is the

neation o! the conditions it chanes# shapes# or trans!orms# "hich is "hy Nietzsche !amously

claims that $li!e operates essentially# that is in its basic !unctions# throuh in(ury# assault#

e4ploitation# destruction and simply cannot be thouht o! at all "ithout this character *@M )),

-.+' $9i!e is# he claims# $essentially appropriation# in(ury# overpo"erin *B@& .F=+' Surely#

"e miht be tempted to conclude# this settles the matter, li!e is !undamentally at odds "ith

morality human nature must be so as "ell'

3o"ever# this apparently obvious in!erence5one "hich Nietzsche sometimes dra"s5is

simply !alse' 2hat !ollo"s !rom the claim that e4ploitation *to choose only one description !rom

Nietzsches provocative list+ is an essential !eature o! li!e is simply that $e4ploitation in some

sense is a necessary !eature o! every action' 3o"ever# this does not in turn entail an

incompatibility bet"een human nature and morality' 8irst# it does not mean that humans have a

!undamental drive# desire# or "ill toe4ploit persons or thins' Conse/uently "e cannot conclude

the moral restraint o! e4ploitation is also a !rustration o! human desire# nature# or happiness' )t

only tells us that every action "ill involve e4ploitation# reardless o! "hat drives or desires

motivate the action' Second# it does not !ollo" that the e4ploitation that essentially characterizes

every human action is $e4ploitation in an ethically problematic sense' Not only does this not

!ollo" it is clearly !alse' 8or i! e4ploitation is an essential !eature o! li!e# then the sense o!

$e4ploitation *or $in(ury# $assault# $destruction# etc'+ that Nietzsche is usin must be broad

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enouh to describe every h!man action' Lnless "e are "illin to admit the absurd vie" that

every human activity is essentially immoral# then surely this is not $e4ploitation in a morally

relevant sense' Because Nietzsche is attemptin to characterize li!e as such# these descriptions

are so eneral as to be almost empty o! content "hen applied to the /uestion o! social and ethical

in(ury# violence# or domination amon persons'

Conse/uently# a "ill or tendency to heihten ones po"er is not necessarily a desire to

increase po"er relative to anothers po"er' Nor is it a desire to decrease anothers po"er, $the

state in "hich "e hurt others ' ' ' is a sin that "e are still lac1in po"er *@S -+' = Rather# to

increase po"er is !undamentally to increase ones po"er in relation to ones o"n activity, to

enhance and e4ercise ones abilities# to increase ones ability to act# to do# or to produce# not

unli1e the contemporary usae o! the term $empo"erment' $&very animal# Nietzsche says#

$instinctively strives !or an optimum o! !avorable conditions under "hich it can e4pend all its

strenth *@M ))), ;+' The "ill to po"er is not# then# measured by the e!!ect o! ones po"er upon

others# but accordin to ones ability to act# to mani!est or e4pend strenth' )ndividual human

po"er is primarily the cultivation o! capability# independence o! action# and sel!%mastery it is

not primarily or necessarily a matter o! havin more po"er than# or po"er over# someone else *o!

overpo"erin# dominatin# or e4ploitin+'-:

=That the increase o! the sub(ects $po"er in the sense o! relevant to $"ill to po"er does not necessitate a decrease

in anothers po"er should be evident !rom Nietzsches repeated suestion that relationships o! strule or

resistance are not obstacles to the "ill to po"er but rather its essence or precondition *@S -# T) F,# =,> A :# F;B@&


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Moreover# "hen Nietzsche connects oodness to po"er# his stress is not on the increase

o! po"er simply but rather upon the increase o! the !eelin o! and "ill to po"er *$All that

heihtens thefeeling ofpo"er# the "ill topo"er' ' ' ' Thefeeling thatpo"er increases+' Both o!

these conditions5the !eelin o! po"er and the "ill to po"er5can be increased independently o!

