Military Intervention: Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia

UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Politics and Peace Studies (BA) Dissertation

Has Military Intervention Played a Positive Role In Facilitating Secessionist Movements in The Cases of Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia?

Thomas Felix Creighton

Number of Words: 13,196


May 2012


Has Military Intervention Played a Positive Role In Facilitating Secessionist Movements in The

Cases of Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia?

Introduction

“Secession is the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognised state by a

constituent unit to create a new sovereign state” (Bartkus, 1999:3)

“The age of genocide” (Power, 2002:13) “The age of intervention” (Knaus, 2011:99)

The primary intention of this dissertation is to consider the title question with a view to better

understanding the processes through which secessionist movements attempt to achieve full

independence, and the role of military intervention in this. This will be achieved by examining five

key issues that have become apparent during a review of the existing literature. These are: the

contradiction in the international system between state sovereignty and the right to self-

determination; the rapidity with which longstanding processes of secession can become violent

conflicts; the short duration of external actors’ military interventions; the long-term consequences

of these military actions; and the political difficulties which still remain with the secessionists. It is

hoped that by examining the three case studies - NATO’s intervention to aid Kosovo’s secession from

Serbia, Turkey’s intervention to aid the Turkish Cypriots to achieve secession from the Republic of

Cyprus, and Russia’s intervention to help the South Ossetians secede from Georgia – pertinent

observations may be made that will help provide an answer to the title question and also to assist in

identifying areas for future research.

1) Self-determination and state sovereignty.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, Article 1.2, the organisation exists in order to;

“develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-

determination of peoples” (UN, 2012a:1). However, it is difficult to determine which social, ethnic,

linguistic, or cultural groupings represent a ‘people’ and so are entitled to the right to self-


determination (Smith, 2001). During the post-colonial period “the ex-colonies in Asia and Africa were

simply converted from quite arbitrary colonial administrative conveniences into ‘nations’” (Isaacs,

1975:436). During the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the internal administrative units were

recognised as nation states (Gachechiladze, 1995). Hewitt (2009) noted that at this time, the rights

of smaller sub-groups were ignored as borders often defined by Stalin became ‘set in stone’ by the

international community. Bélanger, Duchesne, and Paquin (2005:438) posited that because stability

is vital for states, they have “an anti-secession bias”. Horowitz (2000) observed that changes to

internationally recognised boundaries have been strongly resisted, and that the principle of national

sovereignty is upheld in the overwhelming majority of both secessionist and irredentist conflicts.

2) The process of secession.

The right to self-determination has in practice been restricted to de-colonisation and rare examples

of state disintegration (Bartkus, 1999); yet despite high costs, and a high failure rate, secessionist

movements have proliferated over the past fifty years. The Basques, Kurds, Bengalis, South

Sudanese, Northern Chadian and Biafrans have all had movements demanding autonomy, if not the

absolute right to self-determination (Horowitz, 2000). Whilst some secessionist movements have

received external assistance (Bélanger, Duchesne, & Paquin, 2005), and some have achieved de facto

statehood – as with the three case studies – they have generally failed to gain recognition from UN

member states. Indeed, Bartkus (1999) claimed that the only modern secessionist state whose

legitimacy is generally accepted is Bangladesh, although South Sudan has attained both

independence and membership of the United Nations since then (UN News Centre, 2011). There is

not the space in this dissertation to examine these case studies in conjunction with the three others.

Briefly, however, Bangladesh was able to gain independence after Indian military and political

intervention after widespread human rights abuses by the military of West Pakistan. Bélanger,

Duchesne, & Paquin (2005:439) noted that “groups subjected to exploitation, domination and social


injustice by their central state” are able to gain greater acceptance internationally for the legitimacy

of their right to self-determination than those that have not.

3) The nature of military intervention.

The purpose of the United Nations, as set out in the preamble to the organisation’s charter is to end

“the scourge of war” (UN, 2012a:1). Whilst a variety of forms of deadly conflict have proliferated in

the post-Cold War era (Cramer, 2006), industrialised state-to-state warfare as known to the authors

of the UN Charter has largely been averted; Smith (2006) argued that this due to the high

consequence of warfare in the age of nuclear weapons and the de-legitimisation of warfare as an

acceptable means of achieving political goals – suggesting that Clausewitz’s (2008:252) dictum, “war

is simply a continuation of political intercourse”, no longer applies as it once did. However, Knaus

(2011:99) claimed that military intervention has become such a prevalent feature in modern

international relations that we could describe our era as “the age of intervention”. Halle (1973:20)

observed that what represents legitimacy “changes from generation to generation”. Cunliffe (2010)

argued that states’ right to non-interference was challenged by the ICISS (2001) report The

Responsibility to Protect; this stated that military intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophes

may be necessary in exceptional circumstances. Cunliffe (2010) further argued that this could

undermine traditional domestic forms of domestic state legitimisation. However, secessionists are

those who have already rejected the legitimacy of their ‘home state’ (Bartkus, 1999). The case

studies below will demonstrate that when military intervention has taken place in support of

secessionists, it has tended to be short in duration – although the consequences have been long-

lasting. The military interventions have been by states, or a collection of states, which fought

conventionally against other states.

4) An assessment of the effects of intervention.


As mentioned above, military interventions were short in duration, but the conflicts that were

affected were long in duration. Hewitt (2009) noted that in the case of South Ossetia, key decision-

makers in the West often had to make rapid decisions with partial information early on in the

conflict. Gibbons (1997) made a similar observation of global powers regarding the Turkish Cypriots.

Smith (2006) noted the lack of thorough analysis regarding Kosovo before military intervention was

made by NATO. The longstanding ‘frozen’ conflicts in all three case studies ‘defrosted’ rapidly

causing major powers to act swiftly. These could be defined as cases of what Rogers (2010:183)

termed ‘liddism’, short military actions to ‘keep the lid’ on a situation, with “the pot boiling over

amid a chronic inability to turn down the heat”. In all three case studies, serious political issues still

remain after intervention. The question is whether military intervention facilitated a positive

progression for the secessionists.

5) The conflicts continue after intervention.

That last question will be examined in the case studies below, comparing the situation before

military intervention with the situation afterwards. Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, and South Ossetia

currently exist as independent self-governing entities which have permanent populations, defined

territories, and a government; three of the four requirements for statehood according to the 1933

Montevideo Convention (Zaum, 2007). The fourth, the capacity to enter into relations with other

states may be contested; Serbia, Southern Cyprus, and Georgia all use their position of prior

recognition to prevent the admission of these entities to the United Nations and other international

organisations (Wilson, 2009; Batur, 2007; Hewitt, 2009). It may be argued that they are attempting

to ‘keep the lid’ on the secessionists. However, it is debateable whether they are employing

strategies that will turn down the heat.

*****


This essay will employ the Bartkus’ (1999) framework for the analysis of secessionist movements.

The four factors of importance according to this framework are; ‘a distinct community’, ‘discontent’,

‘territory’, and ‘leadership’. This allows for Horowitz’s (2000) two key trends of secessionist

movements, ethnic cleavages and economic grievances, to be incorporated in ‘distinct community’

and ‘discontent’. It also allows an incorporation of the dynamics of leadership, along with the role

physical and human geography play in secessionist conflict as noted by Dunn (1997). The military

intervention will be examined from two perspectives, those provided by Chandler (2003) and Smith

(2006). The former examines the importance of internal political drivers for external military action

on the part of major powers. The latter examines the degree of effectiveness comparing the cost of

action and the apparent results. It is hoped that these two perspectives will allow for a suitable

examination of intervention, as well as giving a suitable opportunity to assess whether external

military intervention has played a positive role in these secessionist conflicts.


Literature Review

Introduction

Before attempting to answer the title question, it is important to examine the context in which this

question is being asked. There is already a considerable body of literature on both interventionism

and secessionism, although the two do not always overlap. Much of the literature on

interventionism examines the implications for wider international relations rather than investigating

effects at the ‘grassroots’ level1. This dissertation examines the relationship between

interventionists and secessionists from the opposing perspective – a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-

down’ perspective. This is in keeping with the general trend in writing on peacekeeping (Bellamy,

Williams, & Griffin, 2004), state-building (Pouligny, 2004) and development (Sen, 2001).

Self-determination

Central to any secessionist movement is the demand to exercise the right to self-determination

(Bartkus, 1999). For this reason, a short account of the practice of self-determination will be given

here. In the early twentieth century, a major international conference could involve the

representatives of perhaps only six countries, twenty at the most it included self-governing

dominions such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand (James, 2005). In the modern day, there are

currently one hundred and ninety three member states of the United Nations (UN, 2012b). There are

also some entities such as Taiwan which are not members, although there are special arrangements

made in the cases of the Palestinian Authorities and the Holy See (UN, 2012c). One of the key drivers

in this change in the landscape of International Relations was the anti-colonial movement. Kissinger

(2000) suggested that the rise in the number of politically independent states is the most significant

political movement of the twentieth century.

1 For example, Sestanovich (2008) makes no mention of South Ossetia in his analysis of the 2008 conflict.


Nations that gained independence in the twentieth century from European colonial powers

sometimes claim to be suffering from a negative legacy, with the ‘artificiality of boarders’ a common

complaint (Eriksen, 2010). Although Furguson (2004) argued that European nation states and

Midwestern states in the US also have boarders drawn by relatively isolated elites through a history

equally bloody - if not more bloody in some cases. Equally, the borders of South America were

predominantly created by the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies in order to consolidate their

conquests and “expropriate Indigenous People from their territory” (Parodi, 2002:xii); yet these

borders are commonly perceived as equitable. Notably, one of the earliest priorities of the

Organisation of African Union was to encourage its members to recognise colonial borders, so as to

promote stability on the continent (Eriksen, 2010). Secessionist movements have been resisted by

local elites as much as colonial elites resisted independence, and sometimes more so (Smith, 2001).

The right to independence from oppressive colonial elites is established but the right to

independence from oppressive post-colonial elites is not (Bartkus, 1999). However, it is in this

context that secessionism occurred in the cases of Turkish Cyprus and South Ossetia as will be

detailed in the case studies.

A ‘second wave’ of secessionist movements occurred as the Soviet Union collapsed in the early

nineteen-nineties. Primarily in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, states that had formed a key part of

the ‘Eastern bloc’ suddenly asserted their autonomy as the ‘price of secession’ was perceived to

lessen (Castle, 2003). In some cases, such as Poland and Georgia, secession was widely deemed to be

a success as it led not only to independence from the Soviet Union but also the emergence of stable

democratic systems of governance (Gachechiladze, 1995; Davis, 2001). However, in other cases such

as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, secession from the USSR did not lead to progressive, democratic

forms of governance (Lewis, 2008).

Sovereignty


In the modern day, secessionist movements are not seeking independence from European empires

or the Soviet Union. They seek to secede from post-colonial nation states, which have themselves

exercised the ‘right of self-determination’ (Horowitz, 2000). These nations have been recognised by

other states as sovereign entities. In some cases, the separate ideas of ‘nationhood’ and ‘statehood’

have been combined with the term ‘nation-state’ to describe these countries (Smith, 2001). It has

also been argued that some nations that lack a state are therefore not ‘nations’ but rather

ethnic/cultural groups, communities or sub-national groups. This is the reason Bartkus (1999)

preferred to use the term ‘distinct community’. Yet it could be argued that using this logic, a nation

wishing to exercise self-determination can never do so, as they are only considered a nation once

they have already exercised this right.

