Middleware 201 Directories Configuration & Operations Michael R. Gettes Lead Application Systems Integrator Georgetown University [email protected].

Middleware 201Directories

Configuration & Operations

Michael R. Gettes

Lead Application Systems Integrator

Georgetown University

[email protected] Member MeetingSpring 2001

How Deep?

• Background

• Site Profile - configuration

• Applications

• General Operational Controls

• Schema

• Access Lists

• Replication

• Related Directories

• LDAP-Recipe

• PKI Issues

MACE

•Middleware Architecture Committee for Ed.

•IT Architects – meet often – no particular religious affiliations

•MACE-DIR – eduPerson, Recipe, DoDHE

•MACE-SHIBBOLETH – global AuthN/Z

•MACE-PKI HEPKI (TAG/PAG/Labs)

•MACE-MED – HIPAA, mEduPerson

MACE-ochists

•RL “Bob” Morgan, Chair, Washington

•Steven Carmody, Brown

•Michael Gettes, Georgetown

•Keith Hazelton, Wisconsin

•Paul Hill, MIT

•Ken Klingenstein, Colorado

•Mark Poepping, CMU

•Jim Jokl, Virginia

•David Wasley, UCOP

MACE-DIR

•Keith Hazelton, Chair, Wisconsin•eduPerson objectclass

•LDAP-Recipe

•Dir of Dir for Higher Education (DoDHE)

•Shibboleth project dir dependencies

•Meta Directories – Architech free to HE

•http://middleware.internet2.edu/directories

MACE-DIR: eduPerson 1.0 (1/22/01 release)

•MACE initiated (Internet2 + EDUCAUSE)

•Globally interesting useful attributes

•Get community buy-in, must use it also

•eduPersonAffiliation (DoDHE), eduPersonPrincipalName (Shibboleth)

•“Less is more”, how to use standard objectclasses

•http://www.educause.edu/eduperson

MACE-SHIBBOLETH

•Steven Carmody, Brown, Chair

•A Biblical pass phrase – “password”•Get it right or “off with your head”• Inter-institutional Authentication/Authorization

•Web Authentication of Remote Sites with Local Credentials

•Summer, 2001 – Prototype target•http://middleware.internet2.edu/shibboleth

HEPKI

•TAG – Technical Activities Group• Jim Jokl, Chair, Virginia• Mobility, Cert Profiles, etc, etc, lots of techno

•PAG – Policy Activities Group• Default Chair, Ken Klingenstein, Colorado• Knee-deep in policy, HEBCA, Campus, Subs+RP

•PKI Labs (AT&T)– Neal McBurnett, Avaya• Wisconsin-Madison & Dartmouth• Industry, Gov., Edu expert guidance

•http://www.educause.edu/hepki

Site Profiledc=georgetown,dc=edu

• Netscape/iPlanet DS version 4.11• 2 Sun E250 dual cpu, 512MB RAM

• 75,000 DNs (25K campus, others = alums + etc)

• Directory + apps implemented in 6 months

• Distinguished names: uid=x,ou=people• DC rap, “Boom shacka lacka”• Does UUID in DN really work?

• NSDS pre-op plugin (by [email protected])• Authentication over SSL; Required• Can do Kerberos – perf problems to resolve

• 1 supplier, 4 consumers

Applications

• Mail routing with Sendmail 8.11 (lists also)

• Netscape messaging server v 4.15 (IMAP)• WebMail profile stored in LDAP

• Apache server for Netscape roaming (no SSL)

• Apache & Netscape enterprise web servers

• Blackboard CourseInfo Version 5 Level 3

• Whitepages: Directory Server GateWay

• DSGW for priv’d access and maintenance

Applications (Continued)

• Remote access with RADIUS (funk).• No SSL (3/2000); proper LDAP binds (fix 8/2000)

• Authenticates and authorizes for dial-up, DSL and VPN services using RADIUS called-id.

• We want to use this for other access control such as Oracle

RADIUS server

RADIUS + LDAP

NAS(terminal server)

DialupUsers

User calls202-555-1110

CalledId from NAS is mapped to guRadProf

DirectoryServer

Netid = gettesguRadProf = 2025550001guRadProf = 2025551110guRadProf = OracleFin

LDAP Filter is:guRadProf = 2025551110+ NetID = gettes

Applications (Continued)

• Alumni services (HoyasOnline).• External vendor in Dallas, TX (PCI).

• They authenticate back to home directories. Apache used to authenticate and proxy to backend IIS server.

• Email Forwarding for Life!

