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Adrienne LemonSenior DM&E Regional SpecialistEast, Central,
and Southern AfricaSearch for Common Ground
[email protected]
MID-TERM EVALUATION
JULY – OCTOBER 2016
Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika PHASE IV
TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY-
Patrick Mugula Security Sector Reform Programme Coordinator
Search for Common Ground
[email protected]
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TABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6
ABBREVIATIONS 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8
Methodology 8
Limitations 8
Principal Conclusions 9
Recommendations 10
PROJECT BACKGROUND 11
Introduction to the Project 11
Revising the logical framework and alignment with the ISSSS
strategy 13
Background 14
METHODOLOGY 16
Objectives of the mid-term evaluation 16
Data Collection and Analysis 17
Research Team 17Documentation Review 17Mixed Methodology 17
Respondent Profiles 20
RESULTS 21
Project Indicators 22
Overall Objective: Perceptions of Security and Role of Security
Forces 26
Incidents of Misconduct and Prosecution Among Security Forces
26Popular Perceptions of the Changing Security Situation 26The
FARDC and the PNC: Security Actors and Protectors of Civilian
Populations 28
Specific Objective 1: Knowledge and Awareness of Security Forces
and Civilians Regarding Roles, Rights and Responsibilities 29
Coverage of training and awareness activities 31Among Civilians
31Among Security Forces 31Gender Considerations in Activities
32Coverage of Media Activities 32
Committee Function 33
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Awareness 33Recording Incidents and Prosecutions 34Reporting by
the Committees 34
Knowledge Development Among Members of the Security Forces
35Regarding Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) 35Training Base
Committees 36
Knowledge Development Among Civilian Populations 36Impact on
Attitudes and Behaviours of the Security Forces 37Perceptions and
Behaviour of the Security Forces Towards Civilians 37
Abuses and Accountability of the Security Forces 38Changes in
the Numbers of Abuses 38Reporting of Abuses 40
Impact on the Behaviours and Perceptions of Civilian Populations
41Reporting Abuses 41
Summary of Specific Objective 1 42
Specific Objective 2: Accountability, Collaboration and
Communication Between Civilians and Public Security Actors 44
Coverage of Reconciliation Activities 45Inclusion of Women in
the Activities 45
Committee Function 46Changes in Perceptions and Trust Levels
Between Civilians and the Security Forces 46
Civilian Perceptions and Trust in the Security Forces 46Security
Forces’ Perceptions and Trust in Civilians 47Impact on Relations
and Collaboration 48
Summary of Specific Objective 2 49
CONCLUSIONS 50
RECOMMENDATIONS 52
ANNEXES 55
Annex 1: Profile of Individuals Surveyed 55
Profile of Civilians Surveyed 55Profile of Military Personnel
Surveyed 56Profile of Police Officers Surveyed 57
Annex 2: Explanatory note on the programme committees 59
Explanatory note on the programme structures 59
Annex 3: Obstacles to the Implementation of Knowledge Acquired
by the Security Forces 60
Annex 4: Inception Report 61
Annex 5: Tools 79
Annex 6: Terms of Reference 138
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TABLESTable 1: Survey Sampling (quantitative and qualitative)
18
Table 2: Dates and times of the mid-term evaluation 19
Table 3: Number and proportion of respondents by province
(military, police and civilian) 20
Table 4: Table showing the completion of objectives and the
expected results 22
Table 5: Activities relating to specific objective 1 and their
degree of progress 30
Table 6: Programmes listened to by civilian, military and police
respondents 33
Table 7: Perceptions of the reduction in the number of incidents
of abuse, by province (n=418) 39
Table 8: Structures to which civilians would turn in order to
report abuses by the security forces 42
Table 9: Activities relating to specific objective 2 and their
level of completion 44
Table 10: Relative levels of trust in various entities among
civilians 46
Table 11: Education levels of civilians surveyed, by province
55
Table 12: Education levels of military personnel surveyed, by
province 57
Table 13: Military ranks surveyed (n=418) 57
Table 14: Education levels of police officers surveyed, by
province 58
Table 15: Ranks of police officers surveyed (n=410) 58
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FIGURESFigure 1: Map of the provinces in which the project is
being implemented 11
Figure 2: Perceptions of the changing security situation over
the past six months, by province (n=418) 27
Figure 3: Perceptions of the potential evolution of the security
situation over the next six months, by province (n=418) 27
Figure 4: Perceptions of the contribution of the FARDC and the
PNC to security, by province (n=418) 28
Figure 5: Table of military and police personnel that have
participated in a training on human rights, divided by province
31
Figure 6: Knowledge of the sentence for aiding and abetting rape
on the part of the security forces 35
Figure 7: Estimates of the number of acts of violence committed
during the previous month, by category of respondents 39
Figure 8: Military personnel and police officers who would speak
up if they heard about an abuse or an act of violence by one of
their colleagues. 41
Figure 9: Participation in reconciliation activities 45
Figure 10: Do you agree with the following statement: I would
accept a member of my family marrying a..? (% no) 47
Figure 11: Relative levels of trust in civilians among the
security forces 47
Figure 12: Military perceptions regarding the transmission of
information to armed groups by civilians 48
Figure 13: Civilian-police relations according to the civilians
49
Figure 14: Age of civilians surveyed, by province (n=418) 55
Figure 15: Employment of civilians surveyed (n=418) 56
Figure 16: Age of military personnel surveyed, by province
(n=418) 56
Figure 17: Age of police officers surveyed, (n=410) 58
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The implementation of this mid-term evaluation
for Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika” project in the provinces
of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa was carried out with
the participation and contributions of the FARDC, PNC, civilian
populations and our partners: the Security and Justice Sector
Reform Network (RRSSJ) in Kinshasa, the Collectif Alpha Ujuvi in
North Kivu, the Association for the Defence of the Military and
Security Sectors (ADDROSMIL) in South Kivu and Justice Plus in
Ituri. We would like to express our gratitude to all those, near
and far, who have helped in the completion of this work.
First of all, we wish to thank the security forces’ senior
leadership, officers, and enlisted recruits in various locations,
whose cooperation allowed us to realize qualitative and
quantitative data collection on the ground. We would also like to
express our gratitude towards the heads of the Provincial
Coordination Committees (CCP) and the National Steering Committees
(CNP) of the FARDC and the PNC, to the members of the Service
education civil et affaires social (SECAS), and Cellule Reforme de
la Police (CRP) our partners on the ground who spared no effort to
assure the success of Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika”
project. Our thanks and gratitude also goes to the Country Director
and the SSR programme team.
The quantitative and qualitative data collected via the
evaluation of Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika” project remain
the property of Search for Common Ground and cannot be used without
its content.
All rights reserved. Copying or reproducing this material
whether completely or in part and by any means is forbidden without
the express consent of Search for Common Ground.
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ABBREVIATIONSC(P)AJM (Provincial) Military Justice Support
Committee/Comité (Provincial) d’Appui à la Justice Militaire
CCP Provincial Coordination Committee/Comité de Coordination
Provincial
CdB Base Committee/Comité de Base
CLS Local Security Council/Conseil Local de Sécurité
CLSP Local Community Security Council/Conseil Local pour la
Sécurité de Proximité
CNP National Steering Committee/Comité National de Pilotage
DFID Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUSEC European Union mission to provide advice and assistance
for security sector reform
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo/Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FGD Focus Group Discussions
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL International humanitarian law
ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support
Strategy
KAP Knowledge, attitudes and practices
LMYS Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
SO Specific objective
PNC Congolese National Police/Police Nationale Congolaise
PCR Traffic Police/Police de Circulation Routière
SECAS Service education civil et affaires social
SFCG Search for Common Ground
SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence
SSR Security sector reform
SSU Stabilization and Support Unit
STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo
TOR Terms of Reference
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYSearch for Common Ground (SFCG) is a
non-governmental organisation (NGO) that has been present in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. Its mission is to
transform the ways in which individuals, organisations and
governments handle conflict, moving away from confrontational
approaches and looking for cooperative solutions.
