Michalis Hadjipantelis-Dissertation (PP5500)

BRUNEL UNIVERSITY Department of Politics, History and Law

PP5500: Dissertation

The Arab-Israeli 1973 ‘’Yom Kippur War’’: A political analysis of the origins and an intelligence and

military assessment of the course of the War.

Name: Michalis Hadjipantelis Student ID: 1437717

Academic year: 2015-2016

Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Matthew Hughes

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of MA/MSc of Brunel University – 2015. This dissertation

is entirely my own work and all material from other sources, published or unpublished, has been duly acknowledged and cited

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Abstract

The ‘’Yom Kippur War’’ is the last official Arab-Israeli war in history. On October 6th 1973, Syria

and Egypt launched an attack against Israeli Defense Forces where they found them unbalanced and

surprised. This happened on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur. The Arab efforts

initially were successful due to the Israeli surprise and the good execution of their plans. However,

during the course of the war the Israelis regrouped and in combination of various factors they

managed to reverse the Arab success and to finally win the war. The aim of this dissertation is to

examine, through an analysis, the major factors that led the Arabs to wage war against Israel, the

factors that led the Israelis be surprised, the factors that led to the Arab’s initial success as well as

the factors that enabled the Israelis to seize the battle back. The Yom Kippur War can be set an

example for military and political decision makers because includes a plethora of military and

political intrigues.

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Acknowledgements

This paper was made possible by the support and encouragement of many people. I would like to

thank my supervisor Professor Matthew Hughes whose advice and support was of utmost

importance in the design and implementation of this paper. His assistance during the research

process enabled me to find my field research and maintain it. I am extremely grateful for his

generosity and patience.

I would like also to thank Dr. Kristian Gustafson for his support on completing the

submission process of the dissertation, and all the faculty members of the Department of Politics,

History and Law at Brunel University for their continued help to complete the dissertation and on

their continued provision of all the necessary facilities.

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Table of Contents

1.0INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................51.1LITERATUREREVIEW..............................................................................................................................................................7

2.0WHYWARWASINEVITABLE?......................................................................................................................112.1DIFFERENCESINMOODSANDDIFFERENCESINAPPROACHESTOSETTLECONFLICT................................................112.2ANWARALSADATTAKESOVEREGYPTIANPRESIDENCY.SADATFLIRTSWITHTHEWEST.SUPERPOWERS’POSITIONONTHEARABISRAELICONFLICT............................................................................................................................132.3DIPLOMATICEFFORTSTORESOLVETHEARAB-ISRAELICONFLICTDURINGSADAT’SPRESIDENCY.....................14

3.0WHYANDHOWWERETHEISRAELISSURPRISED?..............................................................................173.1OUTDATEDNATIONALSECURITYCONCEPT.....................................................................................................................183.1.1ConfidenceinIsrael’smilitarycapabilities.EnsuingbeliefinNo-AttackFirstbyArabStates....183.1.2ConfidenceinIsrael’sStrategicDepthofTerrain............................................................................................20

3.3RESISTANTTOCHANGINGTHENATIONALSECURITYCONCEPT...................................................................................213.4THERIGIDITYOFTHENATIONALSECURITYCONCEPT–THECONCEPTWASSYNONYMOUSTOAUNIVERSALRULE................................................................................................................................................................................................233.5THENATIONALSECURITYSCHEMAWASINCOMPLETE..................................................................................................253.5.1ArabConcept....................................................................................................................................................................263.5.2ArabaugmentedmilitarycapabilityandtheArabefforttoconcealit..................................................27

4.0WHYANDHOWWERETHEARABSINITIALLYSUCCESSFUL?...........................................................294.1WARPREPARATIONS.EFFORTSTOCREATEADVANTAGESOVERTHEISRAELIS.......................................................294.2MISTAKESTHATWEREEXPLOITEDBYTHEARABSDUETOTHEISRAELISURPRISE.................................................314.2.1THESTRATEGICADVANTAGEANDITSEXPLOITATIONBYARABSONBOTHFRONTS.............................................324.2.2Southernfront.................................................................................................................................................................334.2.3Northernfront.................................................................................................................................................................34

4.3THETACTICALADVANTAGEANDITSEXPLOITATIONBYARABS...................................................................................354.3.1Southernfront.................................................................................................................................................................354.3.2NorthernFront................................................................................................................................................................39

