MinorityMajority Relations in Canada: The Rights Regime and the … · 2015-05-12 · MinorityMajority Relations in Canada: The Rights Regime and the Adoption of Multicultural Values

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Minority­MajorityRelationsinCanada:TheRightsRegimeandtheAdoptionofMulticulturalValues

AllisonHarellCanadianOpinionResearchArchive

SchoolofPolicyStudies,Queen’sUniversityAbstract:HowhavechangesinthemanagementofculturaldiversityandeffortstopreventdiscriminationimpactedpublicopiniontowardimmigrationandmulticulturalisminCanada?Thisarticlesetsouttoexaminehowattitudeshaveshiftedtowardimmigration,ethnicandracialdiversityandmulticulturalismsincethe1970s.DrawingonawealthofpollingdataavailablethroughtheCanadianOpinionResearchArchive,evidenceispresentedthatpublicopinionhasshifteddramaticallysincetheearly1990stowardmorepositiveattitudes.ItisarguedthatthisopinionshiftsreflectsbothsignificantpolicydevelopmentsinCanadaconcerningminorityrights,anti‐discriminationandmulticulturalismandinter‐generationaldifferencesinexperienceswithdiversity.ThepaperconcludesbyarguingthatyoungergenerationsofCanadianshavegrownupwithauniquesetofmulticulturalnorms,whichreflectunprecedentedlevelsofopennesstowardethnoculturaldiversityintheyoungestgenerationofCanadians.

PaperpreparedfortheCanadianPoliticalScienceAssociationannualmeetinginOttawa,

ON,May27‐29,2009.

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Introduction

Canadiandemocracyhasexperiencedamassivetransformationinthepastforty

years.Ithasformallyentrenchedaconstitution,withstoodtwoattemptsbyQuebecto

secedefromthefederation,andundertakenaradicalshiftinimmigrationpolicy–tripling

thevisibleminoritypopulation.Thesechangeswereaccompaniedbyapolicyframework

thatdefinedCanadiansocietyasbilingualandmulticulturalandbylegalframeworksthat

ensureallaretreatedequallybeforethelaw.Whatimpacthavethesechangeshadonthe

attitudesofCanadians?DoesCanadiansocietyreflectthevaluesespousedinthesepolicy

developments?Haveconditionsofgreaterequalitybetweenminoritiesandmajorities

facilitatedmorepositiveoutgroupattitudes?

Thispapertracesthedevelopmentofthe"rightsrevolution"inCanadaandcritically

examineshowthesedevelopments,combinedwiththerealityofamoreracially,ethnically

andreligiouslydiversepopulation,haveledtoamassiveshiftinpublicopinionsincethe

early1990s.Thisshiftnotonlyreflectsthesignificantchangesinpublicpolicyandlegal

norms,butalsotheeverydayexperiencesofmorerecentgenerations.Canadiansborn

after1970havegrownupinafundamentallydifferentnormenvironmentwhererespect

forbothrightsandpluralismplayaprominentroleindefiningCanadianidentity.They

havealsohadunprecedentedopportunitiestointeractwithpeoplefromvariousracial,

ethnicandreligiouscommunities.

TheRightsRevolutioninCanada

TheCanadianstoryoftherightsrevolutionmustbeunderstoodsimultaneouslyfor

itsuniquenessanditsrelationshiptoabroadertrendthatwasoccurring,invariousforms,

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inmanystatesaroundtheworld.Epps(1998:7)definesarightsrevolutionas“a

sustained,developmentalprocessthatproducedorexpandednewcivilrightsand

liberties."Thisprocessisreflectedinnewfoundattentionbythecourtstoquestionsof

individualrightssuchasspeech,assemblyandreligionaswellaspopularandlegislative

attentiontorightsissues.1Competingexplanationsexistforthesourcesoftherights

revolution.YetinCanada,asintheUnitedStatesandmanyotherindustrializedcountries,

thelastfiftyyearshavebeenmarkedbysuccessiveattemptsatcodifyingbasiccivil

libertiesandensuringthatindividualshaveequalaccesstotheserights.

InCanadaasinothercountries,thisprocessincludedashifttowardanti‐

discriminationlegislationandthelegalelaborationandprotectionofindividualrights.The

rightsrevolutioninCanadabeganinthe1960swiththepassingoftheBillofRights,which

wasapieceoflegislationwhichpreventedfederalagenciesfromdiscriminatingonthe

groundsofrace,nationalorigin,colour,religionandsex.2Thisbill,whilelimitedinscope,

markedthestartingpointforanti‐discriminationlegislation,andwasfollowedshortly

thereafterbythe1962ImmigrationActwhichpreventeddiscriminationbasedonskin

colour,raceorethnicoriginintheselectionofimmigrantsandwasreplacedwiththe

pointssystemin1967whichisstilllargelyinplacetoday.3

Meanwhile,asthedevelopmentofanti‐discriminationpoliciesbegantotakeshape,

anintensefocusonlanguagerightswasalsoemergingtoaddresstheunequalpositionof

French‐speakingCanadians,largelymotivatedbytheincreasinglynationalistdiscourseof

1Thereare,ofcourse,intensedebatesaboutwhetherthisincreasedattentionbythecourtsreflectsanincrease,orevenanoverstepping,ofjudicialpower.See,forexample,MortonandKnopff(2000).2ForadetailedhistoryofthedevelopmentoftheBillofRights,seeMacLennan(2003).3However,thepreferentialtreatmentprovidedtoCommonwealthcountriesmeantthatcertainimmigrantgroupswerestillprovidedsomeadvantageingainingcitizenship.Thispreferentialtreatmentwasremovedinthe1977CitizenshipAct.