SFCG has been participating in security sector reform (SSR)
since 2007. In this context and with the support of the Department
for International Development (DFID), SFCG has been implementing
phase IV of “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika – Tomorrow is Another Day”
programme (2014-2017). This new phase has the overall objective of
strengthening mutual trust between civilians and the security
forces, following up on improved behaviour by the security forces
and the greater power of local communities to hold them accountable
for their actions.
This project was originally aligned with the ISSSS strategy and
M&E framework in DRC during the design process in 2014, and has
made efforts to align with the newly proposed logical framework for
the ISSSS strategy in the second half of 2016.
The specific objectives (SO) of the SFCG programme are the
following:
1) SO1: Increase knowledge and awareness on the part of the
Congolese security forces and the civilian population regarding
their roles, rights and responsibilities towards one another
2) SO2: Strengthen accountability, cooperation and communication
between civilians and state security personnel around current
reforms and key achievements
METHODOLOGYThe mid-term evaluation uses a mixed methodology,
combining quantitative and qualitative approaches as part of a
participative approach, including beneficiaries (civilians,
military personnel and police) in data collection. The survey was
carried out in the four provinces identified by the programme:
North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa. The preparatory phase,
as well as the collection and input of data, was carried out by an
external consultant, with the drafting of the report being carried
out by SFCG’s regional Institutional Learning Team.
LIMITATIONS The mid-term evaluation team encountered some
constraints during the three evaluation phases.
Data concerning the results indicators for the programme were
not all collected in a systematic manner from the beginning of
phase IV. Despite some monitoring of activity implementation,
trainings (pre/post-tests) and certain activities themselves
(reconciliation, popular discussion forums), the database system
and monitoring practices have not allowed for the easy collection
of results indicators from the Base Committees (FARDC and PNC) and
the CPAJM/CAJM. While this posed some difficulties surrounding
interpretation of results, much of the data on indicators was
successfully collected in the surveys during the mid-term
evaluation.
The interpretation of certain data turned out to be a complex
process. First, some of the focus group data was not detailed
enough to provide a full overview of the participants responses.
Despite this, the answers were sufficient to triangulate the
information with the quantitative data and contribute to analysis.
Regarding the questionnaire, many of
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the individuals surveyed skipped certain questions: data
collectors noted that these people – mainly civilians – were either
illiterate or did not understand the questions, which were
formulated in an overly complex manner. In response, analysis
focused on questions with the most representative data provided by
participants.
The breadth of analysis aimed for in the terms of reference
could not be maintained. This was principally due to the lack of
time1, the limited quality of the data and the fact that the
drafting of the document was not done by the team that carried out
the data collection. Despite this, the report allows for the
identification of the programmes’s successes and challenges, and
points to areas needing particular attention in the last seven
months of phase IV. To ensure the quality of the report at this
critical time in the project cycle, SFCG relied upon its regional
Institutional Learning Team to ensure quality drafting of the
report.
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONSOverall, the acquisition of knowledge on
the part of the beneficiaries has been effective, and is considered
by the various actors to have been at the origin of a visible
change in behaviour on the part of the security forces (specific
objective 1). For example, military personnel have better knowledge
of humanitarian law: the baseline study showed a lack of awareness
of the legislation regarding individual criminal responsibility,
with 40% of military personnel saying that they could not be
prosecuted for having tortured an enemy fighter as long as they
were following orders from a superior officer. At this, the mid-way
point, 98% demonstrate increased knowledge and awareness on this
issue. Moreover, according to the CdBs and a majority of the
civilians surveyed, the majority of members of security forces now
act with greater respect for civilians and their rights. During the
focus group discussions, girls and young women discussing military
personnel mentioned, they had noticed a reduction in torture,
theft, and demands that civilians carry military personnel’s
baggage. Concerning the police, it was remarked that they no longer
oblige families to pay to be able to give food to detainees, that
they no longer “knock people down” and that they accompany women
travelling at night to protect them.
However, concerning the change in the number of incidents of
abuse and the reduction in unaccountability, results remain
limited: nearly a quarter of civilians believed that cases of abuse
have not decreased (24%), with 32% saying “it depends” and 41%
feeling that there has been a reduction. Civilians also emphasised
the fact that while they have witnessed many prosecutions, they
later saw the accused parties walking free, and so concluded that
reporting abuses has no effect. The monitoring of these cases,
carried out with some deficiency by the CdBs, is not yet subject to
centralisation by the CPAJMs and partner NGOs, who have encountered
problems. This limits the level of analysis that can be carried out
regarding abuses by the security forces.
Reconciliation and improved collaboration have been noticed by
various actors, but with certain provisions related to the fact
that so far relatively few reconciliation activities have been
carried out (specific objective 2). Additionally, it has been noted
that trust and perceptions of relations between civilians and
security forces have not developed in an entirely positive manner,
even though a lower proportion of respondents consider relations to
be bad. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in acceptance of
the security forces within local communities, with, for example, a
higher proportion of civilians willing to accept a member of their
family marrying a member of the FARDC (from 40% to 62%) or a police
officer (from 51% to 64%). With the exception of the media
activities, work was delayed by the establishment of lines of
communication between SFCG and implementing partners, including
developing transparent operating procedures. Despite this, radio
remains the
1 Delays concerning the signature of the contract and the
transfer of funds to the Consultant led to a late start in carrying
out the mid-term evaluation. Moreover, the delays to humanitarian
flights by ECHOFLIGHT interrupted the planning of the mission and
the collection of data on the ground, which contributed to delays
in drafting the report.
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best way to reach the majority of the Congolese population.
These two lines of progress have contributed to improved popular
perceptions of the changing security situation and the role of the
security forces (overall objective). Now more than 80% of civilians
believe that the FARDC and the PNC contribute to ensuring the
safety of their province, and that they are acting with the aim of
guaranteeing the security of local populations. However, some
uncertainty concerning the future remains noticeable, something
that is likely a product of the complicated situation in which the
country finds itself with regards to the politics surrounding
potential elections.
RECOMMENDATIONSAs a result of this mid-term evaluation, certain
programme recommendations have been made to improve the
implementation of activities over the coming months and reinforce
their impact, which is already visible, though fragile.
Concerning the activities:
Reviewing the appropriateness of the awareness strategies for
different audiences with the committees, in light of the obstacles
identified. While an effort has already been made to hold awareness
events in local languages, there remain opportunities to reinforce
the impact of this activity by considering how to adapt the
messages and the techniques to the type of audience. Additionally,
there is a need for the committees to take ownership of the gender
aspects in the programme. In order to strengthen the effectiveness
with which the messages are broadcast, it is also important to
think about working further with the trainers on techniques and the
use of guides and materials.
Strengthening awareness activities concerning sexual and
gender-based violence (SGBV), and ensuring that awareness
activities are not uniquely based around sanctions and risks, but
also cover the rights of women and the positive social consequences
that come from respecting them.
Balancing efforts between the centres and more rural areas. The
focus group discussions emphasised that change was more visible in
urban centres and suburbs than in the more isolated areas of the
provinces. Here too, specific strategies should be considered to
include different geographic areas in a more egalitarian
manner.
Concerning the work with the committees:
Review the responsibilities of the various committees and
partners, and clarify expectations in terms of regular reporting
and feedback. Work on collaboration between partners and committees
should be done to help them work effectively together. For its
part, SFCG should improve the regularity with which funds are
disbursed – notably to partner organisations – in order to ensure
that the activity schedule is followed and to avoid limiting the
effect of the activities. This is particularly true concerning
reconciliation activities.
Concerning the monitoring and project management, SFCG
should:
Strengthen the use of the monitoring and evaluation plan. This
would also allow for better identification of the audiences for
different activities, and their satisfaction levels, as well as
making progressive improvements. This implies using the monitoring
carried out by the media department to better understand listener
appreciation and understanding of messages. Finally, it will be
necessary to conduct in-depth monitoring of the current situation
and the risks related to the project.
