Migration of Minorities in Pakistan : A Case Study Analysis

Migration of Minorities in Pakistan A Case Study Analysis

SafiyaAftab and ArifTaj

Copyrights AAWAZ Programme @2015

AAWAZ Programme is funded by the UKAid

through the Department for International

Development (DFID), AAWAZ was conceived

initially as a five-year programme, from 2012 to

2017. Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) is the

Management Organization (MO) for

implementing the AAWAZ programme, while

Pakistan’s prime civil society organizations:

Aurat Foundation (AF), South-Asia Partnership

Pakistan (SAP-PK), Strengthening Participatory

Organisation (SPO) and Sungi Development

Foundation (SF) form the implementation

consortium responsible for directly working with

communities.

All publications by AAWAZ are copyrighted,

however, can be cited with reference.

We are greatly indebted to Michelle Chaudhry, President, Cecil and Iris Chaudhry

Foundation; Sylvester Saleem from the same organization, Gopal Singh Chawlaand

Kulbeer Singh from the Sikh community; Mehmood Mashooq from Shamsabad, and

Adeel Mirza and Amir Mahmood from Rabwahfor their assistance and facilitation.

Christopher John, an activist from Rahimyar Khan, deserves special mentionand

our gratitude for volunteering three days of his time to facilitate our researchers.

This study would not have been possible without their assistance. Lastly, we would

like to acknowledge the hard work of Kapil Dev and Ashraf Kakar who did the field

work for this study in extenuating circumstances. Their contribution was

invaluable.

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

Context .............................................................................................................................................. 1

Migration and the Changing Structure of Society ............................................................................................... 2

The Rise of Extremism ............................................................................................................................................ 3

Persecution in Recent History ................................................................................................................................ 5

Data and Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 7

Background Interviews with Community Elders ............................................................................. 8

Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 11 Migration in the Christian Community ........................................................................................... 11

Case 1: A School Teacher in Multan ................................................................................................................... 11 Case 2: A Lawyer Who Fled the Country ........................................................................................................... 12 Case 3: The Shop Owner Who Escaped a Mob ................................................................................................ 13 Case 4: The Educationist Accused of Proselytisation ..................................................................................... 13

Migration in the Ahmadi Community ............................................................................................ 14

Cases 1 and 2: Migration from Shamsabad – a Community Relocates ......................................................... 14 Case 3: Harassment in College ............................................................................................................................. 16 Case 4: Migration from Sindh ............................................................................................................................... 16

Migration in the Hindu Community .............................................................................................. 17

Case 1: A Tenant is Forced off the Land............................................................................................................ 17 Case 2: A Land Dispute Turns Ugly .................................................................................................................... 18 Case 3: A Young Girl’s Vulnerability Prompts a Family to Move ................................................................. 18

Migration in the Sikh Community .................................................................................................. 19

Case 1: A Family is Targeted Twice..................................................................................................................... 20 Case 2: Escaping Militants in the Tribal Area .................................................................................................... 20 Case 3: A Target Killing in Peshawar .................................................................................................................. 20

Key Findings .......................................................................................................................... 22 Common Trends ............................................................................................................................. 22

Issues Specific to the Ahmadi Community .................................................................................... 24

Issues Specific to the Christian Community .................................................................................. 25

Issues Specific to the Hindu Community ....................................................................................... 25

Issues Specific to the Sikh Community .......................................................................................... 26

Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................................... 28

Works Cited ............................................................................................................................ 30

Annexure A: Ahmadis Booked for Religious Offences 1984-2014 ......................................... 31

Annexure B: Questions for Migrant....................................................................................... 32

Annexure C: Questions for Migrant's Family........................................................................ 35

Annexure D: Questions for Community ................................................................................ 38

Acronyms

CPC Country of Particular Concern

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area

FFP Fund for Peace

KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

MRGI Minority Rights Group International

MSF Muslim Students Federation

PCC Pakistan Christian Congress

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

USCIRF US Commission on International Religious Freedom

VAW Violence Against Women

Migration of Minorities in Pakistan: A Case Study Analysis

1

Introduction

Migration is as eternal as human beings themselves. It occurs at a variety of scales, from millions of people

to an individual or a household, depending on the cause. The study of the phenomenon is, of necessity, inter-

disciplinary, as migration is typically caused by a range of factors, including economy, race, religion, gender,

language, and culture, which typically combine to make each migration or displacement case a complex whole.

Migration may be inter-continental, intra-continental, or simply internal – indeed sometimes over short

distances.It does, however, always exact a cost, not just in monetary terms, but also social and emotional. This is

particularly true when migration is involuntary, or, as it is more commonly called, forced.

This paper looks at a specific form of migration – that of non-Muslim Pakistanis, which has occurred as a

result of religious persecution. This migration could be domestic (from one city or town to another inside the

country) or international (where a migrant has left the country to escape threats). Unlike migration which occurs

due to state persecution, migrants are, in this case, not escaping from state violence per se, but from the effects of

state apathy and incompetence, or, in the case of some groups, a policy of ignoring or even covertly encouraging

offences against them.

The focus of this paper is on understanding the circumstances of this form of migration, and placing the

phenomenon within the context of a growing culture of intolerance in Pakistan.

Context

Pakistan regularly appears inside the top 10 on the list of fragile states issued by the Fund for Peace (FFP)

annually.1 While this branding is highly controversial for a number of reasons, there is little doubt that governance

issues have multiplied in the country in the last decade or so, that Pakistan is increasingly susceptible to violence

and conflict at all levels (local, provincial and national), and that the country faces an existential threat from

different groups of non-state actors who have not only effectively caused the state to retreat from some

geographical areas, but have succeeded in significantly weakening the state’s ability to enforce its writ across the

board. For all these reasons, it is not wrong to infer that Pakistan is, if not a fragile state, then at least one

1 The index is published annually by Foreign Policy magazine. For the most recent ranking see: “Fragile States Index 2014,” Foreign Policy. Available athttp://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/

http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/


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characterised by weak capacity of key state institutions. As is typical of states with this combination of

characteristics, Pakistan is liable to render its most vulnerable citizens further susceptible to exploitation,

mistreatment, and violence.

Migration and the Changing Structure of Society

The current situation in the country has, not surprisingly, taken time to evolve. Religion has been

inextricably woven into Pakistani politics ever since the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims was first

tabled. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 led to large-scale cross border migration, with Hindus and Sikhs

in what is now Pakistan heading for Hindu majority areas, mostly in north-central India, and Muslims from those

regions heading mainly to West Punjab and Sindh. There are no reliable estimates of the numbers of those who

migrated – but numbers from the censuses of 1951, held in both India and Pakistan, demonstrated that 7.3 million

and 7.2 million people in each country respectively, were classified as “displaced” four years after partition.

Historians believe that the bulk of these were those who had migrated across the border. Even a conservative

estimate would thus suggest that at least ten million people left their homes and moved to what was perceived as a

safer environment in a separate country.

This migration resulted in the large-scale displacement of minority populations from their ancestral

homelands, leaving a particularly strong impact on Pakistan. According to the census of 1941 conducted in

undivided India, non-Muslims constituted about 20 percent of the population in the areas that came to form West

Pakistan.2 By 1951, however, non-Muslims constituted just 4 percent of the population in the same area. This

proportion has remained roughly constant since –according to the last census conducted in Pakistan in 1998, non-

Muslims (mainly Christians and Hindus) constituted 3.7 percent of the population. Nonetheless, there are some

variations across provinces regarding the constitution of minorities. The bulk of Pakistan’s Hindu population is

concentrated in Sindh. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is largely homogenous with regard to religious affiliation, with only

0.6 percent of the population being non-Muslim. In Punjab, about 2.3 percent of the population in 1998 was

Christian, while the proportion of Hindus in the province constituted a negligible 0.13 percent.3

2 See complete census data for 1941 at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM 3 See the complete religious breakdown for each province for the 1998 census at http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm

http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM

http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm


3

The Rise of Extremism

While the proportion of minorities in Pakistan has remained small, those who did choose to live in the

country contributed to the pluralistic society that characterised the first few decades of the country’s existence.

Pakistan’s founder had discerned that the country was bound to be pluralist, to be governed democratically, and

had enunciated in his first speech to the Constituent Assembly that religious freedom would be at a premium in the

new state. For a significant part of Pakistan’s early existence, this was in fact the case. With exception of anti-

Ahmadiriots in 1953-54, and (mainly non-violent) incidents of Shia-Sunni conflict, sectarian and religious

extremism posed no major law and order threat from the 1950s to the 1970s (see Box 1).

Box 1: Statement of Tariq Khosa, former Director General, Federal Investigation Agency, in the Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production4

When I started my service in 1973 the only aggressive exchanges we saw in the sectarian context were between Deobandis and Barelvis, and we would try to control them. The maximum that used to happen was that there would be aggressive exchanges over the loudspeakers during Friday prayers, but weapons were never used, except a few irritants during Muharram.