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theQuietRevolutioninQuebec.4TheRoyalCommissiononBilingualismandBiculturalism

wassetupin1963,andmanyofitsrecommendationsenactedbyPrimeMinisterTrudeau

appearintheOfficialLanguagesActof1969.TheemphasisonlanguagerightsinCanada

wasalsoaccompaniedbyanincreasingfocusonotherculturalgroups,notablyimmigrant

communities.TheCommissionReportrecognizedotherculturalgroupsinbookfour,aptly

titled“TheCulturalContributionoftheOtherEthnicGroups.”Thediscourseof

biculturalisminitiallyfacedresistancefromestablishedimmigrantcommunitiesinCanada

whosoughtrecognitionoftheirroleinCanadiansociety.Thisrecognitionwasgrantedin

Trudeau’sannouncementofanofficialpolicyofmulticulturalismin1971.Pal(1993)

providesadetailedaccountofhowgovernmentinstitutionsprovidedthefoundationforan

increasingfocusonidentityandcollectiverightsinCanada,especiallyamonglanguage

communities,immigrantcommunitiesandwomen.

Theanti‐discriminationaswellascollectiverightsdiscoursefromtheCanadian

governmentwouldflourishinthe1970sand1980sinCanada,perhapsmostnotablyinthe

ConstitutionActof1982whichincludedtheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,a

billofrightsthat,unlikeits1960scounterpart,wasentrenchedintheConstitution.The

Charteritselfhasreceivedanimmenseamountofscholarlyattention(see,forexample,

Cairns,1991;Manfredi,2004;Dobrowolsky,1999;Morton,1987,1998;MortonandKnopff,

2000;Pal,1993;Russell,2008;Seidle,1993;Hiebert,2002;Cairns,1992)andreceives

widespreadsupportamongtheCanadianpopulation(FletcherandHowe,2001).

4OnesuchexpressionofQuebeccollectiveidentitywastheChartequébécoisedesdroitsetlibertéswhichwaspassedinto1975(Morel,1987).WhiletheQuebeccharterwasasimplepieceoflegislation,itisinterestingtonotehowrightsareintimatelytiedtoasenseofcollectiveidentity,bothwithinQuebecandwithinCanadamoregenerally.

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WhiletheCharterreceivesthevastmajorityofattention,severalotherkeypiecesof

legislationreflectimportantstepsinthedevelopmentofanti‐discriminationpoliciesandin

aninstitutionaldiscoursearoundequality.TheseincludetheCanadianHumanRightsAct,

whichwasenactedin1977andprohibitsdiscriminationinallareasunderfederal

jurisdiction5,theEmploymentEquityActin1986,andtheCanadianMulticulturalismActin

1988thatcreatesalegislativeframeworkforthe1971policyofmulticulturalism.6

Inthethirty‐yearperiodfrom1960to1990Canadaexperiencedarightsrevolution:

civilrightsandlibertieswerenotonlyprotectedthroughsuccessivelegislation,butthey

wereentrenchedinthenewCanadianconstitutionandincreasinglythefocusofthecourts’

attention.7ThesechangeswerenotexclusivetoCanada.Othercountrieshavereactedto

aninternationaldiscourseonhumanrights,aswellasinterestgroupmobilizationsof

previouslymarginalizedcommunities(Epps,1998;Walker,1998;Glendon,1991).8Yet,

Canada’sexistingpluralism–andthewaysinwhichgovernmentchosetomanageit–make

itauniquecase.Thedevelopmentofarightsculturewasaccompaniedinfundamental

wayswithdiscoursesaroundaccommodatingculturalpluralismanddefiningCanadian

identity.Howhasadiscoursearoundequalityrightsandmulticulturalismimpacted

Canadianvalues?Hasitchangedthewaysinwhichminoritiesandmajoritiesrelatetoeach

other?

5ThisCanadianHumanRightsActfollowedtheenactmentofsimilarlegislationattheprovinciallevels.6ItshouldbenotedthatQuebechasdevelopedanalternativeframeworktomulticulturalismcalledinterculturalism,whichwaselaboratedbytheprovincialgovernmentin1990.Foradiscussionofthedifferences,seeKarmis(1994).7Epps(1998:172‐174)documentsthatbeginninginabout1975,andespeciallyby1980,civilrightscasesweremoreoftenexaminedbytheSupremeCourtofCanada.8Foranalternativeperspectiveonthesechanges,seeBrodieandNevitte(1993b).TheyarguethattheNewPoliticsofthe70sand80sreflectedawidervaluechangeinadvancedindustrializeddemocraciestowardmorepost‐materialistvalues.