Develop an exit strategy in collaboration with partners and
committees. While the committees say that they are prepared for
SFCG’s departure, the question of the financial feasibility of the
activities without SFCG support has not yet been dealt with.
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PROJECT BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECTSearch for Common Ground (SFCG) is a
non-governmental organisation (NGO) that has been present in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. Its mission is to
transform the ways in which individuals, organisations and
governments handle conflict, moving away from confrontational
approaches and looking for cooperative solutions.
SFCG has been participating in security sector reform (SSR)
since 2006, with the aim of changing the attitudes and behaviour of
police and military personnel when it comes to protecting civilian
populations, working with leaders and influencers at the national,
provincial and community level.
In this context and with the support of the Department for
International Development (DfID), SFCG has been implementing phase
IV of its “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika – Tomorrow is Another Day” programme
(2014-2017). This new phase has the overall objective of
strengthening mutual trust between civilians and the security
forces, following up on improved behaviour by the security forces
and the greater power of local communities to hold them accountable
for their actions.
Figure 1: Map of the provinces in which the project is being
implemented2
2 Note this drawing has been done by the programme for
activities. Participating provinces = South Kivu, North Kivu,
Kinshasa and Ituri Province
Carte de la RDC représentante le nouveau découpage
territorial
Implementation Zones
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The specific objectives (SO) of the SFCG project are the
following:
SO1: Increase knowledge and awareness on the part of the
Congolese security forces and the civilian population regarding
their roles, rights and responsibilities towards one anothers
SO2: Strengthen accountability, cooperation and communication
between civilians and state security personnel around current
reforms and key achievements
The project is based on the following theory of change:
If the Congolese security forces and the civilian population are
aware of and knowledgeable about their roles, rights and
responsibilities towards one another, and if they are able to
communicate and interact in a more open, transparent and
constructive way, then behaviour, relations and trust between them
will improve.
Three types of activities have been implemented concurrently:
(1) capacity building; (2) activities to build ties in four regions
of the country (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and activities for
national level General Staff Headquarters personnel in Kinshasa);
(3) fighting against impunity. All of which are supported through
mass media campaigns.
SFCG and its partners have identified target zones based on the
revised I4S strategy. In other words, the strategic priorities are:
1) areas in which joint MONUSCO/FARDC operations are taking place,
2) areas under the control of the FARDC, 3) areas in which the PNC
has retaken control. Nevertheless, the project remains flexible as
far as the types of activities to be carried out in each zone are
concerned, given that the situation can evolve very quickly and in
an unpredictable manner.
The target areas include:
Province Areas targeted
North Kivu Rusthuru/ Ishasha/ Sake/ Massisi/ Walikale/ Beni/
Oicha
South Kivu Bunyiakiri/ Kalehe/ Walungu/ Shabunda/ Bukavu/ Uvira/
Baraka/ Fizi
Former Orientale Province3
(Ituri Province)Irumu/ Mambassa/ Bunia/ Djugu/ Mahagi/ Aru/
Dungu (Haut Uele)
Kinshasa Kinshasa
SFCG is working with various committees that are pre-existing
structures within the FARDC and the PNC. An explicatory note
regarding these committees can be found in Annex 2. SFCG plans to
educate 24,500 current FARDC personnel and 14,000 new recruits, as
well as 60,480 members of the PNC. The programme also aims to
target 100 officers and high-ranking members of the FARDC belonging
to the General Staff Headquarters in Kinshasa and the targeted
military regions. Additionally, 75 officers and high-ranking
members of the PNC at the national and provincial level will be
targeted. Lastly, the project will target at least 2,550,000
civilians in four provinces, via joint activities involving
civilians and the security forces in addition to community
engagement activities.
3 In 2015, the former Orientale Province was divided into four
new provinces: Bas-Uele, Haut-Uele, Ituri and Tshopo.
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REVISING THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND ALIGNMENT WITH THE ISSSS
STRATEGY
This project was envisioned from its inception to coordinate
with DfID and ISSSS strategy. In its original design, Search for
Common Ground incorporated indicators from the ISSSS M&E
Framework to ensure alignment with ISSSS across all elements of the
project. This collaboration began a discussion about possible needs
for revision of some of the objectives and project indicators,
whereby DfID and SFCG agreed to review the feasibility of these
following the completion of the baseline study and start-up of
activities. Early in 2015, discussions began between the DfID and
SFCG to analyse the current state of implementation of the
activities as compared with the logical framework to reconsider the
manner in which the objectives were formulated in order to make
them more realistic and easier to measure. The original logical
framework contained three specific objectives:
1. Improve the capacity of the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC)
and the Police (PNC) to protect local populations within areas
affected by conflicts or military operations, controlled by the
military, recently placed under civilian/PNC control, or in the
stabilised zones in the East of the DRC;
2. Improve the capacity of the security forces to fight
unaccountability and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV);
3. Strengthen trust between civilian populations and security
forces via better joint engagement and increased cooperation and
communication regarding reforms and key results.
DfID’s principal questions were centred on the manner in which
the project had been designed to meet the first two objectives,
notably concerning institutional change and reform, as well as on
the matter of the communications activities and how they were
intended to maintain progress on the programme. Following these
discussions, in June 2015 it was decided that the logical framework
would be reduced to two specific objectives in order to reflect a
more realistic set of outcomes and their contributions to the
overall goal.
In 2016, following a request from MONUSCO’s monitoring and
evaluation unit, the SSR programme team at SFCG began working to
reconcile the logical framework with the ISSSS strategy. The
programme proposed to be in alignment notably with the first pillar
(democratic dialogue), the second pillar (security) and the fifth
pillar (prevention of sexual and gender-based violence). For
example, concerning pillar one, the ISSSS strategy has as its first
specific objective “increased and inclusive support for the
stabilisation and security strategy at community level”, and
various indicators allowing for the monitoring of progress on this
issue. Similarly, regarding the overall objective of the project,
SFCG’s indicators are linked to this, in that they allow observers
to visualise the evolution of the security situation and the
perceptions of the population.
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BACKGROUNDThe security situation in the DRC, and in particular
in the East, remains unstable. Roadblocks and kidnappings of
civilians by armed groups are still being reported in some areas of
North Kivu. Nevertheless, there are currently no ongoing military
confrontations involving heavy artillery or invasions by rebel
groups – despite incidents such as the recent Beni massacre4. At
the national level, recent violent demonstrations indicate the
fragility of the situation. In the areas targeted by the programme,
security is stable overall, with only a few incidents reported to
have taken place in certain pockets while phase IV of the programme
has been ongoing. Investigations showed that cities (Goma, Bukavu,
Bunia) are more stable than some of the rural transport corridors
where military operations are carried out.
Several structural changes were noted at various levels of the
PNC and FARDC chain of command during phase IV. These changes
having had an effect on the implementation of project activities
including the departure of certain committee members, a lack of
understanding of the programme’s logical framework on the part of
the new unit commanders (necessitating time spent explaining SFCG’s
approach to them and obtaining their engagement), and the loss of
certain equipment following troop movements or the departure of
committee members.
In South Kivu the security situation has been calm overall,
despite incidents indicating a certain level of insecurity (armed
robberies) reported in Walungu, Fizi and Shabunda. These incidents
have had a negative impact on relations between the army, the
police and the local populations. Moreover, the situation remains
volatile in this province and particularly in the areas close to
the border with Burundi, these communities having been affected by
the crisis in Burundi (since April 2015).
Since the beginning of the project, the security situation in
North Kivu has stabilised in certain previously-volatile areas,
while other regions have been subject to military operations, such
as those carried out in Beni, Walikale, Rutshuru and Massisi in
2015. These operations, against Mai Mai (Walikale, Rutshuru),
Nyatura FPC (Massisi), ADF NALU (Beni) and foreign-armed groups
(the FDLR and ADF NALU), are still causing large-scale population
displacements from the affected areas to more stable zones. There
have been more than 600 deaths in the Beni region since 2014 and
tensions with the security forces continue: civilians accuse the
FARDC of complicity with ADF NALU, while the FARDC accuses
civilians of the same thing. This shows the lack of communication
and understanding between the two parties. The same situation is
present in Rutshuru and certain communities close to Kitshanga (in
Massisi), where the security situation is having a negative impact
on military-civilian relations.