Central to the linkage of secession and intervention, is the relationship of each of these to the

principle of sovereignty. Secession challenges the integrity of a state’s territory and the state’s claim

of authority over its people (Dunn, 1997). Intervention can be even more controversial as in

principle, all states may claim equal sovereign rights – regardless of differing capabilities (Calhoun,

2007) – so one state intervening in another state’s internal affairs against its wishes can arouse

intense hostility (Stewart & Knaus, 2011). However, it has been suggested that intervention does not

necessarily contravene the modern concept of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001); rather, the concept of

sovereignty has altered over time from sovereignty of states to the ‘sovereignty of a people’. Zaum

(2007) described the former as ‘horizontal sovereignty’, the declaratory act of state-to-state

recognition of authority. The latter, the fulfilment of a state’s responsibilities towards its citizens,

was defined as ‘vertical sovereignty’. Hearn (2006:12) stated that modern politics is “dominated by

the idea that power at the top gains its legitimacy from the base”, so stressing the importance of

vertical sovereignty.

Intervention


During the Cold War, military interventions were made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nicaragua

and many more countries (Young, 1993); however, at this time interventions objectives were

defined by the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineteen-nineties,

military interventions have assumed ‘humanitarian’ objectives. The term ‘humanitarian’ was

rejected by professionals who worked in sectors more traditionally described as ‘humanitarian’; who

were concerned that they might be perceived as having been co-opted by military-political

establishments (ICISS, 2001), as indeed the US Army suggests is desirable in certain instances (USDA,

2007). In order to address these concerns the term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or ‘R2P’ was

postulated as an alternative: “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal

war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or

avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (ICISS,

2001:xi). In 2005, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, citing the ICISS report, stated; “I

believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it”

(UN General Assembly, 2005:35). The topic of military intervention has been one of the most

controversial issues in post-Cold War international relations; both when it has happened, such as in

Iraq, and when it has not, as in Rwanda (Stewart & Knaus, 2011). In attempting to analyse whether

military intervention played a positive role in facilitating secessionist movements, it is important to

identify how ‘a positive role’ will be defined. Due to confines of time for research and space to write,

only one criterion for ‘positive’ will be applied; did the intervention aid the secessionists in achieving

their goals?

Responsibility to Protect

The intervention in Kosovo was a key example in the ICISS (2001) report on the Responsibility to

Protect. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus which long preceded it was not mentioned. However, it

may be speculated that the Turkish intervention influenced NATO’s later actions – especially as

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 (NATO, 2012) and has the second largest army in the


organisation (Zanotti, 2011). In 2006, Russian premier Vladimir Putin stated that the “Cyprus model”

would be applied to Georgia’s breakaway republics if Kosovo was granted recognition by the

international community (Smith, 2009:128); the comparison between these three was rejected

immediately by Georgian politicians. Russia’s claim that it was undertaking the Responsibility to

Protect in South Ossetia has since been widely questioned (Illarionev, 2009). However, Borgen

(2009) noted similarities between the cases of the Kosovo and South Ossetia conflict; in both cases

secessionists demanded the right to self-determination and a great power intervened militarily in

order to assist them. Both of these factors also apply to Cyprus, where Turkey intervened on behalf

of the Turkish minority (Richmond, 1998). This dissertation is not an analysis of the Responsibility to

Protect. However, the concept will be referred to, as aiding secessionists appears to have been

considered a partial solution to the political issues underlying the three conflicts.

Utility of Force

Military methods are only one tool at the disposal of regional and international powers. There is a

case to be made that the military is over-studied in comparison to how states deploy economic,

diplomatic and material resources such as development and emergency assistance aid. State

intervention in other nations can take on non-military forms such as; economic sanctions, criminal

prosecutions, expulsion of diplomatic staff, and the attaching of conditions to the provision of much

needed aid (Halle, 1973). Greco-Turkish relations were improved through the provision of both state

and NGO aid after the Marmara earthquake in August 1999 (Öktem, 2011). Turkish-Israeli relations

were worsened by the Mavi Marmara’s attempt to provide aid to the Palestinian Authorities, and

subsequently improved by the role Turkey played in securing the release of kidnapped soldier Gilad

Shalit (Eran, 2011). Russia has used military means in both South Ossetia and Chechnya and has also

been equally adept at so-called ‘pipeline’ politics in Eastern Europe; negotiating and renegotiating

gas prices with neighbouring states that are dependent on Russia’s supply of this natural resource

(Schaffer, 2008). There is also a notable literature on how Israel deploys water resources in the


Occupied Territories (Lonergan & Brooks, 1994). Military factors are not invariably the most

significant factors in international relations.

Military history is one of the most heavily written about forms of history, far more so than social,

political, artistic or technological. However, more people died in the 1918 influenza epidemic than in

all the battles of the First World War put together (Billings, 2005; Honigsbaum, 2009). It may be

argued that epidemics provide far more relevant historical lessons to today’s leaders and decision

makers than trench warfare. However, the devastation of warfare both originates and ends entirely

in the realm of human decision making, giving it a distinct fascination. Warfare is also an active

decision, as opposed to ignorance or cumulative neglect which led to such disasters as the 1952

‘Great Smog’ to which as many as 12,000 premature deaths have been attributed (Mickley, 2007).

History records the names of those who act during a crisis, not those who prevent crises (Taleb,

2010); hence we readily recall war leaders, not those who created the Clean Air Act to prevent

future smog deaths.

In each of the three case studies, however, military intervention was an essential factor that

significantly and permanently changed local conditions in a rapid manner. Bartkus (1999) suggested

that the Turkish Cypriots would never have gained independence without military action from

mainland Turkey, although adding this was not the sole cause of Turkish Cypriot independence.

Dunn (1997:169) stated “Geopolitics never simply dictates or prohibits the pursuit of separatist

politics”. Military actions in all three case cases below did effect profound changes both in ordinary

lives, and in the politics and relationships of the communities concerned. Issues that had been

evolving for years, even decades, were irreversibly changed in a short time span by military action. In

all three cases, a key part of the interventionists’ public dialogue was that they were supporting

secessionist movements that were under dire threat.


Grassroots Secessionists

Did military intervention aid the secessionists in achieving their goals? At a more basic level it might

also be relevant to question what freedoms were gained at an individual level for those who are part

of secessionist communities. Such freedoms might be similar to those defined by Amartya Sen in

Development as Freedom (2001); freedom from hunger, physical oppression and disease along with

political freedoms. How secessionist regimes are able to address the needs of the population might

be addressed along the line of Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs. This could be considered to align

with Galtung’s (1996:32) “positive peace” in which distinct communities are guaranteed freedom

from oppression and exploitation, and political issues are resolved through peaceful means. This is

contrasted with ‘negative peace’, the normative absence of physical violence when oppression and

exploitation may still remain part of a community’s continuous common experience. All of these can

be difficult to quantify, particularly when attempting to judge them according to what might have

happened if military intervention had not taken place. When analysing past events, there is only ever

one set of data to draw from, what actually happened (Taleb, 2010). This demands caution in

analysis and thoroughness in fact checking.

A wider perspective taking in all local, regional or global actors is not taken. This is partially for

reasons of space but also because powers that intervene claiming an interest in facilitating

secessionists are rarely judged on these grounds alone2.

Another issue might be the exact definition of ‘facilitate’ in terms of the title question. This term

might suggest an emphasis on the secessionist’s agency. Heraclides (1990) noted that it is common

for secessionist entities to be described as ‘puppet states’ controlled by former colonial powers –

and found this to be without base in the secessionist states he examined. South Ossetia has been

described puppet state of Russia (Cornell, & Starr, 2009). Kosovo has been referred to as part of the

EU’s “Eastern Empire” (Chandler, 2006:96). Northern Cyprus is sometimes dismissed as an

2 Examples of this might be found in Cornell & Starr (2009).


autonomous entity and is referred to as being “under Turkish military occupation” (Republic of

Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012:1). This essay will not assess secessionist authorities against

an ideal standard of autonomy. These are small nations with limited resources and a deeply troubled

recent history as the case studies will illustrate. A potential ‘litmus test’ for this may be; are the

interventionists doing themselves out of a job?3

*****

As this literature review has illustrated, there are five key areas for investigation within this essay;

the contradiction in international relations between the principles of sovereignty and self-

determination, made apparent through secessionist conflicts; the potential this has for escalation to

violent conflict; the relationship between military intervention and secessionist movements; an

assessment of military interventions according to the outcomes from the secessionists point of view;

and an assessment of the current situation of the three secessionist movements. By investigating

these three case studies, it is hoped to provide a sufficient base in observable fact to allow for

general conclusions. It is hoped that this may illustrate areas for future research.

3 As Ditcher (2003) asked of the development industry.


Has Military Intervention Played a Positive Role In Facilitating Secessionist Movements in The Case

of Kosovo?

Introduction

This chapter will examine Kosovo as an example of military intervention facilitating a secessionist

movement. This will be done in three parts, first examining the secessionist movement, then

detailing the interventions made by external actors, and finally an attempt is made to evaluate the

military intervention. Kosovo has become one of the best known cases of ‘humanitarian

intervention’ – or Responsibility to Protect (Stewart & Knaus, 2011). After the tragedy caused by

inaction in Rwanda only a few years before, the prospect of genocide in Europe caused policy-

makers to act decisively in this case (Power, 2002). Kosovo has since become something of an

example of how R2P ought to be, what success in this field ought to look like (Solana, 1999). It is for

this reason that this case study needs to be examined critically. There exists a growing critique of the

international intervention in Kosovo4. Yet Kosovo represents for many an example of a just war

(Mertus, 2001).

Distinct community

The Kosovars have a history as a distinct community dating back to before the thirteenth century,

when the kingdom came briefly under the control of the Serbian empire (Wilson, 2009). After

conquest by the Ottoman Empire in 1389 it remained part of that poly-ethnic empire for the next

five hundred years; Payton (2006) argued that these five centuries of Ottoman rule are highly

instructive in understanding Kosovo and some attitudes still found today in the wider region. Indeed,

a lengthy period of Ottoman rule is something that this case study has in common with Cyprus

(Gazioğlu, 1990), and to a lesser extent Georgia (Gachechiladze, 1995). Kosovo and Cyprus also have

ethnic/religious tensions that may bear at least some superficial resemblance, so a brief description

of the Ottoman system of governance may be worthwhile here. Kosovo enjoyed some degree of

4 E.g. Chandler (2006), and also Chompsky (2000).


autonomy under the millet system, whereby each confessional community was largely self-

governing under the ‘guidance’ of the ruling Ottoman elite, which in turn was drawn from the all the

millets within the empire (Kinross, 2002). It is arguable that this would have allowed the Kosovars to

remain a distinct community without being absorbed into a larger hegemonic identity.

