Migration Scoping Report - New Zealand Red Cross

Migration Scoping ReportIdentifying current and emerging issues in key migrant population groups in New Zealand

MAY 2021

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FRONT COVER: Manahel Haroura, a single mother who fled the war in Syria with her three young children. After living in Lebanon for nearly two years, she and her kids settled in Dunedin where, with the help of New Zealand Red Cross, she took on a job as a machinist — her first job ever — to provide for her family.© New Zealand Red Cross

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ContentsIntroduction 4

Executive Summary 6

Acknowledgements 8

Part one: Migration Categories

1. Refugee family support category (RFSC) 11

1.1 The international context 12

1.2 New Zealand context 13

1.3 Legal basis for RFSC in New Zealand 14

1.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to RFSC 15

1.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to RFSC 16

1.6 What are the needs and gaps? 17

2. Asylum seekers and convention refugees 19

2.1 The international context 20

2.2 New Zealand context 21

2.3 Legal basis for asylum seekers and convention refugees in New Zealand 23

2.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to asylum seekers and convention refugees in New Zealand 25

2.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to asylum seekers and convention refugees 26

2.6 What are the needs and gaps? 28

3. Refugee settlement 313.1 The international context 32

3.2 New Zealand context 33

3.3 Legal basis for refugee settlement 36

3.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to refugee settlement 37

3.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to refugee settlement 38

3.6 What are the needs and gaps? 39

4. Australian returnees 414.1 The international context 41

4.2 New Zealand context 42

4.3 Legal basis for Australian returnees in New Zealand 43

4.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to Australian returnees 44

4.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to Australian returnees 44

4.6 What are the needs and gaps? 46

5. Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme 47

5.1 The international context 47

5.2 New Zealand context 48

5.3 Legal basis for RSE 50

5.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to RSE 51

5.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to RSE 52

5.6 What are the needs and gaps? 53

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6. International and non-resident students 56

6.1 The international context 56

6.2 New Zealand context 57

6.3 Legal basis for international students in New Zealand 58

6.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to international students 59

6.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to international students 60

6.6 What are the needs and gaps? 61

7. Temporary migrant workers 637.1 The international context 64

7.2 New Zealand context 64

7.3 Legal basis for temporary migrant workers 66

7.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to temporary migrant workers 67

7.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to temporary migrant workers 68

7.6 What are the needs and gaps? 70

8. People without valid visas 728.1 The international context 73

8.2 New Zealand context 74

8.3 Legal issues for people without a valid visa 76

8.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to people without a valid visa 77

8.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to people without a valid visa 78

8.6 What are the needs and gaps? 78

Part two: Emerging Issues

9. Mobility, Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate 81

9.1 The international context 82

9.2 New Zealand context 83

9.3 Legal basis for environmental and climate migrants 84

9.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to environmental and climate migrants 86

9.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to environmental and climate migrants 87

9.6 What are the needs and gaps? 89

10. Trafficking and modern slavery 9110.1 The international context 92

10.2 New Zealand context 93

10.3 Legal basis for combating human trafficking and modern slavery 94

10.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to trafficking and modern slavery 96

10.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to trafficking and modern slavery 97

10.6 What are the needs and gaps? 98

11. Migrants in emergencies and disasters 100

11.1 The international context 101

11.2 New Zealand context 101

11.3 Legal issues for migrants in disasters and emergencies 104

11.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to migrants in disasters and emergencies 105

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11.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to migrants in disasters and emergencies 107

11.6 What are the needs and gaps? 108

12. Public perceptions of migrants and refugees 109

12.1 The international context 110

12.2 New Zealand context 112

12.3 Legal issues for public perception of migrants and refugees 114

12.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to public perception of migrants 115

12.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to public perception of migrants 116

12.6 What are the needs and gaps? 119

13. Additional categories and issues 120

13.1 Categories 120

13.2 Emerging Issues 121

Glossary 122

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Introduction

© New Zealand Red Cross

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INTRODUCTION

Working with and for vulnerable migrants, particularly those who have fled conflict or disaster, is one of the long-standing traditions of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Individually and together, the National Societies strive to provide assistance and protection, uphold rights and dignity, empower people in their search for opportunities and sustainable solutions, as well as promote social inclusion and interaction between migrants and host communities.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Global Strategy on Migration 2018–2022 focuses on reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience, which reflects that this is not just about meeting humanitarian needs and mitigating risk, but also supporting the resilience of migrants by integrating assistance, protection and advocacy.

The Migration Programme is one of New Zealand Red Cross’s three core service areas in Strategy 2030. The strategy notes:

We will address the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants by supporting them to achieve their aspirations and become part of diverse, inclusive and resilient Aotearoa New Zealand communities.

Refugee settlement has been the main migration focus for New Zealand Red Cross since integrating Refugee Services Aotearoa (in 2012) and Refugee Trauma Recovery (in 2017). However, strategic approaches have largely been driven by government contracts for settlement, limiting New Zealand Red Cross’s independent response to service. The purpose of the Migration Scoping Report is to gain an understanding of the current and emerging needs of migrants in the New Zealand community and to inform the organisation when considering future strategic directions.

Strategy 2030 presents an exciting opportunity to consider how New Zealand Red Cross can make an impact through our unique contribution to the lives of vulnerable migrants. The development of a Migration Strategy 2021–2025 is currently underway, informed by this report.

This report also serves as a valuable resource – both internally and externally – for those wanting to understand and engage with the relevant issues facing those new to New Zealand. Some sections, such as that on how vulnerable migrants are supported in a disaster, can immediately be used to improve existing service delivery.

The scoping report was undertaken as a desktop exercise and we acknowledge that further research, community engagement and consultation would need to occur for some of the areas if future activities were being considered.

It bears repeating that some of the existing analysis, reporting and research on these areas has been condensed or left out due to limitations of the large scope of the overview and the need for a concise report. The authors welcome feedback on areas of emerging and existing migration concern.

After the initial research for this project was completed, the global COVID-19 pandemic arrived, leading to increased challenges for service providers.1 Priorities of government and other entities involved in migration are likely to have shifted, especially in the short to medium term, because of the pandemic.

1 We have attempted to include as much up to date information on how COVID-19 has affected each migration category and issue. A useful starting point for how service providers have faced this pandemic can be found in Mortensen, A. (2020). RASNZ COVID-19 Response study: Remote psychosocial service provision to former refugee and asylum seeker communities in Auckland during lockdown. Paper presented for Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (RASNZ). August. https://rasnz.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/RASNZ-COVID-19-Response-Study-2020.pdf

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The Migration Scoping Report presents a broad overview of migration in New Zealand in 2021 through a humanitarian lens. New Zealand Red Cross Migration Programmes has created these in-depth analyses across eight migration categories and four emerging issues, to inform the organisation as it considers how it aligns the programme’s activities with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement and how this fits with the implementation of Strategy 2030.

Executive Summary

The principle of humanity reflects the Movement’s aim to prevent and alleviate human suffering, wherever it may be found. As such, the categories and issues considered in this report tend to focus on areas where the migration status of an individual may lead to unmet basic humanitarian needs, discrimination, exploitation, a lack of connection to community or other situations where access to basic and guaranteed standards falls short.

Across all categories of migration, New Zealand Red Cross is best versed in and most experienced at refugee settlement (see section three). It has a long history of supporting refugees, stretching back to the arrival of the Polish children in 1944 and continuing today with the organisation contracted, in late 2012, as the primary provider of settlement support to refugees who have settled in New Zealand. In reading this report, it is useful to understand refugee settlement core competency, and how some migration categories and issues are particularly closely linked to this work, for example, the Refugee Family Support Category (section one) and Asylum Seekers and Convention Refugees (section two).

Each section in the Migration Scoping Report works through a common formula. The current International and New Zealand contexts are summarised as best they can be in the limited space available before the category is linked

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

to a legal basis or context. The next part places each issue in relation to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, before an environment scan signals which other groups are already working in this area and where gaps exist in service provision. A provisional version of this report was presented to the New Zealand Red Cross National Board in February 2021, alongside recommendations on areas that could expand the focus of Migration Programmes.

Gaps identified in the scoping report point to significant areas of humanitarian concern across a wide range of migration areas and across themes such as social isolation, a lack of resourcing for assistance and the compounded challenges also faced by the general population around housing, education, language (including translation) and healthcare. Some areas have seen concerted research and advocacy from other organisations in recent years, such as trafficking and modern slavery. Other areas, such as Australian returnees, are deeply concerning to New Zealand Red Cross, but are not a natural fit with the skills that exist within the organisation.

Some issues closely align to the skills and humanitarian focus of New Zealand Red Cross but remain in flux at the time of publication. A review of the Refugee Family Support Category led to significant allocations in Budget 2020, but these allocations have not yet been assigned. Many categories came to New Zealand Red Cross attention for the first time through the organisation’s work with the Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri support for foreign nationals during COVID-19. For example, there were concerns that people who are in New Zealand without a valid visa, for whatever reason, might not access healthcare or would become increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. Other areas are more amorphous but closely align to the movement’s international goals around the safety of environmental and climate refugees and migrants in emergencies and disasters. These areas offer some of the strongest opportunities to work across all pillars of New Zealand Red Cross.

Two areas have been chosen for further research in the coming year: (1) asylum seekers and convention refugees, and (2) the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme. One key concern that fits with New Zealand Red Cross expertise is a lack of consistent access to services,

including work and education, for asylum seekers and convention refugees. These shortcomings are most acute in the years between when asylum seekers arrive and when their claims for protection are accepted. At the same time, while there are only a small number of cases of asylum seekers being detained in prison, these situations are sufficiently acute that they deserve attention.

The RSE scheme has had a lot of attention when it comes to the needs of New Zealand employers, but there has been less focus on the thousands of Pacific islands workers who were stuck in the country over winter 2020 and separated from their families. The scheme offers numerous challenges around social isolation, pastoral care and equity of outcomes. Specific challenges include those highlighted in the media relating to cases of exploitation and potential corruption, as well as a general view that the benefits of the scheme disproportionately favour employers and New Zealand.

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This report was commissioned by New Zealand Red Cross’s National Board in 2018 and was undertaken by the National Migration team.

We want to acknowledge the invaluable contributions to this report from Emily Menkes, Sue Elliott, Emma Groombridge, Miriam Bugden, Nicola Sutton, Rachel Lutz as well as Australian Red Cross (on human trafficking), the International Students Association of New Zealand (on international students), Professor Richard Bedford and Dr Charlotte Bedford (on RSE workers), Tim Maurice from the Asylum Seeker Support Trust (on asylum seekers), Marieke Jasperse (on refugee settlement), Eliana Rubashkyn (on LGBTQI+ asylum seekers and refugees), Ezekiel Simperingham (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or IFRC), Associate Professor Vivienne Anderson (on International Students) and a wide range of New Zealand Red Cross employees covering every area of operations.

We would also like to acknowledge the significant contribution from Dr Murdoch Stephens on this project while working for New Zealand Red Cross. Dr Stephens brought his knowledge and expertise in the sector to contribute to many of the sections and undertook editing of the whole report. Our thanks, also, to Johanna Knox for copy-editing the final document and MakeReady for design expertise.

Acknowledgements

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

June 25, 2018. Kutupalong, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. A child carries firewood in Kutupalong—a camp and temporary home for displaced families in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.

© Brad Zerivitz/Am

erican Red Cross

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As a young adult, Sahra Ahmed stepped off a plane in Auckland to claim asylum. Now she is a nurse, international humanitarian aid worker and mental health advocate. She was profile as part of our #KiwiLengends campaign in 2018, alongside other former refugees who are playing an important role in the community.

© N

ew Zealand Red Cross

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1. REFUGEE FAMILY SUPPORT CATEGORY

Migration Categories

1. Refugee family support category (RFSC)Three hundred refugees can enter New Zealand each year through the RFSC, with this scheduled to double in July 2021. These places are in addition to the 1,500 places available through the annual refugee quota. In the 2020 budget, the government announced that the RFSC would increase to 600 people per year from 2021/22. The budget also featured an allocation of $22 million over three years – the first support ever given to RFSC migrants – to defray the costs of applying for the category and moving to New Zealand.

The objective of the RFSC is to facilitate the successful settlement of refugees who are resident in New Zealand by providing them with an opportunity to sponsor family members, who – with the exception of places with the annual refugee resettlement quota – do not usually qualify for residence under any other category of government residence policy.

The RFSC requires refugees to sponsor family members to arrive. Sponsoring means that the government does not provide any specific support for their settlement. The families of those sponsored are responsible for their settlement and consequently they often miss assistance and, at times, the protection they require.

Refugee-background communities and providers in the refugee settlement sector have long raised concern that there is no settlement support provided to this group. The pressures placed on the sponsor family are often significant. External groups have raised concerns that New Zealand Red Cross is effectively discriminating against this group by only providing support to quota refugees and not RFSC arrivals. In response to these concerns, a pilot programme was established in Wellington with evaluations showing significantly improved settlement outcomes with New Zealand Red Cross involvement.

In providing support to former refugees to settle, the single greatest area of concern is the well-being of their families who are overseas or who may be

In this part of the report, we consider a wide range of migration categories based on their visa type (e.g., RSE worker) or migration status (e.g., asylum seeker). These selections have been made based on the existing or potential vulnerability of those under these categories, with much less focus on areas with fewer humanitarian concerns.

Part one

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for a visa to join families.7 Australia offers the chance for families to be reunited through the offshore humanitarian part of their settlement programme, however, there are significant problems: the cost of the visa for this programme is excessively high and the wait times are long; family is narrowly defined; and no-one who arrives by boat can reunite with their families through this measure.8 In conjunction with the International Organisation on Migration (IOM), families entering under the Special Humanitarian Programme Visa are eligible for a loan of 75 per cent of the costs of airfares.9

In 2015, New Zealand Red Cross undertook a scoping exercise of the Australian NGO-led travel loan scheme. This research evolved out of an opportunity for New Zealand Red Cross to distribute an amount of money though a loan scheme to support refugees to arrive in New Zealand. The decision was to not progress with this opportunity.

The USA also has a range of family reunification systems, including the I-730 for spouses and children under the age of 21. Refugees can also lodge a claim for priority “P-3” resettlement through the annual quota for certain people from select countries, though this is currently suspended and is subject to claims about fraud.10 When the system reopens, it may require DNA testing.11 In Canada, there are two main options: first, the one-year window programme, where a person identified within one year of a refugee entering the country, and who is a spouse or a child under 19 years old, is eligible for entry; second, due to the naming aspect of the community sponsorship scheme, a family member, or friend, or any relation, can be sponsored if they’re in a refugee or refugee-like situation.12

7 British Red Cross (2020). Torn Apart. https://www.redcross.org.uk/-/media/documents/about-us/report-how-reuniting-families-can-provide-solutions-to-the-refugee-crisis.pdf

8 Refugee Council of Australia (2019). Family Reunion Issues for Refugees. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Family-Reunion-Issues-for-Refugees-2019.docx

9 International Organisation for Migration (2020). Services for Global Special Humanitarian Visa (Subclass 202) holders. https://australia.iom.int/travel-assistance; there are concessional airfares and increased baggage allowances for both Australian and New Zealand for new migrants who are either family, humanitarian or skilled migrants.

10 United Nations High Commissioner for (2020). US Family Reunification. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/us-family-reunification.html

11 Worth, K. (2015). For Some Refugees, Safe Haven Now Depends on a DNA Test. Frontline: PBS. 19 October. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/for-some-refugees-safe-haven-now-depends-on-a-dna-test

12 Canadian Council for Refugees (n.d.). Family reunification. https://ccrweb.ca/en/psr-toolkit/other-useful-info-family-reunification

missing. In 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) put new emphasis on the importance of missing family members, especially on knowing what has happened to those who are missing and facilitating reconnections.2 These recommendations – drawing from the Geneva Convention and supplemental resolution of the ICRC – state that it is the role of the ICRC and the Central Agency to “facilitate and organize family reunifications”.3

1.1 The international contextFamily unity is a fundamental principle of international law.4 For refugees, this unification is a legal principle and an essential framework of protection. According to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), although the right to seek and enjoy asylum in another country is an individual human right, the individual refugee should not be seen in isolation from his or her family.5

Resettlement countries often strictly apply a narrow family definition, comprising only the father, mother and minor children, which results in limited family reunification, leaving other family members in their country of origin, often in insecure conditions. This limit serves to split families, rather than reunite them.6

The British Red Cross has just released Torn Apart, an overview of the challenges facing family reunification in the United Kingdom. Among the primary concerns were the challenges of accessing a Visa Application Centre to safely apply

2 International Committee of the Red Cross (2003). The Missing and their families: summary of the Conclusions arising from Events held prior to the International Conference of Governmental and Non Governmental Experts (19–21 February 2003). International Committee of the Red Cross Report. 21 February. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/themissing_conf_03.2003_en_90.pdf

3 Ibid.4 Jastram, K. & Newland, K. (2003). Family unity and refugee

protection. In Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, Feller, E., Türk, V., & Nicholson, F. (eds).

5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1999). Protecting Refugees: a field guide for NGOs. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c03682d4.html

6 Nicholson, F. (2018). The ‘Essential Right’ to Family Unity of Refugees and Others in Need of International Protection in the Context of Family Reunification. UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series.

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1. REFUGEE FAMILY SUPPORT CATEGORY

1.2 New Zealand contextReuniting with family members is widely recognised as an important contributor to the well-being of refugees who have already made their home in New Zealand. A Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) study from 2004 stated, “For many, reunification is of primary importance, and the task of sponsoring family was seen to be both difficult and costly”.13 The importance of an effective and fair family reunification system cannot be overstated for achieving settlement outcomes for both quota refugees as well as those actually welcomed through this Refugee Family Support Resident Visa.14 But beyond the actual work of bringing family members to the country, there are concerns that there is not sufficient settlement support for RFSC entrants and that the burden (including costs of flights and settlement) continues to sit on sponsors who are often still, themselves, in the process of settling.

In response to long-term advocacy from community groups, including organisations representing refugee-background people, New Zealand Red Cross has been trialling support for RFSC refugees in Wellington since 2016. There had been some public facing conversations that suggested that, by not offering support to refugees coming in this category, New Zealand Red Cross may have been discriminating based on visa status. Letters were also written to New Zealand Red Cross’s National Board outlining this concern. The trialled support was based on the idea that people coming through the RFSC are a humanitarian intake and should be afforded the same professional care as quota refugees. Programme evaluations pointed to significant improvements in outcomes for both the RFSC arrivals and the sponsors who have welcomed them. The evaluation – comparing pilot sponsors with non-pilot sponsors – noted that, without this support, sponsors often abandon their own work or study to offer full-time assistance to new family

13 Dunstan, S., Dibley, R. & Shorland, P. (2004). Refugee voices: A journey towards resettlement. In Social Policy, Research and Evaluation Conference. Wellington: New Zealand Immigration Service.

14 Immigration New Zealand (2021). Information about: Refugee Family Support Resident Visa. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/refugee-family-support-resident-visa

members. For many of these cases, an expedited three-month process alongside sponsor support (compared to the normal six-month quota refugee Pathways to Settlement programme) was offered and deemed to be sufficient, when combined with the sponsor’s own support.

One of the most engaged groups in facilitating family reunification is the Wellington-based Refugee Family Reunification Trust (RFRT). Established in 2001, RFRT has raised $2.26 million to help pay for airfares, medical tests and other costs associated with reuniting families.15 They have reunited nearly 300 families and assisted in over 800 applications for help.16 The RFRT has also played a significant guiding role in setting up other family reunification trusts, has assisted people outside of the Wellington region when no local provider could, and were instrumental in advocating for New Zealand Red Cross to establish settlement support in Wellington. Other trusts exist in Auckland, Hamilton and Palmerston North. In Christchurch, the Canterbury Refugee Centre provides practical settlement support for RFSC.

In 2016, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) reported on the question of refugee resettlement, including family reunification. It found that “[t]he reality of wider family interdependence needs to be acknowledged” and recommended “a generous, culturally sensitive and flexible definition of family should be applied”.17

In 2019, the Green Party successfully lobbied for a review of the RFSC and reunification programme18 which led to the increase in numbers and the establishment of funds. At this point, it is not yet clear how the Budget 2020 funds will be allocated, though the specific wording in the budget noted: “his initiative provides funding to review and provide support to the system for refugee family reunification.”19 New Zealand Red

15 Wellington Refugee Family Reunification Trust (2019). Two Million Dollars for Refugees. https://refugeefamilyreunificationtrust.org.nz/2019/07/10/two-million-dollars-for-refugees

16 Wellington Refugee Family Reunification Trust (2020). Refugee Family Reunification Trust Newsletter 2020/2021.

17 Human Rights Commission (2016). New Zealand Refugee Resettlement: Fulfilling its obligations as a good international citizen. New Zealand Refugee Resettlement. https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/7414/5669/3524/2016_Quota_Review_-_HRC_.pdf

18 Devlin, C. (2019). Greens’ family reunification policy review seeks more settlement funding. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/113621757/government-review-of-family-reunification-for-refugees-to-begin

19 Treasury (2020). Wellbeing Budget 2020: Annex Budget Initiatives, Labour Market. https://budget.govt.nz/budget/2020/wellbeing/annex/initiatives-labmar.htm

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Cross has provided written recommendations to Immigration New Zealand on best practice for supporting this group with the increased funding.

COVID-19 halted the increase to the RFSC category and meant that only three cases of refugee family reunification were offered, as part of emergency places in the quota, in the 2020/21 year.20

1.3 Legal basis for RFSC in New ZealandThe integrity of the family is protected under international law and customs. For example, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour or reputation.21 Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Consistent with this principle, Immigration New Zealand introduced the RFSC in 2007, to improve how extended family members of refugees in New Zealand can access Permanent Residence.22 This policy reflects the difficulty faced by family members of refugees to meet the eligibility requirements of normal immigration policy.23 The establishment of the RFSC in 2007 replaced the Refugee Family Quota ballot where, every year, 300 people would be selected from a “lottery” process.24 This ballot had replaced the much broader Humanitarian Category, leading the Human Rights Commission to note, in 2010, that the previous decade had

20 Walls, J. (2021). Govt restarts its refugee resettlement programme after Covid-19 shutdown. New Zealand Herald. 5 February. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/govt-restarts-its-refugee-resettlement-programme-after-covid-19-shutdown/YJ5W5WTHNFLF26ES33PRRMB3FA

21 See Starr, S. & Brilmayer, L. (2003). Family Separation as a Violation of International Law. Berkeley Journal of International Law. 21. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3442&context=fss_papers

22 Gruner, A. (2007). New Zealand’s refugee sector: Perspectives and developments, 1987–2010. Department of Labour.

23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: Country Chapter: New Zealand.

24 Wellington Community Law (2011). A guide to refugee family reunification in New Zealand: assisting refugee families through the immigration process. https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/40806157/a-guide-to-refugee-family-reunification-in-new-community-law

seen a reduction in avenues for reunification and increased requirements on families as sponsors.25

RFSC sponsors must register as either a tier one or tier two sponsor before their family members can be invited to apply for a New Zealand resident visa. Refugees may sponsor “immediate family”, defined as their “spouse and dependent children” provided that these individuals were declared during the refugee’s initial offshore interview with Immigration New Zealand.26

Tier one sponsors, who have no other family in New Zealand, are given first access to available places. Given the number of registrants for tier one, tier two is rarely opened and, when it does open, is usually closed again after a few days – in the most recent case it was only open for three days. Registrations are selected from the tier one queue in the order they are entered into the system. If there are remaining places after all tier one registrations have been selected, registrations from the tier two queue are selected. In the 2020/21 year,27 Immigration New Zealand has continued issuing Invitations to Apply to 24 people in tier one and 44 people in tier two. As the RFSC programme was suspended due to COVID-19, there have been no residence visas issued in this period.28

The application process is challenging, and almost all people require support – primarily from immigration lawyers or Community Law, though some local Members of Parliament also do a significant amount of work – to fill out the applications. Established refugee communities are more likely to have experience and knowledge to help new arrivals with the process; smaller communities or isolated individuals find this process difficult. Community Law notes that there is significant advocacy needed over numerous years for an application to proceed through this system. These considerations were of particular note for MBIE when considering how to allocate

25 Human Rights Commission (2010). Rights of Refugees. Human Rights in New Zealand. 337–349. https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/3914/2388/0522/HRNZ_10_rights_of_refugees.pdf

26 Immigration New Zealand (2016). Operational Manual. Wellington, S4.20. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/#35439.htm

27 The year-on-year measurement for Immigration New Zealand runs from 1 July to 30 June. Where a split year is referred to in this document, for example 2018/19, this means 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019.

28 Immigration New Zealand (2020). Refugee and Protection Unit Statistics Pack. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/statistics-refugee-and-protection.pdf

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support for RFSC applicants after the 2020 Budget allocation.29

Once an invitation to apply has been issued, a residence application must be lodged within 12 months. Lodging the residence application and getting it approved can be a fraught process, particularly as applicants need to provide an acceptable housing plan. Numerous advocates noted that the housing plan is the biggest hurdle and is where the processing of our applications stall.

But even submitting the residence application can be difficult, as refugees are required to obtain identity documents, birth and marriage certificates and police checks. This can be particularly challenging for those living in refugee camps. Just collating all the evidence required to lodge a residence application can be overwhelming for many of our clients.

The largest barrier is the accommodation plan that places significant costs prior to family arriving. In the recent years, RFRT has put forward $100,000 to fund 24 refugee families exclusively towards rent and bond for their family on arrival. This funding is held by a trust until each family arrives. Other issues include the costs of health checks, flights and application fees. Submitting the residence application can be difficult as refugees are required to obtain original identity documents, birth and marriage certificates and police checks and then have them translated and couriered to New Zealand. This can be particularly challenging for those living in refugee camps. Advocates note that collating all the evidence required to lodge a residence application can be overwhelming for many clients and many people incur debt to reunite with family. There have been instances where this debt has been passed on to the new arrivals, particularly where a family breakdown has occurred.

According to an Official Information Act (OIA) request in February 2019, there were 1,165 applicants for tier two sponsorship who had not yet been invited to apply. In recent years, the number of applicants invited to apply has been roughly split between the two tiers, though with often twice as many invitations to apply made for

29 New Zealand Treasury (2020). New Spending Initiative Summary: Improving the system for refugee family reunification.

tier two and half as many places offered.30 The challenges of family reunification are consistently cited as a stress and concern for representatives from the resettled refugee communities.31

1.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to RFSCAll Red Cross National Societies prioritise the reconnection of asylum seekers and refugees to their family, as well as facilitating family reunification through practical assistance. The Red Cross Red Crescent Working Group on Family Reunification was established by the Red Cross European Union Office in 2018 as a tool to unify good practice on working with states to reunite families.32 This Working Group was one of the key submissions of the Red Cross European Union office to the Global Compact on Refugees. This work seeks to put the right to family at the centre of international discussions and best practice on integrating refugees into all societies.

A new report from Red Cross European Union describes the wide range of European Red Cross National Societies work across multiple streams that contribute to refugee family reunification. This support straddles advocacy and assistance, with support being as simple as providing information and referrals. At the more complex end of the spectrum, many National Societies offer litigation assistance, integration support

30 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019). Response to an Official Information Act request. https://fyi.org.nz/request/9605-numbers-in-the-queue-for-refugee-family-support-tier-2

31 Department of Labour (2004). Refugee Voices: A Journey Towards Resettlement. June. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/2752-refugee-voices-executive-summary-pdf; Choummanivong, C., GE Poole & A Cooper (2014). Refugee family reunification and mental health in resettlement. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 9:2, 89–100.

32 UNHCR (2019). RCRC Working Group on Family Reunification (FRWG). Global Compact on Refugees. https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/rcrc-working-group-family-reunification-frwg

1. REFUGEE FAMILY SUPPORT CATEGORY

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and cross-border liaising with a range of external organisations.33

A baseline, key mechanism for reuniting families is the Restoring Family Links programme utilising all three components of the movement.34 For example, the British Red Cross helps both in identifying where missing family members are and then in collecting the necessary documentation for reunification to occur. Similarly, the French Red Cross takes a holistic approach that includes everything the British do, but also going as far as to organise embassy appointments in the countries where family members are located.35 The focus on family has existed within the movement since 1859, with the protections now enshrined in the Geneva Convention and their additional protocols.36

Since 2016, New Zealand Red Cross’s Wellington team has provided a basic support programme to RFSC arrivals, paid from general funds ($30k). This work has involved collaboration with: Refugee Family Reunification Trust, Community Law (Wellington and Hutt Valley), and Catholic Social Services. At a basic level, New Zealand Red Cross staff are well placed to offer support across all settlement locations due to the similarities of this programme with that undertaken by quota refugees. New Zealand Red Cross support includes training and placing volunteers with newly arrived families and providing some basic casework assessments and referrals.

The success of the Wellington programme is due to establishing processes and relationships with each agency and the ability to use New Zealand Red Cross volunteers to provide practical assistance. Internal evaluations of this programme pointed to significant improvements in outcomes, not only for RFSC arrivals but for the sponsors who have welcomed them. External evaluations comparing pilot sponsors with non-pilot sponsors noted that, without this support,

33 European National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2021). PERCO handbook on Safe Avenues to access protection across Europe. Platform for Red Cross and Red Crescent European Cooperation on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants. Forthcoming. See: https://www.ifrc.org/perco

34 International Committee of the Red Cross (2020). Restoring Family Links Families Belong Together. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4435-restoring-family-links-families-belong-together

35 Red Cross European Union (n.d.). Bringing families together. https://redcross.eu/projects/bringing-families-together

36 International Committee of the Red Cross (2021). Restoring Family Links About Us. https://familylinks.icrc.org/en/Pages/AboutUs/About-us.aspx

sponsors often abandon their own work or study to offer full-time assistance to new family members. For many of these cases, an expedited three-month process alongside sponsor support (compared to the normal six-month quota refugee Pathways to Settlement programme) felt adequate.

While families of refugees settle all over New Zealand, New Zealand Red Cross only provides coordinated, specialised assistance in Wellington. In all other settlement locations, New Zealand Red Cross staff refer families to local NGOs, but, even when those referrals are made, there are significant challenges due to a lack of specialised knowledge and support such as interpreting services.

1.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to RFSCGovernmentImmigration New Zealand (a unit within MBIE) is the government agency responsible for administering the RFSC. As noted above, the Budget 202037 changes came about as a condition of the Green Party confidence and supply arrangement with Labour, agreed to in 2017. The Human Rights Commission is also active in this space, with public recommendations that a more flexible and culturally sensitive definition of family needs to be applied to the policy.38

NGOsRFSC is supported by different non-government agencies, which vary according to location. For example, in Wellington, the Refugee Family Reunification Trust (RFRT) works closely with other refugee agencies including New Zealand Red Cross (which includes mental health support through Refugee Trauma Recovery), English Language Partners, Community Law, and

37 Treasury (2020). Wellbeing Budget 2020 Annex. https://budget.govt.nz/budget/2020/wellbeing/annex/initiatives-labmar.htm

38 Human Rights Commission (2016). Fulfilling its obligations as a good international citizen. https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/7414/5669/3524/2016_Quota_Review_-_HRC_.pdf

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1. REFUGEE FAMILY SUPPORT CATEGORY

Changemakers Resettlement Forum. The RFRT helps pay for the costs of application fees, medical reports, airfares and other related expenses.

Community Law centres in Waikato, Christchurch, Otago, Nelson and Wellington provide legal advice and services to RFSC sponsors and applicants. Community Law Wellington and Hutt Valley manage an ongoing caseload of around 50 applications and have a significant waitlist of eligible applicants. Community Law centres report that funding this work is an ongoing challenge, with some having to make the difficult decision to cease providing assistance due to a lack of sustainable funding.

Other resettlement trusts operate in Auckland (Auckland Refugee Family Trust – established in 2010 and which has reunited 60 families as of 2020),39 Waikato (Waikato Refugee Whanau Reunification Trust – established in 2012), and Manawatū (Manawatu Reuniting Refugees Family Trust – established in 2016). However, no other trusts operate at the scale of the Wellington-based RFRT. All these charities are 100 per cent volunteer run, which means that all donations go directly towards family reunification. In Christchurch, ReUnite Trust Canterbury was established in 2009, but was deregistered in 2017.

1.6 What are the needs and gaps?People arriving through the RSFC category are from refugee or refugee-like situations and require support to resettle, however, there is no government funding to resource this. This lack of support can result in significant pressure on the sponsor, and the result of no professional settlement support services can result in poorer settlement outcomes for individuals and the community. For example, without support to assist family when they first arrive, the sponsors can sacrifice the study or work opportunities they have developed.

The RFSC appears to be a low strategic priority for the government. Reunification is not mentioned

39 Auckland Refugee Family Trust (2020). Who we have helped. https://arft.org.nz/new-page; personal communication.

in the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy – Priorities to 2020 or in other resettlement documentation.40 Significantly, this indicates RFSC entrants have little to no planning for their well-being in the country, even though they are a humanitarian category and, more often than not, recognised refugees or in refugee-like situations. There is a need for recognition, then action, around professional settlement assistance beyond what their sponsors have the capacity to offer. This shortcoming is concerning given the number of refugees is planned to double.

The lack of priority can also be seen in the likelihood that even though there is significant demand for family reunification, missed places from the past year have not been rolled over into the coming financial year. Similarly, cases that are drawn can take three or four years to process. RFRT pointed to one case lodged in April 2015 that is still waiting for a decision. There are hopes that the lengthy delays in processing RFSC cases and the backlog in cases will be remedied with some allocation of funding from Budget 2020.

The rights and entitlements of RFSC arrivals are not well understood by many agencies, and RFSC arrivals frequently lack the paperwork beyond one primary travel document. Since RFSC arrivals do not transit through the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre – Te Āhuru Mōwai o Aotearoa, basic settlement tasks (such as opening bank accounts, obtaining IRD numbers, applying for MSD benefits, and liaising with Public Health authorities) can be hit and miss.

The high cost of RFSC applications remains a barrier, though there is some expectation that Budget 2020 – along with the continued work of reunification trusts – will significantly reduce this problem. Key pre-arrival costs include:

ɠ application fees (approximately $1,000)

ɠ approximately 50 hours of immigration advisor/legal assistance in completing applications, collating evidence to meet INZ’s mandatory lodgement requirements and responding to INZ requests for further

40 Immigration New Zealand (2018). New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy Priorities to 2020. April. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/refugees/settlement-strategy-priorities-2020.pdf

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RIGHT: Maher is from Damascus in Syria. In his mid-twenties, he has left behind his sister and mother while he seeks safety for the whole family in Europe. He has travelled by boat, train and on foot to get as far as Macedonia, but his journey will continue into northern Europe. He plans to seek asylum, and apply for his family to join him.

information, including taking cases to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal

ɠ airfares (between $2,000 and $5,000, depending on case circumstances)

ɠ expenses incurred in obtaining medical records (variable)

ɠ establishing the ability to provide housing. This is a vexing issue which could be addressed by making this requirement a final step once everything else is arranged.

The narrow definition of “family” currently used by Immigration New Zealand effectively precludes some refugees from accessing the policy. The reality of wider family interdependence needs to be acknowledged, especially given the relationships that can be forged during years of displacement.

In summary, while strong NGO support exists in Wellington, there is a need for application and settlement support of sponsors and those who they sponsor. While the gains from the 2020 budget will help with pre-arrival costs, there is a need for advocating for the place of family reunification to be better understood, supported and valued.

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2. ASYLUM SEEKERS AND CONVENTION REFUGEES

2. Asylum seekers and convention refugeesAn asylum seeker is a person who has left their home to seek protection in another country, but who has not yet been processed in accordance with the United Nations refugee law. Each year, around one million people seek asylum around the world.41 Once an asylum seeker has been accepted, they are then known as convention refugees – that is, people whose refugee status is based on the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Compared to most other countries, New Zealand receives very few asylum seeker claims every year: in the 2019/20 year, 502 people made asylum seeker claims. Of the decisions made in that year (noting that COVID-19 disrupted this process), 36.3 per cent (124 people) were approved by Immigration New Zealand.

New Zealand Red Cross has been deeply concerned about the practice of detaining some people who are seeking asylum in prison, often

41 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Asylum Seekers.https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html

held in the general population. New Zealand Red Cross has also been aware of the significant challenges facing people seeking asylum, particularly regarding meeting their basic needs including food, clothing, housing and school uniforms. These observations have led to a small investment in providing practical assistance and volunteer support for this group of people in Auckland. During COVID-19 lockdowns, asylum seekers were impacted by not being able to access government financial assistance that they were eligible for. It is not uncommon for this group to be discriminated against and for there to be perceptions that they are “queue jumpers” or “illegal”.

Asylum seekers receive limited government assistance and convention refugees are not eligible for some assistance until they are granted permanent residence, a process that can take up to two years. The only NGO supporting this group – Auckland-based Asylum Seeker Support Trust (ASST), formerly operating as the Auckland Refugee Council – is often overwhelmed with emergency accommodation requests. This lack of support makes asylum seekers vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, most of which flows from the twin issues of a lack of direct support and restricted opportunities to engage in work which would allow them to support themselves.

FYR Macedonia: Gevgelija, 08 August 2015, © Stephen Ryan / IFRC

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Asylum seekers, including those in detention, are some of the most vulnerable migrants in the world and are, as such, central to ICRC’s migration focus. These vulnerabilities are a result of not having the same rights as residents and citizens of the countries that they are in. For example, without accessible work rights, asylum seekers must choose between working illegally or not having a place to live or food for themselves and their families.

2.1 The international contextThere are now nearly 80 million forcibly displaced people in the world. The UNHCR estimates that 30–34 million of those forcibly displaced are children. Globally, an estimated 11 million people were newly displaced in 2019, including 2.4 million newly displaced refugees and asylum seekers. Developing countries continue to host a disproportionately large number of displaced people, amounting to 85 per cent of the global total. The least developed countries provide refuge for 27 percent of refugees and asylum seekers (6.6 million people). Over the last decade, 16.2 million asylum applications were registered globally, including 2.3 million in 2019 alone. At the end of 2019, about 4.1 million people were still awaiting a decision on their application for asylum.42

Most of the highly publicised movements of refugees walking across international borders are asylum seekers: boats crossing from Indonesia to Australia up until 2013, Syrians and others entering Europe in 2015, and the migrant caravans going from Central America towards the USA in 2019. This broad media attention colours much of the discourse around refugee protection around the world, even when refugees are moving as part of a managed resettlement, sponsorship or reunification process.

Under international law, immigration detention is only meant as a last resort and where it is necessary, reasonable, and proportionate to

42 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019.https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf

a legitimate government objective.43 In recent years, much of the regional discussion has centred on the detention of asylum seekers by the Australian government in Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. The majority of those in offshore detention have either been moved to Australia, resettled in a third country or pressured into returning to their countries of origin, while the offer to resettle 150 people per year to New Zealand, remains on the table.44 Despite this reduction in numbers, there remains a strong connection in the public discourse across Australasia and other asylum-seeker-receiving countries that offshore detention is a necessary, if regrettable, policy. As of mid-December 2020, Australian refugee advocates note there are approximately 290 people offshore (Nauru/Papua New Guinea); 200 in the Alternative Places of Detention, or APODs (hotel detention in Australia); and approximately 800 in the community in Australia (either in community detention or bridging visas).45 A slow but steady series of reports have shown small numbers of asylum seekers and refugees – including those relocated to Australia under Medevac provisions – being released into the community.46

Australia – even after stopping arrivals by boat – received 24,566 applications for asylum in the 2018/19 year. Adjusted for population size, that is ten times as many applications as New Zealand. However, in the same period, only 1,650 people were granted Convention status by Australia, at a rate of 11 per cent, a sharp decline from 32 per cent in previous years. The Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) notes that the increased rate of applications and decreased acceptance rate is due to significant increases in unaccepted claims from Malaysia and China.47

43 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2012). Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum‐Seekers and Alternatives to Detention.

44 McCulloch D. (2019). Dutton still not ditching NZ refugee deal. Newcastle Star. 29 October. https://www.newcastlestar.com.au/story/6990892/dutton-still-not-ditching-nz-refugee-deal/?cs=7307

45 Thorn, G. (2020). Public communication via Twitter. 14 December. https://twitter.com/drgrahamthom/status/1338359850883923969

46 Seselja, E. & Hanifie, S. (2021). Medevac detainees in Brisbane released with others in Darwin and Sydney also expected to walk free. ABC News. 1 March. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-01/dozens-of-medevac-detainees-expected-to-walk-free-from-brisbane/13198942

47 Refugee Council of Australia (2020). Asylum statistics in Australia. 30 August. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/asylum-community/2

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On top of the challenges with offshore detention in Australia, there have been moves to limit the ability of those who have arrived in Australia without a valid visa to claim permanent protection through the asylum process. The adoption of two visa options for those asylum seekers – Temporary Protection Visas (TPV) and Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (SHEV) – have led to asylum seekers remaining in Australia without any permanent protection.48 Instead, of asylum claims leading to permanent residency if accepted, the TPV requires rolling over applications every three years. While the SHEV appears to have the option of a permanent residency, applicants must meet requirements similar to regular migrants, but are restricted in accessing those options by restrictions in access to upskilling services such as tertiary education.49 The policy has drawn widespread criticism, including from Human Rights Watch.50 It fell out of usage due to political changes in 2007, but was reinstated in 2013. As the RCOA notes, even those who arrive on valid visas and then claim asylum still struggle to access support.51

2.2 New Zealand contextIn the 2019/20 year, 502 people applied to Immigration New Zealand for Refugee and Protection Approval; in the same year, 342 decisions were made, with 124 (36.3 per cent) people approved as convention refugees. There were 218 people declined. The 2018/19 year showed the highest total number of asylum claims since 2003/04, with applications from 60 different countries. The data shows the top five countries of origin among asylum seeker applications were China, India, Sri Lanka, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, the top five

48 Kaldor Centre (2020). Factsheet: Temporary Protections Visas (TPVs) and Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (SHEVs) Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law. November. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/Factsheet_TPVSHEV_Apr2019.pdf

49 Meixner, S. (2021). A Life in Limbo. ABC. 7 March. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-07/temporary-protection-visa-asylum-seekers-stuck-for-life/12935502

50 Human Rights Watch (2003). Human Rights Watch Commentary On Australia’s Temporary Protection Visas For Refugees. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/refugees/australia051303.htm

51 Refugee Council of Australia (2021). Australia’s asylum policies. 1 March. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/asylum-policies/2

countries to have these applications approved were China, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Only 6.7 per cent of claims from India – which had the second greatest number of applicants – were successful, compared to 56.5 per cent from China, which had both the greatest number of applicants and the greatest number accepted. 52

The approval rate for refugee claimants to New Zealand has remained between 25 per cent and 30 per cent in the past decade but was significantly lower in the preceding decades – with just 6.5 per cent approved in 1993/94.53 The most recent report notes that 40 people have been granted convention refugee status based on their sexuality or gender and associated persecution, or fear of persecution. This population accounts for 8 per cent of all claimants in the five years preceding the report.54

The Asylum Seeker Support Trust (ASST), previously the Auckland Refugee Council, is the main organisation working with asylum seekers and convention refugees. In Auckland, ASST provides accommodation in a 16-bed hostel and temporary accommodation in three units to enable families to establish a rental history. Clients are referred to ASST through lawyers and community networks. The client profile does not entirely match the profile of the top nationalities claiming asylum, as ASST tends to work with those who are most vulnerable.

ASST employs two full-time social workers and a part-time accommodation coordinator who is responsible for the day-to-day running of the hostel. ASST also has several volunteers who assist with a range of issues. The social worker assists clients with applying for housing (including social housing), provision of psychological and social support, Work and Income, school enrolments and other identified needs. Though they have increased staffing in the last year, ASST

52 As of February 2021. See Immigration New Zealand (2020). Refugee and Protection Unit Statistics Pack. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/statistics-refugee-and-protection.pdf

53 Immigration New Zealand (2020). Refugee and Protection Unit Statistics Pack. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/statistics-refugee-and-protection.pdf; RefNZ Statistics (2010). Table 3: The number of refugee status applications determined, and the number of applications and people approved and declined by the Refugee Status Branch during the financial years from 1992/93 to 2008/09. https://www.refugee.org.nz/stats.htm

54 Radio New Zealand (2017). LGBT asylum seekers granted refugee status in NZ. Radio New Zealand. 17 June. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/333279/lgbt-asylum-seekers-granted-refugee-status-in-nz

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notes that asylum seekers have significant needs that they are not resourced to deal with. In effect, ASST functions as a crisis response for those cases that are in most need, rather than as a service provider that can deal with every asylum seeker.

From a detention perspective, New Zealand distinguishes between those who apply for asylum at the border (who have the potential to be liable for turnaround) and those who apply for asylum after they become liable for deportation or turnaround. For those who claim at the border, Immigration New Zealand’s operational manual provides guidance to immigration officers, which has detention in a penal institution essentially as the option of last resort.55 For those who apply after being liable, it is not clear whether any guidance exists on when the discretion to apply for a warrant should be exercised (none appears to be publicly available). However, as noted above, if a warrant is applied for, the strict test in the Act means the presumption is towards detention.

There are multiple facilities that may be used to house or detain asylum seekers who are liable for arrest and detention. For asylum seekers subject to a warrant of commitment, s332 provides they must be detained in a prison or a premise approved by the Judge and the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE).56 For individuals subject to residence and reporting requirements, it is possible they could be placed at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre (MRRC) – Te Āhuru Mōwai o Aotearoa, with members of their family or community, or at a hostel. As of 25 September 2020, two asylum seekers are detained in prison and one is at the MRRC,57 but anecdotally there have been – up until a year ago – on average a dozen people housed there at the MRRC at any one time. Those detained in MRRC are not afforded access to schooling, are not fed alongside quota refugees, and are given limited rights to move off-site. When they are detained for long periods of time – one recent high-profile

55 Immigration New Zealand (2016). Operational Manual. Wellington. (A16.2.10.10.) https://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/#35439.htm

56 Immigration New Zealand (2009). Immigration Act (s9A).57 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020).

OIA response to Equal Justice Project. https://fyi.org.nz/request/13831/response/52147/attach/2/DOIA%202021%200624%20Response%20Letter.pdf

case saw a South American held for three years58 – mental health suffers. Overall, while MRRC is safer than prison, asylum seekers are still treated significantly differently from people arriving through the quota.