In Ituri the overall security situation has been calm in the
city of Bunia, as well as in several other regions, such as
Mambassa and Kasenyi. However, things have been volatile in areas
such as Djugu and Irumu, where armed groups remain active (FPRI,
Mai Mai Morgan and Werrason). Ituri province is still subject to a
certain level of instability among the security forces and the
representatives of the civil service, who have been subject to new
assignments and appointments in the wake of the decentralisation
procedure and the new administrative divisions.
In Kinshasa, the overall security situation has been calm within
the city of Kinshasa itself, but several incidents were reported
following demonstrations carried out by opposition groups in 2015
and 2016. Members of the security forces were implicated in these
incidents. However, the units participating directly in the
programme were not involved in handling these incidents/crises, and
their areas of responsibility were not directly affected. The
government had tentatively scheduled a presidential election for
the end of 2016. However, the Constitutional Court signed a
decision on October
4 This occurred on the 13th August 2016:
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministres
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministreshttp://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministres
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15 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
17, 2016 and a political agreement was signed between the
current government and a part of the opposition on October 18, 2016
that allows the current president to remain in office until 2018.
While the opposing political parties appear to be responding
strategically through joint campaigns, the popular response has
been highly varied from high levels of violent demonstrations in
Kinshasa to violent free civilian marches in Goma.
The unstable and largely unpredictable political environment
presents a risk to the programme both from an implementation and
reputational point of view. In response, SFCG is monitoring the
situation closely and working with programme partners to respond
appropriately.
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16 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P
H A S E I V
METHODOLOGY
OBJECTIVES OF THE MID-TERM EVALUATIONThe mid-term evaluation has
three principal objectives:
• Collect data on the programme indicators and determine the
rate of progress towards achieving results;
• Check the relevance and coherence of the activities
implemented with regard to their direct effect upon
deliverables;
• Provide information regarding the sustainability of the
project activities.
The following lines of enquiry were included in the Terms of
Reference:
• Perceptions and opinions of local populations regarding the
FARDC and the PNC, particularly concerning their behaviour;
• Perceptions and feelings of local populations regarding the
situation in the East of the country (security, peace,
stability);
• Abuses and human rights violations committed by the FARDC and
the PNC, and the legal proceedings ongoing in this area;
• Knowledge and awareness on the part of the FARDC and the PNC
regarding international humanitarian law, human rights (notably
legislation against sexual and gender-based violence) and the basic
principles of civilian, police and military relations;
• The security situation in targeted areas;
• Access to information, educational material and legal texts
for members of Provincial Committees in Support of Military Justice
(CPJAM);
• The level of cooperation between local populations and the
security forces;
• The level of knowledge of local populations regarding
relations between civilians, military personnel and the police;
• And finally, information regarding completed deliverables,
such as the functioning of the committees, the level of
synchronisation between communications activities and on-the-ground
activities.
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17 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
RESEARCH TEAMThe preparatory phase, involving the collection and
input of data, was carried out by Boumas Guennolet, a consultant
selected by SFCG. In order to ensure the quality of the final
report, the SFCG regional Institutional Learning Team were
responsible for analysis and drafting.
DOCUMENTATION REVIEWThis stage was dominated by the examination
of documents shared by SFCG’s SSR team. These included political,
strategic and other documents produced concerning SSR in the DRC,
as well as data and reports available on the FARDC and the PNC. As
far as SFCG is concerned, this includes, notably: the logical
framework document (2014), the evaluation of previous projects
involving the FARDC and the PNC (2013), methodological guides,
training manuals, memoranda of understanding, the baseline study
for phase IV (February 2015), the project evaluation report on
phase III (February 2014), the communications strategy (2014) and
the project activity reports.
MIXED METHODOLOGYThe mid-term evaluation uses a mixed
methodology, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches as
part of a participatory approach, including beneficiaries
(civilians, military personnel and police) in the data collection
stage. The survey was carried out in the four provinces of
intervention identified by the project: North Kivu, South Kivu,
Ituri and Kinshasa. More information can be found in the inception
report in Annex 3.
Quantitative Methodology: In the terms of reference the
population was set at 2,550,000 civilians, 60,480 members of the
PNC, and 24,000 FARDC personnel. The margin of error is 5% with a
confidence interval of 95%.
The questionnaires were differentiated according to their
targets:
1. An individual questionnaire for military personnel and FARDC
members
2. An individual questionnaire for PNC members,
3. An individual questionnaire for civilians
Qualitative Method: Focus groups support qualitative
understanding of people’s ideas, beliefs, practices and behaviours.
Discussion guidelines for the focus group sessions were developed
during the preparatory phase and tested in Goma. These guidelines
were specific to each group. The focus groups were carried out with
homogenous groups of eight to twelve people: girls and young women,
CLP/CLSP/CLS, FARDC, grassroots committees, women of the PNC, PNC
provincial coordination committees (CCP) and joint reconciliation
committees (CMR). Individual interviews were also carried out with
the CAPJM/CAJM, certain partners and the SFCG team.
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18 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
Table 1: Survey Sampling (quantitative and qualitative)
Quantitative Methodology
Project target Sample size Number Collected
Notes The safety margin was included in case of insecurity or
inaccessibility of one of the areas to be studied. It has no effect
on sampling.
2,500 FARDC personnel
∑=378 418 Safety margin =40
60,480 PNC members
∑=382 410 Safety margin =28
2.550.000 civilians ∑=384 418 Safety margin =34
Qualitative Methodology
Sampling Number Collected
Notes
3 10 Focus groups: girls and young women
- 5 Focus groups: police
8 13 Focus groups: PNC committees
8 14 Focus groups: FARDC grassroots committees
3 3 Focus groups: CLS/CLSP/CLP
- 1 Focus groups: CCP PNC
- 2 Focus groups: CMR
3 3 Interviews: CPAJM
3 3 Interviews: partners
In the case of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, four geographic
areas were chosen through random selection by the SSR team from the
zones in which the FARDC and the PNC were active. For security
reasons some of these areas were not included in the final plan.
Certain zones and territories, specifically Shabunda (South Kivu),
Walikale (North Kivu), Dungu (Ituri), were inaccessible due to
ongoing military operations. The following table summarizes the
activities carried out in the various survey areas.
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19 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
Table 2: Dates and times of the mid-term evaluation
ACTIVITES LOCATION DURATION
Office Phase(Consultant and SFCG)
Meeting to coordinate ways and means
North Kivu: Goma April to June
Meeting on operational planning for activities
Field Data Collection Phase
Data collection on the ground via individual interviews,
beneficiary surveys, focus groups, monitoring workshops and other
methods.
North Kivu: Goma, Beni, Kitshanga, Massisi, Rutshuru.
From 5th July to 18th August 2016
South Kivu: Bukavu, Baraka, Fizi, Walungu, Minova
Ituri: Bunia, Mambassa, Kasenyi
Kinshasa
Data entry North Kivu: Goma From 15th July to 22nd August
2016
Production of a mid-term progress evaluation report
Ituri: Bunia From 20th July to 25th September 2016
Synthesis Phase(Consultant followed by SFCG Institutional
Learning Team)
Production of mid-term evaluation report (draft and final
version)
Outside the DRC September/October
Gender issues are cross-sectional and are addressed in the
project via the definition of indicators and the implementation of
activities. However, there were not enough women present in the
police and the military units studied to carry out a quantitative
analysis by gender. Consequently, the following elements support
the inclusion and consideration of the gender dimension in this
evaluation:
1. Representation of women in the samples taken during the
quantitative study: 31.6% of the civilian sample, 5.1% of the
police sample and 1.9% of the military sample (fewer women being
present in the regiments sampled due to ongoing military
operations).
2. Separate focus groups organised for female police
officers
3. Focus groups organised specifically for young women between
age 14 and 24 years old sampled from among the civilian
population.
