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Mission Impossible: the European Unionand Policy Coherence for
DevelopmentMaurizio Carbone aa Department of Politics , University
of Glasgow , Glasgow, UKPublished online: 16 Jul 2008.
To cite this article: Maurizio Carbone (2008) Mission
Impossible: the European Union andPolicy Coherence for Development,
Journal of European Integration, 30:3, 323-342,
DOI:10.1080/07036330802144992
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European IntegrationVol. 30, No. 3, 323342, July 2008
ISSN 07036337 Print/ISSN 14772280 Online/08/030323-20 2008
Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/07036330802144992
ARTICLE
Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence
for
Development
MAURIZIO CARBONE
Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UKTaylor
and Francis LtdGEUI_A_314665.sgm10.1080/07036330802144992Journal of
European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original
Article2008Taylor & Francis303000000July
[email protected]
ABSTRACT The principle of policy coherence has been the object
of a contentiousdebate in the European Unions external relations,
though discussions have been limitedmainly to its foreign policy
and its ability to speak with one voice in the internationalarena.
Despite being institutionalized in the Treaty of Maastricht, policy
coherence fordevelopment (PCD), which implies taking into account
the needs and interest of devel-oping countries in non-aid
policies, failed to make headway in the EU, remaining theunheeded
concern of some NGOs and a small group of member states. A change
indirection occurred in the early 2000s when the European
Commission, taking advan-tage of a number of favourable conditions
and using an astute strategy, managed to setan ambitious agenda for
the EU. This article, nevertheless, shows that promoting PCDrisks
being a mission impossible for whoever attempts it due to the
interplay of variousissues and interests, the different commitment
to international development of themember states, and the EUs
institutional framework.
KEY WORDS: Policy coherence, EU development policy, foreign aid,
Millennium Development Goals
Introduction
The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a
contentious debatein the external relations of the European Union.
These discussions, however,have been limited mainly to the common
foreign and security policy (CFSP),where, without indulging in
linguistic sophistry, coherence is used inter-changeably with
consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Tietje 1997;Duke 1999;
Smith 2001; Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005).1 In line with the
Correspondence Address: Maurizio Carbone, Department of
Politics, University of Glasgow,Glasgow, G12 OEG, UK. Email:
[email protected]
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324 Maurizio Carbone
Single European Act (SEA), which called on the EU to act as a
cohesive forcein international relations (Article 30.2[d]), the
Treaty of Maastricht estab-lished that the The Union shall in
particular ensure the consistency of itsexternal activities as a
whole in the context of its external relations, security,economic,
and development policies (Article C).2 While previously
greateremphasis was given to the relationship between the member
states and theUnion, the Treaty of Maastricht gave more prominence
to consistency acrosspolicies. Moreover, it introduced a single
institutional framework to coverthe three pillars of the EUs
activities, with both the Commission and theCouncil sharing
responsibility in ensuring consistency in the EUs
externalactivities. The aim was that the EU would not only speak
with a single voice,but would also be able to assert its identity
on the international scene(Duke 1999, Gauttier 2004).
Policy coherence for development (PCD) which according to a
widelyaccepted definition means taking account of the needs and
interests of devel-oping countries in the evolution of the global
economy (OECD 2003, p. 2) has been largely absent from this debate.
This scant attention is rathersurprising if one considers that PCD
is included in the EUs constitutionalcharter it was introduced in
the Treaty of Maastricht and strengthened inthe Treaty of Lisbon,
an exceptional case among international donors andthat its scope
reaches several hard policies, such as trade, agriculture,
fish-eries. True, very little progress was achieved throughout the
1990s, includingwithin the Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
which attemptedto further the discussion without much success
(Forster and Stokke 1999a).The adoption of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), following theMillennium Summit of
September 2000, changed the parameters ofthe debate (Payne 2005,
Grieg et al. 2007). Specific targets were set, and theinternational
community was forced to face up to the widening gap betweenthe rich
and the poor. This led to a renewed focus by most donors on
foreignaid and, in fact, the amount of development assistance
increased enormously,from 52 billion in 2000 to 104 billion in 2006
(DAC 2008; see also Riddell2007). But to achieve the MDGs, it
eventually became clear that foreign aidwas not enough, but better
synergies between aid and non-aid policies neededto be explored.
The European Union this time took the lead and, in May2005, in the
context of the Millennium + 5 Summit and as part of a pack-age that
included a significant boost in its foreign aid, it agreed on an
ambi-tious agenda on PCD (Council 2005). Even the DAC, which had
always beencritical of EU development policy, acknowledged that the
EU has activelycontributed to the growing international consensus
on policy coherence(DAC 2007, p. 16), is clear about its desire to
help shape a broader inter-national approach (ibid.) and that the
Commission has performed itscatalytic role in selected areas of
policy coherence with the support of a smallnumber of Member States
(ibid., p. 19).
This volume analyses the evolution of policy coherence for
developmentfrom the EUs perspective. The aim is to shed new light
on the EUs policy-making process, by looking at the nexus between
various policy sub-systems,and on the role that the EU wants to
play in the international arena, by looking
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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 325
at the impact of its policies on international development. In
fact, the EU, withits 27 member states, not only is the largest
provider of foreign aid in the worldbut it is also the venue in
which a large number of policies affecting developingcountries are
decided. This introductory paper presents the concept of
policycoherence for development and the debate since its
institutionalization in theearly 1990s. The remainder of the volume
concentrates on the linkagesbetween aid and various non-aid
policies. Following Hollands paper, whichprovides an analytical
overview of the new aid initiatives in the EU and theirimpact on
the global development agenda, the first group of papers deals
withthree common economic policies namely trade, agriculture and
fisheries.Elgstrom and Pilegaard show that the existence of value
competition anddifferent priorities within the EU have
significantly challenged policy coher-ence during the negotiations
of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)between the EU and the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states.Matthews
argues that, despite successive reforms of the common
agriculturalpolicy (CAP), which have reduced the distortions that
it generates on worldmarkets, further elimination of export and
production subsidies couldcontribute to higher economic growth in
developing countries if these coun-tries did not have to abide by
the EUs ever-stringent health and environmentalstandards.