5.0WHYANDHOWTHEISRAELISSEIZEDTHEBATTLEBACK?.............................................................415.1STRATEGICADVANTAGESEXPLOITEDBYISRAELIS..........................................................................................................415.1.1NorthernFront................................................................................................................................................................415.1.2Southernfront.................................................................................................................................................................43

5.2TACTICALADVANTAGESEXPLOITEDBYISRAELIS............................................................................................................445.2.1NorthernFront................................................................................................................................................................445.2.2SouthernFront................................................................................................................................................................46

5.3MISTAKESTHATWEREEXPLOITEDBYISRAELISDUETOTHEEGYPTIANDECISIONSANDACTIONS......................476.0CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................................507.0BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................................53

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1.0Introduction

The topic of this dissertation will focus on the assessment of intelligence and military aspects of the

Yom Kippur War along with the identification of the political reasons that led to the war. The Yom

Kippur War was the most recent ‘’official’’ war in the history of the Middle East but it became well

known because it broke out on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) in 1973, which is the holiest

day in the Jewish calendar. The Yom Kippur War also named October War started with a surprise

Arab attack on Israel on Saturday 6th, October 1973. Egyptian and Syrian military forces exploited

the situation by attacking Israel because they knew that the Israeli army and people would

participate in the religious celebrations linked with Yom Kippur. It is significant to study this

conflict because it provides useful insights into key aspects of military history such as the causes of

the war, the military doctrine differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, the strategies and

tactics used by both sides, and how these changed during the conflict, as well as the role of the

international community prior and during the war.

The main structure of the dissertation will consist of four chapters, each analyzing different

political, military or intelligence aspects of the Yom Kippur War. In the first chapter the ‘Why war

was inevitable’’, will be discussed extending back to the late 60s providing useful information in

understanding the circumstances and the events that led to the war. The second chapter examines

the reasons that enabled Arabs to surprise Israel. In the third chapter, the main reasons that led the

Arabs' to the initial success are examined. The fourth and last chapter presents the reaction of the

Israelis against the Arabs and the reasons that led them to the victory. In the conclusion, insights,

which will be derived from the analysis, will be discussed. The four chapters will address the

following questions:

a) Why was war inevitable? The war was inevitable due to the Israeli unwillingness to agree

a political solution with the other Arab states, the political and economical pressure that derived

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from the internal political sector of Egypt and Syria as well as the failure of the international

community and especially the superpowers (Soviet Union and USA) to bring peace in the Middle

East.

b) Why and how were the Israelis surprised? The answer to the question ‘’why and how

Israelis were surprised’’ will highlight the main important errors made on behalf of the Israelis. The

Israelis, by creating an overconfident view of themselves, miscalculated the Arab’s capabilities.

This overconfident view led them to a number of mistakes, which enabled the Arabs to surprise

them.

c) Why and how were the Arab’s initially successful? The Arab success was a result of

coordination between the military forces of Egypt and Syria. The factors that contributed to the

Arab success will be examined.

d) Why and how did the Israelis seize the battle back? An assessment of the Israeli military

efforts, to gain the control over the war situation and overturn the outcome in their favor, will be

examined.

Through the analysis of the military and intelligence assessment, the dissertation will

attempt to provide an insight on the following: self-perception of rivals in terms of military

strength, strategic and tactical ways of handling crisis situations and ways reverse the outcome in a

crisis, for instance war. Through the analysis of the political aspects of the origins of the war, the

dissertation aims to claim that war can be used as a tool to provide political gains and get nations

out of impasses.

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1.1Literaturereview

Having dealt with the key research questions of the thesis, it is now useful to turn to the

existing literature to see what sources this dissertation will use and where it might be able to fill any

gaps. In the current available historiography, priority is given mainly to the presentation of the war

events and the blaming game in each side. In fact the blame game was useful, because by studying

the various views of the other authors enables the researcher to form an integrated view. The target

of this dissertation is not to compare the various views of the other historiographers. This

dissertation uses many of these contradictory views as a tool, in order to answer the above questions

properly and with evidence.