This began to change with the advent of General ZiaulHaq’s military rule in 1977. Zia started a policy of

Islamisation in the country– atwo pronged strategy that helped himto retain powerand crush political forces

within the country on the one hand, and seek legitimacy for his coup on the other. The promotion of an orthodox

interpretation of religion domestically, and the establishment’s support of the Afghan Mujahideen in the war

against the Soviet Union, combined to create an atmosphere in the country wherein deviation from Sunni Islam

became a basis for discrimination, if not outright persecution.

Persecution was not just confined to social relations. The period of military rule from 1977 to 1985 saw the

enactment of legislations such as Ordinance XX of 1984, which attempted to prohibit Ahmadis from “indulging in

anti-Islamic activities.” A draconian law, this barred the community from using certain forms of address and

4Report of the Defence Committee on Defence and Defence Production. Available at: http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf


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greeting, and even prohibited the call to prayer from being issued from the community’s places of worship.5 As a

result, 3,680 Ahmadis have been booked for offences ranging from displaying the kalima, to preaching or even

“posing as Muslims” between 1984 and December 2014.6 Moreover, the entire population of the town of Rabwah

(about 60,000 persons) has been charged twice under Section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code (once in 1989 and

then again in 2008), while the entire Ahmadi population of Kotli was charged under the same Section in 2008 for

repairing their place of worship.7

Similarly, amendments to the Penal Code, specifically the introduction of Sections 295B in 1982 and 295C

in 1986, made the defilement of the Holy Quran and the utterance of derogatory remarks against the Prophet

(PBUH), respectively, offences that were punishable by death. In an important omission, the text of the

amendments does not contain the words “willfully” or “on purpose” or any other term that would specify that the

accused must have demonstrated mala fide intent. As such, the law can be applied in circumstances in which no

intent to defame was apparent.

The amendments to the blasphemy law (sections 295B and 295C) in 1986 resulted in a surge of registered

cases on the issue. From 1927, when section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (later adopted as the Pakistan Penal

Code) was promulgated as the first form of a regulation against blasphemy, to 1986, only 14 cases were registered

under the law.8 But in the 29 years since the additional amendments were introduced, the number of blasphemy

cases registered soared to over 1,000.9 In 2011 alone, 80 blasphemy cases were registered. About 50 percent of

these cases were registered against non-Muslims, who constitute roughly three percent of the population. Ahmadis

and Christians are the main victims of the law.

General Zia ulHaq died in 1988, but the intolerance and extremism which had taken root in society in his

era, continued to flourish, aided by domestic political rivalries as well as regional and international power

struggles. The emergence of militant groups threatening the Pakistani state is the culmination of decades of mis-

governance, and of the state’s promotion of divisive ideologies. Another manifestation of these poorly conceived

policies is the now systematic persecution of religious minorities.

5 Ordinance No. XX published in the Gazette of Pakistan, April 26 1984. 6According to statistics provided by the Jama’at e Ahmadiyya. See Annex A. 7 This section prohibits Ahmadis from preaching or propagating their faith or calling themselves Muslim. 8 Section 295A prohibits “Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.” 9“Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview,” Center for Research and Security Studies (June 2013).


5

Persecution in Recent History

Since 2002, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has been recommending

that Pakistan be designated a “country of particular concern” or CPC with regard to the state’s failure to uphold its

citizens’ rights to basic religious freedoms. Similarly, the international NGO, Minority Rights Group International

(MRGI), which publishes an annual ranking of People under Threat, consistently places Pakistan amongst the top

ten countries where minorities are under the threat of large-scale violence.

While incidents of violence against minority groups are too numerous to recount here, some of the major

incidents in recent years include: the 2009 mob violence against Christians in Gojra, a village in Punjab, in which

eight people were killed and over a hundred houses burnt; an attack on an Ahmadi place of worship in Lahore in

May 2010 in which ninety people were killed and 125 injured; an attack on a church in Peshawar in September

2013 in which more than a hundred people died; mob violence and arson in March 2013 in a Christian colony in

Lahore; and more recently, the burning of a Christian couple accused of blasphemy in a brick kiln in district Kasur.

In addition to outright murder and arson, forced marriages and conversions, threats and intimidation, and target

killings of leaders of minority communities are regularly reported in national newspapers and by minority rights

groups.

The response of non-Muslim Pakistanis to this systemic persecution has been muted, not least because of

the scale of the threat that they face, and because the leadership of the various communities continues to be

targeted. One form of response, which has increasingly been reported on in recent years, however, is migration.

While in most cases this is internal migration, with individuals or communities shifting to places where they can

rely on kinship networks, international migration resulting from systemic persecution has also increased over the

past decade (see Box 2).


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Box 2: Around 21 non-Muslims fleeing Pakistan every day

According to a report which appeared in Dawn newspaper on May 13 2014, Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, a member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) told the National Assembly on May 12, 2014 that around 5,000 Hindus were migrating from Pakistan to India every year.10 The Economist, quoting UNHCR, reported on May 3, 2014, that the number of asylum-seekers, mostly Christians and members of the Ahmadi community, arriving in Sri Lanka from Pakistan increased to 1,489 last year, up from just 102 in 2012.11 Similarly, the Express Tribune reported on July 15, 2014 that around 1,000 Christians and Ahmadis had taken refuge in Thailand in 2014. Furthermore, 175 members of the Pakistani Sikh community, according to its own members, moved to India in 2014.12 If all the figures are put together, we see that about 21 people from amongst religious minorities appear to be fleeing the country every day.

The most commonly reported stories are those of the Hindu community in Sindh leaving for India, which

include such prominent cases as a former member of the Sindh Provincial Assembly who migrated in 2011.13 The

magnitude of this migration can be judged from the fact that in September 2014, the Indian government set up a

task force to expedite pending citizenship requests for Hindu and Sikh migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh.14

According to a statement made by a Hindu Member of the National Assembly in May 2014, an estimated 5,000

Hindus have been migrating to India every year over the last few years.15 Additional information from an

organisation overseeing the welfare of Sikhs in Pakistan indicates that 128 Sikh families have migrated to India

over the last five years.16 Seventy of these fled from the tribal area.

More recently, in June 2014, Sri Lanka cancelled the on-arrival visa facility for Pakistanis, alleging that the

facility was being abused by potential asylum seekers. According to news reports, the bulk of these asylum seekers

belong to the Ahmadi community.17 However, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) asserts that Christians are

10“5000 Hindus Migrating to India every year, NA told,” Dawn, May 13, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1105830 11“Uncertain Haven,” The Economist, May 3, 2014. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601562-minorities-fleeing-pakistan-sri-lanka-best-temporary-refuge-uncertain-haven 12“Packing their bags: Christians moving to Thailand to escape violence, insecurity,” Express Tribune, July 15, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/735724/packing-their-bags-christians-moving-to-thailand-to-escape-violence-insecurity/ 13 The case of the MPA, Ram Singh Sodho, who belonged to Pakistan Muslim League (Q), became controversial as the Sindh Government initially denied that he had migrated. 14See: “Indian Citizenship, Visas Made Easier for Minority Refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh,” NDTV, September 5, 2014. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-citizenship-visas-made-easy-for-minority-refugees-from-pakistan-bangladesh-587389. The report estimates that about 400 Hindu refugees from Pakistan are awaiting immigration documents. 15 See statement by Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani carried in Dawn report on May 13 2014, above. 16 The organisation has asked not to be named. 17See: “Sri Lanka seeks help from the UN to resettle asylum seekers,” Reuters, October 3, 2014:

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601562-minorities-fleeing-pakistan-sri-lanka-best-temporary-refuge-uncertain-haven


http://tribune.com.pk/story/735724/packing-their-bags-christians-moving-to-thailand-to-escape-violence-insecurity/

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-citizenship-visas-made-easy-for-minority-refugees-from-pakistan-bangladesh-587389



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well represented amongst asylum seekers in Sri Lanka as well, while the community has also witnessed the recent

large-scale migration of its members to Thailand and Malaysia.18

While news reports suggest that out-migration of non-Muslim Pakistanis has increased significantly in

recent years, there is little reliable data regarding the numbers of those departing the country, or on how migration

is effected, or even on the circumstances which compel migrants to take the first step. But out-migration at least

makes headlines. On the other hand, there is a real dearth of information on internal migration as a result of

religious persecution – specifically, the phenomenon wherein a “ghetto-isation” of minorities is taking place, as

individuals and households flee religious persecution to live in “safe” areas where other members of their

community are well represented.

Data and Methodology

This paper is an attempt to explore the issue of forced migration as a result of religious persecution, looking

primarily at internal, but also at international migration. The study broadly focuses on the causes of migration,

with an emphasis on the circumstances that prompted the decision to migrate. It attempts to assess the costs (both

economic and social) of the exercise, not only those that are incurred by the migrants themselves, but also those

that are incurred by the community that is left behind.

This paper takes a case study approach, using a particular individual migrant as the focal point of each case.