Bretherton and Vogler look at the adoption of the new
fisheriespartnership agreements, which, despite the promises,
demonstrate that theEUs economic interests take precedence over its
commitment to promoteboth sustainable development and poverty
eradication. The second group ofpapers examines socio-political
policies. Youngs looks at the commitment tolink security and
development, claiming that the EU, besides some
rhetoricalcommitments, has achieved little on the balance or
direction of causalitybetween these two policy goals. Lavenex and
Kunz investigate the EUs migra-tion policy and show that the
development-focused approach promotedby various international
organizations has not yet fully replaced the EUsdominant
security-orientated approach that focuses on the repression
ofunwanted immigration. Finally, Orbie and Babarinde start from the
role ofthe EU in promoting the social dimension of globalization to
demonstrate thatthe direct impact of the EUs internal social
policies has been limited, whilean indirect impact has occurred
through its trade and development policies.
Understanding Policy Coherence for Development
Before discussing it in the context of development policy, it is
useful to reflectbriefly on the general concept of policy
coherence. Three preliminary consid-erations must be made. First,
the existing literature often refers to policycoherence within
states, in which two or more domestic policies may push indifferent
directions. With globalization, not only has the distinction
betweeninternal and external policies become blurred, but the
interplay betweendifferent policies also involves the regional and
global level. Besides the EUsdistinctive institutional
arrangements, a central difference with conventionalstates is that
the resolution of cases of incoherence in the EU is conductedin the
full glare of publicity, and through mechanisms which are not
only
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326 Maurizio Carbone
imperfectly developed, but reflect diverging views about the
proper form ofEuropean governance (Nuttall 2005, p. 93). Secondly,
policy coherence canbe explored as an outcome (what is achieved)
and as a process (how itis achieved) (Di Francesco 2001). In the
first case, it implies the absence ofincoherencies between and the
mutual impairment of policies adopting anegative approach or the
interaction of policies with the aim of achievingoverriding
objectives using a more positive approach (Ashoff 2005, p. 11).In
the second case, the focus is on tools and mechanisms, often
considered apre-condition for achieving policy coherence. Thirdly,
to offer a meaningfulanalysis of policy coherence, it is
fundamental to identify the beholdersperspective: the same decision
may be coherent from a trade perspective butincoherent from a
development perspective. This means that claims to perfectcoherence
are unrealistic and that a certain degree of incoherence is
inevita-ble in pluralist political systems (Koulamah-Gabriel 1999).
The taskfor policy makers is to avoid unnecessary incoherence,
which implies thatwinwin solutions are possible, whereas necessary
incoherence, which resultsfrom the aggregation of legitimate
conflicting interests, is more acceptable(Hoebink 2004, Picciotto
2005).
Rationale for and Obstacles to Policy Coherence
Traditionally, a distinction is made between two types of policy
coherence.Horizontal coherence refers to the potential problems
raised by the interac-tion between various policy areas; more
specifically to development policy,it refers to the consistency
between aid and non-aid policies in terms of theircombined
contribution to development. Vertical coherence refers to the
rela-tions between the member states and the EU; more specifically
to developmentpolicy, it refers to the consistency between
different policies across variousmember states in terms of their
combined contribution to development. Inaddition to these two
types, internal coherence refers to the consistencybetween the
objectives of a given policy; more specifically to
developmentpolicy, it refers to the consistency between purposes of
aid (e.g. promotingdonor or recipient interests), channels (e.g.
aid to states, aid to non-stateactors, aid to multilateral
organizations), functions (e.g. budget support, aidto the private
sector, aid to the social sectors). Donorrecipient coherencerefers
to the interaction between policies adopted by the industrialized
coun-tries and those adopted by developing countries. Multilateral
coherence refersto interaction between international organizations,
such as the UN and theInternational Financial Institutions, which
often promote incompatible goals(Hoebink 2004, Nuttall 2005,
Picciotto 2005). The focus of this study isprimarily on horizontal
coherence, though other types particularly verticaland internal
coherence unavoidably enter the discussions.
Policy coherence is both a political imperative i.e. avoiding
being seenas inconsistent by political competitors or by the
citizens and, in the case ofEU external relations, avoiding
undermining the credibility of the EU as anactor in international
politics and international development and aneconomic imperative
i.e. avoiding wasting scarce resources (Di Francesco
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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 327
2001). But, as mentioned earlier, a certain degree of
incoherence is inevita-ble in a pluralist society because of the
fragmentation of policy systems.May et al. (2006) argued that
policy coherence depends on the interplay ofissues and interests: a
policy that has greater issue focus and is dominatedby few
interests is likely to have stronger policy coherence. However,
theargument runs, even very crowded policy areas can still cohere
if theycontain integrative properties that glue issues and
interests, such as a clearset of goals, a compelling policy image,
a well-defined targeting, and thestrong involvement of the
executive agency.3 Forster and Stokke (1999b)maintained that
coherence depends on dedication of the political andadministrative
leadership at the centre, particularly relevant in the EUwhere a
not-too-strong centre must co-exist with various centrifugal
forces.Politics is compartmentalized; each sub-subsystem has its
own logic reflect-ing perceptions, interests and values. To avoid
incoherencies, the variouspolicies need to be coordinated.
Coordination, and consequently coherence,is not easily achievable
when policy sub-systems relate to each other hori-zontally and
there are only weak hierarchical coordination mechanisms.Ashoff
(2005) listed a number of potential causes for policy
incoherence.He noted that in the area of societal and political
norms the pursuit ofpolicy coherence may be sacrificed to
legitimate interests, whereas in thearea of political decision
making coherence may be made more difficult byglobalization, the
impact of external forces on policy making, and by
decen-tralization, due to the increased number of negotiation
levels to be takeninto account. In the area of policy formulation
and coordination, coherenceis less likely when strategy, goals and
objectives are unclear. In thesecircumstances the structure and
process of policy coordination do not workeffectively, and there is
a shortage of information.