Given the delays to gaining permanent residency for convention refugees, there are several flow-on effects in terms of access to government services. ASST notes that the delay tends to see convention refugees treated as migrants rather than people who have been granted the protection of the state. The issue is also particularly acute for transgender convention refugees who are unable to change their names and/or genders on their official documents. This has led to numerous dangerous, alienating and disturbing situations for some to the most at-risk individuals in the convention refugee community.59

The 2019 Budget included $25 million as part of a Maritime Mass Arrival Prevention policy, aiming to boost capacity within the government to counter asylum seeker boat arrivals. While the government framed the spending as a humanitarian act, advocates pointed out that the title of the bill indicated the primary aim was to prevent boat arrivals and did little to help asylum seekers.60 Documents released in the wake of the Budget also showed that the Treasury had advised against the extra spending and suggested that there was no evidence of increased attempts by people to reach New Zealand by boat.61 The full details of the policy implementation have not yet been made public, so this is one area where more research and advocacy attention may need to be focused.

58 Norman, C. (2020). Asylum seeker imprisoned for over three years seeks compensation for breach of human rights. TVNZ. 13 December. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/asylum-seeker-imprisoned-over-three-years-seeks-compensation-breach-human-rights

59 See IDAHOBIT Day Coalition (2018). Situation of Rainbow persons in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Submission to UPR. https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/6915/4448/0436/SOGIESC_UPR_Pre-Session_Draft_3_fin.pdf; Byrne, J. (2018). Select committee letter on BDMRR bill. https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCGA_EVI_74854_859/a0cc6588cf22394539224f1375769501b9005322

60 Perinpanayagam, U. (2019). Government’s ‘saving lives at sea’ rhetoric rings hollow. The Spinoff. 16 June. https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/16-06-2019/governments-saving-lives-at-sea-rhetoric-rings-hollow

61 Devlin, C. (2019). Treasury advised Government against funding to prevent boats of asylum seekers. Stuff. 14 August. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/115008615/treasury-advised-government-against-funding-to-prevent-boats-of-asylum-seekers

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2. ASYLUM SEEKERS AND CONVENTION REFUGEES

2.3 Legal basis for asylum seekers and convention refugees in New ZealandThis section starts with the legal basis for asylum seekers followed by the legal basis for conventions refugees.

Legal basis for asylum seekersNew Zealand is a signatory of the following human rights conventions and therefore supports the right of people to seek asylum here:62

ɠ 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees

ɠ 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

ɠ 1984 Convention Against Torture

ɠ 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Part 5 of the Immigration Act 2009 provides the statutory basis for the system by which New Zealand determines to whom it owes obligations under the above instruments as well as the process through which these claims will be decided in keeping with these Conventions, Protocols and Rights. Similarly, Part 5 of the Act notes the rare situations where there is to be cessation or cancellation of recognition of a protection claim.

The Refugee Status Unit handles initial refugee and protection claims which can be made in person (to an Immigration Officer, Police Officer or Customs Officer) or in writing (to Immigration New Zealand). All claims must be later confirmed in writing by completing a lengthy claim form. Claimants are usually entitled to Legal Aid, and in practice, claims require the support of a lawyer or registered Immigration Consultant. While timeframes around decisions are not formalised, the Refugee Status Branch aims to have a case

62 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Information for Asylum Seekers. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/audiences/supporting-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/asylum-seekers

completed within 120 days.63 Despite this, 40 per cent of claims were older than six months, and 18 per cent were older than nine months. Budget 2020 secured an extra $5 million of funding towards ensuring these cases were processed in a timely fashion.64

Asylum seekers are eligible to apply for a Work Visa, which is usually granted for six to 12 months. However, it is difficult for asylum seekers to obtain work if they only have a six-month visa, as employers are concerned about their status. These restrictions place asylum seekers in a vulnerable place that can lead to the need for illegal work and exploitation. At the same time, they can technically access healthcare and have their children enrolled in school. In reality, there is little support for people to navigate this system and – if people are forced to work without a proper visa – there are incentives to avoid registering home addresses with the government.

Most people who claim asylum in New Zealand arrive in the country on valid visas or are issued visas on arrival and live in the community. A very small number of people claim asylum on arrival at New Zealand’s borders as most are filtered out by the airline’s advanced passenger screening processes. Those that do claim asylum at the border are more likely to be subject to a Warrant of Commitment and detained in Mt Eden Remand Prison because of identity and security concerns (although Immigration New Zealand’s operational manual provides guidance to immigration officers, which has detention in a penal institution essentially as the option of last resort).65

New Zealand does not have mandatory detention of asylum seekers, but it can detain certain individuals and “mass arrivals groups”66 under the law.67 The legal context for immigration-related detention in New Zealand is primarily contained

63 Casey, V. (2019). Review of processes and proceedings for making refugee and protection status determinations under Part 5 of the Immigration Act 2009. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. October. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/10382-review-of-processes-and-proceedings-for-making-refugee-and-protection-status-determinations-under-part-5-of-the-immigration-act-2009

64 Devlin, C. (2020). Budget 2020 funds security increase at Refugee Resettlement Centre and opens door for community sponsorship. Stuff. 15 May. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/121531742/budget-2020-funds-security-increase-at-refugee-resettlement-centre-and-opens-door-for-community-sponsorship

65 Immigration New Zealand (2016). Operational Manual. Wellington. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/#35439.htm

66 ‘Mass arrival groups’ refer to 30 people or more who arrive at the same time, on the same craft or group of crafts.

67 Immigration New Zealand (2009). Immigration Act (s9A).

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in the Immigration Act 2009 (relevantly amended in 2013 and 2015), the Corrections Act 2004 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which states “everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained”.68

Part 9 of the Immigration Act establishes a tiered approach to monitoring and detention. A person can only be subject to Part 9 (s309) of the Act if they are liable to arrest and detention. Generally speaking, this means they will be liable for turnaround or for deportation.

With respect to warrants of commitment, prior to 2013, a warrant of commitment to detain an individual under the Immigration Act 2009 (or Immigration Act 1987) could only be sought on an individual basis. A warrant of commitment must be applied for in accordance with one of the purposes in s310, which include to detain a person pending the making of a deportation order (including while any appeal is heard against their liability for deportation) or to deport the person by placing them on the first available craft. If the Court is then satisfied the legal tests in s316 and 317 are met, the Court can grant the warrant. If not, the individual must be released into the community on conditions.

The test for granting warrants of commitment is much stricter for refugee claimants who claim after becoming liable for deportation. Under s317(5)(d) of the Immigration Act, if the person has only claimed refugee status after they were served with a deportation liability notice or deportation order or arrested and detained for the purposes of deportation or turnaround, a Court must grant the warrant of commitment unless the individual can establish “exceptional circumstances”. These requirements mean, for these individuals, if a warrant is applied for there is effectively a presumption of detention.

These policies are arguably contrary to the UNHCR’s guidelines on asylum detention because such a strict test can be seen as a deterrent to seeking asylum. It may also be contrary to the guidelines because the warrant will likely have been applied for the purpose of detaining the person pending deportation, yet guidelines state: “it is unlawful to detain asylum seekers in on-

68 Flynn, M. (2014). Immigration Detention in New Zealand. Global Detention Project. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/545891740.pdf

going asylum proceedings on grounds of expulsion as they are not available for removal until a final decision on their claim has been made”.69

In 2012, the government introduced an Immigration Amendment Bill (enacted in 2013), to address “mass arrival groups”. The amendments included the introduction of group warrants allowing for the detention of mass arrival groups for extended periods of time.70 The Bill drew widespread criticism from human rights groups who said the policy did not sit within New Zealand’s international obligations or its domestic law. Several provisions in the amendment were criticised, including the possibility of indefinite detention, the ‘mass arrival warrant’ and that the amendment does not include an “explicit presumption against detention.71 To gain the support of Peter Dunne’s United Future party, a provision was included that said the bill would only apply to groups of 30 or more people where – previously – the minimum was ten or more.72

The Minister of Immigration at the time, Nathan Guy, said the Bill introduced “tough measures to deter groups of illegal immigrants from travelling to New Zealand,’ and aimed to combat people smuggling.73 Legal experts argued the original premise for the bill was largely unfounded and did not consider the existing safeguards against people smuggling, including specific offences under the Crimes Act 1961. People smugglers would also likely meet the criteria for offences under the Immigration Act, such as through the provision of false or misleading information.74 Much of the controversy involved considerations about whether detention could be considered “arbitrary”.

Detained asylum seekers have their situation reviewed before the District Court every 28

69 New Zealand Human Rights Commission (2010). Human rights in New Zealand/Ngā tika tangata o Aotearoa. Report. http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/Human_Rights_Review_2010_Full.Pdf

70 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (2012). Immigration Amendment Bill — First Reading. 3 May. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/50HansD_20120503_00000012/immigration-amendment-bill-first-reading

71 Global Detention Project (2016). New Zealand Immigration Detention Profile.

72 Shuttleworth, K. (2013). Dunne backs ‘asylum seeker’ bill. Otago Daily Times. 12 April. https://www.odt.co.nz/news/politics/dunne-backs-asylum-seeker-bill

73 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (2012). Immigration Amendment Bill — First Reading. 3 May. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/50HansD_20120503_00000012/immigration-amendment-bill-first-reading

74 Ibid.

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days. Technically, this is a new application for a Warrant of Commitment (WOC) every month, but, in practice, there needs to be a change in circumstances for the warrant to be changed.

Once identity and security concerns have been allayed, asylum seekers subject to a WOC are directed to live at the MRRC or in the community. Those who are released on Resident and Reporting Conditions (RRC) may be housed at MRRC (if agreed to by MRRC), where they can be granted leave for up to four hours per day, or they may be released to live in the community. An increase in accommodation pressure on site has led to a decrease in the number of asylum seekers living at MRRC.

If the Refugee Status Unit approves a claim, the asylum seeker is recognised as a refugee or protected person. Unsuccessful claimants can appeal to the independent Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT).75 Approximately 19 per cent of IPT appeals are refugee or protected persons cases and about a third of these are upheld.76

There are increasing concerns about several bureaucratic delays in immigration processes, as the internal changes at Immigration New Zealand seem to have impacted asylum seekers disproportionately, e.g., asylum seekers living at MRRC are issued with a work visa but then the visa is not renewed six months later, or interim visas are not granted or are slow in being granted, which increases vulnerability and anxiety. Work visas used to take up to six weeks to be processed. They now take several months.

Legal basis for convention refugeesIndividuals who claim asylum in New Zealand and who demonstrate they are refugees (those who cannot return to their home country because they have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their religion, race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion) are

75 Ministry of Business, Education and Employment (2017). Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status in New Zealand. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/forms-and-guides/inz1071.pdf

76 Spiller, P. (2019). Immigration and Protection Tribunal Annual Report 2018/2019. https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Immigration-Protection-Tribunal-Annual-Report-2018-2019-for-website.pdf; Bonnett, G. (2021). A third of rejected asylum cases overturned by appeals tribunal. Radio New Zealand. 24 January. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/435083/a-third-of-rejected-asylum-cases-overturned-by-appeals-tribunal

referred to as convention refugees. Immigration New Zealand is obligated to keep refugee and protection claims confidential under s151 of the Immigration Act 2009.77

Convention refugees are eligible to apply for permanent residence for themselves and their spouse and dependent children. The cost of applying is waived for convention refugees but they need to pay for any medical costs associated with the application.78 Currently this process takes up to two years, adding to refugees’ anxiety and feelings of being in limbo. After five years living in New Zealand as permanent residents, convention refugees can apply for New Zealand Citizenship. They are also eligible to apply for a Work Visa (again application costs are waived) and can be eligible for Work and Income support if they are unable to find work.

The Refugee Status Unit of Immigration New Zealand is also responsible for cancellation or cessation of refugee status if it was obtained by fraud, if the person no longer needs to be protected because of changes in their or their country’s circumstances, or if they have committed serious crimes and pose a risk to the community. These decisions can also be appealed to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal.79

2.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to asylum seekers and convention refugees in New ZealandAsylum seekers are of interest to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement due to

77 Immigration New Zealand (2018). Immigration Fact Sheets Refugees and Asylum Seekers. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-09/Refugees%20and%20asylum%20seekers%20factsheet.pdf

78 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Information for Convention Refugees. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/refugees/inz-information-for-convention-refugees.pdf

79 Immigration New Zealand (2018). Immigration Fact Sheets Refugees and Asylum Seekers. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-09/Refugees%20and%20asylum%20seekers%20factsheet.pdf

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their lack of legal status and protection compared to citizens which makes them most in need of humanitarian protection. These concerns are particularly heightened for those asylum seekers who are detained in prisons. As the ICRC notes, drawing from the fundamental principle of impartiality regarding nationality, “our focus is on helping the most vulnerable migrants, regardless of their legal status.”80 Relatedly, National Societies all over the world deal with internal displacement on large scales and there are relevant humanitarian actions in these operations.

For both asylum seekers and convention refugees, the largest unmet need is the lack of support available at an organisational level. New Zealand Red Cross works in a similar space with quota refugees as part of their settlement programmes and Restoring Family Links.

In Auckland, New Zealand Red Cross Migration Team works closely with ASST and for the past four years has provided trained volunteers to support asylum seekers with temporary settlement tasks. Practical assistance has also been provided through the payment of school uniforms, provision of hygiene kits and inclusion in settlement orientation. Across the country, Pathways to Employment also provides support to people seeking asylum or convention refugees who have the legal right to work in New Zealand. During lockdown, food vouchers were provided to ASST to distribute to families with urgent food needs.

Concern about the number of people being detained has led to conversations with ICRC Suva on the potential for detention monitoring visits in Mt Eden prison. ICRC recommended completing the scoping project and then working together to identify if a detention visit should occur.

New Zealand Red Cross takes guidance from the ICRC policy on migrants in detention, who state, “With regard to administrative detention, migrants are entitled to the protection established under international treaties to which the detaining state is a party, as well as customary international law and a number of internationally and regionally recognized standards. The applicability of these to immigration detention has been increasingly addressed in human

80 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015). Activities for Migrants. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4246-activities-migrants

rights jurisprudence and in expert opinions.”81 The document sets out ten guidelines for dealing with general conditions of detention as well as procedural safeguards and the “special circumstances and needs of particular asylum seekers”.82

There is scope for New Zealand Red Cross to build on previous initiatives conducted by its international body. In 2015, ICRC published guidelines for National Societies working in immigration detention and published a Policy Paper on immigration detention in 2017. The ICRC visit detained migrants in both criminal and dedicated immigration detention facilities. During these visits, as with all detainees, the ICRC assesses whether detained migrants are treated humanely, held in conditions that preserve their dignity and afforded due process of law. The ICRC also evaluates whether they can maintain contact with the outside world, such as with their families and consular authorities, if they wish to do so.

2.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to asylum seekers and convention refugeesGovernmentImmigration New Zealand is the lead domestic agency with respect to asylum seekers and refugees. It is responsible for administering New Zealand’s refugee quota, determining asylum claims made onshore, and certain settlement initiatives. It is also responsible for immigration compliance, including detention. Immigration New Zealand produces a brochure – the most up-to-date version can be found online – providing high-level information about services available to asylum seekers living in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, the cities where most asylum seekers and convention refugees live.83

81 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013). The Administrative Detention of Migrants.

82 Ibid.83 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Services for Asylum Seekers.

Auckland. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/refugees/servicesforasylumseekersaucklandenglish.pdf

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As with asylum seekers, Immigration New Zealand provides some high-level information for convention refugees on their website. Since 2018, MBIE has employed a staff member as a convention refugee navigator. The desk-based role contacts convention refugees around two months after they are accepted and offers advice on how to access government services. Unlike quota refugees, there is no other government funding or support for asylum seekers.

In the 2020 budget, the New Zealand government increased funding to support a forecast increase in claims from 600 to 700 people. The funding will boost capacity to address fraud and integrity issues and strengthen processes, but there is no funding in this to support the NGOs working with asylum seekers.

Four independent organisations monitor detention facilities where asylum seekers can be detained: the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA), Children’s Commissioner, Ombudsman, and Inspector of Service Penal Establishments. These groups make up the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) with the Human Rights Commission as the coordinating body.

In 2019, Victoria Casey QC completed a review of the processes for making an asylum seeker claim for MBIE.84 The review noted that while the formal structures to guarantee the rights and processual fairness of asylum claims were sound, in practice, procedures were not always followed. The main theme of the report was the relationship breakdown between practitioners (lawyers representing asylum claimants) and refugee protection officers working at the Refugee Status Branch within MBIE. Anecdotal evidence from contacts indicates that, since the Casey report was released, some good progress has been made towards rectifying some of the key issues raised in the report, including changes to how asylum

84 Casey, V. (2019). Review of processes and proceedings for making refugee and protection status determinations under Part 5 of the Immigration Act 2009. MBIE. October. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/10382-review-of-processes-and-proceedings-for-making-refugee-and-protection-status-determinations-under-part-5-of-the-immigration-act-2009

claims are made in order to make the process less stressful for claimants.85

Advocacy groups and NGOsAs noted earlier, ASST is the largest and most active organisation that deals with asylum seekers and convention refugees. ASST is not funded by the government but survives through a range of sources including grants, revenue from the hostel and donations. In the last year, they have made numerous media appearances covering the detention of asylum seekers in prison.86

Outside of Auckland, there are no specific support services, though groups like Changemakers Resettlement Forum in Wellington and Christchurch Resettlement Services often get called on to help asylum seekers find a place to live on first arrival. At other times, asylum seekers are connected to people from their own ethnic communities already in New Zealand, which places a large burden on these groups to assist. ASST provides some advice to these agencies and some clients by phone. Overall, the services provided are not well established as the organisations are already stretched and do not receive funding for their work with asylum seekers.

The Auckland Refugee Family Trust provides support for some family reunification cases when Convention Refugee funds have been depleted through the asylum process. In terms of advocacy, the Asylum Seeker Equality Project at Victoria University of Wellington’s law school, is working to secure equal settlement support for all refugees in New Zealand.87

Advocacy groups active on issues of asylum seekers in detention include the Global Detention Project, the Human Rights Commission, the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APPRN) and the International Detention Coalition. There are other

85 Burrell, M. (2021). ‘Significant’ changes introduced to claiming refugee status in New Zealand. New Zealand Herald. 29 March. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/significant-changes-introduced-to-claiming-refugee-status-in-new-zealand/QJVARGF7N733NJMHHBV7EB6NGM

86 Kilgallon, S. (2020). No crime, no charge the asylum seekers welcomed to NZ with jailtime. Stuff. 27 December. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/123786697/no-crime-no-charge--the-asylum-seekers-welcomed-to-nz-with-jailtime

87 Craig, P. (2019). People asking for asylum in NZ get a raw deal. Stuff. 3 October. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/opinion/116226783/people-asking-for-asylum-in-nz-get-a-raw-deal ActionStation (2016). Equal support for Convention Refugees. https://our.actionstation.org.nz/petitions/equal-support-for-convention-refugees-1.

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migrant advocacy groups, typically focused on general settlement issues, who often comment on issues of detention (for example, Migrant Action Trust).

In 2020, the issue has been repeatedly raised by Amnesty International Aotearoa New Zealand, first around a report issued in January on the state of prisons,88 then in April around COVID-19 issues for the incarcerated,89 and then around World Refugee Day.90 A final report on their work on asylum seekers in detention is expected in the coming months, and there are indications that it will remain on their radar for the foreseeable future.

A recent wide-ranging panel discussion organised by Asylum Seeker Equality Project, sought a range of views on why detentions are taking place. Alongside discussion of securitisation, immigration lawyer Kamil Lakshman noted that the main problem was a lack of other suitable, non-prison spaces for those asylum seekers to be housed in.91 A late 2020 Official Information Act (OIA) request by the group has shed some light on Corrections practices in housing asylum seekers.92

On the back of increases in the number of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers, as well as growing attention on them,93 a relatively active group called Rainbow Path New Zealand was founded. Launched in January 2019, the group is proactively involved in supporting and providing a network to LGBTQI+ asylum seekers and refugees. The group has been mostly conducted through a private Facebook group (though they have recently established a

88 Satherley, D. (2020). New Zealand’s prison policies under fire in new Amnesty report. Newshub. 30 January. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/01/new-zealand-s-prison-policies-under-fire-in-new-amnesty-report.html

89 Amnesty New Zealand (2020). Amnesty International releases human rights briefing to COVID-19 committee. 15 April. https://www.amnesty.org.nz/amnesty-international-releases-human-rights-briefing-covid-19-committee

90 Radio New Zealand (2020). Amnesty International calls for end to jailing asylum seekers. Radio New Zealand. 15 June. https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/first-up/audio/2018750656/amnesty-international-calls-for-end-to-jailing-asylum-seekers

91 Though the discussion is not online, a description of the event is here: https://www.eventbrite.co.nz/e/a-right-delayed-is-a-right-denied-tickets-119400631503 and the Asylum Seeker Equality Project’s online site is here: http://asep.co.nz/home

92 Department of Corrections (2020). OIA reply to Asylum Seekers Equality Project. FYI. 10 November. https://fyi.org.nz/request/13830/response/52723/attach/13/C126581%20Correspondence%20from%20Corrections.pdf

93 Murphy, S. (2017). Number of Queer and Gender Diverse Refugees in New Zealand Rises’. Gay Express. 29 June. https://gayexpress.co.nz/2017/06/number-queer-gender-diverse-refugees-new-zealand-rises

website94 and outreach events at Pride Auckland) and places a high value on privacy as many members are not out to their ethnic or national communities. The core group has approximately 35 members, with 85 per cent being transgender and a high proportion identifying as Muslim. Of these 35, only five arrived in New Zealand as quota refugees. A Wellington-based group, Rainbow Haven, emerged at the end of 2020 with a similar kaupapa.95

The number one issue for Rainbow Path members in New Zealand is the delay in changing name and gender on identity documents. As this can only happen when permanent residency is granted, convention refugees often spend up to five years in difficult circumstances. Overtures have been made to the government through politicians, including Grant Robertson, and the Auckland District Law Society. The international organisation Pride Legal hosts an in-depth domain featuring relevant LGBTQI+ legal materials and links to a significant quantity of relevant news stories.96

In the MRRC, RASNZ is engaged with providing counselling, body therapy and psychological support for asylum seekers. As there is no official support for convention refugees and they can be asked to leave with just 24 hours’ notice, RASNZ found themselves in the position of offering ad hoc, emergency settlement support including assistance with housing.

2.6 What are the needs and gaps?For both asylum seekers and convention refugees, the biggest unmet need is lack of resourcing to provide support to meet basic needs and to advocate where required.97 There

94 Rainbow Path New Zealand (2021). Connecting LGBTQIA+ Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Aotearoa New Zealand. https://rainbowpathnz.com

95 Though there is not a strong online presence for Rainbow Haven, both Changemakers Resettlement Forum and Tranzform Wellington have posted on social media about collaborations with the group.

96 Pride Legal (n.d.). New Zealand LGBT Laws. https://pridelegal.com/new-zealand-lgbt-laws

97 Yzelman, R. & Bond, S. (2020). Gaining a sense of citizenship and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand: the work of refugee support providers. sites 17(1), 66–90.

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is a significant gap in that there is only one specialty organisation in the country, and this is underfunded.

Unmet needs: asylum seekers ɠ Many of the unmet needs are underpinned by

chronic poverty among the asylum seekers (including those supported by ASST). This poverty means that basic humanitarian needs such as food and shelter are going unmet.

ɠ Accommodation in Auckland is expensive and difficult to secure for single men and those without a New Zealand rental history. Lawyers and others in the sector report people living in cars, or at homeless shelters (of which there are a decreasing number) or sleeping rough.

ɠ Work and Income is a constantly challenging process as staff do not understand the entitlements of asylum seekers and often ask incorrect questions regarding the basis of asylum claims. It is difficult for clients to access benefits without the help of a social worker or skilled volunteer.

ɠ Those with six-month work visas struggle to gain formal employment and are often forced into the grey economy.

ɠ Access to education (either ESOL or Tertiary) as an asylum seeker is limited.

ɠ ASST especially, and other NGOs working with asylum seekers, have no budget for interpreters. Many of the languages used by asylum seekers are not provided by InfoNOW (which took over the Language Connect contract).

ɠ Asylum seekers are not entitled to the same support as Quota Refugees and are not included in the Refugee Resettlement Strategy. This issue has been raised by Changemakers Resettlement Forum in 2013 and was the basis of the formation of the Asylum Seekers Equality Project campaign.98

ɠ There is a lack of services for asylum seekers outside of Auckland.

ɠ There is a pervasive approach to government policy that asylum seekers must be deterred

98 Bloom, A., O’Donovan, T. & Udahemuka, M. (2013). Marking Time: experiences of successful asylum seekers in Aotearoa New Zealand. https://tindall.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Marking-time-Experiences-of-successful-asylum-seekers-in-Aotearoa-NZ.pdf

from coming to New Zealand. This deterrence attitude also leads to negative attitudes even once asylum seekers are accepted as convention refugees, undermining their well-being and settlement.

ɠ While there is little quantitative data on public perceptions of asylum seekers in New Zealand (and very little on refugees, in general) there is a pervasive public discourse, mirroring that of Australia, that asylum seeking is a less legitimate way of obtaining protection than through the quota.

Unmet needs: asylum seekers in detention

ɠ No monitoring of detention; detention used before it is a last resort At present there is no monitoring of asylum seekers being detained in prison, and there is little effort made to use alternative methods to house or clarify the identity of asylum seekers before they are detained. At the very least, we would expect clear guidelines that show asylum seekers will be treated as different from those who have committed a crime.

ɠ Transparency of information Detailed statistics about where immigration detainees are held or how many people are detained is not proactively made available in New Zealand.99 An RNZ article in August 2019 stated that eight asylum seekers were being detained, one of whom had been detained for over a year.100 A series of OIA requests101 have shed some light on the issue.

ɠ Issues with current legislative and policy settings There is an argument that the application of the stricter warrant of commitment test to those individuals who claim asylum after becoming liable acts as a deterrent to refugee claims. Under international law and

99 In response to a request from the Global Detention Project (GDP), an official at the Department of Labour wrote, ‘The Department does not hold information regarding which prisons hold asylum seekers or which particular corrections facility irregular migrants or asylum seekers were held at’ (2016).

100 Bonnett, G. (2019). Asylum seekers in NZ waiting 7 months on average for decision. Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/395952/asylum-seekers-in-nz-waiting-7-months-on-average-for-decision

101 These documents can be found through a search for key terms at the FYI website: https://fyi.org.nz/search/%22asylum%20seekers%22/all

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New Zealand domestic law,102 deterrence or punishment is not a legitimate ground for administrative detention. Other than for border claimants, there appears to be a lack of guidance on when the decision to apply for a warrant of commitment should be exercised.

As noted above, there are concerns with the mass arrival warrant process, including risk of lengthy or indeterminate detention. However, these provisions have never been used.

Legal representation can also be challenging. An application for a warrant of commitment is filed in the District Court and heard in a (usually brief) hearing before a District Court judge. Individuals are often represented by the duty solicitor, who will typically have little knowledge of the Immigration Act.

ɠ Lack of oversight of the detention process Asylum seekers are at risk of being in detention for extended periods. The principle of non-refoulement means that no one can be transferred (i.e., deported) to another state if there are substantial grounds for believing that they will be in danger of persecution or other fundamental rights breaches. This rule is reflected in s164 of the Immigration Act which provides refugees and claimants cannot be deported. In terms of detention, this means that if an individual is detained pending deportation, and they are also an asylum claimant, they cannot be deported until (and only if) their claim is negatively determined. This detention could be for a significant period, for example, in 2020, Immigration New Zealand stated that the two asylum seekers in detention were there for, on average, 395 days.103 Given the risk of such extended detentions, independent reviews of the appropriateness of these detentions (aside from the Court process) should be considered.

It is unclear to what extent the conditions of an asylum seeker’s detention are monitored. Detention may be even more pertinent when a prison is privately managed. For example,

102 Yadegary v Department of Labour, NZAC 295 (2008). https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4986f7512.pdf

103 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). OIA response to Equal Justice Project. https://fyi.org.nz/request/13831/response/52147/attach/2/DOIA%202021%200624%20Response%20Letter.pdf

an asylum seeker, in detention at the privately managed Mt Eden prison, was reportedly forced to participate in the “fight clubs”.104

Unmet needs: convention refugees ɠ Currently Convention refugees are waiting up

to two years for permanent residence to be granted. Until they have permanent residence, Convention refugees with families are not entitled to Family Tax Credits, nor the Work and Income Accommodation Supplement. For some families, this can make a difference of $500 per week. 

ɠ Applying for permanent residence and family reunification is costly and time consuming. Legal Aid does not cover these applications and so lawyers charge their regular fees. The cost of airfares is met by Auckland Refugee Family Trust for a number of families, but sometimes convention refugees borrow this money from others in the community.

ɠ There are no facilities for transgender convention refugees to change their names and gender on official documents until granted permanent residency.

ɠ As with asylum seekers, dealing with Work and Income is stressful and often requires the intervention of a social worker to secure entitlements.

ɠ Convention refugees are not entitled to the same support as Quota Refugees and are not included in the Refugee Resettlement Strategy.

ɠ If a convention refugee arrives in New Zealand as part of a “mass arrival group” without a valid visa, their eligibility for a resident visa will be restricted. Such individuals must hold a temporary visa successively for three years before they can be granted residence and have their refugee status reviewed (to determine if it should be cancelled) before they are eligible to apply for a permanent resident visa based on their refugee or protected person status.

104 Cowlishaw, C. (2016). Prisoner claims he was forced to take part in fight clubs at Mt Eden. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/82383201/prisoner-claims-he-was-forced-to-take-part-in-fight-clubs-at-mt-eden

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3. REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

3. Refugee settlementRefugee settlement in a third country is a life-saving tool of protection alongside the integration of refugees in the country where they first seek protection and returning to the refugee’s home country when it has become safe. While the settlement process fulfils the humanitarian goal of saving lives, there are also challenges in settling in a new country and culture.

A formal refugee settlement programme, known as the refugee quota, has been in place in New Zealand since 1987.105 Prior to the formal programme, an ad hoc system welcomed numerous groups on the basis of need. The New Zealand settlement programme offers generous

105 The language around refugee settlement and refugee resettlement is not settled. New Zealand Red Cross tends to use the term settlement for the processes once a refugee has arrived in New Zealand and is in the process of settling. In this document we have used resettlement when referring to specific language of other organisations, policies and the international sphere, for example the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy.

protection by granting permanent residency on arrival. Since the end of World War Two, and the beginning of the modern refugee resettlement systems, 40,000 people have made New Zealand home as resettled refugees.

New Zealand Red Cross has been the lead refugee settlement provider in the community since Refugee Services Aotearoa merged into the organisation in 2012. Due to the relatively small number of refugee arrivals in New Zealand, specialised and accessible support services are often limited. Key issues in achieving successful settlement outcomes are a lack of support for young people, access to mental health and trauma recovery, access to health and welfare services, social integration, the experiences of discrimination, and housing. Overlying many of these issues is a lack of cultural competence in service provision and a lack of use of interpreters.

Adraa Mofak, former refugee from Syria, alongside Rita Murphy, New Zealand Red Cross Refugee Support Volunteer, trying to make sense of a letter she has received in her letter box.

© N

ew Zealand Red Cross

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3.1 The international contextThe number of people recognised as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 26.3 million. Of this population, the number of people requiring settlement in 2021 is projected to be 1.445 million, twice as many as in 2017.106 Globally, the UNHCR ten-year resettlement strategy aims to settle three million refugees over the next ten years through a combination of resettlement (one million) and complementary pathways (two million).107

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol do not bind states to implement refugee quotas. Global quota programmes are set by governments and these intakes can change significantly depending on political influences. Changing political priorities, particularly in the USA which has historically been the country with the largest refugee resettlement programme, have seen a dramatic drop in recent years of the number of places for resettlement. This reduction has placed significant pressure on the UNHCR and resulted in people with more complex and higher needs being referred.

Once a person is granted refugee status by the UNHCR, they may be put forward for resettlement in a third country if they face severe health and/or safety issues and there is no prospect of being able to return to their home country. Australia, Canada and the USA have run resettlement programmes for roughly the same length of time as New Zealand, although their programmes – even on a per capita basis – resettle many more refugees than the New Zealand programme. In 2018, Australia had a target of 7,900 and Canada 9,000 for refugees selected offshore, and both countries also accept substantially more refugees through a combination of community sponsorship (some of which is government assisted) and through processing asylum claims. Both countries provide support to refugee arrivals

106 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Refugee Data Finger. UNHCR. 8 December. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics

107 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019). The Three Year Strategy (2019–2022) on resettlement and complementary pathways. June. https://www.unhcr.org/5d15db254.pdf

for up to five years post arrival.108 In contrast to Australia and Canada, sponsoring agencies in the USA ensure basic needs are met for the first 30 days of resettlement through cooperation with the Department of State. Further assistance programmes for longer-term settlement needs are also supported with government funding.109

Resettlement programmes vary significantly from nation to nation. For a comprehensive evaluation of global resettlement programmes, see the New Zealand Red Cross report on Refugee Resettlement: Global Landscape Review Trends and Gaps in Measuring Successful Refugee Integration, completed by Deloitte in 2016.110 Stacey Shaw and Mallory Funk’s 2019 overview of social service provision in refugee resettlement goes into more detail on exactly what these different systems offer.111 For example, the USA provides support for only the first three months after arrival, with the focus on gaining employment. In comparison, Sweden places greater focus on integration and has support programmes that can last more than two years.112

The health needs of resettling refugees are one key humanitarian concern across resettlement communities where a wide range of approaches are drawn from differences in broader approaches to healthcare, insurance and migration status. In Australia, physical and mental health needs are considered as part of the case-management plan within the Humanitarian Settlement Program (HSP).113 In the USA, resettlement agencies refer refugees for an initial comprehensive health assessment free of charge. Refugees are then eligible to apply for healthcare support through

108 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: Australia. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e542d4.html; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: Canada. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e55594.html

109 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: United States of America. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e5a764.html

110 Deloitte and New Zealand Red Cross (2017). Refugee Resettlement: Global Landscape Review: Trends and Gaps in Measuring Successful Refugee Integration. January. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/06/Refugee-Resettlement-Industry-Review-White-Paper_FINAL.pdf

111 Shaw, S. & Funk, M. (2019). A Systematic Review of Social Service Programs Serving Refugees. Research on Social Work Practice. 29(8), 847–862.

112 Konle-Seidl, R. (2018). Integration of refugees in Austria, Germany and Sweden: Comparative analysis. European Parliament, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU(2018)614200_EN.pdf

113 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: Australia. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e542d4.html

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Medicaid or Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA). Through RMA, eligible refugees may access health care, including mental health care, for up to eight months.114 In Canada, refugees’ physical and mental health needs are first covered by the Interim Federal Health Program until the refugee becomes eligible for provincial or territorial healthcare coverage (typically within 90 days). In both cases, this coverage includes psychology and psychotherapy services. Additionally, physical and mental health promotion activities are available through orientation programmes and healthy living community interventions.115

3.2 New Zealand contextHistoryNew Zealand has a long history of resettling refugees, with one early, large-scale acceptance of refugees occurring in 1944 when 733 Polish children and 105 carers arrived. What was meant to be temporary protection until the end of World War Two eventually became permanent when the post-war annexing of Poland made it impossible for the group to return safely.116

The community settlement programme was first delivered by churches through the Inter Church Commission on Immigration and Refugee Resettlement (ICCI). Over time this work was centralised, professionalised and secularised, with the organisation becoming Refugee and Migrant Service (RMS) in 1990. While small amounts of funding have been provided over the years (in 1994, government funded two part-time paid workers) it was only in 2004 that the government provided funding for settlement providers and not until 2014 that the service was fully funded. Outside of selection and reception, settlement had largely remained the domain of churches and NGOs such as the Hebrew

114 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: United States of America. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e5a764.html

115 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018). Resettlement Handbook: Canada. https://www.unhcr.org/3c5e55594.html

116 For an in-depth history of refugees and asylum seekers in New Zealand see Beaglehole, A. (2013). Refuge New Zealand: a nation’s response to refugees and asylum seekers. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Immigrant Aid Society, though with greater government coordination and involvement from the early 2000s onwards. After several more name changes, the organisation, known then as Refugee Services Aotearoa, was closed and the resettlement programme merged into New Zealand Red Cross in December 2012.

The refugee quota programme includes humanitarian categories and designations for women at risk (at least 75 places, to grow to 150 when quota grows to 1,500),117 general protection, urgent resettlement (up to 35 cases per annum) and medical cases (retained at up to 75 places, but in practice there have been significantly fewer in recent years). Selection is based on humanitarian and protection needs and fulfils a large part of the New Zealand government’s humanitarian intake, as opposed to the skilled migrant programmes.

While the humanitarian categories and the long-term consistency of New Zealand’s refugee quota programme can be viewed as generous, unfortunately the size of the quota and its composition cannot. Over the past decade, a public campaign to double New Zealand’s refugee quota, the global media coverage of the Syrian crisis and increased global political solidarity with refugee situations all influenced public opinions and political commitments, resulting in a change of policy. In 2015, the National Party-led government accepted 750 Syrians over three years, with 500 of this number on top of the quota, and committed to raising the quota to 1,000 in two years’ time. A change of Government in 2017 saw the new coalition announce an increase in the refugee quota to 1500 from 1 July 2020. A doubling of the quota to 1500 is still only equivalent to 31.3 arrivals per 100,000 of the population. In comparison, Australia resettled over 23,000 people in 2017 at a rate of 94 arrivals per 100,000 of the population.118 The only highlight regarding the size of New Zealand’s quota is that it is increasing at a time when many states, including traditional resettlement states such as the USA, have been decreasing their

117 Immigration New Zealand (2019). Three year Refugee Quota Programme 2019/20 to 2021/22. Cabinet Paper. 6 November. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/three-year-refugee-quota-programme-2019-20-to-2021-21.pdf

118 For a detailed overview of the changes to the refugee quota during this period see Stephens, M. (2018). Doing Our Bit: the campaign to double the refugee quota. Wellington: BWB Texts.

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quotas. Permanent reductions by the Australian government during COVID-19 has led to a situation where, on a per capita basis, the two Tasman countries are accepting almost the same number of refugees.119

In the last full year, 1,008 people arrived from 23 countries of origin and 50 different ethnic groups. In addition to the quota programme, New Zealand also has a small number of asylum seekers each year (see section two, above). New Zealand’s complementary pathways also include the Refugee Family Support Category (see section one) and a pilot community sponsorship programme (see section 13 on additional categories).

New Zealand’s refugee quota composition policy has reflected broader discriminatory aspects of the country’s migration policy. In the 1940s to 1980s, the quota composition largely followed New Zealand’s immigration policy and refugees were selected from primarily white countries of origin such as Eastern Europeans including Czechs, Hungarians and Slovaks. In the 1990s, the quota programme diversified significantly with arrivals from a number of countries and regions including Africa and the Middle East. Opportunities for settlement of people from Latin America were established in 2008.

In 2009, the quota composition established new restrictions on cases from Africa and the Middle East to require a family link to be in place before selection.120 These restrictions have resulted in a significant reduction in the number of cases arriving from Africa and calls into question New Zealand’s claim of a humanitarian quota, as the greatest need for resettlement is in Africa.121 The quota composition policy came under review with an acknowledgement from Iain Lees-Galloway, Minister of Immigration, that the policy is “the definition of discrimination”. In October 2019, the Minister announced the family link requirement would be dropped. The composition of the contemporary quota programme still prioritises

119 Refugees, here, includes all categories of people who have a likely path to permanent residency. See Stephens, M. (forthcoming). Australia cuts, New Zealand doubles, but who takes more? Overland Journal.

120 Stephens, M. (2018). Unfair and discriminatory: which regions does New Zealand take refugees from and why? Policy Quarterly, 14(2). https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/pq/article/view/5097

121 Stephens, M. (2019). A short history of New Zealand’s racist refugee policy. The Spinoff. 28 May. https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/28-05-2019/a-short-history-of-new-zealands-racist-refugee-policy

cases from the Asia-Pacific region,122 though focuses on Myanmar and Afghanistan.123

The settlement processRefugees are chosen for settlement in New Zealand through a process that includes a Cabinet decision influenced by UNHCR recommendations and requiring that each person to be settled has been referred by UNHCR.124 Every three years, Cabinet signs off on the quota composition which guides Immigration New Zealand (INZ) case selection. People who are resettled in New Zealand through the quota receive government-funded settlement support for up to a minimum of 12 months.125 The current New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy focuses on self-sufficiency, social integration and independence.126

The New Zealand quota programme provides generous protection. On arrival, people receive permanent residency and are eligible to access the same support as other permanent residents and citizens, including financial benefits, housing, healthcare and settlement assistance. All quota refugees currently spend their first five weeks in New Zealand at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre (MRRC) - Te Āhuru Mōwai o Aotearoa, in Auckland. At MRRC, they participate in a reception programme aimed at preparing them to live and work in the community. The reception programme addresses the priority areas of health assessment, initial treatment and health promotion, settlement planning and orientation to New Zealand, English language and preparing

122 It is worth noting that no refugees actually come from the Pacific islands to New Zealand through this category. The definition, as with Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, is from the UNHCR and does not represent a commitment to the countries that New Zealand otherwise prioritises through aid and other links.

123 Asia Pacific is the UNHCR regional grouping but can be a little misleading to New Zealand readers as there have been no Pacific island refugees resettled through this programme in New Zealand. Myanmar, Afghanistan and Bhutan have been the main countries of origin for Asia Pacific refugees settled in New Zealand in the past two decades.

124 See the most recent Cabinet Paper for insights into this process: Immigration New Zealand (2019). Three year Refugee Quota Programme 2019/20 to 2021/22. Cabinet Paper. 6 November. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/three-year-refugee-quota-programme-2019-20-to-2021-21.pdf

125 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). New Zealand Refugee Quota Programme.https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/supporting-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/refugee-and-protection-unit/new-zealand-refugee-quota-programme

126 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/refugee-resettlement-strategy

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working age adults for employment and children for school.127

On arrival in settlement locations – after leaving MRRC – refugees continue to receive government-funded settlement support. New Zealand Red Cross is the main provider of settlement support in all settlement areas, except Timaru and Ashburton, and is contracted by Immigration New Zealand to deliver the Pathways to Settlement programme, which aims to support the New Zealand Resettlement Strategy. The Pathways to Settlement programme uses a strengths-based approach to assist former refugees in New Zealand as they begin their settlement journey. A key part of the programme involves connecting families to their new community and supporting them to access mainstream services so they can become independent. New Zealand Red Cross runs orientation programmes in the community which build on the information provided at the MRRC reception programme and provides linkages to community resources and providers.

The first year in the community of a resettled refugee consists of the starting up phase (one to three months), settling (three to six months) and the building independence and connections period (six to 12 months). As part of an expanded COVID-19 response, settlement has been expanded to a two-year programme, and although there is evidence this expansion is beneficial, there has not yet been confirmation whether it may be an option in the future. The settlement journey takes longer than 12 months and approximately 20 per cent of quota refugees need support after this first 12 months. This often relates to specific groups such as youth, solo parents, and the elderly who, without support, often experience social isolation and challenges accessing their entitlements to services and resources to meet their basic needs. Scholars note the centrality of refugee support organisations to the settlement process, at the same time as noting the constraints of under-resourcing and systemic challenges. Yzelman and Bond conclude with the comment, “there is a need in Aotearoa New Zealand to increase capacity and resourcing for the settlement process.”128

127 Immigration New Zealand (2019). Immigration Factsheets: New settlement locations. https://mstn.govt.nz/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/New-settlement-locations-FAQ-May-19.pdf

128 Yzelman, R. & Bond, S. (2020). Gaining a sense of citizenship and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand: the work of refugee support providers. sites 17(1) 66–90.

The current refugee resettlement strategy prioritises access to mental health services within New Zealand.129 Limited access to mental health services, however, may not be the only impediment to positive mental health outcomes for former refugees. A major mental health barrier for former refugees is familial separation. One study found that family reunification was the most important factor in former refugees’ own perceptions of successful settlement; furthermore, there was an increased prevalence of mental health and settlement difficulties amongst refugee-background families in New Zealand where reunification applications were underrepresented.130

Currently there are only two specialist mental health service providers for former refugees in New Zealand: Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (RASNZ) in Auckland and New Zealand Red Cross – Refugee Trauma Recovery in Wellington. RASNZ is a mental health charitable trust that has provided holistic mental health and well-being support to former refugees in New Zealand since 1995. They provide initial support at the MRRC, working with 43 per cent of quota refugees. They also provide mental health support through clinical, youth, community, research, and training initiatives. They support hundreds of clients every year and have access to 125 interpreters.131 Refugee Trauma Recovery has a multidisciplinary team of clinical and therapeutic mental health specialists offering services to former refugees of all ages who have experienced serious trauma and now live in either the Wellington or Hutt Valley District Health Board (DHB) area. These services are free of charge and trained interpreters are available as needed.132 Both are funded by the respective DHBs.