Territory

In 1912, after the Ottoman Empire receded from the Balkans, Serbia swiftly occupied Kosovo to the

widespread resentment of the Kosovars; Öcal and Çelenk (2010) suggest this as a possible origin of

the modern conflict and that later events merely acted to freeze and perpetuate the conflict. In the

mid-twentieth century, power transferred to Italian controlled Albania and then Yugoslavia. Whilst

part of Yugoslavia, Kosovo gained regional autonomy in 1974, giving the province “de-facto self-

governance” (BBC, 2012:1); as the Soviet Union collapsed in the early nineties, and an increasing

number of European states achieved independence, Kosovo’s limited regional autonomy was

abrogated as power was centralised within Yugoslavia to Belgrade. Slobodan Milosevic, who had

become the leader of Serbia’s communist party in 1986 had recognised the waning appeal of

Communist ideology, in response he “substituted nationalism for communism as a mechanism

through which to maintain and consolidate political power” (Human Rights Watch, 1995:115). This

was particularly important for Kosovo because, according to Power (2002:444), the Serbs had had

“an emotional relationship” with the territory since 1389 when the Ottomans had defeated the

Serbian Empire in battle on the Field of Blackbirds. So, Serbians consider this clearly defined territory

an essential part of their nation, irrespective of its modern demographics (Kaufman, 2001).

Discontent and Leadership

When autonomy was abrogated by Slobodan Milosevic’s Belgrade government in 1988, “Kosovo

immediately came to a virtual standstill with massive, spontaneous, and largely non-violent marches,

hunger strikes, boycotts, and organised meetings” (Reitan, 2000:72); the leadership of the Kosovars


attempted repeatedly to gain recognition of their cause from the international community, having

calculated early on that Serbia would not (re)grant autonomy independently. Indeed, as the Balkan

wars progressed throughout the early nineties – and the Serbian economy became strained by the

wars themselves plus international sanctions – Milosevic’s government became progressively more

repressive towards any domestic critics: “He muzzled dissent. He authorized political assassinations.

He shut down independent media stations. He stole elections his party could not win. And he began

brutalising ethnic Albanians in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo.” (Power, 2002:444-445). Yet

Ibrahim Rugova, then leader of the Kosovars, remained committed to peaceful methods; “largely

because of his accurate assumption that armed resistance against Serbia would mean collective

suicide because of Kosovo’s military inferiority” (Reitan, 2000:76). In the face of widespread

discontent, the leadership advocated peaceful conflict resolution.

According to Chompsky (2000), this non-violent strategy began to lose popular support in Kosovo

after the Dayton accords in 1995. Western negotiators had sought to preserve regional stability by

recognising Serbia’s territorial integrity – cementing Kosovo’s status as an indivisible part of Serbia,

and demonstrating that years of peacefully seeking secession had failed. Power (2002) observed a

fear among Western diplomats at this time that instability in Kosovo could lead to military

involvement by Albania and Macedonia, and perhaps even Turkey and Greece. Having been

rendered politically bankrupt, the non-violent Kosovan leadership was “eclipsed by the rise in

revolutionary violence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed rebel factions” (Reitan,

2000:70). In 1988, the Kosovars did not demand independence but rather a reinstatement of their

previous system of regional governance. By the mid nineteen-nineties, however, this had altered

radically. Bartkus (1999) has suggested that the majority of independence movements do not begin

as such, that they gradually evolve their position according to the relative costs and benefits of the

available political options. As it became apparent that autonomy was not going to be granted by

Serbia, and as the state became an apparent threat to them, Kosovars began to demand full

independence and international recognition (Reitan, 2000).


Intervention

The two key international leaders calling for military intervention in Kosovo were Tony Blair and Bill

Clinton (Chompsky, 2000). Blair later stated (2010:229); “non-intervention in Bosnia in the early

1990s... led directly to Milosevic believing that he could get away with the operation in Kosovo”.

After decades of repression, many perceived that the Serb authorities were determined to rid the

region of the Muslim majority, with extrajudicial killings occurring in steadily increasing numbers

(Mertus, 2001). Power (2002:455) stated that by 1999, Milosevic’s repression of the Kosovars was so

intense that almost every member of the distinct community “preferred to take his or her chances

with NATO bombing over business as usual under Milosevic”.

It was apparent early on that the lead actor in any NATO intervention would be the United States,

which itself viewed the prospect of military action with considerable caution (Blair, 2010). Powers

(2002) drew attention to the role of domestic US politics in determining, to some extent, Clinton’s

policies. The challenger for the presidency, Bob Dole, was a long established Republican figure

calling for greater international action – calls which carried greater weight when coupled with his

own wartime record. Clinton did not wish to seem weak to his own electorate. Blair and Clinton

repeatedly stated that the credibility of NATO was at stake in Kosovo, claims that Chompsky (2000)

interpreted as meaning that US and UK credibility was at stake. Blair (2010:237) stated that some of

his own staff thought it “a little strange that a government committed to changing Britain’s public

services and cutting unemployment should put its life on the line for a military adventure in the

Balkans”. Daddow (2009) noted that in his second year in office, Blair had delivered neither the

domestic reforms he had promised nor his main foreign policy objective before coming to office,

closer ties with the EU. In each case, his chancellor Gordon Brown seemed to have considerable

influence, but defence was one issue that remained the Prime Minister’s prerogative alone. Here

Daddow (2009) finds grounds to support Chandler’s (2003) assertion that intervention in Kosovo was

a product as much of domestic pressures as the suffering of those living in conflict zone.


Repeated attempts were made at peaceful conflict resolution in Rambouillet, France, which

ultimately failed. Although some radical critics of the process have claimed that the negotiations

were set up to fail, this has been rejected by the majority of commentators (Mertus, 2001). After

repeated cease-fire violations by Serb forces, NATO began a seventy-eight day bombing campaign in

March 1999 against Serbia, in order to apply pressure on Milosevic to halt his attacks on the

Kosovars (Dumbrell, 2008). The bombing campaign, while destructive and causing predictable

civilian casualties, succeeded in pressuring Serbia into withdrawing forces from Kosovo and allowing

the presence of international peacekeepers under UN administration (Solana, 1999). Despite the

criticisms regarding the motivation – noted above – memories of the Rwandan genocide and the

massacre of eight thousand civilians in the UN ‘safe zone’ in Srebrenica, were still then fresh (Knaus,

2011). The thought was present in many minds that the cost of non-intervention could be equal to,

or even greater than, the costs of intervention (Power, 2002). Furthermore, it was perceived that

diplomatic pressure was not enough in itself to coerce Milosevic into halting attacks against the

Kosovo Albanians (Blair, 2010).

The title of Chandler’s (2006) book on the Balkans, Empire in Denial, indicates the author’s concern

that international assistance – even if well intentioned – can have profoundly negative, long-term

implications for local actor’s agency. “The victim status of the ethnic Albanians, that allowed them to

gain the support of NATO states, was not enough to allow them a say in the post-war government of

the province” (Chandler, 2003:308). This finds resonance with Dichter’s (2003) critique of the

development industry, Despite Good Intentions, which claims that international actor’s long-term

actions in this field also have a tendency to reduce local actor’s agency. The 1933 Montevideo

Convention stated that lack of preparedness “should never serve as a pretext for delaying

independence” (Zaum, 2007:33). This principle held throughout the de-colonization period and, also,

during the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, ‘humanitarian intervention’ seems also to have

been coupled with ‘state-building’, a process of top-down development in which local actors can feel


significantly disempowered (Stewart & Knaus, 2011). The powers granted to multi-national

authorities in Kosovo had the nation defined as a “protectorate” by Chandler (2006:8).

Outcomes

Power (2002:460) recorded an interview with a survivor of a Serb massacre of Kosovars who,

supporting NATO’s military intervention, despite comprehending the potential dangers stated; “we

were going to be killed anyway. It was only a matter of time... NATO fought and now we, at least, are

free”. Chompsky (2000) claims that the scale of violence that NATO employed in its intervention

rendered any good that was achieved negligible. NATO’s failure to prevent ‘revenge killings’ of Serbs

in Kosovo remained a topic of controversy for several years (Mertus, 2001). As of writing, the

international system has failed to resolve the contradiction between Serbia’s sovereignty and

Kosovo’s right to self-determination. Kosovo is recognised by less than half of the members of the

United Nations, and is not even recognised by some members of the European Union (Öcal &

Çelenk, 2010). Whilst a negative peace, the absence of war, may have been achieved through a short

military intervention, the positive peace of reconciliation and “solidarity instead of fragmentation”

(Galtung, 1996:32), remains unrealised (Wilson, 2009).

The Kosovo conflict was considered sufficiently unimportant in 1995 that Kosovar leaders were not

given a place at the Dayton accords (Reitan, 2000). Yet, the conflict that Öcal and Çelenk (2010)

claim had been frozen since the early twentieth century led, within four years, to the first aggressive

war fought by NATO since its founding. The military intervention lasted only seventy-eight days and

was planned to be shorter (Smith, 2006). However, the application of force has failed to provide a

resolution to the underlying political issue. That decision-makers continue to believe a military

presence is necessary, may indicate that the potential for violent conflict still exists. After the failure

of military force to resolve the conflict in 1999 and with Serbia continuing to obstruct Kosovo’s

recognition, it may be argued that this remains primarily a conflict over legitimacy – and of the


incompatibility of sovereignty and self-determination in the international system. Military

intervention did not provide a solution to the political problem in Kosovo.



of Northern Cyprus?

Introduction

This case study will follow the same essential structure as the last, examining the secessionist

movement, then detailing the interventions made by external actors and, finally, an attempt will be

made to evaluate the military intervention. The nature of international relations was very different

at the time of the 1974 Turkish military intervention; Cold War logic coloured much of policy-makers

thinking (Kissinger, 1979). The Turkish intervention is also different as it was a unilateral

intervention, not an alliance of nations. Indeed, some tension was caused by threat of an inter-NATO

conflict between Turkey and Greece (Birant, 1985). At this time, when realpolitik was in vogue, it

was assumed that states only acted according to their national interest, not for ‘humanitarian’

purposes (Young, 1993). This case has often fallen outside of the debate on Responsibility to Protect,

yet there is a case to be made for its inclusion – especially considering, as stated earlier, Turkey has

been a member of NATO since 1952 (NATO, 2012) and has the second largest army in the

organisation (Zanotti, 2011).

Distinct Community

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, on a clear spring day the Turkish mainland is

clearly visible from the north of the island. Despite being over two-hundred miles away from Greece,

four fifths of the islands inhabitants are self-defined as ‘Greek’ (Richmond, 1998). The island’s Greek

Cypriots (GCs) have a history that dates back millennia. The Turkish Cypriots (TCs) date their history

back to the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571 (Gazioğlu, 1990). As with Kosovo, Cyprus was

governed by the millet system during Ottoman rule. In the Balkans, the Christian communities

generally felt at a disadvantage within this system and conversions to Islam were not uncommon

(Kinross, 2002). However, in Cyprus this situation was reversed, the Greek Orthodox Ethnarch was in


a position of power and his ‘flock’ were primarily the merchants, administrators and skilled workers

of the island (Gazioğlu, 1990); the TCs remained, for the most part, farmers. As with the Balkans, the

two communities led largely separate existences. In the Balkans, communities were often separated

by natural geography (Poulton, 1991). However, the TCs and GCs lived in ‘mixed villages’ which were

then divided internally into a Turkish and Greek side with family members living close to each other

(Aziz, 2000). The unusually high degree of communal separation was caused by the differences in

languages, alphabets, religions, histories, and cultural practices (Richmond, 1998). Intermarriages, if

they occurred at all, were exceedingly rare (Gazioğlu, 1990).