In light of these considerations, pursuing policy coherence for
the promo-tion of international development and, more specifically,
in the context of theEU, is a sort of mission impossible for
whoever attempts it. First, over thepast decade the number of
issues to be included within the remit of interna-tional
development has significantly increased. Development policy no
longerentails only the transfer of financial resources for economic
and social devel-opment, but also involves other economic means
(such as trade preferencesand foreign direct investment) as well as
political considerations (such as thepromotion of human rights and
democracy assistance). Nor is developmentpolicy the exclusive
preserve of state-to-state activity since it engages anincreasingly
large number of actors (e.g. civil society, decentralized
actors,national and international corporations). Secondly,
development interestsoften succumb to other interests. The
development constituency, made of aidbureaucracies and the
community of development NGOs, is often too weakvis--vis
agriculture groups, domestic firms, multinational corporations
andother organized interest groups. This implies that, for
instance, when the econ-omy is under pressure, not only is the aid
budget the first to be cut, butmeasures aimed at promoting
international development indirectly, such astrade preferences or
liberal migration policy, are less acceptable to the public.Some
commentators have argued that while allocating development
assistance
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328 Maurizio Carbone
is politically palatable because the costs are shared among a
large numberof tax payers, measures that affect an economic sector
concern a small butpowerful group, which can easily mobilize
opposition (Grieg-Gran 2003).Others, however, have pointed out that
a significant correlation can beexpected between high levels of
development assistance and policy coherencefor development, perhaps
because the median voter in these countries (orpoliticians seeking
their votes), will have a heightened concern with tax moniesspent
for that purpose (Kapstein 2004, p. 19).
Thirdly, the real commitment to international development of the
variousmember states varies significantly. The commitment to
development index(CDI), introduced by an American think-thank,
shows that not only foreignaid, but also other policies have an
important role in affecting the pace ofdevelopment in poor
countries.4 Going beyond the criticism of the arbitrarychoice and
weight of the various sectors (Picciotto 2005), the CDI offers
anindirect measure of policy coherence across member states. The
conventionalwisdom is that good performers in foreign aid are also
committed to policycoherence for development as also shown by the
number of policy state-ments and mechanisms they have adopted over
the years (ECDPM and ICEI2006, ECDPM et al. 2007). The three states
that score highest in the foreignaid index (i.e. Netherlands,
Denmark and Sweden) score only about averagein four of the
remaining six policy areas. Those countries that perform poorlyin
the foreign aid index (i.e. Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Greece) performjust below average in most of the other policy
areas. The big three (France,Germany and the UK) score around
average in almost all the indexes. Ingeneral, while the gap between
countries in the foreign aid index is remark-able, it is less so in
other indexes; the bottom line, therefore, is that allcountries
could do much more to spread prosperity (Roodman 2007, p. 7).
Finally, some considerations should be made on the impact of the
EUspolicy framework which, according to Nugent (2006, p. 389), can
hardlybe said to display a clear pattern or coherence. Two broad
methods ofdecision making co-exist in the EU, though this
difference is now questioned(Stetter 2004). In the case of
supranational policies such as trade, agricul-ture, fisheries
decision-making processes are based on the interactionbetween the
three key institutions, with the European Commission spearhead-ing
the efforts to promote policy coherence. In the case of
intergovernmentalpolicies e.g. foreign and security policy the
European Commission andthe Parliament play a less relevant role
than the Council, and the Presidencyis the key advocate of
coherence. In areas of mixed competence, the decisionto grant
authority to the European Commission to represent them is in
thehands of the member states. For instance, in the case of
environment, climatechange, transport, energy (if linked to the
internal market), information soci-ety, research, migration, and
social policies, the initiative rests mainly withthe Commission,
though national policies also exist and external action isusually
member-state led (Egenhoher 2006, pp. 67).5 Because of these
insti-tutional arrangements, various commentators have argued that
achievingpolicy coherence in the EU is extremely difficult, but we
will return to thispoint in the last section of this paper.
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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 329
The Global Context of Policy Coherence for Development
The efforts to promote policy coherence for international
development are arelatively recent phenomenon. The integration of
various goals and objec-tives into development policy has, however,
been a concern for industrializedcountries for a long time. In the
1960s, the idea of comprehensive planningimplied accelerating
development by focusing on strategic economic sectorsand by
adopting a national development plan produced through a
bureau-cratic process involving economic expertise in various
ministries. In the1970s, integrated development was the answer to
the ineffectiveness ofproject aid and rivalry between agencies, as
it brought together under a singleinstitutional umbrella not only
planning and design but also implementation.In the 1980s, most
donors took a common stand and coerced developingcountries into
adopting structural adjustment programmes aimed at reform-ing their
macro-economic framework, followed in the 1990s by an even
morerigorous programme aimed at implementing political reforms
(Hydn 1999,pp. 6473).
The first official discussion on policy coherence for
development as suchwas held in a High-Level Meeting of the DAC in
December 1991. The DACconcentrated on how non-aid policies (like
macro-economic policies, trade,exports credits, tied aid, foreign
direct investment, agriculture, environment,migration, arms trade,
and drugs) could increase the effectiveness of aid. Thepromotion of
PCD was also sold as part of a strategy that contributed tomanaging
a number of challenges in the upcoming decade and implied alsothe
need for effective participation by developing countries in the
global deci-sion-making process (Forster and Stokke 1999b). In
1996, the DACpublished a much-quoted report, Shaping the 21st
Century, in which it urgedindustrialized countries to ensure that
their policies do not underminedevelopment objectives with the aim
of increasing effectiveness of aid. In2001, it published the
Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, which contained asection on policy
coherence and another section on institutional require-ments for
policy coherence (Ashoff 2005). Finally, since 2000, it hasincluded
a separate chapter on coherence in the peer reviews that it
conductson the development policies of its members. This new
instrument hascontributed to raising awareness on best (and bad)
practices, but at the sametime has failed to deliver rigorous
assessment of PCD performance at thecountry level because it is not
governed by clear and uniform standardsconnected to explicit PCD
objectives (Picciotto 2005, p. 319).
While the DAC tried to play a leading role in furthering the PCD
agenda some talk also of institutional entrepreneurship or
institutionalsurvival, which implies that some international
organizations launch newideas and become their promoters to justify
and preserve their existence,engaging in a sort of competition with
other organizations to set the interna-tional agenda (Forster and
Stokke 1999b) the issue of policy coherencehas been dealt with in
other international settings. At the level of the UN, thedecade of
conferences on environment and development (Rio deJaneiro 1992),
social issues (Copenhagen 1995), gender equality (Beijing
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330 Maurizio Carbone
1995) which preceded the Millennium Summit held in New York
inSeptember 2000, contributed to a better and wider understanding
of devel-opment. The subsequent adoption of the MDGs marked a
change of direc-tion for the international community (Greig et al.