In most cases, a set of three interviews was conducted for each migrant – one with the migrant himself or herself,

one with the migrant’s family, and one with the community from which the migration had taken place. Cases

included members of the Christian, Ahmadi, Hindu, and Sikh communities, and fieldwork took place in Punjab and

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in districts where AAWAZ is operating.19In addition to the case study centered interviews

and discussions, consultations were also held with community leaders to explain the purpose of the study, and to

request assistance in identifying cases. These discussions were particularly important to gain the confidence of the

communities, as they were in many cases reluctant to divulge information for fear of harassment. In the case of the

Sikh community in particular, a “convenient sampling” approach had to be used where at least three or four

18 The PCC issued a press note to this effect on October 2 2014. Details of the note can be found at:http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980 19 It was decided to restrict fieldwork to AAWAZ districts because of the relative ease of facilitation of interviews with the help of district programme staff. Also, as the paper dealt with a sensitive topic, it was important to conduct fieldwork within the framework of a larger programme dealing with rights issues.

http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980


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meetings were held with community leaders in Peshawar, Hasan Abdal, and Nankana Sahib, before any member of

the community agreed to more detailed interviews. A similar approach was used with the Ahmadi community. The

Christian community, and the Hindu community in south Punjab, were approached through intermediaries who

have long-standing links with these groups.

The table below shows the breakdown of interviews across districts and by the religious affiliation of

migrant.

Table 1: Breakdown of Interviews

The total migrant cases recorded were fourteen, and the total number of interviews conducted, one with

the migrant herself/himself, one with the family, and one with the community, totaled about forty. The relevant

questionnaires used are attached as Annexures to this study.

Background Interviews with Community Elders

Prior to the commencement of documentation of cases, community elders were approached for permission

to interview members of their community. The experience of the AAWAZ researchers with these

preliminaryinterviews varied significantly across communities, and was indicative of how the actual interviews

would proceed.20

20Names in this report are either not revealed, or changed, to avoid creating security or social issues for the respondents.

Districts/Community Hindu Christian Ahmadi Sikh

Lahore 0 2 1 0

Hasan Abdal 0 0 0 1

Nankana Sahib 0 0 0 1

Rahimyar Khan 3 1 0 0

Peshawar 0 0 0 1

Rabwa 0 0 3 0

Rawalpindi 0 1 0 0

Sabqaddar 0 0 0 0

Charsadda 0 0 0 0

Total 3 4 4 3


9

Interviews with leaders of the Ahmadi community took place in Lahore, Rabwah, and Kasur districts. They

were arranged through prominent members of the Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya, which only allowed AAWAZ researchers

access to the community after a series of meetings that AAWAZ held to establish liaison, and after checking the

credentials of the programme. Community elders emphasised that persecution of the Ahmadis had been, to a

degree, legitimised by the state, leaving them with little recourse to systems of justice. The second constitutional

amendment, as well as the enactment of anti-Ahmadi legislation, specifically Ordinance XX, has effectively opened

the door for a range of actors, from extremist groups to public officials, and even ordinary citizens, to lodge

complaints against members of the community on a range of “offences” which can range from something as minor

as greeting someone with the traditional Islamic greeting, to carrying out proselytisation in any form. This has

resulted in a climate of fear for the community wherein they are increasingly restricting their interaction with non-

Ahmadis, and in fact seeing the town of Rabwah, where the community is centered, as their only safe haven in

Pakistan.

A similar climate of fear pervades the Christian community as well, and once again it is the use of

legislation, specifically the amendments to the blasphemy law, which are to blame. Ironically, victims of the

blasphemy law are not restricted to those against whom cases are registered – the threat of accusation under the

law is enough to endanger lives and property. The assassinations in 2011 of the former Governor of Punjab, and

the Minister for Minorities Affairs, which took place in response to the two individuals’ support for a Christian

accused under the blasphemy law, adequately highlight the vulnerability of the community. In addition, some

recent high profile cases involving Christians, including arson in Joseph Colony, Lahore; the RimshaMasih case in

which a teenage girl with learning difficulties was accused of blasphemy; and the incineration of a couple in a brick

kiln in Kasur district, are all examples of how accusations of blasphemy can trigger an extreme response before any

formal judicial proceeding even commences. The Christian community has responded to this pervasive threat by

marshaling its professional resources, ensuring strong legal representation where necessary, starting

communications and advocacy campaigns through inter-faith NGOs and community based organisations, and using

the offices of its church leaders to propagate the community’s plight in the media. However, these efforts are

necessarily muted, as community leaders and activists are aware that a prominent role in countering extremism

would put them at risk.

The Hindu and Sikh communities have not been victimised by the legal system to the extent that the

Ahmadis and Christians have, but sections of the Hindu community who work as agricultural labour are subject to

intense exploitation on the part of local landlords, and have not been able to highlight their issues at the national


10

level. Further, the fact that they are co-religionists with the majority population in a hostile neighbour has

rendered them vulnerable in a society where their religion has been vilified in school textbooks, in which Hindus in

general are painted as the prime enemy. The bulk of the community is settled in Sindh, where the atmosphere until

recently was relatively benign and a long tradition of peaceful coexistence was apparent. This has changed

radically in the last decade, and the community has suffered incidents of forced conversions (mainly of girls),

kidnappings (mainly of businessmen), and extortion. In south Punjab, where the community mainly consists of

agricultural labour, their vulnerability stems from their poor economic status.

The Sikh community on the other hand is generally well-off, with businesspeople well represented in their

numbers. The bulk of the community was settled in the tribal areas, where the Sikhs have had a presence since the

expansion of Ranjit Singh’s empire more than two hundred years ago. The Sikhs maintained a low profile, and have

traditionally been somewhat protected due to their superior socio-economic status. Over the last decade, however,

the community has been under threat from militants in the tribal agencies, where the jizya (or a tax on

unbelievers) was imposed on them, and there also began an extortion racket targeting their community. Some

members of the community initially moved from the tribal areas to Peshawar district, but the target killing of a

Sikh businessman in the outskirts of Peshawar in March 2014 prompted further migration of some Sikh families to

Hasan Abdal and Nankana Sahib in Punjab. As mentioned earlier, there has been an increase in the migration of

Sikhs and Hindus to India, but the community was reluctant to provide any information about such cases.


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Case Studies

A total of fourteen cases were covered in this study, as detailed in Table 1. The accounts of the migrants

varied with regard to the nature of the threats they faced, the circumstances that prompted their migration, and

their choice of destination. Most of the migrants interviewed were men, as it was typically they who had taken the

decision to migrate, and had made arrangements for families to accompany them.However, two women migrants

also formed part of the study. This section details the responses, and highlights underlying trends.

Migration in the Christian Community

The four Christian migrants (three male and one female) interviewed were all from Punjab – four of them

had migrated within the province (two had in fact moved localities within the city of Lahore), while one had left the

country and was interviewed via Skype from the U.S. All were urban based, generally well educated (one had a

post-graduate degree while two had completed their Intermediate), and had been working either as salaried

employees, or running their own businesses. One was a professional lawyer.

The circumstances that prompted the migration were similar for four out of the five interviewees in the

sample. In all four cases, harassment by neighbours, colleagues, or acquaintances, which carried the threat of

accusations of blasphemy, prompted the decision to migrate.

Case 1: A School Teacher in Multan

In the first case documented, a 40 year-old female school teacher with a Masters degree, working in Multan,

was harassed to a point where she left her job and went back to her hometown, Rahimyar Khan, leaving behind

opportunities for significant career growth in a bigger city. She recounted that she had been transferred to Multan

and taken up her responsibilities in a government school. Her husband and family had moved with her, and they

began to settle down in their new home. However, having moved to an environment where she was unfamiliar

with her co-workers and away from her family and core community, she soon began to experience harassment

from her colleagues. The issue began when some colleagues began to hold “friendly” discussions with her about

how she should consider converting to Islam. But it soon went beyond discussion – she began to face sustained

pressure to convert, even being told that she should leave her husband and rely on her new community to find a

suitable Muslim husband for her. She reacted strongly to such suggestions, but soon found that this only made


12

things worse. The situation became worrying when she began to receive phone calls from unknown numbers at

odd times telling her that she must convert or face the consequences. After a few months of experiencing this

harassment, she and her husband decided to return to their hometown, Rahimyar Khan, where they could

essentially operate within the environs of a familiar community consisting of family and other co-religionists.

The costs of this reverse migration (back to the couple’s hometown) were significant. Being a government

employee, the process of having a transfer approved was not only time intensive, but also entailed dealing with

rent-seeking officials. The couple claimed to have paid Rs. 70,000 to officials of the Education Department to

ensure that the teacher was formally transferred from a post in Multan to one in Rahimyar Khan. Other financial

losses incurred included the cost of selling a newly acquired plot in Multan at less than market price (the couple

claimed to have incurred a loss of Rs. 100,000 or so) in order to fund the cost of relocation. Above all, the emotional

and psychological costs of the relocation were tremendous, as was the couple’s perception that they had not had

the opportunity to take advantage of the superior education (for their children) and health facilities in Multan,

which were key factors in their initial decision to move to the bigger city.