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PoliticalValuesandInstitutionalFrameworks

MuchofthefocusontherightsrevolutioninCanadahastakenadecidedly

institutionalapproachwherethreemainactorsplaycentralroles:thecourts,parliament,

andinterestgroups.Thisliterature,ingeneral,addressestwokeyquestions.Ontheone

hand,intensescholarlydebatehasemergedaboutthesocialandpoliticalimplicationsof

judicialreviewandthedegreeofparliamentarysupremacyinCanada(Hiebert,2002;

MortonandKnopff,2000;HoweandRussell,2001).Ontheotherhand,detailedstudies

havealsoexaminedthemobilizationofinterestgroupsaroundthenewlyenshrinedrights

providedbytheCharter(Epps,1998;Pal,1993;Manfredi,2004;Seidle,1993),especiallyas

theyrelatetotheequalityclause(Section15),whichrecognizestherighttoequal

protectionandrecognitionbeforethelaw.

Thisinstitutionalapproachhasprovidedathoroughexaminationofhowthesethree

setsofactorsinteractandtheimplicationsthishashadintermsofpolicyandlegal

developmentsinCanada.However,relativelylittleattentionhasbeenpaidtohowthese

policiesreflect–andperhapsshape–publicopinion.Thisisanimportantlacunainthe

research,yettheimplicationisclearlypresentinpastresearch.Manyauthorshaveargued,

inCanadaaswellaselsewhere,thatrightsrevolutionsleadcitizenstoframeconflictsin

termsofindividualrights–often,itisargued,tothedetrimentofthedevelopmentofa

sociallycohesivesociety(Bibby,1990;Cairns,1988,1991,1992;Glendon,1991;Ignatieff,

2000;Walker,1998).Theextenttowhichpoliticalvaluesareshapedbytheseinstitutional

changesrequiresananalysisofhowpublicopinionhaschangedduringthiskeyperiods.

Tobefair,theinterestgroupliteraturedoesemergefromacivil‐societyperspective,

butlittleempiricalevidencehasrelatedthesesocialmovementstobroaderattitudesshifts

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towardamoretolerantsociety.Broadertrendsinpublicopinionarelargelyviewedas

culturalframeswhich“undoubtedlyshapethekindsofclaimsthatindividualscan

conceive,aswellasthekindsofchangesthattheyviewaswithintherealmofpossibilities”

(Epps,1998:17),buttheseso‐calledculturalframeshavebeenstudiedlargelyinisolation

fromthestudyofrightsrevolution.9Yet,thereisasensethatlegaldevelopmentslikethe

CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomswillallowinstitutionslikethecourtsto“be

activeinshapingthecharacterofCanadiansociety”(Vaughan,2001:23).Cairnscaptures

thissentimentstarklywhenheargues,“Overtime,thecumulativeresultsofits[the

Charter’s]applicationswillreachdeeplyintoourinner‐mostbeing,manipulatingour

psycheandtransformingourself‐image”(Cairns,1991:62).

WedoknowthatCanadiansarelargelysupportiveofboththeCharterandthe

courtsmoregenerally.FletcherandHowe(2001,2000a,2000b)haveconductedoneofthe

onlystudiesthatexaminesattitudestowardtheCharteritself.10Theyfindthatthereis

widespreadsupportfortheCharteramongCanadians,asmuchin1999(87%)astherewas

inanearlierstudyconductedin1987(84%).Theyfindasurprisingamountofconsistency

inpeople’sattitudestowardthecourtatthesetwopoints.Theyalsofindlittledifferences

acrosssalientsocialanddemographiccategories,reinforcingtheviewthatthissupportis

widespread.Inshort,sinceitsadoptions,Canadiansseemtogenerallyfeelquitepositive

aboutit.

Theextenttowhichsuchinstitutions–andmorespecificallythepoliciesand

decisionsofsuchinstitutions–impactCanadianvaluesmoregenerallyremainsan

empiricalquestionthathasreceivedverylittlescrutiny(see,however,BrodieandNevitte,9AlthoughseeGlendon(1991)foradiscussionofhowarightsframehasshapedpublicdiscourseintheU.S.10ForamorepessimisticviewofCanadiansattitudestowardtheCharter,seeNanos(2007).

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1993b,1993a;Cairns,1993).ItseemstobeconventionalwisdomthatCanadiansociety

hasbecomemoretolerantinrecentdecades,althoughlittleovertimedatahasbeen

availabletosupportthisperception.Oneofthefewstudiesthathastrackedchanging

valuesovertimeisNevitte(1996).11Heexaminesattitudesfromthe1981and1991World

ValueSurveysandarguesthatCanadiansarebecomingmorepost‐materialandless

deferentialtoauthority.Thisisreflectedinlesstrustinpoliticalinstitutionsandagreater

willingnesstoengageinprotestpolitics,aswellassupportformoreegalitarianvalues.Of

particularimportanceforthispaperisevidencethatCanadianshavebecomemore

supportiveofpluralism,asmeasuredbyavarietyoftolerancemeasures,andthatthisis

especiallytrueforyoungergenerations(seealsoLambertandCurtis,1984).