any increase in ones po"er measured in relation to anothers' That is# one can !eel po"er!ul#

and one can "ill or strive to be po"er!ul# "ithout possessin reater po"er than another' There

is no necessary inverse relationship bet"een the level o! ones o"n !eelin o! po"er and the

po"er o! another' This emphasis upon !eelin o! po"er rather than po"er is# then# a !urther

indication that !or Nietzsche po"er is primarily positive and productive5the measure o! po"er

is the positive criterion o! the ability to act# not the neative criterion o! the e!!ect o! ones

actions upon another'-- Conse/uently# it is possible to enhance one sub(ects po"er or !eelin o!

po"er "ithout decreasin anothers'-. And i! the increase o! each sub(ects ood is in principle

compatible "ith the increase o! every other sub(ects ood# then it is possible !or a Nietzschean

morality o! po"er to consistently a!!irm and promote the ood o! every member o! the social

roup' A noble !orm o! morality is possible# because the promotion o! the others ood is not the

neation o! ones o"n' The basis o! noble morality5the primacy o! sel!%a!!irmation in the

desires lead to action# the very !orce or drive o! human action' )t does not presuppose !irst order desires but is the

condition !or their e!!icacy'--@olomb has made a similar point, $A man possessin a !ull sense o! positive po"er does not need to e4ploit others

to con!irm and enhance his o"n sel!' 3ence# only such an individual can allo" himsel! to reard others not as a

means only# but also as ends in themselves *-=>=, .=+'-.Admittedly# Nietzsches psycholoy does suest the necessity o! aonistic relations o! tension and strule

amon sub(ects' 3o"ever# this crucial !eature o! Nietzsches understandin o! human motivation and activity hasusually been interpreted either in too voluntaristic a !ashion *as thouh the "ill to po"er "ere a conscious desire to

enter into con!lict+ or too moralistically *as thouh the "ill to po"er "ere a purely vindictive desire to decrease thepo"er o! another+' 3o"ever# Nietzsches identi!ication o! con!lict at the heart o! every action must be read

descriptively not moralistically, it does not re/uire that these aonistic relations ta1e speci!ically violent or

destructive !orms or have necessarily neative ethical conse/uences !or either party in a relationship' A!ter all# the

most stri1in aspect o! Nietzsches po"er psycholoy is that he interprets every human interaction# even the mostinnocuous or apparently altruistic# as essentially aonistic5not (ust relations o! overt con!lict' 8or an e4cellent

e4planation o! the compatibility o! altruistic activity and eoistic motivation in Nietzsches psycholoy# see

Reinster .:::'

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conception o! the ood5remains intact even "hen Nietzsches po"er%centered conception o! the

ood is e4panded to include the ood o! others'

$. The Indeendence of Noble Values from Social %ierarch!

The conclusion that a noble morality based in the value o! po"er is possible miht seem

surprisin# and Nietzsche "ould surely not endorse such a morality' Nonetheless# such a

morality is thorouhly compatible "ith Nietzsches o"n account o! the oriin o! noble values'

This may not# at !irst# appear to be the case' Most interpreters assume# based on Nietzsches

description o! the oriin o! noble values in an aristocratic social caste# that social hierarchy and

domination are a precondition !or noble values' Conse/uently# noble values re/uire social

ine/uality either !or their production or their support5a re/uirement incompatible "ith morality'

This ob(ection is based on a mista1en e/uation o! the noble as a psycholoical type "ith the

$master# that is# "ith a social position o! po"er over others' Thouh Nietzsche historically

connects the development o! noble values to a position o! political privilee# ) "ill arue that

social hierarchy and political domination are not necessary to noble values' Moreover# any set o!

values that re/uires social domination "ill con!orm to Nietzsches description o! $slave values

rather than that o! $noble values'

Nietzsches discussion o! the historical oriins o! noble values in On the Genealogy of