2007). In particular, theinclusion of MDG-8 (Develop a global
partnership for development)acknowledged the need to go beyond
development cooperation in otherpolicy areas, notably the
development of an open trading and financialsystem committed to
good governance, development and poverty reduction,and measures to
address the special needs of least-developed countriesthrough
tariffs and quota-free access for their exports (Grieg-Gran
2003).The Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. World Bank and IMF) and
the WorldTrade Organisation (WTO) have apparently played a
secondary role in thepromotion of PCD. Nevertheless, in addition to
the structural adjustmentprogramme of the 1980s, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)reflect the principles of
comprehensive development, ownership, partnershipand
results-orientated development (Picciotto 2005). The WTO has been
thekey venue for discussions on the links between trade (but also
agriculture)and development. The adoption of the Doha Development
Agenda in 2001seemed to start a new era in global politics.
However, the failure of the WTOround in Cancun, particularly on the
issue of cotton, showed how difficult itis for developed countries
including the EUs member states to reformtheir trade and
agriculture policies (Grieg-Gran 2003).
Policy Coherence for Development in the European Union
The origin of the debate on policy coherence for development in
the EU canbe traced back to the Treaty of Maastricht, which
officially introduced apolicy in the sphere of development
cooperation among the activities of theEU.6 The new legal framework
included three principles for the functioningof development policy,
the so-called 3Cs: complementarity, coordinationand coherence
(Holland 2002). Complementarity means that the memberstates and the
EU share competences in development policy, which must beexercised
alongside each other. Coordination implies that member states andEU
should coordinate their policies and consult on their aid
programmes,including in international organizations and during
international confer-ences. Coherence entails that the EU shall
take account of the objectivesof its development policy in the
policies that it implements which are likelyto affect developing
countries. These provisions on policy coherence weregenerally
considered weak. First, the word coherence was not mentionedbut was
replaced by a less categorical takes into account. Secondly,
theattention was placed on the process rather than results, which
means thatdevelopment policy, a soft policy, has been vulnerable to
more powerfulinterests, notably those of trade, fisheries and
agriculture. Thirdly, the coher-ence article applied to
supranational policies, which partially left unan-swered the
question of the coherence between intergovernmental policies
anddevelopment policy (Hoebink 1999, Koulamah-Gabriel 1999). In
reality,the Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the principle of
consistency,
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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 331
which referred to all external policies, thus including foreign
and securitypolicies.
A Decade of Non-decisions
The discussion on the operationalization of the three Cs started
before theTreaty of Maastricht came into force, when the European
Commissionpublished a communication on the future of development
policy (entitledHorizon 2000). However, the European Commission
concentrated on coor-dination and the shortfalls of the
implementation of a truly coordinatedpolicy; less attention was
given to coherence (Loquai 1996). A majority ofmember states seemed
to be more ambitious and, in the Development Councilof November
1992, urged the European Commission to prepare a study andto report
within a year on the practical consequences of the
coherenceprinciple. The European Commission failed to do so,
lamenting inadequatestaff levels and a dismissive attitude of some
member states (Hoebink 2004).European NGOs tried to fill this
policy void by launching a number of publiccampaigns. One of the
most visible was in April 1993 against the EUs meatexports in West
Africa, which were not only incoherent with the
developmentassistance aimed at supporting the meat industry in the
region, but alsocontributed to disrupting local markets. Other
important campaigns werecarried out by NGOs during the 1990s, such
as that of May 1996, againstthe overcapacity of the EUs fishing
fleets and for disregarding the impact ofits fisheries agreements
on poor countries, and the 1997 campaign against thechocolate
directive, which penalized cocoa-producing countries to the
advan-tage of the chocolate industry (Koulamah-Gabriel and Oomen
1997).
The combination of the first NGO campaigns and the pressure of
somemember states forced the European Commission to publish a
report in May1994, in which it finally acknowledged the presence of
incoherencies betweenthe CAP and development policy. It should,
however, be noted that the Euro-pean Commission itself was
cautious, pointing to the fact that reconcilingdifferent interests
was extremely difficult. In the ensuing meeting of the Devel-opment
Council in June 1995, a number of member states were favourableto
the idea of better coherence between development, trade and
agriculture.Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, the most active
among the memberstates, proposed setting up mechanisms to raise
cases of incoherence, such asfor example cross-sectoral meetings
within the Council. This idea wasrejected by France and Germany,
and progress on this issue stalled (Loquai1996). Considering all
these disagreements, it is not surprising that theconclusions of
the Council were very weak, simply asking the Commissionto continue
its work on this issue (Council 1995). A similar outcome
wasproduced in 1997, when, thanks to initiatives of the Dutch
Presidency (andlater also Luxembourg), supported by Denmark and
Sweden, the Counciladopted a generic resolution covering links
between development and fourthemes: peace building, conflict
prevention and resolution; food security; fish-eries; and
migration. The European Commission was once again verycautious
about linking development with trade and agriculture. In the
final
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332 Maurizio Carbone
resolution, the Council invite[d] the Commission to present
regularly, pref-erably on an annual basis, a report to the Council
on questions related tocoherence in connection with development
cooperation and to raise anypossible case of negative effects [on
development policy] as arising fromunintended incoherence of
policies (Council 1997). The European Commis-sion was very slow and
circulated a non-paper only in May 1999, in whichit proposed a
categorization of various types of coherence, but failed toadvance
innovative proposals (Hoebink 2004, pp. 203204).