At the political aspect on the cause of the war, it is generally observed that political

responsible, was the Israeli leadership and especially Golda Meir. Chaim Herzog agrees with

Borchgrave’s opinion that Golda Meir lost her last chance for peace when she rejected Moshe

Dayan’s suggested solution early in 1971 1 . Ahron Bregman in turn, denigrates Meir for

intransigence and lack of flexibility and demonstrates that Meir failed to materialize the previous

military successes into peace2. Golda Meir refused the charges and blamed for the diplomatic

failure Egypt, for refusing to reach a peace agreement with Israel3. All the above views depict the

political blame game by various parties.

There are several authors who have written on the subject of the intelligence failure and the

strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War. Nadav Safran states that the intelligence failure was the

result of consisted structural, conceptual and attitudinal flaws on behalf of the Israelis that allowed

1 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.18 2 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.104. 3 Meir, Golda. ‘’My life.’’ GP Putnam's Sons, (1975), pp.289-290

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the Arabs to gain strategic surprise.4. Uri Bar Joseph in turn credits AMAN director Eli Zeira for the

intelligence failure because he ignored the clear signals that the war was imminent after receiving

important warnings from CIA, King Hussein of Jordan and by the Soviet evacuation that monitored

by AMAN just before the War broke out 5. Golda Meir and Bren Adan also blame the intelligence

services for the failure to predict the Arab surprise. In her memoirs ‘’My Life’’, Meir wrote ‘‘our

intelligence people thought that it was most unlikely that the war would break out, but nonetheless

we decided to treat the matter seriously’’6. Bren Adan ‘’On the Banks of the Suez’’ states ‘’My

colleagues and I were certainly surprised…For the past ten days, the Director of Military

Intelligence had struck to this evaluation, offering reasonable explanations about the buildup of

forces’’7.

The Arab success was also the focus of the discussions. According to Meir ‘’the fate of

small countries always rests with the superpowers, and they always have their own interests to

guard’’8. Thus Golda Meir blames United States for not providing the adequate guard at least at the

first stages of the war. Henry Kissinger in turn criticized Golda Meir for taking the initiative not to

launch a pre-emptive strike instead of asking the approval of such attack by the United States when

they realized the morning of 6th October that the war was imminent, and he believes that if the

Israelis launched a preemptive attack, the Arab success could not exist9. Edgar O’ Balance in ‘’No

Victor, No Vanquished’’, highlights the Israeli low state of preparedness which was the result of the

mood of triumphalism and blames the Israeli unpreparedness for being the cause of the Arab

4 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977): 167. 5 Uri Bar-Joseph, “Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure,” in P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the October War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p.11–35.

6 Meir, Golda. ‘’My life.’’ GP Putnam's Sons, (1975), p.357 7 Adan, Avraham. "On the Banks of the Suez." Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers (1980), p.3 8 ibid, p.369 9 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, (2011), p.477

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success. He wrote ‘’ Lulled into a sense of superiority, the Israelis had not thought it conceivable

the Arabs would be capable of mounting an offensive against them’’ 10.

The Arab mistakes that led the Israelis to establish their victory was the focus of discussions

between the Egyptian command. El Shazli in ‘’The Crossing of the Suez’’ one of the few translated

in English memoirs of Arab Generals of the Yom Kippur War, emphasizes in the political rivalries

within the Egyptian administration and how this affected to the policy making of the political

leadership of Egypt. In the specific book, Shazli denigrates President Sadat for his decision to

launch an attack on the Sinai Passes on the 14th of October11. He also sets him responsible for the

destruction of the Egyptian Army due to his orders, which left the Egyptian 3rd Army

unprotected12. On the contrary, General El-Gamasy adopts a more faithful approach to his superior.

In his memoirs ‘’The October War’’, El-Gamasy justifies the offensive of 14th of October as part of

the official plan despite the destruction inflicted to the Egyptian forces. The only criticisms against

Egypt’s command decisions were firstly the fact that the Egyptian forces should not halt after the

successful crossing of the canal and keep advancing until reaching the Sinai passes, and secondly,

the State of the Egyptian 3rd Army was not as bad as reported and the 3rd Army should keep

fighting 13. In his turn, Anwar al-Sadat considers in his biography that the main reason of the Israeli

later success was due to the United States assistance by satellites and the resupplies of war logistics.

He believes that if the United States did not provide information by all the available means, the

Israelis would not launch a counterattack to save the dismal situation of their forces in the Sinai14.