Morality appears to suest that the creation o! noble values is a direct product o! the condition

o! belonin to a privileed and more po"er!ul social roup' This leads some commentators to

suest that noble values *and# conse/uently# a noble morality rounded in Nietzsches values+

are impossible "ithout the division o! the community into hiher and lo"er# more and less

po"er!ul# dominatin and dominated'- But althouh Nietzsche does historically associate noble

values "ith a master class that dominates a "ea1er class# "e cannot directly conclude that social

-See# !or e4ample# Stron -=;F, ., $Master morality al"ays implies an oppressed class and Appel -==='

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domination is a precondition o! noble values' &ven i! social mastery can be the basis o! noble

evaluation# it need not be the only possible basis' More importantly# social mastery may not

directly be the basis o! noble evaluation at all'

Althouh it is a $master class that !ounds values o! the noble type# Nietzsche does not

ive any indication that this is only because it occupies the social position o! master' 3e does# in

contrast# ma1e it /uite clear that the slave class produces slavish values simply because o! its

social condition o! oppression' )n other "ords# social domination is indeed a direct basis !or the

production o! slavish values' The essentially neative nature o! slave morality directly re!lects

the misery o! the slaves actual condition, $Suppose the violated# oppressed# su!!erin# un!ree#

"ho are uncertain o! themselves and "eary# moralize, "hat "ill their moral valuations have in

common? robably# a pessimistic suspicion about the "hole condition o! man "ill !ind

e4pression# perhaps a condemnation o! man alon "ith his condition *B@& .:+' The slavish

concept o! the ood# as "e have seen# oriinates as a direct neation o! the hated other "ho

causes the slaves misery' )t is because the slave is dominated# or $denied the true reaction# that

o! deeds *@M ), -:+# that the slave ma1es its oppressor the neative measure o! moral value'

Slave values are characterized by a $lonin !or freedom# the instinct !or happiness and the

subtleties o! the !eelin o! !reedom *B@& .:+ precisely because they have their basis in the

absence o! !reedom and happiness' Conse/uently# "e "ould be /uite (usti!ied in assumin that

slave values re/uire !or their e4istence the condition o! social hierarchy# domination# or

oppression' But this is not the case "ith noble values'

The primary conditions that ive rise to the noble !orm o! values are simply those o!

"ell%bein and happiness5in Nietzsches lanuae# po"er and the !eelin o! po"er' Nietzsche

says that the noble $honors himsel! as one "ho is po"er!ul and as one $"ho has po"er over

himsel! *B@& .:+' The $basic concept o! noble evaluation# he tells us# is the assertion# $2e

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noble ones# "e ood# beauti!ul# happy ones *@M ), -:+ But i! the only precondition o! noble

sel!%a!!irmation *and thus o! noble values+ is happiness# then "e cannot directly conclude that

social mastery is also a precondition and that# conse/uently# social domination is necessary !or

the possibility o! a noble morality' 8or the round o! happiness !or Nietzsche is the !eelin o!

po"er and# as ) have arued above# there is no necessary connection bet"een po"er# the !eelin

o! po"er# and social domination' Noble values presuppose happiness5they re/uire an achieved

state o! po"er# ability# and "ell%bein !or their support' But they do not presuppose a happiness

that must come at the e4pense o! other individuals or entire social roups' Conse/uently# the

po"er that rounds noble morality need not be political po"er' Social masters may# than1s to the

po"er that social domination brins# be noble in character and in the !orm o! their values'

3o"ever# nobles need not be social masters' Noble values are independent o! political status and

the speci!ic conditions o! social hierarchy'

2e cannot# then# directly conclude !rom Nietzsches description o! noble values that all

values o! this !orm re/uire social hierarchy as their basis' More importantly# there is a very

stron reason !or completely re(ectin that conclusion, namely# any set o! values that re/uires the

e4istence o! an oppressed or neatively%evaluated other "ill correspond to Nietzsches

description o! slave values rather than noble values' That is# any morality that re/uires or

promotes social hierarchy is a slavish one'