Territory

The territory of Cyprus became part of the British Empire in 1878, as a result of debts owed by the

Ottoman Sultan to the UK government (Orr, 1972); for most Cypriots, Turk or Greek, this made very

little difference in daily life. When the ‘Winds of Change’ speech was made, Cyprus was listed as a

colony that might never receive independence due to its geostrategic position – near the Suez Canal

(James, 2005). In reality, the British would spend most of the nineteen-fifties attempting to convince

the Cypriots of the merits of independence, as opposed to Enosis; union with Greece (Crawshaw,

1978). The campaign for Enosis became violent with the establishment of EOKA, which ultimately

was responsible for the deaths of over five-hundred people, most of whom were Greek Cypriots who

supported independence (Gibbons, 1997). Ultimately it was the traditional Ethnarch, Archbishop

Makarios III, who negotiated independence from Britain and agreed to a constitution on behalf of

the GCs. This constitution was guaranteed by Britain, Turkey, and Greece through a set of

international agreements, whereby each retained the right of intervention should the independence

of the island ever be threatened (Denktaş, 2002). Whilst the new Republic of Cyprus was to be

sovereign, Britain would retain two small enclaves as military bases, whilst Turkey and Greece would

also maintain a military presence on the island. Internally, sovereignty was divided between the TCs

and GCs, who voted in separate elections for separate representation (Crawshaw, 1978); the


Republic of Cyprus achieved independence in 1960, the same year it was admitted as a member

state to the UN.

Discontent and Leadership

The legacy of pro-Enosis violence remained with the new republic in the form of EOKA’s successor

organisation, EOKA-B. Within three years of independence, EOKA-B precipitated attacks against the

Turkish Cypriot community, who defended themselves in small enclaves (Denktaş, 1988; Gazioğlu &

Demirer, 1998; Aziz, 2000); this was done after President Archbishop Makarios unilaterally amended

the constitution in violation of international agreements and, despite the objections of the elected

TC representatives and the constitutional court (Tamkoç, 1988). The UN intervened rapidly,

delineating a ‘Green Line’ to separate the combatants in the capital Lefkoşa/Nicosia, and also

sending in a peacekeeping force. Despite this, violence between EOKA-B, supported by the Greek

Cypriot National Guard, and the TC resistant movement TMT continued at varying levels of intensity

for the next ten years (Richmond, 1998; Denktaş, 2002). As the majority of Turkish Cypriots became

trapped in small enclaves supplied from mainland Turkey, the TCs moved their support away from

moderate leaders, advocating a return to the 1960 constitution, to more radical leaders demanding

the right to self-determination (Batur, 2007). This conforms to Bartkus’ (1999:8) observation that;

“secession is a logical, although not inevitable, conclusion of the process of political disintegration”.

Intervention

In 1974, two external interventions were made in Cyprus, the first by Greece and the second by

Turkey. On the fifteenth of July, the military dictatorship in Greece sponsored an EOKA-B coup

against President Archbishop Makarios led by Nicos Sampson (Richmond, 1998). The intention

appears to have been to realise Enosis and so increase the legitimacy of the military regime, which

was then ailing. The obstacle presented by the Turkish Cypriot community was to be removed by an

‘ethnic cleansing’ operation, detailed as the Akritas Plan (Gibbons, 1997). It appears to have been


assumed that Turkey would be either unable, or unwilling, to intervene militarily in time to prevent

this plan from unfolding (Tamkoç, 1988). This possibility was expressed by top level Turkish decision-

makers (Birant, 1985); politicians feared the military would not be capable of effecting a successful

operation, the military feared the politicians would be unable to secure sufficient backing from the

international community. For this reason, two separate military interventions were enacted. The

first established a bridgehead in Cyprus to secure the TC enclaves. Once this was achieved, peace

negotiations were held in Geneva (Richmond, 1998). However, the cease-fire broke down rapidly

and mass killings of TCs proceeded. Turkey then enacted the second military operation so ending the

peace talks, and securing the northern third of the island as a safe area for the Turkish Cypriots

(Birant, 1985).

Internal Motivation for Intervention

The Greek motivation for intervention in Cyprus appears to have been primarily internal (Tamkoç,

1988). However, with a pre-independence history of pro-Enosis movements, dating back to the

nineteen-twenties (Crawshaw, 1978) it may be that the junta felt confident that a short military

intervention would resolve the ongoing political conflict. Although Turkey had come close to

intervening in Cyprus militarily before, the government was unable to resist public pressure in 1974,

when the threat of genocide became apparent (Birant, 1985). The first operation was not intended

to resolve the dispute, but, rather, to establish conditions in which negotiations could take place –

something Smith (2006) noted was a hallmark of modern conflict. With the second Turkish

intervention, the island was separated and populations exchanged as with mainland Turkey and

Greece after the 1919-1922 conflict (Kinross, 1993). Within a year, authority in the north was

transferred to the democratic Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which it was then assumed would

accede into the Republic of Cyprus in a Swiss style cantonal arrangement (Denktaş, 1988). It was

only after ten years of failed negotiations that a referendum was held in the north, which decided on


a new independent form of statehood; the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or TRNC, which only

Turkey recognised (Batur, 2007).

Outcomes

As of writing, the international community has failed to resolve the contradiction between the

Republic of Cyprus’ sovereignty and the TRNC’s right to self-determination. A violent conflict took

place in Cyprus from 1963 until 1974, attracting little international notice, until Turkey’s military

intervention (Batur, 2007). The intervention lasted thirty days, including a cease-fire, as negotiations

took place (Birant, 1985). Despite the enormity of the consequences of intervention, resolving the

political dispute on the island was not among them (Richmond, 1998). Thirty thousand Turkish

troops are still stationed on the island, the Republic of Cyprus maintains conscription, and a UN

peacekeeping force remains to separate the two armies. Though there has been an absence of

violence for over thirty years, ‘positive peace’ remains elusive. The ‘Cyprus Problem’, as the conflict

is known, has become such a feature of everyday life, it even has its own word in English; the

Cyprob5. As the southern Republic of Cyprus continually attempts to de-legitimise the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus (Moran, 1999), it may be argued that this remains, primarily, a conflict

over legitimacy – and of the incompatibility of sovereignty and self-determination in the

international system. Military intervention did not provide a solution to the political problem in

Cyprus.

5 E.g. Patroclos (2012)



of South Ossetia?

Introduction

This final case study has both commonalities and differences with the previous two. One notable

difference is that South Ossetia has never been governed by Georgia – though it is internationally

recognised as a part of that state. The movement for South Ossetian independence from the Soviet

Union coincided with the Georgian independence movement (King, 2008). The small, self-governing,

state has only 70,000 inhabitants, in comparison with Kosovo with almost two million inhabitants

(CIA, 2012a) and Turkish Cyprus with over a quarter of a million (Atun, 2010). In common with

Cyprus and Kosovo, the conflict in South Ossetia existed as a ‘frozen’ conflict for many years before

escalating rapidly into a violent conflict which dominated news headlines across the world (Cornell &

Starr, 2009). This chapter will examine South Ossetia as an example of military intervention

facilitating a secessionist movement. As with the last two case studies, this will be done in three

parts, first examining the secessionist movement, then detailing the interventions made by external

actors and, finally, an attempt is made to evaluate the military intervention.

Distinct Community

The Ossetians name for themselves is ‘Iron’, and for Ossetia ‘Iriston’ – the name they are known by

in English derives from the Georgian ‘o(v)s-i’ and ‘o(v)seti’ (Gachechiladze, 1995:86); they are the

only native people in the north Caucuses to speak an Indo-European language, Ossetian. This

language is “entirely unrelated to Georgian”, and quite close to the language of the Pathans in

Afghanistan (Kaufman, 2001:87). Ethnic Ossetians are divided by the north Caucasus mountain

range, the majority living north of Georgia’s border with the Russian Federation (Gachechiladze,

1995); those that migrated south did so, initially, after the Mongol invasion, but only spread to the

lowlands of Georgia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At this time, they were welcomed


by Georgian feudal lords who were in need of cheap labour. The lands in which Ossetians formed a

majority joined Tsarist Russia in the 1750s but, forty years later, the governorship passed to the

Georgian capital Tbilisi for administrative convenience (Petro, 2009). Despite this long history as a

distinct community in a well defined territory, many Georgians regard South Ossetians as

“essentially ‘guests’ without the right to expect political autonomy” (Kaufman, 2001:94).

Territory

When the USSR fragmented in the early nineties, the borders of the successor states followed the

“arbitrarily delimited borders” between administrative units of the USSR (Gachechiladze, 1995:2);

these borders were often regarded by those that created them as artificially contrived. By the early

nineteen-nineties, much of the logic that had previously applied to them had ceased to have any

relevance (Glinkina & Rosenburg, 2003). This led to conflicts in the Caucuses, such as between

Armenia and Azerbaijan, which demonstrated the volatility of these new states which had flexible

identities, contested boundaries and abiding feelings of insecurity. South Ossetia, as stated above,

already had established borders which preceded the Soviet state and a history of autonomy. In 1990,

the South Ossetians attempted to establish an independent state (Allison, 2008). However, it was

the Soviet defined borders which became recognised internationally, so a split occurred between the

de facto and de jure governance of South Ossetia (King, 2008).

Discontent

Georgia attempted to solve this contradiction between sovereignty and self-determination, by

regaining the province by force in a campaign which occurred 1991-1992 (Allison, 2008). As passions

ran high, the contemporary president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, is quoted as saying that all

Ossetians “should be burned out with a red-hot iron from the Georgian nation” (Petro, 2009:2).

Subsequent Georgian leaders proved comparatively moderate. However, two claims have remained;

that the Ossetians represent a distinct community and that, irrespective of this, the territory forms a


constituent part of Georgia. When mediating between Georgia and South Ossetia, international

negotiators have conventionally had some form of reintegration as the imagined end state (King,

2008): this is despite the fact that Georgia has now attempted to retake South Ossetia by force on

three occasions; 1991-1992, 2004, and 2008, thereby deepening the Ossetian’s perception of

Georgia as an aggressor state that requires a Russian military presence to deter further action.

Leaders

South Ossetia has been described as a ‘puppet state’ of Russia (Latynina, 2004). Heraclides (1990)

found this to be a common allegation made against secessionist entities in general – especially

among journalists and decision-makers – but an assumption largely without basis at the time. In the

2011 presidential election in South Ossetia, the candidate backed by Moscow was narrowly rejected

in favour of an opposition candidate, although the result remains in dispute (Interfax, 2012). Oxford

Analytica (2011) claimed that this was not a rejection of Russia per se but rather a rejection of local

elites accused of both corruption and of failing to provide adequate assistance to displaced persons:

a further claim was that the majority of South Ossetians would prefer union with Russia, but that

this contradicts Moscow’s policies. The previous president of South Ossetia – Eduard Kokoyty – has

stated that union with North Ossetia, a part of the Russian Federation, is highly desirable and would

be best achieved by joining in the same customs union with Russia as Belarus (BBC, 2008); this could

potentially end the economic isolation that South Ossetia suffers as an unrecognised state. In this,

apparently, flawed democracy, the leaders have chosen close ties to Russia over union with Georgia.