NET ID

TMS

HRIS

SIS

Alumni

LDAP Master

Client Browser

WWW

hoyasonline Content

PCI (Dallas)

Vendor-provided services

Other local hosts

GU provided self-

service applications

LDAP Replica

OS/390

HoyasOnline Architecture

Gratuitous Architectural Graphic (GAG)

WayDownIn Texas

Applications (Continued)

•Access+• Georgetown developed

• Web interface to legacy systems using Unix front-end to custom made mainframe tasks. Many institutions have re-invented this wheel.

• LDAP authentication, mainframe doesn’t yet do SSL. Always exceptions to rules.

• Student, Faculty, Staff, Directory/Telephone Access+ Services. This technique keeps mainframe alive. (good or bad?)

Applications (Continued)

• Specialized support apps• Self service mail routing

• Help Desk: mail routing, password resets, quota management via DSGW

• Change password web page

• Person registry populates LDAP people data, currently MVS (mainframe) based.

• PerLDAP used quite a bit – very powerful! (make sure version >= 1.4)

Applications (Continued)

• Georgetown Netscape Communicator Client Customization Kit (CCK).• Configured for central IMAP/SSL and directory

services.• Handles versions of profiles. Poor man’s MCD

• Future: more apps! Host DB, Kerberos integration, win2k/ad integration?, Oracle RADIUS integration, Automatic lists, Dynamic/static Groups, Top-Secret, Bb – further integration.

General Operational Controls

• Size limit trolling (300 or 20 entries?)

• Lookthru limit (set very low)

• Limit 3 processors for now, MP issues still!

• 100MB footprint, about 8000 DNs in cache• Your mileage will vary – follow cache guidelines

• 24x7 operations

• What can users change?? (Very little)

• No write intensive applications

General Ops Controls (cont…)

• Anonymous access allowed• Needed for email clients

• Anonymous access is good if you resolve FERPA and other data access issues.

Schema: Design & Maint

• Unified namespace: there can be only one!

• Schema design and maintenance• Space/time tradeoffs on indexing• Eduperson 1.0 vs. guPerson• guRestrict, guEmailBox, guAffil, guPrimAfil• guPWTimebomb, guRadProf, guType, guSSN• Relationships (guref)

• Maintained by ldif file using ldapmodify

Access ListsDesign & Maintenance

• Access lists: design & maintenance• Buckley(FERPA) protection & services

• Priv’d users and services

• userPassword & SSN

• Maintained by file using ldapmodify

• Working on large group controls at GU• Groups vs. Roles

• Likely easy to populate, hard to design & implement

Replication

• Application/user performance

• Failover, user and app service

• Impact of DC= naming (replica init)• Fixed in 4.13 and iDS 5.0

• Monitoring: web page and notification

• Dumper replica – periodic LDIF dumps

• Backups? We don’t need no stinkin’ backups!• Vendor Specific• No good solution for backups (iPlanet)• IBM uses DB2 under the covers• Novell?

Replication (Continued)

• Application/users config for mult servers

• Deterministic operations vs random

• Failover works for online repairs

• Config servers are replicated also

• 10 to 1 SRA/CRA ratio recommended

• Cannot cascade with DC= (netscape)• Cascading is scary to me

Normal Ops

Replica Structure

MASTER

DUMPER

WHITEPAGES MAILHOST

POSTOFFICE

NetID RegistryWeb Servers

Users

Users

Failure Ops

Netscape Console

• Java program (FAT client).

• Used to create, configure and monitor Netscape servers.

• Preferred the web page paradigm of the version 3 products.

• Has enough bugs that it is only used by server admins, not for mere mortals.

• Demo???

Other Directories

• Novell – GU abandoning GroupWise.

• Active directory??? Ugh!!!• Static Groups Only

• Strict Tree Structure for Group Policy

• No plans for MS to change this…

• Integrate whitepages service with hospital.• This led to the consideration of…

Directory of Directories

• Outgrowth of Georgetown WhitePages problem

• Expose common schema and use Eduperson 1.0.

• Performance issues for massively parallel searches.

• Interesting lessons learned about LDAP API.

• Sun Microsystems Grant.

• Will it be more than just an experiment?• Now being worked on to make it real. (11/2000)• See Directories Update Session on Thursday

LDAP-Recipe

•http://middleware.internet2.eduOr http://www.georgetown.edu/giia/internet2

• DIT, Schema Design, Access Control, Replication, Name population, Good use of LDAP design and features, LDAP configuration, Password Management, eduPerson discussion, DoDHE expectations

domainComponent (DC=) RAP

•The “DC” Rap, origins belong to RL “Bob” Morgan, University of Washington

•Traditional X.500 naming:

cn=Michael R Gettes, ou=Server Group, ou=UIS, o=Georgetown University, c=US

•Vs. domainComponent (DC) naming:

uid=gettes,ou=People,dc=georgetown,dc=edu

•HEPKI is issuing guidance and advice on DC= naming

Buyer Beware

• LDAP is LDAP is LDAP – yeah, right!