4. Inclusion of specific questions related to gender-based
violence in the survey and the interview guides.
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20 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
RESPONDENT PROFILESAmong the people who replied to the survey,
around one third belonged to the FARDC (418), one third to the PNC
(410) and one third were civilians (418). Distribution by province
was equally balanced, as the table below shows.
Table 3: Number and proportion of respondents by province
(military, police and civilian)
Province Military (FARDC) Police (PNC) Civilians
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Ituri 139 33,3% 135 32,9% 136 32,5%
North Kivu 137 32,8% 137 33,4% 139 33,3%
South Kivu 142 34% 138 33,7% 143 34,2%
TOTAL 418 100% 410 100% 418 100%
Details regarding the profiles of the military, police and
civilian interviewees can be found in Annex 1.
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21 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
RESULTSThis report is structured in accordance with the baseline
study, providing a coherent analysis of each programme objective.
The various lines of enquiry mentioned in the Terms of Reference
have been taken into account and included in the structuring of the
document. After providing an overview of the state of the results
and indicators, the report summarizes the progress made towards
achieving the overall objective and the two specific objectives of
the project. Concerning the specific objectives, emphasis is placed
upon the coverage of the activities corresponding to these
objectives, the functioning of the committees working on these
activities, the development of knowledge and perceptions, and a
brief analysis of impact at the mid-way point in the project. The
report concludes with a summary of the programme’s relevance,
effectiveness and long-term sustainability.
The sections outlining contribution to the two specific
objectives will demonstrate a clear evolution in terms of knowledge
and a subtler, though visible, change in perceptions. While these
may have been influenced by other actors like MONUSCO and other
sectorial NGOs, the changes can be directly linked to training,
awareness-raising and reconciliation activities carried out through
SFCG programming. The awareness-raising work carried out by the
Base Committees via the media shows a decrease in the level of fear
among civilians and a growing consciousness both of their role and
the role of the security forces.
This report presents and analyse certain behavioural changes
that have been noticed. The data shows that the population has
observed a decrease in abuses by the security services, and that
relations between civilians and the FARDC/PNC are less bad and thus
calmer. While these developments were targeted by SFCG in this
project as being the product of improved knowledge and
communication, it is nevertheless important to emphasise the
limitations when measuring the exact contribution of SFCG’s
activities to these changes. The developing situation, the internal
work done by the FARDC and the PNC, and the cumulative efforts of
the various security sector reform actors have, naturally,
influenced these changes, which remain dynamic in the
long-term.
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AU
TR
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LO
BI
MO
KO
LO
YA
SIK
A
P
HA
SE
IV
PRO
JECT
IND
ICAT
OR
S
Tabl
e 4: T
able
show
ing
the c
ompl
etio
n of
obj
ectiv
es an
d th
e exp
ecte
d re
sults
Base
line
Mid
-way
po
int
End
of
proj
ect t
arge
tN
otes
Ove
rall
obje
ctiv
e: S
tren
gthe
n th
e cre
dibi
lity,
effica
cy an
d ac
coun
tabi
lity o
f the
Con
gole
se se
curit
y for
ces i
n pr
otec
ting
loca
l pop
ulat
ions
aff
ecte
d by
confl
ict i
n th
e DR
C an
d pa
rtic
ular
ly in
the f
our p
rovi
nces
of N
orth
Kiv
u, S
outh
Kiv
u, O
rient
ale a
nd K
insh
asa.
Indi
cato
r A
: N
umbe
r of
pros
ecutio
ns f
or m
iscon
duct
agai
nst t
he F
ARD
C as
com
pare
d w
ith th
e tot
al n
umbe
r of
incid
ents
of m
iscon
duct
iden
tified
by
inde
pend
ent
repo
rting
mech
anism
s.
--
Incr
ease
Som
e CPA
JMs s
till h
ave t
roub
le co
mpi
ling
this
data
, but
pro
gres
s has
bee
n ob
serv
ed.
In N
orth
Kiv
u th
e Bas
e Com
mitt
ees b
etwe
en
Febr
uary
- Jun
e 201
6 re
porte
d 24
pro
secu
tions
.
Else
wher
e, ac
ross
all t
he p
rovi
nces
, mor
e tha
n 70
pro
secu
tions
hav
e bee
n br
ough
t for
ward
(B
eni,
Rut
shur
u, M
angi
na an
d M
assis
i).
Indi
cato
r B: %
of t
he p
opul
atio
n pe
rcei
ving
the F
ARD
C as
a se
curit
ising
/sta
bilis
ing
pres
ence
B.1:
% w
ho b
eliev
e tha
t the
FAR
DC
cont
ribut
e to
the
safet
y of t
heir
prov
ince
68,7
%80
,6%
+ 20
%Ta
rget
alm
ost a
chie
ved
B.2:
% w
ho b
eliev
e tha
t the
acti
ons o
f the
FAR
DC
are
take
n w
ith th
e aim
of p
rotec
ting t
hem
and
guar
antee
ing
their
secu
rity
67,0
%87
,4%
+ 20
%Ta
rget
achi
eved
Indi
cato
r C: %
of t
he p
opul
atio
n pe
rcei
ving
the F
ARD
C as
a se
curit
ising
/sta
bilis
ing
pres
ence
C.1
: % w
ho b
eliev
e tha
t the
FAR
DC
cont
ribut
e to
the
safet
y of t
heir
prov
ince
74,5
%81
,5%
+ 20
%A
chie
vem
ent i
n pr
ogre
ss.
C.2
: % w
ho b
eliev
e tha
t the
acti
ons o
f the
FAR
DC
are
take
n w
ith th
e aim
of p
rotec
ting t
hem
and
guar
antee
ing
their
secu
rity
71,9
%83
,5%
+ 20
%Ta
rget
alm
ost a
chie
ved
Indi
cato
r D: %
of t
he p
opul
atio
n wh
o be
lieve
that
the E
ast o
f th
e DRC
is p
rogr
essin
g to
ward
s pea
ce an
d sta
bilit
y
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23
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A
P
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SE
IV
Base
line
Mid
-way
po
int
End
of
proj
ect t
arge
tN
otes
D.1
: %
who
beli
eve
that
the
secu
rity
situa
tion
has
impr
oved
over
the p
ast s
ix m
onth
s40
,9%
70,6
%55
%Ta
rget
exce
eded
– n
eeds
to b
e con
text
ualis
ed in
ligh
t of
the d
evelo
pmen
t of t
he si
tuat
ion
in g
ener
al
D.2
: % w
ho b
eliev
e th
at th
ey w
ill b
e sa
fer si
x m
onth
s fr
om n
ow21
,3%
44,0
%+
50%
Ach
ieve
men
t in
prog
ress
Indi
cato
r E
: N
umbe
r of
viole
nt i
ncid
ents
repo
rted
with
in th
e pro
gram
me z
ones
-- 5
0%So
me C
PAJM
s stil
l hav
e tro
uble
com
pilin
g th
is da
ta, b
ut p
rogr
ess h
as b
een
obse
rved
.
Spec
ific O
bjec
tive 1
: Inc
reas
e awa
rene
ss an
d kn
owle
dge o
n th
e par
t of t
he C
ongo
lese
secu
rity f
orce
s and
the
civi
lian
popu
latio
n re
gard
ing
thei
r rol
es, r
ight
s and
resp
onsib
ilitie
s tow
ards
one
anot
her.
Indi
cato
r 1.1
: Kno
wled
ge o
f hum
an ri
ghts
and
inte
rnat
iona
l law
on
the p
art o
f the
FA
RDC
, inc
ludi
ng re
gard
ing
the p
rote
ctio
n of
wom
en (S
GBV
)
1.1.
1: %
of m
ilita
ry p
erso
nnel
awar
e th
at th
e sen
tence
for a
idin
g and
abe
tting
in ra
pe is
no l
ower
than
that
for
com
mitt
ing r
ape
57,7
%0,
0%+
50%
Prob
lem w
ith th
e phr
asin
g of
the q
uesti
on
or fa
ult i
n th
e awa
rene
ss ac
tiviti
es.