There have been some recent difficulties in settlement locations outside of Auckland and Wellington with a lack of independent mental health services for people with a refugee

129 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2017). New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/refugees/nz-refugee-resettlement-strategy-overview_april-2017-docx.pdf

130 Choummanivong C., Poole, G. & Cooper, A. (2014). Refugee family reunification and mental health in resettlement. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 9:2, 89–100. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1177083X.2014.944917

131 Refugees As Survivors New Zealand (n.d.). About us. https://rasnz.co.nz/about-us

132 New Zealand Red Cross (n.d.). Refugee Trauma Recovery. https://www.redcross.org.nz/what-we-do/in-new-zealand/migration-programmes/refugee-trauma-recovery

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background. In the MidCentral DHB area, including the settlement areas of Palmerston North and Levin, counselling referrals are made to THINK Hauora. New Zealand Red Cross is working with this organisation and ACROSS, another social service provider, to improve access to appropriate counselling services for people with a refugee background. In Dunedin and Invercargill, people with a refugee background may access priority referral help for mental health support through WellSouth, though this is not specialised care for traumas experienced as a former refugee.133 In Nelson, Deb Moore began the Stressbusters group programme in 2017 to address the complex mental health needs of former refugees from Colombia as a supportive group alternative to individual therapy.134 In the Wellington region, alongside specialised Refugee Trauma Recovery services, the Piki programme offers tautoko: therapy, peer support coaches, and other free mental health advice and services for people aged 18–25.135

The additional Syrian arrivals announced in 2015 – effectively increasing the quota to 1,000 places – required new settlement locations to be established. After extensive lobbying from the community and a council-backed proposal, Dunedin was the first new location to be selected. The Dunedin City Council has been the first council to work with a refugee steering group and participate in the coordination of integration initiatives. In comparison to other legacy locations, the steering group has resulted in a significantly different settlement experience for both the new arrivals and the wider community. In 2018, Invercargill was announced as the next settlement location and while the same approach was taken by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), it was not as well received due to concerns from the City Council about a lack of consultation. In March 2019 – just prior, and unrelated to, the March 15 Terror Attacks – Christchurch was reopened as a settlement location and the Christchurch City Council has played an engaged and supportive

133 WellSouth Primary Health Network (n.d.). Brief Intervention Services. https://wellsouth.nz/community/about-us/clinical-service/brief-intervention-services

134 Nelson Marlborough Health (2020). Stressbusters: Supporting Colombian former refugees in Nelson. https://www.nmdhb.govt.nz/quicklinks/news-and-publications/our-people-our-stories/stressbusters

135 Piki (n.d.). Support. https://piki.org.nz/support

role, but to date no steering group or coordination has been established.

The planned increase of the refugee quota to 1,500 resulted in six new settlement locations being announced for establishment in 2020: Timaru, Ashburton, Masterton, Levin, Blenheim and Whanganui. Planning to establish Whanganui as a settlement site was paused, perhaps for the long term, due to concerns raised by iwi about a lack of consultation.

The current intake of the quota and the full use of these new settlement locations has been affected by COVID-19 border closures. Several emergency cases were accepted into the country from November 2020, and, in February 2021, the quota was tentatively restarted but will not meet the new 1,500 intake for the 2020/21 year,136 with just under 300 people likely to be welcomed.137

3.3 Legal basis for refugee settlementNew Zealand is a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Very little of the refugee settlement programme is based on law, but instead comes about as policies agreed on by Cabinet every three years. The New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy is a whole-of-government approach to delivering improved refugee settlement outcomes.

Refugee settlement policies are also supported by international human rights conventions (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care) as well as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act 1993, which ensure equality and prohibit discrimination.138

136 Parliamentary Service (2020). The New Zealand Refugee Quota: A snapshot of recent trends. Parliamentary Library Research Papers. https://www.parliament.nz/media/7269/new-zealand-refugee-quota-august-2020.pdf

137 Basagre, B. & Cann, G. (2021). Over 200 refugees set to come to New Zealand as quota programme resumes. Stuff. 5 February. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300223368/over-200-refugees-set-to-come-to-new-zealand-as-quota-programme-resumes

138 Bloom, A. (2010). Rights-based approaches to mental health services with refugees: An annotated bibliography. https://www.mentalhealth.org.nz/assets/ResourceFinder/Rights-based-approaches-to-mental-health-services-with-refugees-An-annotated-bibliography-Sept-2010.pdf

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As such, there may also be a rights-based argument for access to care in refugee settlement that addresses shortcomings in mental health and other long-term structural inequalities faced by former refugees in New Zealand.139 Under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s32 B10, a person is eligible to receive publicly funded health services if they are recognised as a refugee under the Immigration Act 2009.140

While these basic protections are in place, academics have argued that the degree of legal protection for both quota refugees and convention refugees is insufficient to meet the economic, social and cultural rights of those granted protection.141 Using examples from health, housing, education, employment and social security, they draw out three concerns. First, they argue access to ECSR varies due to regional differences in resettlement services; second, they note funding focuses on general population, or, when it is specific, on short-term outcomes; third, they note that a lack of embedding of these rights leads to discrimination and a weakness in the overall human rights framework.

3.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to refugee settlementThe humanitarian consequences of migration and displacement are central to the work of parts of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The Movement often provides cross border support as people flee conflict, with particular attention paid to access to health and other services in refugee camps, offering protection regardless of nationality and undertaking advocacy for third country

139 Ibid.140 Ministry of Health (2014). Refugee Health. https://www.health.

govt.nz/our-work/populations/refugee-health/health-needs 141 Mahony, C., Marlowe, J., Baird, N. & Humpage, L. (2017).

Aspirational yet precarious: Compliance of New Zealand refugee settlement policy with international human rights obligations. International journal of migration and border studies, 3(1), 5–23.

resettlement. It is not uncommon for people fleeing conflict and then who are resettled in a third country to have been assisted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement at each stage of their journey.

Regionally, New Zealand Red Cross contributes to the Asia Pacific Migration Network (APMN) to work towards the Movement Leadership model for Migration. The Movement Leadership model is a way to try to create a shared approach to migration that will allow the ICRC to achieve some of the goals shared with the Global Compact on Migration as well as to focus on shared goals within National Societies. While settlement strategies were not the focus of either the APMN or the leadership model, settlement is one of the ways that many of these challenges can be resolved.

Several Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies are involved in refugee settlement, particularly across Europe (e.g., Iceland, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany), North America and Australasia. The British Red Cross offers direct settlement support, through 58 service centres, though this is described as emergency support rather than a universal programme and tends to be focused on asylum seekers and convention refugees.142 The Australian Red Cross also runs refugee settlement programmes in some selected states and is funded by the Australian government in this regard.143 This programme, of all those considered here, is the most like that provided by New Zealand Red Cross.

American Red Cross do not directly provide settlement support in the manner that it is provided in New Zealand, but they do provide support without discrimination and are involved via Restoring Family Links programmes.144 The main focus for the American Red Cross, however, is helping refugees, asylum seekers and migrants through relief and medical care outside of the USA.145 In Canada, Red Cross links new

142 British Red Cross (2021). Get help as a refugee. https://www.redcross.org.uk/get-help/get-help-as-a-refugee

143 Australian Red Cross (2021). Migrant & refugee settlement services. https://www.redcross.org.au/about/how-we-help/migration-support/humanitarian-settlement-program

144 American Red Cross (2020). How Does the American Red Cross Help Asylum Seekers and Migrants? https://www.redcross.org/about-us/news-and-events/news/how-does-the-american-red-cross-help-migrants.html

145 American Red Cross (2020). Migration and Refugee Crisis: Responding in Times of Crisis With Relief and Hope. https://www.redcross.org/about-us/our-work/international-services/migration-and-refugee-crisis.html

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refugees to resources, but not through a formal settlement programme.146 A number of Red Cross National Societies across Europe – including Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Switzerland and Norway – also run settlement support programmes. New Zealand Red Cross engages with some of these societies through the UNHCR-led Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR).

As the main settlement support provider in New Zealand, much of the prior sections detail the work that New Zealand Red Cross undertakes with the settlement of refugees. Key work undertaken by the organisation includes Pathways to Settlement (145 staff and 1,400 volunteers), Pathways to Employment (25 Staff), and Refugee Trauma Recovery in Wellington (12 staff). There has also been more work from New Zealand Red Cross in recent years to strengthen refugee background voices in the national dialogue, from highlighting these stories as part of the Kiwi Legends campaigns to employing staff from refugee backgrounds in a range of roles.147

3.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to refugee settlementEstablished communities with refugee backgroundsThe most common source of guidance and support for former refugees after they exit New Zealand Red Cross support comes from their own community members. Many community members provide support to newly arrived groups voluntarily. There are five refugee forums which are led by refugee-background communities and are based in Auckland (Aotearoa Resettled Community Coalition), Hamilton (Waikato Refugee Forum), Palmerston North (Manawatū Refugee Voice), Wellington (Changemakers Resettlement Forum) and Christchurch

146 Canadian Red Cross (2021). Migrant and Refugee Services. https://www.redcross.ca/how-we-help/migrant-and-refugee-services/first-contact

147 See, for example, Regmi, G. (2020). Former Refugee Voice: Reflection on the refugee and settlement process. sites. 17 (1), 8–14.

(Canterbury Refugee Resettlement and Resource Centre). MBIE provides a small amount of funding to facilitate regional refugee consultation and engagement through the “Strengthening Refugee Voices” initiative148, while some have advocated for an expansion of the programme.149

NGOs and community groupsThere are many NGOs who support refugee settlement, but very few focus solely on supporting former refugees. However, a number specialise in working with refugees and migrants. NGOs and community groups include English Language Partners volunteer home tutors, English language teachers, KiwiClass, Citizens Advice Bureau, Community Law centres, regional migrant centres, Christchurch Resettlement Service, Catholic Social Services and other faith-based organisations such as mosques and churches.

As noted in section two, two LGBTQI+ groups – Rainbow Path in Auckland and Rainbow Haven in Wellington – have emerged in recent years as social, advocacy and support groups. Of the two, the Auckland group is more established150 and organised an event on refugee and asylum seeker rights as part of Auckland Pride 2021.151

As noted in section two, there are only two specialist mental health service providers for former refugees in New Zealand: Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (RASNZ) in Auckland and New Zealand Red Cross – Refugee Trauma Recovery in Wellington, as well as numerous less established programmes, if not organisations, around the country. Third Culture Minds has been active across refugee youth mental health work with a particular strength in engaging with the media, which crosses over to public perception of migrants (see section 12).152

148 Cunliffe, D. (2007). Making a difference. Speech at National Refugee Resettlement Forum Hamilton Kingsgate Hotel. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/making-difference-refugees

149 Stephens, M. & Dutta, M. (2018). Strengthening Refugee Voices in New Zealand. Palmerston North: CARE Research centre.

150 Marrett, C. (2021). Rainbow refugees come to NZ to find safety, but say the system is not built for them. Re:News. 20 April. https://www.renews.co.nz/rainbow-refugees-come-to-nz-to-find-safety-but-say-the-system-is-not-built-for-them

151 Auckland Pride (2021). So Far To Go: Refugees’ and Asylum Seekers’ Rights. https://aucklandpride.org.nz/rainbow-path-panel

152 See, for example, Third Culture Minds (2020). Racism and Islamophobia are a mental health issue. Re: News. 23 June. www.renews.co.nz/racism-and-islamophobia-are-a-mental-health-issue

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GovernmentIn 2013, the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy (NZRRS) was established and it is implemented by an across government senior officials group representing different ministries including Health, Education, Social Development, Kāinga Ora and Immigration. The resettlement strategy has five goals with indicators of success: self-sufficiency, education, housing, participation, and health and well-being. MBIE is progressing a range of programmes under this strategy aimed at improving settlement outcomes, including an employment project and language assistance project.

3.6 What are the needs and gaps?Lack of mental health supportA recent government inquiry into mental health and addiction states that people with refugee backgrounds living in New Zealand experience unmet mental health needs and disproportionately poorer mental health than the general population.153 While acknowledging that there are ways to improve mental health outcomes within settlement, it is also important to note the individuality, resilience and resourcefulness of people with refugee backgrounds.154 A study at MRRC found that only 14 per cent of former refugees reported significant psychological symptoms155 and 45 per cent accessed mental health services in New Zealand.156

153 New Zealand Government (2018). He Ara Oranga: Report of the Government Inquiry into Mental Health and Addiction. November. https://www.mentalhealth.inquiry.govt.nz/assets/Summary-reports/He-Ara-Oranga.pdf

154 Cunningham R., Kvalsvig, A., Peterson, D., Kuehl, S., Gibb, S., McKenzie, S., Thornley, L. & Every-Palmer, S. (2018). Stocktake report for the mental health and addiction inquiry: A background report for the Inquiry panel. https://mentalhealth.inquiry.govt.nz/assets/Summary-reports/Otago-stocktake.pdf

155 McLeod, A. & Reeves, M. (2005). The health status of quota refugees screened by New Zealand’s Auckland Public Health Service between 1995 and 2000. The New Zealand Medical Journal, 118(1224), 36–52.

156 Immigration New Zealand (2018). New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy: Success Indicators and Measures Outcomes Update for 2017/18. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/refugees/nzrrs-dashboard.pdf

A background report for the inquiry panel highlights particular challenges for former refugees including: previous trauma, limited access to mental health services, isolation from family and community, language barriers, poor access to qualified interpreters, poverty, ignorance about the health and welfare system and their entitlements, lack of trust towards service provider and authorities, and cultural beliefs about mental health.157 Additionally, the use of mental health services by young people from a refugee background showed complex challenges including discrimination, lifestyle changes, homesickness, complex family situations, and difficulty accessing culturally safe services.158 Challenges in accessing mental health services were put down to a lack of interpreting and translation and cultural competence available at mainstream services, and limited use in secondary health care but also involved stigma within resettled communities.

Settlement support required for longer than 12 monthsSome families and individuals require support for a longer period than New Zealand Red Cross contracts allow. The needs vary by personal circumstances and by region, often depending on the length of time communities have been settled where they are placed. New Zealand Red Cross estimates that up to 33 per cent require ongoing assistance for up to three years. For many former refugees, the intermediate stages of settlement are more complex than the first few months of living in New Zealand. Issues commonly emerging after several years include worry about family members in exile or when there are difficult events in their home country.

Specialised support for young people requiredNearly half of the people who arrive through the refugee quota are under the age of 18. A review of young people’s experiences of settling in New Zealand, undertaken by New Zealand Red Cross in 2016, identified the need for settlement support

157 Cunningham R., Kvalsvig, A., Peterson, D., Kuehl, S., Gibb, S., McKenzie, S., Thornley, L. & Every-Palmer, S. (2018). Stocktake report for the mental health and addiction inquiry: A background report for the Inquiry panel. https://mentalhealth.inquiry.govt.nz/assets/Summary-reports/Otago-stocktake.pdf

158 Ibid.

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tailored to young people. The existing NZRRS and the service description for the MBIE settlement service delivery do not specify adaption of service for young people.

Amplifying former refugee voices.An ongoing issue for many former refugee and migrant community groups and organisations is the limited opportunities and resources available to them so they can represent their own voice in New Zealand and deliver settlement services to their communities. There is a lack of funding within the sector as a whole and multiple barriers for refugee-background communities to access funding.

Experiences of racism and discriminationThe March 15 Terror Attacks were a horrific reminder of the tragic impacts of racism in the community. Public perceptions, stereotypes and lack of information limits the opportunity for people to integrate into the community. Racism and structural discrimination affect employment, health and education and social integration.

Treaty obligations in refugee settlement New Zealand Red Cross is currently not honouring our obligations to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and tangata whenua are rarely involved in our settlement programme. Connection and engagement with iwi has been sporadic and varied across the regions. Considering a kaupapa Māori approach to settlement could reshape how settlement goals and integration are achieved.

HousingThere is a shortage of housing in many places and housing that is secured is often substandard due to the pressure to take whatever is available. These shortcomings can result in issues with health, safety and neighbourhood issues. Complaints of cold and damp housing are common, with links between poor housing and ill-health reported. Private rentals are expensive (because of bond costs and weekly rent) and those without a tenancy history, as well as single people, struggle to find housing if their circumstances change. Buying a house can also prove problematic without knowledge of New Zealand systems e.g., requesting a LIM report.

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4. AUSTRALIAN RETURNEES

4. Australian returneesMandatory visa cancellations by the Australian government have increased in recent years. These powers have seen nearly 2,000 people deported to New Zealand since hard-line enforcement of the policy began in 2014. In the last year alone, 477 New Zealand citizens were returned from Australia.159

New Zealand Red Cross has received a small number of requests from Australian Red Cross to provide support to New Zealand returnees that Australian Red Cross have been supporting. Where possible, New Zealand Red Cross’s Migration team has provided referral information for Australian returnees. Little is known about this group – often referred to as “501s” – including who may be providing support to them beyond basic government services.

159 Biddle, D. (2020). ‘A hell worse than prison’: Deportee describes Australian detention centre. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/119785003/a-hell-worse-than-prison-deportee-describes-australian-detention-centre; Australian Government, (2020). Visa cancellation statistics. Department of Home Affairs. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/visa-statistics/visa-cancellation

4.1 The international contextThe United Nations Human Rights Committee condemned Australia’s practice of deporting long-term residents as a breach of international law in 2011.160 Other countries who have adopted this approach, including the USA, have also drawn considerable criticism.161

Under Australia’s Migration Act (1958) a visa can be revoked (and consequently the person can be deported) under s116 and s501. Under s501, cancellation occurs because the person does not meet the prescribed good character test; under s116, cancellation can occur because the person poses a risk to the health, safety or good order of the Australian community, or to an individual within the Australian community. These changes to Australian migration legislation have increased

160 Human Rights Law Centre (2011). UN finds Australia violated international law in landmark case. 7 September. https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/un-finds-australia-violated-international-law-in-landmark-case-on-rights-of-non-citizens-and-protection-of-families

161 Mann, J. (2008). Deported: A History of Forced Departures from Australia by Glenn Nicholls. Reviews in Australian Studies, 3(5); Mount, M. (2018). Turn That Plane Around: The Pending Decision on the Deportation of Asylum Seekers. Georgetown Immigration Law Journal. 33, 149.

New Zealand Red Cross disaster response volunteer, Nicky Van Praagh, providing psychological first aid to a returnee from Wuhan, China, in the early days of COVID-19 global pandemic.

© N

ew Zealand Red Cross

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the number of visa cancellations on character grounds and are mainly due to a new mandatory visa cancellation power, which is now applied to all foreign nationals in Australia.162

New Zealanders living in Australia, who fall within these provisions, can be deported with little notice (sometimes a matter of days) in a regime immigration lawyers are describing as “heart-breaking”.163 One lawyer familiar with these cases stated, “I’d rather deal with a murder case than a visa cancellation, because deportation is a life sentence with no parole.164 The Australian government is currently looking to expand its powers to deport people born in New Zealand so anyone (including children) convicted of a crime with a potential sentence of two years can be deported.165 There are also particular concerns about the restrictive nature of the s116 removals: those removed through this only have seven days to appeal and they must pay $1,700. Appealing the s501 cancellation is free and there are 28 days to file an appeal. Lawyers are also concerned that while the s501 removal has a prescribed set of rules over what constitutes good character, these are not in place for s116 removals.166

In January 2021, almost all the Christmas Island detention centres – where deportees go awaiting appeals – were burnt down. Deportees had complained that they were kept in cells for 22 hours a day, received no medical or mental health care, and that the New Zealand government would not tolerate this treatment of their citizens from countries like China and Japan.167

162 Department of Corrections (2019). Returning Offenders: Frequently Asked Questions. https://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/28407/Returning_offenders_fact_sheet_January_2019.pdf

163 Biddle, D. (2020). Kiwis caught out by law forcing deportation within days, Australian lawyer says. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/119855692/kiwis-caught-out-by-law-forcing-deportation-within-days-australian-lawyer-says

164 Ibid.165 One News (2020). Humans Rights Commissioner concerned as

Australia looks to expand New Zealand deportation policy even further. TVNZ. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/humans-rights-commissioner-concerned-australia-looks-expand-new-zealand-deportation-policy-even-further

166 Biddle, D. (2020). Kiwis caught out by law forcing deportation within days, Australian lawyer says. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/119855692/kiwis-caught-out-by-law-forcing-deportation-within-days-australian-lawyer-says

167 Andelane, A. & Prendergast, E.(2021). Another riot breaks out at Australia’s Christmas Island detention centre overnight advocate. Newshub. 10 January. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/world/2021/01/another-riot-breaks-out-at-australia-s-christmas-island-detention-centre-overnight-advocate.html

4.2 New Zealand contextAs of 2020, there are over 650,000 New Zealanders living in Australia, and 62,000 Australians living in New Zealand.168 Between the 2013/14 and 2016/17 years – when the Migration Act was amended – the number of visa cancellations on character grounds increased by over 1,400 per cent. These cancellations were often for relatively minor convictions, such as dishonesty.169 In the most recent year, 477 New Zealanders had their visas cancelled in Australia – more than four times the number of cancellations as the next greatest country, the United Kingdom.170

Nearly 2,000 people have been deported to New Zealand since Australia began hard-line enforcement of immigration policy in 2014. One third of those people had not visited New Zealand for over a decade. Individuals who appeal the cancellation of their visas remain locked in detention centres, sometimes for several years, while their case is decided. In the past year, 36 per cent of appeals were successful, meaning the New Zealander could remain in Australia.171

At least three New Zealanders have died while in detention and at least two other deaths have been linked to deportation,172 while there is also significant self-harm among many of the broader cohort of detainees.173 New Zealand Prime

168 Clarke, M. (2020). Jacinda Ardern to plead with Scott Morrison to stop deporting New Zealanders. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-28/jacinda-ardern-to-plead-with-scott-morrison-for-change-of-heart/12008262

169 New Zealand Police Association (2018). Crime and Banishment. https://www.policeassn.org.nz/news/crime-and-banishment

170 Australian Government (2020). Visa cancellation statistics. Department of Home Affairs. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/visa-statistics/visa-cancellation

171 Ibid.172 Hasham, N. (2016). New Zealand detainee dies inside Villawood

detention centre after apparent altercation. Sydney Morning Herald. April 5. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/new-zealand-detainee-dies-inside-villawood-detention-centre-after-apparent-altercation-20160405-gnyii7.html; McGowan, M. (2020). New Zealand man dies while detained in Melbourne immigration detention centre. The Guardian. 10 August. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/aug/10/new-zealand-man-dies-while-detained-in-melbourne-immigration-detention-centre; Pickering, S. & Weber L. (2020). Australian Border Deaths Database. Border Crossing Observatory at Monash University. https://www.monash.edu/arts/border-crossing-observatory/research-agenda/australian-border-deaths-database; One News (2021). Man killed in Papatoetoe police stand-off was deported from Australia in 2017. TVNZ. 26 February. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/man-killed-in-papatoetoe-police-stand-off-deported-australia-2017

173 Theunissen, M. (2019). Man dies at detention centre where New Zealanders are on hunger protest. Radio New Zealand. 26 January. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/380970/man-dies-at-detention-centre-where-new-zealanders-are-on-hunger-protest

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Minister Jacinda Ardern said the deportation laws were having a “corrosive effect” on the country’s relationship with Australia.174 In response, some media commentators have noted that while these deportations are causing trouble in the relationship, New Zealand is equally guilty since 1,040 Pacific Island nationals were deported in the previous five years.175

As at December 31 2019, there were 1,450 people in detention centres in Australia and 11 per cent were New Zealanders.176 Australian Human Rights Commissioner Edward Santow said New Zealand currently makes up the second-largest demographic within Australian immigration centres.177 Deportees are held for 496 days on average in immigration centres; this compares with the average in Canada of just over 12 days.178 Twenty per cent of people in immigration centres have been held for over 730 days.179 New Zealanders of Māori and Pacific island descent are over-represented in these centres at more than 60 per cent of total cases.180

Feedback from refugee background communities indicates that there is a small but significant cohort of people from their communities who have been deported as part of this system. As a part of smaller communities in New Zealand, the stigma associated with deportation for former refugees can be greater than for the general population. Community members noted a crisis point for returnees around poor mental health, which sometimes led to suicide.

174 Ainge Roy, E. (2019). ‘I was petrified’: the New Zealanders deported from Australia despite decades working there. Stuff. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/08/i-was-petrified-the-new-zealanders-deported-from-australia-despite-decades-working-there

175 Du Plessis-Allan, H. (2021). Heather du Plessis-Allan: Standing up to Australia what’s Jacinda Ardern’s game here? New Zealand Herald. 20 February. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/heather-du-plessis-allan-standing-up-to-australia-whats-jacinda-arderns-game-here/YPGP2Z4NI6BOBSXJHMCIZARWWM

176 Biddle, D. (2020). Kiwis caught out by law forcing deportation within days, Australian lawyer says. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/119855692/kiwis-caught-out-by-law-forcing-deportation-within-days-australian-lawyer-says

177 One News (2020). Humans Rights Commissioner concerned as Australia looks to expand New Zealand deportation policy even further. TVNZ. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/humans-rights-commissioner-concerned-australia-looks-expand-new-zealand-deportation-policy-even-further

178 Ibid.179 Powell, R. (2019). ‘Questions of fairness: New Zealander

experiences of s501 and the case of Shane Martin. Overland, 6 June 2019.

180 O’Regan, S. (2018). Why New Zealand Is Furious About Australia’s Deportation Policy. New York Times. 3 July. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/asia/new-zealand-australia-deportations.html

In early 2021, deportees featured in heightened discussions about whether Australia’s policy had led to a substantial reported increase in gang numbers and sizes. While the methodology for determining the increase in gang numbers was questioned,181 the number of deportees involved in gangs was also shown to be low.182 Nevertheless, the association of deportees with an increase in gang activity may have been fixed in the public discourse due to a few highly publicised cases.183 In March 2021, the issue became politicised as part of a general reported cooling in trans-Tasman relations.184 Key events were the Australian government granting a journalist access to the runway where deportees were being transported back to New Zealand,185 and the deportation of a 15 year old.186

4.3 Legal basis for Australian returnees in New ZealandThe Returning Offenders (Management and Information) Act (ROMI) was passed under urgency by the New Zealand government in 2015. The Act was passed in response to an Australian law change that made non-Australian citizens liable to have their visas cancelled if they were sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment or more. During 2015, the number of offenders returning to New Zealand rose from five per month to

181 Gilbert, J. (2021). Gangs: Shonky stats lead to shonky responses. Newsroom. 16 February. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/gangs-shonky-stats-and-shonky-responses

182 Lynch, J. (2021). Australian deportees make up minuscule amount of New Zealand’s gang explosion. Newshub. 21 February. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/02/australian-deportees-make-up-minuscule-amount-of-new-zealand-s-gang-explosion.html

183 See, for example, the focus on the Comancheros in Radio New Zealand (2021). Comanchero gang leader Pasilika Naufahu jailed for 10 years. Radio New Zealand. 19 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/436732/comanchero-gang-leader-pasilika-naufahu-jailed-for-10-years

184 Murphy, K. & Hunt, E. (2021). NZ politicians attack Australian minister Peter Dutton for comparing deportees to ‘trash’. The Guardian. 11 March. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/mar/11/nz-politicians-attack-australian-minister-peter-dutton-for-comparing-deportees-to-trash

185 Quinlivan, M. (2021). Australian reporter hounds deportees as they’re bundled on flight to NZ, MP Peter Dutton calls them ‘trash’. Newshub. 11 March. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2021/03/australian-reporters-hound-deportees-as-they-re-bundled-on-flight-to-nz-peter-dutton-calls-them-human-trash.html

186 Hunt, E. & Hurst, D. (2021). ‘Rogue nation’: anger in New Zealand after Australia deports teenager. The Guardian. 16 March. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/16/rogue-nation-anger-in-new-zealand-after-australia-deports-teenager

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25 per month. In the first 18 months of the Act’s operation, 625 offenders returned to New Zealand. Most (98 per cent) came from Australia (12 came from the USA, two from Thailand and one from the United Kingdom).

The Act places two main burdens on deportees: there are requirements to submit certain information and data; deportees are subject to supervision on arriving in New Zealand. The ROMI Act affects returning offenders, that is, people who have been convicted overseas of an offence that would be an imprisonable offence in New Zealand. As their conviction has made them liable for deportation or removal, they have returned to New Zealand. The Act enables the New Zealand Police to obtain information from returning offenders, including their name, address, date of birth, photograph, and fingerprints. In certain cases, the police may also obtain a DNA sample from a returning offender.187

The ROMI Act established a supervision regime for returning prisoners. Returning prisoners are included in the definition of returning offenders: people who were sentenced to more than one year in prison or to a number of sentences that total more than one year, and who return to New Zealand within six months after their release. This regime mirrors that for people released from New Zealand prisons and includes the imposition of standard and special conditions under the Sentencing Act 2002 and the Parole Act 2002.

Under s32, some offenders who have returned more than six months after being released from custody may also be subject to supervision conditions. A court must be satisfied that conditions are necessary to facilitate the person’s rehabilitation and reintegration or to reduce the risk of reoffending. In September 2019, a government review of the ROMI Act reported that it was generally working as intended. Only one minor recommendation was made to improve the operation of the Act.

187 Powell, R. (2020). Submission to the Working Group on Private Military and Security Companies in Immigration Enforcement. Border Crossing Observatory. 11 July. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/ImmigrationAndBorder/powell-submission.pdf

4.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to Australian returneesAustralian returnees are of interest to both the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the New Zealand and Australian National Societies as they experience humanitarian challenges. These humanitarian challenges include the forced repatriation of non-citizens from Australia to New Zealand, as well as the integration and legal challenges that arise for returnees in New Zealand.

To date there has been very little engagement with this group. Australian Red Cross has contacted New Zealand Red Cross on a small number of occasions to ask for information on local services or support that can be passed on to people Australian Red Cross is supporting before they are deported.

The Movement’s role in monitoring detention could cross over with this issue. Further exploration would be required if there were areas of detention monitoring that could be engaged with, such as the treatment of deported nationals and/or advocacy around these issues.

4.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to Australian returneesGovernmentWhile the New Zealand Labour Party was in opposition, Kelvin Davis was outspoken in supporting deportees, including visiting Christmas Island.188 In 2020, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern argued that people who were only

188 Radio New Zealand (2015). Kelvin Davis arrives at Christmas Island. 17 October. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/287269/kelvin-davis-arrives-at-christmas-island

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nominally New Zealanders – who had Australian family and accents and had lived there for ten years189 – should not be deported here and that a reciprocal policy might be put in place.190 The Green Party has, in 2021, started calling more directly for a change in Australia’s policy.191

The Human Rights Commissions in Australia and New Zealand are active in this space. The Australian Commissioner, Edward Santow, voiced concern about the “very strict” current rules being extended further.192 The New Zealand Human Rights Commission, working with Community Law, petitioned parliament to take the breach of human rights to the United Nations.193

NGOs, advocates and prisonersAcross New Zealand, the organisation Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society (PARS) supports deportees with criminal histories and domestic prisoners. Between 2017 and 2018, PARS assisted 221 deportees, which was nearly double that of the previous year. PARS Chief Executive Tui Ah Loo said many of the deportees have no family or support networks and need help with basic tasks, and that there is a greater risk of reoffending.194 As PARS is funded in part by Corrections, there remains a lack of independent advocacy on this issue.

Monash University research initiative Border Crossing Observatory, led by Rebecca Powell, made submissions against this Bill and is currently conducting a research project

189 Keyzer, P. & Martin, D. (2019). No, Peter Dutton. Most deported Kiwis aren’t paedophiles and you’re hurting our relationship with NZ. The Conversation. 24 July. https://theconversation.com/no-peter-dutton-most-deported-kiwis-arent-paedophiles-and-youre-hurting-our-relationship-with-nz-120655

190 One News (2020b). ‘Deport Kiwis but keep Australians’ Jacinda Ardern’s fierce message about Australia’s deportation policy. TVNZ. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/deport-kiwis-but-keep-australians-jacinda-arderns-fierce-message-australia-s-deportation-policy

191 Ghahraman, G. (2021). Ally or no, New Zealand must stand up to callous Australia over 501 deportees. The Guardian. 17 March. https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2021/mar/17/ally-or-no-new-zealand-must-stand-up-to-callous-australia-over-501-deportees

192 One News (2020). Humans Rights Commissioner concerned as Australia looks to expand New Zealand deportation policy even further. TVNZ. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/humans-rights-commissioner-concerned-australia-looks-expand-new-zealand-deportation-policy-even-further

193 Human Rights Commission (2020). Parliament Petitioned to Take Australian Human Rights Abuses to UN. 27 February. https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/parliament-petitioned-take-australian-human-rights-abuses-un

194 Varnham O’Regan, S. (2018). Why New Zealand Is Furious About Australia’s Deportation Policy. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/asia/new-zealand-australia-deportations.html

entitled “Balancing risk and human rights in the deportation of convicted non-citizens from Australia to New Zealand”. Part of this work considers the role of private prisoner providers and other businesses that work with deportees.195

Powell notes the role of a range of private security companies and airlines in facilitating the detention and removal of New Zealanders in Australia. Serco employees’ prolonged physical abuse of detainees in offshore detention of asylum seekers in Nauru and Manus Island has been of particular note in recent inquiries.196

Deportees (such as Adrian Maere) and their advocates are conducting hui to discuss the deportation rules with both New Zealand’s and Australia’s Human Rights Commissions and immigration lawyers.197 Iwi n Aus, affiliated to Morunga Migration, has been advocating for deportees, among other migration-related work.198 Most of the assistance needs tend to be in appealing deportation and imprisonment while these appeals take place, rather than direct calls for assistance with settling into lives in New Zealand post-deportation. Most recently, Filipa Payne, from Iwi n Aus and the affiliated Route 501 Facebook page, has told the media she will launch a class action lawsuit against the Australian government over their treatment of 501s.199

195 Powell, R. (2020). Submission to the Working Group on Private Military and Security Companies in Immigration Enforcement. Border Crossing Observatory. 11 July. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/ImmigrationAndBorder/powell-submission.pdf

196 Ibid. 197 Biddle, D. (2020). ‘A hell worse than prison’: Deportee describes

Australian detention centre. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/119785003/a-hell-worse-than-prison-deportee-describes-australian-detention-centre

198 Doran, M. (2020). New Zealand criminals to be deported after months in coronavirus lockdown. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-14/new-zealand-criminals-to-be-deported-after-months-in-coronavirus/12451688

199 Block, G. (2021). 501s fight back: ‘Let’s hold the Australian Government accountable’. Stuff. 23 April. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/300284356/501s-fight-back-lets-hold-the-australian-government-accountable

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4.6 What are the needs and gaps?For this topic, there is a significant knowledge gap in current, available information. Very little is known about the deportees that are currently being held in immigration centres after appealing the cancellation of their visas. While overrepresentation of Māori and Pasifika people has been acknowledged – accounting for 60 per cent of all deportees – further research is needed into particular cases, like that of the unpublished study by Keyzer and Martin.200

There are few recognised social support networks available to Australian deportees, a need that is further exacerbated by a lack of funds. Elizabeth Stanley, a professor in criminology at Victoria University, said rehabilitation and reintegration is exceptionally difficult for deportees and can be much harder than for the domestic prison population. New Zealand Police say more than 40 per cent of deportees reoffend and that “they lack every support that we know helps people move away from a life of crime.”201

While PARS is involved, further research would be required to identify if independent or additional support should be provided. There are challenges for NGOs involved in this space especially if they are interpreted as being connected to the government. That view may be likely as returnees report feeling they have been subject to extra punishment by being imprisoned then placed in immigration detention202 and then required to undertake the parole-equivalent of six months supervision in New Zealand.

200 For some preliminary research see: Keyzer, P. & Martin, D. (2019). No, Peter Dutton. Most deported Kiwis aren’t paedophiles and you’re hurting our relationship with NZ. The Conversation. 24 July. https://theconversation.com/no-peter-dutton-most-deported-kiwis-arent-paedophiles-and-youre-hurting-our-relationship-with-nz-120655

201 Ainge Roy, E. (2019). ‘I was petrified’: the New Zealanders deported from Australia despite decades working there. Stuff. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/08/i-was-petrified-the-new-zealanders-deported-from-australia-despite-decades-working-there

202 Keyzer, P. & Martin, D. (2019). No, Peter Dutton. Most deported Kiwis aren’t paedophiles and you’re hurting our relationship with NZ. The Conversation. 24 July. https://theconversation.com/no-peter-dutton-most-deported-kiwis-arent-paedophiles-and-youre-hurting-our-relationship-with-nz-120655

For Fenika Lome and other Regional Seasonal Employer (RSE) workers in Te Puke, the wet weather and COVID-19 have had a major impact on their ability to work, so the support provided by New Zealand Red Cross has been warmly welcome.

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5. RECOGNISED SEASONAL EMPLOYER (RSE) SCHEME

5. Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme Over the past decade, the labour supply of Pacific island workers from the RSE scheme has become a core asset to the rapid growth of the New Zealand horticulture and viticulture industry. Significant attention has been paid to both how this scheme allows planned growth of the industry and how it affects the myriad of participants. A discourse of the triple win – the destination state, origin state, and migrants – has framed much of the debate about the success of the scheme. In recent years, however, a combination of increased costs for participants, a lack of acknowledgement of the skills of workers, increased demand for similar workers in Australia and detrimental effects for Pacific communities has led to a questioning of the shared benefits for all participants.203

During the delivery of Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri (VCMM), New Zealand Red Cross noted a small number of concerns regarding social isolation of RSE workers and potential workplace violations. These observances involved a small number of instances but were relatively serious. The lack of involvement of a non-governmental organisation in the scheme does raise concerns about options for RSE workers to speak out and get support outside of the existing employer relationships.

5.1 The international contextThe RSE Scheme is a circular migration scheme developed by the New Zealand government for the domestic horticulture and viticulture industries. The major aims of the RSE scheme are to fulfil labour requirements and add to the international development programme in

203 Note: this section is derived from a larger overview of the RSE scheme produced in September 2020 to help New Zealand Red Cross with its VCMM response.

the Pacific. Circular migration can be defined as “repeated migration experiences involving more than one emigration and return”.204 When made into policy, these programmes have often been hailed as a triple win due to claims that three key actors (the destination state, origin state and migrants) all benefit.205 For example, the destination state gains a temporary labour supply, the origin state increases their economic and social capital without losing a migrant’s skills permanently, and the migrant earns an income – the majority of which is sent back to the country of origin as remittances – while continuing to have a home base.206 Recent analysis has sought to expand the concept of the triple win to also include the community and ancillary services, and to incorporate both wins and losses.207

Internationally there are concerns that, while such schemes reduce the social and political costs of migration, they are essentially reproducing temporary migration programmes that take advantage of low-skilled migrants. Similar to previous guestworker schemes around the world, the basic goal appears to be to “bring in labour but not people … a way of recruiting labour to meet employer demands, while restricting worker rights and entitlements”.208 Schemes similar to New Zealand’s include Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program which involved 46,500 migrants in 2019;209 Spain’s Integrated Management Programme for Seasonal Immigration for strawberry and citrus cultivation; and Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) for horticulture, agriculture, aquaculture, cotton, cane, accommodation and tourism labour from the Pacific, though this scheme has only recently matched the prominence of RSE through a removal of the cap on employee numbers and

204 Castles, S. & Ozkul, D. (2014). Circular Migration: Triple win, or a new label for temporary migration? In Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. 27–49. Springer, Cham.

205 Ibid.206 Bedford, C. (2013). Picking winners? New Zealand’s recognised

seasonal employer (RSE) policy and its impacts on employers, Pacific workers and their island-based communities. PhD dissertation.

207 Underhill-Sem, Y., Marsters, E., Bedford, R., Naidu, W. & Friesen, W. (2018). Are There Only Winners? Labour Mobility for Sustainable Development in the Pacific. New Zealand Institute of Pacific Research.

208 Castles, S., & Ozkul, D. (2014). Circular Migration: Triple win, or a new label for temporary migration? In Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. Springer, Cham.

209 Sevunts, L. (2020). Ottawa wants to improve living conditions for temporary foreign workers. Radio Canada International. 29 October. https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2020/10/29/ottawa-wants-to-improve-living-conditions-for-temporary-foreign-workers

© N

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rapid expansion.210 Issues have emerged in each scheme, most commonly founded on the lack of workers’ rights.211

The United Nations has hailed the RSE as a model of best practice for low-skilled managed circular migration,212 and there has also been praise from the World Bank and International Labour Organisation.213 Researchers have also noted the potential of the RSE to lead to success around the Sustainable Development Goals of gender equality and labour rights in a safe work environment.214

A recently published wide-ranging RSE Impact Study suggests that significant changes need to be implemented for ongoing benefits to also flow to Pacific nations.215 The study suggests policy makers pay more attention to worker well-being and financial returns, and ensure more equal distribution of RSE benefits across and within Pacific countries, across gender and across the employer/employee relationship. The study also notes the potential risk to Pacific communities, especially in cases where workers participate in both New Zealand’s RSE scheme and one of Australia’s temporary migration programmes for the rest of the year.

There are concerns about the function of circular migration schemes. As Collins and Bayliss note, nationalism is inherent in the way that temporary migration programmes, like the RSE scheme, operate.216 The RSE scheme is particularly challenging as there are also the complicated dynamics of trying to avoid depopulation of Pacific islands as has been experienced in those

210 Lawton, H (2019). ‘Australia’s seasonal worker program now bigger than NZ’s. DevPolicy. 25 July. https://devpolicy.org/australias-seasonal-worker-program-now-bigger-than-nzs-20190725

211 Castles, S. & Ozkul, D (2014). Circular Migration: Triple win, or a new label for temporary migration? In Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. Springer, Cham.

212 Bedford, C. (2013). Picking winners? New Zealand’s recognised seasonal employer (RSE) policy and its impacts on employers, Pacific workers and their island-based communities. PhD dissertation.

213 Nicholson, T. (2017). RSE a decade of success. New Zealand Winegrower. 11 September. https://ruralnewsgroup.co.nz/wine-grower/wg-general-news/rse-a-decade-of-success

214 Underhill-Sem, Y., Marsters, E., Bedford, R., Naidu, W. & Friesen, W. (2018). Are There Only Winners? Labour Mobility for Sustainable Development in the Pacific. New Zealand Institute of Pacific Research.

215 Nunns, H., Bedford, C. & Bedford, R. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Synthesis report. Immigration New Zealand, 22 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-synthesis-report.pdf

216 Collins, F. & Bayliss, T. (2020). The good migrant: Everyday nationalism and temporary migration management on New Zealand dairy farms. Political Geography, 80, 1–11.

Pacific countries that have a free-association relationship with New Zealand.217

5.2 New Zealand contextThe initial goal of the RSE scheme was to support the horticulture and viticulture industries through the creation of a sustainable labour supply. As noted in the RSE Impact Study, the primary focus of the scheme was on New Zealand employers, industry and government, along with Pacific governments.218 This goal was to be achieved through improving the productivity of businesses, creating a steady circular flow of migrants that did not lead to permanent residency, and contributing to New Zealand’s regional interests such as Pacific development, integration and stability.

The measured impact of the scheme on these goals, according to the most recent RSE Employer survey, included more productive workers, a more stable seasonal workforce, an opportunity to expand business, the ability to employ more New Zealanders, and reduced training, recruitment and pastoral care. The scheme is also increasing the per capita income, expenditure, savings and subjective well-being of workers with a recent remittances study showing each RSE worker’s income flows through to support, on average, nine people.219 However, one study has also noted that the reliance on low-waged work has slowed down the adoption of new technologies in the sector and led to a dependency on RSE workers. This reliance is considered to have a wage-suppressing influence for those other workers in the same job, and for the region in general.220 A 2021 report from the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research backed those claims, but also

217 For a case study on the Cook Islands see: Marsters, E. (2016). New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Free Association. Pacific Geographies. 46. July/August. 21–5.

218 Nunns, H., Bedford, C. & Bedford, R. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Synthesis report. Immigration New Zealand, 22 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-synthesis-report.pdf

219 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019a). RSE Employers Survey 2019. June. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-2019-survey-report.pdf

220 Yuan, S., Cain, T. & Spoonley, P. (2014). Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A literature review. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment report. https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Research/ntom/Yuan%20Cain%20and%20Spoonley%202014.pdf

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noted the difficulty in concluding on the labour market in these sectors that also include working holidaymakers and international students.221

The change in government in 2017 saw a new Minister of Immigration and new goals come to the fore. The new government agreed to continue the growth of the scheme,222 but supplemented its original goals with five further objectives:

1. in the context of strong economic conditions, support industry growth by alleviating labour shortage

2. acknowledge that industry has made some progress on challenges, while incentivising the industry to keep working (such as to build more purpose-built accommodation and to do more to employ New Zealanders)

3. respond to calls for more certainty and transparency in the cap process

4. manage the risks of exacerbating local housing pressures

5. increase opportunities for Pacific workers and nations to benefit.

While there are no tangible proposals currently on the table, there has been some discussion about expanding the RSE scheme from the horticulture and viticulture industries to other sectors that are experiencing labour shortages, including trials in the fisheries and construction industry and the potential of a similar trial in tourism. A report presented by the then-Minister of Immigration at the 2019 conference on the RSE scheme in Vanuatu also noted age care and transportation as possible future sites for RSE expansion.223

Further, the aim of reducing labour shortages in key industries is not only being met, but the stability of RSE labour supply has become a bedrock of the expansion of horticulture and

221 Wilson, P. & Fry, J. (2021) Picking cherries: Evidence on the effects of temporary and seasonal migrants on the New Zealand economy. NZIER report to the New Zealand Productivity Commission. https://nzier.org.nz/static/media/filer_public/0b/6a/0b6a2bbf-2b2b-4438-8acf-5fceea4ca7d5/release_version.pdf

222 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2018). Final Cabinet Paper: Proposed immigration work programme to improve Pacific Migration policies. 15 May. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/897e7e39bc/final-cabinet-paper-proposed-immigration-work-programme-to-improve-pacific-migration-policies.pdf

223 Samoa Global News (2019). RSE Scheme Builds a Sustainable Future Together. Samoa Global News, 25 July. https://samoaglobalnews.com/rse-scheme-builds-a-sustainable-future-together

viticulture industries.224 While these expansions are primarily based on private economic opportunities, the RSE Impact Study also notes that expanding this area of production allows the New Zealand economy to diversify away from agriculture as a high greenhouse gas producing use of land.225

During COVID-19, RSE workers were classified as essential employees, allowing them to continue to work while maintaining social distancing.226 At the time of the nationwide lockdown on 20 March 2020, 10,989 RSE workers were in the country. By October that year, more news stories were coming through on potential shortages, including a focus on New Zealanders being unwilling and less able to do the work. For example, one prominent story noted that one employer “would have to employ three times as many Kiwis to match the productivity of his 40 Ni-Vanuatu workers”.227 In November 2020, the government announced 2,000 Pacific workers would be able to enter the country though they would need to be earning a living wage and the RSE employers would have to cover managed isolation costs.228

While many RSE workers wanted to return home, for some that was not possible due to border closures or lack of flights. Immigration New Zealand adjusted policies to allow RSE workers to change employers, and some were moved around New Zealand to work in other locations when work had finished in their original locations. There has been a large amount of media and social media attention on the issue, including

224 Bedford, C. (2013). Picking winners? New Zealand’s recognised seasonal employer (RSE) policy and its impacts on employers, Pacific workers and their island-based communities. PhD dissertation.