Case 2: A Lawyer Who Fled the Country

A Christian lawyer, known particularly for his willingness to defend those accused of blasphemy, formed

the subject of the second case study. With three post-graduate degrees in addition to his qualification in law, he

was a well-respected member of the community. His involvement in the defense of some high-profile blasphemy

cases had brought him into the public eye over the last decade, and he had been receiving threats from unknown

sources for a while. In 2006, he was physically attacked by unknown assailants, and while he escaped unhurt, a

colleague of his was killed, and his car destroyed. However, he continued with his work in human rights and with

his law practice, focusing on false accusations of blasphemy.

In 2010, his defense of a particular blasphemy case pitted him against powerful leaders of the Namoos-e-

Risalat (Honour of the Messenger) movement, and the threat level he faced began to escalate. Later that year, his

office was attacked and he and his staff were beaten up. By early 2011, following the assassinations of the then

Governor of Punjab (an outspoken critic of the blasphemy law) and the Minister for Minorities Affairs, the lawyer

was convinced that his life, as well as the lives of other outspoken critics of the law, were in danger. Being a

prominent human rights activist, he was in touch with some international NGOs, and was eventually helped by a

faith-based organisation, which arranged for him to leave the country and seek asylum overseas. He has been

settled there for almost four years.


13

Although the migrant himself did not provide this information, newspaper reports detailing the attacks on

him, as well as his subsequent migration, suggest that he was targeted by an extremist group, which were carrying

out an organised campaign against him. Although he lived in an area of Lahore where the bulk of the population is

Christian, his family who remain in the area testified that he was threatened in his locality in addition to his place

of work. As such, he feared not just for himself but also for his immediate family. In fact his nephew, who now

resides at his house in Lahore, claims to have received threats from the same organisation.

Case 3: The Shop Owner Who Escaped a Mob

The third case studied involved the owner of a small steel-works shop in Islamabad’s F-10 area. The

migrant had an exchange of hot words with a labourer at his store, who proceeded to share the details of this

incident with the Imam of a local mosque. Without bothering to ascertain the facts of the case, the Imam issued a

fatwa in the Friday prayer, accusing the shop owner of blasphemy. Fortunately for the Christian shop owner, a

Muslim friend of his was listening to the sermon, and immediately called him to tell him that his business, and in

fact his life, was under threat, as a mob was planning to leave for his place of business immediately after the prayer.

The shop-owner hurriedly called a relative in the neighbouring city of Rawalpindi, who lives in a majority Christian

locality, and within a matter of hours, left the locality.

The shop owner has not returned to Islamabad, and in fact, has not managed to successfully resuscitate his

business in Rawalpindi. He ended up selling his shop at below market price, and was, for many months, entirely at

the mercy of his relatives in Rawalpindi. Even now, more than five years since the family left Islamabad, they have

been unable to recoup their economic loss, or to set up another trading establishment.

Case 4: The Educationist Accused of Proselytisation

The most recent case studied was that of an educationist who, along with his wife, used to run a school in a

middle class locality of Lahore. Although the couple is Christian, and the school was named after a Christian saint, it

had only a handful of Christian students, and no Christian teacher other than the co-owner. Nevertheless, rumours

began to circulate in the community of how the school was being used for proselytisation, and that the owners

were trying to convert children to Christianity.

As the school continued to do well, with growing enrolment (student strength had reached 400 in three

years), the school owners started receiving complaints from parents of enrolled students, saying that they were

worried about their children being exposed to Christianity. When assured that this was not the case, the parents


14

retreated, but the community in general remained restive. The situation escalated to a point when, in 2013, a group

of people attempted to storm the couple’s house. A potentially ugly situation was averted as Christian and Muslim

elders managed to intervene in time and the mob dispersed. Nevertheless, the couple began to rethink their future,

and decided that in the long run, it was better for them to move to a Christian majority area. They sold their school

and moved to Yohannabad, a locality in Lahore that mostly houses Christians.

The couple has suffered significant financial losses as a result of their decision to move. They sold a thriving

establishment (the school) at a throwaway price, and now work as middle order employees in another school.

Their monthly income loss alone is estimated at about Rs. 40,000. More than that, the couple was proud of their

accomplishment in building a school from scratch, and bringing it to a level where they had a substantial student

body and good examination results. Although they feel safer in their new locality, they are disappointed that they

cannot pursue their passion.

Migration in the Ahmadi Community

Two of the four Ahmadi migrants interviewed for this study had migrated in similar circumstances – from

the town of Shamsabad in Kasur district to Rabwah, which is the center of the Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya and the only

town in Pakistan where the community constitutes a majority. One had migrated from the same town to Lahore,

while the fourth migrant had arrived from Sindh, seeking refuge in Rabwah.

Cases 1 and 2: Migration from Shamsabad – a Community Relocates

The organised persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan has been well documented, but the interviews of

migrants from Shamsabad throw the plight of the community in sharp relief. The village of Shamsabad has about

2,000 households, of which about 20 consisted of Ahmadi families. The two communities have had a history of

inter-marriage in the past, and as such, there are strong kinship ties between some Ahmadi and Sunni households.

Ahmadis were well integrated in the community, and participated in the public life of the village. It was, however,

precisely due to this strong tradition of interaction that the problems arose.

Tensions between the two communities began to build when prominent members of the Jama’at-e-

Ahmadiyyaand other local notables got into a series of discussions about the origin of the Ahmadi sect, and its key

teachings. What started as a regular neighbourhood gathering soon assumed a more ominous flavour, and after a


15

particularly serious altercation in late 2012, the Sunni notables decided to challenge the Ahmadi community to a

munazara or a theological debate.

To this extent, the accounts of the two communities concur. But with regard to the terms of the debate, two

conflicting accounts appear. The Ahmadi community says that the debate was to be an intra-community affair, with

only locals participating, but that the Sunnis called in a religious leader from the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (or Finality of

Prophethood) movement, from the nearby city of Faisalabad, to support the debate on their behalf. The Sunni

community denies that any outsiders came for the munazara. Nevertheless, what is indisputable is that the debate

soon deteriorated into a name-calling session, and Ahmadi religious leaders were mocked and ridiculed. As this

series of events unfolded, a rumour emerged that a young Sunni boy in the village had converted to the Ahmadi

belief. The young man had allegedly left for Rabwah, with the Sunni community alleging that he had been

kidnapped and the Ahmadis denying this claim. The atmosphere in the village became ever more strained, and the

community became further marginalised. A local chapter of the virulently anti-Ahmadi Khatm-e-Nabuwwat

movement was formed in the village. This was followed by outright threats to the Ahmadi households, and

eventually an announcement that Ahmadis would be subjected to a social boycott.

The local police had been informed of the rising tension in Shamsabad, and had in fact sent some personnel

to be stationed in the village to avoid clashes. As the situation became more strained, however, they expressed

their inability to defuse the escalating tensions. In fact, as told by members of the Ahmadi community interviewed

for this report, the police advised the Ahmadi community to leave the village, saying that it was unfeasible for law

enforcement agencies to maintain a continued presence in the area, and that the security of Ahmadi households

could not be guaranteed in the longer run. At this point, the leaders of the Ahmadi community in the village, in

consultation with leaders of the Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyyain Rabwah, advised the Ahmadis of Shamsabad to move to

Rabwah if at all possible.

The two migrants interviewed for this study, who had migrated from Shamsabad to Rabwah in 2012, both

confirmed that their families decided to leave the village in the aftermath of the debate. One family decided to

settle in Rabwah as two sons from the household were already settled there, and they arranged to rent a house for

their parents and helped them settle in. The second family chose Rabwah because they received financial help from

the Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya based in the town. The Jama’at helped them settle in at the time of the time of the

interview in December 2014, was still paying for their basic food and rent. They also confirmed that only two

Ahmadi families remained in Shamsabad – one family was too poor to move, and the main breadwinner of the


16

other worked in an office in a nearby town and could not afford to leave his job. However, their interaction with the

village at large is apparently limited, and their former neighbours worry for their safety.

Although the migration of the community from Shamsabad was planned over the course of some weeks or

months, the families still incurred financial losses in their migration, mainly on account of having to sell off their

houses and businesses to the locals at half the market price. Property markets in rural areas are narrow at the best

of times, and in this case, people in the area were aware that the Ahmadis had no choice but to leave. However, the

process of settling into Rabwah was relatively simple for them, and the migrants were able to find new jobs and

rent houses.