Twotrends,then,aresuggestedbythiswork:first,thereseemstobeaperiodeffect

whereattitudesarechangingamongthewholepopulation.Second,theremayalsobea

generationaleffectwhereyoungergenerationsarereportingadifferentsetofvaluesthan

pastgenerations.ConsistentevidencetendstosupporttheclaimthatyoungerCanadians

tendtobemoreopentowarddiversity,althoughthisdifferenceisusuallyreportedin

singlewavesofsurveyresearchwhichmakeitimpossibletodistinguishagefrom

generationaleffects(ParkinandMendelsohn,2003;Adams,2007).Theperiodeffecthas

receivedlimitedattentionaswell(BerryandKalin,1995;Palmer,1996;Gidengiletal.,

2003).12Forexample,BerryandKalin(1995:316)findthatattitudestoward

multiculturalismhavebecomemorepositivebetween1974an1991.Inperhapsthemost

comprehensivetestofover‐timechangesinattitudestowardimmigration,Wilkesand

11SeealsoNevitte(2002)andWilkes,GuppyandFarris(2008).12Gidengiletal.(2003:395)provideevidencethatthosewantinglessimmigrationhasdeclinedoverfourwavesoftheCanadianElectionStudy(1988‐2000),bothinQuebecandintherestofCanada.

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colleagues(2008)findthatattitudeshavebecomemorepositivetowardimmigration

beginninginthe1990s.RelyingonseventeenCanadianGalluppollsfrom1975to2000,

theyfindthatinterests,ideologyandthestateofthenationaleconomyhelpexplainanti‐

immigrantsentiment.Whilenotthefocusoftheiranalysis,theyalsofindanageeffect,with

olderindividualslesssupportiveofimmigration.

Whilethesestudiessuggestincreasingopennesstowarddiversity,theydonot

directlytesttheimpactoftherightsandpluralismdiscoursesonpublicopinion.

Furthermore,sinceovertimeanalyseshaveoftenbeenlimitedtotwodatapoints,trends

acrosstimeandacrossgenerationshavebeendifficulttoassess.Evidencesuggeststhat

trendstowardmorepluralisticvalueshavespreadacrossadvancedindustrialized

democracies(Nevitte,1996;Inglehart,1998;Nevitte,2002).However,theempirical

supportforthiscontentionismorelimitedintheCanadiancase.Thisisunfortunate

becauseCanadaoffersauniquecaseforexamininghowtheselargertrendscorrespond

withactualpolicydevelopmentsinCanada,andforassessingthedegreetowhichits

uniqueapproachtoaccommodatingculturaldiversitymayhavemattered.

Cross‐nationalresearchsuggeststhatCanadiansaremoresupportiveof

multiculturalismandimmigrationthanotherindustrializedcountries(WardandMasgoret,

2008;Adams,2007)andsomeevidencesuggeststhatthereislessracialconflict(Reitz,

1988).Canadawasthefirstcountryintheworldtoannounceanofficialpolicyof

multiculturalismandhasservedinmanywaysasanexampletoothersastohowto

successfullyintegrateadiversesociety.Thereisresearchtosuggestthatpoliciesthat

promoteaninclusiveidentityareassociatedwithimprovedinterculturalrelationsand

attitudestowardimmigrants(Berry,2000;Billietetal.,2003)andthatdifferentregime

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typesimpactthetypesofvaluestowarddiversitythatcitizenshold(Weldon,2006).Given

thisresearch,itisimportanttoexaminehowattitudestowarddiversityhavechangedover

timeinCanada,andwhetherinstitutionalchangeshaveprecededorfollowedthem.Given

theemphasisonanti‐discriminationoverthepast40years,itisessentialtoexaminehow

intergrouprelationshavechangedinCanada.

Thispaperwillmakethreespecificcontributions.First,itwilltrackattitudesover

timetowarddiversityrelyingonamultitudeofattitudemeasuresatmultiplepointsin

time.Second,itwilltakeadecidedlygenerationalapproachtoexamineifthosewhohave

grownuppost‐rightsrevolutionareadoptingmoremulticulturalnormsthanpast

generations.Finally,unlikepaststudies,itwillexaminetherolethatintergroupcontact

playsinpromotingpositiveattitudestowarddiversity.Unlikeasimpleapplicationofthe

contacthypothesis(Allport,1958),suchcontactwillbeviewedascontext‐specific.In

otherwords,thechangingpoliciesanddiscoursesarounddiversitywillbearguedto

facilitatethetypeofcross‐groupinteractionthatishopedtopromotepositiveoutgroup

attitudes.

PluralistPoliciesandPluralistValues

Clearly,Canadahasexperiencedamajortransformationinitslegalandlegislative

frameworks.Thesedevelopmentshaveplacedincreasingimportanceonissuesofequality

andanti‐discrimination,whilealsosettingthestagefordramaticchangesinthe

compositionoftheCanadianpopulationitself.Yetweknowlittleabouthowthese

institutionalvalueshavetranslatedintoCanadianpoliticalculture.Thispapertakesa

decidedlyreciprocalviewofthisprocess:whiledecisionsaboutpolicyareclearlydrivenin

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partbythemobilizationofinterestgroupsandacalculationofhowpolicieswillbe

receivedbythegeneralpublic,oncepoliciesareputintoplace,theycanalsoconditionthe

wayscitizensthinkandfeelaboutvariousissues.Thisviewissimilartothethermostatic

modelputforwardbySorokaandWlezian(2005),wherepoliciesrespondtodemands

fromthepublic,whointurnreacttopolicychanges.