225 Nunns, H., C Bedford and R Bedford (2019). RSE Impact Report: New Zealand stream report. Immigration New Zealand, 10 July. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-new-zealand-stream-report.pdf

226 Bedford, C. (2020). RSE COVID-19 responses, supporting seasonal workers in New Zealand. DevPolicy. 9 July. https://devpolicy.org/rse-covid-19-responses-supporting-seasonal-workers-in-new-zealand-20200709-2

227 Jamieson, D. & McKenzie-Mclean, J. (2020). Thousands of jobs go begging because unemployed Kiwis won’t take them. Stuff. 17 October. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/123055187/thousands-of-jobs-go-begging-because-unemployed-kiwis-wont-take-them

228 Fryckberg, E. (2020). Govt to allow 2000 horticulture workers in from Pacific under strict conditions‘, Radio New Zealand. 27 November. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/431549/govt-to-allow-2000-horticulture-workers-in-from-pacific-under-strict-conditions; Bedford, C. (2021). Pacific seasonal workers return for New Zealand’s summer harvest. DevPolicy. 28 January. https://devpolicy.org/pacific-seasonal-workers-return-for-new-zealands-summer-harvest-20210128-2/

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stories of shortages of workers,229 responses that the government intends to continue to focus on using New Zealand based labour,230 challenges to the wages paid in the sector,231 questions around the underlying relationship between Pacific labourers and New Zealand’s exploitation of their work232 and Tonga’s choice not to prioritise participating in the scheme for the 2021 season.233

5.3 Legal basis for RSERSE workers can only be recruited by approved RSE employers who have been accredited by Immigration New Zealand (INZ). The scheme is not the product of legislation, but departmental policy and this has meant that the Minister of Immigration is free to change the scheme without passing legislation. One recent adjustment requiring legislative changes was a COVID-19 related directive in July 2020, based on s 61A(2)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009, to extend the visas of RSE workers beyond their deadlines.234 It is likely that similar adjustments will continue to be made if RSE workers are unable to return home or if agreement is reached for them to stay for back-to-back seasons.

To be granted the status of a RSE, employers must be able to prove they are in a sound financial position, have robust human resource and workplace practices, and be committed to

229 See, for example, Fuller, P. (2021). Lack of seasonal workers puts squeeze on Wairarapa grape harvest. Stuff. 23 February. https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/124318862/lack-of-seasonal-workers-puts-squeeze-on-wairarapa-grape-harvest

230 Patterson, J. (2021). Migration will not return to pre-Covid levels when NZ border reopens, Immigration Minister warns. Radio New Zealand. 26 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/437205/migration-will-not-return-to-pre-covid-levels-when-nz-border-reopens-immigration-minister-warns

231 O’Sullivan, P. (2020). Local Focus: Orchard wages rising thanks to worker shortage and new RSE rules may lift it further. Hawkes Bay Today. 2 December. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/hawkes-bay-today/news/local-focus-orchard-wages-rising-thanks-to-worker-shortage-and-new-rse-rules-may-lift-it-further/A6OBI6GIK57BZUHG4UT4I2FJMI/; Hall, C. (2021). Want to earn at least $22 an hour? Kiwifruit packhouses up rates. Bay of Plenty Times. 28 February. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/want-to-earn-at-least-22-an-hour-kiwifruit-packhouses-up-rates/VZ74VGSCE23ZXC6M5ROMF2XCJM

232 Tuiburelevu, L. & Wagner-Hiliau, H. (2020). Pick your own damn fruit. e-Tangata. 1 November. https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/pick-your-own-damn-fruit

233 Hopgood, S. (2021). Tonga passes on latest RSE intake in NZ. Radio New Zealand. 2 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/435676/tonga-passes-on-latest-rse-intake-in-nz

234 For the full text of the agreement, and the subsequent agreement to be signed by employers see: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/special-directions/special-direction-2013-grant-of-limited-visa-to-stranded-rse-workers.pdf

employing New Zealanders.235 Once a business is registered as an RSE they need to submit an Approval To Recruit (ATR) application so they may begin hiring from overseas.236 The ATR sets minimum requirements of employers around both duties to employees – guaranteed hours of work and pay rates, for example – as well as to MBIE in the case of a breach of the agreement.

Employees must be recruited from a list of eligible Pacific countries unless granted special permission to hire from elsewhere. Those eligible states include Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Workers are granted visas for a maximum of seven months in any 11-month period.237 Special permission can be granted to hire from elsewhere based on pre-existing relationships with employees from other countries and these are decided on a case-by-case basis. In recent years, this has seen a steady return stream of people from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, India and the Philippines, though these numbers have not grown with the raised cap.

RSE workers make a visa application to Immigration New Zealand for a Recognised Seasonal Employer Limited Visa which must be supported by their intended employer. This application includes providing the written employment agreement which states the type of work and working conditions.238 Once employees are hired, their workplace is then required to provide a certain level of assistance which is known as pastoral care. This care includes transport to and from New Zealand, accommodation with suitable facilities, translation when necessary, access to medical insurance and personal banking, as well as

235 For the current application guide for employers wanting to join the RSE scheme see here: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/forms-and-guides/inz1145.pdf

236 For the current application form and requirements for the ATR part of the RSE scheme see here: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/forms-and-guides/inz1141.pdf

237 Due to their distance from New Zealand and the cost of this transport, workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu can work for nine of 11 months. See the RSE overview from Immigration New Zealand: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/research-and-statistics/research-reports/recognised-seasonal-employer-rse-scheme

238 For more information on the process for RSE Employer selection processes see https://www.immigration.govt.nz/employ-migrants/hire-a-candidate/employer-criteria/recognised-seasonal-employer/apply-rse-status

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recreation and religious opportunities.239 Much of this assistance comes directly out of the employee’s pay, and – in combination with taxes of 10.5 per cent240– led to between 30 and 40 per cent of gross income remaining with employers and the New Zealand government.241

After the 2017 election of a Labour-led coalition government, more emphasis was placed on employers to proactively work with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) to ensure opportunities for employment were extended to New Zealand citizens and residents. Additional requirements were made that the expansion of the scheme did not adversely impact local housing stock. There are now examples of large employers providing purpose-built forms of accommodation for RSE workers.242

5.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to RSEA focus on migrant workers from the Pacific closely aligns with ICRC Strategy 2030 with the drivers influencing Red Cross service – climate change, migration and growing inequalities – all intersecting in the RSE sphere. Specifically, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) notes the importance of seasonal labour opportunities where other climate-related migrant schemes do not exist, citing New Zealand’s labour migration agreements with

239 For more information of RSE employers rights and the obligations of employers, see Immigration New Zealand: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/#34412.htm

240 Inland Revenue Department (2010). Non-resident seasonal workers’ tax rate.’ RIS Pack Supplementary Order Paper No. 187 Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill, 29 October. https://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2010-ris-sop-187-gstrm-bill/non-resident-seasonal-workers-tax-rate#:~:text=The%20RSE%20scheme%20allows%20for,a%20flat%20rate%20of%2015%25.&text=Given%20the%20time%20constraints%2C%20the,viticulture%20industries%20were%20not%20consulted

241 Bedford, C., Bedford, R. & Nunns, H. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Pacific stream report. Immigration New Zealand, 12 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-pacific-stream-report.pdf

242 Eder, J. (2020). Opportunity knocks as seasonal workers vacate Blenheim properties. Stuff. 21 August. https://www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/homed/real-estate/122411010/opportunity-knocks-as-seasonal-workers-vacate-blenheim-properties

Kiribati and Tuvalu.243 These aims have been bolstered by the involvement of New Zealand Red Cross in VCMM support with RSE workers across the country and bolster the IFRC’s aim to support the aspirations of migrants while also contributing to social inclusion.244

During the delivery of VCMM support, 267 applications were received from RSE employers representing 5,466 people. A specialised team was set up to work with RSE employers and employees. Over $3.89 million of food, healthcare and clothing assistance was delivered. One challenge in distributing this assistance was the requirement to go through employers. VCMM teams also undertook site visits to ensure RSE workers had access to New Zealand Red Cross and to identify if they had any other needs or if assistance was required.

New Zealand Red Cross’s engagement with the RSE scheme through VCMM built awareness of the potential risks of the scheme when problems arise and workers have limited access or awareness of independent advice and guidance separate to the employer relationship.

There have been a small number of discussions with other National Societies in the Pacific regarding concerns about protection of RSE workers and the need to be aware of impact risks as well as the opportunities the scheme provides for Pacific communities. There was feedback from some Pacific National Societies who were aware of the support New Zealand Red Cross gave RSE workers via VCMM.

243 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2018). Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate: The Role of Asia Pacific National Societies. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/12/2018-IFRC-Climate-Change-Disasters-Displacement-Report-LR.pdf

244 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2018). Addressing the humanitarian consequences of labour migration and trafficking: The role of Asia Pacific National Societies. 19 June. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/addressing-humanitarian-consequences-labour-migration-and-trafficking-role-asia-pacific

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5.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to RSEIn their recent systematic review of the RSE scheme, Nunns, Bedford and Bedford describe the importance of understanding the complex system that makes up the RSE scheme. They note the cultural, economic and situational differences between different Pacific island employees and the range of locations and work they may be employed in around New Zealand. The vast number of connections and contexts that inform the scheme led them to a methodology that described the RSE as a complex adaptive system. That observation meant that they were reluctant to describe any causal connections between policy and outcomes, preferring to indicate relationships between organisations, governments and other actors.245

Industry and EmployersHorticulture and viticulture industry exports were worth $5.5b to the New Zealand economy in 2017, more than double the $2.7b net receipts in 2007. Industry expansion of the sector has been driven by a consolidation in ownership with many small holdings being bought out and foreign investment leading to significant expansion in planting.246 These industry groups are represented by bodies such as the New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers, Summerfruit New Zealand and New Zealand Apples and Pears. Industry expansion has had important flow on effects for the other businesses – examples include irrigation, construction, transport and agricultural services – that service this industry. Annual surveys by MBIE give an insight into the views of employers on the RSE scheme.247

Employers regularly praise the scheme for helping boost productivity and meeting labour shortages, as seen in the annual Immigration New Zealand survey of RSE employers. Employers can also band together in groups to share the

245 Ibid.246 Ibid.247 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019). 2019 RSE

Survey. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-2019-survey-report.pdf

costs and the responsibility for the hiring period across crops and regions. The first way to group together is through a joint Approval to Recruit (ATR) which allows employers to submit a joint application to Immigration New Zealand. As with the RSE applications, there are requirements for employers to meet around accommodation, pastoral care and transport. The second way to group together is through a grower cooperative or member cooperative like Seasonal Solutions or Pick Hawke’s Bay. These cooperatives are an umbrella for employers that take on responsibility for workers and then contract them out to employer-members in their region. The main benefit of these shared approaches is that cooperatives allow smaller employers to access workers for the periods they need, while splitting hiring and flight costs among hiring organisations.

Pacific island countriesAs noted in section one, most RSE workers come from eight Pacific islands countries, with Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga having the strongest representation. Each of these countries has a degree of control over how recruiting of RSE workers takes place. Most recently, Vanuatu has attempted to reformulate how they select people for the programme, with some concern over the way the selection process can be politicised.248 The government has banned licensed recruiters and moved the process in-house to try to bring recruitment fees in-house and to improve the outcomes for citizens on more remote islands.249

GovernmentThe Labour Inspectorate and INZ (both within MBIE) are the main governmental authorities presiding over the scheme in New Zealand, though their counterparts in the Pacific also set law, negotiate employment relations, lobby for greater access and prepare workers for departure.

248 Wade, J. (2020). Abolishing recruitment agents in Vanuatu: really? DevPolicy. 30 October. https://devpolicy.org/abolishing-recruitment-agents-in-vanuatu-really-20201030-2; Curtain, R. (2020) Reforms to improve Vanuatu’s seasonal labour recruitment system. DevPolicy. 20 November. https://devpolicy.org/reforms-to-improve-vanuatus-seasonal-labour-recruitment-system-20201120-2

249 Curtain, R., & Howes, S. (2020). Throwing it all away? Vanuatu’s abolition of licensed SWP and RSE agents. DevPolicy. 27 October. https://devpolicy.org/throwing-it-all-away-vanuatus-abolition-of-licensed-swp-and-rse-agents-20201028; McGarry, D. (2020). How many more workers can Vanuatu get on the next plane? DevPolicy. 29 October. https://devpolicy.org/how-many-more-workers-can-vanuatu-get-on-the-next-plane-20201028-1

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MBIE is responsible for ensuring employers are fulfilling their obligations to workers and are involved in any disputes. As discussed earlier, MFAT sees the RSE scheme as contributing towards development goals in the Pacific, as most recently established in the Pacific Reset policy of 2018.250 One key role within government is a mediator-like relationship manager position within MBIE. Their role is to help solve any problems between workers and employers and this function appears to be well regarded by employers.251 MBIE’s counterparts in the Pacific – for example, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Labour in Samoa – oversee the scheme from the sending country end of the process.

NGOs, unions and community groupsOutside of this basic ecosystem of organisations, there are numerous governmental and non-governmental groups that can and do interact with RSE employees and employers such as the Inland Revenue Department, Citizens Advice Bureau and churches. In addition, some unions have attempted to organise workers or become involved in cases of mistreatment. However, it is thought that some workers may be fearful of the repercussions of joining a union from either their employers or home governments, thus there is not a huge amount of involvement. Union groups with an interest in the RSE Scheme include the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the Central Amalgamated Workers Union. Smaller groups, but with a wider migrant-focused mandate, like the Migrant Workers Association, First Union/Unemig’s network of migrant workers and the Migrant Workers Network, are also engaged more broadly in working against the exploitation of migrant workers. Increased work appears to be underway from First Union’s Pasefika FONO to engage with RSE workers, alongside all workers from Pacific islands. Finally, some NGOs also work with RSE workers to improve development outcomes in the Pacific, notably Te Puke-based Fruit of the Pacific

250 Harvey, J. (2018). The Pacific Reset: The First Year. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/R-R-The-Pacific-reset-The-First-Year.PDF

251 Curtain, R. (2019). Go-betweens needed to troubleshoot Pacific labour mobility schemes. DevPolicy. 6 February. https://devpolicy.org/go-betweens-needed-troubleshoot-pacific-labour-mobility-schemes-20190206; Curtain, R. (2021). Solving problems quickly to safeguard the welfare of seasonal workers. DevPolicy. 29 January. https://devpolicy.org/solving-problems-quickly-to-safeguard-the-welfare-of-seasonal-workers-20210129-1

who have worked with ni-Vanuatu workers on projects as diverse as oral health education and fundraising around Cyclone Pam.

5.6 What are the needs and gaps?Drawing from the documents, studies and reports – especially the in-depth RSE Impact Study – the following unmet needs have been identified. Of note is the lack of any established NGOs operating in this space. While church connections offer some of the social and emotional support for workers, ultimately RSE workers seem to be defined by their employment relationship and this often determines the kinds of support they receive.

Pastoral care and supportNew Zealand Red Cross engagement with RSE employers and employees during the COVID-19 affected 2020 season showed that there were acute problems with pastoral support for RSE workers when faced with unforeseen challenges. While Tihei Mauri Ora! was set up in the Hawkes Bay – a collaboration between local iwi and the DHB – to provide mental health support during this period, there is a need for this kind of culturally competent support to be extended to non-COVID-19 times and to larger population areas. This support is particularly effective when Pacific health workers can respond to the specific needs of people from the same linguistic and cultural communities.

There was also concern from VCMM staff that COVID-19 disruptions would increase pastoral care needs for New Zealand workers (including making greater provisions for their movements and accommodation, especially across ATR applicants with multiple employers) and that this might lead to a lack of resources to assist with RSE workers who remain in the country. Others from New Zealand Red Cross noted that some RSE communities had strong leaders who were able to ensure that issues were addressed; the challenge was in areas where this leadership was absent and problems would tend to linger and become exacerbated rather than solved.

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Independent non-governmental oversight and advocacyOne recurring issue concerns whether the government is failing to protect workers under the scheme. While there are relationship managers employed by MBIE, the challenges highlighted in the past year – including in the RSE Impact Study – indicate the potential for involvement of non-governmental oversight. While in opposition, Iain Lees-Galloway stated he believed the failures derived from “a lack of oversight by the labour inspectorate”. When the coalition government took power, Labour promised to double the amount of labour inspectors and introduced the Employment Relations Amendment Bill to “support good employment practices among RSE contractors” which includes the ability to unionise.252

There is also a sense from the RSE Impact Study that the design of the scheme as an employer-led programme has led to deferral to those employers and industry bodies from MBIE and central government. In making their recommendations for changes to the system, the authors of the study repeatedly noted where recommendations to MBIE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) would not be popular with “certain stakeholder groups” – these groups were inevitably New Zealand employers and industry bodies.253

There has also been discussion, linked to the RSE Impact Study, that industry leaders may wish to create a gold-silver-bronze ranking system for RSEs and that this system would be influential over increased allocations of workers under expanding employee numbers. The study notes that those rankings would be determined on a wide range of factors including pay, deductions, training and planting projections.254 However, the challenge of any such scheme would be industry capture where the benefits to the government are seen as synonymous with benefits to industry. One way to avoid that problem is through non-governmental, non-industry oversight of

252 Sachdeva, S. (2017). RSE scheme set to expand despite oversight concerns. Newsroom. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/07/05/37520/rse-scheme-set-to-expand-despite-oversight-concerns

253 Nunns, H., Bedford, C. & Bedford, R. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Synthesis report. Immigration New Zealand, 22 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-synthesis-report.pdf

254 Ibid.

any review and ranking system. The creation or funding of an independent “watch-tank” – a watchdog combined with a think tank – was recently suggested as a solution to the RSE problems by a University of Waikato academic.255

Groups that might be able to help employees raise issues about their employment are also restricted in that process by conflicting motivations about future participation in the scheme. Additionally, researchers report that most workers come from cultures that are highly deferential to those in positions of authority. This deferral makes complaints rare and those complaints that are made tend to be minimised at every level of reporting: the team leader, Pacific island governments and the RSE worker all know that if there is a perception that they are troublemakers then employers can recruit other people, from other communities.

Stronger engagement with local communitiesWhile some workers return over many years, there is still a sense within many communities that they are hosting transient workers who have little place in local communities. With the constantly expanding cap on numbers of participants, it is important to rethink the opportunities to engage larger numbers of people and establish enduring connections. As the RSE Impact Study notes, local communities rarely distinguish between RSE workers and other temporary members of their communities on other visas.

Of all the organisations that RSE workers connect to, churches and marae are the most important. These connections have led to peer-to-peer support in natural disaster response, for example fundraising for specific communities in Vanuatu after it was devastated by a cyclone.256 On top of these charity efforts, the dispersal of RSE workers across a range of Pacific nations means that the bottom-up benefit of remittances can immediately help in a way that other funding rarely can. As Bailey and Ng Shiu note in their study of seasonal work as a response to natural

255 Fonseka, D. (2020). The ‘but’ in ‘least corrupt’. Newsroom. 7 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/nz-must-guard-transparent-reputation

256 Nunns, H., Bedford, C. & Bedford, R. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Synthesis report. Immigration New Zealand, 22 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-synthesis-report.pdf

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disasters, workers are often encouraged to stay in their countries of employment and to send money home, rather than to return themselves.257

A $240,000 grant for community integration in Roxburgh has led to it being the standout example of local communities embracing temporary workers as essential parts of their communities. In contrast, a myriad of complaints about RSE workers can be found in Hastings, though most of these are around perceived favouritism of employers to RSE workers over locals.258

One other case offers interesting insights for possible future work in the expanding iwi business sphere: Morrison studied the interface between Tongan RSE workers and the only Māori RSE, Kono in Motueka. This interface appears promising due to the higher cultural similarities between Māori and Pacific worldviews, such as framing the migration movements in terms of kāinga in two ways: the work as the production and provision of food, and the labour as the provision of food in the workers’ countries of origin.259 The possibilities of other non-Pākehā bases for pastoral care and connection was also suggested by New Zealand Red Cross VCMM case workers in the Hawke’s Bay, who suggest the fonofale model of health that would also incorporate more modes of well-being.

AccommodationAs with the rest of New Zealand, the rising cost and below average quality of housing is causing significant problems for the RSE scheme. Established rules around the need for better accommodation and for that accommodation not to contribute to the housing shortages in other parts of New Zealand has led to changes around the quality and type of accommodation offered.260 While some purpose-built housing

257 Bailey, R. & Ng Shiu, R. (2016).’New Responses to Natural Disasters through Seasonal Labour Mobility Programs’, State, Society and Government in Melanesia: In Brief, 12. http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-05/ib-2016-12-baileyngshiu.pdf

258 See several stories from Dileepa Fonseka on difficulties in Hastings, including: Fonseka, D. (2020). The ‘but’ in ‘least corrupt’. Newsroom. 7 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/nz-must-guard-transparent-reputation; Fonseka, D. (2020). Boss allegedly assaulted seasonal worker. Newsroom. 16 July. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/alleged-assault-of-hawkes-bay-seasonal-worker

259 Morrison, S. (2018). Ako ki he nofo ‘a Kāinga: A Case Study of Pastoral Care Between Wakatū/Kono and Recognised Seasonal Employment Workers. A Handbook of Indigenous Education.

260 Bailey, R. (2018). Suitable accommodation for seasonal worker programs. DevPolicy. 13 December. https://devpolicy.org/suitable-accommodation-for-seasonal-worker-programs

is being constructed, there are still challenges involved in the cost and quality of dorm room-style accommodation. Given the acute nature of the housing crisis and the increases in numbers of RSE workers, even with attention from the government and large RSEs, accommodation is likely to remain an issue. RSE workers may receive more of the blame than is due for the housing shortages according to Bedford, Bedford and Nunns, who note that the visibility of RSE workers compared to New Zealanders and backpackers doing the same work may be the source of assumptions about the use of housing. They note the following percentages of RSE workers fulfilling seasonal labour requirements: Bay of Plenty (17 per cent); Central Otago (15 per cent) – meaning that a large majority of workers in the sector are from outside of the scheme.261

The cost of housing is one of the ways that workers are paying more than might be deemed reasonable and, if Sector Agreements regulating the industry go ahead,262 the government is likely to insist on benefits to RSE groups that can show an investment in housing for employees that is of a high quality at a reasonable price.

261 Bedford, C., Bedford, R. & Nunns, N. (2020). RSE Impact Report: Pacific stream report. Immigration New Zealand, 12 May. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-impact-study-pacific-stream-report.pdf

262 Sector Agreements are industry wide agreements that provide an agreement between government and industry to ensure New Zealand citizens are given the best possible chance to be employed in the specific sector. Some more details can be found here: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/changes-to-temporary-work-visas/employing-migrant-workers-under-sector-agreement

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6. International and non-resident studentsRecent years have seen over 100,000 international students studying in New Zealand per year, with 80 per cent of these in the tertiary sector. As these students are away from their families, despite the university’s focuses on pastoral support, they can lack the social support of domestic students. This lack was most recently evidenced by the high number of students accessing Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri (VCMM) support during 2020. Specifically, international tertiary students can be vulnerable to a range of separate issues including labour violations, visa fraud and social isolation.

While this section primarily focuses on international students as non-residents who pay international fees to study in New Zealand, it also considers other issues facing non-resident students. For example, there are challenges for non-resident primary and secondary students whose parents do not have valid visas. While technically able, these young people often do not enrol in schools due to their parents’ reluctance to share details of their residence.

6.1 The international contextExploitation and isolation of international students is a common occurrence in many countries. Previous studies cite their vulnerability to exploitation, but also note a lack of adequate access to psycho-social support.263 International students are more likely to suffer psychological and social distress than domestic students, including psychological and health problems, though these problems tend to be magnified versions of the challenges faced by domestic

263 Sherry, M., Thomas, P., & Chui, W. H. (2010). International students: A vulnerable student population. Higher education; Sawir, E., Marginson, S., Deumert, A., Nyland, C. & Ramia, G. (2008). Loneliness and international students: An Australian study. Journal of studies in international education, 12(2), 148–180.

students. Researchers have noted that more attention needs to be placed on the diversity of international students264 and that COVID-19 has led to drastic reductions in the number of international students worldwide, with particular challenges for those that remain – in terms of social isolation and economic pressures.265

264 Anderson, V. (2014). ‘World-travelling’: a framework for re-thinking teaching and learning in internationalised higher education. Higher Education, 68(5), 637–652; Ramsey, S., Jones, E., & Barker, M. (2007). Relationship between adjustment and support types: Young and mature-aged local and international first year university students. Higher Education, 54(2), 247–265.

265 Mackie, C. (2020). The Pandemic Drives Unprecedented Decline in International Students. World Education News and Reviews. 24 November. https://wenr.wes.org/2020/11/the-pandemic-drives-unprecedented-decline-in-international-students

Wladimir Muñoz and Franco Busillos Rojas, both from Argentina, got stuck in Aotearoa as New Zealand entered COVID-19 Aert Level 4 lockdown. They were supported by New Zealand Red Cross' Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri programme.

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6.2 New Zealand contextWhile numbers of international students have risen to nearly 20 per cent of the entire student population in New Zealand, the central government is playing a larger role in the marketing and regulation of the export education industry.266 The most recent figures show more than 104,010 international students from 177 different countries were studying in New Zealand in 2019, which contributed an estimated NZ$1.2b to the economy.267 This figure has remained roughly the same since a peak of international students in 2003/04. The five years from 1998 to 2003 saw a five-fold increase in student numbers from around 25,000 to 125,000.268 According to the Ministry of Education, international students created approximately 33,000 jobs in 2017, making international education New Zealand’s fourth largest export industry.269 Less than one-fifth of these international students were in primary or secondary education. Of the tertiary education providers, 55,000 were through government subsidised education providers, while 34,000 were through wholly private providers.270

There are also challenges in relation to non-resident students who come from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. In particular, the unwillingness of some parents without a valid visa to enrol their children in primary and secondary schools is a significant humanitarian challenge. The New Zealand Ministry of Education

266 New Zealand International Students Association (2019). Rising international student numbers in New Zealand. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ED1908/S00055/rising-international-student-numbers-in-new-zealand.htm

267 Education Counts (2020). Number of international fee-paying students 2003–2019 July. https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/international-students-in-new-zealand; Professionals in International Education (2020). New Zealand universities report continued uptick in int’l enrolments. https://thepienews.com/news/new-zealand-unis-report-uptick-in-intl-enrolments-students-add-nz1-2bn-to-economy

268 Stringer, C., & Michailova, S. (2019). Understanding the Exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: A Comparison of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Report prepared for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7110-understanding-the-exploitation-of-temporary-migrant-workers-a-comparison-of-australia-canada-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom

269 Ministry of Education (2018). International student enrolments are down but value holds. https://www.enz.govt.nz/news-and-research/media-releases/international-student-enrolments-are-down-but-value-holds

270 Education Counts (2020). Number of international fee-paying students 2003–2019 July. https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/international-students-in-new-zealand

has provisions for these students to be enrolled as domestic students, but part of that process requires students to engage with schools and provide a home address.271 Given that the parents of these students are fearful of coming into contact with the government, they are often reluctant to engage with schools, which leads to students missing out on education.

When students come to study in New Zealand, education providers have a responsibility to ensure that those students are well informed, safe and properly cared for. Despite attempts to standardise pastoral support, fewer than 40 per cent of the students believe that support is available from staff at their institutions for dealing with living arrangements, language and communication problems.272 Evidence also suggests that assistance with emotional issues (loneliness, depression) is difficult to access.273 To support improved pastoral care, the New Zealand government has developed the Education (Pastoral Care of International Students) Code of Practice 2016. The Code was amended in 2019 to encourage proactive care.274 The Code will soon undergo another review and may be merged with the domestic interim Code under the new iteration of the Education Act.

Examples of a lack of pastoral care were highlighted in early 2020 when the University of Auckland terminated the enrolment of an international student after she attempted suicide following a sexual assault, and she was threatened with deportation.275 According to the university, she did not make her change of mental state clear to authorities.276 The university was widely criticised and legal action has been filed

271 Ministry of Education (2020). Enrolling students (as domestic students) who are living unlawfully in New Zealand. https://www.education.govt.nz/school/managing-and-supporting-students/enrolling-students/enrolling-students-as-domestic-students-who-are-living-unlawfully-in-new-zealand

272 Ward, C., & Masgoret, A. M. (2004). The experiences of international students in New Zealand. Report on the Results of a National Survey. Wellington: Ministry of Education.

273 Ibid.274 New Zealand Qualifications Authority (2016). Education (Pastoral

Care Of International Students). Code Of Practice. https://www.nzqa.govt.nz/assets/Providers-and-partners/Code-of-Practice/Code-of-Practice-Amendments-2019.pdf

275 Hutt, K. (2020). Auckland University terminates enrolment after alleged rape victim attempts suicide. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/118695850/auckland-university-terminates-enrolment-after-alleged-rape-victim-attempts-suicide

276 Ibid.

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against this decision.277 In the following discussion on New Zealand Red Cross’s work in the sector, we discuss the experience of international students with pastoral care under COVID-19.

The problem of exploitation was highlighted by Stringer and Michailova, and Collins and Stringer in their overview of temporary labour exploitation.278 In summing up, they noted the complicity of some private training establishments that “potentially helped facilitate the exploitation of international students in workplaces”.279 They also noted international education agents regularly lied about residency pathways leading to students incurring large amounts of debt.280

COVID-19 border closures have led to a decrease in international student numbers. An estimated 40,000 remained in the country in early 2021, with half of these visas to expire in March.281 The government has put aside 1000 Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) places for new students and is considering whether school-run MIQ systems might help increase the number of places available.282 So far, 700 job losses in the sector have been attributed to COVID-19 restrictions, though none have been lost at the

277 Fyfe, J. (2020). University of Auckland student launches legal action over enrolment termination after suicide attempt. Newshub. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/02/university-of-auckland-student-launches-legal-action-over-enrolment-termination-after-suicide-attempt.html; New Zealand International Students Association (2020a). Milking international students until their mental health becomes a liability. https://nzisa.co.nz/2020/01/10/milking-international-students-until-their-mental-health-becomes-a-liability

278 Stringer, C. & Michailova, S. (2019). Understanding the Exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: A Comparison of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Report prepared for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7110-understanding-the-exploitation-of-temporary-migrant-workers-a-comparison-of-australia-canada-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom; Collins, F., & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

279 Ibid.280 Ibid.281 Radio New Zealand (2021). Foreign students prepare to leave

country as study visas expire. Radio New Zealand. 8 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/435974/foreign-students-prepare-to-leave-country-as-study-visas-expire; Menchin, J. (2021). 10,000 international students “best case” for NZ HE campuses this year. The PIE News. 28 January. https://thepienews.com/news/10000-intl-students-best-case-for-new-zealand-he-this-year

282 Hutt, K. (2021). Covid-19: Proposal for school-run MIQ for international students ‘under consideration’. Stuff. 9 February. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/124168570/covid19-proposal-for-schoolrun-miq-for-international-students-under-consideration

University of Otago, which has a cap of 15 per cent of their enrolments on international students.283

6.3 Legal basis for international students in New ZealandAn international student is classified in the Education and Training Act (2020) as a student studying in New Zealand without a New Zealand or Australian passport, a New Zealand residence class visa, or as a New Zealand citizen from the Cook Islands, Tokelau or Niue.284 All international students must apply for a student visa if they are studying in New Zealand for longer than three months.285

In 2016, the Education (Pastoral Care of International Students) Code of Practice came into force (with clarifications added in 2019). The code put in place a raft of measures to ensure that international students are treated fairly by standardising the expectations of service providers (though these do not cover academic quality). Being a signatory to this code is a prerequisite for enrolling international students and NZQA oversees the process and deals with any shortcomings.286

iStudent Complaints was created in 2016 as the government funded mediation service to deal with financial and contractual disputes between international students and their education providers, replacing the International Students Appeal Authority.

In 2018, the government tightened regulations for international students enrolled in lower-level qualifications, making it more difficult for

283 Gerritsen, J. (2021). International student downturn costs 700 university jobs. Radio New Zealand. 1 March. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/437379/international-student-downturn-costs-700-university-jobs

284 Which merged the Education Act of 1964 and 1989, including updates as per Ministry of Education (2020).

285 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Offering A Place To International Students. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/assist-migrants-and-students/assist-students/understand-your-obligations/bringing-international-students-to-new-zealand/offering-a-place-to-international-students

286 NZQA (2016). The Education (Pastoral Care of International Students) Code of Practice 2016 (including Amendments 2019) https://www.nzqa.govt.nz/providers-partners/education-code-of-practice

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them to work in New Zealand once their study had finished. At the same time, they increased work rights for others by introducing a three-year post study work visa for people graduating from postgraduate degrees. According to former Minister of Immigration Iain Lees-Galloway, “the removal of employer-assisted post-study work rights at all levels will help reduce the risk of migrant exploitation, and better protect New Zealand’s international reputation.287 The move was welcomed by the New Zealand International Students Association as reflective of their lobbying efforts.288

Regarding unlawful students – the official term for non-resident students – the Ministry of Education, in a 2020 Circular, clarifies that if a “student is ordinarily resident in New Zealand, living with their parents, legal guardians or family in New Zealand for more than six months, they may be able to enrol as a domestic student, even if they are not legally entitled to be here.” A previous Circular, from 2017, had mentioned that the school could share information with Immigration New Zealand. This has been removed in the 2020 update, and replaced by an explicit comment that information will not be shared with Immigration New Zealand.289

6.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to international studentsThe International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement focuses on the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, but included in these commitments is a focus on supporting the

287 Davison, I. (2018). Government tightens rules for foreign students. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12103471

288 New Zealand International Students Association (2018). Immigration New Zealand adopts NZISA’s recommendations in recent post-study work rights changes. 21 August. https://nzisa.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NZISA-Immigration-Changes-Media-Statement.pdf

289 Ministry of Education (2020). Circular 2020/08 Eligibility to enrol in New Zealand schools. https://www.education.govt.nz/our-work/publications/education-circulars/latest-circulars/circular-202008

aspirations of migrants and building partnerships with migrants.290 Similarly, international students are of interest to the Movement due to the high proportion of students being young people, who make up half of the Movement’s volunteers.291

New Zealand Red Cross has a strong focus on youth engagement and international students are at a clear intersection of this demographic. There is a match with the organisation’s priorities on migration, international development and – directly – youth. As such, engaging with international students could fall under numerous policies and roles for New Zealand Red Cross. For example, while international students might be vulnerable to particular kinds of employment challenges and exploitations (as noted above) they might also be volunteers that help to lead New Zealand Red Cross into stronger international connections, particularly in regions of concern to the organisation.

While the as-yet unpublished results of New Zealand Red Cross’s Youth Engagement Survey292 does not solely look at international students, there is some crossover in both the demographics in those surveyed by age and by their self-identification as immigrants (eight per cent), former refugees (five per cent) and international students (two per cent). The immigrant, refugee and international student categories were not analysed due to them not being discrete categories – that is, that many people identified across a range of these groups. Nevertheless, key themes emerged that non-Pākehā felt more social isolation than Pākehā, international students were among the least likely to claim to have witnessed discrimination (behind only refugees, though there are potential reasons for this seeming anomaly) and Pākehā and Māori reported higher levels of belonging than any of the other ethnic groups.293

290 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2009). Policy on Migrants. November. https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/89395/Migration%20Policy_EN.pdf

291 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2021). What we do Red Cross and Red Crescent Youth. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/what-we-do/red-cross-and-red-crescent-youth

292 See https://www.redcross.org.nz/stories/new-zealand/youth-survey for the original survey form; the data analysis and findings are yet to be published.

293 Similar observations have been made by New Zealand academics in this field. See, for example, Anderson, V. (2012). Homes’ and being ‘at home’ in New Zealand: women’s place-making in internationalised higher education. Gender, Place and Culture, 19(3), 327–343.

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The New Zealand Red Cross Youth Engagement Strategy 2020-2030 highlights the role of young people in leading social change, and connects this to issues like climate change, migration and humanitarian crises that motivate them to act.294 Of particular relevance to international students is the focus on inclusion, though it is also worth noting that there will be plenty of opportunities for international students who are thriving to take leadership roles in other areas by building community resilience, activating voice and hope and mobilising the values of humanitarianism for local and global impact.

Perhaps the greatest engagement that New Zealand Red Cross has had with international students came as part of supporting these foreign nationals during the COVID-19 VCMM response. New Zealand Red Cross had specific staff dealing with universities and international students on campuses and noted how particular challenges were exacerbated, such as failing courses, difficulty when courses end and no work is available, and challenges dealing with being far from home when a health crisis emerges. One common challenge was that the compulsory health insurance usually only covered medical issues and students reported that this did not allow for access to mental health services or pregnancy services.295 Finally, there were concerns from international students that the stress on education systems would lead to diminished pastoral care for international students and more of a focus on the strains for domestic students. These concerns were compounded for international education institutions with a high number of international students that had already seen staff cuts and diminished student numbers.

294 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). New Zealand Red Cross Youth Engagement Strategy 2020-2030. https://www.redcross.org.nz/documents/652/RC_Youth_Engagement_Strategy_2020_A4_v6.pdf

295 One reviewer noted that mental health is covered by the University of Otago’s recommended provider and that there may be some communication issues around what can be covered.

6.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to international studentsAs with many immigration categories, the international student environment is host to a complex mix of organisations. Interested parties include origin and destination states, educational institutions, education agents, and the students along with their families, friends and communities.296

Political parties and government agenciesWhile most international students are studying at a tertiary level and come under the remit of the Tertiary Education Commission, there are also numerous other government agencies concerned with international students. Education New Zealand (ENZ) is the Crown agency responsible for ensuring that international education benefits New Zealand. They work across all education levels and attract international students to New Zealand at the same time as promoting opportunities for New Zealand citizens to study abroad. ENZ are also responsible for administering the Recognised Agency accreditation process to ensure quality of Education Agents. NZQA, in contrast, works in validating overseas qualifications (and, in turn, does the same for New Zealanders studying overseas).

A recent policy study of the international student sector – the International Education Strategy (IES) – has highlighted future directions including moving to a focus on “quality education” and moving away from tying work rights to studying, especially in lower-level private training establishments. With the decimation of international student numbers due to COVID-19, Minister Chris Hipkins signalled an opportunity to reset along the lines of the IES strategy.297

296 Collins, F. (2012). Organizing Student Mobility: Education Agents and Student Migration to New Zealand. Pacific Affairs 85 (1) 135–158.

297 Gerritsen, J. (2020). NZ international student sector: More focus on quality education than work rights Cabinet papers. Radio New Zealand. 4 August. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/422694/nz-international-student-sector-more-focus-on-quality-education-than-work-rights-cabinet-papers; Ministry of Education (2020). Cabinet paper: A Strategic Recovery Plan for the International Education Sector. 22 June. https://www.education.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/R-285-288-Cabinet-Paper-Pack-International-Education-Recovery-Redacted2.pdf

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As part of the 2017 Labour–New Zealand First coalition agreement, the government was to consider the exploitation of migrants with a particular focus on international students. This change of government resulted in several literature reviews of exploitation of migrant workers in New Zealand298 and Cabinet agreement to implement a raft of measures to prevent exploitation, protect those at risk and to enforce penalties on exploitative employers.299

Networks and agenciesThe New Zealand International Students Association (NZISA) is an umbrella organisation representing students from seven of the eight universities in New Zealand. The main work of NZISA is conducting research and advocating best practice for government departments and education institutes. Several other associations work in this space, including relevant tertiary and secondary education providers (including halls of residence), the New Zealand Union of Students’ Association (NZUSA) who represent most of the student unions of the major universities (excluding Canterbury, at present), and other tertiary education establishments. NZISA are developing changes to the Code of Practice for a forthcoming amendment to the Education Act.

NZISA are working on several issues within this community that need to be addressed to ensure improved well-being for all international students. These issues include a lack of representation for international students, inadequate education on tenancy rights, policies that lead to poor integration between domestic and international students and a lack of support staff.300 They noted that these issues were particularly acute when New Zealand universities are reducing spending

298 For examples, see Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand; Stringer, C. & Michailova, S. (2019). Understanding the Exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: A Comparison of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Report prepared for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7110-understanding-the-exploitation-of-temporary-migrant-workers-a-comparison-of-australia-canada-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom

299 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). Temporary migrant worker exploitation review –final proposals. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11801-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review-final-proposals-proactiverelease-pdf

300 New Zealand International Students Association (2019). Rising international student numbers in New Zealand. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ED1908/S00055/rising-international-student-numbers-in-new-zealand.htm

on staff and resources, while also expecting international students desire to study in a COVID-19-free environment to be what returns the sector to profitability.301

ISANA NZ, or the International Education Association of Aotearoa New Zealand, is a national association that aims to professionalise the provision of education to international students by enhancing the capacity of teaching and academic staff. They work across primary, secondary and tertiary levels, offering events and resources to allow professional development of all people associated in the industry of international education. Recent work has included a micro-course in international education recovery in a COVID-19 environment and work on intercultural risk and opportunities through their CI model.302

Universities New Zealand is the sector voice for the eight New Zealand-based universities, with key roles including quality assurance and scholarship administration. The organisation was previously known as the Vice Chancellors’ Committee, before a 2010 rebrand.

6.6 What are the needs and gaps?Despite being mandated in the Education (Pastoral Care of International Students) Code of Practice, there remain challenges in ensuring adequate access to support and relevant information about New Zealand, including resources for vulnerable students. This unmet need extends to providing suitable and effective pastoral care for all students (and for these support networks to not be limited by regions).

As per the New Zealand Red Cross Youth Engagement Strategy 2020–2030 focus on increased engagement with diverse communities, there is an opportunity for more functional programmes – or partnerships with grassroots organisations – that engage international

301 New Zealand International Students Association (2020b). The hypocrisy of New Zealand universities capitalising on Covid-19. https://nzisa.co.nz/2020/05/06/the-hypocrisy-of-new-zealand-universities-capitalising-on-covid-19

302 See https://www.isana.nz/online-micro-course

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students to reduce their feelings of social exclusion. This exclusion is most acutely noted in response to the challenges of studying in a COVID-19 affected environment but was still of note and concern in the pre-COVID-19 New Zealand Red Cross Youth Survey. Local studies have also noted the benefit of volunteering for international students in terms of employment pathways.303

As for non-resident students, recent changes from the Ministry of Education have sought to ensure that every 5–19-year-old in New Zealand can enrol in school, regardless of their immigration status. However, it is still difficult to ascertain exactly how many people in precarious visa situations take up this process.

One New Zealand study said the perception of international students as universally wealthy was an inaccurate and damaging assessment.304 One way to give a more accurate representation would be by providing actual evidence on statistics and data to show that hardship support can be needed for international students, too. VCMM has shown that while students have sufficient resources to travel to New Zealand to study, they can also be reliant on part-time work and support from their home countries, both of which are subject to change. University student associations are also seeing a rise in hardship grant applications from international students, indicating that while there are stringent requirements around the funds students need to have, there appear to be numerous challenges to those systems in times of international economic turmoil.

303 Anderson, V., McGrath, T. & Butcher, A. (2014). Asia-born New Zealand-educated business graduates’ transition to work. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 34(1), 65–79.

304 Butcher, A. & McGrath, T. (2004). International students in New Zealand: Needs and responses. International Education Journal, 5(4), 540–551.

RIGHT: Sofia Cecchini and her partner Felipe Di Giacinti were travelling from Argentina to New Zealand when COVID-19 reached Aotearoa. Based in Queenstown, the couple were on temporary working visas and benefited from New Zealand Red Cross' Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri support.

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7. TEMPORARY MIGRANT WORKERS

7. Temporary migrant workersThis section considers migrants to New Zealand who do not have permanent residency. While this section does include migrant workers who have a residence visa, it focuses mostly on issues for workers on temporary visas. Those temporary visas may or may not have a path to residency – and permanent residency – but it is the specific vulnerabilities around the precarity of visa status that are of interest, along with the humanitarian needs that arise from these situations.

Regionally, the welfare of temporary migrants is of increasing interest to National Societies. For example, Australian Red Cross has recently published a report on the safety and well-being of people on temporary work visas

during COVID-19 as part of their broad focus on vulnerable migrants.

It is also worth noting the overlap between this section and others already considered in this paper: section five pays particular attention to Recognised Seasonal Employer category workers, section six covers international students – who have had work rights, and section two covers asylum seekers and convention refugees who have work rights but are often unable to access them. Those discussions will not be repeated here, except to gesture to previous discussions. Similarly, section eight deals with the conditions facing people who do not have a valid visa, and, while those people could be considered as temporary migrant workers, they have specific challenges which will be addressed in their own section; section ten deal with trafficking and modern slavery, the latter of which affects many temporary migrant workers.