In the new Commission appointed in November 1999, the
DevelopmentCommissioner Poul Nielson, who had been very active as
Danish Ministerfor development policy, made coherence a central
issue of his mandate. InFebruary 2000, DG Development issued a
paper Towards improved coher-ence between the Community development
policy and other Communitypolicies, in which it was far more
critical than in the past, focusing particu-larly on the trade,
agriculture and fisheries policies. It also proposed anumber of
institutional mechanisms, to be set up within DG Development.The
document, however, was considered too critical and a
watered-downversion was adopted by the College in April 2000 and
then discussed in theCouncil in May 2000 (Hoebink 2004). A
symptomatic conclusion of thisperiod is the first statement on EC
development policy, jointly adopted bythe Council and the
Commission, which, like ten years earlier, simplyproposed to ensure
that Community development policy objectives aretaken into account
in the formulation and implementation of other policiesaffecting
the developing countries. In sum, despite its
institutionalizationwith the Treaty of Maastricht, the principle of
coherence for developmentfailed to make headway in the EU during
the 1990s. Throughout the decade,the issues of the implications of
trade, agriculture and fisheries policy fordeveloping countries
were neglected, not only because the EU placed itsinterests before
those of developing countries, but also because of theassumption
that the needs of developing countries were taken care ofthrough
development assistance.
A New Ambitious Agenda
With the beginning of the century, a new season opened in EU
developmentpolicy (Carbone 2008). This era was characterized by an
extensive reform ofboth the management which essentially means
delivering aid better andfaster and the content of the policy which
implies the elevation ofpoverty reduction as the guiding principle
of all the Community externalassistance programmes. This process
culminated in the adoption of the Euro-pean Consensus on
Development (signed in December 2005 by the EuropeanCommission,
Parliament and Council) and the Code of Conduct on Comple-mentarity
and Division of Labour (adopted by the Council in May 2007),which
commit the member states and the EU institutions to a common viewon
the promotion of international development and a common
implementa-tion strategy. Meanwhile, in view of the Financing for
Development confer-ence held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002
and thanks to the leadership
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of the European Commission, the EU adopted a number of
commitmentsaiming at boosting the volume of aid and enhancing its
effectiveness (the so-called Barcelona commitments). More
significantly, by acting as a unitaryactor, the EU had shaped the
global agenda on development policy. The Euro-pean Commission also
managed to play a leading role in the post-Monterreyperiod and used
the monitoring reports not only to follow progress on theBarcelona
commitments but also to launch important initiatives (Carbone2007).
In view of the Millennium+5 Summit planned for September 2005,
theEuropean Commission proposed a comprehensive package consisting
ofthree different proposals: a new ambitious target for EU aid;
more aid toAfrica; a new initiative on policy coherence (European
Commission 2005a).7
The first communication ever on policy coherence for development
startedfrom the idea that the committed additional volume of aid is
important, butin itself is not sufficient to enable developing
countries to reach the Millen-nium Development Goals (p. 3). The
European Commission thereforediscussed the impact of various
non-aid policies, either directly or indirectly,on the achievement
of one or more MDGs. In particular, it argued that theEUs policies
on trade, agriculture, fisheries, transport and energy have adirect
impact on the ability of developing countries to generate
domesticeconomic growth, which is the basis for progress towards
all the MDGs. TheEUs policies on migration, through the role of
remittances; research, for itsrole in improving access to health
and education; and security, by creating aconducive environment for
business, play an indirect yet significant role inthe attainment of
various MDGs. Finally, the EUs policies on the environ-ment and
climate change affect global progress towards
environmentalsustainability (which is MDG-7). Against this
background, the EuropeanCommission identified eleven policy areas
(trade; environment; security;agriculture; fisheries; social
dimension of globalization, employment anddecent work; migration;
research and innovation; information society; trans-port; and
energy) and, for each of these priority areas, established
specificcoherence for development commitments. It also pointed out
that existingtechnical mechanisms to promote policy coherence,
often limited to thefield of development cooperation, were
insufficient and that the real chal-lenge would be at the political
level. Finally, it proposed to monitorprogress on PCD through the
publication of a biannual report (EuropeanCommission 2005b). The
General Affairs and External Relations Council(GAERC) of May 2005
confirmed the eleven priority areas identified by theEuropean
Commission and added a twelfth one, climate change. It alsodecided
to examine the Councils procedures, mechanisms and instrumentsin
order to strengthen the effective integration of development
concerns inthe decision making procedures on non-development
policies and, at thesame time, invited member states and the
European Commission to do thesame (Council 2005).
The crystallization of policy coherence for development into the
newEuropean Consensus on Development (ECD) confirmed the ambitions
of theEU in this area. Jointly agreed by the European Commission,
Council andParliament in December 2005, the ECD established a
common vision on
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334 Maurizio Carbone
development policy, in which policy coherence for development
found acentral space. In the absence of a new Treaty, which would
update the legalframework for development, the ECD established that
PCD was no longeronly about supranational policies, but was also to
be extended to all EUpolicies.8 It also mentioned that the European
Commission fand the memberstates would prepare a rolling work
programme as a new tool for followingup on the twelve priority
areas, which would propose priorities for action,define roles and
responsibilities of Council, Member States and Commis-sion and
serve as a reference point for all levels of decision
makinginvolved in the implementation of the PCD commitments
(Council, MemberStates and Commission) and to integrate PCD
commitments into the exami-nation and discussion of Commission
proposals and EU standpoints ininternational fora where relevant
(Carbone 2007). The rolling workprogramme, proposed by the European
Commission, became a joint tool ofthe Commission and the Council to
identify common priority actions; thiswas confirmed by the Council
in April 2006, which invited each Presi-dency, at the beginning of
the Presidency and with the help of the CouncilSecretariat, to
engage with the Commission to identify which prioritiesneed to be
updated.9
The first biannual report on PCD was adopted by the European
Commis-sion in September 2007 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b).10
Contraryto general expectations, the European Commission produced a
critical report.In general, it acknowledged that awareness of PCD
has increased not onlywithin EU institutions but also across the
member states, but is still belowthe ambitious agenda initiated two
years earlier. The promotion of PCDworks better within the European
Commission than in the Council, and thisis attributed to the
presence of effective mechanisms (i.e. Impact AssessmentSystem;
Inter-Service Group; CSPs).11 Within the Council, some progress
hasbeen achieved thanks to the initiatives of individual
Presidencies, but theprinciple of PCD is not well institutionalized
in the decision-making process.The European Parliament has started
to engage in this debate through reportsand resolutions. At the
level of member states, despite some notable excep-tions such as
Sweden and Denmark, who adopt a whole-of-governmentapproach the
picture is less optimistic, with progress being hampered bythe low
political commitment of non-development ministries,
insufficientcapacity and knowledge among officials, and the belief
that achieving policycoherence is simply too difficult and it is an
either/or choice between devel-opment and domestic interests.