To establish this# let us hypothetically consider the case o! a noble value%system that

re/uires or promotes social ine/uality' 2e shall see that such a case is# in !act# impossible' 8or

i! these values presuppose the condition o! social mastery over other persons# then that condition

must be included in the de!inition o! the ood in that value system' The concept o! the ood in

this hypothetical hierarchical noble morality "ould still be de!ined as po"er and the increased

!eelin o! po"er# but "ith the added stipulation that po"er is to be measured neatively aainst

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anothers po"er' This concept o! the ood "ould not consist simply o! the a!!irmation o! the

nobles o"n happiness# but "ould instead include the devaluation o! the slaves happiness' )n

other "ords# the nobles superiority "ould be determined relative to the slaves in!eriority' The

ood "ould be determined not as po"er# happiness# or pleasure simply# but "ould instead

depend upon comparison'

This is completely at odds "ith Nietzsches account o! noble values5indeed# so much

so# that such an interpretation mirrors his description o! slave morality' Nietzsche tells us that

the noble simply $!eel themselves to be happy they do not have to $establish their happiness

arti!icially by e4aminin their enemies *@M ), -:+' $The !ree man# accordin to Nietzsche#

$possess his measure o! value, loo1in upon others !rom himsel!# he honors or despises *@M )),

.+' 3o"ever# in any value system "here the ood re/uires the political subordination o! another#

the concept o! the ood is no loner primarily a!!irmative# as Nietzsche has claimed is the case

"ith noble values' 9i1e the slavish concept o! the ood# a hierarchical morality o! po"er beins

"ith a primary $No# a $need to direct ones vie" out"ard instead o! bac1 to onesel! *@M ), -:+'

Nietzsche describes this stratey o! value creation# one "hich a!!irms the sel! only in its

di!!erence !rom a devalued other# as $the essence o! resentment# "here resentment is the primary

characteristic o! the slave as a psycholoical type' The ood in this version o! noble morality is

little more than the neation o! the others e/uality and independence# or the neation o! ones

o"n "ea1ness as measured aainst the others strenth' 2hereas the noble type $e4periences

itselfas determinin values and sees itsel! as $that "hich !irst accords honor to thins *B@&

:+# this conception o! the ood is one in "hich the sub(ect needs the other in order to

determine its o"n value its value is rounded in comparison' Admittedly# noble values also

include comparison# but in precisely the opposite "ay, the noble determines its concept o! the

bad throuh comparison to itsel! as the ood' )n the case o! values that include the position o!

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social privilee in their conception o! the ood# on the contrary# the bad is not derived

secondarily' Rather# the ood presupposes the identi!ication o! the bad "ith the others e/uality#

independence# or po"er' This hypothetical version o! noble morality turns out to be a thorouhly

slavish interpretation o! nobility in "hich the individual a!!irms her o"n po"er only throuh the

neation o! anothers po"er' )t is no coincidence that this slavish interpretation o! nobility leads

to a purely neative concept o! po"er# the very same understandin o! po"er that is assumed in

conventional readins o! the "ill to po"er as a desire to overpo"er or dominate'

Lltimately# "e cannot vie" social hierarchy as a precondition !or noble values "ithout

seriously con!usin# and ultimately invertin# Nietzsches primary opposition o! noble and

slavish values' Conse/uently# Nietzsches cateory o! noble values does not re/uire or

presuppose a state o! social hierarchy# and there is no incompatibility bet"een noble values and

morality' As much as Nietzsche may have "anted to be an anti%moralist# to re(ect morality in its

entirety# nothin about his conceptions o! po"er# human nature# or nobility# re/uires that he ta1e

such a position'

$. The Possibilit! of a Noble &orm of '(alitarian )ustice

)t is a surprisin enouh conclusion that# !or all his critical !ury aainst morality#