Figure1outlinesthegeneraltheoreticalframeworkunderpinningtheforthcoming

analysis.Asstated,substantialevidencehasbeenaccumulatedthattherightsrevolutionin

Canada,asrepresentedbycurrentlawsandpoliciesintheseareas,wasdrivennotonlyby

pastpoliciesandlegalprecedents,butalsobythemobilizationofinterestgroupsand

politicalcompetitioninCanadatogarnersupportfromspecificcommunities(Epps,1998;

Hiebert,2002;Morton,1987;MortonandKnopff,2000;Manfredi,2004;Pal,1993;Seidle,

1993).Oncetheselawsandpoliciesareinplace,theyhavetwomainoutputs.First,the

rightsrevolutionarguablyhasimpactedtheframesofdebateinCanada,withquestionsof

identityandrightsincreasinglyplayinganimportantrole(Cairns,1991;Pal,1993;Cairns

etal.,1999;Uberoi,2008;Ignatieff,2000).Second,theyhaveconcretepolicyoutcomes

relatedtodiversity,suchaschangesinschoolcurriculums,thenatureandlevelsof

immigration,andthecreationofmechanismstoensureequityinareaslikehousingand

employment.13Boththeframesofdebateandpolicyoutcomesarelikelytoimpactthe

waysinwhichthepublicfeelsaboutpluralismandhowtheyinteractwithracialized

minorities.Theseopinionsinturnfosterinterestgroupmobilizationandpolitical

competitionthatfuelfurtherpolicydevelopments.

13Forarelatedargumentbetweenimmigrationlevelsandattitudes,seeStolleandHarell(n.d.).

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[figure1abouthere]

Thismodelprovidesabasisforexpectingchangesovertime(i.e.periodeffects),but

thereisalsoreasontobelievethatthisprocesswillhaveadisproportionateimpactonthe

attitudesandvaluesofyoungerCanadians(i.e.generationeffect).Politicalsocialization

researchhasdemonstratedthatearlyexperiences,suchasinthefamilyandatschool,

contributetopoliticalattitudesandbehaviorsthataresurprisinglystableoverthelife

course(Hooghe,2004;YatesandYouniss,1999;Gimpeletal.,2003;Jaros,1973;Langston,

1969;MillerandSears,1986;Torney‐Purtaetal.,1975;Gerberetal.,2003;Greenand

Shachar,2000;Plutzer,2002).Changesintheinstitutionalcontext,andsubsequent

changesinboththeframesofdebateandtheenvironmentinwhichthesedebatestake

placeshouldthereforehaveadisproportionateimpactonthevaluesandattitudesof

youngergenerations.Theimpactshouldbeparticularlystrongforthosewhoexperience

mostdirectlytheoutcomesoftheseinstitutionaldevelopments.Whilesomeofthese

changesmayberelativelyconstantformostyouth(suchaschangesintheschool

curriculum),otherchangeswillbeexperienceddisproportionatelybycertainyouth,such

asincreasesintheethnicandracialcompositionofthepopulationresultingfromamore

openimmigrationregime.

Thus,thePolicy‐PublicOpinionModelpresentedinFigure1offerstwomajor

expectationsforpublicopiniondataovertimeinCanada.Firstofall,weshouldwitnessa

shiftinpublicopiniontowardmoreopenattitudestowardimmigrationand

multiculturalismthatproceedsthedevelopmentofarightscultureinCanada.Second,this

shiftshouldbemostacuteamongyoungergenerations,especiallythosewhohavehadthe

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opportunitytoexperiencetheeffectsofsomeofthesechanges,suchasthosewhoare

exposedtoincreasedethnoculturaldiversityintheireverydaylives.

DataandMethods

Thedatausesforthisanalysisarefrompublicopinionsurveysthathavebeen

conductedinCanadasincethe1970s.TheprimarysourceofdataistheFocusCanada

series.Thisisaquarterly,representativepublicopinionsurveyconductedbyEnvironics.

Whilethesurveyquestionsvaryfromwavetowave,anumberofquestionshavebeen

repeatedovertimetoallowforamoreaccuratetrackingofattitudetrendsthanisusually

available.AdditionaldataisalsodrawnfromtheCanadianElectionStudies(CES),Gallup

andsurveysconductedbytheCentreforResearchandInformationonCanada(CRIC).14All

resultsarepresentedinweightedformat.

TheDevelopmentofMulticulturalValues

HaveCanadiansbecomemoresupportiveofdiversityovertimeinCanada?While

thisquestionseemsrelativelystraightforward,themajorobstacletoansweringithasbeen

theavailabilityofovertimemeasuresonavarietyofquestionsrelationtodiversityand

multiculturalisminCanada.Figure2presentsthetrendsinresponsestoeightdifferent

questionsaboutimmigrationandracialminoritiesthatwereaskedaminimumofthree

timesbetween1975and2006.Thelinesrepresentatwopointmovingaveragefor

responsesthatwereconsideredpositivetowarddiversity.Inaddition,atimelineis

providedalongthex‐axisthatplotsoutmajorchangesinlegislationandkeyevents.14Thesesurveys,alongwithtechnicalinformation,areavailablethroughtheCanadianOpinionResearchArchive(www.queensu.ca/cora).

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[figure2abouthere]

Duringthe1970sand1980s,twodifferentpollingfirms(EnvironicsandGallup)

repeatedlyaskedCanadiansabouttheirattitudestowardthelevelofimmigrationin

Canada.Theysuggestthattherewassomemovementinattitudesduringthisperiod.15

PastresearchhassuggestedthatsupportforimmigrationinCanadaislinkedtoeconomic

conditions,whichroughlymirrortheupsanddownsduringthisperiod(Palmer,1996).

