Military Review June 1965

7/27/2019 Military Review June 1965

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f mIlMilitary ReviewP rofessiona l J ourna l of t he U S Army

Strategy and $ystems Analysis . . , Lt Col Delbert M. Fowler, IJSA 3Whispers in a Windstorm . . . . Lt Col Gustav J. Gillert, Jr., USA 8Protection of Roads . . . . . . . . . Slavko N. Bjelajac 17

25onsoons and Military Operations . . , Lt COI Harlan & Koch, USAHukbalahap Insurgency . . . . . . . . Robert Ross Smith 35NATO Infrastructure . . . . . . Lt COI Emmett R. Arnold, USANATOs Flanks

43. . . . . . . . . . Eu~ene Hinterhoff 48

Anguish of Normandy . . . . . . . MN2 David H. HoIt, USN 56Inter-American Force . . . . . . Lt (lol I-k@l R. Arj rOn, USA 63The Good OfNcer . . . . . . . , . . Davis B. Bobrow 69Soviet Tactics . , . . . Maj Gen V. Reznichenko, Soviet Army 76

Col A. Sidorenko, Soviet Army

Original t(MAG . . . . . . . . , . Richard P. Weinert

Soviet Armored Carriers . . . . . Capt Wil liam E. Odom, USA 81Shift in Soviet Strategy . . . Col Donovan P. Yeuell, Jr., USA, Ret 87

93MilitaryN odes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Military Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

The Military Review, a publ icat ion of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the express ionof mil!tary thought with emphas}s on doctri ne concerning the drwsion and higher Ievel$ of command.


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E ditor in ChiefCol Donald J. Delmrey

Assistant EditorLt ColAlbertN. G arla nd I

features EditorMaj Robert L. B urke

La yout Editer1st Lt Robert K. Lirrdgrerr

Actin g S pa rr ish -Amer ica nE dit orLuisA. Monserr a te I

Braz i l ianEdi torLt Col LU IZde A. Ara ri~ e

Associate EditorLt C ol Algin J. HughesArmy War College

P roduction OfficerMaj NormanC. Murra y

S t a f f ArtistCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEWPubfished monthly by the U.S Army Command arrd Generai Staff College, Fort Lea!enworth, Kansas, m Engl!sh, Spamsh, and Portuguese. Use of funds for p+mfing of this publi cation hasbeen approved by Headquarters, DeIIartment of the Army,3 July 1962.Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rate% $3.50 (US currency)ayear m the United States, United States mlli~ary pos t off ices, andthose count ries which are members ofthe Pan AmerJcan Postal Un!on (including Spaml, $4.50 a year in all other count ries Address subscnption mail to the %mirDenartmerrt . U. S. ,4rmv . and G enera !Stef f Colleee. Fort Leavenworth,. Command .Kansas 66027.


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STRATEGY ANALYSISNDSYSTEMSLieutenant Colonel Delbert M. Fowler, United States Armg

D U RING the past few years , in-na tiona l publica tions a nd in norma l conversa tion in th e balk of thePentagon, we have been bombardedwith such sta tements ae:

I t s a bat t le betw een th e genera lsa nd the w hiz kids.

I t s a str uggle between flag officersa nd th e Secreta ry of D efense.

I t s a deba te over th e relative merits of milita ry intuit ion versus qua ntitat ive analysis.

It s tbe a ge-old str uggle betw eenage and youth.

Some individua ls ha ve a tt empted tota ke persona lities out of tbe discussion by a iming th eir ba rbs a t sciencea nd th e inan imat e computer. As Dr .Alain C. E nt hoven, Deputy Assista ntSecreta ry of Defense for Syst emsAna lysis, sa id to a recent space w riters convent ion in Florida:

I can iwmgine that most editorswould much prefer to see a storyJ un e1965 3


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about a ftst fight betwee% a generaland a whiz kid! on the third floorof the Pentagon rather than a straightdiscus8io?c of the various complicatedand conflicting factor-s that go into adecision on a major weapon system.These have been the headlines forthe past few years . But what havebeen tbe real iesues behind these headlines ?

Two years ago, Dr. Entboven said:. . . top defense oficials are now

being aided in making these judgments by ths .sgstematic availabilityOf Quantitative information on the effectiveness and costs of alternativestrategies, forcss, a nd weapon systems. This information is produced bva method sometimes called SystemsAnalysis.

And from tha t t ime to this, systemsa na lysis, as it perta ine t o a lternat iveforces a nd a lternat ive wea pon systems, has been tbe subject of mostof the wr it ings in this ar ea.Brooder Iktestion

The broader question of syst emsana lysis a nd a l ternat ive stra tegies basnot been widely discussed. Tbe various multila tera l force proposa ls a ndth e use of at omic d emolition mun i

. tions a re exam ples of s uch a lterna tivestr a tegies now being considered bythe North Atla ntic Treat y Organ ization na tions in th e forma lizat ion of

I Alai. C. E.thwen. W.terns Analwis andDecision M.ktns,- Mdit.ru Revtem,JmuaIY 1963,. ., ,.1,.....Lieutenant Colonel Detbert M. Fowler-, a student at the Industrial Collegeof the Armed Forcesr


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SYSTEMS ANALYSISthe integrated, correlated, apportioned, and reasoned app[


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SYSTEMS ANALYSISfort h a s a ~ esult of US w orld leadership a lso spaw ned a requirement forsystems a na lysts to ta ke the productsof th e va rious disciplines a nd towea ve them together into a lternat ivestr a tegies for the decision ma ker.In the ca se of both st ra tegy a nd thecomput er, th ere w ill he a requir ement for systems a na lysts until thegeneralist decision ma ker a nd a ll th especia lists learn each oth ers la ngua geto the point tha t int erpreters a re no,longer necessar y. B ut even if th iewere to happen in the near future, ca nit be said tha t systems a na lysts woulddisappear from t he scene ? Ha rdly! Agroup well educa ted a nd familiar withmodern comma nd, ma na gement, ~anddecision-ma king processes will morelikely r eplace less w ell-qu a lified mem bers on th e decision ma kers sta ff.Conclusive EvidenceE vidence support ing th is generalth esis of th e relat ionship betweens t ra tegy and systems analysisa bounds. The recent C a na dian defensereorga niza tion, for exa mple, still being hotly deba ted in defense circlesa round the world, wa s done in thena me of economy in governm ent a ndcost effectiveness. Recent B rit ish defense reorga niza tions w ere a ccomplished for simikw rea sons. Unit edSt a tes-Federa l Republic of G erma nya greements to provide opera tions research tra ining for the G erman defense esta blishment w ere signed inWa shin gt on in November 1964.

P erha ps th e most conclusive evidence came in late 1964 when the ViceP resident a nnounced tha t the G overnment might soon hire a sta ff of economists, sociologists, mathematicians,a nd scientists to a ssist in the insta Ra tion of some comput er-a ssist ed, detision-ma king technique in th e Whit eHouse. S uch a technique a lrea dy h a s

been proposed a nd ia designat ed byth e a cronym P ATTER N (P lan ningAesietance Through Technical Evalua tion or Releva nce Num bers). Accord.ing t o th e Vice P resident , such a process w ould permit decieion ma kers tosee pat terna tha t would ordina rily betoo complex to evaluate by the traditional intuitive mental process.Aspirations

At this point, your reaction maylikely be: So w ha t? Wha t ha s a ll thisto do w ith me?

If you a re ha ppy to remain the milita ry specialist , then the a nsw er is: Nothin g. If , how ever, you as pire toloft ier heights, such as tha t of thedecision ma ker or str a tegist, th en tbea nsw er is equa lly a s obvious.

Las t year , Lieutenant ColonelCha rles M. Fergusson, J r . , a memberof the faculty at the U nited St a tesArmy War College writing for theMi/itarl/ R#z,ie w, answered this ques.t ion in a nother wa y: .Itisdifficult to exaggerate the importance of the subject of strategicthinking and studies, It concerns themost important tceapon that man possessesh is mind-applied to his mostcrucial problemsecurity. . . . Weshould recognize that sound jcscfg

rwent and sound thinking a re complern~ntary, not conflictin g a s ha s toooften been assumed. A recent a rt icle in a nother publica

tion pointed out that :Problems of this complexity, if thevcan be solved at all, can be solved onlyby men generating and excluding possibilities with maximum effectiveness,to obtain a high degree of information per unit timem en willing towork a little bit at thinking.

Or consid er th e following:~ Lm@sni ,Cokml Chmles M. Fer!wwm, Jr.,%tmtemc Thrnkins and Stud],,,,) M,lU@r#R..mew. Am] 1964, DP 9-24.

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SYSTEMS ANALYSISAfter giving careful considerationto qualif ication for sea command and

required specializations, I believe theselection board should place greatshvss on seehing evidence, in the pastpctfovmance of prospective flag Oficers, of the qualities of flexibility ofmind, analytical thought processes,crtiativitv and imaginat ion which willbest qualify them to compete with theincreasingly professional a nd intellectual civilian leadership within an in-c~easingly integrated Defense Department. I think that the evidence of S U C I Lqualif ications can be found in manycategories of billets. However, I canthink of none zohere the naval oficeris put to a greater test of ability torise above his background and Possible prejudices than by demonstratedoutstanding performance in Joint andIn ternat ional Staffs and Agencies. Itis here that the common dogma of an~

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one service must give wag to the giveand take of analysis from differingperspectives. It is here that he mustrely less on the lessons of past experience and more on his basic qualitiesof intellect a nd thoughtfulness.

This is but one pa ra gra ph of a letter of . instr uctions f ra m the Secreta ryof the Navy to a recent Navy flag officer selection boa rd. It goes wit houtsnying tha t the demonstra t ion ofth ese qua lities will require a goodw orking knowledge of th e other disciplines involved in th e ma king of na tiona l stra tegy, th ose of polities, eco.nomics, a nd psychology.

P erha ps the best summa ry tha t Ica n give is to par a phra se Clemencea us oft en ma ligned expression: Letus hope tha t th e ma king a nd implementa t ion of U nited Sta tes na t iona lstra tegy is too import a nt to lea ve toeveryone but the generals !

We will continue to need men of vision. Our free society encouragesoriginal ideas. This is one of the rarest commodities of all and it is ourgreatest strength. As long as we have men of imagination and vision withth e strength of mind to push a head we will cont inue to ha ve th e strengthas a nat ion that leadership demands.

General B. A. .%hriever


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whispers in a windstorm .Lkutena nt Colonel G ustav J . G iI lert , J r . , United States Armu

t

The oiews expressed in this article are the authors and are notnecessarily those of the Departmentof the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Army Commandand General Staff College.Editor.

IS t o be expected, a nd, perh~ ps,ITit is a ppropria te, for t he currentU S milita ry a ctivity in South Viet

na m to ha ve a n inordina te influenceon our at t ifude a nd opinion towa rdpresent US Army counterinsurgencydoctr ine. En uncia ted, in part , in FieldManual 31-22, U. S. Army Counterirzsurgenc~ Forces, November 1963,this doctr ine wa s influenced in lar gemeasure by the Communist subversivethrea t to South Vietna m.