• “Sure! We support LDAP!” What does that mean?

• Contract for functionality and performance

• Include your Directory/Security Champion!!!

• Verify with other schools – so easy, rarely done.

• Beware of products that specify Dir Servers

• Get vendor to document product requirements and behavior. You paid for it!

Local Policy

• We don’t need no stinkin’ policy!

• Covert warfare can be a valid tactic for IT deployments

• Yes, this is a juicy rationalization with a self-serving purpose

• Still need to apply FERPA and HIPAA officially. Applied best practice thus far – ok for now.

• Verified no District (DC) Laws limiting PKI

Technical Policy

PKI is1/3 Technical

and 2/3 Policy?

Attributes for PKI

•Store them in a Certificate?• Attributes persist for life of Certificate• No need for Directory or other lookup

– The Certificate itself becomes the AuthZ control point

•Store them in a Directory?• Very light-weight Certificates• Requires Directory Access• Long-term Certificate, Directory is AuthZ control point.

•How many Certificates will we have?

•Pseudonymous Certificates

Approaches to PKI

• U.S. Federal Government• Purist approach, not considering the directory until end of project

• Assumes X.500 naming, DC= Rap/Rant• Bridge Certification Authority – Feds lead the way!

• Higher “Edge”ucation• It’s all about the applications!• This is not just your identity anymore

Bridge CAs

• What we know and love today• Vertical or Hierarchical CA paths

– Verisign and friends – in the browsers today– Requires there to be a deity in charge (not good)

• Bridge CA concept is just networking• Each CA is like a border router – peering vs. deity• Chain of trust path analysis more complex• All software in the world needs to change

– Browsers, Servers, Services (like path analysis services)

• This solution is scalable

Bridge CA and Trust Paths

Verisign

CA-A CA-B

Bridge CA

CA-C CA-D

FedBridge CA

HE

Bridge CAs

• Higher Education Bridge CA – FBCA peering

• How many HEBCAs?

• Competing BCA complexity issues?

• Do we really understand PKI implementations with respect to policy needs? (proxy certificates, relying party agreements, name constraints, FERPA, HIPAA, who eats who?)

• BCA seems to be the most promising perspective. Will each person be a BCA?

• All Software (Client/Server) needs to be changed.

Authentication:Overall Plan @ Georgetown

• Currently, Server-Side PKI self-signed

• Best of all 3 worlds• LDAP + Kerberos + PKI

–LDAP Authentication performs Kerberos Authentication out the backend. Jan. 2001 to finish iPlanet plug-in.

• Credential Caching handled by Directory.• Cooperative effort – Georgetown, GATech, Michigan

–All directory authentications SSL protected. Enforced with necessary exceptions

• Use Kerberos for Win2K Services and to derive X.509 Client Certificates

• One Userid/Password (single-signon vs. FSO)

Directories are part of the I in PKI

• Directory (October, 1999 @ Georgetown)•Centralized, automated Name Space•VERY carefully controlled

–Users modify very little–Priv’d access highly restricted

•Control considered necessary step for PKI to trust the directory

•Eventually, client, server and other certs/CRLs will be published in the directory.

Are Directories part of the I in PKI?

• Michigan (Kx509), Columbia• Short-lived Certificates• Avoids CRL and Directory Publications

• MIT• 1 year certs, but people can get all they need using Kerberos

Authentication

• But… A namespace infrastructure is still assumed and they all have it.

We’re Building A

“Bridge Over The River PKI”

Middleware Marketing

Drivers of Vapor Convergence

JA-SIG uPortal Authen

OKI Authentication

Shibboleth Inter-Realm AuthZ

Local Web SSO Pressures

We all get Web SSO for Local Authentication and an Enterprise Authorization Framework with an Integrated Portal that will all work inter-institutionally!

Middleware Inputs & Outputs

GridsGrids JA-SIG &JA-SIG &uPortaluPortalOKIOKI Inter-realmInter-realm

calendaringcalendaring

Shibboleth, eduPerson, Affiliated Dirs, etc.Shibboleth, eduPerson, Affiliated Dirs, etc.

EnterpriseEnterpriseDirectoryDirectory

EnterpriseEnterpriseAuthenticationAuthentication

LegacyLegacySystemsSystems

CampusCampusWeb SSOWeb SSO

futuresfutures

EnterpriseEnterpriseauthZauthZ

LicensedLicensedResourcesResources

EmbeddedEmbeddedApp SecurityApp Security