However,duringthe1990s,acrossalleightquestions,whichrangefromsupportfor

immigrationtohowmuchshouldbedoneforracialminorities,thereappearstobea

significantupswinginsupportacrosstheboard.Forexample,whereasroughlyone‐third

ofCanadiansdisagreedwiththestatementthattherewastoomuchimmigrationinthe

early1990s,bytheearly2000s,thisnumberdoublewithnearlytwo‐thirdsofCanadians.16

Linkingthisshifttotheformerinstitutionalcontextdevelopedaroundpluralism

rightsinthe1970sand1980srequiresmorethansimplytemporalorder.Yettheshift

whichoccurredinthe1990sisstriking,anditfollowedaperiodrightlydescribedasa

rightsrevolutionwhichplacedimmenseimportanceontheideasofanti‐discrimination

andequality.Wasthepublicopinionshiftconsistentacrossthepopulation?InFigure3,

responsestothelongestrunningquestion(Generallyspeaking,thereistoomuch

15Thedifferenceinlevelsofpositiveresponsestothesequestionsislikelyduetodifferentquestionwording.WhereastheGalluppollaskedaquestionthatprovidedbothapositiveandnegativeresponse,theEnvironicsquestionrequirestherespondenttodisagreewithanegativestatement.Givenresponseacquiescence,itisnotsurprisingthatthisquestiontracksatalowerlevel.Whatisimportant,however,isthatthepatternovertimeislargelyparallel.16Thislevelisparticularlyremarkablebecausethequestionwordingisbiasedtowardananti‐immigrantresponse.Acquiescencebiasmayinfactmeanthislevelismuted.

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immigration)arebrokendownbyagegrouptoaddressthisquestion.17Thepattern,not

surprisingly,mirrorstheaggregatetrends.However,differencesacrossagegroupsare

apparent.Whilenoclearagetrendappearsinthe1980s,beginningintheearly1990s

wheretheupswinginsupportforimmigrationbegins,theyoungestagecohortare

consistentlymoresupportiveofimmigrationthanoldergenerations.In2006,those

betweentheagesof18to24disagreedwiththeanti‐immigrationstatement70percentof

thetime,comparedtoonly58percentamongthoseovertheageof55(p<.01).Thegap

betweentheyoungestandoldestcohortsrangesfromfourpercentagepointsin1992to14

percentagepointsin1994and2001.Whilesupportforimmigrationhasincreasedacross

allagegroups,theyoungercohortconsistentlyreportshigherlevelsoverall.Thisage

difference,itisimportanttonote,wasnotconsistentlypresentbeforetheearly1990s.

[figure3abouthere]

Aswithpreviousresearch,thereisacleartendencyamongyoungerCanadiansto

providemorepositiveresponsestowarddiversity,andthisisconfirmedinTable1,where

responsesfroma2006Environicssurveyareprovidedforsixdifferentimmigration

questionsbyagegroup.Ineverycasebutone,youngpeopleages18‐24provideanswers

moresupportiveofimmigrationthanoldergenerations,andthesearesignificant(p<.01)in

fourofthefivecases.Theoneexceptionisresponsestothestatement:Immigrantstake

jobsawayfromotherCanadians.Inthisinstance,youthareactuallytheleastlikelyto

disagree.Thisisperhapsnotsurprising,sincethisistheagegroupwhohasorwillbe

17Notethatthe1977datapointisnotdisplayed,asanagevariableisnotincludedinthisdataset.

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shortlyenteringtheworkforce,andforwhomemploymentcompetitionmaybehighly

salient(Palmer,1996).Onthewhole,however,publicopinionamongyoungerpeople

tendstobemorepositiveaboutimmigration.Whenthesesixitemsarecombinedintoa

singlescale(alpha=.738),wherehigherresponsesindicatemoreopenattitudestoward

immigration,youngCanadians,onaverage,havethehighestscore.

[table1abouthere]

Thedatashowthatsupportforsocialdiversityhasincreasedsincetheearly1990s,

andthatyoungpeoplearemostlikelytoexpresssociallytolerantattitudes.Itisimportant

tonotethatduringthistimeCanadaexperiencedanimmensegrowthinethnic,religious

andracialdiversity,largelydrivenbyimmigration.AccordingtotheCanadiancensus,less

than5%ofthepopulationwasconsideredavisibleminorityin1981.Overthefollowing

twoandahalfdecades,thisnumbertripled.In2006,CensusCanadaestimatedthatonein

sixCanadiansisavisibleminority.Thisgrowingdiversitywasnotaccompaniedby

increasedanti‐immigrantsentiment,asithasbeeninEurope(McLaren,2003).18

ThestructureofimmigrationtoCanadaisuniqueinmanyways,partlybecauseof

thetypesofimmigrantsthatcometoCanada.Thepointsystem,whichwasputinplacein

1967,replacedtherace‐basedpoliciesthatguidedimmigrationpre‐1967.Thisattemptat

a“merit”systemprioritizeseducationandworkexperience,whichmeansthatCanadian

immigrantsoftenarrivewithcomparablybettersocio‐economicresourcesthan

18Wilkesandcolleagues(2008)haveprovidedafurthertestofthisfindingintheCanadiancontextandfindnoeffectforthelevelofimmigrationonanti‐immigrantsentiment.