Case 3: Harassment in College

The case of the third migrant from the Ahmadi community is also linked to Shamsabad. The migrant, whose

wife is Sunni, disclosed that his family was from Shamsabad and his son was studying in a local government degree

college. The young man had not told most of his classmates that he was Ahmadi. The fact that his mother belonged

to a known Sunni family helped maintain his privacy. However, as tensions grew in his home village, his

classmates, some of whom belonged to Sunni families from Shamsabad, began a campaign against him in the

college. Essentially, the tensions of the village spilled over into the nearby campus. The involvement of the student

wing of a center-right political party added impetus to the campaign against the Ahmadi student, and as news of

the debate in Shamsabad filtered through to the campus, his position became ever more untenable. At some point,

the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) launched a complaint against him accusing him of blasphemy, and tried to

pressurise the principal of the college to register a case.

Although the principal refused to oblige, the threat of the blasphemy accusation was a game changer for the

student, and created a panic in his household. The family, including the student, left for Lahore overnight. The

family has kept a low profile since, although their relatively superior socio-economic status, and close relationship

with Sunni households does allow them to maintain links in the village. Nevertheless, they cannot return to their

ancestral homes.

Case 4: Migration from Sindh

The fourth migrant interviewed from the Ahmadi community had reached Rabwah from Larkana in Sindh

in October 2013. A young, newly married man, he had been working as a salesperson in a shop in Larkana city,

when activists of a political party started a campaign against him and urged other shopkeepers to cut off all ties


17

with him. Threats to him and to his family were soon followed up with pressure to convert to Sunni Islam. His

resistance led to an attempt to file a blasphemy case against him – an act in which workers of a right wing political

party, which has lately gained traction in Sindh, were prominent. The migrant had been in touch with the head of

the Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya in Larkana, who informed senior leaders of the Jama’at in Rabwah about the situation,

and arranged for him to leave Sindh within a few days. Given the superior organisation of the Jama’at, he was able

to leave his native town having paid just for train tickets for himself and his wife. The rest of his expenses were

taken care of by the Jama’at, and he was provided with a house, basic necessities, and a job upon his arrival in

Rabwah.

Migration in the Hindu Community

All of the Hindu migrants interviewed for this paper belonged to district Rahimyar Khan in southern

Punjab. As mentioned earlier, Hindus from this area have also migrated to India but there is little or no information

about them, and their neighbours, friends, and families who remain in Pakistan are reluctant to even admit that

they know someone who is currently in India. Most of the cases detailed here therefore relate to people who have

migrated within the district, often from one village to another, in order to escape some form of persecution.

Case 1: A Tenant is Forced off the Land

An 80 year-old Hindu migrant living in union council Bahishti in Rahimyar Khan was found to have

migrated four years ago from a village in the Liaquatpur area of the same district. The migrant owned 25 acres of

land, which he had obtained during the land reforms of the early 1970s. But in addition, he was working as a

sharecropper on the landholdings of the powerful Mahar family, whose lands were contiguous to his. The tenancy

agreement was verbal, as is often the case, but his understanding was that he would work the Mahar lands for

twenty years. About four years ago, the migrant’s family became involved in a dispute with the Mahars. Accounts

differ here – the migrant’s family said that the dispute was land related, but when the community was questioned,

they pointed to a more personal matter. Apparently, a girl from the Mahar family was thought to have gotten

involved with one of the migrant’s grandsons. For the Mahars, this was a slight on their family honour – not only

because the boy involved was a Hindu, but also because he belonged to the family of a tenant. The family reacted by

not only forcing the tenant family off their land, but in fact hounding them out of the village. Given the sensitivity of

the matter, none of the other Hindu families in the village supported the migrants.


18

The migrant family moved to another union council in the same district, where they had a benefactor – a

Muslim landlord who offered them shelter, has employed them on his lands, and initially provided food, housing,

and helped place the children of the family into school. The migrant’s family incurred significant losses in the

process as the Mahars ransacked their house, confiscated their dairy animals, and took away their stock of grain

and seed.

The nature of the dispute recounted above was such that a similar outcome could have been expected even

if the tenant family had been Muslim. However, the fact that the family is Hindu added another dimension to the

threat they faced. They claimed that even before their migration, they and other Hindus in the village were

constantly being pressurised to convert. This was confirmed by other Hindu families in the village from where the

migrants originated. But the incident fueled the fear that the powerful landlords of the area could, if they wished,

unleash extremist groups against them, which would then have endangered the lives of the entire community. They

felt it was better to leave rather than confront the Mahars in any way.

Case 2: A Land Dispute Turns Ugly

The second case studied in the Hindu community involved a person who had in fact migrated to India,

where he already had some family. The migrant ran a photographer’s studio in Rahimyar Khan city. In late 2013, a

dispute arose in the Basti Ali Lahar area, wherein a group tried to occupy a Hindu cremation ground/burial site,

claiming that they had rights to that land. The migrant took a strong stand against this – his forefathers had been

buried in the area, and he felt that the Hindu community should unite and take action. He urged the Hindus of the

area to register a case against the claimants. As his campaign gained prominence, he began to receive threats from

unknown quarters. The migrant’s elder brother had already moved to India some years ago, and was settled in

Jodhpur. He urged the migrant to sell his shop and his house, and apply for a visa for India. The migrant made all

the arrangements in utmost secrecy, and only informed his close family (his sister and brother-in-law) of his

decision to leave four days prior to his departure. He has been living in India since November 2014 and has no

plans to return.

Case 3: A Young Girl’s Vulnerability Prompts a Family to Move

The third case examined was of a young Hindu girl who had migrated to India with her parents and was

now back in Rahimyar Khan making arrangements for her husband to join her family in India.


19

About five years ago, she had begun to be noticed by a Muslim boy in the community who began to

pressurise her to convert to Islam and marry him. Having heard of instances of forced conversions of Hindu girls in

Sindh, and fearing that the girl would be kidnapped or dishonoured if the situation was allowed to fester, her father

decided to send her to Sindh to live with some relatives, and also arranged a marriage for her in the Hindu

community. In the longer run though, the family was convinced that it would be safer to leave the country. An

incident in a nearby locality where Hindu houses were burnt down during a land dispute further strengthened

their resolve.21 The family’s decision was facilitated by the fact that the girl’s father had an elder brother and other

relatives who had migrated to India in the 1990s and are well settled in the city of Jodhpur.

The girl was married off and was living in Rahimyar Khan when the family’s visas came through and they

decided to move. She accompanied her family to Jodhpur and lived there for a few months to assess the situation.

She then returned to Rahimyar Khan a few months ago to make arrangements for her husband to also leave

Pakistan and join them permanently in India. She has run into some documentation issues and is waiting for these

to be resolved before they make the final move. Her account of her family’s life in India was largely positive. The

family had had time to plan their move, and her father had sold off his property and assets before he left. He has

bought a small house in Jodhpur and works as a day labourer. The girl is confident that once her paperwork is

sorted out, she can sell the remaining assets that the family has in Pakistan (some milch animals and gold

ornaments) and generate enough income to have a comfortable start for herself and her husband in Jodhpur. Her

husband, who was also interviewed, is also keen to leave.

Migration in the Sikh Community

The Sikh community’s migration patterns are distinct from those of others, as they take the form of step

migration. The first wave of migrations took place from 2002 onwards, when the community started moving from

the tribal areas to Peshawar and other areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A more recent wave of migrations has been

prompted by growing militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sikhs have now started moving further west to

Nankana Sahib and Hasan Abdal in Punjab – both districts where they have traditionally had a strong presence.

21 AAWAZ researchers confirmed that such an incident had taken place in Rahimyar Khan’s Sunni Bridge area. Some people laid claim to land where some Hindu households lived, showed allotment papers, and razed the houses to the ground. The Hindus contested this claim, and succeeded in getting a stay order against the land allotment. The matter is now sub-judice.


20

Further migration to India has also begun to take place over the last few years, although the community does not

discuss this.

Case 1: A Family is Targeted Twice

The family interviewed for the first case study had faced militancy twice. In the first case, which occurred in

2009, the now 56 year-old head of the family had been kidnapped by militants from his home in the Khyber Agency

and had been transported to Orakzai Agency. He was released upon payment of ransom. Two years later, in 2011,

his son was shot dead by unknown persons in Khyber Agency. After that incident, the migrant decided to move his

family from the tribal area to the relative safety of Peshawar. Being a hakeem or traditional medicine man by

profession, he felt that he could earn a living anywhere. His immediate family, as well as the families of his two

brothers, moved to Peshawar in 2011. Although the family is settled in a mohalla or locality with many Sikh

inhabitants (most of whom have also migrated from the tribal area), they still feel unsafe. The migrant has, for

example, curtailed his trips to Multan, where he used to go regularly to see patients, as he was receiving

threatening letters in the city warning him not to travel in Punjab.

Case 2: Escaping Militants in the Tribal Area

Another Sikh migrant told a similar story. He is a businessman who was working in Peshawar, but his

family lived in Khyber Agency and he was in the habit of visiting them on weekends and holidays. He began to

receive threats from a militant group which is particularly strong in Khyber Agency, and had announced that all

non-Muslim residents of the Agency would henceforth have to pay jizya. The threats escalated to a point where he

arranged for his family to flee the Agency, sold his business in Peshawar, and is now living along with other

members of the Sikh community, in a gurdwara in Hasan Abdal. The migrant was candid about his future plans,

saying that he plans to take his family to India at the earliest opportunity. He does not see a future for his

community in Pakistan, saying that they, along with all non-Muslims are easy targets for extremists.