Self-determination has been confirmed in two referenda as the majority view within South Ossetia

(BBC, 2011).

Intervention

It could be argued that there were two military interventions in South Ossetia in 2008, a Georgian

one and a Russian one. Such claims are rejected by those that maintain that South Ossetia is


internationally recognised as part of Georgia and, so, the movement of Georgian troops into the

area of Tskhinvali could not constitute an ‘intervention’; Goble (2009:185) suggests that even to

discuss this issue “has the effect of casting doubt on Georgia’s position” and is irresponsible.

However, given the de facto independence of South Ossetia and the majority view within that

territory as set out above, the Georgian actions will be discussed here first. The Georgian

government had previously signed an interim peace agreement which prohibited any Georgian

military presence in South Ossetia, and which was enforced by a Russian peace-keeping force

(IIFFMCG, 2009). So, whilst the entry of Georgian troops into the area around Tskhinvali on 7th

August 2008 did not represent a violation of international law, it was a violation of local peace

agreements (Goble, 2009). Ten Russian peace-keepers were killed as a result of this action and it was

this that Moscow held as the causus belli for the subsequent five day war.

There is, as yet, no universally accepted name for the conflict that followed between Russia and

Georgia. The term ‘the South Ossetia War’ is rejected by many, as military action also took place in

other regions such as Abkhazia. The term, ‘the War of August 2008’, is rejected by some who

consider the conflict to be simply part of a much longer conflict between either Russia and Georgia,

or Russia and the West more generally (Cornell & Starr, 2009). Tsygankov (2009) argued that

attempts to frame the conflict in terms of a wider Russia/West confrontation were precipitated by

self-interest in the US; the then presidential candidate, John McCain, allegedly saw the conflict as an

opportunity to pursue his campaign on a national security topic, where he was perceived as strong.

Obama then adopted an identical stance to appear, “as tough as McCain on Russia”, allowing him to

defuse the topic and move on to an economics debate (Tsygankov, 2009:8). The convergence of

both presidential candidates on this issue allowed a diversity of interest groups to heighten fears of

a ‘neo-imperialist’ Russia, justifying NATO expansion abroad and a sizable defence budget

domestically.


As mentioned above, 2008 was the third time that Georgia has attempted to take South Ossetia by

military means. In order to explain the Georgian military intervention in South Ossetia, Petro (2009)

identified three domestic Georgian factors; firstly, the failure of Georgia’s political elites to make

progress in South Ossetia through negotiations, secondly, the Georgian political elite’s frustration

with the apparent lack of progress in their application to join NATO and, finally, the possibility of

facing a less sympathetic leadership in the US after the election. This may have constituted an

internal pressure to intervene in South Ossetia.

Russia, controversially, issued Russian passports to South Ossetian citizens in the years preceding the

conflict (Cornell & Starr, 2009). Moscow claims this was because many South Ossetians had not been

issued with Georgian passports and were, therefore, unable to travel internationally. Georgia

maintains that the Russian government issued these passports to facilitate the claim that Russia was

simply intervening to protect its own citizens – a claim which was indeed made in 2008 (Goble,

2009). Georgia’s claim suggests that Russia planned the campaign against Georgia many years in

advance. This perspective recalls Heraclides’ (1990) ‘conspiracy hypothesis’, that secessionists

receive external support from ‘neo-colonialist’ powers attempting to re-assert regional supremacy;

this was a view he found common among journalists and decision-makers, but lacking in

substantiation. Notably, South Ossetian citizens have consistently supported secessionist leaders

through referenda and regular elections (BBC, 2011). Despite the international condemnation of

Russia’s intervention, the policy was, “wildly popular in Russia”, with one set of poll data reporting

an eighty percent approval rating (King, 2008:9). Support was particularly high in the North Caucasus

region of Russia, which has itself produced a number of secessionist movements, such as in

Chechnya. Heraclides (1990) noted that states are no less likely to intervene to support secessionists

in other states, if they themselves are susceptible to secessionist movements.

This conflict followed the pattern observed by Smith (2006); a considerable amount of military force

was applied by a nation state, which then failed to resolve underlying political problems. The


government of South Ossetia is only recognised by Russia, Belarus, and Nicaragua (King, 2008). The

state of South Ossetia - to use Zaum’s (2007) terms - still lacks ‘horizontal’ sovereignty. Furthermore,

it could be argued that ‘vertical’ sovereignty has also been undermined; the five day war

demonstrated to the South Ossetians that their own government is not their primary security

guarantee.

Discussion

There is still substantial disagreement within the literature regarding the causes of events in August

2008. The consequences generate no less controversy and many facts appear unclear. This may

represent a suitable topic for further research for those interested in the future of security in the

region – a region that is gaining in significance as Europe’s energy security depends on increasing

diversification of sources (Schaffer, 2008). It has been claimed that the German government’s ‘pro-

Russia’ stance during the war was due to this nation’s dependence on Russian energy (Cornell, &

Starr, 2009). It has been claimed that Western condemnation of Russia was due to a culturally

ingrained fear of a strong Russia (Tsygankov, 2009). It is apparent that whilst a ‘negative peace’ has

been established, a ‘positive peace’ remains to be constructed.

As of writing, the international system has failed to resolve the contradiction between Georgia’s

sovereignty and South Ossetia’s right to self-determination. Although the conflict remained present

at a low level for almost twenty years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 2008, the war appears to

have caught many by surprise – including some participants. The use of force by Russia and Georgia

has failed to provide a resolution to the conflict, and, aside from a refugee crisis, the situation has

changed very little from the situation before the war. The political issues that created the armed

conflict still remain. As Georgia continues to obstruct the right of self-determination to the

democratic state of South Ossetia, it may be argued that this remains primarily a conflict over

legitimacy – and of the incompatibility of sovereignty and self-determination in the international

system. Military intervention did not provide a solution to the political problem in South Ossetia.


Has Military Intervention Played a Positive Role In Facilitating Secessionist Movements in The

Cases of Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia?

Discussion

As is demonstrated in the conclusions to the case studies above, there are five key issues that the

conflicts over Kosovo, Turkish Cyprus and South Ossetia have in common: 1) The difficulty of the

international system in dealing with disputes where state sovereignty and self-determination are in

conflict. 2) The underlying conflicts may have been described as ‘frozen’, but crises escalated quickly

and with little notice. 3) The short duration of military intervention in long duration conflicts, and

the lasting consequences of this. 4) The use of military force by an intervening state did not resolve

the political issue at hand. 5) The difficulties of the secessionists in gaining international recognition

remains despite the support of a more powerful international actor. Each of these five key points

will be examined below.

1) Sovereignty and Self-Determination

Every nation has a right to self-determination under the UN Charter and every state is sovereign

(UN, 2012). However, as Culhoun (2007:40) noted; “no definition of nation (or its correlative terms

such as nationalism and nationality) has ever gained general acceptance”. The three case studies

have demonstrated that there is not always a perfect match between those groups that describe

themselves as ‘nations’ and the states they find themselves inhabiting. According to Dunn

(1997:143); “no one today is self-evidently a citizen of exactly the right state, and rather large groups

are palpably subjects of quite the wrong ones”. However, many still equate nationality with

statehood, denying those nations without a state even the claim that they represent a ‘nation’

(Smith, 2001). Hence Bartkus (1999) chose to use the term ‘distinct community’ to describe the

population base of secessionist movements. She further stated that the political conflicts that arise

from the tension between the two principles of self-determination and sovereignty are, in no small


part, a struggle to gain widespread acceptance of legitimacy – to the claim of nationhood and then

statehood.

Kosovo has been used as a key example of when the international community should act in breach

of a nation’s sovereign right to non-interference due to a greater humanitarian principle (Stewart &

Knaus, 2011). The principle at stake was not that of self-determination, but, rather genocide.

However, self-determination for the Kosovars has been the result, if not the solution, to the initial

problem. If the Responsibility to Protect is to be confined to cases of genocide, this posits the

question of what constitutes genocide. This term was resisted by many governments in the case of

the Rwandan Genocide, as it might have forced states to take action they did not then wish to take

(Power, 2002). In 2008, Russia and Georgia both accused each other of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and

‘genocide’ (UN, 2008; Cornell, & Starr, 2009). If the term ‘genocide’ becomes widely accepted, does

this mean that full statehood for the minority in question is a natural solution? The case of Kosovo

might suggest this. The claimed necessity for a Jewish homeland after the Holocaust, which forms a

central part of Israel’s national identity, might also relate to this (Rosenbaum, 1996).

In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, it is difficult to determine when they first started to consider

themselves a nation, as opposed to a community (Vorka, 2009). Indeed, a major fault line between

the two major TC political parties remains whether to pursue independence further and seek

recognition, or to attempt some form of federation with the south (Akfırat & Özkan, 2010). The

Turkish Cypriot community comprised one half of the constitutional make up of the Republic of

Cyprus when it was founded in 1960. Tamkoç (1988) has argued that, when that constitution was

abrogated, legitimate state sovereignty was rendered void; this may be to see sovereignty as

primarily vertical. However, the Republic of Cyprus, whilst rejected by the Turkish Cypriot

community, continued to be recognised horizontally by other states and the UN (Denktaş, 2002). In

the case of South Ossetia, the recognition of the former internal administrative borders of the USSR

as international borders, has created a gulf between de facto and de jure statehood (King, 2008);


Georgia retains vertical sovereignty whilst the South Ossetian government appears to hold

horizontal sovereignty. This seems to be a key source of conflict between the two authorities and

the external actor, Russia. It is questionable whether the South Ossetian people constitute a

‘people’, or whether they comprise one part of a larger ‘Ossetian’ identity – north and south.

Georgian elites claim that the South Ossetian identity is a sub-group of a larger Georgian national

identity but this is apparently rejected by the South Ossetians themselves (Kaufman, 2001).

It may be that not all people are granted the right to self-determination, as we have no generally

accepted idea as to what constitutes a ‘people’ (Smith, 2001). However, when a clearly defined

‘people’ are under threat of existence, it appears that military intervention by external parties can

gain general acceptance and, that granting recognition to secessionist authorities is perceived by

many as a solution to endemic political problems (Stewart & Knaus, 2011). In the case of South

Ossetia, it is highly contested as to whether the Georgian authorities did pose a threat to the

existence of the South Ossetian people, although they did pose a threat to the existence of the

South Ossetian political entity (Cornell & Starr, 2009). The ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect

(2001:32) stated that either “the large scale loss of life”, or ‘ethnic cleansing’ entailing threats to

physical safety, was an essential criteria for intervention, not threats to the existence of political

regimes. When the justification for Russian intervention was questioned at the 5953rd meeting of the

UN Security Council, the representative of the Russian Federation asked: “How many civilians had to

die before it was described as genocide?” (UN, 2008:1). Attempting to establish a clearer threshold

for intervention may represent a future area for research.

2) Rapid Escalation

The conflicts used here as case studies all existed for some time before rapidly reaching new levels

of violence. Maiese (2003:1) stated “a great deal of conflict escalation is inadvertent”, and that

decision-makers often fail to fully consider the outcomes of their policies in rapidly evolving crisis

situations.