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immigrantsinothercountries.19Thismaymitigatesomeoftheintergroupconflict

betweenimmigrantsandhostsocietiesthathasbeendocumentedinEurope(Quillian,

1995).Yet,researchsuggestsaswellthattheinstitutionalsupportsinCanadaprovidedto

immigrantplayanimportantroleinexplainingimmigrantintegration,beyondtherelative

differencesinstatusofnewcomers(Bloemraad,2006).

Whilethenatureofimmigrationisclearlyanimportantfactorinexplaining

immigrantattitudes,Iwouldarguethatitreflectsthebroaderinstitutionalvaluesof

equalityandpluralismreflectedintheCharterandotherlegaldevelopmentsthroughthe

1960sand1970s.ThetypesandlevelsofimmigrantsinCanadaisapolicyoutcome,which

inpartmediatestherelationshipbetweentheinstitutionalcontextandpublicopinions.

Thereisanimmenseamountofresearchthatdocumentsthatincreasedcontactbetween

minoritiesandmajoritiesfostersmorepositiveattitudes(Allport,1958;Pettigrew,1998;

Dovidioetal.,2003;PettigrewandTropp,2006).Thereisalso,however,acompeting

literaturethatsuggeststhatincreasingdiversityshouldactuallyresultinmorehostile

intergrouprelations(TajfelandTurner,1979,1986;GilesandBuckner,1993;Quillian,

1995;McLaren,2003;TolbertandGrummel,2003).Themajordistinctionbetweenthese

twoframeworksisthenatureofintergroupinteraction.Thecontacthypothesisrequires

positiveinteraction,whereasthethreathypothesissimplyrequiresproximity.Thus,

contextisthekeymechanismintranslatingexperienceswithdiversityintosocialand

politicalattitudesaboutothergroups.TheCanadiancontext,Ihaveargued,providesa

contextinwhichpositiveinteractionacrossgrouplinesislikelytotakeplace.

19Clearly,thissystemhasitsdrawbacks.ThereremainsdifficultyintranslatingtheseskillsintoemploymentinCanada,duetoalackofrecognitionofforeigncredentials.Foracritiqueoftheeconomicimperativesofimmigration,seeAbu‐LabanandGabriel(2002).Thereisalsosomeevidencethatincreasinglyissuesofracialdiscriminationarealsocreatingbarrierstofullemploymentformorerecentimmigrants(Reitz2007).

18

[table2abouthere]

Wemightexpectthatthegapinsupportacrossagegroupswillbeamplifiedamong

thosewhohavemoreexposuretodiverseothers.Totestthis,itisnecessarytoknowthe

typesofethnicandracialdiversitythatindividualshaveactuallybeenexposedto.Oneway

tocapturesuchexposureisbyexaminingcontact.The2006Environicssurvey,fortunately,

askedaboutthefrequencyofcontactwithsixdifferentminoritygroupsinCanada:Jews,

blacks,Chinese,Pakistani/EastIndians,Muslims,andAboriginals.Responseswereona

four‐pointscalefromnevertooften,andtheresponseshavebeencompiledintoan

additivecontactscalethatrangesfrom0to18(alpha=.815).Themeanforallagegroups

isabout10.1,withtheexceptionofthoseover55whoaveragean8.7onthescale.Thereis,

then,littleevidencethatyoungerCanadiansreportsubstantiallydifferentlevelsofcontact

thanolderCanadians.20Butconsiderthecorrelationsbetweencontactandpro‐

immigrationattitudesinTable2.Whilethetwoarepositivelyrelatedinallcases,notehow

therelationshipappearstostrengthenamongyoungergenerations.Youthcontactseems

tobemorecorrelatedwiththeirattitudestowardimmigrants.Thisisexpectedfroma

socializationperspective:earlyexperiencesaresupposedtobemorerelatedtopolitical

attitudes.

[table3abouthere]

20However,seeStolleandHarell(n.d.)forevidencethatyoungpeopledoreporthigherlevelsofethnicandracialdiversityintheirfriendshipnetworks.Theyalsoshowthatinamultivariatesetting,thepositiveimpactofnetworkdiversityongeneralizedtrustisonlyfoundamongyoungergenerations.

19

InTable3,therelationshipbetweencontactandagearefurtherexploredinthe

multivariatesetting.Thecontactscaleisincludedinthemodel,aswellasdummyvariables

forthedifferentagegroups.Controlsareincludedforregionofthecountry,whereOntario

isconsideredthereferencecategory,immigrantstatus(1=immigrant),visibleminority

status(1=firstmentionforethnicbackgroundotherthanEuropean/NorthAmerican),

gender(female=1),employmentstatus(1=unemployed),andimpressionsofthestateof

theeconomy(4‐pointscalewhere1=veryworriedand4=notatallworried).Theinclusion

ofthelasttwoitemsareimportant,astheyoffercontrolfortheimpactofeconomic

competitiononanti‐immigrantattitudes,amajorexplanatoryfactorinpreviousresearch

(Palmer,1996;O'Connell,2005).