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7.1 The international contextThere are an estimated 164 million migrant workers in the world, comprising roughly 64 per cent of all international migrants.305 Oceania is the region with the highest proportion of international migrants globally.306 Though permanent migration flows remain relatively stable across OECD countries, temporary labour migration flows have substantially increased over the previous decade (though interrupted in 2020 by COVID-19 border measures).307

A reliance on low-wage migrant workers is an almost universal theme in the present age and this means that exploitation is also a common factor. Common forms of exploitation in all countries, including New Zealand, include wage theft, excessive recruitment fees, and unlawful contracting practices. Concurrently, issues of excessive working hours, unsafe working conditions, and unsuitable accommodation are also recognised.308

Further complexities and vulnerabilities for temporary visa holders came to light during the COVID-19 pandemic response. There were safety, financial and legal concerns as people were stranded, lost jobs, and had limited or no access to social services.309 Many migrants work in essential services, contributing meaningfully to host country pandemic responses, but they have also faced higher risks of infection and increased discrimination during this time.310 Of particular concern in a pandemic is the fact that many

305 International Organization for Migration (2020). World Migration Report 2020, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

306 Ibid.307 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020).

Executive Summary. In International Migration Outlook. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ec98f531-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/ec98f531-en

308 Stringer, C. & Michailova S. (2019). Understanding the exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: A Comparison of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, p. 66. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7110-understanding-the-exploitation-of-temporary-migrant-workers-a-comparison-of-australia-canada-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom

309 Australian Red Cross (2020). Covid-19 Impacts Us All. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/0a4ca4bb-c5b9-4b6b-89e9-ff90df3a01fc/Australian-Red-Cross-COVID-19-TempVisa-Report-web.pdf.aspx

310 United Nations News (2020). Uncertain future for migrant workers, in a post-pandemic world. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1072562

people on temporary work visas do not have automatic rights to healthcare.311

7.2 New Zealand contextIncreases in temporary migrants have been substantial enough that Carey, writing for the OECD, described them as having “soared”.312 Recent years have also seen no corresponding increase in the number of new residency decisions being made. This gap can partially be explained by the tightening criteria for residency, but also by systemic issues facing the processing of residency decisions, with claims from numerous groups that this is an ad hoc approach to reducing permanent migrant numbers.313

In New Zealand, temporary migrants work across all industries, but there are concentrations of workers across several main industries: agriculture, horticulture, hospitality, telecommunication, and construction. Traditionally many of these workers have come from Pacific islands, but increasingly employers choose to recruit temporary workers from India, China and the Philippines.314 These workers, along with a handful of others,315 are specifically allocated special temporary work visas to encourage their filling in gaps in

311 Collins, F. (2020). Caring for 300,000 temporary migrants in New Zealand is a crucial missing link in our coronavirus response. https://www.waikato.ac.nz/news-opinion/media/2020/caring-for-300000-temporary-migrants-in-new-zealand-is-a-crucial-missing-link-in-our-coronavirus-response

312 Carey, D. (2019). Improving well-being in New Zealand through migration. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economics Department Working Papers No 1566. https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2019)35&docLanguage=En

313 See Collins, F., & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand; Hickey, B. (2019). The dirty little secret in this migration debate. Newsroom. 11 November. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/11/11/899072/the-dirty-little-secret-about-this-migration-debate; Fonseka, D. (2020). ‘Scary’ residency queue gets worse. Newsroom. 20 July. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/residency-backlog-not-right

314 Stringer, C. & Michailova, S. (2019). Understanding the exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: A Comparison of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7110-understanding-the-exploitation-of-temporary-migrant-workers-a-comparison-of-australia-canada-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom

315 See New Zealand Government (2021). Visas for workers from specific countries. 22 February. https://www.govt.nz/browse/immigration-and-visas/get-a-visa-to-work-in-nz/visas-for-workers-from-specific-countries/

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essential industries. Advocates have increasingly raised their voices about the exploitation that is occurring through these visa programmes.316

Work visas are primarily granted under Employer-Assisted schemes, but a significant number are also granted as Family visas, Student or Post-study visas (see section six) and Working Holiday visas. A small number are also granted under the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme (see section five) and for other specific circumstances, such as on humanitarian grounds (see section two).317 In March 2020, before border measures were changed in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, a new height of 221,226 people were in New Zealand on temporary work visas. There were also 81,948 people on student visas and 190,608 people who were recently granted resident visas. Temporary work visa holders surpassed residence visa holders in early 2019, which appears to be part of a trend towards reliance on temporary workers and diminishing opportunities for turning these temporary visas into residency.318

There are multiple categories of temporary work visas in New Zealand, though few provide pathways to residency.319 The Talent and Long Term Skill Shortage visas have pathways to residency, but these options will end in 2021. Following this change, migrant workers will have a pathway to residence if they meet two requirements: they must earn over 200 per cent of the median wage (calculated yearly) and they must work in a highly paid job in New Zealand for two years. There are also business and investment visas (Entrepreneur, Investor, and the Global Impact work visas) that offer pathways to residence based on capital and skill contributions to the New Zealand economy.320 Low-paid

316 Kilgallon, S. & Xia, L. (2021). ‘It’s all fake’: Chinese migrant builders sold a dream, left exploited and hungry. Stuff. 21 February. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/124279195/its-all-fake-chinese-migrant-builders-sold-a-dream-left-exploited-and-hungry

317 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2019), A New Approach to Employer-Assisted Work Visas and Regional Workforce Planning: Paper One Employer Gateway System and Related Changes, p. 8. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7007-a-new-approach-to-employer-assisted-work-visas-and-regional-workforce-planning-paper-one-employer-gateway-system-and-related-changes-proactiverelease-pdf

318 The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). Migration Data Explorer. Accessed 8 December 2020: https://mbienz.shinyapps.io/migration_data_explorer/#

319 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Temporary work visas. https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/move-to-nz/new-zealand-visa/work-visa/temporary-work-visa

320 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Visas to invest and innovate. https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/investing-in-nz/visas

migrant workers may only stay in New Zealand for a maximum of three years and do not have a pathway to residence.321

Recent years have seen a steady increase in the number of temporary work visas issued, but with no corresponding increase in the number of new residency decisions being made. This gap can partially be explained by the tightening of criteria for residency, but also by systemic issues facing the processing of residency decisions, with claims from numerous groups that this is an ad hoc approach to reducing permanent migrant numbers.322

A 2019 study commissioned by MBIE on temporary migrant worker exploitation in New Zealand found that exploitation occurs most frequently for those on student visas and employer-assisted visas. It also suggests that temporary migrant exploitation is endemic and a serious issue in New Zealand. The nature of temporary migrant work – especially in terms of the hope for residency in the future – means that workers will often be complicit in their own exploitation. This exploitation has an oversized effect on migrant workers and their families with overwork common, an inability to settle in communities and strains on family ties.323

Key instances of employer exploitation include underpaying employees, not complying with employment contracts, denying leave, and leveraging immigration assistance as compensation for substandard work arrangements. Vulnerability to exploitation is exacerbated when employers have the power to threaten visa cancellations either overtly, or through more deceptive claims about the business – and the visa – not being able to

321 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Employing migrant workers — what is changing. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/changes-to-temporary-work-visas/employing-migrant-workers-changes

322 See Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand; Hickey, B. (2019). The dirty little secret in this migration debate. Newsroom. 11 November. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/11/11/899072/the-dirty-little-secret-about-this-migration-debate; Fonseka, D. (2020). ‘Scary’ residency queue gets worse. Newsroom. 20 July. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/residency-backlog-not-right

323 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

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exist if legal conditions were met.324 In short, employees can often become partners to their own exploitation in service of the greater goal of a residency visa. The impacts of this exploitation on people are profound and can include subsequent effects such as mental and physical exhaustion through overwork, and exclusion from basic rights of the state when workers feel they also need to be invisible to service providers. In short, exploitation leads to people living in a society as second-class citizens without the rights to freedom and resources that others take for granted.

Starting in October 2019, Immigration New Zealand began rolling out changes to temporary work visas with the goal of implementing these changes fully in 2021. Most temporary work visas will be affected by these changes, but a few – including RSE, Working Holiday, Humanitarian, and Partnership work visas – will not change.325 Though one of the goals for these changes is to better screen exploitation and immigration misuse,326 the Migrant Workers Association criticised the decision to continue attaching migrants’ visas to employers instead of industries or regions as insufficiently addressing migrant workers’ vulnerability to exploitation.327

During the 2018 New Zealand Migrant Survey, eight per cent of temporary migrants reported exploitation; though likely an underestimate, this extrapolates to the exploitation of at least 20,000 temporary workers.328 To combat this worker exploitation, the government is implementing $50 million worth of changes, including a free-phone line for reporting cases and a new visa option for those with visas tied to an exploitative employer

324 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation in New Zealand. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

325 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Employing migrant workers — what is changing. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/changes-to-temporary-work-visas/employing-migrant-workers-changes

326 Immigration New Zealand (2019). Changes to employer-assisted temporary work visas: overview, p. 6. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/about-us/changes-employer-assisted-temporary-work-visas-overview.pdf

327 Scotcher, K. (2019). Migrant Workers Association criticises New Zealand work visa overhaul. Radio New Zealand. 18 September. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/398994/migrant-workers-association-criticises-new-zealand-work-visa-overhaul

328 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2020). Temporary migrant worker exploitation review final proposals. p. 6. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11801-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review-final-proposals-proactiverelease-pdf

by mid-2021.329 Currently, Immigration New Zealand offers assistance to exploited workers on a case-by-case basis.330 However, recent legal decisions highlight inconsistencies between the treatment of migrants on different work visas. In 2018, the coalition government allowed some people to switch their employer-assisted visas to open work visas, but people on these open work visas did not receive the six-month visa extension granted to employer-assisted visa holders during the COVID-19 response.331 Instances such as these may factor negatively into workers’ decisions to report exploitation and lose their employer-assisted pathways in future.332

7.3 Legal basis for temporary migrant workersThe International Labour Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency, provides conventions and protocols that countries are encouraged to ratify for the protection of workers. New Zealand currently has 33 of these conventions in force, many of which provision protections for migrant workers, including: C155 on occupational safety and health, C097 on migration for employment, C059 on the minimum working age, C047 on the 40-hour week, C017 on worker’s compensation for accidents, and C098 on the right to organise and collective bargaining.333 However, New Zealand is not yet party to the International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 1990.334 Numerous other statutes and conventions have been discussed in previous chapters, but

329 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). Temporary migrant worker exploitation review. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/immigration-and-tourism/immigration/temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review; Lock, H. (2020). Concerns efforts to stop migrant exploitation don’t go far enough. Radio New Zealand. 28 July. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/422168/concerns-efforts-to-stop-migrant-exploitation-don-t-go-far-enough

330 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Migrant exploitation. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/policy-and-law/integrity-of-the-immigration-system/migrant-exploitation

331 Fonseka, D. (2020). Migrant exploitation moved ‘too little, too late. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/migrant-exploitation-journey-continues

332 Ibid.333 International Labour Organization (n.d.). Ratifications for New

Zealand. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102775

334 New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade (n.d.). Human rights. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/human-rights/#actionplan

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especially relevant are those in chapter ten on modern slavery.

Employee minimum rights in New Zealand do not change based on visa status. All workers have the right to a written employment contract, minimum wage (if at least 16 years old), holiday pay, protection from unlawful discrimination, and to work in a safe environment with proper training, supervision and equipment.335 The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 regulates minimum workplace health and safety obligations for all businesses, employers and employees. These standards include the right to refuse hazardous work, protection against discrimination based on work health and safety involvement and the right to a safe workplace.336

The fundamental rules around temporary worker visas are defined in the Immigration Act 2009, including temporary entry visa instructions (22), conditions on temporary entry class visas (52 and 53) and provisions applying to temporary entry class visas (76–79).337 These provisions include extensions of temporary visas by special direction 78A (1) which was recently enacted to extend temporary work visas during the COVID-19 pandemic.338

The Immigration Amendment Act (No 2) 2015 brought amendments to address the exploitation of migrant workers. Previously, it was only an offence to exploit unlawful workers in New Zealand, but this offence was extended to the exploitation of temporary workers to ensure they were provided minimum wage payment and to prevent other employer abuses of control. Punishments for these employer offences include up to seven years of jail and fines of up to $100,000, as well as deportation if the offence took place within ten years of the employer gaining residence.339

335 Employment New Zealand (2019). Know your employment rights. https://www.employment.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/tools-and-resources/publications/09ab9b05c6/employment-rights-new-zealand.pdf

336 Employment New Zealand (n.d.). Health and safety at work. https://www.employment.govt.nz/workplace-policies/health-and-safety-at-work

337 For the full document see: Immigration Act 2009. http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/0051/latest/whole.html?search=sw_096be8ed81a01543_61_25_se&p=1#DLM1440614

338 For this and other short-term changes made to temporary work visas in New Zealand on 7 July 2020, see: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/media-centre/news-notifications/the-government-has-made-short-term-changes-to-nz-temporary-work-visas

339 New Zealand’s National Plan of Action (2015). Pass the Immigration Amendment Bill (No.2) to address gaps in the compliance regime and introduce measures to address the exploitation of migrant workers. https://npa.hrc.co.nz/actions/21

7.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to temporary migrant workersThe International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement provides support based on need with a focus on upholding the dignity of people based on the principles of humanity and impartiality.340

Drawing from these principles, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement does not discriminate based on visa status, a principle often used in relation to temporary migrants who may not have a valid visa, or specific groups such as asylum seekers.

The primary means that New Zealand Red Cross engages with migrant workers is through the Pathways to Employment programme. Pathways to Employment helps former refugees plan their employment, education, training and career goals and, ultimately, find work. In working in this sector, New Zealand Red Cross inevitably comes across other employment issues related to migrants as well as the public. While the engagement with temporary migrant workers is very limited, there is a tendency to work alongside some of the sectors with the greatest risk of exploitation. In the limited occasions where concerns have been raised, Pathways to Employment have referred issues to the labour inspectorate and MBIE.

Concerns about migrant exploitation in New Zealand raised by the Pathways to Employment team during COVID-19 led to New Zealand Red Cross writing to the Minister of Immigration. Following on from this, the organisation was involved in the VCMM delivery. As a crisis intervention, New Zealand Red Cross delivered VCMM with the Department of Internal Affairs – Te Tari Taiwhenua from 1 July to 30 November 2020 to provide support for temporary visa holders unable to return to their home countries because

340 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). New Zealand Red Cross scaling up to assist foreign nationals affected by COVID-19. 1 July. https://www.redcross.org.nz/stories/new-zealand/visitor-care-manaaki-manuhiri-release

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of the COVID-19 pandemic.341 This programme helped more than 12,000 temporary migrants access essential goods and services including accommodation, utilities, food, medication and warm clothing.342 Since the end of the VCMM programme there have also been concerns that temporary migrant workers are not getting access to the benefits to which they were entitled.343

7.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to temporary migrant workers Government MBIE is currently leading a policy and operational review of temporary migrant worker exploitation with the aim of preventing exploitation, protecting temporary migrant workers and enforcing immigration and employment law through penalties and deterrence. The government is investing $50 million dollars to implement these changes over the upcoming years.344 As part of these changes, a new 0800 phone line and online system for reporting exploitation and a new visa to enable migrants to leave exploitative employment without compromising their immigration status are expected to be in place by mid-2021.345 The review has also involved significant international and local research highlighting the key role the government plays in addressing this issue within New Zealand, as well as the necessary collaboration of employers, industry

341 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri. https://www.redcross.org.nz/stories/new-zealand/visitor-care-manaaki-manuhiri

342 Bonnett, G. (2020). Govt, Red Cross spend $15m helping immigrants stranded in NZ. 11 November. Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/430331/govt-red-cross-spend-15m-helping-immigrants-stranded-in-nz

343 Bonnett, G. (2021). Migrant says unjustified benefit refusals and delays keeping numbers down. Radio New Zealand. 22 March. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/438876/migrant-says-unjustified-benefit-refusals-and-delays-keeping-numbers-down

344 The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). Temporary migrant worker exploitation review. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/immigration-and-tourism/immigration/temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review/

345 Ibid.; The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). The temporary migrant worker exploitation review: a summary of changes. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review-summary-of-changes.pdf

organisations, unions, migrants, education providers and other community organisations for effective intervention.346 While it is unclear whether this review will be sufficient to address exploitation, there are significant challenges around how entrenched these systems are that will take more than one term of government to address. The centrality of temporary migrants to the coming term of government can be seen in two of the four priority areas in the MBIE Briefing to the Incoming Minister of Immigration. These areas focus on improving the skill level of those migrants and residents that are accepted and decreasing their exposure to exploitation.347

June 2020 saw the establishment of 15 Regional Skills Leadership Groups (RSLGs) tasked with the role of identifying and predicting labour needs across different regions. Migration is seen as one of the key tools to be able to address regional skills shortages.348

The government also currently enforces a stand-down period in which employers that breach employment standards cannot support migrant work visas. This stand-down may come by way of an infringement notice issued by a Labour Inspector, a penalty ordered by the Employment Relations Authority, or a sanction ordered by the Employment Court.349 However, these regulatory agencies have recently been reported as under-resourced and insufficiently proactive.350

Industry and EmployersThe largest single category of temporary workers are employer-assisted visa holders, amounting to roughly 34 per cent of temporary workers

346 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation in New Zealand. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

347 The other two priorities are (i) the reopening of the border and the internal financial budget balance of INZ with reduced visa applications. See Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Immigration. November. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/12539-briefing-for-the-incoming-minister-of-immigration

348 Ibid.349 Employment New Zealand (n.d.). Employers who have breached

minimum employment standards. https://www.employment.govt.nz/resolving-problems/steps-to-resolve/labour-inspectorate/employers-who-have-breached-minimum-employment-standards

350 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation in New Zealand. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

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or 65,000 people as of March 2019.351 Industry responses to the anticipated temporary work visa changes announced in 2019 were generally positive.352 Federated Farmers and Horticulture New Zealand praised the streamlining of the visa process and further changes that they believe provide additional advantages to rural communities.353

Collins and Stringer found in their review of temporary migrant worker exploitation that a number of industries, companies and employers have taken steps to reduce exploitation. These measures include technological advancements (linking ID cards to timesheets and fingerprint sign-in systems) and procedural changes (standardised employment agreements, random audits, training programmes, translated educational materials on employment rights and stricter regulations). Other industry measures noted for mitigating exploitation were using intermediary companies that interview people after placements to ensure positive future experiences and obtaining product certifications such as GlobalGAP that indicate certain standards of welfare.354

Unions and community organisationsThe Immigration New Zealand website directs workers to the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) so that workers know their right to join a union and can find a union that encompasses their particular occupation.355 There are 27 unions listed on the CTU website united under the goal

351 The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2019). A new approach to employer-assisted work visas and regional workforce planning: Paper One Employer Gateway system and related changes, p.6. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/a-new-approach-to-employer-assisted-work-visas-and-regional-workforce-planning-paper-one-employer-gateway-system-and-related-changes.pdf

352 Business Central Wellington (2019). Temporary work visa improvements a welcome start. Scoop Business. 17 September. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1909/S00232/temporary-work-visa-improvements-a-welcome-start.htm

353 Federated Farmers (2019). Streamlined temporary work visa process is a real positive. Scoop Business. 17 September. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1909/S00429/streamlined-temporary-work-visa-process-is-a-real-positive.htm; Horticulture NZ (2019). Horticulture NZ welcomes temporary work visa changes. Scoop Business. 17 September. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1909/S00430/horticulture-nz-welcomes-temporary-work-visa-changes.htm

354 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation in New Zealand, 59 61. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

355 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Support in the workplace. https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/work-in-nz/support-in-the-workplace

to “improve the lives of working people and their families” through active campaigning.356

Workers can also seek help from community organisations such as the Union Network of Migrants (Unemig, part of FIRST Union) or the Migrant Workers Association of Aotearoa (MWA).357 Unemig is a migrant-led network for the protection of migrant worker rights and welfare in New Zealand. It offers employment advice, representation for migrants experiencing illegal or discriminatory work conditions, immigration advice, employment relations seminars, and referrals to other relevant agencies and community organisations. It also campaigns on issues affecting migrant workers.358 For instance, they were involved in the recent, successful push to extend emergency benefits to migrant workers through the Social Securities Act after the VCMM programme came to an end in November 2020.359

The MWA began as the Indian Workers Association, but now advocates for the rights of all migrant workers. They proactively educate people about migrant rights and responsibilities through public meetings, seminars, and weekly radio shows, while also protesting and campaigning in support of migrant worker equality.360 Recently, Anu Kaloti from MWA has appeared in the news campaigning on behalf of temporary migrant workers, who have valid visas, but are stuck overseas because of COVID-19 restrictions.361 Another recent campaign supported by Unite Union, One Union and the MWA urges the government to set up a “Pathways to Residency” visa option for temporary workers who have made New Zealand their home for five years or more.362

356 New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (n.d.). About us. https://www.union.org.nz/about/

357 Community Law (n.d.). Migrant workers. https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-20-starting-and-leaving-a-job/migrants-and-other-vulnerable-workers/

358 First Union (n.d.). Union network of migrants. https://www.firstunion.org.nz/our-union/union-networks/unemig.

359 Harris, C. (2020). Migrant workers to receive emergency benefits. 20 November. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/123455880/migrant-workers-to-receive-emergency-benefits

360 Migrant Workers Association (n.d.). Who we are. https://www.migrantworkers.org.nz/about-us/

361 Kumar, A. (2020). Offshore work visa holders need ‘statement of reassurance’, says Migrant Workers’ Association. 24 November. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/tarana/123494217/offshore-work-visa-holders-need-statement-of-reassurance-says-migrant-workers-association

362 Unite Union (2020). Unions Launch A “Pathways To Residency” Campaign For Migrant Workers. 7 November. Scoop Politics. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO2011/S00072/unions-launch-a-pathways-to-residency-campaign-for-migrant-workers.htm.

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After interviewing nine union representatives and 18 community participants, Collins and Stringer report that exploitation is perceived within these groups as more pervasive than the media or government acknowledge. They identified international students and post-study work visa holders as those most often exploited; however, the most vulnerable migrant populations were Filipino, Indian and Chinese workers.363

An international NGO, Talent Beyond Boundaries, is also working to provide pathways for refugees to migrate outside of traditional settlement programmes. They are interested in working in New Zealand, having established the programme in Australia, and are seeking to use skilled migrant pathways to increase these complementary protection pathways. Given the UNHCR has sought to increase these pathways in their refugee settlement plans for the coming decade, this is an area that may gain some traction.364

7.6 What are the needs and gaps?While the government is taking steps to address the exploitation of migrant workers with a policy and operational review and roll out of changes, exploitation remains an issue of concern in New Zealand.365

MWA pointed out that the government’s choice to provide the option of an open work visa for exploited workers does nothing to protect workers from getting exploited in the first place.366 Further unaddressed issues include the burden of proof migrants currently face in accessing legal help, a problem likely to also make obtaining the open work visa difficult for many.367 It is difficult to

363 Collins, F. & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation in New Zealand, p. vii, 37 41. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

364 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019). The Three Year Strategy (2019-2022) on resettlement and complementary pathways. June 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/5d15db254.pdf

365 The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). The temporary migrant worker exploitation review: a summary of changes. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-review-summary-of-changes.pdf

366 Fonseka, D. (2020). Migrant exploitation moved ‘too little, too late’. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/migrant-exploitation-journey-continues

367 Ibid.

know how enduring the changes from this review will be, but there appears to be enough interest from academics and unions that wage and exploitation issues are generally well represented in advocacy and the media.

The Australian Red Cross’s report on the safety and well-being of people on temporary visas during COVID-19 highlighted the precariousness of temporary visa holders regarding financial, housing, and health insecurities because of the pandemic.368 These insecurities, they noted, are only exacerbated by the current global health crisis, not caused by it. Similarly, people in New Zealand on temporary visas granted for less than 24 months have limited access to health and social services.369 While unions are making the case for the rights of workers, there is still a gap for the humanitarian needs that exist irrespective of employment, as exemplified by the challenges of COVID-19 and related sudden unemployment.

Another concern is the dangerous nature of many occupations that rely on migrant workers. In New Zealand, the primary sector has the highest recorded incidents of injuries and fatalities, with the highest rates reported within the occupational groups of agriculture and fishery.370 Furthermore, higher work-related mortality rates have been recorded for those with non-native English skills.371 More should be done to ensure workplace safety across these sectors, particularly as it relates to educating workers in a language they understand.

People whose ability to work and live in New Zealand based on their partnership status also face vulnerabilities around domestic abuse. If they contact the police or leave their partner, their right to remain in the country changes. Though there is a residency visa for victims of

368 Australian Red Cross (2020). Covid-19 Impacts Us All. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/0a4ca4bb-c5b9-4b6b-89e9-ff90df3a01fc/Australian-Red-Cross-COVID-19-TempVisa-Report-web.pdf.aspx

369 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Getting public health care in New Zealand. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/tools-and-information/medical-info/getting-public-health-care-in-new-zealand

370 Yuan, S., Cain, T. & Spoonley, P. (2014). Temporary migrants as vulnerable workers: a literature review. Report prepared for the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE52095177

371 Ibid.

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domestic abuse, the criteria for this visa is very strict, leaving many migrant women particularly vulnerable.372 This lack is especially complicated when they have children with their abuser and do not have the right to take these children with them once their visa ends.373 In 2018, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women expressed concern about these issues and recommended that New Zealand revise its immigration laws to include a permanent residency pathway for mothers of children with New Zealand nationality, increase shelters, provide free legal and psychological services for migrant women, and provide information about legal rights in a language migrants can understand.374

As of 19 March 2020, the New Zealand border has been closed to almost all temporary visa holders. Around 10,062 temporary migrants were stuck overseas as of June 2020,375 and though changes in October 2020 opened the border to some temporary visa holders, this exemption is expected to amount to only 850 people.376 Some temporary visa holders have reached out to the media to express the significant stress and financial losses, as well as employment and visa insecurity brought on by New Zealand’s strict border response to COVID-19.377

372 Duff, M. (2020). The impossible choice for migrant women who are abused by their partners. 13 November. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300156998/the-impossible-choice-for-migrant-women-who-are-abused-by-their-partners

373 Ibid.374 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

(2018). Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report of New Zealand. https://women.govt.nz/sites/public_files/CEDAW_C_NZL_CO_8_31061_E%20%283%29.pdf

375 Fonseka, D. (2020). The immigration toss-up. 16 September. Newsroom. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/a-humanity-vs-industry-immigration-toss-up

376 Fonseka, D. (2020). Temporary visa holders can return. 9 September. Newsroom. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/temporary-visa-holders-can-return

377 Bonnett, G. (2020). Graduate international students locked out of New Zealand plead for exemption. 19 November Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/431017/graduate-international-students-locked-out-of-new-zealand-plead-for-exemption; Bonnett, G. (2020). New Zealand partnership visa two-tier system frustrating for couples split by Covid-19. 27 November. Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/431616/new-zealand-partnership-visa-two-tier-system-frustrating-for-couples-split-by-covid-19

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8. People without valid visasThis section covers foreign nationals (and stateless people) who are in New Zealand without a valid visa – just under 14,000 people by the most recent Ministry of Immigration assessments.378 Although It is incorrect, these people are often referred to as “illegal immigrants”. While COVID-19 has produced challenges and confusion around automatic

378 Fonseka, D. (2020). Calls for an overstayer amnesty for the good of all. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/be-kind-dont-deport

extensions to visas, this section will tend to focus on people who have been in New Zealand in the medium to long term and do not intend to leave.

Across the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the principle of not discriminating is applied in migration by “not discriminating due to visa status”. This principle seeks to ensure that vulnerable people receive assistance regardless of legal status. The principle of Independence is also applied in these situations to ensure that government requirements do not limit the Red Cross Red Crescent humanitarian response.

© Tatu Blomqvist

African migrants saved from the sea play football with Tunisian Red Crescent volunteers in front of a newly refubished dormitory, a former chicken farm.

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8.1 The international contextOne of the core measures of what limits and delimits a nation state is the ability to regulate the people who reside within its borders. In practice, however, there are numerous possible challenges to this absolute sovereignty, many of which are based on normative adherence to international laws such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the related 1967 Protocol that, if acceded to, grants foreign nationals the rights to claim protection. However, there are also the practical challenges of maintaining the sovereignty of borders and this leads to a population of people – interchangeably referred to as irregular, undocumented or unauthorised migrants – living in nations without valid visas. It is also worth noting that there are a range of ways that people can find themselves in a situation without a valid visa – they might have entered without a valid visa, it may have lapsed, or they may have had residency that has lapsed.

While there are somewhat reliable data estimates on irregular migration for many countries in North America, Australasia and Europe – as well as for nations with a strong UNHCR presence – there is a lack of solid evidence on irregular movements in Latin America, Asia and Africa.379 The difficulty of coming to a global figure (and the associated practical questions of how these figures are used and misused) was highlighted in the IOM’s 2020 Global Migration Report where they highlighted the shortcomings in a “What Not To Do” section on irregular migration statistics.380 For this section, we will focus on Anglo- and Euro-sphere countries due to both the similarities in reasons for migration and the media environment that affects how people without valid visas are viewed.

The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) is a network of organisations working towards guaranteeing minimum human rights regardless of migration status. The need for these rights was highlighted as a guiding principle in the non-legally binding objectives of the United Nations Global Compact

379 Migration Data Portal (2020). Irregular Migration. 22 June. https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/irregular-migration

380 International Organization for Migration (2019). World Migration Report 2020. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

for Migration in 2018.381 One of the key medium-term goals of PICUM was the establishment of the Firewall Principle that creates “a clear separation between immigration enforcement and access to services (including health care, shelter and education), protection and justice.”382

With no overland border to another country, Australia is in the most similar situation to New Zealand in terms of people living in the country without a visa. While there remain challenges in accurately knowing the number of people who remain without a visa, the Australian statistics are more comprehensive than many other countries, including data on how many years people tend to remain in the country.383 Described by the government as “unlawful non-citizens”, a recent estimate by the Department of Home Affairs put those without a visa at 62,900 people.384 Much of the attention on people in Australia without a visa is on working and exploitation. In contrast, Singapore’s COVID-19 outbreak among migrant workers, has led to questions on how to ensure this community is not a vector for the spread of the virus.385

In the United States of America there has been particular attention on anticipating and restricting overland migrants from Mexico and Central America (though the numbers of people without a valid visa decreased from 12.2 million in 2005 to 10.5 million in 2017).386 Though this attention has been more focused on border security, there have also been policies focused on reducing the number of people who are in the USA without valid visas who do not enter through

381 United Nations (2018). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713_agreed_outcome_global_compact_for_migration.pdf

382 Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (2016). Strategic Plan 2016-2020. https://picum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/StrategicPlan_2016-2020_EN.pdf

383 See Coyne, J. (2019). Australia’s other border security problem: visa overstayers. ASPI Strategist. 6 March. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-other-border-security-problem-visa-overstayers

384 ibid.385 Segrave, M. (2020). The coronavirus risk Australia is not talking

about: testing our unlawful migrant workers. The Conversation. 7 May. https://theconversation.com/the-coronavirus-risk-australia-is-not-talking-about-testing-our-unlawful-migrant-workers-137268

386 Kamarck, E. & Stenglein, C. (2019) How many undocumented immigrants are in the United States and who are they? Brookings Institute. 28 November. https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumented-immigrants-are-in-the-united-states-and-who-are-they

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the southern border with Mexico.387 The rhetorical focus on keeping migrants out of the USA will be considered in section 12 on the public perception of migrants.

A combination of the Schengen visa free movements in the European Union and a lack of research by the Home Office has meant that there is no official tally of the number of people without a valid visa in the United Kingdom.388 This lack of official information has also led to a situation where very different estimates of the number of people without a visa are made, including by some seeking to overestimate for political gain. 389

Some other countries have responded to challenges around movement and COVID-19 by regularising the status of some migrants. As noted in the second annual review of the Global Compact on Migration, France, Italy, Portugal and Zambia all made moves in this direction.390

In summary, populist political leaders have found people without valid visas to be an easy political target. This rhetoric will often skip over the official and legal status of all migrants and refugees, including those who have been citizens for generations. In the Asia-Pacific region, more of the focus has been on asylum seekers than people overstaying visas391 and that has meant more opportunities for nuanced understandings of why someone might find themselves without a valid visa.392

387 Sacchetti, M. & Urhmacher, K. (2019). Nations targeted by U.S. for high rates of visa overstays account for small number of violators. Washington Post. 25 April. https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/nations-the-white-house-is-targeting-for-visa-overstay-rates-account-for-small-number-of-violators-omit-brazil-venezuela-china/2019/04/24/956ef970-65d7-11e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html

388 BBC (2020). Illegal immigration: No recent figure for UK, report finds. BBC. 17 June. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53075318

389 Reuters (2020). Fact check: It is not known how many illegal immigrants are in the UK. Reuters. 1 October. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-immigrants-idUSKBN26L2F4

390 United Nations (2020). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Report of the Secretary-General. Seventy-fifth session: agenda items 14 and 122. 26 October. https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/default/files/docs/english.pdf

391 Coyne, J. (2019). Australia’s other border security problem: visa overstayers. The Strategist. 6 March. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-other-border-security-problem-visa-overstayers

392 See, for example, Blakkerly, J. (2018). What it’s like to be an overstayer in Australia. SBS. 4 June. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/what-it-s-like-to-be-a-visa-overstayer-in-australia

8.2 New Zealand contextPeople without a valid visa in New Zealand have broadly been considered under the category of irregular migration.393 The number of people overstaying their visa’s duration peaked at 21,000 in 2004,394 while the most recent figures have the number at 13,895.395 On a per capita basis, this is roughly proportional to the estimates of people overstaying visas in Australia. The top five countries in order of the number of people who do not have a valid visa are Tonga, Samoa, China, India and the United Kingdom.396 New Zealand hosts very few stateless people, with just two cases in a recent overview.397

There are many ways that people end up in New Zealand without a valid visa, and while this means they are outside of legal migration channels, the cases observed were never with criminal intent. For example, some people may have misunderstood or been actively misled about the path to obtaining a work visa. That process leads to debts, but the migrant has expectations that legal employment will allow them to pay off these debts. Once they realise they are unable to pay off this debt, many stay in New Zealand – like Sia, in a recent New Zealand Herald profile398 – with the hope they will be able to become legal, or at worst, pay off the outstanding debts before returning home. These debts tend to lead to increased vulnerability of migrants to exploitation which does not just affect them, but any dependants and offshore family. One anomaly of this system was brought to the public attention in 2021, when the widow of a Chinese worker who died working in New Zealand but without a valid

393 McMillan, K. (2008). Irregular Migration: New Zealand’s experience and response. New Zealand International Review. 33(4) 1–6.

394 Ibid.395 Fonseka, D. (2020). Calls for an overstayer amnesty for the good

of all. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/be-kind-dont-deport

396 Ibid; Hunt, T. (2017). Overstayers estimated at almost 11,000, of whom 2100 were deported last year. Stuff. 30 October. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/98349601/overstayers-estimated-at-almost-11000-of-whom-2100-were-deported-last-year

397 Lewis, O. (2018). ‘Legally they don’t exist’: New Zealand’s stateless population of two. Stuff. 14 April. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/102973303/legally-they-dont-exist-new-zealands-stateless-population-of-two

398 Tan, L. (2020). New Zealand overstayer on what it’s like living a secret life’ New Zealand Herald. 10 October. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-zealand-overstayer-on-what-its-like-living-a-secret-life/Y6I4JFGV36AQVWFJRDDYZ3YOQ4

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visa was paid out by ACC.399 Commentators noted that the no-fault, no lawsuit system required that ACC had to offer universal coverage regardless of employment status.400

While people remaining in the country after their visas have expired are still sporadically invoked for political, anti-migrant gains – see the discussion of Behrouz Boochani401 and the occasional parliamentary question402 – New Zealand does have a recent history of intense politicisation of this group of people. In the 1970s, with an increase in Pacific migrants staying here after their visas had expired, and an increase in domestic unemployment, the Kirk government launched a highly publicised series of dawn raids of houses in Auckland to find “overstayers” and deport them. The terms “dawn raid” and “overstayer” are complex signifiers, both reclaimed by Pacific communities (see Dawn Raid Records for example) but also retaining the marks of institutionalised racism.403

While there is significant attention on how exploited workers can be persuaded to contact labour inspectors or the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), there has been less attention on the challenges for individuals who are reliant on partners to maintain their visa status. In essence, advocates argue, women are being kept in abusive

399 Fisher, D. & Tan, Q. (2021). Illegally working overstayer dies on the job ACC payment made to widow in China. New Zealand Herald. 18 January. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/illegally-working-overstayer-dies-on-the-job-acc-payment-made-to-widow-in-china/OWADEJMGCUYM36WLF6YNKUA2SE

400 Rennie, D. (2021). ACC Payout For Illegal Overstayer. Scoop. 21 January. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO2101/S00065/acc-payout-for-illegal-overstayer.htm

401 Williams, P. (2019). Peter Williams: Behrouz Boochani is an overstayer and he should leave New Zealand immediately. Newshub. 20 December. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2019/12/peter-williams-behrouz-boochani-is-an-overstayer-and-he-should-leave-new-zealand-immediately.html

402 Pugh, M. (2016). Oral Question to Immigration Minister Michael Woodhouse. Hansard New Zealand Parliament. 16 April. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/51HansS_20160412_00000638/pugh-maureen-oral-questions-questions-to-ministers

403 See, for example, Grainger, A. (2006). From immigrant to overstayer: Samoan identity, rugby, and cultural politics of race and nation in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 30(1), 45–61; Bartley, A. & Spoonley, P. (2004). Constructing a Workable Multiculturalism in a Bicultural Society. In Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi, edited by M. Belgrave, 136–148. Auckland: Oxford University Press; Simon-Kumar, R. (2015). Neoliberalism and the new race politics of migration policy: Changing profiles of the desirable migrant in New Zealand. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(7), 1172–1191; Sadler, R. (2020). Pacific Island overstayer urges Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to grant residency to others living illegally in New Zealand. The Project. 29 June. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/06/pacific-island-overstayer-urges-prime-minister-jacinda-ardern-to-grant-residency-to-others-living-illegally-in-new-zealand.html

relationships by Immigration New Zealand tying their visa status to their partner.404 A recent review by MBIE on the effectiveness of a Family Violence Visa noted some large gaps for migrant women, especially around the lack of an option for those whose partners were not citizens or residents yet. On top of these challenges were difficulties in accessing information about the visa, concerns about the slowness of processing, a lack of consistency, use of translators by Immigration New Zealand staff and the need for specialised legal assistance which was not readily available.405 In early 2021, one case of exploitation of Tongans without a valid visa were discovered when a church was investigated for a scam that was supposed to lead to citizenship.406 Media noted that the scam could target over 100 people because they were concerned about coming forward with their concerns in case they would be deported.407

COVID-19 has led to numerous challenges for people in New Zealand without a visa. These challenges have led to at least two anonymous people without a visa talking to the media408 and have culminated in a call from the Race Relations Commissioner and community advocates for an amnesty for people who have overstayed their visas and a path to permanent residency.409

404 Duff, M. (2020). The impossible choice for migrant women who are abused by their partners. Stuff November 13. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300156998/the-impossible-choice-for-migrant-women-who-are-abused-by-their-partners

405 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019). Recent Migrant Victims of Family Violence Project 2019: Final Report. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/12138-recent-migrant-victims-of-family-violence-project-2019-final-report

406 Dreaver, B. (2021). Elaborate passport scam involving small Tongan church in South Auckland under investigation. 1 News. 15 January. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/elaborate-passport-scam-involving-small-tongan-church-in-south-auckland-under-investigation

407 Dateline Pacific (2021). Akld church overstayers afraid to come forward to immigration. Radio New Zealand. 26 January. https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2018780892/akld-church-overstayers-afraid-to-come-forward-to-immigration

408 Tan, L. (2020). New Zealand overstayer on what it’s like living a secret life. New Zealand Herald. 10 October. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-zealand-overstayer-on-what-its-like-living-a-secret-life/Y6I4JFGV36AQVWFJRDDYZ3YOQ4/; Sadler, R. (2020). Pacific Island overstayer urges Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to grant residency to others living illegally in New Zealand. The Project. 29 June. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/06/pacific-island-overstayer-urges-prime-minister-jacinda-ardern-to-grant-residency-to-others-living-illegally-in-new-zealand.html

409 Fonseka, D. (2020). Calls for an overstayer amnesty for the good of all. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/be-kind-dont-deport; Pailate, M. (2020). Petition of Makahokovalu Pailate for Pacific Leadership Forum: Provide pathways for overstayers to gain permanent residency in NZ on compassion. New Zealand Parliament. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/petitions/document/PET_99196/petition-of-makahokovalu-pailate-for-pacific-leadership?fbclid=IwAR2xR61yB1tqSnoeK3prrsTR4kQ1pgJoav-vUihrfq76recOVrbycwYcKAs

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The challenges of COVID-19 have also seen two people without a visa attempt to claim refugee status around fear of returning to India with its relatively high COVID-19 numbers.410 The New Zealand government, in turn, has tried to assure people without a visa that they are able to get a test for COVID-19 and their information will not be shared with Immigration New Zealand or other authorities.411 These discussions were particularly acute in August 2020 when immigration advocates and advisors noted that people without a valid visa who attended the Mount Roskill Evangelical church would not trust the Ministry of Health and would have no incentive to come forward unless there was a complete amnesty for people who had overstayed their visas.412 People without a valid visa are also concerned that they will not be eligible for a vaccine.

8.3 Legal issues for people without a valid visaNot having a valid visa causes multiple and significant challenges for a person attempting to participate in everyday life in any manner that involves working with the government. These challenges result in an inability to meet basic needs and have a significant humanitarian impact on individuals and family well-being such as a lack of shelter, safe education opportunities and food supply.

In countries with many people without a valid visa, informal systems tend to arise that allow participation in precarious employment and housing. Some states and cities will attempt to get around these challenges of exclusion by making their services not contingent on national or federal identification, fixed addresses or other registration.

410 Tan, Q. (2020). Jailed overstayers claim Covid refugee status in bid to remain in NZ. New Zealand Herald. 20 November. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/jailed-overstayers-claim-covid-refugee-status-in-bid-to-remain-in-nz/WJ4SAKVEPAMT3A6CWHFRQJN3DM

411 Raman, V. (2020). Minister assures no link to immigration. Indian Newslink. 27 August. https://www.indiannewslink.co.nz/overstayers-can-take-covid-19-test-without-fear-of-repercussions

412 Fonseka, D. (2020). Calls for an overstayer amnesty for the good of all. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/be-kind-dont-deport;

In New Zealand, there are fewer informal systems for people without a valid visa to participate in everyday life than in many of the other countries considered above. Without a valid visa, employment must take place “under the table” or off the business records and be paid in cash. This situation means that the legal issues of not having a valid visa can cascade into other legal issues around employment, exploitation and abuse. In June 2018, the New Zealand Police and Immigration New Zealand began an information sharing scheme that was designed to give police access to a person’s immigration status in real time which is likely to increase the number of deportations.413

People who are without a visa can make a case for a Special Visa under s61 of the Immigration Act 2009, described by Community Law as a last resort for people who have a good reason for remaining in the country. For these cases, Immigration has absolute discretion over whether to accept the reasoning or not.414 It is also possible to make an appeal on humanitarian grounds against the requirement to leave New Zealand to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT).415 While Immigration New Zealand notes that it wants to stop the exploitation of workers without a valid visa, any protection offered for contacting them about exploitation is highly provisional and while their advice comes in numerous languages, it makes no guarantees about being able to remain in the country up to or beyond when a prosecution takes place against an employer.416

COVID-19 has led to some changes in this space with a COVID-19 Short Term Visitor Visa allowing stays of two months to bridge visas for people

413 One News (2018). Most read story: Over 10,000 overstayers in NZ, Immigration not actively looking for most. TVNZ. 26 March. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/most-read-story-over-10-000-overstayers-in-nz-immigration-not-actively-looking

414 Community Law (n.d.). Applying for a visa as a special case (“section 61” visas). https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-29-immigration/if-youre-here-illegally-understanding-your-options/applying-for-a-visa-as-a-special-case-section-61-visas/#:~:text=The%20full%20range%20of%20visas,that%20particular%20type%20of%20visa.&text=Note%3-A%20Section%2061%20visas%20can,t%20been%20made%20against%20you

415 Community Law (n.d.). Appealing on special humanitarian grounds. https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-29-immigration/if-youre-here-illegally-understanding-your-options/appealing-on-special-humanitarian-grounds

416 Immigration New Zealand (2020). Migrant exploitation. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/policy-and-law/integrity-of-the-immigration-system/migrant-exploitation

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unable to go home.417 People without valid visas were not eligible for Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri (VCMM). Those without visas were in that situation often due to financial issues or travel timing issues. Not being eligible meant that people in hardship were not able to access support to meet their basic needs.

New Zealand Red Cross needs to be aware as it engages with the government to partner to deliver services in the future the exclusion of this vulnerable group puts both the organisation at risk of conflicting with the fundamental principles and could mean that government responses may not be providing support to those most vulnerable.

8.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to people without a valid visaAs noted in the previous chapter’s section on the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy on temporary migrant workers, the Red Cross principle of impartiality means the organisation does not discriminate based on visa status or nationality. People who do not have a current valid visa are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and lack access to the basic services of a society. As such people without a valid visa must be seen as a key concern for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent centred humanitarian concerns generated by international migration, declaring humanitarian assistance should be provided by National Societies to vulnerable migrants should be provided irrespective of

417 See Immigration New Zealand (2020). Information about Covid-19 Short Term Visitor Visa. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/visa-factsheet/covid19-short-term-visitor-visa

the legal status of migrants.418 Though much of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy focuses on irregular migrants needing short term assistance with the actual migration movement regularly focussed on, when describing other services provided by National Societies it is also emphasised that there should be active steps taken to avoid discrimination on the basis of migration status.419 The irrelevance of migration status for assistance was underlined in the IFRC COVID-19 response where both health and dignity of migrants was foregrounded,420 as well as in Australian Red Cross advocacy around the rights of this group to access healthcare and have their status resolved.421

As noted in section seven on temporary migrant workers, New Zealand Red Cross VCMM work came into contact, and had anecdotal feedback on, foreign nationals who did not have a valid visa. The challenges of COVID-19 changes to visas meant that many clients faced uncertain visa statuses and quickly changing rules and processes. These changes meant that the organisation was often on the front lines of assisting people who found themselves without a valid visa and at risk of discriminating based on visa status. New Zealand Red Cross has argued for a firewall between VCMM and Immigration New Zealand to reduce concern for foreign nationals about their visa being affected that would hamper distributing aid. This area was of particular concern given the commitments of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to provide aid regardless of the nationalities of the people who are affected.

418 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2009). Policy on Migration. https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Governance/Policies/migration-policy-en.pdf

419 Ibid; Red Cross European Union (2016). Position Paper: Protecting the dignity and rights of migrants in an irregular situation. https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Governance/Policies/migration-policy-en.pdf

420 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2020). Least Protected, Most Affected: Migrants and refugees facing extraordinary risks during the COVID-19 pandemic. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/09/IFRC-report-COVID19-migrants-least-protected-most-affected.pdf

421 Australian Red Cross (2020). COVID-19 impacts us all: Ensuring the safety and well-being of people on temporary visas during COVID-19. August. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/0a4ca4bb-c5b9-4b6b-89e9-ff90df3a01fc/Australian-Red-Cross-COVID-19-TempVisa-Report-web.pdf.aspx

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amnesty for people on expired visas in relation to COVID-19 to ensure widespread testing.424

NGOs, advocacy groups and individualsMany of the advocates for the rights of people without a visa come from the communities most represented. For example, Kennedy Maeakafa Fakana’ana’a-ki-Fualu and Makahokovalu Pailate, representing the Pacific Leadership Forum launched the petition to the Prime Minister for an amnesty for people who had overstayed visas.425 They also worked to provide food to families affected by the COVID-19 lockdown, noting the increased risk of exploitation.