B ut tha t doctr ine is a lso intendedMil it a ryRev iew


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to serve a much broader purpose a sth e count ering mecha nism to w orldw ide subversive insur gency. Thus,while our a tt ention curr ently ie fo.eused !mima rily on south east Asia,Communist a c~ ivity in th e Middle

I

East, Africa, and Latin Americama kes th ese ar eas no less critica l orimportant to us. Herein lies much ofth e ba sic difference of opinion a nda cademic discord w hich exist a mongth e va rious members comprising ourcount erinsu w ency commun ity, par ticular ly w ithin th e U S Army itself .P rin cipa lissueOf principa l issue is t he questiona s to w hether or not S outh Vietna mshould hold a position of preemin encem our count erinsu rgency effort . I be{ieve it should.

Since South Vietn a m is curr entlyth e great est, a s w ell a s th e most direct a nd open, insur gent th reat , shouldour counterinsurgency doctrine a ndeffort be reshaped to reflect this prin.cipa l th reat , i f necessar y to th e exclusiou of a ll oth ers? The answer is n o !Fur th ermore, I do not believe tooma ny people a ctu a lly subscribe to sona rrow a course. There is a grow inga w a reness tha t w hile t he peculiar poIit lco-milita ry situa tion in Sout h Viet nam represents a depart ure from thea ccepted count erinsurgency pat tern, i t~ieatenan t Colonel Gust;v J. GiL[W, Jr., a member of the faculty ofthe U. S. Armg Command and G eneralStaff College, is the author of Counterinsurgenc~ which appeared in theAprii 1965 issue of the MILITARY RE VIEW. He holds a B.S. degree from theUniversity of Mar@znd and wa s graduated from the USA CGSC RegularCourse in 1963. He has held variousairborne and Special Forces assignments, including a four of dutg inLaos as .Specia[ Forces Advisor during 1961-62.

WHISPERSneed not be cons idered out of doctrinal context.

There is a t endency, however, tooversimplify t he va riety of complexcoun t erinsu rgency problems so th a tth ey ca n be expla ined rea dily by quicka nd superficia l a na lysis. There is a lsoa ten~ ency to overcompensat e in a nat tempt to a chieve results t ha t are inevita bly slow in fort hcoming a nd invar iably a ppear to be of minor immediate consequence. These results,therefore, a re undra ma tic in na turewhen they are achieved.Pacification MeasuresB y compa rison, th e slow , painsta king pa cifica tion mea sur es-clear , hold,a nd builda ppear inadequa te response to a n insurgent morta r at ta cka gainst a fr iendly a irbase, or to thesinking of a n a ircra ft ca rrier by aViet C ong demolition tea m. It is especially frust ra ting not to be a ble tocome to grips with such an illusiveand yet apparent overt Communistthreat a nd al l the more so w hen w eseem una ble t o sma sh it quickly w ithour prepondera nt milita ry ca pability.

Wha t usua lly results is a furioussoul eea rching a mong both politicia nsa nd milita ry a uth orities to seek rea sons for yet another Viet Cong triumph a nd South Vietn a mese shortcoming. It is a dilemma tha t breedsdiscont ent w ithin th e ra nks of dedicat ed professiona ls, opera tiona l pan icin the field, and a form of doctrinalschizophrenia a round conference ta bles. In a th ra shing a bout for demonstra ble success+ r a ccepta ble equivocat ionsa n a ll-too-rea dy solution isto follow a cour se of a ction th a t givesth e impression of a ppropria t e coun tera ctivity a nd viability.

Fr om such irresponsible beginn ingsha ve come severa l peculia r milita ryconcepts in t he past ; snm e st ill linger


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WHISPERSto ha unt U S. I am not suggest ing tha tw e hold dogged}y to present doct rineor to curr ent milita ry response w henit is clearly inadeqttata, when it is obviously ina ppropria te, or w hen it isw

Wha t I am suggesting is tha t ,w hether w e cont emplat e cha nge jcount erinsur gency doctr ine, divisiona lorga n~ a tion, or the basic rif le for ourinfan tr y soldier, w e w ould do w ell to, 7

A*V N,U J SFs.ztw,,Republic of Vietna m air borne infa nt ry dr op in t o reinforce government t roops in ~tight with Viet Cong forcesnot in our nat iona l interests to doso. And I do not oppose change whencha nge w ill ma terially improve or a dvance our capabilities.

The purpose of th is a rt icle is t o recommend change. How ever, I a m ca utioned by th e counsel of a w ise, respected, but generally unsung leader,the lat e G enera l Henry I . Ha des, who,a f ter h ea ring. a Depa rtment of theArm y briefing tea m extol th e virt uesof t he th en new pentomic division,summed UP in his ta ci turn wa y t hedoubts of ma ny w hen he ca utionedtha t cha nge is not a lwa ys progress.

explore t he experiences of hist ory a ntevaluate the present while we 100iforw a rd to th e ephemera l prospect s oisomething new a nd bett er in th e fu.tur e. Moreover, w e ha ve a n a lmosiinevita ble t endency to look for orga ni.za tiona l a nd equipment remedies wh ertbe problems a re essent ially personnel perform a nce deficiencies. All t ofoften t he resulta nt doctr ina l a nd or.ganizational turbulence wrought b~continua l cha nge is not only nonproductivt ?, but self-defea tin g a s w ell. WIha rdt y ha ve t ime to find out w here W(ha %e been a nd w ith w ha t, before W(

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str ike out a ga in-cliches a nd shibbolet hs flying-in eear ch of somethin gnew.

Consequently , wh ile w e ma y ha vet o look beyOnd the sema nt ics of coun terinsurgency for specific solutions toour Wietn a ms, w e w ould do w ell toreta in as broa d a fundamenta l miiita ry base a nd ca pabili ty for generalresponse a s our resour ces w ill permit .

I t w ould seem profitless a t th is la teda te in our count erinsurgency experience to extend a nyt hing but passingreference to the fact that insurgencya nd, consequently, count erinsurgencytra nscends mili tar y effort a nd entai lstota l government a pplica tion. Nevertheless, before proceedin g, I feelobliged t o a cknowledge a nd to empha size th e pa ra mn unt politica l, economic,sociologica l, a nd psychologica l cons iderat ions inherent in th is t ype of contlict. We ca n sear ch for counterinsu rgency technologica l breakt hroughs a nda tt empt to comput erize th e insurgentthrea t , but no ma tt er how complica tedm exha usting our a ppra isal of ea chspecific insurgent situa tion ma y be,in the f ina l ana lysis we a re engagedin a struggle for the mind of ma n.This is th e first const a nt . I t is a keystone of success w hen interw oven w ithth e corolla ry const a nt th e necessitytn provide th e people w ith physica la nd psychologica l protection a gainstsubversive violence.Objectives

Tbe object ive of coun t erin surg ency,a s tbe object ive of wa r itself, is toemploy our resources so a s t o a chieveresults fa vora ble to our na tiona l purpose. Within th e fra mework of th eexisting Commun ist subversive t hrea tto south east Asia, th e employment ofU S resources should be directed t owa rd this purpose.

It is not my int ent to explore th e

US national policy aapects of the situa tion in South Vietna m. Su ffice tosay, how ever, tha t the mili ta ry a ndpolitica l considera t ions a re sd closelya nd inexora bly interwoven tha t wemu st rela te a ll possible courses of a ct ion, or options open t o na , t o our vita lna tion-a l interests. For th e purpnsesof t hie discussion I ha ve limited myremarks to the course of action predica ted on our cnrrent count erinsurgency doct rine a nd based on presentnational policy.

In effect, this option saya, let uskeep the conflict localized, keep itcounterinsur gencyth a t is, let us continue t o help th e South Vietn a mese doth e job th emselves. Rut w hy ? Is itbeca nse it is t he only rema ining, ora ccepta ble, a lterna tive ?

P ar tial ly , yes. B ut prima rily this isthe only course of action that holdspromise of a sa tisfa ctory solution fort he people of sout hea st Asia . I do notsa y victory-a t lea st, not tota l victory in a mili ta ry sense, a l thnugh Idont ru le out this conclusion completely. A sa tisfa ctory milita ry conclusion is st ill possible, even t houghpolitical realities might mili tatea gainst such a solution.limited Participation

P recisely w ha t does th is course ofa ction ha ve to offer? Our presentcount erinsurgency doctr ine, a s I interpret it , l imits t he par ticipat ion ofUS ground combat units in ta ctica lopera t ions to a briga de-size force,recognizing tha t th e requirement forcomm itment of la rger comba t forma t ionsby definition, if not in fa ctexpa nds t he conflict beyond coun t erinsurgency. I believe tha t this stipulat ion is funda menta l to our doctr ina la pproa ch to count erinsurgency a s w ella s to our milita ry effort in SouthVietnam.

J u n e1965 11


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WHISPERSIt is ditlkult to visua lize a si tua.

t ion in Soutfr Vietna m w here t he intr oduct ion of a U S briga de-size forcew ould have ma teria f consequ ence onth e ta ctical situa tion. A briga de-sizeforce would be but a drop in the rice-fields of Asia, In oth er countr ies,th ough, under oth er circumst a nces a nda gainst Iess formida ble pbsta cles, theemployment of a U S briga de mightha ve significa nt ta ctica l value. In both

force should be our immedia te a nd rel.a tive ca pabili ty a nd th e impera tive tfcommit this type of force.

In principle, th en, U S pa rticipat iona nd, in pa rt icula r, th e level of omforce employm ent should be a s limited a s th e a chievement of our nationa l objectives permit . And t hen j!should be only an cilla ry to th e indigenous effort. The major effort muslcome from th e th rea tened govern

LEVELS 10COUNTERI NSURGENCYfARMYCOMMTMENT

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FI RSTTI ER

situa tions, certa inly, th e psychologica leffect would be considerable.

H owever, beyond a ny loca l psychologica l va lue a nd th e obvious di~ playof nat iona l purpose and intent , theoverr iding considera tion for th e a pplica tion a nd extent of U S ground

ment , beca use t he problems in eaclarea are local and unique to thasociety.

It is importa nt for th e U nite,St a tes to rema in in th e ba ckgrounda n~ , w here poseible, to limit our support to tr a ining, a dvice, an d provid 1

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ing ma terial . Otherw ise, w e mightprejudice t he local governm ent s ef.fort s a nd expose ourselves to unjustified but sometimes effective Comm unist cha rges of int ervention a nd colonialism. Our policy should be toprovide only t hose pertinent resourcesa nd ca pabili t ies to a ugment th e indigenous effort so tha t credit for ~ ccomplishments accrue to the local government.