Blair (2010) argued that Milosevic had not expected a robust response from the international

community due to the previous ‘soft’ responses. Power (2002), however, suggested that it was

precisely the lack of robustness in the past – and the subsequent events at Srebrenica – that

precipitated such a strong response in Kosovo. NATO acted swiftly, without a clearly defined plan,

and without seeking full international approval (Smith, 2006). The 1974 Turkish military intervention

occurred within five days of the Greek sponsored coup in Cyprus – in Ankara, it was considered that

time was of the essence (Birant, 1985). This caught officials in Washington by surprise. Indeed, it

seems unlikely that the Greek Junta would have sponsored such a coup had they predicted such a

swift and robust response from Turkey (Tamkoç, 1988). So, the low-level civil conflict in Cyprus

became an international crisis quickly and unexpectedly.

Some observers have claimed that Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia was planned long in

advance – possibly several years in advance (Illarionev, 2009) – yet this seems to be undermined by

the lack of preparedness of the Russian army. Felgenhauer (2009), reports that there were

considerable delays, not only in transporting tanks into South Ossetia due to mechanical

breakdowns inside the Roki tunnel, but also delays in bringing the wounded out via the same route.

He further reports that communication breakdowns were so severe, that high ranking Russian

military commanders used the civilian cell-phone network to communicate with their subordinates,

using Georgian network providers. Such lack of preparedness might be seen to oppose Illarionev’s

(2009) claim that the operation was intensively planned years in advance.

From the three case studies it appears that the contradiction between the two principles of

sovereignty and self-determination – made relevant through secessionist struggles – created

tensions within these political conflicts which rapidly escalated into violent conflict.

Force Lacks Utility


Smith (2006) argues that conventional warfare – industrialised state-to-state warfare – no longer

exists, and that states using conventional forces are failing to achieve their objectives.

In the case of Kosovo, more than ten years after the military operation, the nation state remains

unrecognised – even by some members of the European Union such as the southern Republic of

Cyprus (Wilson, 2009). Serbia still claims Kosovo as part of its sovereign territory and has successfully

blocked Kosovo’s recognition by the UN. This is despite the emergence of the Responsibility to

Protect doctrine (ICISS, 2001) and the importance given to it by the former UN Secretary General

(UN General Assembly, 2009). The case study of Northern Cyprus argued that the 1974 Turkish

intervention is comparable to NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo. Yet Northern Cyprus remains

recognised only by Turkey (Richmond, 1998). The United States placed an arms embargo on Turkey

in 1974, in response to demands from the Greek-American lobby, but lifted this embargo within a

few years due to Cold War strategic considerations (Kissinger, 1979). Northern Cyprus, however,

remains not only unrecognised, but, also, under a thirty-year long economic embargo (Denktaş,

2002); this is as a result of being ‘invaded’ by Turkey, after what Gibbons (1997) details as an

attempted genocide by EOKA-B.

The foreign policy goals that Russia hoped to achieve by military intervention in South Ossetia

remain disputed (Cornell & Starr, 2009). The ‘Pro-Russia’ perspective is that Russia simply acted to

protect a small independent state under threat from a hostile state; that military action went further

than the borders of South Ossetia need not disprove this, as, not only did NATO do the same in

Serbia, NATO inflicted substantially more damage over a longer timeframe (King, 2008). From this

perspective, the damage inflicted on Georgia was necessary given Georgia’s record of aggression

against South Ossetia. The ‘Anti-Russia’ perspective is that Russia simply wished to re-assert its

power in the region and Georgia was chosen as a demonstration of Russia’s power, due to the

attempted accession to NATO (Tsygankov, 2009). In either case, it may be premature to judge if

Russia’s actions achieved its goals. However, it seems unlikely that Georgia will risk moving their


troops into South Ossetia in the near future and some observers have noted that Russia is being

taken more seriously on the world stage (Cornell & Starr, 2009). This may be considered an example

of a negative peace in the absence of positive peace.

In the three case studies, military intervention did not provide the solution to complex political

issues. Whilst it is arguable as to whether the military interventions succeeded in creating

environments in which political solutions may be found, all three secessionist movements have yet

to achieve their goal of international recognition, either by a majority of states, or in the form of

membership to the United Nations.

Long Secessions, Short Interventions

Bartkus (1999) noted that there are high costs associated with any secessionist movement.

However, this does not deter a large number of such movements from proliferating (Horowitz,

2000). Such movements will generally wait for an “opportune moment” to attempt to achieve their

goal (Bartkus, 1999:145) as it may be argued many Eastern European movements did with the fall of

the Berlin Wall (Davis, 2001). Whilst the case studies demonstrated that secessions have a history

lasting decades and even centuries, external actor’s military interventions have tended to be short.

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was initially intended to last approximately one week. Ultimately,

Serbia was bombed for seventy eight days (Smith, 2006). It is arguable that, since foreign troops

have remained in Kosovo ever since, intervention has been long-term. However, it was the 1999

military operation that facilitated secession and so has had the most lasting consequence.

The 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus lasted thirty days (Birant, 1985) and Turkish troops

have been stationed on the island ever since (Richmond, 1998). The short military operation

changed the demographics of the island and allowed the creation of a new state that could not have

existed otherwise (Bartkus, 1999). The disparity between the capacities of the Turkish forces in

Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot National Guard has also, arguably, prevented any military action by


the south to regain the north, as with Georgia’s three operations against South Ossetia. Greek

Cypriot authors accuse the Turkish army of ‘ethnically cleansing’ the north of Cyprus. Such claims are

rarely tempered by referring to the Greek Cypriot’s ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Turks (Denktaş, 2002).

The result of Turkish military intervention is a negative peace – the absence of violence for thirty

years, the ending of an eleven-year civil war, allowing the Turkish Cypriots their own homeland, but

it did not resolve the underlying sovereignty/self-determination question that underpins the Cyprob.

The war between Russia and Georgia lasted only five days, although Russian peacekeepers had been

in South Ossetia since 1992 and remain there to the present (IIFFMCG, 2009). Cornell & Starr (2009)

detail a range of other forms of Russian intervention in South Ossetia, including social, political and

economic programmes. Yet, as with the case study of Kosovo, South Ossetia had a long history of

self-determination prior to external intervention. The Turkish Cypriots may be considered an

exception to this, although they formed a largely self-governing community from 1960, and more

fully 1963-1974 (Batur, 2007). Interestingly, the Turkish Cypriots did not take the ‘opportune

moment’ in 1974 to declare full independence, but continued to negotiate with southern Cyprus

with a view to rejoining the republic through a federal solution. Full independence was only declared

in 1983 (Denktaş, 1988). Although it may be argued that military intervention was not short lived in

any of these examples, as foreign troops remain in all three cases, the violent application of military

force has ceased. The troops are apparently intended by the interventionists only to be a deterrent

to further violent conflict. So, in these case studies, short military involvement in long term

secessions has led to the open ended military commitments, something Smith (2006) observed to be

a hallmark of modern conflict.

The Battle for Legitimacy

Military campaigns that seek ‘to win the hearts and minds of the people’ are not new; Mocktaitis

(1990) noted that the term itself dates back to the counterinsurgency in Malaya in the nineteen-


fifties, whilst the idea itself has a much older genesis. Smith (2006:331) stated that winning the will

of the people “is the only true aim of any use of force in our modern conflicts”.

Kosovo remains unrecognised, even by members of the European Union, such as Greece and

southern Cyprus. The latter does not wish to confer legitimacy on the secessionist nation, perhaps

due to the situation on the island. However, there are many more nations which, due to fears of

secession or interventionism are also reluctant to recognise Kosovo’s legitimacy – currently 89

members of the UN recognise Kosovo, less than half its membership, and Kosovo is not a member

(Wilson, 2009). The struggle for horizontal sovereignty continues more than ten years after the

NATO intervention. It is common for Greek Cypriot commentators to refer to Northern Cyprus as a

‘pseudo-state’6. It could be argued that such de-legitimatisation in everyday dialogue acts to

reinforce the idea within the Greek Cypriot community that Northern Cyprus is not a legitimate

authority. It is also common for Greek Cypriot commentators to refer to Northern Cyprus as an

illegal state, leading to a satirical campaign in the north with t-shirts bearing the legend; “arrest me

for living in North Cyprus” (Cyprus Today, 2005:1). Such reference to law may support Smith’s (2006)

assertion that for many, legality and morality have become synonymous. During the conflict in 2008,

both Russia and Georgia attempted to portray the other as the aggressor (Goble, 2009); in doing so

seeking to legitimise their own actions as self-defence – domestically, Russian media portrayed the

Georgian President as a ‘demented Fuehrer’, whilst Georgian media presented much the same

image of the Russian Prime Minster (Goble, 2009).

The battle for recognition of secessionists’ states’ legitimacy remains a central concern for these

authorities. Whether dismissed as a ‘puppet state’ or refused recognition due to states’ fears for the

precedent it might set, it remains difficult for secessionist states to gain independence should the

predecessor state wish to prevent this (Bartkus, 1999).

6 E.g. Psyllides (2012)


Conclusion

The five topics discussed above are by no means the only method of attempting to answer the title

question. For example, the legality of assisting secessionists has not been addressed within this

framework – which for some may be questions of central importance (Smith, 2006). This essay does

not provide policy recommendations for future interventions as Stewart & Knaus (2011) considered

important. The role of the United Nations has also not been addressed, as the emphasis of this work

lies on states and secessionist entities. Considering Smith’s (2006) argument that states matter

considerably less in modern conflicts, this may be considered a flaw. However, in two of the three

case studies, military intervention was made unilaterally by states. In the remaining case, Kosovo,

the importance of the United Nations in this conflict, in comparison with major powers, remains

debated (Chandler, 2006). In the realm of peacekeeping – the majority of the workload of modern

armies – nation states generally act within an international framework (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin,

2004). However, invasions, interventions, and war-fighting remain available policy choices of nation-

states and so remain relevant to study (Smith, 2006).

It is debateable whether Kosovo, Turkish Cyprus and South Ossetia are the most prominent

examples of secession assisted by military intervention. They are certainly not the most successful;

Bartkus (1999) identifies this as Bangladesh, whose secession was forcibly opposed by West Pakistan

and only achieved independence as a result of Indian military intervention. In the post-colonial era,

there have been many secessionist movements – Kurdistan, Biafra, and Quebec for example

(Horowitz, 2000). It is not unusual for secessionists to seek external support in order to address the

imbalance in capacity between themselves and the state they seek to secede from (Dunn, 1997).

Maiese (2003) stated that it is a natural part of conflict escalation generally to involve more parties.

Halle (1973) even suggested that it is now impossible for an armed conflict between two countries to

not involve other states in the region – if not the world through the United Nations Security Council.


There are examples of peaceful secession in the modern times; Singapore seceded peacefully from

the Malay Confederation (Kissinger, 2000), but this is an example of secession from a confederacy,

not from a single sovereign state entity. Georgia has rejected peace plans that would entail some

form of federation for South Ossetia apparently due to the increased possibility of secession

afterwards (IIFFMCG, 2009). The political landscape of Eastern Europe today would be radically

different had the Soviet Union attempted to resist secessionist movements in the late nineteen-

eighties and early nineties by force (Hayden, 1994). However, this is a case of state disintegration,

which may be said to equate more closely to anti-colonial movements than the secessionist

movements examined here (Zaum, 2007). Should Scotland secede from the United Kingdom, it

seems unlikely that an armed conflict will be deemed necessary by either side (Gallagher, 2009); this

is because it is expected that the Westminster parliament will not oppose secession through

violence, nor seek to prevent recognition of an independent Scotland – quite unlike the case studies.