Both Shama Ethnic Women’s Trust and the nationwide Shakti network offer migrant-women specific assistance with domestic violence, and the subsequent visa problems that can result from decoupling from a partnership visa. Women’s Refuge has also been active in lobbying for a change to the way victims of domestic violence are treated by Immigration New Zealand.426

8.6 What are the needs and gaps?People without valid visas are vulnerable to both exploitation in the labour market and to increased domestic violence with no path of escape. These challenges are significant humanitarian issues for both those without valid visas as well as their dependents. In the case of domestic violence there are challenges for the safety of women who are not the primary visa applicant or who are partnered to New Zealand citizens or residents and have their status determined by these people. In the recent review by MBIE, reviewers were

424 Radio New Zealand (2020). Auckland councillor Efeso Collins calls for amnesty for people with expired visas. Radio New Zealand. 20 August. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/covid-19/424564/auckland-councillor-efeso-collins-calls-for-amnesty-for-people-with-expired-visas

425 Moala, R. (2020). Pacific Leadership Forum petitions MPs on behalf of overstayers in New Zealand’ Pacific Media Network. 25 June. https://pmn.co.nz/articles/pacific-leadership-forum-petitions-mps-on-behalf-of-overstayers-in-new-zealand-1

426 Duff, M. (2020). The impossible choice for migrant women who are abused by their partners. Stuff November 13. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300156998/the-impossible-choice-for-migrant-women-who-are-abused-by-their-partners

8.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to people without a valid visaImmigration and Legal advisors As a non-profit organisation, Community Law helps all people in New Zealand with legal advice. As they do not have a profit motive, and are jointly staffed by lawyers and community volunteers, they have fewer conflicts about accepting clients. In contrast, immigration lawyers and advisors are often in a difficult position between a client whose only interest is in finding some way to stay in the country, the fees from this work, and the cases that some describe as drawing from irrational hope.422 Immigration advisors and lawyers can sometimes be blamed for not finding a way for people without a valid visa to stay in the country, even when there appears to be no clear path for that to happen.423

GovernmentImmigration New Zealand, within MBIE, is the main government agency charged with ensuring that people without a valid visa are either issued a deportation notice or a visa that will allow them to stay in the country. In their enforcement role they are much more direct about the lack of rights of non-citizens than organisations tasked with assisting migrants

While noting the limits on their ability to help with immigration matters, the Human Rights Commission has been active in making sure that people are treated fairly by immigration New Zealand, including their staff, and have regularly advocated for the rights of migrants, even if these are not presently legal rights that people without a visa have in New Zealand law. Auckland Councillor Efeso Collins backed calls for an

422 See, for example, Lakshman, K. (2018). Overstayers In New Zealand. Idesi Legal. https://www.immigrationlawyersauckland.co.nz/overstayers-in-new-zealand/ and comments from Tuariki Delemare in Fonseka, D. (2020). Calls for an overstayer amnesty for the good of all. Newsroom. 10 September. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/be-kind-dont-deport

423 Ibid.

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told, “visas were commonly used as a tool of control, with abusers threatening women with deportation and separation from their children if they left.”427

While there has been recent attention on the need to focus on the victims of domestic violence and ensure that migration settings help them to break from abusive relationships, there does not appear to be traction on making changes to these policies. There is a need for a well-informed advocacy campaign to insist that the protection of people from domestic abuse is not hindered by visa settings. In 2018, the former Minister of Immigration said that a change to this law was not a priority for his government.428

At a practical level, there is a need for a clear and widely understood minimum set of rights for people without a valid visa. While the United Nations’ Global Compact for Migration sought to establish these, that agreement was opposed in New Zealand by the opposition, and internationally, by a group of far-right groups. Another approach might be to follow international recommendations by PICUM to create the same kind of firewall around some services and sharing of information between these departments and Immigration New Zealand and the New Zealand Police. This firewall, if consistent, should improve levels of trust held by people without a visa that they can participate to a certain level in New Zealand society. The best example of this was the challenge around COVID-19 health tests where this group were reluctant to seek help around testing due to fear of being deported.

New Zealand also has not had an amnesty for people without a valid visa in more than 20 years, though these were regular in preceding decades, starting with Norman Kirk in 1974.429 The most recent amnesty was in 2000 and initiated by

427 Duff, M. (2020). Immigration NZ ‘facilitating abuse’ of migrant women who can’t leave abusive partners without being deported. Stuff. 7 November. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300152207/immigration-nz-facilitating-abuse-of-migrant-women-who-cant-leave-abusive-partners-without-being-deported?rm=a

428 Duff, M. (2020). The impossible choice for migrant women who are abused by their partners. Stuff November 13. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300156998/the-impossible-choice-for-migrant-women-who-are-abused-by-their-partners

429 Sadler, R. (2020). Pacific Island overstayer urges Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to grant residency to others living illegally in New Zealand. The Project. 29 June. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/06/pacific-island-overstayer-urges-prime-minister-jacinda-ardern-to-grant-residency-to-others-living-illegally-in-new-zealand.html

Labour with 8,000 of 20,000 people eligible to sign up to a two-year work visa that could then be turned into permanent residency.430 There has been public support for this being repeated from MWA as well as the Human Rights Commission, and there could be a space for a strong case for the benefits of another amnesty to be made in the wake of COVID-19.

430 NZPA (2000). Overstayers amnesty to cost $12.4m. New Zealand Herald. 10 November. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/overstayers-amnesty-to-cost-124m/3WXGE3D2DKFICUX73Y33NGFIJ4/

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© Corrinne Am

bler/ IFRC

Bangladesh, Sirajganj district, Adere Begum, aged 34, was one of those who received food and safe drinking water from Bangladesh Red Crescent Society during a distribution on a small island on the Jamuna River following the devastating floods which impacted the region in 2017.

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9. MOBILITY, DISASTERS AND DISPLACEMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE

Emerging IssuesIn part two of this report, we consider a raft of emerging issues that do not fit neatly into any one visa type, or which may affect migrants in general. These issues have been chosen due to a combination of their relevance to the priorities of Strategy 2030 – in both the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and New Zealand Red Cross approaches – as well as the likelihood of their continued global and domestic importance in coming years.

Part two 9. Mobility, Disasters and Displacement in a Changing ClimateThe projected mass displacement of people in the coming decades due to increased abnormal weather events will be a defining theme of the century.431 On average, more than 20 million people are newly displaced every year by climate and environmental disasters, with the vast majority of cases in the Asia-Pacific region.432 The humanitarian impact of climate change will be extreme as people will not only be displaced but will often have no ability to return to their homes; at some threshold of climate change some may even be unable to remain living in their country. Climate change will undermine necessities essential to the enjoyment of the basic rights of life: destroying places of shelter, upending food supply locally, regionally and internationally, and denying the rights of citizenry including access to health, education and welfare.

The expected humanitarian impacts of these disasters have led to human mobility as a result of climate change becoming a Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement priority. This priority is based on the broad humanitarian devastation that accompanies the loss of homes, lands, livelihoods and, potentially, citizenship. As such, a proactive human mobility response to climate change and disasters has a central place in both the Disaster Risk Management Strategy and New Zealand Red Cross Strategy 2030, as well as a central place in the planning of National Societies throughout the Pacific. This section will deal with a particular type of human mobility in the context of disasters and climate change. This positioning can be read in parallel with how migrants who are already in New

431 This chapter focuses on human mobility as a result of environmental and climate related phenomena. This position does not imply that climate change is a direct cause of disasters, but that it multiplies already existing phenomena.

432 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2018). Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate: The Role of Asia Pacific National Societies. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/12/2018-IFRC-Climate-Change-Disasters-Displacement-Report-LR.pdf

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Zealand respond to disasters – see section 11 – including preparedness and prevention.

9.1 The international contextHuman mobility as a result of climate change and disasters is a fairly new area of study and the language in this section tends to be less settled than in the others. Because of this, it is worth making a quick note on language. “Climate refugee” is not a legally or academically recognised term, though it is often used and may, despite its shortcomings, come into common usage due to the ease of understanding the term as a shorthand for displacement of people. The UNHCR notes, “the term ‘climate refugee’ is not endorsed by the UNHCR, and it is more accurate to refer to ‘persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change’”.433 For this report, we have used the term mobility as an umbrella category, under which a range of movements exist, including displacements that are short term or permanent, and other types of regular and forced migration. For now, we will merely note that there will need to be continued thought put into how different levels of documents – public-facing communication compared to strategy and research, for example – may need to consider the terminology of human mobility and climate displacement. Given the ongoing terminological discussions, we have attempted to find a middle ground between the passivity of neutral language and the more active terms required for framings that encourage humanitarian action.

In 2012, the United Nations Secretary-General’s report to the United Nations General Assembly on Human Rights and Migration predicted that, by 2050, up to 250 million people may be displaced by the effects of climate change.434 The impacts on humanity of any permanent displacement will be profound and prolonged – while many will lose their lives trying to find safety, millions will also become alienated from their cultures, traditional

433 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Climate change and disaster displacement. https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html

434 Crépeau, F. & Atak, I. (2016). Global migration governance: Avoiding commitments on Human Rights, yet tracing a course for cooperation. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 34(2), 113–146.

lands, ability to support families and any hope for a stable future. Since that report, the scientific evidence on the effects of climate change (including sea-level rise and how climate change is a “threat amplifier”) has increased.435

In 2007, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) – and 190 National Societies – agreed to develop a humanitarian response to climate change. Proactive pledges resulting from this conference were also agreed to by eight governments, including New Zealand. In 2015, the IFRC was describing climate change as the ultimate threat multiplier in the 21st century – showing that climate change is not just a risk for extreme weather events but will make many other already occurring disasters much worse.436

Climate-related human mobility is an inordinately complex issue and difficult to define. Population movement in response to climate change does and will look different across the globe. As climate change impacts will vary depending on the geographic context, so too will movement of people.437 In addition, some people will move voluntarily, some will be forcibly displaced and others will fall on a spectrum between the two (for example, pre-emptively move).438 Accordingly, depending on the situation, people who move for climate-related reasons will look different from each other: they could resemble migrants seeking better opportunities elsewhere, or refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled situations beyond their control.439 Most individuals displaced for climate-related reasons are displaced within their own countries. However, the number of people moving across borders can be expected to also increase, including situations where “climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters

435 Allen, M., Babiker, M., Chen, Y., de Coninck, H., Connors, S., van Diemen, R. & Ferrat, M. (2018). Global warming of 1.5 C, summary for policy makers. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 6, 32.

436 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2015). Climate change and the Red Cross and Red Crescent. November. https://www.climatecentre.org/downloads/files/1297200-IFRC-climate%20change%20report-EN-MD.pdf

437 Nishimura, L. (2015). ‘Climate Change Migrants’: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies. International Journal of Refugee Law.

438 Ibid.439 McAdam, J. (2011). Swimming against the tide: why a climate

change displacement treaty is not the answer. International Journal of Refugee Law, 23(1), 2–27.

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increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements.”440

It is uncertain what level of global warming will occur and, consequently, so too is the extent of any related movement of persons.441 Attempts to quantify the estimated number of people “are fraught with numerous methodological problems and caveats”.442 Nor is the problem evenly spread. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report identified that displacement risks associated with climate change are “regionally differentiated” and “unevenly distributed”.443 Large-scale migration will mainly occur in the Global South and developing regions, with the Pacific at the forefront of challenges in Asia-Pacific.

A 2018 report on disaster and displacement in the Asia-Pacific by the IFRC noted that most climate displacement occurs in the Asia-Pacific at present, and much of that is in East Asia and involves cyclical weather events that cause internal displacement. On a per capita basis, the smaller Pacific island states have some of the highest rates of displacement in the world. In the future, these Pacific nations are likely to see permanent displacement due to sea level rises.444 While some temporary migration and limited humanitarian programmes already exist between many Pacific island states and larger countries like New Zealand’s Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category, these are not sufficient to manage the movement of people, nor do they account for the kinds of cultural loss that could be suffered through permanent relocation. Recent studies indicate that there remains no useful mechanism

440 United Nations General Assembly (2018). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Part II: Global Compact on Refugees. Also, see Weerasinghe, S. (2018 In Harm’s Way: International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change. UNHCR. December. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/5c1ba88d4/39-harms-way-international-protection-context-nexus-dynamics-conflict-violence.html

441 Nishimura, L. (2015). ‘Climate Change Migrants’: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies. International Journal of Refugee Law.

442 Biermann, F. & Boas, I. (2010). Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees Global Environmental Politics 10(1), 67.

443 Field, C. B. (ed.) (2014). Climate change 2014 – Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: Regional aspects. Cambridge University Press.

444 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2018). Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate: The Role of Asia Pacific National Societies. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/12/2018-IFRC-Climate-Change-Disasters-Displacement-Report-LR.pdf

for alleviating the losses and damages from climate change to Pacific nations.445

9.2 New Zealand contextWhile this section is based on the New Zealand response, it is also primarily concerned with challenges for climate change and disaster displacement in the Pacific. As explained above, there is currently no legal basis to recognise climate-related mobility. However, New Zealand, as a developed nation in the Pacific, has an interest and role to play with Pacific island nations446 that are low-lying states and particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and extreme sea-level events such as storm surges.447 Affected nations are also at risk of salt-water contamination of fresh-water sources and salination of arable soil. These vulnerabilities mean many people in the Pacific may be displaced by climate change.

The current government has looked at climate-related migration in the Pacific as part of its refreshed approach to the Pacific islands, known as the “Pacific Reset”. On 2 May 2018, a Paper went to the Environment, Energy and Climate Committee of Cabinet, entitled Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: a New Zealand action plan. The Paper “built a case for early, calibrated and transparent New Zealand action on Pacific climate-related displacement and migration”. The Paper recognised Pacific island countries’ expressed desire to have their people remain in their own countries but noted “there is more that New Zealand can do to assist Pacific island countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change and prepare for internal or cross-border climate migration”. As to the long-term actions, the Paper stated acting for Pacific climate migration “would involve a long-term, concerted policy effort across New Zealand agencies. Initial actions would sit within the

445 Nand, M. & Bardsley, D. K. (2020). Climate change loss and damage policy implications for Pacific Island Countries. Local Environment, 25(9), 725–740.

446 Farquhar, H. (2015). Migration with dignity: towards a New Zealand response to climate change displacement in the Pacific. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 46.

447 Field, C. B. (ed.) (2014). Climate change 2014 – Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: Regional aspects. Cambridge University Press.

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foreign policy and development portfolio, but questions would inevitably arise around New Zealand’s domestic immigration settings”. The Paper recommended “further consideration of immigration options, including any humanitarian visa category, for instance, be addressed in this longer-term approach”.448

On 15 May 2019, a Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment Briefing Paper went to Cabinet seeking endorsement on a proposed immigration work programme to improve Pacific migration policies. With respect to climate-related displacement, the Paper noted it is a “possible … phase of work (likely post-2024), as indicated in the Minister of Foreign Affair and Trade’s paper: Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: a New Zealand action plan to investigate the need for, and design of, changes to visa setting for people displaced by climate change”.449 More recently, Australian researchers have begun putting forward policy documents that include an Australasian response and advocating for a Pacific Access visa, drawing from existing categories in New Zealand such as the Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category.450

In September 2019, the Ministry for the Environment released A Framework for the National Climate Change Risk Assessment [NCCRA] for Aotearoa New Zealand. This NCCRA Framework acknowledges New Zealand will be affected by international influences arising from climate change, including climate-related migration and states that the “NCCRA and National Adaptation Plan will, over time, need to adapt to these influences”.451

A recent academic survey found that New Zealanders were more supportive of climate refugee policies than of addressing these issues

448 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2018). Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: A New Zealand Action Plan. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Redacted-Cabinet-Paper-Pacific-climate-migration-2-May-2018.pdf

449 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2018). Final Cabinet Paper proposed immigration work programme to improve Pacific Migration. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/897e7e39bc/final-cabinet-paper-proposed-immigration-work-programme-to-improve-pacific

450 McAdam, J. & Pryke, J. (2020). Climate Change, Disasters and Mobility: A Roadmap for Australian Action. Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law. Policy Brief 10. https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2020/10/21/Policy_brief_10_Climate_Change.pdf

451 Ministry for the Environment (2019). A Framework for the National Climate Change Risk Assessment for Aotearoa New Zealand. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2019-09/National%20Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Assessment%20Framework%20.pdf

through increased financial aid.452 The authors of the study concluded that those opposed to climate refugees correlated to (a) people with a general anti-egalitarian world view and (b) those who expressed economic concerns over cultural or social norms and values.

9.3 Legal basis for environmental and climate migrantsCurrently, international human rights law, including the Refugee Convention, complementary protection and the Statelessness Convention, do not cover most climate-related displacements. In most cases, individuals will not fall under any of the existing agreements. Accordingly, despite this looming crisis, international law provides insufficient protection to those who will be forced to migrate, and it is not clear what such protection should look like.

Climate and environmental displacement can be considered in the following protection options (albeit in a limited capacity):

ɠ a refugee or protected person claim

ɠ a humanitarian appeal against liability for deportation

ɠ introduction of a specific visa category.

Refugee and protected person claimsWith the recognition in the Global Compact on Migration that climate change is a driver of migration, there are likely to be increased moves in the coming years to adjust refugee and protected people status to account for forced migration that is driven by climate change. New Zealand recognises its protection obligations under the Immigration Act 2009, which provides that an individual can be granted refugee or protected person status, assuming they can establish they meet the requisite tests.453

452 Stanley, S. & Williamson, J. (2021). Attitudes towards climate change aid and climate refugees in New Zealand: an exploration of policy support and ideological barriers. Environmental Politics. Pre-publication. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2021.1892982?scroll=top&needAccess=true

453 Immigration New Zealand (2009). Immigration Act.

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The most relevant legal precedent remains the case Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.454 Mr Teitiota applied for refugee status based on changes to the environment in Kiribati caused by sea-level rise and storms associated with climate change. In 2015, Teitiota and his family were sent back to Kiribati by the New Zealand government after his refugee and protection claims were unsuccessful.

While the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT) acknowledged natural disasters and environmental degradation can involve significant human rights issues, there was no acceptance in this case that the environmental conditions were such that Mr Teitiota’s life would be in jeopardy or he would live without dignity, if returned. Nor was there any evidence that the harm that would be caused to him was related to one of the Convention grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). The Tribunal decision was upheld by the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. This decision marked the first time New Zealand’s higher courts considered the issue of “climate refugees”.

After being deported from New Zealand, Mr Teitiota took his case to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The majority response found that while Mr Teitiota did not sufficiently demonstrate the imminent nature of the threat posed by effects of climate change, it acknowledged the impact of climate change needed to be considered before deporting an asylum seeker. The committee found that, in the future, the effects of climate change may trigger the non-refoulement obligations of sending states.455 This ruling put countries on notice that the situation was under review and that nations should adopt appropriate policies around maintaining the right to life with dignity, or courts may need to step in.456

454 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (2013). New Zealand High Court.

455 Lyons, K. (2020). Climate refugees can’t be returned home, says landmark UN human rights ruling. The Guardian. 20 January. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling

456 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2020). Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016. January. https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,5e26f7134.html

In addition to refugee status, New Zealand has “protected person status”, a form of “complementary protection” (complementary protection is used to describe the situation where an individual is not protected by the Refugee Convention, but nonetheless requires protection under another international human rights instrument). In New Zealand, the Immigration Act provides a person will be granted “protected person status” if they are at risk of arbitrary deprivation of life, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or at risk of torture, if deported from New Zealand. However, the level of harm required to establish a protected person claim is essentially the same as that in a refugee claim.457

Humanitarian appealIt is also possible for a person to appeal their liability against deportation on humanitarian grounds to the IPT. In such appeals, liability will be cancelled if the appellant can establish they have “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” such that it would be “unjust or unduly harsh to deport the appellant”, and that it is not contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand.458 The IPT has accepted that exposure to the impacts of natural disasters, including climate change, can be considered as part of the context of a decision, but not determinative. However, while climate change is a factor that may be considered, at this stage it appears the impacts of climate change alone will not be sufficient.459

Introduction of a specific visa categoryNew Zealand does not have a visa category specific to those affected by climate change. While in 2017 there were discussions about New Zealand introducing “an experimental humanitarian visa” category for people from Pacific islands displaced by the effects of climate change, New Zealand is not currently pursuing this option. These “climate refugee” visas plans were dropped because Pacific island leaders

457 See AC (Syria). (2011). NZIPT 800035, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 27 May. https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,4e0485582.html

458 Immigration New Zealand (2009). Immigration Act. s207.459 AD (Tuvalu), (2014). NZIPT 501370-371, New Zealand: Immigration

and Protection Tribunal, 4 June. https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,585152d14.html

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did not want them. Instead, these leaders called on the New Zealand government to institute a stepwise approach: reduce emissions, support adaptation efforts, provide legal migration pathways, and finally, if all fails, grant refugee status.460

9.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to environmental and climate migrantsClimate change has already taken a central place in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement over the previous decade with climate change considered to be a risk multiplier in many high level IFRC and International Committee of the Red Cross strategies and documents, establishment of the dedicated Red Cross Climate Centre461 and the recent Climate:Red Summit.

At the international level, the IFRC Climate, Migration and Resilience Unit within the Disasters, Climate and Crises (Prevention, Response and Recovery) Department in Geneva, Switzerland, working via regional IFRC offices, provide technical support and guidance to the National Societies dealing with migration and displacement. New tools and structures are being put in place to show the links between migration, health, climate and displacement including a new training resource on climate and migration and a newly launched Migration Lab hosted by Australian Red Cross. Another strength of this work is in the Red Cross International Disaster Law team who are focussed on prevention of, and preparation for responses to, disaster. Migration, inequality and climate change are also recognised to be central drivers influencing

460 Dempster, H. & Ober, K. (2020). New Zealand’s ‘Climate Refugee’ Visas: Lessons for the Rest of the World. Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-zealands-climate-refugee-visas-lessons-rest-world

461 See the website, hosted by the Netherland Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent https://www.climatecentre.org

the provision of Movement services in increasing complex disasters, and protracted crises and will be key focuses within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Strategy 2030. The Movement’s Green Response Working Group – chaired by the Swedish Red Cross – has also been working to make sure that the internal policies of participating National Societies are sustainable. The 2020 Red goes Green report is the latest overview of how the organisation implements sustainability policies.462

The regional implementation of global Movement strategies is also highlighted in the Asia Pacific Migration and Displacement Framework for Action.463 This framework is a high-level approach, but in combination with the 2018 IFRC Climate Change Disasters and Displacement Report,464 cited in the international context above, shows the already established links between international approaches, regional networks and the activities of National Societies. The Asia Pacific Regional Office is currently finalising a guide to planned relocation of Asia Pacific national societies.

The Asia Pacific Migration Network (APMN) plays a key regional role for Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies in responding to the migration challenges in the region, as well as anticipating future migration issues related to climate change and environmental degradation.465 These types of regional networks will be essential to both responding to the movement of people as well as developing the communication and advocacy skills to highlight the risk and help these countries engage in preventive behaviours and policy changes. At present New Zealand Red Cross is a co-lead of the APMN Climate Change, Migration

462 Hartilus, J. (2020). Red Goes Green Barriers and enablers for effectively greening practices and strengthening environmental sustainability across the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. December. https://www.rodakorset.se/globalassets/rodakorset.se/dokument/om-oss/fakta-och-standpunkter/rapporter/red-goes-green_report_2020.pdf

463 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Asia Pacific (2018). Migration and Displacement: Framework For Action Reducing Vulnerability, Enhancing Resilience | 2017–2022. http://media.ifrc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/06/2018-IFRC-AP-Migration-Displacement-Framework-LR.pdf

464 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2018). Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate: The Role of Asia Pacific National Societies. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/12/2018-IFRC-Climate-Change-Disasters-Displacement-Report-LR.pdf

465 Asia Pacific Migration Network (2019). General Meeting Report, 25 July 2019, Bangkok, Thailand. https://www.rcrc-resilience-southeastasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/APMN-AGM-2019-Full-Length-Report.pdf

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and Displacement group in the stream focussed on Knowledge and experience exchange, and Capacity Strengthening Initiatives stream.

From a New Zealand perspective, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has been noted in a recent report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction for the role of the IFRC and National Societies in highlighting how different communities experience disasters and disaster preparation in different ways.466

New Zealand Red Cross signed off on a statement of intent noting that climate change was the single greatest threat to the livelihood, security and well-being of people in the Pacific. The statement noted that more work must go into supporting vulnerable communities affected by climate change as well as building community resilience.467 The core aims of New Zealand Red Cross approach to Strategy 2030 are strongly linked to climate change and migration in the following ways:

ɠ reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience of temporary migrants

ɠ offering a practical way to strengthen community connection to people affected by climate change

ɠ diversifying Red Cross membership in New Zealand and creating stronger connections to the Pacific.

New Zealand Red Cross has a unique chance to directly link migration, inequality and climate change in advocacy work that spans strategic priorities of migration, disaster risk management and international programmes. For example, New Zealand Red Cross agreed to work with the Flood Resilience Alliance Aotearoa project, including reviewing policy work to review gaps in legislation and community resilience work that can prevent cyclical displacement.468 This work

466 Hay, J.E, Manley, M., Lal, P., Bennett, C., Chong, J., Campbell, J. & Thorp, W. (2018). Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction: Research Synthesis Report. Submitted to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Research/Climate-Change-and-DRR-Synthesis-Report-Final-v6.4.pdf

467 New Zealand Red Cross (2019). Statement of Intent: Responding to Climate Change. https://www.redcross.org.nz/documents/574/Statement_of_Intent_Climate_Change_FINAL.pdf

468 Flood Resilience project (2020). New Zealand. https://floodresilience.net/countries#newzealand

also feeds into the London School of Economics Climate Laws database as part of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment which is part of the Flood Resilience Alliance Aotearoa Project. Another example is the development of the New Zealand Red Cross Statement of Intent to Respond to Climate Change and the establishment of the Red Cross Green Team to progress climate change action within the organisation.

9.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to environmental and climate migrantsAs highlighted above, climate-related migration is extremely complex and occurring on a vast scale. There are therefore many agencies working in the area, both internationally, regionally and domestically. Given that, this is just a summary of the key agencies and groups involved.

InternationalInternationally, multiple United Nations agencies are involved in examining these issues, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration. The latter is particularly active in the Pacific in the area of climate and disaster-related mobility. For example, it assisted Vanuatu to draft its 2018 National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster Induced Displacement. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also recently ruled, as noted in the Teitiota case, that governments must consider the human rights violations that can be caused by the climate crisis when considering deportation and non-refoulement of individuals.

In 2012, the Nansen Initiative was set up to look specifically at people displaced due to natural hazards, including climate change. The initiative was a bottom-up, state-led consultative process that conducted extensive regional intergovernmental consultations and civil society meetings, the first of which was held in Rarotonga in 2013. The focus was on building

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consensus among states on the principles that would underlie a soft-law protection agenda going forward.469

During a Global Consultation in October 2015, 109 government delegations endorsed the Nansen Initiative’s “Protection Agenda”. The Agenda offers states a “toolbox” to better prevent and prepare for displacement before a disaster strikes and to better respond to situations when people are forcibly displaced, either within their own country or across an international border. It recommends, among other things, that states ensure there are appropriate laws and policies in place to address the needs of internally and cross-border displaced persons.470 Its successor, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, has been assisting states to implement the Protection Agenda which has led to the development of regional guidance, endorsed by states in Latin and South America. It is currently examining the scope for similar development in the Pacific.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) adopted the Paris Agreement which in its preamble acknowledges that “…climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights […] (and that of) migrants […].”471 The Parties mandated the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage to establish the Taskforce on Displacement to “develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”.472

The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. It holistically addresses all dimensions of international migration by means of 23 objectives, followed by a range of actions. Objective 2 refers

469 Philip, T. (2018). Climate change displacement and migration: An analysis of the current international legal regime’s deficiency, proposed solutions and a way forward for Australia. Melbourne Journal of International Law. 19.

470 Ibid.471 Decision 1. CP/21 FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016)

At: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2. Accessed 7 March 2021.

472 Para 49.

to “Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin” and explicitly references climate change and disasters as a driver of migration.

New ZealandWhile there are many groups in New Zealand working on climate change and migration separately, it is rare for any one group to combine an interest in the two. At the same time, there has also been a flourishing in reports, theses and studies that seek to anticipate the impacts of climate change on the Pacific, with a special focus on displacement. In 2018, Oxfam held a series of public meetings around the country – Readying the Waka: New Zealand’s Response to Climate Change-Induced Displacement in the Pacific – on climate displacement featuring a range of speakers including Evelyn Marsters, Teanau Tuiono (now a Green Party MP) and Nathan Ross. Ross has also recently graduated with a PhD focused on self-determination and climate change induced migration.473 Previously, climate-focused groups like 350 Aotearoa have included issues of displacement to highlight the need for more climate action with a faux-refugee camp set up outside one ANZ bank branch in 2015.474

Within parliament, the Green Party has been relatively active: the idea of the humanitarian visa specifically for those in the Pacific affected by climate change came from the party475 and they also led the public explanation in the previous government as to why it would not take place.476

473 Ross, N. (2020). Low-Lying States, Climate Change-Induced Relocation, and the Collective Right to Self-Determination. PhD dissertation. https://nathanrossconz.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/nathan-jon-ross-phd-thesis-final.pdf

474 350 Aotearoa (2015). Future Climate Refugee Camp. 25 September. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1509/S00338/future-climate-refugee-camp.htm

475 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2018). Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: A New Zealand Action Plan. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Redacted-Cabinet-Paper-Pacific-climate-migration-2-May-2018.pdf

476 Dempster, H. & Ober, K. (2020). New Zealand’s ‘Climate Refugee’ Visas: Lessons for the Rest of the World. Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-zealands-climate-refugee-visas-lessons-rest-world

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9.6 What are the needs and gaps?Despite the challenges of climate and environmental migration exacerbated by climate change, New Zealand Red Cross is uniquely placed at the intersection of Disaster Risk Management (DRM), International Programmes (including our connection to National Societies in Asia-Pacific) and our Migration Programmes. These connections have already been made in internal New Zealand Red Cross and international IFRC strategies, which are now being supported by programmes such as the Flood Resilience Alliance Aotearoa, and through Red Cross Climate Centre delegates.

There is currently a lack of explicit climate disaster and migration scenarios and examples to help the New Zealand public to understand the local effects of climate change. In the communication and research function, especially within the New Zealand Red Cross Green Team, these techniques could help draw out the challenges of climate and environmental migration for New Zealand. Offering these scenarios for internal displacement in New Zealand would help climate and environmental migration to be seen as local issues affecting the rights of New Zealanders to access shelter, safe food and water and the sustained provision of essential services.

While there is plenty of public discussion on “climate refugees”, this often focuses on a catastrophic scenario that overshadows the realpolitik of dealing with already existing movements of people. The extreme “climate refugee” scenarios rarely touch on the actual migration issues – the majority of which are currently internal – with a humanitarian lens. While the New Zealand Red Cross could be well placed to do that kind of work through, for example, the Climate Centre, it is worth discussing how this could be collaborative with other climate-related NGOs. It is also worth considering how other NGOs, especially INGOs, may be developing resources and working on this as part of their own internal focus.

With the demise of the Climate Change visa there also appears to be little public appetite for discussing migration as part of a response to

cross-border climate displacement. Specifically, the Pacific leaders’ views that they do not want to migrate and that this must be a last resort has meant that the issue is now rarely talked about, though it has been suggested that enhancing pathways under existing migration schemes may be the best way forward.477 For example, Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford, in a report commissioned by the Nansen Initiative has suggested a “cluster” or “hub” approach, which looks at existing migration links between states (such as the links between New Zealand and certain Pacific states) and argues that responses to climate migration could be at a bilateral or regional level rather than global level.478 If any advocacy or research was to be done in this area, it would need to be in concert with other proactive climate change prevention work.

For work in this area to be successful, due to the complexity and long-term needs, New Zealand Red Cross would need to find stronger ways to work collaboratively so efforts are not doubled up. This need for collaboration is particularly important when we consider that climate change is both a multiplier of existing disasters, as well as creating new disasters such as sea-level rise.

One key and emerging challenge is that those displaced by climate change in New Zealand are not yet fully recognised as needing protection. While there have been advances, such as the focus on climate change in the Global Compact on Migration, the protection frameworks have not yet been fully established across legal mechanisms. This lack is exacerbated by the complexity of the problem, the rapidly evolving situations and the fact that migration remains a contentious public issue for many.

This issue is not New Zealand-specific, as no clear mandate or consensus has been reached on how to best manage climate-related migrants. However, given the complexity of the problem, it is not at all clear how best to approach any

477 Philip, T. (2018). Climate change displacement and migration: An analysis of the current international legal regime’s deficiency, proposed solutions and a way forward for Australia. Melbourne Journal of International Law. 19.

478 Burson, B. & Bedford, R. (2013). Clusters and Hubs: toward a regional architecture for voluntary adaptive migration in the Pacific. https://www.pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/DP_Clusters_and_Hubs_Toward_a_Regional_Architecture_for_Voluntary_Adaptive_Migration_in_the_Pacific.pdf

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resolution. Nor will it be possible to find a “one size fits all” solution.

One option for meeting this need is to revise the Refugee Convention to include climate-related displacement.479 The main advantage for such an amendment is that the framework already exists – both in terms of the jurisprudence (the human rights framework) and the legal infrastructure (including international and national decision-making bodies, legislation and other legal instruments).

However, there are several reasons not to amend the definition. Extending the definition of refugee internationally is not recommended by the UNHCR because the organisation is already under significant pressure dealing with 22.5 million refugees that clearly fall within its ambit.480 Also, while the Convention is widely ratified, it is not being implemented as effectively or fairly as it could be. While the international community has recently agreed that states should take collective responsibility, this agreement is not legally binding. In such circumstances, amending the definition could be problematic.

Another alternative lies in the tools developed by the Nansen Initiative. The focus there was on building consensus among states on the principles that would underlie a protection agenda going forward.481 As noted above, a Protection Agenda was developed in October 2015. While the Nansen Initiative has ended, the Platform on Disaster Displacement has picked up where it left off.

Enhancing existing migration schemes may also assist in avoiding the negative impacts of migration that can stem from emergency mass movements.482 For example, negative impacts can arise if the receiving communities are unprepared to absorb large numbers of migrants, and, conversely, more positive impacts occur when migration is voluntary and planned strategy.483

479 Philip, T. (2018). Climate change displacement and migration: An analysis of the current international legal regime’s deficiency, proposed solutions and a way forward for Australia. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 19, 639.

480 Fiennes, L. (2019). New Zealand’s Climate Refugee Visa, a Framework for Positive Change. Honours dissertation. University of Otago.

481 McAdam, J. (2011). Swimming against the tide: why a climate change displacement treaty is not the answer. International Journal of Refugee Law, 23(1), 2–27.

482 Martin, S. (2010). Climate change, migration, and governance. Global Governance, 397–414.

483 Ibid.

RIGHT: The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society's community centre in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, offers women at risk and who have experienced violence to meet in a safe place with other women who have lived similar experience. The centre teaches women to sew and make finishing next. The camps of Cox's Bazar hosts close to 1 million people who have fled violence from Rakhine State, Myanmar.

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10. Trafficking and modern slaveryWhile statistics are scarce, researchers at the Walk Free Foundation estimate 45.8 million people are subject to some form of modern slavery, with 71 per cent being women and girls. Africa has the highest prevalence of modern slavery, followed by Asia and the Pacific.484 Included in these statistics are 25 million people who have been trafficked.485 Following COVID-19, these estimates are expected to increase.486

The extent of human trafficking and modern slavery in New Zealand is highlighted in the USA’s Department of State 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, which notes, “As reported over

484 Walk Free Foundation (2018). The Global Slavery Index 2018. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/resources/downloads; International Labour Organisation (2016). Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf

485 United States of America Department of State (2020). 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report

486 Szablewska, N. (2020). Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery in a Time of COVID-19. In Georgeou, N., & Hawksley, C. (eds) State Responses to COVID-19: A Global Snapshot at 1 June 2020. https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws%3A56288/datastream/PDF/download/citation.pdf

the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in New Zealand.”487 Media stories, NGO reports and legal cases have also demonstrated there are cases of people being trafficked in New Zealand, though the government has downplayed the extent of these occurrences.488 Globally this is an area Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies are often involved in. For example, Australian Red Cross has a programme working with people who have been trafficked. To date, New Zealand Red Cross has had no engagement in this space except on the fringes of Pathways to Employment where labour violation concerns are referred to Labour Inspectors.

With only two trafficking prosecutions, it is difficult to assess New Zealand’s implementation of the plan for protection of victims. The reasons for a lack of prosecutions are wide and varied, from a lack of resourcing to monitor, investigate and prosecute, to the unwillingness of those exploited to report and the fact that the victims often get deported/are overseas and cannot testify easily. The pragmatic approach taken by the Crown then

487 United States of America Department of State (2020). 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/new-zealand

488 See, for example, Keogh, B. (2019). ’Human trafficking in NZ: Government accused of having ‘its head in the sand. Stuff. 26 June.

© Elodie Berthe / IFRC

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leads to other charges being pursued that fall short of trafficking or modern slavery.

Modern slavery, contrasted with more colloquial understandings of slavery, is possessing or controlling another person for your own benefit or to make a profit.489 This extreme exploitation is as opposed to the imagery of slavery in colloquial use but can be just as difficult to get accurate figures on, due to its hidden place in global supply chains.

Much of the dialogue around trafficking concerns issues of border security, and not human safety. The issue has usually been framed as criminal, rather than a human rights breach, and the effect of this has been to reduce the protections available for victims and to focus on the prevention and prosecution of criminal networks. One of the main sources for information on trafficking comes in the form of the USA Department of State,490 though there have been recent conflicts over whether criticisms from that source are accurate and New Zealand does maintain a tier-one ranking.491

Human trafficking and modern slavery are hidden crimes and many of these crimes remain unreported, meaning statistics around these issues are highly under-representative.492 Since 2009, there have been 51 recorded victims of trafficking within New Zealand but the government acknowledges that there are likely more victims yet to be identified.493 Because there is often a degree of consent involved – especially in cases where visas and residency are likely to be earned – victims may not know that they will be protected rather than punished

489 Stringer, C. (2017). Christina Stringer: Why NZ needs a Modern Slavery Act. New Zealand Herald. 3 July. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/christina-stringer-why-nz-needs-a-modern-slavery-act/6FJJRZNVUSI2RMGNOOBQLZEBCQ

490 United States of America Department of State (2019). 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: New Zealand. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/new-zealand

491 Keogh, B. (2019). Human trafficking in NZ: Government accused of having ‘its head in the sand’. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/113722839/human-trafficking-in-nz-government-accused-of-having-its-head-in-the-sand; Tan, L (2019). NZ Government failing in anti-trafficking duties: US State Department annual report. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/nz-government-failing-in-anti-trafficking-duties-us-state-department-annual-report/TXDV475UD2H5E3NYZE4OVS2UA4

492 United States of America Department of State (2019). Trafficking in Persons Report June 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf

493 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2020). Combating Modern Forms of Slavery: Draft Plan of Action against Forced Labour, People Trafficking and Slavery 2020–25. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11888-draft-plan-of-action-against-forced-labour-people-trafficking-and-slavery

if they seek assistance.494 Furthermore, victims may struggle to access support because of language barriers, isolation, coercion, fear of authorities, cultural barriers and unawareness of how or where to find help.495

10.1 The international contextThe trafficking of persons is an industry that continues to thrive despite the international and regional state responses and conventions. Since the 1990s, the agreements and legislation have become more comprehensive in response to rising numbers.496 In 2003, the United Nations published the most significant response to the issue, known colloquially as the Palermo Principles. These principles comprise the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and two accompanying protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (most of which were drafted and agreed in 2000 and became effective in 2003/4). The gendered basis of much international discourse on trafficking can lead to a public misconception that trafficking for sexual exploitation is the only form of human trafficking, or that trafficking solely affects women. However, trafficking is a broad term and includes forced marriage and labour exploitation, the latter of which also affects men in a significant proportion.

The Palermo Principle documents have been the foundation for subsequent bilateral agreements, regional treaties and other state responses. In 2004, a whole-of-government response was launched by the Australian government, followed by the first National Action Plan to Combat Human trafficking and Slavery 2015–2019. In 2016, the Australian government established the Migrant Workers Task Force to protect vulnerable

494 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). People trafficking. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/policy-and-law/integrity-of-the-immigration-system/people-trafficking

495 Department of Labour (2009). Plan of Action to Prevent People Trafficking. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/about-us/plan-of-action-to-prevent-people-trafficking.pdf

496 McNevin, A. (2014). Forced Migration in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific. In The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies.

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workers. This work was followed by the Inquiry into Establishing a Modern Slavery Act in 2017 and the introduction of the Modern Slavery Bill in 2018.497

Regionally, the Bali Process (formed in 2002) is the major platform in place to coordinate states’ responses to the irregular movement of people across borders. In New Zealand, concerns about irregular migration have resulted in a range of responses including participation in regional migration initiatives and changes to legislation. The Bali Process focuses on information sharing, building capacity among its 49 members, developing policy guides and achieving regional consensus on policy. The Process aims to contribute “to the eradication of trafficking in persons, forced labour, modern slavery and the worst forms of child labour.”498

The United Nations, via the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), has agreed on a set of guiding principles on Business and Human Rights.499 This work has helped to centre business in discussions about their responsibilities on human rights in addition to those of states and individuals.

International finance is another key sector in opposing the exploitation of migrants and modern slavery. Numerous nations and finance groups have worked alongside the Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking (FAST) to create the Liechtenstein Initiative which incorporates five goals.500 Citigroup has also been a leader in the financial sector in working with a raft of International Labour Organisation and United Nations frameworks on finance and human rights, both within their organisation and with their clients.501

497 Stringer, C. & Michailova, S. (2019). Addressing the Exploitation of Temporary Migrant Workers: Developments in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

498 Bali Process (2018). Declaration Of The Seventh Ministerial Conference Of The Bali Process On People Smuggling, Trafficking In Persons And Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process). https://www.baliprocess.net/UserFiles/baliprocess/File/BPMC%207%20Ministerial%20Declaration-Final(2)(2).pdf

499 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (2011). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy. Framework’. 16 June. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf

500 United Nations University (2019). A Blueprint for Mobilizing Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking. September. https://www.fastinitiative.org/the-blueprint/download-report

501 Citigroup (2018). Statement on Human Rights. November. https://www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/data/citi_statement_on_human_rights.pdf?ieNocache=62

10.2 New Zealand contextIn New Zealand, concerns about irregular migration have resulted in a range of responses beyond legislation, including participation in regional migration initiatives and changes to legislation. The country plays an active role in the “Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime”’ regional dialogue, but many of the actions have largely been focused on deterring asylum seekers from arriving via people smuggling.502 Alongside Malaysia, New Zealand is the co-chair of the Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks. New Zealand has also been an active member in the Joint Period of Action exercises, the most recent in 2018.503 These responses have been considered as largely reactive and, like many other states, have focused primarily on deterrence over the protection of victims.504

Researchers in the field have tended to see a lack of proactive steps in New Zealand to address issues of smuggling and trafficking. High-profile cases include the exploitation of Filipinos workers during the Canterbury rebuild, academic research on the fishing industry and coverage of high-profile fishing exploitation when workers have walked out on arrival,505 numerous liquor store workers,506 and Chorus broadband subcontractors.507 While these public exposures have led to legislative changes, the

502 Curley, M. & Vandyk, K. (2017). The securitisation of migrant smuggling in Australia and its consequences for the Bali Process. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(1), 42–62.

503 Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (2018). Co-chairs Statement, Senior Officials’ Meeting.

504 Stringer, C. (2016). Worker exploitation in New Zealand: a troubling landscape. Prepared for the Human Trafficking Research Coalition; Carville, O. (2016). Exposed: The dark underbelly of human trafficking in New Zealand. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/exposed-the-dark-underbelly-of-human-trafficking-in-new-zealand/4WLQWPUXXOCMIOTQQF4K44HB64

505 Stringer, C. (2016). Worker exploitation in New Zealand: a troubling landscape. Prepared for the Human Trafficking Research Coalition.

506 Piper, D. (2020). Worker exploitation: Auckland bottle store ordered to pay $46,000. Stuff. 24 December. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/300192174/worker-exploitation-auckland-bottle-store-ordered-to-pay-46000; Kilgallon, S. (2021). Thirsty Liquor Tokoroa loses licence after ‘systemic’ non-compliance with labour laws. Stuff. 10 February. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/124197155/thirsty-liquor-tokoroa-loses-licence-after-systemic-noncompliance-with-labour-laws

507 Foxcroft, D. (2019). Chorus blacklists sub-contracting companies after scathing report into migrant exploitation. Stuff. 8 October. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/116371860/chorus-blacklists-subcontracting-companies-after-scathing-report-into-migrant-exploitation

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reactive approach has undermined New Zealand’s commitment to preventing these crimes.508 One key change in onshore attitudes to modern slavery is that businesses maintain a risk if their subcontractors are exploiting workers, even if businesses do not know about it.509 Trafficking of people into labour exploitation in New Zealand has been identified in multiple industries including construction, dairy, fishing, hospitality, international students and prostitution.510

So far, there have only been two people-trafficking prosecutions in New Zealand. The Employer Investigation Unit, part of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) Migrant Exploitation Prevention Strategy, was responsible for the first trafficking conviction with over 5,000 hours put into the investigation that resulted in the first conviction.511 A former Immigration New Zealand Trafficking in Persons programme manager has said cases of trafficking have been prosecuted under different legislation in an effort to secure a conviction, noting: “We don’t want to get caught up in laying people trafficking charges when the end goal is to put the perpetrator behind bars.”512

March 2021 saw a two-day conference in Wellington that began with the delivery of a letter to the Minister of Workplace Relations with a focus on banning modern slavery through a Modern Slavery Act, with particular focus on supply side issues – both in New Zealand and overseas. Included in this conference were unions, NGOs, MBIE, industry representatives – such as Chorus, the NZ Super Fund and DB Breweries – and academics.

508 Stringer, C. (2016). Worker exploitation in New Zealand: a troubling landscape. Prepared for the Human Trafficking Research Coalition.