Case 3: A Target Killing in Peshawar

A Sikh migrant interviewed in Nankana Sahib revealed that he and his family had moved to the district in

March 2014, following the target killing of his brother in the outskirts of Peshawar that month. The migrant was in

fact the brother of the Sikh hakeem killed in the ShabQadar area near Peshawar, whose murder had made

headlines in Pakistan. The migrant revealed that two of his brothers still lived in Peshawar, but that he had

volunteered to bring his dead brother’s children to Nankana Sahib for safety. This was the second step in a series of


21

migrations – twenty years ago, in 1994, the family had moved from Khyber Agency to Peshawar. They had been

well settled in Peshawar for two decades and lived in a mohalla with many Muslim neighbours in addition to ten

other Sikh families. However, the killing in ShabQadar had prompted another migration, this time to an area with a

significant Sikh population, where the migrant already had family and even owned a piece of land.

When asked if he knew who had targeted his brother, the migrant expressed ignorance. He said that his

brother had not received any threats, and nor did the family have enmity with anyone. The family has registered a

case with the police, but no progress has been made. This is a relatively well to do family, but even they have been

helpless when it comes to ensuring that the killers are apprehended.


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Key Findings

The cases presented in the previous section are fairly diverse, but enable us to derive some key patterns in

forced migrations due to persecution, which cut across communities. These are discussed as follows.

Common Trends

The accounts of persecution and subsequent migration of minorities point to a complete breakdown of

the citizen-state compact in Pakistan. Over and over again, interviewees recounted how they had no hope of

intervention of law enforcement agencies on their behalf, nor did they feel that they had the option of recourse to

the judicial system. Those who threaten them, whether individuals, groups, or militant organisations, seem to be

operate with impunity. In the few cases when law enforcement agencies were approached to defuse a situation,

they either made token gestures, simply failed to take any action, or, most damaging of all, admitted to their

incapacity (for example in the case of the Ahmadi community of Shamsabad, which was advised by police to

migrate). The state is failing to enforce its writ, and is giving in to extremism at the expense of its constitutional

and legal obligations.

Militant organisations alone, or in some cases, in conjunction with certain political parties, are

carrying out a sustained campaign against minorities in general, and some communities in particular.

Extremism has been on the rise in Pakistan over the last three decades, and more recently, has given rise to a

sustained militant movement against Pakistani society and the state. This culture of extremism and the associated

rise of militant movements have had significant negative impact on the lives of religious minorities. At least two of

the cases recounted earlier, both pertaining to the Ahmadi community, point to the involvement of right-wing

political parties in hate campaigns targeting individuals (a salesman from Sindh and a student from Shamsabad),

while a religious group took the lead in organising a campaign against the community in the village of Shamsabad,

where they had been settled for generations. Interviews with Hindus in South Punjab revealed that the community

is wary of confronting certain families or groups due to their known links with militant organisations. But the most

glaring example of a community being targeted exclusively by militant groups is that of the Sikh community.

Having been based in the tribal areas and northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for centuries, the community has been

targeted by militant organisations active in the area that have not only targeted them for extortion, but also carried

out target killings of prominent members of the community.


23

Minorities are being ghetto-ised, and are increasingly retreating to “safe haven” settlements or towns

where they are surrounded by other members of their community. Evidence from around the world indicates

that intolerance is best confronted by mainstreaming – the healthy integration of a minority community is

facilitated by their participation in community life, and their visibility in places of work and commercial centres.

The case studies indicate that the reverse is happening in Pakistan. Ahmadis are retreating to Rabwah, Christians

to areas like Yohannabad in Lahore where there is a Christian majority, and Sikhs to areas around major gurdwaras

in Punjab. As this trend gathers pace, social interaction across communities is weakening, as minority groups

increasingly opt to use social services run by their own communities, carry out business dealings preferably within

the community, and generally limit their interaction with the larger society. The researchers working on this study

encountered this trend as a barrier to their fieldwork as well – people were wary of meeting with “outsiders” and

were loath to share their experiences unless introduced by an intermediary from within their community whom

they could trust.

The threat of use of the blasphemy law is enough to force the potential accused to flee. In most of the

cases recounted above, no formal complaint under the blasphemy law was actually filed with the police.

Nevertheless, threats of blasphemy accusations were made, particularly against Christians and Ahmadis, and these

threats alone, even when they were not explicit, were enough to force a decision on an individual or a family. With

almost sixty extra-judicial killings having taken place against the blasphemy accused or convicted post 1987,22 an

accusation in itself is enough to place lives in danger, and as such, migration, or effecting a disappearance is a

rational response.

There are indications that unscrupulous elements are using the cover of extremism to make financial

and economic gains by initiating action against minority groups. Although not explicitly stated, and difficult to

prove, there are indications that many cases of persecution are economically motivated. Forcing a teacher out of a

job or a trader out of business leaves avenues open for others who may covet appointments or promotions.

Creating a climate of fear against neighbours and prompting overnight departures downgrades the value of their

properties and assets, enabling acquisition of such assets at below market rates. In essence, a climate of intolerance

makes it simple to exploit marginalised groups.

The persons interviewed do not, for the most part, see their situation as temporary. Across the board,

interviewees affirmed that they do not see themselves returning to their original homes or to their former lives,

22 See infographic in: Arafat Mazhar, “Why Blasphemy Remains Unpardonable in Pakistan,” Dawn, Feb 19, 2015. Available at:http://www.dawn.com/news/1163596

http://www.dawn.com/news/1163596


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although in some cases they expressed a desire to do so. Instead, there is an air of resignation amongst the

displaced. They either talk of moving on further, or of building lives in their new locations. What is more unsettling

is that they do not see a bright future for their compatriots either. Those who have left the country or are trying to

do so were vocal about how they would encourage their families and friends to find similar avenues.

While the above common trends apply to all minorities, some aspects of forced migration or persecution

are specific to certain communities as recounted below.

Issues Specific to the Ahmadi Community

The Ahmadi community, as mentioned earlier, is facing a form of state endorsed persecution, and as such,

their situation is the most untenable of all minority groups interviewed for this study.

Legal provisions in place against the Ahmadi community specifically provide a carte blanche for those

set on targeting them. Interviews in communities where Ahmadis had once lived, and from where they had been

forced to leave, confirmed that there is no sense of their rights to the basic privileges of citizenship, let alone any

remorse on the treatment meted out to them. Unlike other minority groups, Ahmadis are considered apostates, and

as such deserving of extreme punishment.

Most incidents against Ahmadis arise in circumstances that prompt an emergency response. Ahmadis

are extremely vulnerable to two pieces of legislation, Ordinance XX and Sections 295B and C. As such, accusations

against individuals or the community at large can arise at the slightest pretext. Further, inciting mob violence

against the community is relatively easy, as a sustained hate campaign has been carried out against the community

for decades. As such, the community is more liable than most to be dispossessed of all assets and forced to flee

homes and communities with little preparation or planning. The leadership of the community is organised,

recognizes this, and has tried to provide assistance whenever possible. However, their outreach in small towns and

villages is limited, and the community is large. As a result, not everyone can be accorded protection and provided

with shelter and alternate means of livelihood.


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Issues Specific to the Christian Community

The community is generally centered amongst the poorest sections of society, who are also the most

vulnerable to blasphemy accusations. Christians are most liable to be accused under Section 295B, which

pertains to the defiling of the Holy Quran. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, around 90

percent of cases filed under this Section are against Christians. The community is particularly susceptible to this

provision of the law as many of them are employed as sanitary workers in homes and municipalities, and thus

handle waste paper. Many sanitary workers are illiterate, and cannot defend themselves if accused of mishandling

religious texts.

Due to the nature of accusations under the blasphemy law, the forced migration of Christians,

particularly those accused of blasphemy, also takes place under hurried circumstances. As in the case of

Ahmadis, Christians are liable to face accusations at the slightest pretext, and are often forced to flee overnight.

Unlike the Ahmadi community though, their leadership is not very organised and they have little recourse to

assistance.

Issues Specific to the Hindu Community

Forced conversions of Hindu girls have rendered the community fearful and apprehensive. Members of

the Hindu community, mainly in Sindh but also in South Punjab, have been agitating about how Hindu girls are

forced into marriages with Muslim men, and are not only forced to convert, but are also prevented from ever

contacting their families. Girls who convert but then manage to go back to their families are considered apostates

and their lives are in danger. According to a recent news report, up to a thousand girls have been subject to forced

conversions and marriages in Pakistan the past year.23 This phenomenon has also forced a trend of early marriages

in the community, since they are loath to let their daughters move beyond the confines of their homes due to this

perceived threat.In the context of migration, it is a key cause of the international migration of Hindu families to

India.