While tilis is a most a ccepta ble a ndprudent policy, in pra ctice-esP ecia Nyin th e f ield of mili ta ry a ssista nce~ w eha ve seen tha t i t is not a lwa ys @pra ctica ble or desira bIe. In ma ny of thenewly emerging na tions, th e basicforce str ucture is so inadequa te, a ndthe Communist thr eat is so great orimminent , tha t th e a pplica tion of thebuilding block concept of a dvice a ndassistance is inhibited.Doctrinal Proviso

Our present doctr ine does sa y tha tw hen tra ining requirement s impose a nma ccepta ble Ieadt ime to th e a tt a inment of a n opera tiona l sta tus, i t ma ybe necessa ry to int roduce select ed U SArmy units into the host count ry toa ssist indigenous milita ry forces incomba t support a nd combat servicesupport missions. Fu rt her, th e doctr ine spells out th a t, un der exceptiona lcircumst a nces, U S Army comba t unitsma y be intr oduced into a h ost countryt o perform t a ctica l missions. This isa flexible a nd responsive doctr ina l proviso w hich permits a reasoned a nd appropria te a pplica tion of force.

We America ns must realize tha t wecan condu ct successful count erinsur gency opera tions in th ese th reat enedcount ries only th rough indigenousleadersh ip a nd instit ut ions. A coun tr y tha t w ill n ot f ight, one tha t is notmotivated or prepared to accept theprincipa l role a nd the great est burkore1965

WHISPERSdens in th e fight for i ts na tiona l exist .ence, is a n extremely poor risk a s apar tn er in counterinsurgency. Suchlimited part nership really deman ds toomuch from count erinsur gency; oddsth is unfa vora ble w ould be difficult toovercome in a l~ :out w a r.Succes~

But accepting that we face a morepropitious set of circumst a nces, howcan we succeed with our present response


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WHISPERSIn the f ina l ana lysis, we must go as

far a s .necesea ry to eneure a solutionfa vora ble to our na tiona l purpose. Milita rily, t hk could mea n increas ed operational assistance, combat support ,a nd comba t serviee support a ga instthe internal insurgency forc+ a nd anexpan ded interdiction effort a ga instth e sou rees of out side int ervent ion.Other t a rgets ca n be found in the government s a nd w ithin th e popula tionsof th e externa l powers sponsoring insurgency in South Vietna m a nd, morebroa dly, a mong t ire w orld forumwhere these eponeoring powers havepolitica l a nd economic a ssets th a t ,could be jeopa rd ized by effective politico-psychological counterattacks.Force StructureThe U S Milita ry Assista nce P rogra m, a nd, more precisely, our coun ter insur gency effort , ia predica ted onour Milita ry Assista nce AdvisoryG roups ( MAAG s ) a nd mis sions: Theconcept of providing only a ncilla ry a ssista nce, wit h th e prepondera nt effortemana ting from th e indigenous country , is fundamenta l to the US counterinsurgency progra m. This a ncillarya ssistan ce, based on our MAAG a ndmission orga niza tion, provides for asta ble ta ble of distr ibution ba se organizat ion, with tempora ry augmenta .tion, when necessary, by eelf-conta ined, specifica lly orga nized, coun ter -insur gency-orient ed ta sk forces.

An alternate system would requireth e esta blishment of mult iple, separa te, perma nent-type U S milita ry orga nizat ions in each count ry, w ith eachorganization specifically designed anddelibera tely oriented to th e immedia teloca l situa tion. These fixed orga niza tions could n ot be completely , or rea sona bly, r esponsive to Commu niststra tegy or to th e diverse d eman dsa nd ta ctics of the so-called peoples

wars since Communist subversiv~ ]insur gency va ries in scope, intens ity ~a nd geogra phic a pplica tion. /For example, in 1955, in response to $th e th en recognized thr eat , our a d.visory effort in Sonth Vietna m tota led jless th a n 35o personn elit curren tly jexceeds 21,000. Essential responsiw- ~ness a nd a ppropria te count era ction to :this type of threat can be achieved :only w ithin a doctr ina l fra meworktha t r ecognizes the broad a nd far .reaching milita ry, polit ica ~ a nd psy.chological implica tions of Commu nistinsurgency, a nd by a complementa ry, ,ftexible milita ry orga niza tion. We cana nd s hould ba se s uch .? responsivecount erinsurgency orga mza tion on ourexisting force str ucture a nd presentca pabilities. In sum, our present build.ing block or tier force st ruct ure forproviding increa sed milita ry a ssista nce is funda menta lly sound a ndshould be reinforced.Organizational ModificationThe ra tiona le for t he orga nizat iona lst ruct ure of th e Arm ys principa lcount erinsu rgen cy force-t he SpecialAction Forces (S AFs)folIows t heconcept of providing specifically organized, area-oriented, counterinsurgency-t ra ined ta sk f orees. The Arm ysSpecial Forces G roups (SF G S), organized the same for unconventionalwa rfare an d for counterinsurgencyan d with both unconvent iona l wa rfare !a nd count erinsu rgen cy mission:-constitut e the orga nizat iona l baee for th eSAFS.

This concept, however, places exces-.sive and, perhaps, unreasonable dema nds on an y one mili tary orga nization. In order to focus more directlyon each of theee tw o dema nding a reas,unconventiona l w a rfa re a nd eomrt erinsurgency, a nd to eneure a ppropria tegefiera l an d cold w a r ca pabilities, some

MilitaryReview


15/112

WHISPERSorga niza tiona l modifica tions ca n bema de w ithout a n extensive disruptionof our. present count erinsu rgen cyeffort.Ca pa bili&MI X

I suggest tha t we develop a ca pability mix by esta blishing th ree sepa ra te types of SFG s+ ne orga nizedexclusively for unconvent iona l w a rfa re; a secOnd for count erinsurgency;a nd a th ird, a composite group, possessin g both capa bilities. These gr oupsw ould be deployed on t he ba eis of existing or a nt icipa ted requiremente. Apossible deploym ent , for exa mple,might be:

A E uropean SFG (unconventiona l w a rfa re), comprised of fourSpecia l Forces compa nies (un conven tional warfare) .

A Middle E a st ern SF G (composit e), compr ised of one S pecia l Forcescompa ny (unconventiona l w a rfa re)a nd t hr ee Specia l Forcee compa nies(counterinsurgency).

. An Africa n SFG (count erinsurgency), comprised of four S pecia lForces compa nies (coun ter insu rgency).

An Asia n SF G (composit e),compr ised of one Special Forces compan y (unconventiona l w a rfa re) a ndt hr ee Specia l Forces compa niee (coun terinsurgency).

c A La t in-Amer ican S FG (coun t erinsu rgen cy), comprised of fourSpecia l Forcee compan ies (coun ter insurgency).

. A B a se SF G (composit e), comprised of tw o Specia l Forces compa niee (unconventiona l w a rfa re) a ndtw o Specia l F orces compa nies (coun terinsurgency).

Some interna l reorga niza tion w ithinth e present SFG S w ould a lso be a ppropriate for the counterinsurgency-ta ilored compa nies. Thus, t he tw o

demolitionists in th e A Det a chmentcould be replaced by enlieted engiueerspecialists tr a ined in civic a ction, a ndth e deta chm ent execut ive officer couldbe specifica lly tr a ined a s a n a rea intelligence officer.Minimal ChangezSeveral other counterinsurgency-oriented cha nges a lso a ppear n ecessa ry, but they ca n be minima l. Thea ugmenta tion, support , a nd ba ckupforces f or such a specia lized coun terinsur gency orga niza tion must contin ue to come from a ll genera l-purposeU S Army ta ble of orga nizat ion a ndequipment unit s. The curren t delimita tion of second a nd th ird-tier, a rea -oriented, a nd part ia lly langua ge-tr a ined briga de-size ba ckup forces,however, is a rtificial a nd does not fa ceup to tbe rea lity of an a lready overburdened training schedule.

The backup force responsibilityshould be given to all deployed andcont inenta l U nited St a tee-based t a ctica l units to provide a broa der baeeof support.

There is noth ing uniq ue, new , ormyst erious in th ie ta sk w hen it becomes necessa ry for US soldiers t osta rt shooting at insurgents , or a dvising others to do so. This is the samepersona lized, dirty lit t le w a r each a ndevery rifle a nd ba yonet eoldier ha sknow n an d fought th roughout our history. H e ha s done it in junglee,sw a mpe, mounta ins, a nd in th e cold.And a U S Army unit tra ined for l imited and general war does have theca pability to count er insurgents.

The milita ry a spects of coun t erinsurgency a re broa d in purpose a ndscope. They a re over-a ll milit a ry problems, a nd,. consequently, a re the overa ll responsibility of th e Arm y a s aw hole. They a re as tota l a s in generalw a r .

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WHISPERS , While it is clea rly necessa ry a nd

a dvisable to ma inta in a principa l eounterit x+ urg ency force to focus directlyon t he speeifie problems of count erin su rgency, a nd on uncofiventiona l w a rfa re a s w ell , it is w rong to separa te bydoctr ine, implicat ion, or design th ew ide-ra nging ca pa bility a nd experience of th e U S Army a s a tota l count erinsur gency force<

I believe w e must reexa mine our see.

ond a nd th ird-tier force st ructure tUensure tha t t he a ccepta nce of thiscount erinsur gency responsibility in now a y degra des our ca pabili ty to w a gegeneral war. But, more pointedly, wemust ensure the over-all US Army ea.pability to condu ct effect ive count er.insurgency opera tions, a nd w e mustth en use tha t capa bility, lest w e loset he peoples w a r beca use w e couldnot solve th e pa per w a r !

INFORMATION OFFICER PROGRAMThe Arm y In form a tion Officer P rogra m outlinsd in Arm y Regula tions 614-140

is designed t o develop a nucleus of professiona lly tr a ined officers w ith specia lbackground a nd a ptitude in th e informa tion f ield. Most off icers a lternat e in theseassignments with others designed to maintain basic career branch qualif ications.Other sources of information on this program are Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, J une 1964, a nd t he E xecut ive for Ca rser P lan ning, Office of P ersonnel Opera t ions, AT TN: S cient ific a nd Techn ica l S ect ion ( OP XC), Wa shin gt on,D. C. 20315.

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17/112

D U RING World Wa r I I , G ermanforces on th e E a stern Frontfa ced a serious dilemma . To keep supply rout es open a nd t o protect milita ry tra ff ic aga inst guerri lla a tt a ck,th ey eith er ha d to underta ke extensiveprotection measures or risk a tota lcollapse of t heir logistical supportsystem. In effect, th e securit y of t helines of comma nicat ions beca me t heG erma n Achilles heel.

All roads used by the G erman s w ere, ~ bjects of guerrilla a tt a ck. E a ch morn

mg loca l inha bita nt s, supervised byG erma n soldiers, probed for mines.!J evert heless, t he mines took t heir t ollmd ma ny convoys suffered heavyosses in men a nd mot or vehicles.

The individua l G erma n soldierFoundit difficult to adjust to the facttha t each pea sant a nd laborer , every

lune19S5

tea cher, doctor, or law yer, t he w oma nwho peeled potatoes for the soldiers,t he girl w ho a llow ed h erself to bedra w n into a ccmversat ion, a nd evenchildren w ho begged for brea d mightbe his enemy, w orking w ith t he guerrillas, ca rrying messages to th em, ororganizing nighttime dynamitings. Hesoon discovered tha t part isa n wa r wa sa w a r w ikbout sleep.