TheeffectforbothcontactandagearesignificantinTable3.Thosewhoreport

morecontactwithminoritygroupsaremorelikelytohavepositiveattitudestoward

immigration(p<.01).Asexpected,theyoungestagecohort(18to24yearolds)isalsothe

mostpositivetowarddiversity(p<.10),withmorenegativeattitudesevidentwitheach

successiveagecohort(p<.01).Thesefindingsholddespitetheinclusionofavarietyof

demographiccontrols.Furthermore,theeffectsarealsopresentwhenthemodelis

examinedonlyfornon‐immigrants(resultsnotshown).Boththecontactscaleandyouth

remainpositiveandstatisticallysignificant(p<.01andp<.05respectively).

[figure4abouthere]

20

Ideally,tofullytestwhethercurrentcontactimpactsyouthattitudestoward

diversitymorethanotheragegroups,interactiontermswouldbeincludedinthemodel.

Unfortunately,theeffectofageandtheinteractiontermdisappearwhenbothareincluded

inthemodel(notshown).Thisislikelyduetotherelativelysmallsampleof18to24year

oldsinthesample.21Inanexaminationoftheyouthsamplealone,thecontactscale

remainssignificant.Infact,itisoneoftheonlyvariablesthatattainsstatisticalsignificance,

otherthanfeelingsaboutthestateoftheeconomy(notshown).Figure4highlightsthe

proposedinteractionbetweenageandcontact.Thegraphplotstherelationshipbetween

contactandpro‐immigrantattitudes,withregressionlinesshownforeachagegroup.As

expected,theoveralllevelfortheyoungestgroupishighestreflectingtheirhigherlevelsof

overallsupportforimmigration.However,therelationshipisalsostrongerforthe

youngestgroup(r‐squared=.066comparedto.028forthose55andover)andtheslopeof

thelineappearsslightlysteepercomparedtotheoldestcohort.

Whilethisisonlysuggestiveevidencethatcontactmaymattermoreforyouth

comparedtooldergenerations,itclearlydoesmatter.This,combinedwiththeconsistent

agedifferences,supportsthecontentionthatCanadiansattitudestowarddiversityhave

becomemoreopentowarddiversity,andthatthischangehasbeenfeltespeciallyamong

youngpeopleandthosewhohaveexperiencedirectlythepluralismthattherights

revolutionhasmadepossible.

21Thereare197youthrespondentsinthesample,and155ofthemprovidedvalidresponsesonallitemsinthetable3model.

21

ConcludingRemarks

ThispaperhassetouttodocumentchangesinCanadians’attitudestowarddiversity

sincethe1970s.Evidencewaspresentedthatasignificantincreaseoccurredbeginningin

theearly1990sthatproceededmajorinstitutionalchangesinCanada.Thesechanges

reflectthedevelopmentofarightsregimewhichemphasizesindividualrightsandanti‐

discrimination.InCanada,thedevelopmentoftherightsregimetookonunique

characteristicswhichreflectthepre‐existingculturaldiversitythathascharacterized

Canadasinceitsfounding,includingthepresenceoftwolanguagecommunities,

Aboriginals,andsuccessivewavesofimmigrationthatbroughtwiththemcultural,

religiousandethnicdiversity.HowsuccessiveCanadiangovernmentshavemanageda

respectforbothindividualrightsandculturalpluralismarereflectedinbothpolicy

outcomesaswellastheframesofdebatethatstructurepublicdiscussionaround

accommodatingdiversity.

Clearly,therearelimitationstotheanalysisputforthinthispaper.Thenextlogical

stepwillbetomodeltheageeffectsovertime,controllingforindividuallevel

characteristicsthatarenotcapturedbyasimplebreakdownofattitudesbyage.Theinitial

findingsfortheageeffectsinthemultivariatesettingsuggestthattheageeffectisindeed

robusttocontrolsinthe2006sample.Asecondlimitationistheavailabilityofcontextual

information.Becausetheimpactofdiversityisfeltdifferentlydependingonwhereoneis

located,futureresearchwillneedtocontrolforbothurban/ruraldynamicsandideallyfor

census‐tractlevelinformationforeachrespondent,aswellaschangesinthelevelsof

ethnicandracialdiversityovertimeandthestateoftheeconomy.

22

Despitetheselimitations,theevidencepresentedinthispaperdoesprovideoneof

thefewlooksatchangesinattitudestowarddiversityovertimeinCanada.Thisstudyhas

reliedonamultitudeofquestionsthatareaskedrepeatedlyovertime.Whileacomparison

betweentwopointsintimeisuseful,confidenceinthepresenceoftrendsisgreatly

increasedbythepresenceofmultipledatapoints.Furthermore,thispaperpresenteda

contextualizedunderstandingoftheenvironmentinwhichthesechangesweretaking

place.Whilelarge‐scale,cross‐nationalvaluechangeiscertainlypartofthestoryin

Canada,itisalsoclearthatthemultinationalandmulticulturalnatureofCanadahas

presentedauniquechallengetopolicymakersastheyhavedealtwithincreasingdemands

forindividualrightsandequalitybetweengroups.Thepolicyresponsesreflectbroader

trendsinanti‐discriminationaswellasauniquelyCanadianfocusrecognizingand

respectingculturaldiversity.

23

TablesandFigures

Figure1:Policy­PublicOpinionModel

InputsPastpoliciesLegalprecedentsInterestgroupsPoliticalcompetition

Currentlawsandpolicies

OutputsFramesofdebatePolicyoutcomes

PublicOpinion

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

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