23MahamJavaid, “Forced Conversions Torment Pakistan’s Hindus,” Al-Jazeera, August 18, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment-pakistan-hindus-201481795524630505.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment-pakistan-hindus-201481795524630505.html



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A form of apartheid is practiced against Hindus in Pakistan. The subjects of the case studies reported

that discriminatory practices against Hindus are of the worst kind, which restricts their upward economic mobility.

They cannot run any businesses pertaining to food and edibles, as Muslims are increasingly loath to eat and drink

with them. Their community is systematically vilified in textbooks, and their interaction with relatives across the

border is deemed suspicious. As these trends intensify, the community is feeling increasingly beleaguered and

though reluctant to discuss this, is looking beyond Pakistan’s borders.

Chain migration patterns are evident in the Hindu community. Unlike the cases of Christians and

Ahmadis who are often forced to migrate at short notice and are the main victims of legislation, Hindus are facing a

more systematic form of discrimination, which aims to isolate them. A good number of people in the community

have relatives and friends in India, and with a more liberal visa regime for the community now in place, the trend

of moving across the border is becoming more pronounced. Hindu migration to India is generally well planned and

executed over a period of some months or even years. Commonly, one member of a family migrates, meets up with

relatives or friends across the border, and then over a period of some years, calls other family members from

Pakistan to join him or her. Reports of reverse migration in the community are also being cited, with the notion

that migrants from Pakistan are viewed with suspicion across the border, and also face issues of literacy (being

unable to read and write in the Devanagri script). In the course of this research, however, no case of reverse

migration was found.

Issues Specific to the Sikh Community

The Sikh community has been targeted by militants, and has responded with large-scale migration

from the tribal area. The community is conspicuous because of the distinctive appearance of its male members,

and is also prominent in business circles and in the practice of hikmat or herbal medicine, professions which entail

significant public dealing. They thus constituted easy targets for extremists. While they became targets for

extortion from the time militancy in the tribal area gained ground over a decade ago, the targeted killings that have

traumatised the community are a more recent phenomenon, and remain largely unexplained. Interestingly, most of

the victims of target killings, in the Khyber Agency and in Peshawar, have been practitioners of herbal medicine.

Whether this group is being targeted because of their public dealing or because of their reputed wealth and power

is not clear. The community’s reaction to the wave of target killings has been to close ranks and to refrain from

bringing up the issue publicly. The community is also closely watched by intelligence agencies wherever they are


27

stationed in Punjab because they are perceived to be under threat from militant groups. This surveillance makes it

even more difficult to access Sikh community leaders.

Sikh persecution is largely confined to the Pashtun belt. In Punjab, the community is shielded by its

relatively superior socio-economic status, and the fact that it tends to remain confined to areas around places of

worship.

Sikh migration can be characterised as step migration, and the degree of urgency of the migration

varies by stage. Thus the community’s migration from the tribal areas in the wake of the militancy typically took

place abruptly, with families initially resisting migration, but often being forced to leave overnight or within the

space of a few days as the threat to their lives and livelihoods increased. This first stage of migration typically took

families from the tribal area to Peshawar and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. More recently, and particularly

after target killings in the outskirts of Peshawar, a further step of migration has manifested itself as Sikhs move

from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Nankana Sahib and Hasan Abdal in Punjab. Some families are now effecting a further

step and moving across the border to India. Once again, there are few details on this last step as members of the

community are generally reluctant to discuss plans to move across the border. This last stage of migration, when it

does take place, is planned over a period of time, and as in the case of the Hindu community, usually takes place

when friends and/or relatives across the border facilitate it.

The Sikh community has not been affected by the blasphemy laws or other legislations. This could be

because the community has only recently taken up residence outside the tribal area, which is not governed through

the application of the penal code. Nevertheless, the community is unique in that the source of its persecution lies

more in the ongoing militancy than in societal attitudes.


28

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is much evidence that minorities are increasingly under threat in Pakistan and are resorting to

extreme steps, including abandonment of ancestral homes and livelihoods, to secure themselves. Not only is this

indicative of the complete failure of the essential state function of protecting the lives and property of its citizens, it

is also traumatic for families and communities. This study analyses patterns across communities and finds that

while many issues are commonly experienced, different religious groups are also targeted in distinctive ways.

The following key recommendations stem from the research conducted:

An Act for the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission was passed by the National Assembly

in December 2011, and by the Senate in May 2012. However, the Commission has yet to be constituted. The

government’s reluctance to constitute the Commission is difficult to justify, given that Pakistan is signatory

to the 1993 UN Resolution calling for member countries to constitute national institutions for the

promotion and protection of human rights.24 As per the Act, the proposed Commission includes at least one

minority member, and has been given extensive powers to investigate instances of rights violations. As

such, an effective, functioning Commission could do much to stem the effects of the rising tide of

intolerance against minorities. The findings of this study point to the fact that the immediate constitution of

the Commission is a must.

The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment dated June 19, 2014, issued a number of directives on the

issue of promoting inter-faith harmony.25 Among other observations, the judgment states that there is a

general lack of awareness about minority rights in the population. The judgment also has very strong

recommendations on measures to protect the rights of minorities, including the formation of a taskforce on

religious tolerance, and instructions to provincial governments on curriculum revision to remove hate

speech against minorities, in addition to promoting a realisation that people of different faiths have a right

to profess and propagate their beliefs. This judgment has been relegated to a backburner and little action

has been taken on its recommendations. The governments of Punjab and Sindh have submitted reports to

the court claiming that curriculum reform is underway, and the government of Punjab has pledged that

24 General Assembly Resolution 48/134 dated December 20, 1993. 25 Supreme Court judgment 1/2014 dated June 19, 2014.


29

new textbooks will be issued by the summer of 2015. Such measures are also now part of the National

Action Plan to fight terrorism, and their implementation needs to be facilitated urgently. In general, the

Supreme Court’s directives on inter-faith harmony, as laid out in the aforesaid judgment, should be

operationalised at the earliest.

The government must recognise that minorities are especially vulnerable to blasphemy accusations and

that an accusation, or even the threat of an accusation can be life threatening. The authorities have to take

action against instances of vigilante justice, and stem the tide of extra-judicial killings that take place in the

wake of accusations.

There is an urgent need to take action against hate speech and the incitement to violence against

individuals and communities. According to Section 153A of the Penal Code, promoting enmity between

different groups, on religious or other grounds, is a crime liable to imprisonment of up to five years.

However, hate speech is being commonly employed against non-Muslim Pakistanis and against minority

sects and no action is taken against the perpetrators.

Turning back the tide of intolerance that has engulfed Pakistan in recent decades will be a long, slow, and

painstaking process. But the first steps have to be taken before it is too late. The migration of minorities is just one

indicator of how the spread of extremism can strike at the essence of societal organisation. This trend has to be

curtailed before it encompasses the larger society.


30

Works Cited

Reports and Newspaper Articles

Javaid, Maham. “Forced Conversions Torment Pakistan’s Hindus.”Al-Jazeera, August 18, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment-pakistan-hindus-201481795524630505.html

Mazhar, Arafat. “Why Blasphemy Remains Unpardonable in Pakistan,”Dawn, Feb 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1163596

“5000 Hindus Migrating to India every year, NA told,” Dawn, May 13, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1105830

“Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview.” Center for Research and Security Studies (June 2013).

“Fragile States Index 2014.” Foreign Policy. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/

“Indian Citizenship, Visas Made Easier for Minority Refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh,” NDTV, September 5, 2014. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-citizenship-visas-made-easy-for-minority-refugees-from-pakistan-bangladesh-587389.

“Packing their bags: Christians moving to Thailand to escape violence, insecurity,”Express Tribune, July 15, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/735724/packing-their-bags-christians-moving-to-thailand-to-escape-violence-insecurity/

“Report of the Defence Committee on Defence and Defence Production.”Available at: http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf

“Sri Lanka seeks help from the UN to resettle asylum seekers,” Reuters, October 3, 2014.

“Uncertain Haven.” The Economist, May 3, 2014. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601562-minorities-fleeing-pakistan-sri-lanka-best-temporary-refuge-uncertain-haven

Websites

“Census data for 1941.” Census India. http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM

“Census data for 1988.” Census Pakistan. http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm

Pakistan Christian Post. http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980





http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/





http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf



http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM

http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm

http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980


31

Annexure A

Ahmadis Booked Under Religious Offences from 1984 to December 2014

NO. Description of cases Total

number of

cases

1 Number of Ahmadis booked for displaying Kalima, i.e. “There is none

worthy of worship except Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah”

765

2 Number of Ahmadis booked for calling Azan, call to prayers 38

3 Number of Ahmadis booked for ‘posing’ as Muslims 447

4 Number of Ahmadis booked for using Islamic epithets 161

5 Number of Ahmadis booked for offering prayers 93

6 Number of Ahmadis booked for preaching 796

7 Number of Ahmadis booked for celebrating Ahmadiyya Centenary in 1989 27

8 Number of Ahmadis booked for celebrating the 100 year anniversary of

the eclipses of the sun & moon that occurred in 1894 as a sign for the

Promised Mahdi, i.e. Founder of the Ahmadiyya Community

50

9 Number of Ahmadis booked for distributing a pamphlet ‘EkHarf-e-

Nasihana’ i.e. ‘A Word of Advice’ commenting upon anti-Ahmadiyya

Ordinance XX

27

10 Number of Ahmadis booked for distributing “Mubahala” pamphlet, i.e. “A

challenge to the opponents for prayer duel”

148

11 Number of Ahmadis booked for allegedly defiling the Holy Quran 45

12 Various other cases against Ahmadis on religious grounds 1065

13 Number of Ahmadis charged under the “Blasphemy Law”, i.e. PPC 295-C 303

14 Former Supreme Head of the Community while living in London was

charged in his absence in sixteen cases.