At times, t he da ma ge inflicted byguerri llas wa s so grea t tha t the de-Iivery of supplies to and the strategicmovement s of the G erman forces w ereseriously th reat ened. In September1943, for exa mple, in t he rea r a rea sof the German Army Group Center ,t he guerrilla s destr oyed 74 bridgesand carr ied out 737 assaults and ambushes on G erma n convoys. In th esa me month th e guerrillas ma de 32S

THEPROTECTIONOF

ROADSSk+ vko N. B ]ela ]a c

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ROADS ,a ssaults on a mmunition dumps, a irfields, a nd oth& inst a llat ions, a nd cutt a ctica l t elephone lines a t 3,600 pla ces.This t hey a ccomplished in spite of t he122,37& G erma n t roops a ssigned to security duties.

The G erma n H igh C omma nd eventua lly devised a syst em of protectionw hich w ould w ork. S ince the protection of the entire road network of anoccupied a rea requ ired a tr emendousa mount of forcesa n a vera ge of 10t o 12 soldiers for ea ch kilomet er ofroa d a nd 24 soldiers for one kilomet erof ra ilroa d w ere considered ha re min. ,imum figures-th e G erma ns decidedto protect only those roa ds w hich w eremilitarily indispensable.Organization

The experiences ga ined by th e G erman Army may well have applicationtoday in South Vietna m, par ticular lyif th e Viet Cong forces ga in, suchstrength that they could impose onthe South Vietna mese a w a r in w hichma jor forces w ould h e used. The Sout hVietn a mese forces w ould th en needmore supplies than could be deliveredby air , and i t would have to be assumed that the Viet Cong would haveincreased th eir a ir-int erference ca pa bility. La nd communicat ions, th en,would have gained in importance.

A roa d selected for a Iine of communica tion by th e G erma ns w ould begiven a designa tionna me or num bera nd put, und er the direction of aroad comma nder wh o, for tha t purpose, had under him a road commandcomprised of s sma ll sta ff and tra ff ic

Slavko N. Rjelajac is a former colo-nel of the R?yal Yugoslav Army. Hehas been emplo~ed by US agenciessince 19.&9,and is presently with theOjfiee of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Militar~ Operation; Departmentof the Army.

.

a nd securit y sections. To fa cilita ttratlic service and to protect more eifectively th e insta llat ions a nd th e construet ion work a long a roa d a nd thconvoys and supply columns which o!erated over i t , the road was divideinto roa d sections (Figur e 1). Ea tsection of th e roa d opera ted un dersect ion comma nder w ho, assisted bysmall staff, directed the elements fowa rning, a construct ion team, and th

Road Defense Organization

S a m + SICIIONHUO@UN1L3SI&a AND61RRISON

SECTION sumWmwmns1A $lCIIOMInmawmnGhRRI SOM

Sf C1fOM!WOWRTI KSm mmonXC1!OMI &I

!Figure 1.

tr oops for t he protection of his wtion (Figure 2).The term protection for roa d a ndsection commanders meant:

The protection of colum ne a ndconvoys against guerril la attacks,raids, and ambushes.

, . P rotection a ga inst guerrilla a ndsa boteur a ctivities of const riction

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19/112

ROADSprojects a nd insta lla tions vita l for th e The security of th e roa ds wa s en-ma intena nce Of road tr a ff ic. trust ed to mili tary a nd para mili tary

Wa r n in g- a g a in st a p pr oa ch in g forces, including field genda rm erie.enemy a ircra ft . P rotection Lga inst Mount a in tr oops w ere used in th eenemy a via tion wa s not their respon- mounta inous a reas, Wha t forces orsibility. combina tion of forces w ere used de-

Alth ough the responsibility for pro- pended cm th e ty pe of forces a va ila ble,th e loya l si tna tion, terra in, import ect ion of sect ions of roa ds rest ed on tance of the road, and on the aggressection comma nders, th e road comsi veness of th e guerrilla a nd saboma nder ha d t he over-a ll responsibil teurs.i ty for the security of th e entire road.

H e wa s a lso responsible for t ime t a - The ta ble of orga niza tion of th eblesa function perform ed by his forcee deployed for t he protection oft ra ffic section. For secnr ity rea sons, a par ticular road depended on th eRoadandSectionCommands

mI ROAO COMMANO: I

L --r--dI SECTION IA.1. I I SECTION IA.2 I I SECTION IA.3 I

SECTION COMMANO: I I SECTION COMMAND I I SECTION COMMANO: IIIARINN6SECTION WARNING SECTION WARNINS SECTIONCONSTRUCTIONECTION CONSTRUCTION SECTION CONSTRUCTION SECTIONNO1OIN6 GARRISON HOtOING GARRISON NO1OINS GARRISONMOOIIE RESERVE MOOIIE RESERVE MOBILERESERVEARMOREO SCOUT TEAMS ARMOREO SCOUT TEAMS ARMOREOSCOUTTEAMSFigure 2.

tbe columns pa ssed each other only length of the roa d sect ions, the num- in the towns and villages found in th e ber an d vulnera bil ity of const ructionmiddle of each eection a nd wh ich w ere objects such a s bridges a nd insta llaprotected by a holding ga rrison. tionsa nd on th e loca l situa tion.J une1$65 19


20/112

ROADSThus, roa d section forces va ried insize frorb one compan y to one regiment.

Each section command was composed of ~ suflicient personnel to forma gar r ison uni t a nd a mobile reserve.The mobile reserve included speciallytra ined reconna issance team s, w hichopera ted on foot, a nd a r~ ored scoutcar teams. In some cases, the roadcomma nder a lso ha d his ow n arm oredcar teams which he used for protection when movement was requireda nd as hia ready reserve for reinforcement s of section comm a nds in a critica l situ a tion. When ever possible, hew ould a lso ha ve a sma ll mobile reserve equipped with tracked vehiclesor personnel carriers (Figure 3).Iiolding GarrisonEach mobile r eserve of a sectioncomma nd kept a small , well-a rtn edcombat team ready for immediate deployment aga inst a n enemy a t ta ck until the bulk of the reserve could bebrought to th e place of enga gement.

The force designa ted a s a holdingga rrison ha d th e responsibility of protecting a nd defending a specific loca lity . Field fort ifica tions, ba rbedw ire, electr ic fences, a nd mines wereutil ized, a nd th e force wa s given a rt i l lery a nd morta rs to ensure a ca pability of covering a zone of terr a inw ith protect ive fire. The num ber a ndtype of arti l lery and heavy infantryw eapons w ould depend on the terra inconditions, th e situa tion preva iling inth e a rea, and the a ggressiveness ofth e guerrillas. The holding ga rrisonforce wa s not permitt edunder a nycondit ionst o be deployed for a nypurpose oth er t ha n defense of its lo

cality (Figure 4).The mobiIe reserv e of a roa d skc

tion wa s u sed to repulse, a n at ta ckand pursue the enemy, for setting am

bushes, and for conducting clearinopera tions. The reconna issa nce tea mw hich opera ted on foot ha d th e mitsion of pa tr olling, discovering th e a lpreach of the enemy, and of engagin

Elements of Section Command

a @hRRI SONMumom RmmRECOHMNCS4UCIOH!001EAMSA mm (scum]o

&J%iMoa! ,, ,mmFigure 3.

th e enemy unt il the mobile reserve orarmored scout teams could arrive andintervene.

The armored scout teams, usuallycomposed of four, five, or more lightor medium ta nks depending ou terra ina nd f loca l conditions, pa tr olled th e

Military Review0


21/112

Profeclionof a locality~//.. W

/

\\\\ - II

& MOBILE RESERVE m WARNING SECTION% CONSTRUCTION SECTION& GARRISON A OBSERVATIONPOST

x ARMORED SCOUT TEAMmFigure 4.

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ROADS road and the a dja cent terra in. Theirmission ,wa s to discover th e enemysa pproa ch in an a~ ea close t o the road,oppose t he enemy force, a nd reportth e enem~ s presence to th e sectiona nd road comma nders a nd to a ny moving columns and convoys. They werea lso responsible for protectin g colnmns and convoys during passageth rough da ngerous part s of their roa dsection; for esta blishing liaison betw een gar risons in the event th a toth er mea snres failed or a ga rrisonwa s isolated by the enemy; a nd forma inta ining ra dio communicationsw ith the foot reconna issance teams.Tactics

Reconn a issa nce tea ms opera ting onfoot consta ntly patr olled t he a rea adja cent to the ga rrison a nd road. Atnight , a mbushes w ould be set upa long th e routes of th e enemys m,ostprobable a pproaches. Team s w ere dispat ched t o discover th e enemy, r eporthis presence to the ga rrison a nd armedscout teams, stop him, or delay his advance until the elements of the mobilereserve or a rmored scout t eam, orboth depending on th e str ength ofth e enemy a nd seriousness of the situa tion+ ould int ervene. These tea msdeployed th eir civilian scouts an da gents on a large perimeter far a headof t he a rea t hey patr olled a nd forwhich they were responsible.

After receiving a report on th e enemys a pproach, or if firing w a s hea rd,th e holding g a rr ison force would ta keposition a nd open a rt illery or morta rfire if so requested by reconnaissancetea ms; fire w ould be opened aut oma tica lly if ta rgets could be identified.Infa ntry heavy weapons had to be

. ready to open fire wh en tbe ta rgetsa ppear ed w ithin th eir ran ge. The element s of th e mobile r eserve ha stenedto th e place of enga gement by sending

the sma ller part of its force a gain}the enemys front and by directingstronger part against his wings anflanks.

In principle, th e enemy wa s to tdiscovered a nd encount ered a s ftaw ay as possible from the ga rrisoa nd the road; tbe most effecthdistance at which he could be dec

$ecurih of a Convov

2AN6ER ZONE*J ,$ i\~ /gii

SI CI I R)NOWOKPUTOON{

Figure 5.sively enga ged depended on th e tcrain and the t ime needed for the mbile reserve to int ervene. E ffecti

Mililafy Re~iew

I [

1

I

1

11

crttf11(i1

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23/112

barra ge f ire wa s an importa nt defenseelement.

The reconn a issa nce tea ms could,gain time if t hey w ere sufficient ly forwa rd. B ut i f they w ere too far forw a rd, th ey risked isolat ion a nd destruction. For this reason, their tactics w ere restr icted to withdra wa l a ndma intenance of conta ct with the enemy w ithout decisive engagement.Their most importa nt dut y wa s to report on th e enemys str ength a nd hisdirection of movement.Defensive Tactical Plan

The roa d sect ion comm a nder, w hoa lso comm a nded t he forces of his section, w a s responsible for t he defensive ta ctical pla n. D efensive a rt illerya nd heavy w eapons ha d to be pla cedso th a t t hey w ould be ca pa ble of covering by fire a ll ba tt le sections. Apla n to count er a n enemy a tt a ck atnight required ca reful prepar a tionth e routes leading to ea ch position tobe used a t night; th e pla n of bar ra getires; signal commun ica tions; a nd th eprocedures tha t w ould be fpllowed inva rious situa t ions. All of t hese requ ired precise orders. N ight a mbushta ctics w ere highly recommended toreconna issa nce teame a nd forw a rd a dva nced squa ds a nd pla toons.