Far more numerous are the examples of secessionist movements that have failed to achieve any

form of independent statehood (Horowitz, 2000). This includes both predominately peaceful

examples such as Tibet and also violent secession movements such as the Karen of Burma/Myanmar

(Bartkus, 1999); in the face of sustained opposition, such movements have often proven unable to

provide benefits equal to those of the state from which they hope to secede from.

It is hoped that in choosing the three case studies of Kosovo, Turkish Cyprus and South Ossetia, an

analysis could be provided of how states sometimes react to ‘revolts from the margins’ – to use

Rogers (2010) term – in a supportive manner, albeit a violent one, directed against other states. In

each of these three case studies, substantive non-military assistance has been provided to

secessionist states; the EU has played a substantive state-building role in Kosovo alongside NATO

(Chandler, 2006), Turkey has provided up to $400 USD in aid to Turkish Cyprus in recent years (CIA,

2012b) and Russia continued to play an active post-war role in the affairs of South Ossetia. During

the visit of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to South Ossetia in 2009 – described as,


“disgraceful and immoral” by the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili – issues under discussion

included military, economic, and social issues (Interfax, 2009:1). However, in all three cases it

appears to have been short military intervention that secured the independence of the secessionist

states. Without this, it is difficult to see how the Kosovars under threat of genocide (Power, 2002),

the Turkish Cypriots under violent systematic repression (Gibbons, 1997) or the South Ossetians with

the threat of Georgian military takeover (Hewitt, 2009), could have freely exercised the right to self-

determination.

One-hundred and forty four peace agreements were signed between 1989 and 2005 but there has

been a substantial variation in the quality of the peace that followed (Höglund & Kovacs, 2010). One

key differentiation is lies in the concept of positive and negative peace. The case studies

demonstrated that negative peace may be achieved through external military intervention. However

in all three cases, a positive peace has remained elusive. However, in all three cases, it is arguable

that vertical sovereignty has been achieved but horizontal state-to-state sovereignty has not.

To conclude, there exists a contradiction in the international system between state sovereignty and

self-determination. Political conflicts that arise from this can exist at a low level for some time

before escalating rapidly and unexpectedly. Involvements by external actors in the form of military

engagements are short in duration with long term consequences. However, the outcomes may not

be those intended by the interventionists. Military force appears to lack utility when resolving

international political disputes; especially in cases of self-determination, where the secessionists

seek recognition of their legitimacy from the established system of international relations.


Bibliography

Akfırat, S., & Özkan, B. (2010). Ulusal/Etnik Kimliklerin Stratejik İnşası: Kuzey Kıbrıs Örneği - Strategic

National/Ethnic Identity Constructions: The Northern Cyprus Case [Journal Article in Turkish]. Bilig -

Kış/Winter: Number 52, 1-32.

Allison, R. (2008). Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace'. International

Affairs - 84:6 , 1145-1171.

Atonenko, O. (2008). From Kosovo to South Ossetia: In Seach of a Precedent. [Website, accesed, 27th

October, 2011]: Available from: Available from: http://www.gab-ibn.com/IMG/pdf/Ge8-

_From_Kosovo_to_South_Ossetia_-_in_search_of_a_precedent.pdf.

Atun, A. (2010). Kıbrıslı Türkler Kaç Kişi [In Turkish]. [Website, accessed April 10th, 2012]: Available

from: http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/1/col/97/art/9407/PageName/KIBRIS_POSTASI.

Aziz, T. (2000). The Death of Friendship. Nicosia: Near East Publishing.

Bartkus, V. (1999). The Dynamic of Secession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Batur, N. (2007). Rauf Denktaş – Yeniden Yaşasaydım [in Turkish]. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap.

BBC. (2008). South Ossetia to Remain Independent of Georgia and Russia Says Envoy - BBC

Monitoring Former Soviet Union (Sep 11, 2008) - Origional Credit: RIA Novosti news agency, Moscow

[in Russian] (Sep 11, 2008). [Website, accessed 3rd April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/460268131/135DD1C28DB288184EA/28?a

ccountid=17193.

BBC. (2011). Timeline: Georgia. [Website, accessed 28th October, 2011]: Available from:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1102575.stm.

BBC. (2012). Timeline - Kosovo. [Website, accessed 21st February 2012]: Available from:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/3550401.stm.

Bélanger, L., Duchesne, É., & Paquin, J. (2005). Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements:

The Democratic Factor. [Website, accessed 14th March, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/25165812.

Bellamy, A., Williams, P., & Griffin, S. (2004). Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity Press

in association with Blackwell Pub.

Billings, M. (2005). The 1918 Influenza Pandemic. [Website, accessed 10th February, 2012]: Available

from: http://virus.stanford.edu/uda/.

Birant, M. (1985). 30 Hot Days. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blair, T. (2010). A Journey. Random House: London.


Borgen, C. (2009). The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of

Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia. [Website accessed 15th March, 2012]:

Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/237219515/fulltextPDF/1362F924E331FF4

21A0/1?accountid=17193.

Brien, O., & Kevin, A. (1994). Russian Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad . [Website, accessed 6th

April, 2012]: Available from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/234426867?accountid=17193.

Calhoun, C. (2007). Nations Matter - Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream. Abingdon:

Routledge.

Campbell, J. (1975). The Mediterranean Crisis. Foreign Affairs - July 1975 - Vol. 53, No. 4 , 605-624.

Castle, M. (2003). Triggering Communism's Collapse - Perceptions and Power in Poland's Transition.

Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishes Inc.

Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in Denial. London: Pluto Press.

Chandler, D. (2003). Rhetoric Without Responsibility: the Attraction of Ethical Foreign Policy.

[Website accessed 4th March 2012]: Available from:

http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/BJPIR%20%205.3%20Rhetoric%20Responsibility.

pdf.

Chompsky, N. (2000). Rouge States - The Rule of Force in World Affairs. London: Pluto Press.

Churchill, W. (1950). The Second World War - Volume III - The Grand Alliance. London: Cassell & Co.

Ltd.

CIA. (2012a). CIA - World Factbook - Kosovo. [Website, accessed 5th March, 2012]: Available from:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html.

CIA. (2012b). CIA - The World Factbook - Cyprus. [Website, accessed 20th April, 2012]: Available

from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html#Econ.

Clausewitz. (2008). On War - Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Cornell, S. & Starr, S. (eds.). (2009). The Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War in Georgia. London: M.E.

Sharpe.

Cox, M., & Stokes, D. (2009). Introduction: US Foreign Policy - Past, Present, and Future. In C. M, & S.

D. (eds.), US Foreign Policy (pp. 1-6). London: Oxford University Press.

Cramer, C. (2006). Civil War is not a Stupid Thing - Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries.

London: Hurst & Company.

Crawshaw, N. (1978). The Cyprus Revolt - An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece. London:

George Allen & Unwin.


Cunliffe, P. (2010). Dangerous Duties: Power, Paternalism and the 'Responsibility to Protect'.

[Website accessed 20th March, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/873500754/fulltextPDF/1364801266F216C

E566/6?accountid=17193.

Cyprus Today. (2005). Convoy Flies Flag for TRNC - July 16-22, 2005 [Newspaper Article]. Lefkoşa:

Cyprus Mail Ltd.

Daddow, O. (2009). 'Tony's War'? Blair, Kosovo and the Interventionist Impulse in British Foreign

Policy. [Website, accessed 4th March, 2012]: Available from:

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00813.x/pdf.

Davis, N. (2001). Heart of Europe: the Past in Poland's Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Denktaş, R. (1988). The Cyprus Triangle. London: Rustem.

Denktaş, R. (2002). Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem. Nicosia: CYREP.

Dichter, T. (2003). Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World Has

Failed. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press.

Dumbrell, J. (2008). America in the 1990's. In M. Cox, & D. Stokes, US Foreign Policy (pp. 88-104).

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dunn, J. (1997). Conclusion. In T. Anderson, B. Bull, & K. Duvolod, Seperatism - Culture Counts,

Resources Decide (pp. 167-172). Bergen: CMI.

Dunn, J. (1997). Does Seperatism Threaten the State System? In T. Andresen, B. Bull, & K. Duvold,

Seperatism - Culture Counts, Resources Decide (pp. 130-145). Bergan: CMI.

Eran, O. (2011). Israel: Quo Vadis, Turkey? [Website accessed 17th April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/901019155/fulltextPDF/1362729629F6A59

D271/2?accountid=17193.

Eriksen, S. (2010). The Theory of Failure and the Failure of Theory: "State Failure", the Idea of the

State and the Practice of State Building. In K. Harpviken, Troubled Regions and Failing States: The

Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflicts (pp. 27-51). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. .

Eriksen, T. (1997). Rethinking Ethnicity - An Alternative Approach to the Study of Identification. In T.

Andresen, B. Bull, & K. Duvold, Seperatism - Culture Counts, Resources Decide (pp. 41-55). Bergan:

CMI.

Felgenhauer, P. (2009). After August 7th: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War. In S. Cornell, & S.

Starr, The Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War in Georgia (pp. 162-180). London: M.E. Sharpe.

Furguson, N. (2004). Empire - How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books.

Gachechiladze, R. (1995). The New Georgia - Space, Society, Politics. London: University College

London Press.


Gallagher, T. (2009). The Illusion of Freedom: Scotland Under Nationalism . London: C. Hurst.

Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means - Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo:

International Peace Research Institute.

Gazioğlu, A. (1990). The Turks in Cyprus - A Province of the Ottoman Empire (1571-1878). London: K.

Rustem & Brother.

Gazioğlu, A.C. (ed.). (1998). Cyprus, EU and Turkey - Selected Extracts from the World Press. Nicosia:

CYREP.

Gazioğlu, A.C. & Demirer, M.A. (eds.). (1998). Cyprus: The Island of Sustained Crises. Nicosia: CYREP.

Gibbons, H. (1997). The Genocide Files. London: Charles Bravos.

Glinkina, S., & Rosenburg, D. (2003). The Socioeconomic Roots of Conflict in the Caucasus. [Website,

accessed 2nd April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/214910810/135D843995B545B1970/1?acc

ountid=17193.

Goble, P. (2009). Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War. In S. Cornell, & S. Starr, The

Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War in Georgia (pp. 181-195). London: M.E. Sharpe.

Goltz, T. (2009). The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia's Descent into Chaos. In S. Cornell, & S.

Starr, The Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War With Georgia (pp. 10-27). London: M.E. Sharpe.

Halle, L. (1973). Does War Have a Future? Foreign Affairs - October Edition, Vol. 52.1 pp20-34.

Hayden, J. (1994). Poles Apart: Solidarity and the New Poland. London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd.

Hearn, J. (2006). Rethinking Nationalism - A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Heraclides, A. (1990). Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement. [Website, accessed 2nd April,

2012]: Available from:

http://journals.cambridge.org.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/action/displayFulltext?type=1&pdftype=1&fid=43

22932&jid=INO&volumeId=44&issueId=03&aid=4322924.

Hewitt, G. (2009). Abkhazia and Georgia: Time for a Reassessment. [Website, accessed 5th March


http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/219467587/fulltextPDF/13549DD0C7A666

B9CED/16?accountid=17193.