Nietzsche has !ailed to completely dispose o! it# even on his o"n terms' This compatibility

bet"een Nietzsches values and morality has even more stri1in conse/uences !or the issue o!

social (ustice' )! a Nietzschean morality o! po"er is possible# there are no obvious obstacles to a

noble !orm o! social (ustice rounded in such a morality' 8or the principal obstacles to such a

!orm o! (ustice are identical to those ) have already addressed in relation to morality' 3o"ever# )

"ould li1e to o !urther than simply suestin the compatibility o! Nietzsches noble values and

(ustice' ) "ill no" arue that Nietzsches values are compatible "ith speci!ically ealitarian

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conceptions o! (ustice and that# indeed# these values are even conducive to ealitarian

conceptions o! (ustice'

)t miht seem obvious that Nietzsches values cannot possibly be compatible "ith

ealitarianism in any !orm' 3is disdain !or the concept o! $e/uality is "ell%1no"n# and his "or1

is !ull o! criticisms o! ealitarian ideals and political movements'-


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values' Moreover# since ealitarianism see1s to reduce the po"er o! the rulin classes# it is

clearly at odds "ith Nietzsches a!!irmation o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er'

This ob(ection is a variation upon the earlier discussed ob(ection to Nietzschean morality'

9i1e that ob(ection# it depends on the assumption that po"er is e/uivalent to or inseparable !rom

domination5a sense o! po"er that ) believe Nietzsche cannot consistently endorse' The demand

!or e/uality is an e4pression o! slavish values only i! it is a demand to eliminate or reduce

anothers po"er' But the demand !or e/ual po"er is not necessarily such a demand *no more# !or

e4ample# than a demand !or e/ual pay is a demand that others salaries be reduced to the level o!

ones o"n+' )t is so only i! the increase o! my po"er comes at e4pense o! anothers' That is to

say# ealitarianism is slavish only i! "e assume that the individuals ood# as de!ined by

Nietzsche# is essentially incompatible "ith the ood o! others' 8or only then "ould social

e/uality re/uire the reduction o! anothers po"er' ) have already arued that this is not the case'

Nietzsche understands the human ood in terms o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er# "hich can be

increased independently o! the po"er o! others it is measured primarily in relation to the

sub(ects ability to act rather than in relation to the e!!ects o! the sub(ects po"er upon others'

Conse/uently# the demand !or e/uality can be entirely a!!irmative5a demand !or the

ma4imization o! every individuals ood# since the ood o! every sub(ect can in principle be

bro!ght !$ to the same level' There are# "e miht say# slavish and noble conceptions o!

ealitarianism' The slavish !orm assumes the incompatibility o! human oods and demands

e/uality as mutual sacri!ice# "hile a noble !orm o! ealitarianism is characterized by the

assumption o! compatible oods and promotes the e/ual ma4imization o! po"er' These t"o

conceptions o! ealitarianism mirror Nietzsches o"n distinction bet"een t"o 1inds o! e/uality,

$the thirst !or e/uality can e4press itsel! either as a desire to dra" everyone do"n to onesel!

*throuh diminishin them# spyin on them# rippin them up+ or to raise onesel! and everyone

-=


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else up *throuh reconizin their virtues# helpin them# re(oicin in their success+ *3A ::+'

&/uality is not necessarily the neation o! the happiness or !lourishin o! those "ith reater

po"er it can instead be the promotion o! the po"er and happiness o! the une/ual' Conse/uently#

a noble !orm o! (ustice can include the promotion o! social e/uality in its conception o! the ood'

*. '+ualit! as the Precondition of ,astin( Noble Value S!stems

) "ould no" li1e to ta1e the arument a !inal step !urther, ) "ill arue that Nietzsches

values are not merely compatible "ith# but also conducive to# ealitarian (ustice' Speci!ically#

because o! their noble !orm Nietzsches values provide individuals "ith a motivation to pursue

social e/uality' )t is not simply that one miht do so "ithout doin harm to ones o"n ood# but

that it is in the sub(ects best interest to promote social e/uality'