Whenever a viat ion w a s a vailable,th e G erman s used it for reconna issa nce purposes, for observing t ra ffic,and for wa rning aga ins t enemy a t ta ck. Liaison w ith planes w as ma inta ined by th e use of signals. I t wa snoted, how ever , tha t the a ircra ft w ereoften seriously ha ndica pped by difficult t erra in, cover, fog, low clouds,da rkness, a nd inclement w eat her. Inmost insta nces, too, it w a s d ifficnlt forpilot s t o discover t he guerrillas.

Road column s w ere so orga nizedth a t each had its ow n protection. Thisusua lly consist ed of a plat oon or a

ROADScompany armed with automatic weapons a nd morta r a nd tra nsported ont rucks or personn el ca rriers. Thema in body of t he securit y plat oon orcompany would move approximately185 meters or more ahead of the column; a squa d or plat oon w ould be outa noth er. 460 to 640 meters; a nd arear echelon, composed of several mot orcyclists, 185 t o 275 met ers beh indth e column, w ould bring up th e rea r.A squa d or plat oon w ould move behindthe column leader and his small staff(Figure 5).The leader of the column wouldstop from time to time to observe andlisten for sounds of firing, for alarmsigna ls from neighboring ga rrisons orreconna issan ce tea ms, or for t he motors of enemy planes. When approaching a danger zone, if the zone was nota lrea dy covered by a n a rmored scouttea m or by element s of t he mobile reserve, the column leader wmild stophis column a nd send forw a rd a squador plat oon t o reconn oit er or to ta keup defensive positions unt il t he column ha d passed. After tha t , the squador plat oon w ould rega in its place inthe column.Protective Group

If t he column w a s a tt a cked, th e prot ect ive groupplat oon or cOmpan yentered t he a ction. I n principle, th eenemy wa s countera tt a cked a nd repulsed a s fa r a w a y from th e columna s possible. The drivers a nd a ssista ntdrivers, a nd th e milita ry personnelbeing t ra nsport ed by th e column, w ereorga nized into squa ds. These squa dswould leave the vehicles, group themselves behind cover, and attack theenemy.

The dieta nce betw een tr ucks a t ahalt was set at three lengths so that ,if a tt a cked, fire w ould not sprea d fr omone truck to another.

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ROARSThe meeting a nd pa ssing of COI .

umns irr qa rrow ,passa ges, w oods, a ndoth ef places suitable for guerrilla a tta ck a nd a mbush w ere a voided, Theca rs of priva te persons or milita rypersonnel w ere not permitt ed to tr a veltbe roa d a lone, only w ith a column,Only genera ls a nd high-ra nking geueral staff officers were ex$luded fromthis regulat ion, but they ha d to begiven specia l permission by th e roador section comma nder. While en route,sleepiug in t rucks w a s prohibited.Each man had to be alert wi th weapons ready t o f ire. Drivers a nd a ssista nt drivers w ere given ha nd grena desfor immediate use.

I f enemy aviat ion was act ive , traffic moved at uight. In tha t ca se, thesection comma nders ha d to cover da ngerous sections with their forces bysetting a mbuehes a nd ta king protective positions, a nd th e ga rr ison holding force had to open barrage fire ont he short est possible notice.

In regar d to th e protection of roadt ra ffic, G erma n philosophy consist edof offering th e guerrilla s little opportunity for am bushing a nd at ta ckingGerman columns and of defeatingthose attempts if they were made. The

+ __

~ 1Ierma ns believed th a t litt le could bedone wh en a n am bush ha d ha sn !spru ng. Thu s, t heir philosophy of pre. jvention wa a given priority over a phi !Iosophy of disentr a pmentthe lat ter looked a tt ra ctive only beca nse it a p ,pea red t o, he more economica l.

The system devised by the Germans :for protecting road t ra ff ic proveh to be effective a nd a pplica ble to a ll ty peaof terra in. It ca lled for protectingonly select ed ~ oa ds w hich were mili.tarily indispensable.

A simila r system of road prot~ ctionshould find a pplica tion in Sout h Viet -na m todav if ma ior forces a re usedopera tion; last lo;ger, a irlift is insuf- 1f icient , a nd- the enemy ha s at ta ined asignifica nt a ir-int erference ca pability.

In South Vietna m, the protection ofsome selected road s, a nd par ts ofother roads, could have positive repercussions on local economy a nd couldreeult in creat ing fa vora ble psychologica l a nd politica l a tt i tudes on thepa rt of the populat ion. Rice crops, fnrexample, could be delivered safely tocity ma rkets, unha ra ssed by the VietCong. The confidence of tbe peoplew ould be ga ined beca use th ey w oulda gain ha ve a feeling of security.

24 Military Reviev I


25/112

ANDMILITARYPERATIONSMONSOONS

Lieutenant Colonel Harlan G. Koch, United Mates Army

SU TH E AS T Asia ~ monsoona lclimate probably affects militarypla nning an d opera tions for t ha t r egion more tha n an y other singlefactor.

The a nnua l nort hw a rd ma rch of theintertr opica l front from the Eq uat orand i ts return ar e events tha t areaa predicta ble as interest on sa vingsbonds. Alth ough not technica lly a ccu-June 1965

rate, i t could be said that the frontis pushed northw a rd by th e southw estmonsoon a nd is ultima tely usheredback to tbe south by the northeastmonsoon. \

In brief, th e cycle comprises th erainy southwest monsoon followed hythe cool and rela tively dry n ort heastmonsoon, w hich is t hen repla ced bythe hot season. Each of these seasons

25


26/112

IONSOONSha s special cha ra cteristics tha t profoundly, a ffect , milita ry opera tions.CoolSeason

The nort hea st monsoon ia in fullsw ing ilom mid-November t hr oughFebruary, a nd it brings clea r skies,I itt[e rain, and cool nights to the Iarg.est par t of south east Asia. The soilof th e count rys ide begin$ to dry a ndcrack.

Although t emperat ures ma y runinto th e nineties during th e day , tbeclimat e of th e north east monsoon isth e least enervat ing of the seasons.The sma llest str eams a re slow ly butinexora bly reduced to tr ickles; road wa ys, t ra cks, a nd tra ils begin to present th eir optimum ca pacities. In gener?aI , th is season provides th e bestcondit ions for opera tions by a modernmilitary ground force.

The coolest t empera t ur es experienced in southea st Asia a re follow eda bruptly by t he most t orrid. The hotseason lasts from early March throughea rty Ma y, and the sweltering hea~combined with high humidity issmothering , par t icula rly in th e closeness of dense jungle.

While t rees in Missouri dr op t heirlea ves during t he fall a nd w inter, thedeciduous flora of southeast Asiadrops its leaves during the hottestweather. Many trees, however, areevergr een a nd never shed th eir leaves.At th is time, the extensive bam boojungles tu rn yellow , leaving t he jungle floor Ut tered with a ca rpet of

Lieutenant Colonel Harlan G. Kochi8 sxecutive oficer to the Chief ofStaff, Commander in Chief, Pacific,Honolulu. A Chinese-Mandarclz linguist and a China Area Specialist, he- holds a Masters degree from the f Jn i versitgi of Illinois. His assignmentstnclude duty in Korsa, Japan, Taiwan,Thailand, and Laos.

cra ckling lea ves. In th e jungle, Sield$of ground fire a re at th eir a nnua l kmaximum; aerial observation d ; tground ta rgets in th e jungle a nd di. srectI y benea th a ircra ft is th e moa t$ Prevealing. The sma ller str eams, nolonger obsta cles, become a series ofmoss-covered puddles; t ra ffica bility i!at i ts best wh en moving in th e mst ricted a rea s off roads, but convoy!on lat erite-surfaced roada stir U pclouds of red choking duet .

The la rger rivers a re at their low,est levels by May. Thie is the seasonw hen mounta in tribes slash a nd burnnew farming plots. Only a few squa remeters a re usually intended to beburned fr ee of vegeta tio~ , but oftenthe tires will go unchecked, with littlenative concern, for many kilometers,This primitive a nd w a steful fa rmin gpractice results in a smoky ha ze tha textends over a lmost a ll of south eastAsia.

The temperatures lower slightlyjust prior to th e mid-Ma y a rriva l ofth e southw est monsoon. When th erains arrive, the spell of maximumtempera tur es is broken a nd the south w est monsoon hegins t o build in intensity.Southwest Monsoon

For the largest part of southeastAsia. the southwest monsoon arrivesa round the middle of May a nd lastsunt il mid-October. E veryone a nxiouslya wa its its a rrival to brea k th e stitl ingheat ; millions of fa rm ers need itsra in before th ey ca n muddIe th eirfields for the new crops.

This ra th er brisk st ream of wa rmwind has traveled hundreds of kilometers from t he Eq uat or over wa rmw a ters a nd, consequent ] y, a rrives oversoutheast Asia saturated with moi~tu re. The rain is genera lly tr iggeredin two ways:

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. MONSOONS When it a rrives over t he hot ita tion ) which norma lly occurs a s

nd it is ,pushed upwa rd, sometimes sca tt ered th understorms in var ying) more t ha n 15,000 met ers, w her e it intensit y a nd a rea. This usua lly ocrikes th e cooler a ir, condenses, a nd curs in the middle or late afternoonreduces r a inf a ll (convect iona l precip- a t wh ich t ime the ea r th is wa rmes t .

Rmc, , l sa,r l low of warm. most ,outh.e,t monsoon N.rm,l lyoccurs m southeast Asta from nud May to m,d October foll owed byshort translt,on and then coolest pet,od of ma yearArea% wh,ch ram,, the hulk of the,, ra, , ta l l as a result of the

U: southwest monsoon.

Areas wh,ch mcw ve some mmfall as a result of the southwest.., n lo ,oonc >

II Figure 1.I km 1965 , 27


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MONSOONS When t he moisture.laden w ind out t he mounta ins (orogra phic pre

strikes mountain ranges it is pushed cipitation ).upwa rd rapidly towar d the ra iw-trig- During the five months of rainfalgering cooler air. This normally re- rea d surfa ces puddle, poth ole, rut , a nsuite in keavy daily ra infall th rough- often become untrafticable. Stream

\- RepresentsaIrfbw of dominantlycool,dry northeastmonsoontiImall! occursin southeastAsia fmm early November to m$dMar=) foll owed by hottest season nud March t hrough early M ay~,JAreas which rec etve the bulk of thev ra,nlall as a ,esult of t

~\\( .&l ortheastmonsoon

Areas whrch rece,ve some ra,nfall as a result of the northe,\ v mimo.NOTE.Al lof Malaya fece)ves heavy rainfall throughout the year

iwth the most pronounced ramlall dv,mg [he northeast mon&LL_Figure 2:

28 M l i taryl evi ew


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#

! ]eave th eir banks a nd inunda te large~ greas; w ooden bridges a re swept, j a w a y; foids a re no longer forda ble;I j a nd ricefields a re muddled to w heret \even foOt soldiers w ould find crose

~ count ry movement thr ough th em anunprofitable enterprise.The la rge ma jor rivers of south

east Asia ra rely overflow th eir banksda ring the rainy sea son, hut they doreach their high wa termarks a roundearly November-a fter th e ra ins ha veceased. The sma ller tr ibuta ry rivers

, frequent ly over flo\ v subsequent toheavy ra infa l l.