509 See the case of Chorus, for example, as described in Martin Jenkins (2019). Independent review of Chorus’ Next Generation Network Connection Contracting Model. April. https://www.martinjenkins.co.nz/assets/Uploads/Client/Final.Independent.Review.of.Chorus.Contracting.Model-April.2019.pdf

510 Ibid.511 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2017). Briefing

for the Incoming Minister of Immigration.; Carville, O. (2016). Guilty: First human trafficking convictions in New Zealand. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11710423

512 Carville, O. (2016). Exposed: The dark underbelly of human trafficking in New Zealand. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/exposed-the-dark-underbelly-of-human-trafficking-in-new-zealand/4WLQWPUXXOCMIOTQQF4K44HB64

10.3 Legal basis for combating human trafficking and modern slaveryIn New Zealand, there is no one statute that deals specifically with anti-trafficking. To comply with obligations under the Palermo Principles, in 2002, New Zealand made changes to the Crimes Act, Prostitution Reform Act, and Immigration Act. As there is no specific Anti-Trafficking Statute, different Acts are required to be read together which has resulted in a lack of clarity for ruling judges.513 The maximum penalty for trafficking in people is 20 years imprisonment and a $500,000 fine, which is equivalent to a murder conviction.

Similar obligations to allow New Zealand companies to export are being developed around the world and, even though these are not New Zealand law, will have business improving their standards to comply. For example, at the moment, the EU has committed to implementing a Mandatory Due Diligence reporting law, derived from the Guiding Principles of the OHCHR,514 which will place requirements on New Zealand companies doing business in the European Union.515 Though it has been in draft stage for seven years, there is still progress on the United Nations’ binding treaty on business and human rights, which may also form part of the trans-national corporations and other businesses who operate from and within New Zealand.516

The New Zealand Plan of Action to Prevent People Trafficking (Plan of Action) was developed in 2009 with a whole-of-government approach to meet obligations under the Palermo Principles. The initiative was led by the Department of Labour (which merged with three other Departments

513 Thorburn, N. (2017). Practitioner knowledge and responsiveness to victims of sex trafficking in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Women’s Studies Journal, 31(2).

514 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (2020). Towards EU Mandatory Due Diligence Legislation: Perspectives from Business, Public Sector, Academia and Civil Society 11 November. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/towards-eu-mandatory-due-diligence-legislation

515 Evans, A. (2020). Kiwi firms urged to address any human rights abuses in supply chains. National Business Review. https://www.nbr.co.nz/story/push-new-zealand-companies-take-greater-responsibility-human-rights-abuses-their-supply

516 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. (2020). 6th session of the IGWG. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/binding-treaty

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and Ministries to become MBIE in March 2012) through the Inter-agency Working Group on People Trafficking (Immigration New Zealand). In line with these Conventions, the Plan of Action identifies goals for prevention, protection and prosecution of people trafficking. Since its inception, there had been criticism that the plan only functioned across international borders. A new 2020–25 Plan to Combat Modern Forms of Slavery was formally released in March 2021 to acknowledge that people trafficking could also occur without international borders being crossed.517

Domestically, New Zealand criminalises human trafficking through a combination of statutes. S98 of the Crimes Act 1961 criminalises slave-dealing and s98AA specifically criminalises dealing in people under 18 for sexual exploitation, removal of body parts, or engagement in forced labour. Sections 98B, D, E and F specifically criminalise trafficking in people. Section 98C of the Crimes Act prohibits smuggling migrants. The Minimum Wage Act 1983, and subsequent amendments, stipulate the framework for the minimum standards of pay. In 2015, New Zealand made an amendment to the Crimes Act to remove the transnational element and extend the definition of trafficking to include domestic cases of trafficking.518 Some critics are concerned that this action was only taken in response to USA pressure influencing global attitudes towards sex work, which were out of step with New Zealand’s already established legislation.519

New Zealand was the first country to decriminalise prostitution with the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (PRA). To prevent sex trafficking, s19 of the PRA prohibits anyone with a temporary visa from performing sexual services. While this exemption had the intention of being a safeguard for migrant workers, it has resulted in protection concerns for migrants who are engaging in sex

517 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). Combatting Modern Forms of Slavery: Plan Of Action Against Forced Labour, People Trafficking And Slavery. December. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/13568-combatting-modern-forms-of-slavery-plan-of-action-against-forced-labour-people-trafficking-slavery

518 Parliamentary Counsel Office (2015). Crimes Amendment Act Section 98D replaced (Trafficking in people by means of coercion or deception), Public Act 2015, No 95, Date of assent 6 November 2015.

519 Showden, C. R. (2017). From human rights to law and order: The changing relationship between trafficking and prostitution in Aotearoa/New Zealand policy discourse. Women’s Studies Journal, 31(1).

work, either coerced or by choice. Critics have been quick to point out that people are less likely to access help or protection if they are engaging in illegal activities and it essentially drives the practice underground.520

People traffickers and smugglers may also be liable under other legislation. For example, s351 of the Immigration Act 2009 provides the offence of exploitation of unlawful employees and temporary workers. Under civil law, there are also likely to be breaches of minimum employment standards enforceable by the Labour Inspectorate. Similarly, with gendered trafficking, there can be a connection to legislation preventing domestic and family violence, as well as with sexual and gender-based violence.

In 2015, the Ministry of Justice released a Victims Code to provide guidance for agencies on how victims of crime can expect to be treated by government organisations and agencies. MBIE links to this code, though there is no specific mention of trafficking in it.521 One particularly salient point from the literature was that victims of sexual assault are accorded standardised protections that are not established for trafficking victims in the process of testifying.522 There are special work visa and permanent residency categories specifically for victims of trafficking.523 The limitations of existing legislation in preventing and prosecuting, indicates that victims’ rights are also not adequately protected under legislation.524

New Zealand is a signatory on several international obligations to end forced marriage, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. In 2018, the government passed legislation to prevent forced marriage, and while

520 Armstrong, L. (2017). Decriminalisation and the rights of migrant sex workers in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Making a case for change. Women’s Studies Journal, 31(2), 69–76.

521 Ministry of Justice (2015). Victims Code. http://www.victimsinfo.govt.nz/assets/Publications/VictimsCode.pdf

522 Harré, T. (2012). Confronting the challenge of human trafficking for forced labour in the pacific: Some thoughts from New Zealand. New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, The, 10, 173.

523 Community Law New Zealand (2018). Victims of Human Trafficking. http://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-28-immigration/family-violence-and-vulnerable-migrants/victims-of-human-trafficking

524 Lambert, S. (2014). Modern day slavery and human trafficking, Are the recent charges in Nelson just the tip of the iceberg? New Zealand Law Society.

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instances have been recorded, little statistical information exists on forced marriage.525 In December 2019, New Zealand ratified the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention which reaffirmed the country’s commitment to combat the interlinked problems of human trafficking, slavery and forced labour.526

10.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to trafficking and modern slaveryThe International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC) is active in the human trafficking and modern slavery sphere. National Societies are involved in a range of work that includes prevention and awareness-raising activities around safe migration and restoring family links, facilitating regional dialogues and networks, delivering support programmes and assisting people who have experienced trafficking and forced marriage. The Movement broadly undertakes advocacy on these issues as part of a commitment to humanitarian diplomacy.

IFRC considers the consequences of trafficking alongside labour migration in their most recent study of the Asia-Pacific region. In that study, New Zealand is considered primarily as a destination country, similar to others in the region like Australia. Alongside their analysis of other Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies, IFRC notes that New Zealand Red Cross is most actively

525 Bennett, L. (2018). Changes to Family Violence (Amendment). Act in effect from Monday. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/changes-to-family-violence-amendment-act-in-effect-from-monday/BB5PDZNUNT6VRLVJAI2SYQDDWA/; Radhakrishnan, P. (2012). Unholy Matrimony: Forced Marriage in New Zealand.

526 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). Combatting Modern Forms Of Slavery: Draft Plan Of Action Against Forced Labour, People Trafficking And Slavery. September. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11888-draft-plan-of-action-against-forced-labour-people-trafficking-and-slavery

involved in supporting the aspirations of migrants in the region.527

Australian Red Cross acknowledges that the Australian response to human trafficking and slavery is characterised by strong political commitment, but research demonstrates that there is an urgent need to do more, especially with low rates of investigation, prosecution and conviction.528 Out of 841 referrals to Australian Federal Police for human trafficking and slavery from 2004 to 30 June 2017, there were only 20 successful prosecutions.529 As of June 2017 (the most recent report available), 13 cases were before the Australian courts.530

In the past decade, Australian Red Cross has supported 426 people, with the majority being women and girls (355). The reasons for exploitation were comparable to international causes: “38% [of women] were referred for sexual exploitation, 30% for forced marriage and 25% for labour exploitation. From the 71 men supported to date, 88% were referred for labour exploitation.”531 The Australian Red Cross works alongside government agencies – often across multiple years – and aims to offer flexible, responsive and specialised services in a strengths-based casework approach.532

In Europe, IFRC focuses on three forms of action: (1) raising awareness; (2) assistance and protection; and (3) humanitarian diplomacy.533

Internationally, a focus on people trafficking is central to many other National Societies, including Australian Red Cross and British Red Cross. In 2015, Australian Red Cross undertook

527 International Federation of the Red Cross (2018). Addressing The Humanitarian Consequences Of Labour Migration and Trafficking: the Role Of Asia Pacific National Societies. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/05/23052018-Labour-Migration-and-Trafficking-Guidance-for-Asia-Pacific-National-Societies_Spread_lores.pdf

528 Ibid.529 Interdepartmental Committee on Trafficking and Slavery (2020).

Trafficking in Persons: the Australian Government response July 2016-June 2017. Australian government. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/interdepartmental-committee-human-trafficking-and-slavery-07-2016-06-2017.pdf

530 Ibid.531 Australian Red Cross (2019). Support for Trafficked People Program

Data Snapshot: 2009 to 2019. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/7a957782-a7a1-4b25-97c0-86930dbf0f53/Australian Red Cross-Support-For-Trafficked-People-Program-Data-Snapshot-2009-to-2019-small.pdf.aspx

532 Ibid.533 International Federation of the Red Cross (2017). Action To Assist

And Protect Trafficked Persons: Guidance for European Red Cross National Societies on Assistance and Protection to Victims of Human Trafficking. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/06/Guidance-Note-Trafficking.pdf

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a nationwide Labour Migration Scoping Study based on the growing awareness that temporary labour migrants are more vulnerable to exploitation in Australia than other labour migrants and Australian workers. Australian Red Cross has dedicated significant effort since 2015 to developing resources for both forced marriage534 and modern slavery.535 British Red Cross also runs the Trafficking Response hub, connecting National Societies to a range of resources in a range of languages. British Red Cross and Australian Red Cross jointly manage a page on the ICRC Communities of Practice website about Protection in relation to human trafficking, while IFRC published a fact sheet and guidance note on the impact of COVID-19.536

10.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to trafficking and modern slaveryLocal and international NGOsThe Human Rights Commission is undertaking community consultation on modern slavery over the coming year and advocacy for the creation of legislation based on similar work in Australia. In March, a two-day event was held by MBIE, the New Zealand Embassy of the United States of America and the Anglican Church, bringing together key people from business, government and NGOs to focus on modern slavery.

The Human Trafficking Research Coalition (HTRC) has released some research on the boundary of exploitation and modern slavery, particularly through Christina Stringer from the University

534 Australian Red Cross (2018). Forced Marriages: Community Voices, Stories and Strategies. Consultation with community. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/ad745e1b-c62f-4831-b8c3-a389b3037c34/Forced-Marriage-Community-Voices-Stories-and-Strategies-Australian-Red-Cross.pdf.aspx

535 Australian Red Cross (2020). Addressing Modern Slavery: A Guide for Australian Businesses. https://www.redcross.org.au/getmedia/49f34bf5-d438-4aa4-bd9e-d2412ff8b08a/Addressing-Modern-Slavery-Report-Final.pdf.aspx

536 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2020). COVID-19 Impact on Trafficking in Persons Factsheet. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/document/covid-19-impact-trafficking-persons-factsheet

of Auckland.537 HTRC started with five small organisations: Stand Against Slavery, the Préscha Initiative, Hagar New Zealand, Justice Acts and Raising Hope.538 The current members include World Vision, the Préscha Initiative, Child Alert (ECPAT NZ),539 Tearfund and HAGAR.540 Rebekah Armstrong, who previously led this work with the Human Rights Commission and as chair of HTRC,541 is currently working via her Business and Human Rights consultancy542 as well as with World Vision on advocacy around slavery in international supply chains, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on child exploitation.543

Community Law provides guidance on their website for survivors of human trafficking and forced marriage. Additionally, the Salvation Army has helped initiate several “Prevent People Trafficking” conferences. Women’s Refuge has also spoken up on a lack of focus on the exploitation of women in the government’s recent strategies on modern slavery.544 There is limited information about organisations that provide support or information for survivors of forced marriage in New Zealand, though several media organisations have published stories about potential legislative pitfalls.545

537 Though much of this work overlaps with that on exploitation more generally as per the more recently commissioned review by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

538 See a roundup of media coverage at https://www.workerexploitation.com/media-published

539 ECPAT had included the words “Child Prostitution” in its name, but due to a move away from that terminology, they now just go by the acronym without a corresponding explication.

540 Human Trafficking Research Coalition (2021). About Us. Worker Exploitation.com. https://www.workerexploitation.com/contact

541 Armstrong, R. (2018). Rebekah Armstrong: What the Australian Modern Slavery Act will mean for big Kiwi businesses. New Zealand Herald. 12 December. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/rebekah-armstrong-what-the-australian-modern-slavery-act-will-mean-for-big-kiwi-businesses/A4C6XNUHGPUAYFAYKOZNJCCJHM

542 Business and Human Rights Consultant (2021). Who We Are. BHR https://www.bhr.co.nz/page/who-we-are/

543 World Vision (2021). Advocacy. World Vision https://www.worldvision.org.nz/causes/advocacy

544 Johnston, K. (2021). Women are the primary victims of human trafficking. New Zealand’s plan to stop slavery forgot them. Stuff. 19 January. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/123976551/women-are-the-primary-victims-of-human-trafficking-new-zealands-plan-to-stop-slavery-forgot-them

545 Chan-Green, M. (2016). New Zealand forced marriage victims young as 10. Newshub. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2016/12/new-zealand-forced-marriage-victims-young-as-10.html; Chan-Green, M. (2018). Parliament passes Bill to protect teens from forced marriage. Newshub. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2018/08/parliament-passes-bill-to-protect-teens-from-forced-marriage.html; Carville, O. (2016). Exposed: The dark underbelly of human trafficking in New Zealand. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/exposed-the-dark-underbelly-of-human-trafficking-in-new-zealand/4WLQWPUXXOCMIOTQQF4K44HB64

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Overall, there has been a lack of resources in this space and a proliferation of small NGOs and inconsistent interest from larger groups. While coalitions like the HTRC have occasionally brought resources together, the involvement of World Vision, the Human Rights Commission and Tearfund indicate extra support has already coalesced around public-oriented campaigning. The release of a letter supported by 85 businesses, World Vision and Trade Aid in March 2021, to combat modern slavery, marked a watershed moment in NGO and industry collaboration.546 The timing was especially strong as it came at the same time as a focus on the use of slavery in supply chains from China that use Uyghur labour.547

In the university space, the Centre for Research on Modern Slavery at the University of Auckland Business School has become a hub for research into temporary migrant workers.548 A new report from Christina Stringer, who leads the Centre, is due out later this year, with a focus on the liquor industry.

GovernmentHuman trafficking now involves an all-of-government response with numerous government agencies involved in this issue including MBIE and the New Zealand Police. In their 2020–25 document Combatting Modern Forms of Slavery, MBIE lists ten government agencies that are tasked with reducing trafficking including, for example, Oranga Tamariki, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry for Women. The plan will be updated and re-released in the first half of 2021 after feedback that indicated the focus on forced labour had the unintended consequence of putting less focus on the gendered side of human trafficking. 549 There are indications that Green MP

546 World Vision (2021). World Vision & Trade Aid Welcome Government Action Towards A Modern Slavery Act. Scoop. 16 March. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO2103/S00126/world-vision-trade-aid-welcome-government-action-towards-a-modern-slavery-act.htm

547 Clear, L. & Penfold, P. (2021). NZ business and political links to blacklisted Chinese company iFlytek. Stuff. 16 March. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/stuff-circuit/300253078/nz-business-and-political-links-to-blacklisted-chinese-company-iflytek

548 Wong, G. (2021). The insidious return of ‘slavery’. University of Auckland https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/news/2021/02/16/the-insidious-return-of-slavery.html

549 Johnston, K. (2021). Women are the primary victims of human trafficking. New Zealand’s plan to stop slavery forgot them. Stuff. 19 January. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/123976551/women-are-the-primary-victims-of-human-trafficking-new-zealands-plan-to-stop-slavery-forgot-them

Jan Logie will present a raft of bills to Parliament later this year that will, among other things, seek to improve the conditions for woman migrants.

BusinessWith the expansion of interest and legislation on business and human rights, several organisations have emerged that can offer services to New Zealand organisations. For example, Tuhana consulting has employed former Chief Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, David Rutherford, to work in this space. From an independent investigations position, AIM CRI offers businesses help in identifying and eradicating labour exploitation in New Zealand, with employees who were formerly in New Zealand Police. They use similar methodologies to investigate labour practices, with a particular focus on opaque subcontractors who regularly used new company names, addresses and stand-in directors to avoid regulations. An example of AIM CRI’s work is their 2020 collaboration with Zespri to try to stop exploitation of migrants through unfair subcontracting contracts, which they estimated as being in the hundreds.550

10.6 What are the needs and gaps?It is clear that human trafficking and modern forms of slavery, or extreme exploitation, exist in New Zealand and that the numbers of these crimes are large enough to be of concern. While there is crossover with the exploitation of temporary migrant workers, there is enough evidence of egregious cases that more work needs to be done researching and advocating for taking this matter seriously. The government response has been limited and it has a low priority, with a preference from Immigration New Zealand for getting convictions for lesser offences rather than pursuing human trafficking convictions. The lack of prosecutions feed back into claims that there are no issues with trafficking in New Zealand.

550 Shepherd, N. (2020). Zespri helped bring migrant exploitation case, further charges possible. AIM CRI. 8 October. https://www.aimcri.co.nz/post/manage-your-blog-from-your-live-site

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While other NGOs are involved to a limited extent (many focusing on the more prevalent exploitation offshore), there is no consistent group focused on extreme forms of exploitation and trafficking. There are also concerns regarding insufficient or infrequent training, resource constraints and staffing/funding issues for NGOs and government agencies that deal with trafficking. Australian Red Cross research shows the response among service providers and frontline officials is marked by an unclear understanding of referral pathways and intervention criteria across agencies and jurisdictions. Recognising indicators of trafficking and slavery at the community level also remains difficult, with low awareness of the issue or what to do about it. Existing immigration procedures could also have the potential to create barriers to identification in instances where the emphasis placed on visa status and compliance may be greater than further exploration into trafficking indicators. Migrants placed in detention due to their immigration status (such as an expired visa or for working in breach of visa conditions) need time to recover before being likely to disclose evidence of trafficking. Some of this work will require legal expertise and, if New Zealand Red Cross is to be involved, there will need to be collaboration with other National Societies – like Australian Red Cross – that already monitor and advocate in this area.

It is important to recognise that migrants are particularly vulnerable to human rights breaches. These risks are further pronounced if migrants arrive through irregular channels.551 The very nature of being a non-national means a migrant worker may not speak the language, understand the legal system, and may have limited communication with family, which can further isolate them. There do not appear to be organisations providing support to trafficked peoples in any coordinated manner. With New Zealand Red Cross experience in translation and culturally focused support, there are opportunities to assist with some of the most exploited peoples.

551 United Nations (2015). The Economic Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-14-1_en.pdf

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11. Migrants in emergencies and disastersThis section considers how migrants fare before, during and after a disaster, drawing on both academic and public policy research as well as New Zealand Red Cross experience in a range of disasters across New Zealand. The past two years have seen a wide range of challenging disasters and emergencies – the March 15 Terror Attacks in Christchurch, COVID-19 and the Whakaari White Island eruption – all of which included foreign nationals and/or migrants requiring assistance. New Zealand Red Cross work in each of these areas touched on migrants who had significantly different needs from more established populations. In addition to

the Migration Programmes, this work draws from, and intersects with, strategic objectives from disaster risk management, youth and international sections of New Zealand Red Cross.

Though this section focuses on all migrants in emergencies and disasters, there is an established, though changing, convention of describing the issues focused on the vulnerability of migrants. While that framing does fit well with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s focus on humanitarian aid and assistance to those most in need, it also excludes the focus on the strengths of migrants in preparing for, and avoiding the worst effects of, disasters and emergencies. Note that the previous section dealt with climate change and environmental degradation, so these issues are not covered in full in this section.

© Victor Lacken / IFRC

A nurse at the Canadian Red Cross mobile clinic in Kutupalong camp, Bangladesh, uses a MUAC tape to check a baby for symptoms of malnutrition. Recent surveys condiucted in the camp indicate that almost one in five children aged between 6 and 59 months suffers from acute malnutrition.

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11.1 The international contextAs there are an almost limitless number of examples of global emergencies and disasters to draw from, and a correspondingly large quantity of migrants (79.5 million displaced people;552 272 million migrants),553 this overview will be limited to a range of studies on risk preparedness and vulnerability in situations that are similar to those likely to be found by migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand.

There is no widely accepted and shared definition of vulnerable migrants in the international human rights discourse. Instead, the International Organization for Migration notes that organisations and institutions tend to list some examples of vulnerable situations – children at risk, asylum seekers, or people who are ill, for example – without offering a definitive overview of what constitutes vulnerability.554 A key set of clarifications on the vulnerable are made by Sutherland who focuses on those who fall outside of the 1951 Refugee Convention, with a relevant emphasis on the need for protection for those excluded from asylum processes. His analysis is mostly concerned with failed states, but there are useful discussions on the need for temporary protection for people in the aftermath of disaster. That protection would allow both the safety and security of the vulnerable migrant, but also allow for migrants to play a proactive part in the recovery from disasters and emergencies.555 UNHCR makes the important distinction between vulnerability as a result of the situation leading to migration (situational vulnerability) and an inherent vulnerability based on the migrant (individual vulnerability).556 In arguing for an all-of-government/society approach to risk

552 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Global Trends Report 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019

553 United Nations (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationStock2019_TenKeyFindings.pdf

554 International Organization for Migration (2017). Protection Of The Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms Of Migrants And The Specific Needs Of Migrants In Vulnerable Situations. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Protection-of-Human-Rights-and-Vulnerable-Migrants.pdf

555 Sutherland, P. (2017). Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration, United Nations General Assembly, A/71/728, 3 February.

556 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017). Migrants in vulnerable situations: UNHCR’s perspective. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/596787174.pdf

reduction, Guadagno offers a useful list of factors that can increase vulnerability in migrant populations:

ɠ limited language proficiency

ɠ limited knowledge of local environmental conditions, including natural hazards, legal framework and institutions, and markets

ɠ limited social networks

ɠ lack of trust in authorities

ɠ restrictions on mobility

ɠ and discrimination, hostility, and xenophobia.557

The trend towards a strength-based approach to Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) communities can be seen in a number of recent academic works that seek to better analyse vulnerability and resilience within CALD communities. Of note is the metric developed by Ogie and Pradhan via their Strengths-based Social Vulnerability Index (SSVI) that attempts to include some of the benefits of multilingual speakers in sufficient quantity, drawing on empirical and quantitative work from Wollongong.558 They conclude that this more intensively analytic approach will help communities (a) focus on strengths, (b) deploy resources to specific communities and (c) become empowered to manage risk in their own ways.

11.2 New Zealand contextThere have been several large-scale disasters in the past decade with significant loss of life in New Zealand: earthquakes centred on Canterbury (2010/11 with numerous significant aftershocks) and Kaikōura (2016), water contamination in Hawke’s Bay (2016), the eruption on Whakaari

557 Guadagno, L. (2015). Reducing Migrants’ Vulnerability to Natural Disasters through Disaster Risk Reduction Measures. MICIC issue brief. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/resources-and-publications/reducing-migrants%E2%80%99-vulnerability-natural-disasters-through-disaster-risk

558 Ogie, R. & Pradhan, B. (2020). Social vulnerability to natural hazards in Wollongong: comparing strength-based and traditional methods. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 35(1), 61–68; Ogie R. & Pradhan, B. (2019). Natural Hazards and Social Vulnerability of Place: The Strength-Based Approach Applied to Wollongong, Australia. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science. 10, 404–420.

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White Island (2019), the March 15 Terror Attacks on two mosques in Christchurch (2019), several floods, and forest fires in the Port Hills of Christchurch and the Tasman region. Though COVID-19 is a pandemic and an emergency, and has qualitative differences from those disasters already cited, it has also presented numerous challenges for migrants. In this subsection, we will discuss a selection of the tools and plans already in place in the New Zealand context to help vulnerable migrants cope in the aftermath of disasters and emergencies.

The New Zealand government’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was established on 1 December 2019, replacing the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) and providing leadership on nationwide responses to disasters and emergencies. Though NEMA replaces MCDEM, the term Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) remains in place as a descriptor of the broader sector.

The 2019 National Disaster Resilience Strategy is the first new CDEM strategy in a decade to formulate a nationwide, forward-thinking strategy for a holistic response to disasters. The strategy is built around the 4Rs: Risk Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery.559 The strategy promotes a holistic approach to resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors, representing more of an all-of-nation, than an all-of-government approach. This holistic approach has been favoured for at least 15 years with a focus on social and environmental well-being alongside more traditional concerns for the economic and the built environment.560

The 2019 strategy builds on many of the lessons from the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes and expands on delivery of information for CALD communities. CALD communities can be defined as people who do not speak English or te reo Māori as their primary language, or who have been raised in a culture that is different from the one in which they predominantly live.561 Most

559 Civil Defence and Emergency Management (2019). National Disaster Resilience Strategy: Rautaki ā-Motu Manawaroa Aituā. April. Ministry of Civil Defence.

560 See, for example, Norman S. (2006). New Zealand’s holistic framework for disaster recovery. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 21 (4). 16–20.

561 see Civil Defence (n.d.). Information Accessibility. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/dgl-14-13-information-accessibility.pdf

obviously, the strategy has been produced in both simplified English forms, as well as Simplified Chinese, Gagana Sāmoa, Korean and Hindi (plus audio and large print, te reo Māori and New Zealand sign language).

The most recent overview from CDEM on CALD communities was published in June 2013, drawing from lessons learned from the Canterbury earthquakes. The Including culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities document is notable for the wide range of departments (15) required to collaborate on good outcomes for CALD communities and the focus on both CDEM personnel and broader communities.562 This focus has led to an allocation of resources for CALD relevant projects within CDEM such as funding for Foreign Language Emergency Messaging for Radio, produced by Plains FM and Christchurch City Council, to be offered for all foreign language radio stations across New Zealand.563

The widespread devastation of Canterbury in the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes has led to significant government and academic interest in how vulnerable migrants experienced response and recovery. In the immediate aftermath of the February 2011 earthquakes, a cross-sector group, Community Languages Information Network Group (CLING), was formed to unite agencies and media to connect to CALD communities.564 These collaborations laid the groundwork for Christchurch City Council, in collaboration with Partnership Health Canterbury, to develop an extensive best practice guideline for CALD communities.565 The key message from the report was that the best recoveries would occur in communities that were already connected before a disaster. The Christchurch Migrant Inter-Agency (CMIA) group also produced an extensive

562 Civil Defence (2013). Including culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities. April. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/is-12-13-including-cald-communities.pdf

563 Civil Defence (2018). Strengthening CALD Communities Foreign Language Emergency Messaging for Radio. Application for funding. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/CDEM-Resilience-Fund/2018-19/2018-04.pdf

564 Immigration New Zealand (2016). Lessons from the Christchurch quake. Settlement Actionz 6. July. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/media-centre/newsletters/settlement-actionz/actionz6/lessons-christchurch-earthquake

565 Wylie, S. (2012). Best Practice Guidelines Engaging with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) Communities in Times of Disaster. Christchurch City Council. July. https://ccc.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Services/Civil-Defence/BestPracticeGuidelinesofDiverseCommunitiesDisasterMarch2012.pdf

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report on how migrant communities responded to the earthquakes with a set of significant recommendations566

Since the Canterbury earthquakes, several other entities have been practising readiness for likely future disasters. In 2015, Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) partnered with New Zealand Red Cross to produce information in 15 languages.567 This collaboration also brought in European Union translation specialists to help provide an overview for how citizen-led translation might be rapidly produced in a disaster response scenario.568 Civil Defence has also produced earthquake and tsunami pamphlets in 22 languages to aid in readiness.569 A number of other departments have translated some of their key preparedness advice. For example, the Earthquake Commission has “Quake Safe Your Home” documents in five additional languages570, while Civil Defence’s Get Ready website hosts seven additional language overviews of preparing a grab bag with emergency survival items.571

The scale of devastation in the Canterbury region has led to significant academic research into both migrants’ responses to the disaster as well as theorising on what it can teach people in terms of preparedness. A key lesson from Zhuravsky and Harada’s study on culturally safe nursing in times of disaster was the role played by Māori and the potential for further work in Māori disaster resilience.572 This point was more broadly

566 CMIA (2012). Lessons learned following the earthquakes of 22 February 2011. https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxbzKqZEYFl-alIyVXFNamZnM00/preview

567 Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (n.d.). Earthquake Planning Guide (language versions). https://getprepared.nz/households/earthquake-planning-guide-language-versions/; Shackleton, J. (2018). Preparedness in diverse communities: Citizen translation for community engagement. Work in Progress Insight Paper Understanding Risk, Risk Reduction, Consequences and Forecasting Track Proceedings of ISCRAM Asia Pacific (K. Stock & D. Bunker, eds). http://idl.iscram.org/files/jamieshackleton/2018/1652_JamieShackleton2018.pdf

568 See also Federici, F.M. & Cadwell, P. (2018). Training citizen translators: design and delivery of bespoke training on the fundamentals of translation for New Zealand Red Cross. Translation Spaces, 7 (1), 20–43.

569 Civil Defence (n.d.). Translated Resources. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/public-education/public-education-resources/tsunami-public-education-resources/#translated

570 EQC (n.d.). Quake Safe Your Home. https://www.eqc.govt.nz/be-prepared/resources

571 Civil Defence (n.d.). Translated information about emergency survival items and your grab bag. https://getready.govt.nz/prepared/household/supplies/#e1279

572 Zhuravsky, L. & Harada, N. (2019). Providing culturally safe nursing care in disaster: Japanese and New Zealand perspectives. Journal of the National Institute of Public Health, 68(4), 334–342.

discussed by Marlowe and Lou’s evaluation of how refugee communities fared after the major Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011.573 They pointed out that Māori Wardens were particularly useful in identifying when cultural needs were not being met, which was especially important given a reported lack of cultural training for recovery centre staff. Marlowe has also shown the way refugee communities conceptualise belonging and how this identification informs both responses and recovery to disasters.574

The specific challenges for communicating with Auckland’s large Pacific population forms the basis for Marlowe’s expansion of the risk reduction theory to four sub-pillars of engagement: Reach, Relevance, Receptiveness and Relationships.575 The International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction has also featured regular overviews drawing from New Zealand experience including work on short-term migrants and international students,576 language translation (comparing New Zealand to Ireland, the United Kingdom, the USA and Japan) – described as “cursory” in CDEM overviews from 2015 documents and over-reliant on volunteers.577

CDEM has also recognised significant shortcomings in preparedness for Asian identifying communities, people who have been in New Zealand for less than ten years and people for whom English is not their first language. In their annual Colmar Brunton survey of New Zealanders, these three groups regularly showed either a lack of actions to prepare for disasters or a lack of knowledge about what to do in case of a disaster or emergency. While the data did not go much deeper into the CALD groups that this represents, it does show some attention

573 Marlowe, J. & Lou, L. (2013). Canterbury Earthquakes and Resettled Refugee Communities. Aotearoa Social Work Review, 25(2), 58–68.

574 Marlowe, J. (2015). Belonging and Disaster Recovery: Refugee-Background Communities and the Canterbury Earthquakes. British Journal of Social Work, 45 (supplement 1),188–204.

575 Marlowe, J., Neef, A., Tevaga, C. & Tevaga, C. (2018). A New Guiding Framework for Engaging Diverse Populations in Disaster Risk Reduction: Reach, Relevance, Receptiveness, and Relationships. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 9, 507–518.

576 Thorup-Binger, C. & Charania, N. (2019). Vulnerability and capacities of international students in the face of disasters in Auckland, New Zealand: A qualitative descriptive study. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 39.

577 O’Brien, S., Federici, F., Cadwell, P., Marlowe, J. & Gerber, B. (2018). Language translation during disaster: a comparative analysis of five national approaches. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31 (2018), 627–636

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at the national level of difference among the population.578

Though the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing, the success of New Zealand in minimising community transmission is also likely to lead to studies in how a super-diverse community was included in the all-of-government response. As with the work on citizen translators with WREMO, New Zealand Red Cross VCMM work is already leading to discussions of best practice responses to migrant well-being, with the researchers being in contact with New Zealand-based RSE researchers who are comparing this response to the Australian response.

Finally, it is worth noting that the concepts of vulnerability and migrant are not solely derived from being vulnerable in New Zealand. Many migrants in New Zealand are made vulnerable by being away from their families, in search of the economic resources to improve lives at home. When a disaster or emergency strikes at home, migrants in New Zealand become vulnerable to health and mental health pressures – as well as pressures from wider family. Researchers have spent considerable effort in highlighting the role that remittances from New Zealand can play in assisting family members struck by disasters offshore.579

11.3 Legal issues for migrants in disasters and emergencies The main legislation covering the aftermath of disaster is the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) which is a framework designed to facilitate both preparation for, and recovery from, emergencies at the local, regional and national levels. This Act was amended during the COVID-19 response to allow consistent nationwide approaches to the pandemic, though

578 Civil Defence and Emergency Management (2019). Civil Defence Preparedness Survey 2019. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/public-education/2019-Civil-Defence-Disaster-Preparedness-report.pdf

579 Pairama, J. & Le De, L. (2018). Remittances for Disaster Risk Management: Perspectives from Pacific Island Migrants Living in New Zealand. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 9, 331–343.

these will expire two years after being put into place if not renewed. In 2003, CDEM’s Regulations offered additional oversight including the terms by which a national or local state of emergency would be declared, extended and terminated. CDEM also noted 14 other key pieces of legislation relevant to disaster and emergencies in New Zealand, including legislation around earthquakes, biosecurity, Greater Christchurch regeneration and hazardous substances.580

While many of the disasters that have affected New Zealand are one-off events that do not necessarily impact migrants’ visa status, there have been exceptions and changes made to visa and social welfare eligibility around the aftermath of the March 15 Terror Attacks and COVID-19. After the March 15 Terror Attacks, the Christchurch Response Visa allowed for people who were present at the mosque and the immediate family of those injured or killed in the attacks to gain permanent residency in New Zealand, with 153 people having been accepted (and 22 rejected) as of the latest statistics.581 Though COVID-19 did not lead to a new permanent residency category, there were a raft of extensions to already existing visas, and the notable creation of a two-month COVID-19 Short-Term Visitor Visa that could cover anyone still in New Zealand whose visa has expired and is unable to return home.582

In addition to visa changes, COVID-19 also saw the creation of a large set of legislative frameworks and ministry policies (which do not require passing through the Cabinet). In the Ministry of Health alone, legislation relevant to vulnerable migrants stretched across the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 to border notices, and managed isolation and quarantine orders. One area of contention in migrant communities was the reluctance of the government to invoke s64 of the Social Securities Act (2018) that would allow an emergency benefit to be granted to

580 Civil Defence and Emergency Management (n.d.). Legislation. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/legislation

581 Immigration New Zealand (2020). Residence decisions by financial year. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/statistics-residents-decisions-financial-year Also see Lewis, O. (2019). Wider family groups excluded from Christchurch terror response visa. Stuff. 7 August. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/114804849/wider-family-groups-excluded-from-christchurch-terror-response-visa for a wider discussion of those excluded from the visa.

582 Immigration New Zealand (2020). Information about Covid-19 Short-term Visitor Visa. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/visa-factsheet/covid19-short-term-visitor-visa

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those not normally eligible.583 This reluctance was eventually overcome with the establishment of the collaboration between the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) Foreign National support programme and the New Zealand Red Cross VCMM fund.584

11.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to migrants in disasters and emergencies The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement focuses on the most vulnerable and – in the aftermath of disasters – these often include those who are isolated either by not speaking the dominant language or not being aware of cultural norms around receiving help. The IFRC 2020 World Disaster Report highlights these challenges faced by migrants and those already displaced and points to the lack of – and need for – involvement of these communities in disaster risk reduction efforts.585

While most of the disasters and emergencies discussed in this section affect all people, there have also been emergencies that are more specific to migrant and refugee communities, such as the drowning of migrants in the Mediterranean586 and the recent fires in refugee camps in Moria, Greece.587

583 Hayle, M. (2020). ‘Give us some hope’: Stranded visa holders beg for more government help. The Spinoff. 30 July. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/30-07-2020/give-us-some-hope-stranded-visa-holders-beg-for-more-government-help

584 Bonnett, G. (2020). Govt, Red Cross spend $15m helping immigrants stranded in NZ. Radio New Zealand 11 November. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/covid-19/430331/govt-red-cross-spend-15m-helping-immigrants-stranded-in-nz

585 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2020). International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 2020 World Disaster Report https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/world-disaster-report-2020

586 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2017). A response plan to meet the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants: A Movement coordinated approach focusing on the Mediterranean and neighbouring regions. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/04/Response-plan-for-Mediterranean-min.pdf

587 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2020). Residents of Moria camp must be moved now Red Cross head. September. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/press-release/residents-moria-camp-must-moved-now-red-cross-head

New Zealand Red Cross plays a role in disaster management in New Zealand with the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) team leading New Zealand Red Cross contributions in a number of CDEM welfare services sub-functions as described in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015. DRM includes 400 volunteers working in 19 Disaster Welfare and Support Teams located across the country. The focus of these teams is on supporting disaster response (during and immediately following a disaster), and they are also trained to provide support in the disaster readiness and recovery phases (i.e., before and after).

COVID-19 lockdowns and the subsequent loss of work and inability to return home showed that some migrant communities are both vulnerable and hard to reach in terms of providing assistance. New Zealand Red Cross drew expertise from its unique nexus connecting three areas of operations – International humanitarian assistance (delegates), DRM and Migration – to work alongside the Department of Internal Affairs in establishing the VCMM programme to ensure the basic needs of migrants were met. VCMM delivered $20 million of assistance to over 12,00 people. This work ensured that foreign nationals who had lost their ability to support themselves and who were also unable to go home were supported with in-kind payments for food and other needs. Though formal evaluations of the VCMM programme remain to be completed, anecdotal evidence and New Zealand Red Cross policy indicate that uptake of the service was linked to New Zealand Red Cross’s ability to act as a recognised and trusted entity by applicants who might otherwise be wary of how applications for assistance could hinder future applications for permanent residency.588

Prior to VCMM, New Zealand Red Cross also supported refugees and asylum seekers during lockdown through the Pathways to Settlement programme. Pathways to Settlement is the central programme in New Zealand Red Cross to help resettled refugees in their first six months in the country. The challenges of settlement were

588 These concerns were often raised by groups like the Migrant Workers Association. See Robson, S. (2020). Benefits for migrant workers to match standard dole rate. Radio New Zealand. 22 November. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/431197/benefits-for-migrant-workers-to-match-standard-dole-rate

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exacerbated by New Zealand Red Cross workers and volunteers not being able to meet with clients in a face-to-face setting. During the COVID-19 Alert level 4 lockdown periods, Pathways to Settlement workers were considered essential workers and maintained their connection, via phone, to recently settled refugees. They also ensured that official health and safety information was translated into 15 key languages.589

The March 15 Terror Attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, which killed 51 people, led to a combined response from New Zealand Red Cross migration and DRM teams. In addition, migration teams from around the country provided support to new arrivals – particularly from the Muslim community – who were affected by the attacks.

One of the core skills offered by New Zealand Red Cross has been translation and interpreting services in the aftermath of all the disasters focused on in this section. As noted earlier, this key skill has also been put to use in collaboration with WREMO to develop the community skills around rapid translation that are often required in the aftermath of disasters. These collaborations continue in collaboration with Jay Marlowe of Asia Pacific Centre for Refugee Studies.

Another area where New Zealand Red Cross supports migrants in a time of disaster is in managing Restoring Family Links (RFL) as part of the inquiry sub-function of the National CDEM Plan. New Zealand Red Cross works closely with the New Zealand Police, who have requested the activation of the Family Links website twice – for Whakaari White Island and the March 15 Terror Attacks in 2019. This website allowed relatives and friends to register people as “missing” and for people to register themselves, in turn, as being alive. However, there were problems with this as some journalists used names on the “missing” list as if they were missing rather than people who were sought and used this information to contact families before any official process had begun, which distressed families. “Missing” was then amended to “I am looking for”.

589 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). Leaving No-One Behind. https://www.redcross.org.nz/stories/new-zealand/leaving-no-one-behind; See also Checkpoint (2020). Covid-19: How volunteers are helping refugees in New Zealand lockdown. Radio New Zealand. 7 April. https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint/audio/2018741881/covid-19-how-volunteers-are-helping-refugees-in-nz-lockdown

In response to the events mentioned, New Zealand Police has recently developed an in-house platform for “Persons Inquired for” to be launched in an emergency response. This platform includes use of the 105 non-emergency number for enquiries, dedicated lines to receive enquiries, and a website to register people as “I am Alive” or “I am looking for” which, while still in the testing phase, will be accessible in many languages. In the event of an emergency, the Restoring Family Links service would share information on how overseas enquiries can access the service across the Red Cross Red Crescent Family Links Network and provide situation updates to the Movement. Any requests which are not easily resolved may become tracing requests for the Restoring Family Links service. Additionally, New Zealand Red Cross RFL service may receive enquiries if the enquirer prefers not to interact with the New Zealand authorities. The Letter of Agreement between New Zealand Red Cross and New Zealand Police will be reviewed early in 2021.

Regionally, New Zealand Red Cross works with the Asia Pacific Migration Network (APMN) to collaborate on the Movement Leadership model for migration. As co-lead of the Climate Change, Migration and Displacement stream, New Zealand Red Cross is focused on feeding into regional knowledge sharing and capacity building for National Societies responses to emergencies and disasters. These forums assist with improving individual National Societies responses to migrants in times of disaster as well as ensuring that individual Societies contribute to global aims of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

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11.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to migrants in disasters and emergencies Government(s)The key government department in responding to emergencies is NEMA – as such, they are also the most important department in terms of vulnerable migrants, especially in terms of coordinating risk reduction, readiness and response. In terms of recovery, many other parts of government play a role in assisting vulnerable migrants, from Immigration New Zealand providing visa assistance, to the Ministry of Social Development and the Department of Internal Affairs looking after well-being (as per the COVID-19 responses). As noted in the previous section, there are numerous legislative and governmental responsibilities for disaster response and so a holistic response is required. While NEMA is central to those holistic responses, there is also a central communication and decision-making role for the Prime Minister and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). A 2019 Briefing Paper to the Incoming Minister noted that work was underway on a communication strategy for CALD communities.590

When a disaster has struck or an emergency is in place, foreign governments are often quick to become involved to make sure their citizens are protected and assisted. In this space, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs liaises with these governments in the same way that they work together if a New Zealand citizen requires assistance overseas. Depending on the country, their capacity and number of citizens affected, assistance can be as simple as ensuring verified flows of information, or (as we have seen in COVID-19) as extensive as providing repatriation flights and short-term economic support.

Local government has also shown a willingness to advance the support of vulnerable migrant

590 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (2019). Briefing to the Incoming Minister. June. https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/Briefing-to-the-Incoming-Minister-of-Civil-Defence-June-2019.pdf

populations. The impact of the Canterbury earthquakes led to the best practice on CALD (described above) while also influencing the willingness of WREMO to work with New Zealand Red Cross on earthquake preparedness for speakers of non-official languages.

Migrant and faith communitiesMigrant communities play a key part in response and recovery efforts. While these efforts can often be undocumented acts of mutual aid from those within the same cultural and linguistic communities, it is also necessary to acknowledge the role of community leaders, who take on positions that are rarely paid, and bridge official positions and funds from government to those in need.

One good example of community-based mutual aid came in March and April 2020 when COVID-19 led to a lockdown in New Zealand. Gaurav Sharma, editor of the Multicultural Times, describes how both the Sikh and other Indian community groups rallied together in April and May to offer food and support to Indian communities as well as to other New Zealanders.591 This support – including other community groups from across South Asia – also included donations to other groups such as the Downtown Community Ministry and Wellington Night Shelter.592

As noted by researchers looking at Pacific community support in Auckland, the role of churches must not be overlooked as sites of organisation, dissemination of information and mutual aid.593 Similar benefits from working with faith groups was also noted in the above analysis of RSE workers and, while the two mosques were the site of attacks in the March 15 Terror Attacks, other mosques around the country acted as sites of support, solidarity and connection.

591 Sharma, G. (2020). How Indian communities stepped up in lockdown New Zealand. The Spinoff. 17 May. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/17-05-2020/how-indian-communities-stepped-up-in-lockdown-new-zealand

592 Ibid.593 Marlowe, J., Neef, A., Tevaga C. & Tevaga, C. (2018). A New Guiding

Framework for Engaging Diverse Populations in Disaster Risk Reduction: Reach, Relevance, Receptiveness, and Relationships. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 9, 507–518.

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11.6 What are the needs and gaps?There is no one NGO or part of the government that is the point of contact for migrants in a disaster. New Zealand Red Cross has contributed to this space in the last couple of disasters, but there is a need for resourcing and investment to make sure that migrants are not ignored in any of the readiness, response and recovery stages of an emergency or disaster.

While gaps in response to disaster are often clear, there is also a significant lack of broad connections around the country to migrant communities ahead of disasters. As research noted earlier has shown, the best response to disaster comes from situations where there is high trust between migrant communities and those tasked with responding.