To clari!y this point# ) "ill turn to Nietzsches account o! the oriins o! (ustice and la"'

As it happens# Nietzsche has already implied that there is a non%slavish motive !or promotin

(ustice# thouh not ealitarian (ustice' There must be such a motive# !or Nietzsche believes that it

is the noble classes that oriinally !ounded (ustice' 3e adamantly re(ects the common vie" that

(ustice is primarily motivated by envy# resentment# or revene# as "e miht e4pect i! (ustice "ere

the invention o! the oppressed or politically disadvantaed' Justice is not rounded in these

$reactive !eelins# as he calls them' 6n the contrary, $the lastsphere to be con/uered by the

spirit o! (ustice is the sphere o! the reactive !eelins' Accordin to Nietzsche# (ustice and la" are

the invention o! the noble class5precisely those "ho# iven their !ortunate position o! social

privilee# have little cause !or resentment# envy or the desire !or revene' Justice oriinates in

the nobles attempt to brin slavish resentment to an end,

8rom a historical point o! vie"# la" represents on earth ' ' ' the strule against the

reactive !eelins# the "ar conducted aainst them on the part o! the active and aressivepo"ers "ho employed some o! their strenth to impose measure and bounds upon the

.:


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e4cesses o! the reactive pathos and compel it to come to terms' 2herever (ustice is

practiced and maintained one sees a stroner po"er see1in a means o! puttin an end to

the senseless rain o! ressentimentamon the "ea1er po"ers that stand under it' *@M)), --+

This strule aainst resentment includes the introduction o! la"s desined to protect their

sub(ects and the introduction o! leal !orms o! compensation !or damaes5that is# it includes

measures desined to prevent and alleviate the conditions o! ine/uality and su!!erin that

produce reactive !eelins' The institution o! la" prevents such conditions by protectin sub(ects

!rom one another# "hile the establishment o! leal e/uivalents throuh "hich to compensate

sub(ects !or in(ury helps brin resent!ul !eelins to an end by eliminatin the need !or retribution

*@M )), --+'

So "hat speci!ically motivates this historical noble caste to initiate a "ar on resentment

in the !orms o! la" and (ustice? The motive !ollo"s !rom the primary opposition o! noble and

slavish values' The nobles values are an a!!irmation o! their o"n po"er and happiness' But the

slaves values are a direct reversal o! noble values# a direct neation o! the noble type and the

conditions o! its happiness' Because slave morality is nothin more than the inversion and

neation o! the nobles values# the sel!%a!!irmin nature o! noble values re/uires the active

suppression o! slave morality' That is# the nobles cannot consistently a!!irm themselves and

remain indi!!erent to a morality that has as its essence the neation o! noble values and po"er'

Conse/uently# the attempt to eliminate reactive !eelins throuh the institution o! (ustice is

motivated by the nobles desire to preserve and a!!irm their o"n values and conditions o!

happiness' )t is# in other "ords# motivated by a desire !or sel!%preservation'

This# in turn# suests a possible motive !or a Nietzschean !orm o! ealitarian (ustice'

9i1e the alleviation o! resentment# the promotion o! e/uality is a necessary condition !or the

preservation o! noble values' Nietzsches Genealogy5thouh o!ten read as a love letter to

aristocratic politics5miht instead be read as a cautionary tale about ho" social ine/uality leads

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inevitably to the cultural victory o! slave morality' )t is# a!ter all# social ine/uality that produces

slave resentment# "hich in turn ives birth to slave morality' )! it is ine/uality is the principal

basis o! slave values# then "hat better de!ense aainst slave morality than e/uality?