J ungle growth becomes luxurian t,a nd t he can opy of lea f-bedecked t reesnullifies a erial observat ion of groundmovement over la rge a rea s. Forestoffal becomes da nk a nd is infest ed bysubtle a rmies of terrestr ia l leeches.These leeches do n ot live in st rea msbut, ra th er, wa it on shrubs to bebrushed ont o unw a ry victimsa ni.reals or men. Insects swa rm in clouds.Lea th er becomes moldy a nd beddingmildew s a nd there is little opport unit yfor a soldier to dr y th em.VariationsAt this t ime the fa rmers ha ppilycheck t heir ripenin g fields, and t hepsrks a nd ga rdens of Rangoon a ndSa igon a re luxuriant w ith tropica lflow ers. The ra in-soaked coun t ry side,however, does n ot offer a pleasa ntprospect to tbe soldier living a nd fight ing in th e field. A few subregion, pa rticularly Ma laya a nd part s of peninsular Tha ila nd, a re a ffected by rainfrom both th e north east a nd south w est moneoons a nd, consequent ly, receive ra infa ll th roughout most of th eyear ,

Although climate conditions are,genera lly th e sa me th roughout south east Asia, th ere a re a few var iat ionsa nd specia l phenomena from count ry

MONSOONSto count ry w hich a ffect milita ry opera tions. Note the sta tist ics of selectedsta tions in th e ra infall ta ble for abett er understa nding of sea sona l precipitation.

ThailandIn Tha ila nd during the northeastmonsoon, early morning fog oftenblankets interior valleys. This burnsoff by 0800. Haze and smoke also existth roughout tbe da y, part icularly inthe north a nd north east . This sternsfrom w idesprea d burnin g of tbe jungle by mount a in tr ibes a nd becomesmost pronounced by lat e Ma rch.

Visibilit y is comm only redu ced t ot w o kilomet ers, occasiona lly t o ]es~th a n one kilometer, a nd severely rest ricts na p-of-th e-ea rt h flying by high-performa nce a ircra ft. This condit ionholds true for most of southeast Asianorth of the 12th Parallel .

D uring th e north east monsoon, t oo,the west coast of the Gulf of Siamusually ba s a heavy swell crea ted bythe northeast wind, while the reverseis tr ue on th e ea st coa st. This condition reverses itself during th e southwest monsoon.

It is interesting to note tha t, whileth e sma ller st rea ms comm ence fillingra pidly a t th e beginning of the south, :w est monsoon in mid-Ma y a nd frequently leave their banks during thisra iny sea son, the lar ger rivers, l ikethe Mekong and the Salween, have atimela g. For example, th e Cha o P hra ya of Tha iland experiences its highest w a ter a t the beginning of the dryseasonNovembera nd th en gra dualIy recedes to its low point aroundthe end of April,

Soil t ra ffica bility a lso experiencesth is timelag. The flat low lan ds ma ybe covered w ith five or six inchesof wa ter in May an d early J une butmay still be trafficable to vehicles.

une 1965 29


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MONSOONSRAINFALL (INCHES) AT SELECTEO STATIONS

Affected by .nertheast monsoon *Affected by both northeast and southwest monsoon. . + Indicates only trace of recorded rainfallGray color ind icates period of most pronounced rainfall

HAGlANGTUYEN IXJANGHANOIHAIPHONGVINH00NG HOI*HUEOA NANGQUANG NGAIQUI NHON*NHA TRANG*CAP PAOARANPHAN TH157KONTUMOALATSNOULSAIGONSOC TRANG

CAMBODIASTUNG TRENGVAL d EMERAUOEPHNOM, PENHSIEMREAPLAOSLUANG PRABANG~fEE: KHOUANG 1.1t t

2 972 6568; 692 722 834 1272 85;. :;1 56t 3048! 741 72tt ;; t 73

: 2;:t 551 581] ::771 6911 :?t 100

505457476254

tttttttttt

tt1tttttttt

678$8

VI ENTIANEBAN HOUEI SAISENOATTOPEUTHAILANDCHIANG MAI 6. PHITSANULOK 6UOON THANI 9KHORAT ?UBONBANGKOK i :7it 8893PHUKET (ISLANO)* X?

t11t1t

dONGKHLA*BURMAMYITKYINAlASHIOKENGTUNGMANOALAY

LOIKAWTOUNGOORANGOONTAVOYMALAYA

5tttttttt

BUTTERWORTH 5 4TRENGGANU 9 1%.$: 94UALA LUMPURSINGAPORE* m + it 96Figure S . .

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MONSOONSrh is is beca use th e unplow ed cla yey;oils ha ve not yet become sa tu ra ted#ith the S IOWIY penetra ting w a ter;;his does not include mu ddled rice.ields.

In the sa me vein, th eee ident ica lfields in NOvember a nd ea rly D eeember (the dry season) may be bathedi nsunshine and only dotted with spora dic puddles, y et th ey a re qua gmiresto vehicles. This is beca use t he sa tu ra ted cla ys req uire severa l w eeks ofdry w eat her to yield th eir a bsorbedwa ter ; in some ca ses a high w a terta ble must a lso ha ve t ime to r ecede.Direct a tt a ck by typhoons is nonexistent in th e main part of Tha ila nd.On ra re occasions ty phoons ha vecrossed th e G ulf of Sia m from theesst a nd ha ve left a broa d swa th ofdestruction a cross th e south ern partof peninsu la r Tha ila nd. These occurin lat e November a nd December, ifa t a ll. Some selected a bsolute ma ximum a nd absolute minimum temperatures are: ~ , U don Tba niminimum , 37 de

grees Fa hrenheit in December; m~ ximum, 110 degrees Fa hrenh eit in April. B a ngkokminimum , 53 degrees

Fa hrenhei t in J anua ry ; maximum,104 degrees F a brenbeit in Ma y.Laos

Dur ing the northeast monsoon inLa os, a pilot flying a t high a lt itudeawould encounter clear conditions,w hile dur ing th e eouth w est monsoonhe w ould fly thr ough broken cloudeor overca st w ith occa siona l tu rbulence.Thr oughout t he count ry th ere is a pproximately 40 percent cloud coverduring th e nort heaet monsoon a nd 85percent during th e southw eet moneoon, to include t hun derst orms topping a t up to 21,000 met ers. The percenta ges a re a vera ges, of couree, a nddensity va ries from place to place,

In northern La os th ere ie earlyhne 1965

morning fog in tbe valleye during th eo cool sea son. S moke a nd ha ze occur

th rough the lat ter part of the coolsea a on a nd into the hot season in muchthe same manner ae in Thailand.

During the ra iny southw est monsoon, th e clouds a nd frequent show ersobscure mounta int op ma khg low -Ievel a ir opera tion quite ha za rdous.Tbe best time for a ir opera tions dur ing th is sea son ia 0900 to 1100 a ft erth e morning fog ha s dissipat ed butprior t o th e norma lly expected ehowera ctivity. Maximum a bsolute t emperatu res ha ve ra nged from 110 degreesFa hrenheit in April to a minimumlow of 32 degrees Fa hrenheit in J a nuary a t Luang Pra bang.

Ra in a ffects La os even more dra stically th a n it does Tha iland , due pri.ma rily t o primitive road s w hich onlysupport from 200 to 600 tons per dayduring th e dry sea son; th ere a re nosupporting ra ilroa ds in La os. Dur ingthe wet sea son, Laot ian roa dwa ys a repla gued by lan dslides, w a ehouts, a ndsurfa ce deteriora tion. Leeches, mold,mildew, a nd other inconveniences a resimilar to th ose w hich occur in Tha iland.

North and South VietnnmIn Vietna m the coa sta l lowla nds a nd

adjacent mountain slopes extendingfrom Vinb couth to Ca p P a dara n receive the largeet part of their rainfallfrom th e north east monsoon. Although it ma y be the ra iny seaa on inSaigon and Hanoi it will be the dryseason at Hue.

For most of southeaet Asia thenorth east monsoon is a cool, dry w indwhich has traveled down from Siberiaa nd a cross China ; quite na tura lly, i timpa rt s a cool dry clima te. The nort heaet w inds t ha t strike t he coa sta l low lan ds of th e tw o Vletna ms ha ve a nopport unit y, however, of crossing afew h undred kilometers of th e w a rm

31


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;

MONSOONSaid humid South China Sea. By the a n a mphibious opera tion a re consii. istime the wimt reaches the coastline ered, th ere is no one season th a t WOUI : ;i t is no longer dry but is sa tura ted be entirely suita ble. Hea vy ra ins, tropwith moisture. ica l storms, fog, ha ze, cra chin wea ther, t il

Anot her specia l cond ition occurs and typhoons would negate part oral Cw hich is known a s th e cra chh-aprolonged period, la te Novemberth rough ear ly April, of w idesprea dfog and drizzle which ,primarily affects th e coa sta l lowla nds of Nort ha nd South Vietna m from t he RedCh ina border to th e vicinity of NhaTra ng. The cra chin is cha ra cterizedby a persis t ent low-level (610 to 1,220meters thick) cIoud forma tion a ccompanied by light drizzle. This type ofweather sometimes continues fromtw o to th ree da ys a t a t ime. Thecrachin ~everely restricts many categories of aerial operations.

Typhoons occur every yea r in th ecity of Hue, the most frequent, focalpoint. The hea vy precipita tion th a tnormally accompanies typhoons accounts for tbe inordinate amonnt ofa nnua l rainfa ll a t tha t city. Typhoonsstrike most commonly along this coastline from ear ly S eptember th roughNovember; th ey drive in from th eeast a nd ra pidly dissipa te to ra instorms when spoiled by the Annamite

Mounta in Ra nge.The south w est monsoon preva ils

from mid-May through October. Except for th e east ern coa sta l a reas, precipita tion occurs w ith the great est intensity during th is period. H eavyocean swells south of Nha Trang adversely a ffect a mphibious opera tions,but this part of the coastline presentsexcellent conditions for amphibiousopera t ions from J a nuary thr oughMay .

