Migration in the 21 st century: a third demographic transition in the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies Annual Conference, Leicester, 13 September 2004. David Coleman Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford
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Migration in the 21 st century: a third demographic transition in the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies Annual Conference,
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Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in
the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies
Annual Conference, Leicester, 13 September 2004.
David Coleman
Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford
Outline
• Migration marginalised? migration study in broader context of demography.
• Migration paramount? the importance, or insignificance,of migration in demographic change past and present.
• Migration as the motor of a ‘third demographic transition’?
Why (most) demographers don’t do migration
• A fuzzy category: repeatable, reversible• Terrible statistics –defined by 57 varieties
of laws.• Big errors in both directions.• The ‘weak sister’ of demography – or is it?• Theory and prediction even more difficult
than in fertility and mortality.• Politicised and unappealing.
Duff statistics- some examples
• Most ‘migration’ data isn’t.
• Invisible ‘foreigners’.
• You pay your money…..three examples.
• Bondi beach and ‘unattributable demographic change’: a plague on both houses.
Most ‘migration’ data isn’tNet 'migration', selected countries, 1960-2001
Additions to the British labour force through immigration, 1991
– four definitions. Source: Salt 1992 UK SOPEMI Report
Work Permit 28978
Labour Force Survey 50500
International Passenger Survey 75000
Dept of Social Security 81503
Foreign workforce in Germany - two estimates (thousands).
Sources: Social Security, Microcensus.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Microcensus - includes unemployed and self employed. OECD 2003 table A.2.3. Social Insurance statistics. employed foreigners liable for social insurance (Salt 2003 table 11)
Lost en route - immigration within the EU, late 1980s.
Source : Poulain 1990.
Total possible sets of data on migration between EC countries (in 1990)
132
Sets of data available on immigration
96
Sets of data available on emigration
88
Number of possible comparisons
62
Comparisons where data match
6
Demography rules OK – 2001 Census versus IPS
Net Immigration to UK, thousands (3 estimates) 1981-2002. Source: ONS
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
thou
san
ds
Net balance corrected Census-based (1, interim) Census-based (2)
‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient!
or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration estimates’.
• Amaze your audiences!• Lose 290,000 people per decade!• Shrink your migration estimates overnight!• Banish that annoying population growth!• Remove those awkward inconsistencies!• Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible!•
Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100 .
Source: US Bureau of the Census.
US Population Projections 1999 - 2100. Middle Series and Zero Migration (millions)
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1999
2003
2007
2011
2015
2019
2023
2027
2031
2035
2039
2043
2047
2051
2055
2059
2063
2067
2071
2075
2079
2083
2087
2091
2095
2099
Middle
Zero migration
Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050,
(millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden
Population projections, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero migration. Source: Statistics Sweden.
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050
Zero-migration projection (millions)
Standard projection (millions)
Population projections, Netherlands 2003-2050,
medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands
Netherlands 2003-2050 projections, medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
total-medium variant total-zero migration native - zero migration
Why migration may continue to increase: the UK example.
• Hydraulic ‘lavatory cistern’ model should be rejected but - • Upward trend in most components.• UK government policy to expand migration e.g. increase
work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002.• Growth of political influence of ethnic minority populations.• Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority
populations, and other chain migration.• Some new inflow from EU Accession countries.• New diversity-oriented policy (e.g working holidaymakers)• Amnesties (see Demography 2003)
• But asylum claims declining in 2004.
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002 (thousands).
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
Fitted logarithmic curve to actual post-census data (r2=0.83)
Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).
More work permit migration from outside EU
Work permits holders and dependants admitted, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
≥12 months <12 months dependants total
Family and dependent migration
• Main reason for growth of immigrant populations in Europe, N. America post 1970s.
• Marriage migration overtakes ‘family reconstitution’ migration from 1980s.
Components of gross immigration inflows to
Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Australia 2
Switzerland
United Kingdom 3
Portugal
Canada
Norway 4
Denmark
France 5
United States 6
Sweden 7
Workers Family reunification Refugees
Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).
Spouse migration by sex and NC origin, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
All husbands All wives NC wives NC husbands
Displacement of family re-constitution migration by family formation migration UK 1982 - 1996
Entry clearance for wives from the ISC by length of marriage 1982-96, percent. Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics table 2.12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Up to 1 year
1 to 10 years
Over 10 years
Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance
applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.Trends in age-group size and spouse entry applications from Indian sub-
Continent, Great Britain 1981-2001. Source: LFS, Census, Home Office.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Wives/fiancees entry clearance applications, ISC South Asian Males 15-24 / 10
Family re-unification migration and family formation migration, Netherlands 1995, 2002
Non-asylum immigration to the Netherlands by purpose, percent, 1995, 2002.
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70M
oroc
co 1
995
Mor
occo
200
2
Tur
key
1995
Tur
key
2002
perc
ent o
f no
n-as
ylum
tota
l
Labour Family re-unification Union formation Dependants accompanying core family member
Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001.
2002-based 16 - 12k migration 2004 based 1997-based zero migration 1997 - based 13.2k migration
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000 - 2050 as percent of total population, with zero net
migration
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
perc
ent
Germany medium variant USA medium variant Denmark base scenario
Germany zero mig US zero mig Denmark zero mig
Why is it interesting?
• A new development, and asymmetrical• parallels abroad attract attention• change of direction in total pop trend• cultural, political change incl. foreign policy• what happens to original ‘dominant majority’• implies major change of social traditions, identity• a future of mixing or segregation or both• Sensitive to policy change
Really a transition?
• Not yet - only in early/middle stages
• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; and inter-ethnic unions create new populations
• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;
• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of ‘New Worlds’; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.
• Novelty is peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence
• Union migration biggest open-ended migration channel, may define national ethnic composition.
• Trends in partner choice a major factor in future migration flows, and isolation / assimilation of ethnic populations.
• Inter-ethnic union may diminish or increase group size, but will generate in the long run a variety of new populations of mixed origin.
• Utility and propriety of ethnic classification may be questioned.
Why does it matter?• Ethnic replacement would attract attention elsewhere
(Estonia, Latvia, Amazon)
• Demographic, cultural, political implications in the marginalisation of formerly majority traditions.
• Does this infringe human rights of natives?
• Trend is mostly policy-driven, and at least potentially controllable (e.g. Denmark).
• Implies a future of mixing or segregation or both
• No remaining ‘nature reserve’ for populations concerned.
Really a transition?
• Only in early/middle stages, but elements can be projected.
• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; inter-ethnic unions create new populations.
• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;
• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of New worlds; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.