As Nietzsche describes the oriinal noble !orm o! (ustice# it alleviates only speci!ic

in(uries su!!ered by sub(ects# and only ac1no"ledes in(ustices "ithin a speci!ic social class,

$Justice on this elementary level is the ood "ill amon parties o! appro4imately e/ual po"er to

come to terms "ith one another# to reach an $understandin by means o! a settlement5and to

com$el parties o! lesser po"er to reach a settlement amon themselves *@M )), >+' So the

oriinal !orm o! (ustice as practiced by the nobles upholds the social hierarchy in "hich it "as

!ounded'

Because this oriinal !orm o! (ustice deals only "ith speci!ic in(uries in!licted by and

upon members o! a shared social class# it is ine!!ective at treatin the in(ury that is the very

!oundation o! all reactive social !eelins and# ultimately# o! slave morality, social hierarchy#

ine/uality# and domination' Justice cannot possibly succeed in its strule aainst resentment

and the rise o! slave morality i! it preserves class ine/uality'

-F

7et the noble values that round

the pro(ect o! (ustice cannot consistently allo" !or the e4istence o! a morality that has as its

-F3or1heimer has made a similar point, $The overcomin o! this morality lies not in the positin o! a better one# but

in the creation o! conditions under "hich its reason !or e4istin is eliminated *-==, -:=+'

..


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essence the neation and overcomin o! noble values and po"er' Conse/uently# the consistent

a!!irmation and preservation o! noble values demands the elimination o! social hierarchy as the

very condition o! its success' The survival o! $master morality is possible only throuh the

sacri!ice o! the social%political position o! $master'

Conse/uently# a Nietzschean !orm o! (ustice5li1e any !orm o! noble values5can be

preserved !rom the threat o! slave values only on the condition o! achieved social e/uality# the

elimination o! the social condition that produces and promotes slave values' That is the

Nietzschean motivation to endorse an ealitarian conception o! (ustice' To do other"ise is to

uarantee the continued success o! slave morality' 2hile it sounds parado4ical to suest that a

noble !orm o! (ustice sacri!ices social superiority in de!ense o! its happiness# "e must remember

that this is the sacri!ice o! relative superiority in po"er# and Nietzsches conception o! the human

ood is !ounded in a very di!!erent understandin o! po"er' Conse/uently# this motive to

promote e/uality is not a matter o! acceptin a compromised happiness# o! sacri!icin some

portion o! happiness in e4chane !or protected happiness' )t is not# as in the slavish conception

o! (ustice# the promotion o! e/ually distributed sacri!ice' 6n the contrary# a noble ealitarian

(ustice "ould see1# in Nietzsches o"n "ords# to $share not su!!erin but (oy *@S >+'

R&8&R&NC&S

Appel 8 *-===+ Nietzsche contra democracy' Cornell# )thacaBermann 8 *-=>>+ Nietzsches criti/ue o! morality' )n, Solomon R and 3iins 0 *ed+

Readin Nietzsche' 64!ord# Ne" 7or1

8oot *-==


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@euss R *.::+ 6utside ethics' &uro J hilos -- *-+, .=%F'

3iins 0 and Solomon R *ed+ *-=>>+ Readin Nietzsche' 64!ord# Ne" 7or1

3ollindale R *-=F+ Nietzsche, the man and his philosophy' Cambride Lniversity# Cambride3or1heimer M *-==+ &oism and !reedom movements, on the anthropoloy o! the

boureois era' )n, Bet"een philosophy and social science, selected early "ritins' M)T#

Cambride0au!mann 2 *-=F:+ Nietzsche, philosopher psycholoist antichrist' rinceton Lniversity#

rinceton

9eiter B *.::.+ The routlede philosophy uideboo1 to Nietzsche on morality' Routlede#9ondon

Nietzsche 8 *-=+ Beyond ood and evil *trans, 0au!mann 2+' Kintae# Ne" 7or1

Nietzsche 8 *-=;

Miyasaki_Can Nietzsche’s Noble be Moral and Just.doc

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