1.1.
2: %
of m
ilita
ry p
erso
nnel
who
kno
w th
at th
ey ca
n be
pro
secut
ed if
they
obey
an
orde
r fro
m a
supe
rior o
fficer
to
tortu
re an
enem
y59
,7%
99,0
%+
50%
All
mili
tary
per
sonn
el an
swer
ed co
rrect
ly.
Indi
cato
r 1.2
: Kno
wled
ge o
f the
bas
ic pr
incip
les o
f hum
an ri
ghts,
civi
lian
relat
ions
and
polic
e reg
ulat
ions
on
the p
art o
f the
PN
C
1.2.
1: %
of po
lice a
war
e tha
t the
sent
ence
for a
idin
g and
ab
ettin
g in
rap
e is
no lo
wer
than
that
for
com
mitt
ing
rape
62,2
%7,
6%+
50%
Prob
lem w
ith th
e phr
asin
g of
the q
uesti
on o
r fa
ult i
n th
e awa
rene
ss-r
aisin
g eff
orts.
Indi
cato
r 1.
3: N
umbe
r of
CPAJ
M m
embe
rs w
ho s
ay
that
they
have
parti
cipat
ed in
a na
tiona
l lev
el co
nfer
ence
on th
e figh
t aga
inst
unac
coun
tabi
lity
-0
At l
east
one
mem
ber
of ea
ch
CPA
JM
4 pr
ovin
cial w
orks
hops
hav
e bee
n or
gani
sed
for t
he
mem
bers
of C
PAJM
s and
CA
JMs (
Kin
shas
a, N
orth
Kiv
u,
Itur
i et S
outh
Kiv
u)5 i
nste
ad o
f the
nat
iona
l con
fere
nce
5 Th
ese
work
shop
s wer
e ru
n by
the
CA
JMs h
elped
to re
-mot
ivat
e C
PAJM
mem
bers
on
issue
s sur
roun
ding
the
fight
aga
inst
impu
nity,
the
mea
ning
of h
uman
righ
ts vi
olat
ions
and
the r
einf
orce
men
t of d
ata s
harin
g m
echa
nism
s bet
ween
the C
PAJM
s and
the B
ase C
omm
ittee
s.
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IV
Base
line
Mid
-way
po
int
End
of
proj
ect t
arge
tN
otes
Indi
cato
r 1.
4: N
umbe
r of
CPAJ
M m
embe
rs w
ho s
ay
that
they
have
acces
s to t
rain
ing m
ater
ials
and l
egal
text
s-
0
At l
east
one
mem
ber
of ea
ch
CPA
JM
The t
hree
CPA
JM m
embe
rs in
terv
iewe
d sa
id th
at th
ey h
ad ac
cess
to
trai
ning
mat
eria
ls bu
t not
to le
gal t
exts.
The l
ibra
ry in
stalla
tion
activ
ity h
ad n
ot ye
t bee
n co
mpl
eted
as o
f Aug
ust 2
016.
Indi
cato
r 1.5
: Civ
ilian
kno
wled
ge o
f pol
ice is
sues
1.5.
1: %
of ci
vilia
ns w
ho sa
y tha
t the
per
sonn
el at
their
loc
al p
olice
statio
n tr
eated
them
with
cour
tesy w
hen
they
w
ent t
here
of th
eir ow
n fr
ee w
ill
48,6
%82
,8%
+ 50
%Ta
rget
exce
eded
Spec
ific o
bjec
tive 2
: Str
engt
hen
acco
unta
bilit
y, co
oper
atio
n an
d co
mm
unic
atio
n be
twee
n ci
vilia
ns an
d pu
blic
secu
rity a
ctor
s aro
und
refo
rms i
n pr
ogre
ss an
d ke
y ach
ieve
men
ts
Indi
cato
r 2.
1: N
umbe
r of
mili
tary
be
st pr
actic
es pr
omot
ed an
d ca
se stu
dies
deve
loped
and
anal
ysed
-N
/ATo
be
defin
edTh
is ac
tivity
has
bee
n m
odifi
ed an
d wi
ll be
inclu
ded
in th
e dev
elopm
ent o
f a te
chni
cal S
SR
Indi
cato
r 2.2
: % of
mem
bers
of PN
C co
mm
ittee
s abl
e to
quot
e at l
east
two c
oncre
te w
ays t
o resp
ond
effect
ively
to
SGBV
by th
e end
of th
e pro
ject
--
At l
east
60%
Indi
cato
r dat
a not
colle
cted
. 88%
of p
olice
and
mili
tary
per
sonn
el be
lieve
d th
at th
ey u
nder
stood
th
e atti
tude
s and
beh
avio
urs t
o ad
opt.
Indi
cato
r 2.3
: Lev
el of
know
ledge
of p
olice
regu
latio
ns
and
the b
asic
prin
ciples
of po
lice-
civili
an re
latio
ns on
the
part
of CL
S m
embe
rs-
-50
%
Indi
cato
r dat
a not
colle
cted
. In
prep
arat
ion
for t
he fi
nal
evalu
atio
n it
will
be n
eces
sary
to d
efine
a pr
ecise
que
stion
in
ord
er to
be a
ble t
o m
easu
re th
is in
dica
tor a
nd in
clude
qu
antit
ativ
ely
in th
e foc
us g
roup
s or i
n th
e que
stion
naire
in
orde
r to
anal
yse t
he re
sults
bas
ed o
n th
e kno
wled
ge o
f whe
ther
or
not
the i
ndiv
idua
ls in
que
stion
are C
LS m
embe
rs o
r not
.
Indi
cato
r 2.4
: % of
PN
C co
mm
ittee
s and
CLS
s/CLS
Ps
able
to gi
ve co
ncre
te ex
ampl
es of
colla
bora
tion
--
At l
east
50%
Indi
cato
r dat
a not
qua
ntita
tivel
y co
llect
ed. A
roun
d 70
% o
f the
com
mitt
ee m
embe
rs p
rese
nt in
the f
ocus
gr
oups
men
tione
d ex
ampl
es o
f col
labor
atio
n.
Indi
cato
r 2.5
: Evo
lutio
n of
opi
nion
s on
the
beha
viou
r of t
he F
ARD
C a
nd re
lated
ent
ities
at t
he
com
mun
ity le
vel
-
25
SE
AR
CH
FO
R C
OM
MO
N G
RO
UN
D
|
DR
CO
NG
O
DE
MA
IN E
ST
UN
AU
TR
E J
OU
R -
LO
BI
MO
KO
LO
YA
SIK
A
P
HA
SE
IV
Base
line
Mid
-way
po
int
End
of
proj
ect t
arge
tN
otes
Indi
cato
r 2.
5.1:
% o
f th
e po
pula
tion
who
wou
ld b
e ha
ppy
for a
mem
ber o
f the
ir fa
mily
to m
arry
a m
embe
r of
the F
ARD
C39
,8%
61,5
%+
30%
Targ
et ex
ceed
ed.
Indi
cato
r 2.
5.2:
% o
f th
e po
pula
tion
who
fee
l th
at
rela
tions
betw
een
civili
ans a
nd th
e FAR
DC
are g
ood
or
very
good
45,5
%37
%+
30%
Dec
reas
e – h
owev
er, t
he p
ropo
rtion
of t
he p
opul
atio
n th
at fe
els th
at th
ey ar
e bad
has
falle
n.
Indi
cato
r 2.
5.3:
% o
f th
e po
pula
tion
that
has
pas
sed
thro
ugh
one
or m
ore
arm
y ro
ad b
locks
dur
ing
the
past
year
27,1
%55
,3%
- 40%
Incr
ease
– b
ut at
the m
id-p
oint
this
cove
rs th
e %
of th
e pop
ulat
ion
that
has
"see
n" ro
ad b
lock
s.