North of Nha Tra ng to th eRed China border the w orst 6ceanw a ter is experienced from S eptemberth rough December. If ill pha ses of

pha ses of an a mphibious opera tion, }J a nuary through J une, however, a~ $s:considered tbe best month s. ?I

Absolute minimnm a nd ma ximua \ rtempera tures for selected sta tions a re !s

H a noiminimum , 41 degre~ : umaximum :aFahrenhei t in J anua ry ; 1., 107 degr ees Fa hr enheit in April. Vinhminimum, 37 degrees;;Fa hrenhei t in J anua ry ; maximum, 107 degr ees in April. N. Qua pg Nga iminita um, 49 de. hgrees Fa hrenheit in February ; ma xi. ,,:

mum, 104 degrees Fa hrenh eit in May ~ Kontum minimum , 38 degreesFa hrenheit in December; ma ximu m, ~105 degrees Fa hrenh eit in Ma rch. ~ Sa igonminimum , 55 degr eesFa hrenheit in J a nuary; ma ximum,

105 degr ees Fa hr enheit in April. ~Carnbudia

The sout hw est monsoon a rrives inCa mbodia a round mid-Ma y a nd laststh rough ear ly October. This is th eseason of heavy and frequent precipi.ta tion th roughout tbe count ry. Hum id.ities a re highest a nd cloudiness is a ti ts ma ximum. B y mida fternoon it isnot un comm on for cumulus clouds totower and top at over 18,000 meters.Amphibious opera tions w ould be a f. ~ fegted by modera te to high sw ells.

During this season the jungles andforests of Ca mbodia ha ve th e sa mecha ra cteristics a ffecting milita ry OPera tions a s w ere described for Tha iland, La os, a nd the tw o Vietna ms.Hundreds of square kilometers areinunda ted in th e vicinity of Tonle Sa p,a n a nnua l occurrence tha t is th e resuit of Mekong River ba ckwa ter. TheT&le Sa p, Ca mbodia s la rgea t lake,

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[!&

!s a sa fety ~ a lv: w hich virtua lly elimi.

Id na tes flooding m th e low er rea ches of~ t? Mekong River a nd, at th e same~ ,: t ime, provides Ca mbodia w ith a lu,, cra tive interna l fishery.~ ] The cool a nd dry north ea et mon.t ]soon a rrives in Ca mbodia a round ea rly

INovember a nd persist s unt il ea rly orim id-Ma rch. Dur ing this period th erem /,, :la little or no precipita tion, tempera

,( tu res a re a t th eir coolest, a nd skies a re th e clea reat of t he year. Amphib! , IOU Sopera tions a re most pra ctica l a t

th is t ime due to ca lm sea a a long tbe; :Cambodian coastline.The hot sea son exists from mid

,, !vfa rcb th rough early Ma y, with tbe: highest tempera tures occurrin g in; lat e April. At P hnom P enb, the high est record ed t empera t ure is 107 de-S grees Fa hrenheit in April, w hile the, low est is 53 degrees Fa hrenh eit in

February.s Burma1, The sout hw est monsoon in B urm a

comm ences in mid-Ma y a nd a dva ncesover th e entir e count ry by th e first

w eek in J une. This ra iny eea son is3 cha ra cterized by overca st skies, low: clouds, a nd daily intermitt ent light

ra in punctua ted by occa siona l blindmg ra insqua lls . Routes a nd tra fica t ~i,ity toThailandsreSimi]ar during th is sea son.1 B oth eurf an d weat her conditions,

i a t this t ime, ca use a ny la rge-sca le a m. . phibious opera tion t o be exceedinglyda ngerous. C lose-support a ir opera t ions throughout B urma ca nnot berehably scheduled during this season.The a rea of lea st ra infall is in th elow la nds from 80 kilometers north to160 kilometers south of Ma nda la y.

Dur ing tbe nort heast monsoon, a llf B urma is nearly dry w ith clea r

skies a nd relat ively COOI temperatures,This sea son ia follow ed by the hotune 1965

MONSOONSrainless months of March, April, andearly May. At this t ime, there iastrong solar ra diat ion t hroughout th eIargeat part of southeast Asia andlittle cloud cover. Absolute maximuma nd minimum tempera tures for a e-Iected sta tions a re:

La ebiomin imum , 30 degr eesFa hrenheit in December; ma ximum,108 degrees Fa hrenh eit in Ma rch.

Ma nda la yminimum , 44 degreesFa hrenheit in J a nuary; ma ximum,1I 4 degrees Fa hrenheit in April an dMay .

Ra ngoonminim um, 55 degr eesFa hrenheit in J a nuary; ma ximum,109 degrees Fa hrenh eit in Ma y.

MaIawrThe largest part of Mala ya a nd a

part of peninsula r Tha ila nd a re a ffected, to some measure, by rainfallfrom both the northeast and tbe southw eet monsoon. It is difficult to defineclea rly a cha nge from one sea son t oth e oth er insofa r a s milita ry ca pabilities a re concerned. S elected sta tions on tbe east coa st ( Trengga nu ),th e w eat coa st ( B utt erworth ), t he interior ( Kua la Lum pur), a nd th e south ern tip (S inga pore), each show a na bunda nce of ra infa llover 90 inchesper year w ith a large a mount fal l ingin each month of the year. The northeast monsoon brings tbe most rain toMalaya .

Favorable weather for air-groundopera tions va ries a great deal th roughout Malaya at any t ime of the year .The coa sts a nd a dja cent low lands a retbe most fa vora ble opera tiona l a reas,;th e interior valleys a nd mounta insha ve ear ly morn ing fog, wh ile lowclouds often persiet thr oughout th eday .

A special w eat her fea tur e preva lentin Malaya , ca lled the Sumat ras/etrikes from th e south ern tip to the

33


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MONSOONS .vicinity of Kuala Lumpur during thesonthwest monsoon season. Thesestorms; whith normally strike atnight, a re cha ra cterized by a linesqua ll, 50-knot gusts, a nd a ccompa nying tht fnderstormscoastline and thenmove iuland.

All of southeastgreatest facilityground operations

which strike thedissipa te a s th eyAsia provides the

for combined air-during the periodof J a nua ry through May. Althoughth e southea st Asian ra ins commencein ear ly Ma y, th e ofiroad soils a re notyet w a terlogged; lan dslides ar e notyet a deterring factor . B y J une thesouthw est monsoohs deteriora t ing ef- feets a re beginning to be felt,

While th e skies a re genera lly clearin November a nd December, th e w a terlogged ground is dry ing slow ly. Thelargest rivers a re deepest a nd a rejust beginning severa l month s ofsteady recession. D eteriora ted roadways am being cleared of debris andlandslides. Village chiefs a nd na tiona lhighwa y departm ents a re repa ir ingroa dw a y base courses a nd surfa ces.Some flooding of minor rivers stillexists up t o m id-November, a lth oughrains have ceased,

B y J anuary the roadwa ys and major tracks have been sufficiently rest ored; former la kelike low la nds nowhave only isolated puddles, and cracksa ppear in th e ear th s surfa ce. Thiscondit ion exists fr om La shio to Sa igon a nd from B a ngkok to Ha noi.

Only the coastal strip and bordering hills a nd mounta ins from Vinh,North Vietnam, to Cap Padaran ,

S outh Vietna m, experience hea vy masoona I ra ins. Ha noi a nd the Red RivDelta , not inclnded in th e cosststr ip, provide a ma rgina l exceptioThis is t heir driest sea son, but anca siena l cra chin w ill cloud th e dela nd bring light drizzie.J anua ry through May is the beperiod for all-round military opertions, and this season is particularla t tra ct ive to a modern force equippw ith t he lat est sophistica ted vehicland weapons of war, to include cloair support.

The period of J une th rough ffeceber is not desira ble for m a n or besin support of milita ry opera tions. hinfa nt ry force, however, ,w hich is tlored to p~ imitive reads a nd tra ils, thcan depend readily on animal aport er logistics, tha t ha s few orga nmotor vehicIes, and that can rely pma rily on the ta ctics a nd polisht echn iqu es of t he foot soldier, \ha ve less difficulty negotia ting tqua gmir e of ooze, flooded fords, adense folia ge th a n w ill th e hordestrucks, ta nks, heavy a rtillery, a nd ta dministra tive ta il of th e modemilitary machine.

To be sure, a large part of the tecnologica l ga ins of th e modern f ormust be shed in this primitive a reduring th e southw est monsoon.support will not be dependable. Tmodern force, w hich depends on trmendous firepow er in lieu of indiviuals, must then be prepared to matth e potentia [ a ggressor ma n for min a bat tleground w hich is most cducive to th e a ggressors ta ctics.

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THEHUKBAIAHAPNSURGENCYRobert Ross Smith

T HE mili ta ry measures theU nited S ta tes a nd the P hi lip~ ines undert ook towa rd th e end ofw orld Wa r II a nd for the f irst f ivefea rs a f ter the end of tha t w a r fa i led;Ostem th e tide of insur gency in th eP hilippine Isla nds. B eginning in K)50,Iowever, th e P hilippine a rm ed forcesNw sued cert a in militar y a ctivities a nd]rocedures w hich led ultima tely toFietory.

A principa l rea son for t he initia ]fa ilure of coun ter insur gency a ctivit iesfrom the days when the Hukbalahapfirst began to make trouble was thefact tha t purely milita ry opera tionsw ere overemphasized. Moreoverr dur ing the first f ive years of anti-Communist opera tions, th e milita ry ta sksw ere given prima rily to a const a bula ry force tha t w a s ill-equipped, poorlytra ined, a nd badly orga nized for the


36/112

,THE HUKllAIAHAPtask at hand. I t was not much betterwhen the army took over the resposmibility for sta mping out th e Hukba lahap.Area Sw6epsFor tbe first five or six yearsof coun terin surg ency operat ions, thearmed forces depended largely uponbroa d, a rea sw eeps in regions w hereth e Hukba laha p w ere known to bestrong. E$,en during the f irst mont hsa f ter Ra mcus Magsaysa y beca me S ecreta ry of Nat iona l Defense, t he a rmycont inued to employ such ta ctics.Indica t ions a re tha t Magsa ysay initia l ly intended to sweep the Hu k regiona l comm a nds one by one, depending upon the improved morale and etKciency of th e a rm ed forces t o succeedwhere previous sweep operations hadfailed. (Su ch a progra m w ould havef it t ed in well wi th Magsa ysafs alleged early intention of exterminatir tg every C ommunist a nd Hukba Ia ha p member in th e Ph ilippines. )

The sweep tactica did inflict considera ble da ma ge upon th e Hu ks w henconducted eff icient ly a nd enthusia stically, but they were not the f inal answer. Large-unit sweeps normallyga ve th emselves aw a y, permitt ing theThis digest is a n excerpt froman unpublished manuscript at theOffice of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, The Hukbalahap Insur-gency: Economic, Politwal, andMditary Factors, completed in1963.Mr. Smith is a histnvian with

the United States Army in thePacifir. Formerlg with the Oficeof the Chief of Military History,he is the author of two volumesin the UNITED S TATE S ARMY rNWORL D WAR I I series, includizzgTriu?nph in the Philippirres,published in 1963.

36

Hukbalaha p to a void conta ct a nl isthereby minimize casualties. More 1over, tbe sw eeps did not imrnobiliu \ ~the H uks or press t hem int o confinedI 1areas, nor did they provide the armd Jforces w ith th e const a nt offensive ini. ~ [iat ive w hich successful a nt iguerrih,warfare demanded.