16

15 Present Supreme Head of the Community while living in London 2

16 The entire population of Rabwah i.e. Ahmadiyya headquarters in Pakistan

was charged under section PPC 298-C on 15-12-1989, and again on June 8,

2008. (Population of Rabwah is approximately sixty thousand.)

17 A case against the entire Ahmadi population of Ahmadis in Kotli, was

registered for taking up repairs and improvement in their mosque in 2008


32

Annexure B

Questions for Migrant

Province District

Tehsil Town

Union Council Village

Migrant’s Information Gender

1. Male 2. Female

Age

Marital Status

1. Married 2. Never married 3. Divorced 4. Widow/Widower

Number of children

Highest level of education completed

Employment status and current occupation if employed

Migrated to (City, Country if abroad)

Migrated From (City/Town/Village/District in Pakistan)

Date of Migration (Month and year)

Have you migrated alone or with your family?

Family Profile

What was the approximate population of the village/town from which you migrated?

What was your father’s occupation?

How long had your family been settled in the community from which you migrated?


33

What were the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in your original community?

What was the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in your original community? To which

ethnic/sectarian/religious group does your family belong?

Circumstances Preceding Migration

When did you first decide to migrate (year)?

What prompted you to first start thinking of such a course of action? If a specific incident, please describe

in detail. If it was due to general circumstances, please say what these were?

Did you ever receive a direct or indirect threat from anyone in your original place of residence? If yes,

describe what kind of threat it was?

a) killing, b) kidnapping, c) hate speech d) specify if threat was of any other nature

Also, if describe whom the threat emanated from?

a) Organisation, b) individual, c) both

Was that organisation a religious outfit?

What was the name, if Yes,

If a threat was received, did you report it to any law enforcement agencies?

a) Police, b) court, c) other

What action was taken against your complaint?

Was the threat followed up by any attack (verbal, physical, smear campaign, other)?

Did you make the decision to migrate in consultation with your family?

a) Parents, b) spouse, c) siblings), d) in-laws, e) or on your own

Did your family agree with your decision or not? If not, why did they disagree?

How did you make the decision of where to go – how did you choose your current place of stay? Was your

choice based on job prospects/safety/the fact that other members of your community are here/other?


34

Circumstances of Migration

What arrangements did you make prior to migration, if at all (job search in new place/contact friends and

family who are already there/arranging housing or schooling/sold property/other)?

What is the approximate cost of your migration (cost of moving, as well as opportunity cost of employment

etc. left behind).

Approximate cost of the property if any left behind)?

Who helped you to make these decisions regarding migration?

Did anyone help you settle into your new place of abode? If so, how?

Do you think you made the right decision? Or would you go back to your original home if you could or

threat eliminated?

If you have decided not to return to your original place, why you do not want to return?

Thoughts on Circumstances in Original Community

Do you have close family remaining behind in your original community? Or are there extended family or

other close friends and community members still there?

Do you think they are safe and protected?

Would you advise others to follow your example? If yes, why and if no, why not?

Thoughts on Political Representation

Are you satisfied with the minorities’ representatives’ performance against minorities persecution?

Yes No

Why, if yes

Why, if no

Do you think minorities’ political representatives can help curb minorities’ persecution? How, elaborate:


35

Annexure C

Questions for Migrant’s Family

Province District

Tehsil Town


Respondent’s Information Gender

3. Male 4. Female

Age

Marital Status

5. Married 6. Never married 7. Divorced 8. Widow/Widower

Relationship with migrant

Family member Migrated to (City, Country if abroad)

Did he/she migrate alone or with his/her family?

Date of Migration (Month and year)

Family Profile

What was the approximate population of this village/town?

What is yours and your father’s occupation?

What are the levels of education of the adults (men as well as women) in your household (some years of

schooling/college/technical qualifications)?

How long had your family been settled in this community?

What are the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in this community?


36

What is the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in this community? To which ethnic/sectarian/religious group

does your family belong?

Circumstances Preceding Migration

When did your relative first decide to migrate (year)?

What prompted him/her to first start thinking of such a course of action? If a specific incident, please

describe in detail. If it was due to general circumstances, please say what these were?

Did you or any other family member ever receive a direct or indirect threat from anyone in this

community? If yes, describe. Also, if possible, say whom the threat emanated from?

a) Organization, b) individual c) both

Why your or other family feel threatened?

If a threat was received, did your family report it to any law enforcement agencies?

Was the threat followed up by any attack (verbal, physical, smear campaign, other)?

Was any action was taken by the law enforcement agencies on your family complaint?

a)Yes b) No

What action was taken on the complaint, specify, if ‘Yes’?

Why action was not taken, specify, if ‘No’?

Did your relative make the decision to migrate in consultation with you or on his/her own?

Did you agree with their decision or not? If not, why not?

How did he/she/they make the decision of where to go – how did he/she/they choose their current

place of stay?

Specify if the choice was based on:

a) Job prospects b) safety, c) the fact that other members of your community are there,

d) elaborate, if any other?


37

Do you want your relative to be back again?

Why if ‘yes’

Why if ‘No’

Do you want your relative to be back if threat to him/her is eliminated?

Do you think he/she/they safe after migration?

Was any property left behind by the migrant(s)?

Who manages that property in his/her/their absence?

Do you also want to migrate for family re-union?

Circumstances of Migration

What arrangements did the migrant make prior to migration, if at all (job search in new place/contacting

friends and family who are already there/arranging housing or schooling/other), specify?

What was the approximate cost of the migration (cost of moving, as well as opportunity cost of

employment etc. left behind)?

Who helped them to make these decisions regarding migration?

Did anyone help them settle into their new place of abode? If so, how?

Do you think they made the right decision?

How many members of your close family have remained in this community?

How many members of your ethnic/sectarian/religious group remain here? If there has been wide-scale

migration from this area, describe how and over what period of time that has happened.

Would you advise others to follow the example of your family member who migrated? If no, why not?


38

Annexure D

Questions for Community

Province District

Tehsil Town


Respondent’s Information

Number of people in FGD

Number of Males Number of Females

Community Profile

What was the approximate population of this village/town?

What are the general levels of education of the adults (men as well as women) in this community (some years of

schooling/college/technical qualifications)?

What are the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in this community?

What is the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in this community?

Migration trends

How many people have migrated from this community in the last five years – don’t have to give exact

numbers but indicate if it has been quite a few or not many?

Have they migrated as individuals or have whole households left?

What do you think has prompted the migration that has taken place? Why have people migrated from

here?


39

If members of a particular ethnic or sectarian group or religious community have migrated, can you tell us

how many of such households have left, and how many remain in the village/town?

Has the migration been caused by threats emanated from religious outfits, affiliated individual or other sort

of religious oppression/persecution?

Specify:

a) Religious outfits, b) Affiliated individuals, c) specify, if other kind of oppression/persecution?

What is the nature of threats if any?

a) Murder, b) kidnapping, c) hate speech, d) specify if other

Did they ever complain to law enforcement agencies of such threats?

a) Yes, b) No

What action was taken, if ‘Yes’?

If no action was taken, why do you think the law enforcement did not react?

Have some of the migrants (individuals or households) returned to this community? If so, do you know

why they returned?

Would such people be safe after returning?

Which of the four communities stand vulnerable or oppressed as number 1, 2, 3,4 in your view?

Communities Number assigned by communities

Sikh

Hindus

Christian

Ahmadis

Probes:

Why do you think……………………………is No. 1



Why do you think is ………………………..is No. 4


40

What is the biggest threat to religious minorities in Pakistan?

Elaborate:

Security and Conflict Issues

In general, do you think this community is safe and secure? Do most families feel safe here?

What sorts of conflicts have taken place here recently (last five years or so) if any?

What sorts of festivals/events are celebrated in this community on a regular basis? Who participates in

these?


House 4A, Street 42 F-7/1, Islamabad 92-51-2652891-4

[email protected] www.aawaz.org.pk

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Migration of Minorities in Pakistan : A Case Study Analysis

Documents

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fiveyear programme

development alternatives

community elders

christian community

migration of minorities

aurat foundation af

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