The findings of the European Commission need some further
explanations.In general, achieving policy coherence is easier
within the European Commis-sion where decisions are taken by the
Commission as a whole, if necessary,compromise at the level of the
College of Commissioners than in theCouncil. In the case of the
latter there is more dispersion in light of the nineministerial
formations and the sector logic at lower levels. The Presidency
isan important source of leadership, but its achievements in
promoting coher-ence depend on the goodwill of individual member
states. At the level of theCouncil, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (Coreper) should play
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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 335
a central role in ensuring coherence across policies. In
reality, it makes finaldecisions on a small number of issues (15
per cent), whereas the majority ofproposals (about 70 per cent) are
agreed in the Working Groups, in whichthe sectoral logic prevails.
Only rarely do members of the DevelopmentWorking Group attend
meetings of other Working Groups and, if they do so,as in the case
of the 133 Committee during the EPA negotiations, they playa
marginal role.12 The division of tasks between Coreper I
(addressing theinternal market, industry and energy) and Coreper II
(who address externalrelations, economy and finances and justice
and home affairs) does not help.At the Ministerial level (where the
remaining 15 per cent of proposals areagreed), Ministers have more
in common with their sectoral colleaguesthan with their colleagues
in the national cabinets. The GAERC, which is incharge of
coordinating the work of the various Council formations, is
theo-retically supposed to ensure coherence. However, over the last
decade it haslost a substantial part of its coordinating powers due
to the increased amountof time it spends on the EUs external
relations (Egenhofer 2006). At the levelof member states, the
debate on PCD started in the mid-1990s, thoughprogress has been
slow, with some differences. A first group of countries(Cyprus,
Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia) does not make referenceto
PCD in their official policy documents. A second group (Belgium,
Estonia,Greece, Italy, Poland and Slovak Republic) have adopted
policy statementsbut have not translated this commitment into
institutional and administrativemechanisms to promote PCD. A third
larger group (Austria, Czech Republic,Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Nether-lands, Portugal,
Sweden, Spain and the UK) has operationalized and put intopractice
mechanisms to promote PCD (ECDPM et al. 2007).
Overview of the Volume
The biannual report of the Commission discusses in detail the
progress madewithin the EU in improving the integration of the
twelve PCD commitments,showing that even policies generally
perceived as having only an internaldimension also have a strong
external component that can directly or indi-rectly affect the
development process. In general, progress has been slowerthan
anticipated since the promotion of European interests and the
identi-fication of partner countries own concerns must be balanced,
with a view tofinding winwin solutions (European Commission 2007a,
p. 10). Thepotential synergies between development and various EU
policies arediscussed in detail in the papers that follow this
introduction. However, somepoints can be made on policies that for
reasons of space are not covered inthis volume. For instance,
climate change will hit developing countries hard-est and earliest;
in this sense, the EU climate policy aimed as a long-term goalto
limit climate change to an average of 2C as compared to
pre-industriallevels, will directly and indirectly significantly
benefit developing countries.The provision of an effective and
efficient infrastructure system, which is akey element underpinning
competitiveness and economic development, is acentral element of
all EU development programmes, as shown by a number
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336 Maurizio Carbone
of recent initiatives (e.g. EU Energy Initiative for Poverty
Eradication andSustainable Development, EUEI; the EUAfrica
Infrastructure Partnershipand the EUAfrica Energy Partnership).
Other polices have great potential fordevelopment but they have
failed to produce significant results. In particular,EU research
and ICT policies should contribute further to creating
context-specific knowledge and building capacity in developing
countries, with theaim of bridging the knowledge and digital gap
between the North and theSouth (European Commission 2007a,
2007b).
The remainder of the volume covers the links between development
andsix policy areas trade, agriculture, fisheries, security,
migration, and socialpolicies. These chapters are preceded by
Hollands paper on the widercontext of international development and
the role that the EU has played inshaping it. Holland shows that
while in the 1990s there was a loss of interestin development
(exemplified by the declining volume of aid and doubts aboutthe
real impact of aid), at the beginning of the 2000s the
internationalcommunity began to construct a new agenda to address
global inequalities.The EU has been a core partner sometimes with a
leading role of alarger movement that includes the UN, the World
Bank and various interna-tional activists. This new aid agenda
revolves around the MDGs, thoughincreasingly the initial optimism
has become subdued by the realization thatmost of the targets set
for individual MDGs will not be reached. The EU hascontributed by
boosting its volume of aid, including a special focus on Africa,and
by addressing the lack of coordination among its member states,
whichtoo often leads to duplication of efforts. Despite these
commitments, somecritics have pointed to the issue of real aid more
than half of the aidprovided by developed countries is absorbed by
over-pricing, inefficientcooperation or used to fund programmes
that are not strictly associated withdevelopment. Moreover, the
exclusion of technical cooperation and food aidfrom the DAC
Recommendation on untying aid shows that much still needsto be done
in the area of internal coherence.
Elgstrom and Pilegaard look at the coherence between trade and
develop-ment, arguing that the evolution of the process of European
integration hasproduced a highly compartmentalized system, with
autonomous sectors eachreflecting different logics, which makes
policy coherence difficult to achieve.This natural inclination
towards incoherence is tempered by external obliga-tions primarily
the principles of trade liberalization and reciprocity spon-sored
by the WTO and by the fact that the European Commission is thesole
actor in charge of conducting international trade negotiations.
Thisstruggle for coherence is explored in the context of the
negotiations of theEPAs between the EU and the ACP group. While
previously the competencefor trade with the ACP fell within the
competence of DG Development, withthe Prodi Commission it moved to
DG Trade. This new organizationalarrangement, which resulted from a
fight against perceived ineffectiveness inthe EUs external
relations, implied not only that the EPA negotiations wereframed as
trade negotiations but also that DG Trade was in charge
ofconducting the negotiations on behalf of the EU. However, the
existenceof different values among the member states not only the
traditional
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divisions between free trade and development-leader Northern
member statesand protectionist and development-laggard Southern
member states andinside the European Commission with tensions
between DG Trade and DGDevelopment has contributed significantly to
challenging policy coher-ence. The eventual conflict between the
official EU stance and the heterodoxpositions taken by some member
states and by the European Parliamentshowed how difficult it is for
the EU to produce coherent policy outcomes.