Once the reins of the Departmentof Na tional Defense w ere firmly inhis ha nds, Magsaysa y began to cha a geth e a pprna ch to mili ta ry a ctivity. l ieforesa w th e compelling need for uni.fying th e a rmed forces under a singlecomma nd, a nd he decided tha t his mostimporta nt f iret ta sks were to revita l .ize th e a rm ed forces, rey~ ore th e con.fidence of the people m the army,gain civil ian support for army opera.tions, provide protection to th e pea s.a ntry, a nd make the a rmed forces t hefriends ra th er tha n the oppressors ofthe people.

The importance of these goals can.not be underest ima ted. With out th eilrealizat ion, no milita ry campa igns irth e P hilippines, no ma tt er h ow etl iciently condu cted from t he purel~milita ry point of view , could ha vfa chieved more tha n tempora ry successSmall-Unit Tactics

Certain aspects of this progranhelped Magsaysa y a bandon t he largeunit , a rea sw eep technique a nd tmtowa rd sma ll-unit ta ctics. H e beca mconvinced that area sweeps seldoryielded rewards commensurate witth e effort required. In a ddition, hiinitial decision to provide th e pea :antry wi th protect ion against Hukbaa ha p depredat ions tied dmvn so ma ntr oops tha t, unt il th e a rmys exparsion was cnmpleted, effective sweelhad to be l imited in number anscope.

Yet just a s th e H uks believed t h:they must consta nt ly a t ta ck to wi

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THE HUKBALAHAPso Magsa ysay wa s convinced tha t onlycont inuous ~ ffensives on the part ofgovernment forces could reduce theHukbalaha p milita ry threa t to mana geable proport ions. Ma gsa ysa y w a sa ble to must er sufficient str ength tocond uct a few ort hodox sw eep opera tions w hen the situa tion seemed pro.pitious. For th e rest t o cont inue to

ers, indeed, i t a ppeared tha t Ma gsaysa ys ba sic milita ry philosophy w a s,I t ta kes a guerri l la to ca tch a guerrilla.

Actua lly, th is is oversta ting th e ca sequite a bit . Ma gsaysa y never had a nyintent ion of tur ning th e P hilippineArmy into a guerrilla force ca pableof cond uctin g oirly sma ll-unit , guer -

DurinK his term as Defense Secretary, tbe late President Magsaysay reoriented thecount erinsurgemy campaign. He is show n here, third from left, talklng to a rebelwbo surrendered his weapon.ha ra ss th e H u ks consta ntly th roughmt a s w ide an area a s possiblehe de:ided to concent ra t e on sma ll-unit opxations.

J ust how much Magsa ysays ow n?oerrilla experience cont ribut ed t o hisdecision t o devot e considera ble a tt ent ion to sma ll-unit opera t ions is un know n, but he enthusia stica lly urgedt he a rm ed forces to a dopt more or lessun orth odox ta ctics. To ma ny observ

rills-ty pe opera tions. It w a s not unt ilwell into 1951, some six months afterMa gsa ysa y took office a s Secreta ry ofNa tiona l Defense, th a t th e P hilippineArmy really began to emphasize sma H unit a ct ions a nd to make much useof w ha t ha s popularlyif not entirelya ccura tely ~ been termed guerril la -type ta ct ics a gainst the Hukbalaha p.

Magsaysay wa s inst i tu t ing nothingreally new in milita ry opera tions

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THE HUKBALAHAPa gainst the Huks. Sma ll-unit opera tions qn d unpr~ hodox ta ctics ha d a lready been employed with some success against the Hukbalahap-MagsaYsaY~ ly went fur ther than hada ny of IS predecessors. Fu rt hermore,his empha sis on sma ll-unit a ctionsstemmed from both manpower shorta ges a nd the na ture of th e ma npow era t hand .Bsttalion Combat TeamsThe P hilippine Arm ys orga niza tion, when Magss.ysay took over asSecreta ry of Nat iona l D efense, wa sa lready gear ed to relat ively sma ll-unitopera tions. The a rmy s ba sic unit wa sa ra th er independent a nd often largelyself-sufficient battalion combat team(B CT). Norma lly, B CTS cont a inedth ree rifle compa nies (sma ller t ha n a nAmerica n rifle compa ny), a hea vyw eapons compa ny, a light recorpra issa nce compa ny , va rious ser vice elements, and, whenra nted, a bat t eryhowitzers andtransportat ion tobattalion,

Ostensibly. the

the s i tuat ion .warof 105-millimeter

sufficient attachedmotorize th e w hole

BCTS were idealunits forth e rough terr a in of much ofth e P hilippines. P roperly ha ndled th eycould be effect ive a ga inst la rge concentra tions of insurgents, a nd theycould be brough t toget her to formla rger groups, such a s regiments,w hen the terra in or the situat ion demanded.

From t he beginning, the tra iningof the BCTS was based upon the tactical doctr ine of th e U S Army . Nodra stic cha nges w ere needed in tha tdoct rin e for B CTS t o opera t e effectively a ga inst th e Hukba lah a p. The

. th a nges ma de w ereprima rily th ose required to increase flexibility a nd mobility in order to cope w ith Hu kbala bap hit -a nd-run ta ctics. For th e most

part , P hilippine Army tra ining csaw eno dra stic chan ges except for in. dcreased empha sis on scout ing a nd pa - strolling, night opera tions, a nd squa d ga nd plat oon a ctions. iCommando-Type Units

Once the concept of small-unit op- :era tions became more w idesprea d a ndmore firmly established among the :P hilippine a rmed forces, they bega nt o employ comma ndo-t ype un its of ;squad or platoon size extensively iaga inst the Hukba la hap. Such uni ts jconducted h]t-and-run raids simllartothose of the Huks, undertook long-ra nge reconna issan ce a nd intelligence pat rols, seized individua l lfuk lea ders, (a nd gene;ally kept up a program of ;harassment . ,

The size of the commando unitsvar ied a ccording to a teams par ticula r mission. Atypica l one migh t consist of from 15to 20 erdist ed men a ndone officer. Norma lly, a ll tea ms ha done th ing in common,hea vy fire-ipower for t he size of th e unit . Thus ,a ty pica l 15-ma n tea m w ould be foundwith tw o B rowrzi?cg a utomat ic ri f lesand at least four submachineguns.The teams usua lly ca rried a ra dio to 1mainta in conta ct wi th higher headqua rters. A ca mera wa s also often an import a nt item of equipment , forMagsa ysay wa s inclined to dema ndproof of claims of Huks killed.

At first, most of the commando )teams and other ad hoc small units opera ted in uniform, but i t wa s ashort and easy step for the teams tostart moving around in civilianclothes, infiltrating among the localpeople, a nd passing th emselves off a sHuks. Again, such tactics were notnew with Magsaysa y, but ha d beenused to a limi ted extent and with I im- ,ited success before he beca me S ecreta ry of Na tional Defense. The differ

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mce w a s in th e number of suchdisguised opera tions during th e Ma gsaysa y regime a nd the wa y the disguised a rmy units trea ted th e civilians .S ometimee, ema ll groups from acomma ndo team might s ta y in a Hu kmfested a rea for da ys, successfullycovering th eir rea l purpose by devoting only a par t of their t ime t oa ssigned a rmy missions. More often,however, comma ndo tea ms tried toiwep in touch w ith uniformed reinforcements by radio or courier.

By th e sa me token, disguised comma ndo tea ms a nd their element s seldom opera ted in a completely isola tedma nner, hut follow ed schedulee t ha tw ould periodica lly bring th em intocont a ct w ith other units. Meticulouspla nning a nd coordina tion precededeach tea m opera tion to prevent oneteam from ehooting up a nother, a ndto keep uniformed units from a nnihila t ing a team thinking i t wa s a Hukoutf i t. Dangers and Difficulties

The comm a nd o-t ype, dieguised operat ions w ere a lwa ys da ngerousforth ose tea ms unlucky enough to be discovered a nd ca ptured by th e Huks,deat h wa s usual ly immedia t e and painful. On th e other ha nd, in th is t ypeof clan destine, count erinsurgency w a rfare, the P hilippine Army ha d a dvanta ges no foreign tr oops could ever a tta in. The a rmy could a lwa ys ma n i tstea ms w ith na tives of th e region inw hich the teams w ere to opera te , a nd,since eo ma ny enlisted men ca me fromth e ca me genera l ba ckground a s didthe Huks, i t wa s eaey t o f ind men w hocould pass a s pea eant s. Ind eed, t hema in problem w a e often to ma ke aw ell-tr a ined soldier forget his milita rytra ining an d mili tary ha bite so a s toa ct like a Hu k guerrilla in the field.

THE HUKBALAHAPWhatever the dangers and difficul

ties, th e guerrilla ta ctics began to paydividende. For example, during thefirs t few months that both uniformeda nd disguieed comma ndo t eams bega nto opera te extensively, P hilippineArmy sourcee reported that Hukbalaha p casu a lties rose 12 percent w hilea rmy casua lties fell off 25 percent .

Too much should not be made ofth ese sta tist ics, however. B y th e t imeth e employment of th e disguised commando teams became widespread,more ort hodox ta ctice on th e par t ofth e revita lized a rmy, coupled with thema rked effect of Ma gsa yea ys civic a ction program s, ha d a lso begun to ma kesuhsta nt ia I inroa ds into Hukbalaha pstrength. Huke w ere get t ing ha rderto find an d, beginning to Iose comeconfidence in th eir own milita ry prow ess, sought to a void comba t.Unorthodox TacticsOn the other hand, one aspect ofth e guerrilla-like ta ctics t he a rmy employed can not be ignoredth e impression th e unorth odox opera tions ma deupon Hu k sympa th izers or th oee intimida ted by th e Hukba laha p. Whenthe pea sant ry discovered tha t thea rmy wa s meeting a nd often bea t ingthe Hukbalaha p with t he Huks ow nta ctics, respect for the a rmy grew ,fear of the Huks lessened, and reepectfor the Hukba lah a p dropped off.

To ma ny Filipinos, most of w homha ve a n excellent eense of hum or, th ethought tha t the army w as beat ingthe Huks at their ow n game w a s soincongr uous a s to he a mueing. Thisreaction exposed ihe hollowness ofHukbslah a p boa sts of milita ry a bilityand laid the Huks open to ridicule.One w a y or a nother, th e a rmys success w ith guerrilla ta ctics so impressed th ose wh o ha d a dhered t o th eHukbalaha p cause tha t in many a reae


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I

The successful use of merrilla tactics bv the Phiiimine Armv imnressed the nom.. . . .Iace whichbegan furnishing-National Defense was the intelligencesystem. The capture of the Communist P olitbur o in October 1950 w a s,of course, a rea l coup, but t herea fteroutst a ndin g int elligence successes becam e less fzequen t . A coordina t ed progra m for the interroga tion of captured Huks did not exist , and interrogat ion meth ods w ere generally crudea nd unsophistica ted, to say th

Military Review June 1965

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