Due to the closeness of New Zealand Red Cross with disaster responses, there are a range to needs to be addressed:

ɠ A clear lead for coordinating engagement with vulnerable migrants – particularly refugees and asylum seekers/convention refugees during a disaster

ɠ Government departments not using interpreting and translation services on a regular basis

ɠ Lack of vertical connections between government and migrant groups pre-disaster

ɠ Better understanding of how transnational media networks inform migrants during a disaster and how these can be worked with.

ɠ There is a need for a specific preparedness strategy for CALD communities

While much work to have accessible information for migrant communities has been undertaken since the Canterbury earthquakes, there remain gaps and challenges for rapid dissemination. More risk-reduction work could be carried out in translating official documents that anticipate likely disasters within New Zealand Red Cross as well as for local Civil Defence more generally. At the same time, lessons from the WREMO/New Zealand Red Cross citizen translator project can be shared throughout New Zealand. More

broadly, questions remain around equity of access to translations and translator services across the regions of the country. As one New Zealand Red Cross member noted, Civil Defence is funded by rates rather than on an as-needed basis. This funding model means that some regions with high-risk but low populations may be particularly under-resourced to assist with CALD communities.

On top of producing documents in a range of relevant languages, there is a need for more proactive knowledge of how ethnic communities respond to disasters. For example, instead of setting up a centralised disaster response space and expecting all people to know about and come to this spot, decision-makers may need to pay more attention to where vulnerable migrant communities go for assistance. Similarly, producing material so that community groups can effectively use these translated documents, or pointing to places where people can go for information in their own languages would likely increase uptake.

Finally, the challenges of COVID-19 have exacerbated already existing inequalities between migrant and non-migrant populations. Inequalities relate to labour market restrictions (who can work when and for whom?), information accessibility, limited community connections and technology issues, especially for linguistically diverse communities. These inequalities produce challenges that have affected not only onshore migrants, but relatives who rely on remittances offshore, and migrants who have relationships or other commitments in New Zealand but who were not able to return to the country, even when they had a valid visa.594 Some NGOs are already acting in this area, though these are often small and under-resourced, with occasional assistance from the Race Relations Commissioner. Relationships and networks with these migrant communities need to be better maintained outside of the specific disaster response space, to build trust and resilience.

594 Robson, S. (2020). Benefits for migrant workers to match standard dole rate. Radio New Zealand. 22 November. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/431197/benefits-for-migrant-workers-to-match-standard-dole-rate

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12. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

12. Public perceptions of migrants and refugeesTo consider the public perception of migrants and refugees in New Zealand is also to consider contentious questions around infrastructure, identity, religion and place. The last decade has seen record levels of new permanent migrants to New Zealand, with related questions around the degree of planning for both new and existing populations, the role of tangata whenua and the support systems in place to welcome these new communities.

While New Zealand often ranks near the highest in the world in welcoming attitudes to migrants,595 there remain divided opinions

595 For a widely reported, international quantitative study, see Ipsos (2016), Ipsos International Immigration, Refugee & Brexit Poll. https://www.ipsos.com/en-nz/ipsos-international-immigration-refugee-brexit-poll

on the benefits of migrants to the country across economic, cultural and political metrics. This section deals primarily with the public perception of migrants, and while this will necessarily touch on experiences of racism and discrimination, it does not seek to be a full catalogue of the experiences of migrants in response to the New Zealand public.596

Public perceptions directly affect how well migrants settle in New Zealand, so ensuring that these discourses are accurate is important. For example, these perceptions can reduce opportunities to migrants and refugees (such as increasing barriers to employment) and serve to validate discrimination and other manifestations of racism.

596 For a grounding, wider overview of migrants’ experiences of New Zealand, see Butcher, A., Spoonley, P. & Trlin, A. (2006). Being Accepted: The Experience of Discrimination and Social Exclusion of Migrants and Refugees in New Zealand. Working Paper. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270884434_Being_Accepted_The_Experience_of_Discrimination_and_Social_Exclusion_by_Migrants_and_Refugees_in_New_Zealand; or Immigration New Zealand (2018). Recent migrants experiences of settling and adjusting to life in New Zealand. National Migrant Consultations 2018. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/about-us/national-migrant-consultations-2018.pdf

© N

ew Zealand Red Cross

Naing Naing Tun, who fled Mynmar many years ago and now works at Wellington's famous Monsoon Poon restaurant, is being interviewed by TVNZ One News.

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Asylum seekers are one of the most often vilified and least understood migrant groups, especially in response to international media coverage and discussion around the southern border of the USA, the 2015 movement of asylum seekers into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, and the ongoing detention of asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia by boat.

New Zealand Red Cross has played a role in combating some of the negative stereotypes about refugees through sharing the stories of many resettled refugees doing good work in their communities. Some of this work has been through linking media to positive stories, while the #KiwiLegends and #EssentialKiwiLegends projects were more sustained promotions of a dozen former refugees’ contributions.597

12.1 The international contextThe history of the world could be written as the story of the movement of people. As such, any attempt to describe the international context for migration is bound to fall short of a comprehensive study of reasons and outcomes. This section will focus less on what those movements have been and more on the recent surveys and theories that help explain public perceptions of migration.

While it is clear from the literature that migration leads to economic growth, it is also clear that the benefits of that growth have not been shared by all. Over the past decade, the austerity policies implemented by many countries, driven by neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, have seen public services truncated or abandoned.598 In that climate of underinvestment, migrants and refugees are often scapegoated as the cause of problems. While much anti-immigration sentiment can be traced to conscious and subconscious xenophobia, it is worth looking at a wide range of causes so that we can genuinely deal with not just the perceptions of the

597 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). #KiwiLegends. https://www.redcross.org.nz/what-we-do/in-new-zealand/migration-programmes/kiwilegends

598 Clark, D. (2016). The global financial crisis and austerity: A basic introduction. Bristol: Bristol University Press.

existing population, but the underlying material circumstances that drive those perceptions.

This section considers, first, a range of surveys and studies on national-level attitudes to migrants and migration. Second, the section covers broad theories of prejudice that shape attitudes and looks at how different parts of the population are more, or less, supportive of migrant and refugee settlement. It also considers factors that may impact the host community’s willingness to support integration, including the use of political narrative and perceptions of “good” and “bad” refugees and migrants.

Surveys on public perceptions of migrationPrior to the refugee crisis of 2015, Gallup and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) conducted a multi-year set of 183,000 qualitative interviews on what people’s views were on migration in over 140 countries.599 This study was unique in its depth compared to many of the usual polls that focus on ranking countries in terms of a range of questions around fears, welcoming attitudes and perceptions of threat. The key finding was that Southern Europe and the United Kingdom were alone in wanting immigration to decrease, whereas other countries wanted it to stay the same or increase. They also saw a strong correlation between a high self-reported economic optimism about the future and an individual’s likeliness to want more migration. Oceania had the lowest percent of people who suggested migration should decrease (26 per cent) and a corresponding greatest percent who said that it should stay the same (41 per cent) or increase (28 per cent).

A more recent study by Pew suggests that there have been some significant changes in recent years to these European attitudes. For example, France and the United Kingdom have been increasingly welcoming, while Germany and Greece have seen the proportion of welcoming citizens drop by double-digits.600 Ipsos notes that

599 Esipova, N. Ray, J. Pugliese, A. & Tsabutashvili, D. (2015). How the World Views Migration. International Organisation for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/how_the_world_gallup.pdf

600 Gonzalez-Barrier, P. & Connor, P. (2019). ’Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden. Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden

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only three countries had less than a majority of those surveyed in favour of the protections afforded by the 1951 Refugee Convention.601

Dennison offers a recent, macro-overview of seven key public perception indexes of migration, including those described above. He concludes that many of them offer only a limited view of migration categories, ought to focus more on why these beliefs are held and should also discuss emigration in the same context.602

At the level of the state, specific policies can also be a very public demonstration of a nation’s approach to migration. Policies that demonstrate inclusive integration policies have been shown to be linked to lower levels of perceived threat. For example, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s inclusive messaging about refugees was identified as one reason for an increase in public support from 42 per cent to 52 per cent for the refugee settlement programme.603 However, negative political leadership can also lead to increased stereotyping around migrant communities. One particularly prominent issue has been terror attacks in the global north that have resulted in misguided fear of assailants hiding within refugee communities.

Media plays a role in dehumanising refugees, which leads to contempt and using incorrect labels such as “illegal” that influence public attitudes.604 Much of this type of political rhetoric is linked to security or crisis framing, which DeBono argues enables authorities to undertake actions that have dehumanised people seeking protection.605 While terms such as “asylum seeker” and “refugee” are legal definitions, these terms have strongly associated stereotypes that result in different threat perceptions. Due to the incorrect arguments that asylum seekers have “jumped

601 IPSOS (2019). Global Attitudes towards Refugees. June 2019. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-06/World-Refugee-Day-2019-Ipsos.pdf

602 Dennison, J. (2019). Public opinion on migration. Data Bulletin: Informing the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/63124/data_bulletin_16.pdf

603 Pedersen, A., Watt, S., & Hansen, S. (2006). The role of false beliefs in the community’s and the Federal Government’s attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 41(1), 105–124.

604 Esses, V., Medianu, S., & Lawson, A. (2013). Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 518-536.

605 DeBono, D. (2018). In Defiance of the Reception Logic: The Case for Including NGOs as Human Rights Monitors in the EU’s Policies of First Reception of Irregular Migrants. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 24(3), 291–295.

the queue” or are “illegal”, there is significantly higher animosity towards asylum seekers than to refugees in Australia.606

Theories of prejudice The public is not a homogenous group and numerous studies have shown how migrants are perceived differently by different groups. For example, those less likely to be personally affected by perceived competition for resources are more likely to identify symbolic threats such as changing group norms and a concern about retaining cultural norms.607 Historical context also influences social attitudes and can often be a reason for deeply rooted racial prejudice. In the European Union, colonial pasts have been identified as factors in racist views and perceived superiority over refugee arrivals.608 Age and education have been shown to be a factor, with older demographics more likely to identify a threat from migrants. These predispositions are likely for several reasons including that education provides people with opportunities to think critically, exposure to diverse views and engagement with diverse teaching and student bodies.609

Policies that limit or create barriers to economic or social integration will inevitably result in worse integration outcomes for both individuals and families. The degree to which the state is active in building social integration depends on both the type of migrant (refugees are likely to receive more support than students or people on working visas) and the capacity and attitude of the receiving state. For instance, limiting access to financial support to enable refugees to “gain economic independence” may restrict their opportunity to develop local language skills and limit their ability to integrate, even though

606 Verkuyten, M. (2004). Emotional Reactions to and Support for Immigrant Policies: Attributed Responsibilities to Categories of Asylum Seekers. Social Justice Research, 17(3), 293–314.

607 Hynie, M., & Moghaddam, F. (2018). Refugee Integration: Research and Policy. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 24(3), 265–276.

608 Mestheneos, E., & Ioannidi, E. (2002). Obstacles to Refugee Integration in the European Union Member States. Journal of Refugee Studies, 15(3), 304–320.

609 Bohman, A. (2015), It’s who you Know. Political Influence on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and the Moderating Role of Intergroup Contact. Sociological Research Online, 20(3), 1-17; Pettigrew, T. (1997). Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(2), 173–185.

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the concept is couched as an initiative aimed at building independence.610

Most theories on racial prejudice are founded in group threat theory which originated from Blumer’s hypothesis that the social positioning of different racial groups affects intergroup interactions. He theorised that groups’ self-definition automatically occurs and is reinforced when building concepts of a different group – essentially, what is it about “them” that makes them different from “us”.611

Realistic threats are threats from the out-group that may impact on the in-group’s economic, political or physical situation. This threat is founded in the idea of scarcity of resources that results in competition.612 An example of a realistic threat and how it plays out in the community and in the political sphere is the argument that refugees take jobs or housing from the host community. In contrast, symbolic threats are based on a perceived threat of how differences in the values, beliefs, and customs of the out-group may impact the in-group’s own cultural norms. This threat is most prominent when there is a host community preference for assimilation as opposed to multiculturalism.

Allman’s intergroup contact theory seeks ways to counter these threats. He thinks that while these threats are often articulated as collective struggles, racial prejudice is socialised at an individual level, and, in the same way it is learnt, it can be changed through contact between groups.613 Intergroup contact has been shown to reduce prejudice or anti-immigration attitudes.614

610 Hynie, M. & Moghaddam, F. (2018). Refugee Integration: Research and Policy. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 24(3), 265–276.

611 Blumer, H. (1958). Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Pacific Sociological Review, 1(1), 3–7. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1310932368

612 Croucher, S. (2013). Integrated Threat Theory and Acceptance of Immigrant Assimilation: An Analysis of Muslim Immigration in Western Europe. Communication Monographs, 80(1), 46–62.

613 Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books.

614 Bohman, A. (2015). It’s who you Know. Political Influence on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and the Moderating Role of Intergroup Contact. Sociological Research Online, 20(3), 1-17; Pettigrew, T. (1997). Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(2), 173–185.

12.2 New Zealand contextNew Zealand has grown in the past 50 years from one focused on the needs of a monoculture to one that is beginning to address biculturalism while also emerging as a multicultural society. With few exceptions, New Zealand operated a “white New Zealand policy” with a strong preference for British, European and North American migrants. It was not until the mid-1980s that immigration policy widened to include non-traditional countries of immigration, particularly with the 1987 Immigration Act.615

According to the 2018 census, New Zealand is home to 200 ethnic groups and 160 languages. Significant growth of specific groups has occurred, most notably the Asian population which, in a 30-year period, grew from 48,000 in 1983 to 707,598 in 2018.616 This speed of change has been identified as providing challenges to New Zealand to maintain inclusiveness and harmony,617 with 27.4 per cent of people who filled in the most recent census not born in New Zealand.618

Surveys have shown that New Zealanders are more positive about immigration than our closest neighbour Australia and significantly more so than our European counterparts. New Zealanders are more likely to see immigration as positive for the economy, want to prioritise immigrants who can fill job shortages and value an integration approach as opposed to assimilation. Immigrants are generally seen as making the country more interesting, while it is also recognised that immigration can place pressure on services. However, there is still discrimination in how “mainstream” New Zealand perceives different immigrant groups, with preferences for cultures

615 Beaglehole A. (2013). Refuge New Zealand: a nation’s response to refugees and asylum seekers. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

616 Statistics New Zealand (2019) 2018 Census ethnic group summaries. https://www.stats.govt.nz/tools/2018-census-ethnic-group-summaries#Statistics%20New%20Zealand%202018%20Census%20ethnic%20group%20summaries

617 Department of Internal Affairs (2017). Briefing to the Incoming Minister for Ethnic Communities, New Zealand Government.

618 Statistics New Zealand (2019). New Zealand’s population reflects growing diversity. 23 September. https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/new-zealands-population-reflects-growing-diversity

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that are perceived as most like New Zealand’s majority Pākehā culture.619

A 2016 MBIE survey identified that 36 per cent of Māori respondents and 49 per cent of New Zealand European respondents held positive views of migrants. Those with higher education or who spoke a second language were more likely to be positive about immigration than other population groups. There is a large undecided middle ground. In a 2017 UMR Market Research survey, 31 per cent of New Zealand citizens viewed immigration positively, however, 44 per cent were undecided. Younger people (18–29) were more likely to view immigration positively (51 per cent) with older people (45–59 and 65+) the least likely to see positives in immigration (34 per cent). In line with other international surveys, right wing voters (in this case, New Zealand First who are no longer in parliament, followed by National) and immigrants who are well established in New Zealand are less likely to be pro-immigration.620 A recent study conducted during the first months of COVID-19 offered some more data on these issues, however, it is hard to disentangle the results from the heightened circumstances of 2020.621

The size of the refugee quota programme is not well known in New Zealand and consequently there is a perception that New Zealand is accepting more refugees than are actually being resettled. The 2017 UMR Market Research survey showed that only 26 per cent of respondents knew the correct number of annual refugee arrivals with 24 per cent selecting over 10,000 per

619 Ward, C. & Masgoret, A. (2008). Attitudes toward Immigrants, Immigration, and Multiculturalism in New Zealand: A Social Psychological Analysis 1. International Migration Review, 42(1), 227–248; Ipsos, (2016), Ipsos International Immigration, Refugee & Brexit Poll. https://www.ipsos.com/en-nz/ipsos-international-immigration-refugee-brexit-poll; International Migration, Settlement & Employment Dynamics Research (2011). Attitudes towards Immigrants and Immigrant Experiences: Predictive models based on regional characteristics, Department of Labour. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/2724-predictive-models-based-on-regional-characteristics-pdf; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2015). Community Perceptions of Migrants and Immigration, Colman Brunton research. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/c3c87370d1/community-perceptions-migrants-immigration-2015.pdf

620 UMR Research (2017). New Zealand’s views on Immigration. 20 June. https://umr.co.nz/new-zealands-views-immigration

621 Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (2020). New Zealanders’ Perceptions of Refugees: Survey Report 2020. https://rasnz.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/New-Zealanders-Perceptions-of-Refugees.pdf

year.622 The 2016 Ipsos poll showed only 14 per cent knew the correct number of refugee arrivals and those who overestimated the number of refugee arrivals were more likely to be concerned about terror activity through the refugee quota and less confident that refugees integrate.623 People who hold false beliefs about immigration have been shown to have higher negative beliefs about asylum seekers and refugees, so correcting misinformation is important in decreasing negative attitudes towards refugees.624

Ipsos surveys on what issues New Zealanders were concerned with and how political parties were best placed to perform saw two significant changes pre and post the March 15 Terror Attacks. In a list of the top 20 issues, New Zealanders’ concern with “racism” moved from 17th place to 8th – a 14 per cent increase and “defence and terrorism” also rose from 20th to 17th place. In contrast to similar international surveys conducted by Ipsos, New Zealand is one of the most open and welcoming towards refugees and migrants.625 Though New Zealand is not always included in the Ipsos surveys, parallel local versions of the survey have been completed in both 2017 and 2018, with very positive attitudes being shown to refugees and their ability to integrate by comparison to the international norm.626 In 2017 – a year when New Zealand was included in one global overview – a few key points emerged: the main concerns of New Zealanders were material ( jobs, infrastructure) rather than ideological issues (fitting in) and almost half saw immigration as having a net cultural benefit.627

622 Hall, D. (2017). With the election looming, a new poll reveals New Zealanders’ views on immigration. The Spinoff. 12 June. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/12-06-2017/as-we-gear-up-for-an-election-a-new-poll-reveals-nzers-views-on-immigration

623 Ipsos, (2016). Ipsos International Immigration, Refugee & Brexit Poll. September. https://www.curia.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Ipsos-New-Zealand-Immigration-Refugees-and-Brexit-Survey-Report-2016.pdf

624 Pedersen, A., Watt, S. & Hansen, S. (2006). The role of false beliefs in the community’s and the Federal Government’s attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 41(1), 105–124.

625 Ipsos (2018). What New Zealanders think of Refugees and Immigration. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1809/S00232/what-new-zealanders-think-of-refugees-and-immigration.htm

626 Ibid. 627 Ipsos (2017). Global Views on Immigration and the Refugee

Crisis. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2017-09/ipsos-global-advisor-immigration-refugee-crisis-slides_0.pdf

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12.3 Legal issues for public perception of migrants and refugeesNew Zealand has adopted the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New Zealand has not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. New Zealand does not currently have specific hate crime legislation but hate speech is addressed in the Human Rights Act (1993), and the Harmful Digital Communications Act (2015) which are considered in reference to the Bill of Rights Act (BORA) 1990. S61 of the Human Rights Act (1993) makes hate speech illegal, stating it is unlawful “to publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, … words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting ... or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons … on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins.”628 S131 of the Human Rights Act states that it is unlawful to incite racial disharmony “with intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons.”629

The lack of specific hate crime legislation also results in a lack of data and statistics so the scale of the problem in New Zealand is unknown. Unlike the per cent, Germany and the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not currently record or report on hate or racially motivated crimes. The absence of recording of hate crime in New Zealand has long been an issue primarily advocated against by the Human Rights Commission (HRC) which included submissions

628 New Zealand Government. Human Rights Act 1993, Public Act 1993 No 82, Section 61, New Zealand

629 New Zealand Government. Human Rights Act 1993, Public Act 1993 No 82, Section 131, New Zealand

made to the Universal Periodic Review on New Zealand in 2013.630

As a civil matter, complaints on the grounds of breaches of the Human Rights Act are dealt with by the HRC. Complaints received by the HRC must be considered in reference to the freedom of expression protected in the BORA. Where intent can be proven a criminal prosecution can be undertaken but only with the approval of the Attorney General. To date only one conviction for hate speech has occurred when Colin King-Ansell was prosecuted for distributing anti-Jewish pamphlets.631

These provisions in the Human Rights Act are considered in relation to the BORA. Few human rights are exclusionary and the balance of rights such as the freedom of expression and the right of safety and security of person are an example of this need for balance. S14 of the BORA states “that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind”.632 While the freedom of expression is not absolute any limit on it must demonstrate significant detriment to the community.633

Since the 1980s, a significant number of western countries have adopted hate crime legislation including Canada, the USA, the United Kingdom and Germany.634 The term “hate crime” can be a highly emotive and subjective word and it is difficult to establish one definitive definition. The concepts of hate crime and hate speech can be controversial with polarising opinions on limiting freedoms and rights, the thresholds between crime and hate crime, and appropriate punishment. In the United Kingdom, hate crime is defined as “any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race; religion or

630 O’Connor, R. (2013). Kirikiriroa Human Rights Network HRC affiliated, speech, Civil Society Briefing for the Universal Periodic Review on New Zealand, December 2013, Geneva.

631 Cormack, T. (2019). Freedom of speech vs Hate speech. New Zealand Law Society. https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/practice-resources/practice-areas/human-rights/freedom-of-speech-vs-hate-speech

632 New Zealand Government. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Public Act 1990, No 109, Date of assent 28 August 1990, Section 14.

633 Human Rights Commission (n.d.). Enquiries and Complaints. https://www.hrc.co.nz/enquiries-and-complaints/faqs/racially-offensive-comments

634 Mason, G. & Macintosh, K. (2014). Hate Crime Sentencing Laws in New Zealand and Australia: Is there a Difference? New Zealand Law Review, 647–709.

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perceived religion; sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation; disability or perceived disability and any crime motivated by hostility or prejudice against a person who is transgender or perceived to be transgender”.635

The current laws in New Zealand are limited in that they do not protect minority groups in relation to religion, gender, sexual orientation or disability. Also, while existing defamation laws provide protection to individuals, it does not provide protection to groups. An exploration of New Zealand’s hate speech laws by the HRC, Netsafe and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) began exploring their strength in the current changing world. A lack of support for the discourse saw the project halted. After the March 15 Terror Attacks, Justice Minister Andrew Little committed to fast-tracking a pre-planned review of existing legislation governing hate speech, in recognition that the law is very narrow. He stated, “It applies to inciting racial disharmony, it doesn’t relate to expressions that incite discrimination on religious grounds or identity or a range of other grounds.”636 This review will cover the Human Rights Act, Harmful Digital Communications Act and the Crimes Act.

With no current legislation identifying hate crime as an offence, New Zealand’s primary legal mechanism to address hate crime is sentencing legislation.637 Police Minister Stuart Nash said, “We don’t actually prosecute for hate speech per se. We can for offensive behaviour or assault and hate speech or a hate crime actually is an aggravating consideration when determining what charge a person will face.” He also said, if police do decide to charge a person for reported hate crime or hate speech, “then the hate version of that is an aggravating feature in terms of determining the charge the person will face.”638

635 United Kingdom Crown Prosecution Service (n.d.) Hate Crime. https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime

636 Radio New Zealand (2019). Current hate speech law ‘very narrow’ Justice Minister Andrew Little. Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/386237/current-hate-speech-law-very-narrow-justice-minister-andrew-little

637 Mason, G. & Macintosh, K. (2014). Hate Crime Sentencing Laws in New Zealand and Australia: Is there a Difference? New Zealand Law Review, 647–709.

638 One News (2019). Police Minister open to strengthening laws around hate speech. TVNZ, 26 March, https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/police-minister-open-strengthening-laws-around-hate-speech

12.4 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement policy and role in relation to public perception of migrantsThe International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement values of neutrality and impartiality are important and grounding positions which require National Societies not to discriminate on the basis of nationality. This lack of discrimination means that the Movement maintains a strong commitment to the humanitarian rights of migrants, regardless of how states consider an individual’s status. A key position is that the National Society is not for or against migration but will speak to the humanitarian impacts of migration and work to provide assistance and protection in these areas. As part of this commitment to migrants, the Movement pays particular attention to working with host communities and initiatives that promote understanding, interaction and social inclusion.

Recent New Zealand Red Cross advocacy and communication strategies – in place since 2015 – have focused on building public confidence in settlement both as an existing process as well as in new settlement locations. This work is undertaken through working with media to share stories of the successes of, and contributions to communities made by former refugees. These stories have been regularly published in newspapers, online, on television and on the radio since public interest in refugee movements grew during the 2015 refugee crisis.

Alongside this media work, New Zealand Red Cross has also run numerous campaigns to counter stigma against refugees by showing the diverse backgrounds, contributions to the community and everyday lives of refugees resettled in New Zealand. In 2016, the Get to Know Me campaign sought to highlight the similarities of resettled refugees, in contrast to dominant media narratives about hardship which stressed the differences between New Zealanders

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and refugees.639 The #KiwiLegends campaign from 2020, and the COVID-19 #EssentialKiwiLegends campaign from 2020, maintained the themes of focusing on individuals doing great things in the community, with the most recent version highlighting those former refugees who were essential workers during the COVID-19 lockdown period.640

These campaigns combine a range of communication methods from street posters to the same posters being put up across New Zealand Red Cross public-facing sites across the country, to social media and mainstream media placements and partnerships. For example, a full selection of stories about the #EssentialKiwiLegends was shared across The Spinoff website in the lead up to World Refugee Day (WRD).641 New Zealand Red Cross staff also take advantage of the opportunity to write Opinion Editorials on a range of refugee-related issues. Some of these are written as team-wide collaborations, including refugee-background staff members using their lived experience, especially in the lead up to WRD.

Work with new settlement locations continues, with stakeholder and community workshops, scheduled for 2020 but then cancelled, set to begin again in February 2021. These workshops help build capacity in these regions through three overviews: an introduction to the refugee journey, a discussion of working cross culturally in settlement practice, and background to strengths-based integration theories. Central to this work is a Communication Pack that gives seven key messages around issues people are often asked about (why we resettle refugees; how employment works; housing issues), a background to how refugees arrive in New Zealand, a basic glossary of language, answers

639 New Zealand Red Cross (2016). Get to know me. https://www.redcross.org.nz/stories/new-zealand/get-know-me; Dooney, L. (2016). Refugee campaign wants Kiwis to get to know the truth behind the stereotypes. Stuff. 11 April. https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/78641835/refugee-campaign-wants-kiwis-to-get-to-know-the-truth-behind-the-stereotypes

640 New Zealand Red Cross (2020). #KiwiLegends. https://www.redcross.org.nz/what-we-do/in-new-zealand/migration-programmes/kiwilegends

641 See for example, Berthe, E. (2020). Essential Kiwi Legend: The Afghan refugee who became an emergency nurse. The Spinoff. 16 June. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/16-06-2020/essential-kiwi-legend-the-afghan-refugee-who-became-an-emergency-nurse; Timmings, J. (2020). Essential Kiwi Legend: The Bhutanese refugee driving trucks in Nelson. The Spinoff. 19 June. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/19-06-2020/essential-kiwi-legend-the-bhutanese-refugee-driving-trucks-in-nelson

to frequently asked questions, and a suite of media links.

New Zealand Red Cross has also worked with media and journalists to try to refine how former refugees are described in the media and, by extension, how the public thinks of the process of settlement. While “refugee” has often been used as a shorthand for people who have been resettled in New Zealand, New Zealand Red Cross Communications team has also had success at modelling more accurate terminology such as “person with a refugee-background” or, simply, “former refugee”. This focus on language goes a long way towards helping people see the refugee experience as something that does not define an individual but is, rather, something that an individual has lived through. Paying attention to this language – and influencing media where possible – is core to implementing a strengths-based approach to settlement.

12.5 Environmental scan: who is doing what in relation to public perception of migrantsIn this section we will consider those who are working to improve public perception of migrants and those who are in a position of influence. It is easy enough to find anti-migrant voices from a range of justifications. They range from those with genuine concerns about a lack of investment in infrastructure to match increased numbers of permanent residents – to those who are unapologetic racists. While we will not survey those people, it is worthwhile that these views are understood and captured by media monitoring at both a communication and strategic level.

NGOs and unionsAsia New Zealand has been tracking the attitudes of New Zealanders towards Asia and Asian people since 1997. Their most recent surveys have shown increased reports of understanding of Asia, connections through travel and work opportunities and a positive attitude towards

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developing newer connections in the COVID-19 influenced world.642

The refugee crisis of 2015 led to a proliferation of public-facing campaigns on the representation of refugees and reflection on New Zealanders attitudes to refugees. For example, Amnesty International Aotearoa New Zealand produced the “Our Voices” overview of New Zealanders’ attitudes to welcoming refugees. Migrant Workers Association with Unite Union and others have also combined to run the “Love Aotearoa, Hate Racism” campaign, supporting a number of migrant and refugee campaigns and issues.

The Islamic Women’s Council – in particular Anjum Rahman – has been a prominent voice after the March 15 Terror Attacks. For example, recently she has been speaking on the need for investment in deradicalisation programmes for any citizens returning from supporting ISIS in Syria.643 As noted in section three, above, Third Culture Minds has been active across refugee youth mental health work with a particular strength in engaging with the media.644

Government In response to the March 15 Terror Attacks in Christchurch in 2019, the New Zealand government launched the Christchurch Call which sought to ensure that an open and free internet was not used by extremists to organise and share their messages. The Christchurch Call also aimed to encourage governments to make sure that existing legislation was followed and enforced and to create industry standards around extremist content.645 The government, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, considered the programme to be a success and suggested it would stop the sharing of a similar video to that

642 Asia New Zealand (2020). New Zealanders’ perceptions of Asia and Asian peoples: 2019 Annual Survey. https://www.asianz.org.nz/assets/Perceptions-of-Asia-2019.pdf

643 One News (2021). Calls for deradicalization programme in NZ amid debate over NZ-born accused terrorist. TVNZ. 20 February. https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/calls-deradicalization-programme-in-nz-amid-debate-over-born-accused-terrorist

644 See Third Culture Minds (2020). Racism and Islamophobia are a mental health issue. Re: News. 23 June. https://www.renews.co.nz/racism-and-islamophobia-are-a-mental-health-issue

645 Christchurch Call (2020). The Call. https://www.christchurchcall.com/call.html

of the March 15 Terror Attacks if it were created online today.646

The Office of Ethnic Communities, established in 2000, is the lead government department on ethnic diversity in New Zealand, providing information, advice and services to ethnic communities with the aim of supporting community development and social cohesion. After the March 15 Terror Attacks, the Department received an additional $1.8 million for its portfolio and $9.4 million over four years in the budget.

The Ethnic Communities Development Fund also received an immediate $1 million increase. In December 2020, as part of the government’s response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques, it was announced that the Office of Ethnic Communities would become the Ministry for Ethnic Communities.647

Alongside the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy (NZRRS) is the New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy, developed in 2014, which has five key outcome areas: Employment, Education and Training, English language, Inclusion, and Health and Wellbeing. In 2019, MBIE restructured New Zealand Immigration Services to bring these together as a new team called Refugee and Migrant Services.

The “Welcoming Communities” initiative has passed through a pilot phase and will now be rolled out to 30 centres and regions in addition to the original ten.648 The initiative is led by Immigration New Zealand in partnership with the OEC and the HRC. The Welcoming Communities initiative aims to support the development of “Communities that make newcomers feel welcome,” which “are likely to enjoy better social outcomes, greater social cohesion and stronger economic growth. In this environment, everyone can fully participate in the economic, civic and social life of the community. Building connections between locals and newcomers means everyone

646 Radio New Zealand (2019). Christchurch terror attacks: Ardern and Macron hail success of Christchurch Call. Radio New Zealand. 15 May. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/416678/christchurch-terror-attacks-ardern-and-macron-hail-success-of-christchurch-call

647 New Zealand Government (2020). Making New Zealand Safer for Everyone. 8 December. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/making-new-zealand-safer-everyone

648 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2020). Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Immigration. November. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/12539-briefing-for-the-incoming-minister-of-immigration

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feels included and knows they belong.” The pilot locations included two new settlement locations (Whanganui and Ashburton) and two existing settlement locations (Invercargill and Palmerston North).

The HRC has informally recorded racially motivated crime by collating what was reported through mainstream media. As recently as a year before the March 15 Terror Attacks, the HRC was calling for New Zealand Police to collect statistics on hate crimes.649 After the March 15 Terror Attacks, former race relations commission Joris De Bres said that during his term he repeatedly asked the government and police to create a central system for recording details about crimes motivated by hatred and racism.650 The HRC reports on the number of complaints it receives and identified that there had been an increase in complaints about racial disharmony. In 2018, over 400 complaints were received, which included complaints about hate speech, an increase of 26 per cent since 2014. After the March 15 Terror Attacks, the Islamic Women’s Council highlighted how they had been aware of the growing threat towards their community and their frustration in telling the government and not receiving any support to address this.651

The HRC’s 2017 “Give Nothing to Racism” campaign has also been a recent high-profile success, attracting celebrity and public endorsement, as well as being well received internationally, for example, by the recent West Indies cricket team.652 A second iteration of the campaign was launched in 2020, focusing on the voices of racism.

649 Human Rights Commission (2017). We need to collect hate crime data. https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/we-need-collect-hate-crime-data

650 Greenfield, C. & Menon, P. (2019). Before mosque attacks, New Zealand failed to record hate crimes for years, Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-shooting-intelligence-anal/before-mosque-attacks-new-zealand-failed-to-record-hate-crimes-for-years-idUSKCN1RB0PW

651 Rahman, A. (2019). We warned you. We begged. We pleaded. And now we demand accountability. The Spinoff, 17 March. https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/17-03-2019/we-warned-you-we-begged-we-pleaded-and-now-we-demand-accountability

652 Voerman, A. (2020). Black Caps, West Indies take a knee in support of Black Lives Matter before first Twenty20. Stuff. 27 November. https://www.stuff.co.nz/sport/cricket/black-caps/123525318/black-caps-west-indies-take-a-knee-in-support-of-black-lives-matter-before-first-twenty20

Political partiesMigration has become significantly politicised in recent years, especially around the United Nations Global Compact on Migration, foreign buyers of housing, a growth in immigration and the post-March 15 Terror Attacks calls for stronger hate speech legislation. While we will not go into the positions or rhetoric of political parties here, it is worthwhile noting that while leadership on these issues can come from representatives, so can division.

Tangata whenuaThere are a wide range of views on New Zealand’s migrant and refugee settings expressed by different Māori politicians and political groups, iwi, public commentators and scholars. While some link migration to housing shortages, leading to proposals for a total halt to migration,653 there are plenty of other thinkers parsing the differences in migration settings with the challenges to infrastructure and inequality.654 One clear theme from pro-migration advocates is that the structures of colonialism are often the same as those that seek to blame migrants for contemporary problems and that settlers of colour and Māori need to strengthen their relationships to allow for non-colonial approaches to welcoming migrants.655

653 Radio New Zealand (2020). Māori Party housing policy includes immigration halt, homes on ancestral land. Radio New Zealand. 24 September. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/426797/maori-party-housing-policy-includes-immigration-halt-homes-on-ancestral-land

654 For example, see Rata, A. (2020). 5 reasons the Māori Party’s anti-immigration stance is kaka. eTangata. 3 October. https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/5-reasons-the-maori-partys-anti-immigration-stance-is-kaka; Stoddart-Smith, C. (2020). My beloved Māori Party has let me down with its immigration policy. The Spinoff. 3 October. https://thespinoff.co.nz/atea/03-10-2020/my-beloved-maori-party-has-let-me-down-with-its-immigration-policy

655 See, for example, Rata, A. & Al-Asaad, F. (2019). Whakawhanaungatanga as a Māori Approach to Indigenous–Settler of Colour Relationship Building. New Zealand Population Review, 45, 211–233. https://population.org.nz/app/uploads/2019/12/NZPR-Vol-45_Rata-and-Al-Asaad.pdf

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12.6 What are the needs and gaps?While stronger connections to tangata whenua approaches to immigration and refugees are slowly emerging, specific approaches to multiculturalism based on the bi-cultural Te Tiriti o Waitangi foundations are still to be developed. From 2008 to 2019, Te Runanga o Kiririroa, alongside other key partners, welcomed each group of refugee arrivals with a pōwhiri in Hamilton, and occasional pōwhiri still occur. One good example of evolving work is the bi-annual welcome of new migrants and refugees onto Araiteuru marae in Dunedin.656 In Auckland, Ngāti Whātua have recently been working to welcome new migrants, including refugees, onto the marae. A partnership to make a marae visit part of the welcome to all new refugees in the region they are settled could increase Māori/migrant connections and relationships.

While public sentiment is more positive to migrants in New Zealand than in many other countries, there are still basic misunderstandings around what differentiates types of refugees and migrants. More work could also be done to highlight how migrants solve some of the infrastructure problems in New Zealand rather than simply exacerbating them. For example, refugees are regularly criticised for taking up state housing, but few people know that many of the iconic post-World War Two architects, and hence people who were helping to solve housing issues, were refugees.657 There is a need to show the productive side of new migrants, rather than seeing the quota or new migrants as simply numbers.

656 Harwood, B. (2020). Call for community to gather for powhiri. The Star. 19 November. https://www.odt.co.nz/the-star/call-community-gather-powhiri

657 Fitzpatrick, C. (2016). Diaspora by Design: Jewish Refugee Architects and Wellington City. https://www.holocaustcentre.org.nz/uploads/1/2/2/4/122437058/jewish_architects_2.pdf

12. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

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13. Additional categories and issues

13.1 CategoriesDuring the preparation of this report, several additional visa pathways were considered. Desktop research using the structure described above has not been carried out on these issues, but we have highlighted them to show the range of other categories and issues that might become a focus of New Zealand Red Cross in the future or which will have a significant enough public profile that some response or position from New Zealand Red Cross may be required.

Pacific Access Category and Samoan QuotaAs part of the international/humanitarian intake, 1,750 Pacific people are granted residency in New Zealand every year. Recent work commissioned by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) has focused on the disjunct between expectations and the reality of everyday life in New Zealand, with a review of these processes being recently completed and published.658 However, as with other humanitarian intakes, the registration for both ballots have been suspended until a time when the international border is able to open. As of publication, there is no news on when this category will resume.659

658 Kantar (2019). Evaluation of the Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category pre-settlement information pilot Phase 1 Report: Findings to inform development of resources. July. Report commissioned by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11520-evaluation-of-the-samoan-quota-and-pacific-access-category-pre-settlement-information-pilot-phase-1-report

659 Immigration New Zealand (2021). Information about Pacific Access Category Resident Visa. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/pacific-access-category-resident-visa

Community Organisation Refugee SponsorshipThis report does not include discussion on the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship (CORS) as the category remains small and is still in pilot phase. Four NGOs and 24 refugees participated in the CORS pilot, which began in 2018. The 2020 government budget included funding to extend the programme for a further three years with 50 refugee places available per annum and a collaborative design process is currently being tendered. Depending on COVID-19 border restrictions, this second pilot is scheduled to begin in July 2021. A group based out of South West Baptist Church is leading the sponsor side of the expanded pilot and is operating as Refugee Sponsor Hub.660 A similar programme in Canada was a world-leading example of this kind of scheme, with places being in addition to the government assisted quota.661 In contrast, Australia now maintains a 1,000-person strong community sponsorship category within the annual humanitarian, refugee quota.662 The Irish Red Cross and British Red Cross have played a key role in the expansion of community sponsorship.663

Sponsored visa categoriesThough not a migration category, sponsorship is a requirement for particular visas for people in particular circumstances and/or for particular countries. This category is of particular interest to New Zealand Red Cross after sponsored visa holders were ineligible for VCMM.

Sponsored visitor visas are routinely used by New Zealand’s Pacific communities as no Pacific country is eligible for the visa-waiver programme: to visit New Zealand, family members, for example, need to sponsor their relatives and guarantee their welfare and health while in the country.

660 Refugee Sponsor Hub (2021). Homepage. https://www.kiwiswelcomerefugees.com

661 Stephens, M. (2020). Expanding Community Sponsorship in Aotearoa New Zealand. February. https://www.swbc.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PDF-B.pdf

662 Refugee Council of Australia (2021). The Community Support Programme. 22 February. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/community-support-program

663 European National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2021) PERCO handbook on Safe Avenues to access protection across Europe. Platform for Red Cross and Red Crescent European Cooperation on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants. Forthcoming. See: https://www.ifrc.org/perco

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13. ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES AND ISSUES

There are also potential challenges in the work sponsorship visa, where the balance of power between employer and employee is unintentionally skewed by the requirement to remain with one employer. As Collins and Stringer note, being tied to a particular employer makes the worker more vulnerable to exploitation and less likely to report violations of employment law.664

Parent Resident visasRecent years have seen numerous changes to the conditions under which permanent residents are able to sponsor their parents on a pathway to permanent residency in New Zealand. In 2016, temporary restrictions were placed on this category. In October 2019, the category was reinstated but with much higher income thresholds for the children of applicants. Immigration New Zealand suggested this would disqualify 85 per cent of those on the waiting list.665 The visa would also be capped at 1,000 places per year, though there is also a Parent Retirement Resident Visa that allows those with $1 million to invest in New Zealand, and a regular income to gain permanent residency.666

13.2 Emerging IssuesDuring the preparation of this report, several emerging migration issues were identified. Desktop research using the structure described above has not been carried out on these issues.

Migrant volunteeringVolunteering creates an opportunity for former refugees and migrants to participate, develop new skills and knowledge, meet people, integrate, and contribute to society. New Zealand Red Cross has a strategic theme of reimagining volunteering

664 Collins, F., & Stringer, C. (2019). Temporary Migrant Worker exploitation in New Zealand. Report for Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7109-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation-in-new-zealand

665 McCulloch, C. (2019). New parent visa to retain skilled migrants pushing some to leave NZ. Radio New Zealand. 8 October. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/400508/new-parent-visa-to-retain-skilled-migrants-pushing-some-to-leave-nz

666 Immigration New Zealand (n.d.). Parent Retirement Resident Visa. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/parent-retirement-resident-visa

in the organisation. In June 2019 Volunteer New Zealand’s national strategy to support migrant volunteering was released. This document aims to both improve migrant experiences volunteering as well as to increase the numbers of migrants in volunteer work.667

Alternative employment opportunitiesWhile there must remain an absolute humanitarian focus when it comes to the refugee quota and other established pathways, there are emerging opportunities to work with groups like Talent Beyond Boundaries (TBB) to offer refugee protection through non-humanitarian visas. New Zealand Red Cross has been one participant in conversations with TBB in 2019 and 2020 about replicating the successful programmes in Australia and the United Kingdom. This involvement has extended to discussing how programmes like Pathways to Employment or other settlement support could be tied into an emerging TBB programme. As of January 2021, there are some challenges with changes to visa programmes, but TBB is evaluating options to trial the programme with existing visa categories while post-COVID-19 visa categories are being developed by Immigration New Zealand.

667 Volunteer New Zealand (2019). Te Rautaki mō Whanaungatanga: A National Strategy to Support Volunteering for Recent Migrants. June. https://www.volunteeringnz.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/VNZ-RMStrategy-DIGITAL.pdf

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APMN — Asia Pacific Migration Network

APOD — Alternative Place of Detention

APRRN — Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network

ASST — Asylum Seeker Support Trust

ATCR — Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement

ATR — Approval To Recruit

BORA — Bill of Rights Act

CALD — Culturally and Linguistically Diverse

CDEM — Civil Defence and Emergency Management

CLING — Community Languages Information Network Group

CMIA — Christchurch Migrant Inter—Agency

CORS — Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship

CTU — Council of Trade Unions

DIA — Department of Internal Affairs

DHB — District Health Board

DPMC — Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

DRM — Disaster Risk Management

ENZ — Education New Zealand

ESOL — English for Speakers of Other Languages

FAST – Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking

HRC — Human Rights Commission

HSP — Humanitarian Settlement Program

ICCI — Inter Church Commission on Immigration and Refugee Resettlement

ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC — International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

ILO — International Labour Organization

INZ — Immigration New Zealand

IOM — International Organization for Migration

IPCA — Independent Police Conduct Authority

IPCC — Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPT — Immigration and Protection Tribunal

LIM — Land Information Memorandum

MBIE — Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

MCDEM — Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

MFAT — Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

MIQ — Managed Isolation and Quarantine

MP — Member of Parliament

MSD — Ministry of Social Development

Note: As the chapters of this document are intended to be able to be read separately, each new chapter will reintroduce abbreviations. While this might not help with the flow of the entire document, it is necessary for readers who may see only one chapter.

Glossary

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GLOSSARY

MRRC — Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre – Te Āhuru Mōwai

MWA — Migrant Workers Association of Aotearoa

NCCRA — National Climate Change Risk Assessment

NEMA — National Emergency Management Agency

NGO — Non—governmental organisation

NPM — National Preventive Mechanism

NZISA — New Zealand International Students Association

NZUSA — New Zealand Union of Students’ Association

OEC — Office of Ethnic Communities

OECD — Organisation for Economic Co—operation and Development

OHCHR — Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights

OIA — Official Information Act (1982)

PARS — Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society

PICUM — Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants

PRA — Prostitution Reform Act (2003)

RASNZ — Refugees as Survivors New Zealand

RCOA – Refugee Council of Australia

RFL — Restoring Family Links

RFRT — Wellington Refugee Family Reunification Trust

RFSC — Refugee Family Support Category

RMA — Refugee Medical Assistance

RMS — Refugee and Migrant Service

ROMI — Returning Offenders (Management and Information)

RRC — Resident and Reporting Conditions

RSE — Recognised Seasonal Employer

RSLG — Regional Skills Leadership Groups

RTR — Refugee Trauma Recovery

SSVI — Strengths—based Social Vulnerability Index

SWP — Seasonal Worker Programme

TBB — Talent Beyond Boundaries

UNESCO — United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR — United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or the United Nations Refugee Agency

VCMM — Visitor Care Manaaki Manuhiri

WOC – Warrant of Commitment

WRD — World Refugee Day

WREMO — Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office