Matthews explores one of the most controversial policies in the
EU, theCAP, asking whether the criticism that the CAP is incoherent
with develop-ment policy is still valid. The conventional view is
that EU-subsidized exportscompete unfairly with developing country
production and that the presenceof high tariff barriers prevents
developing countries from exporting theiragricultural products into
the EU. Various reforms started in the early 1990shave
progressively reduced the distortions on world market that the
CAPgenerates; however, their impact on developing countries varies:
while theCAP hurts those countries that are net food exporters, the
situation is less clearfor net food importers. Moreover, further
reforms of the CAP may producenot only winners but also losers
among developing countries. For instance,the elimination of export
subsidies to rice and cotton, and the removal ofprotection to meat,
diary products, fruits and vegetables would generallyproduce
benefits for many developing countries. By contrast, the reform
ofthe sugar and banana sectors would be borne by relatively
vulnerable low-income economies. Finally, the CAP is not the only
obstacle to agriculturalproducts coming from developing countries,
which in fact must face ever-stringent sanitary and phyto sanitary
(SPS) and environmental standards.
Bretherton and Vogler look at the implications of fisheries
policy fordevelopment policy, within the context of the EUs
promotion of sustainabledevelopment. In particular, in the 1980s
and 1990s the EUs fisheries policyconstituted a serious threat to
the marine environment due to overexploi-tation of fish and other
marine resources and to the health, livelihood,social cohesion and
economic development of coastal communities in devel-oping
countries. The adoption of the Fisheries Partnership
Agreements(FPAs) in the early 2000s was meant to demonstrate the
EUs commitmentto sustainable development and to address the
increased calls for policycoherence with development policy. In
reality, not only have the negotia-tions of the various FPAs
resulted in EU monologues (rather than theannounced dialogues), but
they may have also contributed to delayingfurther the economic and
social development in developing countries. Struc-tural problems in
the fishing sector in most developing countries, combinedwith
problems of access for processed fish products into the EU
market,such as the restrictive rules of origin and other technical
barriers, imply thatdeveloping countries have no other choice than
agreeing on the conditionsset by the EU. The case of fisheries
policy, in sum, has revealed a number ofunresolved incoherencies at
the horizontal (between the EUs fisheries anddevelopment policies)
and vertical levels (between the approach of the EUand that of
various member states), and has also shown a gap between theEUs
claims to promote sustainable development and the practice.
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338 Maurizio Carbone
Youngs examines the links between security and development,
particularlyin light of the rise in international terrorism.
Following the 9/11 events, thegeneral assumption, especially among
European governments, was that theroots of international
instability lay in economic and political under-devel-opment; the
consequent expectations were that security concerns couldunlock
additional resources for development. Not all member states
acceptedthis kind of approach, pointing to the fact that such
resources generallytargeted middle-income countries rather than the
poorest developing coun-tries. In reality, no mass diversion of aid
resources has occurred, thoughincreases in resources have often
reflected approaches that have little do towith development. More
generally, Youngs shows that the EU has not onlymade modest
progress in promoting synergies between security and develop-ment,
but has also failed to clearly spell out a vision on the balance
anddirection of causality between these two policies. In fact,
while the EuropeanSecurity Strategy expresses the view that
security is a precondition for devel-opment, the European Consensus
on Development refers to a two-waylinkage: development is necessary
for security and security is necessary fordevelopment. Evidence of
progress in both directions of the developmentsecurity link shows
that development-related decisions in the security fieldsreceive
little input from development circles, while some progress has
beenachieved in making development funding more security-aware one
of theexamples being the African Peace Facility, set up with
resources coming fromthe European Development Fund (EDF).
Lavenex and Kunz explore the developmentmigration nexus in the
exter-nal activities of the EU. While, for many years, migration
was considered theoutcome of lacking or failed development, since
the early 2000s the linkbetween migration and development has been
promoted actively by interna-tional organizations in an attempt to
maximize the gains for developingcountries. However, the broad
variety of institutions involved in the debategenerated tensions
over two competing ways of framing the issue: a right-based frame
(sponsored by the International Labour Organization, ILO, andthe
International Organization for Migration, IOM), focusing on
protectingthe rights of migrants and harnessing the potential
development impact oftheir return to the country of origin; a
money-based frame (sponsored by theWorld Bank), emphasizing the
value of remittances as an important sourceof development
financing. These debates have influenced the EU, where,following
the incidents at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
theautumn of 2005, various initiatives proposing a closer
coordination betweenmigration and development policies
proliferated. The proposed GlobalApproach which implied
facilitating the flows of remittances, engagingwith countries of
origin, mitigating the negative effects of brain drain proved too
ambitious: the existing prevailing securitarian-frame, based onthe
repression of unwanted immigration and on getting countries of
originto sign re-admission agreements, has not been yet been
substituted by thedevelopment-based approach.
Orbie and Babarinde explore whether and how the EU has
integratedsocial policies into its relations with the developing
world. While their direct
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impact on developing countries is negligible, the EU has
promoted socialgoals through its trade and development policies.
Proposals for a socialclause in trade relations were discussed in
the early 1990s, but by the 2000it became clear that the
integration of labour considerations into its relationswith
developing countries was unsuccessful. The explanations that
focusingon the reluctance of developing countries to accept clauses
that would hideprotectionist intentions of EU countries should be
supplemented by explana-tions that focus more on the EU. Not only
have member states often failedto take a common stance but, more
significantly, the commitment of the EUitself has been ambiguous,
with labour considerations being overshadowedby other priorities.
Similarly, the new ambitious initiative to promote decentwork is
still at an explanatory stage. Conversely, the European
Commissionhas played a proactive role in stimulating the
international promotion of thecorporate social responsibility,
meant to encourage companies to integratesocial and environmental
corners into their operations.