Hoare, M. (2007). Rejecting False Parallels: Why Kosovo is not South Ossetia (or Abkhasia or

Transnistria or Northern Cyprus). [Website] Available from:

http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=449: Accessed, 2nd February 2012.

Höglund, K., & Kovacs, M. (2010). Beyond the Absence of War: the Diversity of Peace in Post-Conflict

Societies. [Website, accessed 10th April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/204923017/13649AFD18C4C338BD0/7?ac

countid=17193.


Honigsbaum, M. (2009). Living With Enza - The Forgotten Story of Britain and the Great Flu Pandemic

of 1918. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

Horne, B. (2011). Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self-Determination and Foreign Influence.

[Website, accessed 17th March, 2012] : Available from:

http://dss.ucsd.edu/~bhorne/pdfs/paper3.pdf.

Horowitz, D. (2000). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. London: University of California Press, Ltd.

Human Rights Watch. (1995). Slaughter Among Neighbours - The Political Origins of Communal

Violence. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A.D. (ed.). (1994). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ICISS. (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre.

IIFFMCG. (2009). Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG)

- Report - Volume I. [Website, accessed 26th February, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf.

Illarionev, A. (2009). The Russian Leadership's Preperation for War, 1999-2008. In S. Cornell, & S.

Starr, The Guns of August 2008 - Russia's War in Georgia (pp. 49-84). London: M.E. Sharpe.

Interfax. (2009). Top Stories; Medvedev pays surprise visit to South Ossetia: Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Weekly (Jul 14th). [Website, accessed 20th April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/220903958/136470E56CF4AFB534F/7?acc

ountid=17193.

Interfax. (2012). Trouble Spots; Dzhioyeva Recalls Signature Under S.Ossetia Settlement Agreement.

[Website, accessed 3rd April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/919666571/135DD6CB5D85CAECFF4/1?ac

countid=17193.

Isaacs, H. (1975). Nationality: "End of the Road". Foreign Affairs - April Edition, Vol. 53.3 pp432-449.

James, L. (2005). The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. London: Abacus.

Janis, I. (1972). Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos.

Boston: Houghton & Mifflin.

Kaufman, S. (2001). Modern Hatreds - The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornel

University Press.

King, C. (2008). The Five Day War - Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis. Foreign Affairs - Vol.

87, No. 6 , 3-12.

Kinross, P. (1993). Atatürk - The Rebirth of a Nation. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Kinross, P. (2002). The Ottoman Centuries - The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. London:

Perennial.


Kissinger, H. (1979). The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

Kissinger, H. (2000). Foreward. In L. Yew, From Third World to First - The Singapore Story 1965-2000

(pp. ix-xi). New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Knaus, G. (2011). The Rise and Fall of Liberal Imperialism. In R. Stewart, & G. Knaus, Can Intervention

Work? (pp. 99-194). London: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd.

Latynina, Y. (2004). A Conflict That's Right Out of a Gogol Play. [Website, accessed 3rd April 2012]:

Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/467290028/135DD07AB054F28F864/10?ac

countid=17193.

Lederach, J., Neufeldt, R., & Culbertson, H. (2007). Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring,

and Learning Toolkit. Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre Dame.

Lewis, D. (2008). The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia. London: Hurst & Company.

Lonergan, S., & Brooks, D. (1994). Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Isreali Palestinian

Conflict. Ottowa: The International Development Research Centre.

Maiese, M. (2003). "Destructive Escalation." Beyond Intractability. Eds: Guy Burgess and Heidi

Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. [Website, accesed 12th

April 2012]: Available from: http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/escalation.

Maslow, A. (1970). Motivation and Personality - Third Edition. New York: Harper Collins Publishes

Inc.

Mayall, J. (1993). Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mertus, J. (2001). Legitimizing the Use of Force in Kosovo. [Website, accessed 20th April 2012]:

Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/200512054/fulltextPDF/13634829B03E1A6

C93/23?accountid=17193.

Mickley, L. (2007). A Future Short on Breath? Possible Effects of Climate Change on Smog. [Website,

accessed 12th April, 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/224024363/fulltext/136518ABFE2572FC48

3/3?accountid=17193.

Mileham, P (ed.). (2004). War and Morality. London: RUSI.

Mocktaitis, T. (1990). British Counterinsurgency 1919-1960. London: Macmillan, in association with

King's College, London.

Moran, M. (1999). Sovereignty Divided: Essays on the International Dimensions of the Cyprus

Problem. Nicosia: CYREP.


Nagl, J. (2007). The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Feild Manual 3-24,

Counterinsurgency. In USDA, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Feild Manual - The

University of Chicago Press Edition (pp. xiii-xx). London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. .

NATO. (2012). NATO - Topic: Member Countries. [Website, accessed 17th April, 2012]: Available

from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm#About.

Öcal, M., & Çelenk, A. (2010). Making of a New State in the Balkans. [Website, accessed 10th March,


http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/763269795/fulltextPDF/13634DFBF6B76BE

16FC/7?accountid=17193.

Öktem, K. (2011). Angry Nation - Turkey Since 1989. London: Zed Books Ltd. .

Orr, C. (1972). Cyprus Under British Rule. London: Zeno Publishers.

Oxford Analytica. (2011). South Ossetia's Vote Fails to Follow Script. [Website, accessed 3rd April


http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/905217491/fulltext/135DCF3A57B74B4FB7

4/9?accountid=17193.

Parodi, C. (2002). The Politics of South American Boundaries. Westport (Connecticut): Greenwood

Publishing Group Inc.

Patroclos, [No Initials] (2012). Tales From the Coffeeshop: Fresh Lunacy in Short Supply - Cyprus Mail,

March 11th. [Website, accessed March 17th, 2012]: Available: http://www.cyprus-

mail.com/president-demetris-christofias/tales-coffeeshop-fresh-lunacy-short-supply/20120311.

Payton, J. (2006). Ottoman Millet, Religeous Nationalism, and Civil Society: Focus on Kosovo.

[Website, accessed 21 February, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.tristeza.org/download/20232269.pdf.

Petro, N. (2009). The Russia - Georgia War: Causes and Consequences. [Website, accessed 2nd April,


http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/211505008/fulltextPDF/135D854BCE844A

080BB/9?accountid=17193.

Pouligny, B. (2004). Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions and Local People. London:

Hurst & Co. in association with the Centre D'études et de Recherches Internationales.

Poulton, H. (1991). The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict. London: Minority Rights Group.

Power, S. (2002). "A Problem From Hell" - America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books.

Psyllides, G. (2012). Deputy Defamed Former Minster, Supreme Court Rules - Cyprus Mail, January

26th. [Website, accessed 26th March, 2012]: Available from: http://www.cyprus-

mail.com/crime/deputy-defamed-former-minister-supreme-court-rules/20120126.

Reitan, R. (2000). Strategic Non-Violence in Kosovo. Peace and Change - A Journal of Peace Research

- Janurary Edition , pp70-101.


Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012). High Commission of the Republic of Cyprus in

London - Cyprus Question. [Website, accessed April 15th, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/highcom/highcom_london.nsf/9405baa5ab3b1ea9c22570bc003e5634/

21c6c9a45d1b3a49c22570bc00519db0?OpenDocument.

Richmond, O. (1998). Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations. London:

Frank Cass.

Rogers, P. (2010). Losing Control - Global Security in the Twenty-First Century - 3rd Edition. London:

Pluto Press.

Rosenbaum, A. (ed.) (1996). Is the Holocaust Unique? - Perpsectives on Comparative Genocide.

Oxford: Westview Press Inc.

Russia Today. (2008). South Ossetia Conflict: The Legacy. [Online video, accessed 4th April, 2012]:

Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ky6EmOhIUMg&feature=fvst.

Schaffer, M. (2008). The Great Gas Pipeline Game: Monopolistic Expansion of Russia’s Gazprom into

European Markets. [Website, accessed 17th April 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/224180711/fulltextPDF/136274C68E5331A

609A/5?accountid=17193.

Sen, A. (2001). Development As Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sestanovich, S. (2008). What Has Moscow Done? Foreign Affairs - Vol. 87.6, pp12-28 .

Sharpe, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy. London: Profile Books Ltd.

Smith, A. (2001). Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smith, D. (2009). The Saakashvili Administration's Reaction to Russian Policies. In S. &. Cornell, The

Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (pp. 122-142). London: M.E. Sharpe.

Smith, R. (2006). The Utility of Force - The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin Books

Ltd.

Solana, J. (1999). NATO's Success in Kosovo. Foreign Affairs - November/December , Vol. 78.6,

pp114-120.

Stewart, R., & Knaus, G. (2011). Can Intervention Work? London: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd.

Taleb, N. (2010). The Black Swan - The Impact of the Highly Improbable. London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Tamkoç, M. (1988). The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right to Self-determination.

London: K. Rustem & Brother.

Tsygankov, A. (2009). Blaming Rusia: The Power of the Anti-Russia Lobby. [Website, accessed, 5th

April 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/211505213/fulltextPDF/135E7BD234120EE

C677/14?accountid=17193.


UN. (2008). 5953rd Meeting of the United Nations Security Council - Official Record. [Website,

accessed 6th April, 2012]: Available from: http://daccess-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N08/455/78/PDF/N0845578.pdf?OpenElement.

UN. (2012a). Charter of the United Nations. [Website, accessed, 7th April, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

UN. (2012b). The United Nations at a Glance. [Website, accessed 12th February, 2012]: Available

from: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml.

UN. (2012c). Permanent Observers - Non-Member States and Entities. [Website, accessed 20th

February, 2012]: Available from: http://www.un.org/en/members/nonmembers.shtml.

UN General Assembly. (2005). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights

For All - Report of the Secretary General - 21st March, 2005, A/59/2005. [Website: Accessed 6th

February, 2012]: Available from:

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005_En.pdf.

UN News Centre. (2011). UN Welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State. [Website, accessed

April 10th, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39034&Cr=South+Sudan&Cr1=.

UN General Assembly. (2009). Implementing the Responsibility to Protect : Report of the Secretary-

General, 12 January 2009, A/63/677. [Website, Accessed 6th February, 2012]: Available from:

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4989924d2.pdf.

United Nations Office of Public Information. (1974). Record of the Month - June 1974. UN Monthly

Chronical - Vol. 11, No. 7 , 3-10.

United Nations Office of Public Information. (1975). Yearbook of the United Nations 1974, Vol 28.

New York: UNOPI.

USDA. (2007). The US Army - Marine Corps - Counterinsurgency Field Manual. London: The University

of Chicago Press Ltd.

Vorka, I. (2009). Ethno-Politics, Ethnic-Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An Examination on the Case

of Cyprus From 1571 Until 1974 [MA Dissertation]. Bradford: University of Bradford.

Wilson, G. (2009). Self-Determination, Recognition, and the Problem of Kosovo. [Website, accessed

12th March 2012]: Available from:

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/220404306/fulltextPDF/1363195B0E41D1

A2D0B/5?accountid=17193.

Young, J. (1993). The Longman Companion to Cold War and Detente 1941-91. London: Longman.

Zanotti, J. (2011). Turkey - US Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges . [Website, accessed

17th April]: Available form: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41761.pdf.

Zaum, D. (2007). The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Military Intervention: Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia

Documents