Indi
cato
r 2.5
.4: %
of th
e pop
ulat
ion th
at ha
s exp
erien
ced
queu
e-ju
mpi
ng by
sold
iers’ w
ives
in th
e pas
t 12
mon
ths
35,3
%37
,1%
- 40%
Incr
ease
– b
ut at
the m
id-p
oint
this
cove
rs th
e % o
f th
e pop
ulat
ion
that
has
"hea
rd o
f" th
is pr
actic
e.
Indi
cato
r 2.6
: Evo
lutio
n of
opi
nion
s on
the b
ehav
iour
of m
embe
rs o
f the
PN
C an
d th
eir e
ntou
rage
at
the c
omm
unity
leve
l
Indi
cato
r 2.
6.1:
% o
f th
e po
pula
tion
who
wou
ld b
e ha
ppy
for a
mem
ber
of th
eir fa
mily
to
mar
ry a
poli
ce offi
cer51
%64
,1%
+ 30
%A
chie
vem
ent i
n pr
ogre
ss
Indi
cato
r 2.
6.2:
% o
f th
e po
pula
tion
who
fee
l th
at
rela
tions
betw
een
civili
ans
and
the
PNC
are
good
or
very
good
43,7
%36
%+
30%
Dec
reas
e – H
owev
er, t
he p
ropo
rtion
that
fe
els th
at th
ey ar
e bad
has
falle
n.
Indi
cato
r 2.
6.3:
% o
f th
e pa
pula
tion
who
hav
e be
en
robb
ed b
y po
lice o
fficer
s dur
ing
the p
revi
ous 1
2 m
onth
s (m
oney
, goo
ds or
live
stock
)30
%41
%- 3
0%In
crea
se –
but
at th
e mid
-poi
nt th
is co
vers
the %
of
the p
opul
atio
n th
at h
as "h
eard
of"
this
prac
tice.
-
26 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P
H A S E I V
OVERALL OBJECTIVE: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AND ROLE OF SECURITY
FORCESThe overall objective of the project is to strengthen mutual
trust between civilians and the security forces, following upon
improved behaviour on the part of the security forces and greater
powers for communities to hold them accountable.
INCIDENTS OF MISCONDUCT AND PROSECUTION AMONG SECURITY
FORCESWhile several groups are making efforts such as the Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative, Human Rights Watch and UN Justice Human
Right Organization, UNHCR, MONUSCO to systematically document data
on incidents of misconduct and prosecutions, the data continues to
be difficult to attain at a level of geographic disaggregation
relevant to analysis of SFCG’s areas of intervention.
At the time of the baseline, no source could provide this
information for the intervention zones, and so the relative
increases and decreases in these numbers cannot be documented at
this time. The current best option for analysis of impact with this
indicator is for CPAJMs to continue to improve in their
documentation and monitoring of this data. Another option to
support analysis is for groups that collect this data currently to
continue to track and disaggregate data to the territory and
Cheffeire levels so that organizations can connect interventions
and progress.
Another challenge of analysing programming based on this
indicator is that it does not isolate one type of change, but
combines several elements of change that link to SFCG activities in
different ways. Because of this it needs to be analysed carefully
to draw meaningful conclusions. While SFCG’s activities are
designed to impact both the number of incidents reported, they are
less targeted specifically towards the number of prosecutions in
this same timeframe, these changes cannot necessarily happen at the
same pace. For example, the number of incidents of misconduct
reported may decrease as the actual incidents decrease, but may
also increase with improved confidence of civilians in systems for
accountability. Therefore, in order to effectively understand
progress on impunity and examine the credibility, efficacy, and
accountability of security forces, it is necessary to combine
analysis of this indicator with indicators on perception and
qualitative data to support a deeper understanding of the progress
being made through the SFCG approach.
POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGING SECURITY SITUATIONOne of the
progress indicators for this objective is the popular perception of
the security situation in general. It is necessary to emphasise
here that the programme’s specific contribution to these changes is
difficult to measure, and that, conversely, changes in the
situation itself linked to external factors have an impact (whether
positive or negative) on the implementation of the programme.
According to SFCG’s own teams, while the situation in South Kivu
remains relatively calm, the same cannot be said for the whole of
North Kivu. In certain areas, such as Beni, repeated attacks by the
Islamist group ADF NALU and the inability of the FARDC and the PNC
to deal with the threat have significantly affected popular
perceptions regarding the changing security situation. This trend
can also be seen in certain areas of Rutshuru and Massisi, where
pockets of armed fighters continue to operate.
Overall, civilian perceptions of the security situation vary
little by province, with 70% of civilians feeling that their local
security situation has improved. This being the case, it appears
that the situation has remained stable or even improved, given that
this proportion is much higher than that recorded during the
baseline study (41%). This improvement was particularly noteworthy
in South Kivu, where the percentage of positive responses increased
from 33% to 76%.
-
27 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative is currently tracking
civilian perceptions on a range of topics from security to
satisfaction of government services to contribution of
international efforts to improve local quality of life. Regarding
all three provinces (South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri) in 2013 67%
of civilians felt a sense of personal security within their daily
activities while only 44% reported feeing safe to walk alone at
night. In June 52% of civilians reported feeling a sense of
personal security in their daily activities and 75% reported
feeling safe to walk alone at night.6
Figure 2: Perceptions of the changing security situation over
the past six months, by province (n=418)
21% 24% 16%11% 9% 8%
68% 67%76%
In the last six months the security situation has...
Has negatively evolved
Ituri North Kivu South Kivu
Has not evolved Has positively evolved
Regarding the potential for change in the six months following
the survey, local populations are more optimistic than they were at
the time of the baseline survey, but the change is less noteworthy
than in the case of the previous indicator, having increased from
21% positive responses to 44% overall. Nevertheless, this varied
widely by province. Once more, perceptions are more optimistic in
South Kivu.
Figure 3: Perceptions of the potential evolution of the security
situation over the next six months, by province (n=418)
23%16% 11%
25%
48%59%
52%
37%30%
In your opinion, do you believe you will be more secure in the
coming six months?
No Yes Don't know
Ituri North Kivu South Kivu
6 This data and more can be found at the Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative site
http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC_Poll7_FinalEnglish.pdf
-
28 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P
H A S E I V
The demobilisation of some armed groups and the deaths of the
leaders of certain militias, in addition to the policy of
negotiation between the government and the armed groups within the
peace consolidation context have helped to reduce popular
uncertainty regarding the instability of the eastern DRC (in the
three provinces surveyed). However, the 39.5% level of uncertainty
about the future implies that the resilience of local communities
is also fragile. As mentioned above, the future uncertainty
regarding the DRC electoral processes in the next few months, and
the presidential elections creating anxiety across the country.
THE FARDC AND THE PNC: SECURITY ACTORS AND PROTECTORS OF
CIVILIAN POPULATIONSAnother indicator for measuring progress toward
the overall objective is that of civilian perceptions of the FARDC
and the PNC as being agents of security and stabilisation in their
region. Even at the time of the baseline study, 69% of civilians
felt that the FARDC were contributing to security in their
province. Mid-way through the programme, a clear increase can be
seen in this figure, with 81% of people across all provinces
agreeing with this statement as far as the FARDC are concerned, and
81.5% in the case of the PNC.
Figure 4: Perceptions of the contribution of the FARDC and the
PNC to security, by province (n=418)
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
Ituri - FARDC South Kivu - FARDCNord-Kivu - FARDC
77%
18%
4%
89%
8%
3%
75%
18%
7%
Ituri - PNC South Kivu - PNCNorth Kivu - PNC
77%
14%
9%
85%
12%
4%
83%
13%
5%
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
Secure Insecure
Don’t know
-
29 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P
H A S E I V
There was a positive change in the number of civilian
respondents who felt that actions of the FARDC and the PNC were
taken with the aim of protecting them and guaranteeing their
security. At the programme mid-point, 88% felt this way about the
FARDC (67% during the baseline study) and 83.5% about the PNC (72%
during the baseline study). Progress was particularly notable in
Ituri, with an increase in positive responses from 54% to 85%.