Conclusion
The issue of policy coherence for development emerged at the
beginning ofthe 1990s. The Development Assistance Committee played
an important rolein attempting to drive this agenda forward without
much success. Within theEU, the debate started with the Treaty of
Maastricht in the context of the so-called 3Cs (complementarity,
coordination and coherence) but, for variousreasons, limited
progress was made for the rest of the decade. The incoherenceof the
EU in its approach to international development was questioned by
theNGO community which, in turn, carried out a number of public
campaignsmainly against the EUs common trade, agriculture and
fishery policies. Anumber of member states, such as Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden andthe UK, were also active on the coherence
issue. This coherence gapreflected negatively on the credibility of
the EU in the international arena andon its stated commitment to
international development. The era of passiv-ism ended with the
beginning of the new century, when the EuropeanCommission, taking
advantage of a number of favourable conditions andusing an astute
strategy, managed to set an ambitious agenda for the EU. First,it
rallied the principle of PCD around the MDGs, indicating how each
PCDcommitment served the purpose of meeting one or more MDGs.
Secondly, itproposed PCD within a package deal, which included an
additional volumeof aid and concentration of efforts in Africa. In
this sense, the EuropeanCommission showed that the MDGs would not
be achieved if the interna-tional community and, more specifically,
the member states and the EU, didnot take concrete initiatives on
the issue of policy coherence for development.Thirdly, it linked
the issue of PCD to the new role of the EU as a single actorin
international development and to its ability to shape the global
agenda.
The adoption of the PCD communication and the subsequent
Councilconclusions marked a significant change in the EU, as
confirmed by a leadingofficial in DG Development: Even though the
concept of policy coherence fordevelopment was enshrined in the
Treaties a long time ago, the issue has never
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340 Maurizio Carbone
made it all the way up to the Commission Things have changed,
however,since the adoption of the MDG package; development is not
always losing anymore.13 The central question is the implementation
of the commitments. ThisSpecial Issue tries to suggest that,
although it is not an easy task, achievingbetter policy coherence
for development is no longer a mission impossible.However, it is
not simply a matter of designing mechanisms. It is also, if
notmainly, a matter of commitment at the highest political level.
In the future, onemay anticipate a further politicization of this
issue, which may also entail thatthe call for better policy
coherence for development will be intertwined furtherwith the role
that the EU wants to play in international politics. The new
globalagenda on quantity and quality of aid shows that, by acting
as a unitary actor,the EU is able to shape the pace of
international development. The EuropeanConsensus on Development and
the Code of Conduct on Complementarityand Division of Labour
indicate that there is a change of course whereby themember states
are more committed to improving the effectiveness of EU aid,the
visibility of the EU in international development, including its
ability toshape the global agenda. Similarly, more member states
have started toacknowledge that their domestic policies must take
due account of the interestof developing countries. In sum, only by
combining its significant efforts inforeign aid with non-aid
policies will the EU be able to make an indent in bridg-ing the
widening gap between the rich and the poor.
Notes1. The various translations of the Treaty of Maastricht
show that the English version speaks of consis-
tency, whereas the French (but also the German, Italian, Spanish
and Portuguese) speak of coherence.Tietje (1997) preferred to use
the term coherence rather than consistency because the two
wordsmean different things: Consistency in law is the absence of
contradictions; coherence on the otherhand refers to positive
connections. Moreover, coherence in law is a matter of degree,
whereasconsistency is a static concept (Tietje 1997, p. 212).
Similarly, Gauttier (2004, pp. 2526) saw thetwo concepts not as
interchangeable but as mutually reinforcing: horizontal coherence
encompassesboth the absence of contradictions within the external
activity in different areas of foreign policy(consistency), and the
establishment of a synergy between these aspects (coherence) The
requirementof consistency forms therefore the first degree of
horizontal coherence.
2. In reality, calls for consistency had started already in the
late 1960s and continued with the EuropeanPolitical Cooperation
(EPC), though the word consistency made its first appearance in EU
texts inthe Paris Summit of December 1974. On this, see Duke (1999)
and Nuttall (2005).
3. May et al. (2006), who discuss American politics, argued that
greater coherence is linked to policydomains for which there is
greater concentration of committee involvement in holding
hearings.
4. The CDI ranks industrialized countries on a number of issues,
notably foreign aid; openness to devel-oping country exports;
policies that promote investment; migration policies; environmental
policies;security policies; support for creation and dissemination
of new technologies. See www.cgdev.org[Accessed 15 January
2008].
5. For a detailed analysis of the issues of competence in EU
external relations, see Eeckhout (2004). Fora detailed analysis of
the policy-making process, see inter alia Wallace et al.
(2005).
6. However, it should be noted that the quest for coherence,
which implied the involvement of devel-oping countries in the EU
development policy, was present in the Yaound Convention and the
LomConvention (Picciotto 2005).
7. In March 2002, the EU set a collective target of 0.39 per
cent of its combined Gross National Income(GNI) to be reached by
2006 (and an individual target of at least 0.33 per cent) and in
May 2005 acollective target of 0.56 per cent to be reached by 2010
(and an individual target of at least 0.51 percent for EU-15 member
states and 0.17 per cent for EU-10 member states).
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8. These views on policy coherence are also included in the
Lisbon Treaty, which kept development asan independent policy:
Union development cooperation shall have as its primary objective
thereduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The
Union shall take account of theobjectives of development
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to
affectdeveloping countries (Article III 316-I).
9. A proposal was also made to use the Country Strategy Papers
(CSPs) to detect and implement policycoherence at the country
level. The first generation of CSPs, however, show that policy
coherencehas been dealt with inadequately. The sections in the CSPs
are, in fact, rather short, superficial andgenerally too optimistic
(Hoebink 2005).
10. The Commission report was based on the answer to a
questionnaire sent to the member states inJanuary 2007.
11. The Inter-Service Group on PCD, set up in 2006, comprises
members of relevant DGs, the Secretariat-General and the Legal
Service. The Impact Assessment System allows the evaluation of
consequencesof major policy proposals and the assessment of
alternative options. The Inter-service Consultation,although not
specifically set up to promote coherence, ensures that DG
Development raises develop-ment issues when other DGs draft policy
proposals.
12. See Heynes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006).13. These words are
those of Bernard Petit, deputy Director General of DG development,
expressed in a
meeting of the European Parliament. See www.eucoherence.org
[Accessed 15 January 2008].
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