According to SFCG teams, it is generally easier to work with the
FARDC due to their stricter and more organised command system, but
also because the SECAS Regional Director was highly cooperative and
involved with the programme. Moreover, the FARDC have better access
to rural and isolated communities than the PNC, whose sub-stations
are often under-equipped and their image is often better thanks to
the protection that they provide against armed groups. The high
level of involvement on the part of the local FARDC and SECAS
commanders helps explain the positive results in Ituri province.
The programme team also emphasised the situation in the Mambassa
area, where a controversial regiment was deployed early on during
programme activities. The behaviour of the regiment has changed
significantly thanks to the programme activities in the area. This
has had a strong positive effect on the perceptions of the local
population in the central Mambassa area regarding the FARDC.
Despite this, as was emphasised in the baseline study, civilian
perceptions of security actors vary with external conditions. Even
the time of day can be a factor in perceptions. During the focus
groups involving girls and young women it was recognised that
military and police behaviour had changed since the beginning of
the programme, but they were still accused of certain crimes and
offenses. Regarding military personnel, participants complained
notably about rapes and child marriages, while as far as the police
were concerned participants emphasised the robberies that they
carried out.
Additionally, while local populations appear to be aware that
the role of the security forces is to assure their safety and
protect them, their trust in them has not increased in the same
positive manner. As seen in the section covering the second
objective, perceptions regarding relationships and trust are less
bad, but still not good: they remain “average”.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF SECURITY FORCES
AND CIVILIANS REGARDING ROLES, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIESThe first
specific objective of the programme is to increase awareness and
knowledge on the part of the Congolese security forces and the
civilian population regarding their respective roles, rights and
responsibilities towards one another. At the beginning of the
programme the training and awareness strategy was reformulated by
the FARDC and the PNC in collaboration with the SFCG implementation
team. The Base Committees (CdB) were given a new momentum via the
participative planning and evaluation approach taken during the
previous phase’s activities. These meetings allowed a set of
activities to be organised in such a way as to orient the
implementation based on the realisation of the project objectives
and the theory of change.
“We appreciate the FARDC as far as security is concerned because
lots of them give their lives to protect the nation’s borders. What
we have against them is that their behaviour towards civilians is
hardly exemplary. They still extort money from civilians and commit
abuses. We’ve noticed changes in the PNC, except for the Beni Rapid
Reaction Force. We get the impression that not all police units
have been trained in the same way. The night patrols commit more
infractions than the daytime ones. Also, the PNC like to take our
mobile phones without explaining why.” (BENI WOMEN’S FOCUS GROUP,
NORTH KIVU).
-
30 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P
H A S E I V
Concerning this objective, the Base Committee creation/
revitalization work and the organisation of the awareness-raising
activities are at an advanced stage, with targets already having
been achieved in some cases, as the table below shows. The media
activities have also had a good overall achievement rate. By way of
contrast, other activities are still in the beginning stages,
making it impossible to link them with the changes in knowledge and
perceptions emphasised in this section.
Table 5: Activities relating to specific objective 1 and their
degree of progress
Activities relating to specific objective 1 % complete as of
31st July 2016
Re-energisation of existing FARDC and PNC committees and setting
up of new committees 118%
Training and strengthening of committee capacity on various
issues 80%
Raising awareness of human rights, military-civilian relations
and SGBV among new recruits 110%
Organisation of awareness sessions by the Base Committees 126%
FARDC 117% PNC
Organisation of seminars for police commanders on the concept of
neighbourhood policing 67%
Educating security forces and civilians on responsible behaviour
via the «Vrai Djo» mass media campaign 0%
7
SMS marketing campaign 0% 8
Distribution of the «Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika» comic strip 0% 9
Production of gender-sensitive «Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika» radio and
TV episodes 77%
Organisation of showings of the film «Weapon of War» 20%
Organisation of showings of the film “Nadkisa”10 0% 11
Co-production of short weekly radio programmes with RTNC in
collaboration with the FARDC and the PNC 61%
Organisation of workshops with the Military Justice Support
Committees (CAJM/CPAJM) 100%
Provision of each CAJM with a library of essential legal texts
for the CAJM 0% 12
Organisation of conferences bringing together CAJMs/CPAJMs and
human rights protection groups 75%
Organisation of fora for the exchange of ideas between police
commanders, SGBV experts and PNC committees 50%
7 The film is currently being completed and will be broadcast
from December 2016.8 In early October 2016 this activity was 100%
complete.9 27,384 had been distributed (around 10%) by the end of
September 2016.10 The title has been changed; originally it was
“Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika”.11 Public showings will begin in December
2016.12 A library was installed in Bunia in late September
-
31 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
COVERAGE OF TRAINING AND AWARENESS ACTIVITIES
Among Civilians
Despite the fact that there have been no trainings/awareness
activities aimed specifically at civilians, it has been noted that
55% of the civilians who answered the question said that they had
attended an SFCG training session. Among these, 62% received the
training one year previously, but others received them two or more
years previously. During the focus group sessions carried out with
girls and young women, among eight groups, five included members
who said that they had participated in awareness or reconciliation
activities covering legal texts and regulations affecting citizens.
Moreover, 37% of civilians said that they had benefitted from the
training programme on the roles and responsibilities of civilian
populations (40% for men and 34% for women). These programmes were
designed for the security forces so it is not unexpected that
civilian participation was low13. In addition to this, 51% of
civilians said that they had attended a mobile film showing on the
subject of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).
A large majority of the civilian respondents who had
participated in the activities felt that the modules were close to
lived experience (86%), thus demonstrating the relevance of the
awareness activities to the context and the conflict dynamic.
Participants said that the descriptions in the awareness activities
corresponded to their own daily lives. However, one group of women
underlined difficulties regarding the choice of language used,
saying that they did not understand Lingala and would have
preferred materials in Swahili and French.
Among Security Forces
76% of military personnel and 74% of police14 said that they had
already undergone human rights training, compared to only 52% of
military personnel and 54% of police during the baseline study.
For 44% of military personnel and 43% of police, this took place
less than one year previously. For 17% of military personnel and
27% of police it took place two years previously. SFCG provided the
training for 52% of the military personnel and 27% of the police
who had been trained. SFCG was the principal training provider for
the FARDC, but in second place when it came to training the PNC,
behind MONUSCO (37%) and ahead of ICRC (5%). Among the PNC,
lower-ranking officers showed lower participation rates
(constables) at 69%, whereas three quarters of high-ranking
officers have undergone training and notably 90% of commissioners.
This effect was less visible among the FARDC, where 74% of enlisted
members had received training, with similar proportions among
officers (and 100% of captain-majors and commanders).
13 In principal these awareness events are held during military
and police parades with no civilian participation. However, in some
areas and circumstances, civilians have been invited to participate
in parades, particularly when the commander or the local
authorities have an important message to pass on. Moreover, given
that these awareness events are often organised outdoors, they
attract curious civilians to participate in the debates.
14 Within the PNC only 21 women answered the question, of whom
13 said that they had recieved human rights training.
Figure 5: Table of military and police personnel that have
participated in a training on human rights, divided by province
71%80%
70%80%
87%
62%
PNC FARDC
Nord-Kivu IturiSud-KivuNorth Kivu South Kivu Ituri
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32 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O
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H A S E I V
Regarding the relevance of the activity, according to the
participants in the training, 86% of the military personnel and 85%
of police officers felt, as did civilians, that the module was
close to lived experience: “The module fits with what we encounter
on the ground; we understand human rights in the field” (police
officer replying to the survey). Those who disagreed did not
explain why.
In addition to this, 80% of military personnel and 71% of police
officers said that they had participated in Base Committees’
awareness activities, though certain groups appear to have been
excluded. Moreover, half of the FARDC Base Committees (CdB) have
organised seminars for officers. The majority of military personnel
who had not participated said that they did not have time to go,
whereas police officers said that they had either not been given
the information or had not been invited. Some said that their
superior officers had gone, that they were stationed in isolated
areas, or that certain groups were not concerned by the activities;
for example, the border police, neighbourhood policing teams and
communications staff. Nevertheless, according to the programme
team, awareness activities were not invitation-only and the units
mentioned were not excluded. This