There is a limited availability in English literature regarding the Yom Kippur War. Apart from the

biographies of distinguished politicians and military generals that were involved in the war, the

majority of the authors regarding the Yom Kippur War used information from Hebrew and Arabic

sources. It should be mentioned that only few resources were translated from Arabic to English, 10 O'ballance, Edgar. No victor, no vanquished. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978,p.162 11 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, pp. 250-251 12 ibid, p.281 13 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī, The October War (American University in Cairo Press 1993, p. 219 14 Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p.259

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thus limiting our research regarding the Arab perspective of the war.

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2.0Whywarwasinevitable?

This chapter will look at the political failures that led to the Yom Kippur War and argue that the

political unwillingness, mainly on behalf of the Israelis, as well as the political pressure exercised

on President Sadat by the Egyptian public were the main factors that forced Egypt and Syria to

wage war against Israel. The chapter looks to establish that Sadat, in a bid for finding a solution to

the Arab-Israeli conflict flirted with the West, but the West failed to take the initiative. Finally, this

chapter would like to establish that Sadat tried to find a diplomatic solution but his efforts were to

no avail. The chapter will be discussed in the following order: Firstly, the differences in moods and

approaches to settle conflict between Israelis and Arabs will be examined. Secondly, the failure of

Sadat’s flirt with the West and the West’s failure to take the advantage of the situation at hand.

Thirdly, the failure of the diplomatic efforts to accomplish peace in the Middle East will be

examined.

2.1Differencesinmoodsanddifferencesinapproachestosettleconflict

The aftermath of the Six Day War found Israel in the euphoria of victory. The Israelis were

confident in both their acquisition of territories and in their armed forces. On the former, Israel had

captured about half of the Golan Heights from the Syrians and both the entire Sinai Peninsula and

the entire West Bank from the Egyptians and Jordanians respectively. The advantages offered by

the gained territories provided an effective defense against future Arab aggression and provided

strategic depth of terrain that ensured Israel’s security. On the latter, the Israelis had, once again,

won a major war relying totally on both the effectiveness and efficiency of their armed forces. Most

importantly, the Israelis demonstrated that they had the political will and the implementation means

to initiate strategic strikes that could ultimately alter the balances in the region15. The press

celebrated and praised the performance of the military. The world’s interest in Israel grew and the

15 Brams, Steven J. & Jeffrey M. Togman. Camp David: Was the agreement fair?, 1998,p.243

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country’s economy, being in a dismal shape before the war, flourished as a result of the arrival of

both tourists and donations and the commercial exploitation of oil wells in the Sinai 16.

By contrast, the aftermath of the Six Day War found Egypt and the Arabs in the misery of

defeat. Arab pride was tremendously wounded and confidence in the armed forces was very low. In

fact, at least in the case of Egypt, it seemed that the great shame, brought over by the Six-day War,

was felt by large number of people and groups. People felt that the only way to shake off the shame

was to wage war 17.

However, the pressure was not only political but also financial, as the situation was draining

the economy of Egypt badly18. The 1967 defeat resulted in a loss of revenue for Egypt that was

previously generated by the oil producing facilities in the Sinai Peninsula and from the fees charged

to the shipping industry for using the Suez Canal. It was also a time of increased military

expenditure as Egypt tried to rebuild its armed forces by making up weapons and enhancing its

defense capability, which was seriously exposed to both the Israeli Defense Forces and Air Force19.

Unlike the other Arab petro-states, Egypt’s economy was based heavily on the incomes from the

Suez Canal. The closure of the Canal led Egypt in an economic dire straight in a time of military

expenditure.

Both Prime Minister Levi Eskhol of Israel and his successor, Golda Meir, were

unmistakably hawkish regarding the occupied territories. Both maintained the same principles: ‘’no

return to the old international borders, and no withdrawal without direct negotiations with the Arabs

16 Oren, Michael B. Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East. Presidio Press, 2003, p.309 17 Parker, Richard Bordeaux. The October War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida, 2001, p.101. 18 Al-Sayyid, M. K., & Countries, D. (2003). Politics and Economic Growth in Egypt (1950–2000). Cairo University, Cairo, p.11 19 ibid

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and a peace treaty’’20. By contrast, the Arab nations, including Egypt, Syria and Jordan, stated

during the 1967 Khartoum Summit, that there would be “no peace, no recognition and no

negotiation with Israel”. Effectively, the Arabs were rejecting any peaceful solution with Israel. 21

2.2AnwarAlSadattakesoverEgyptianpresidency.SadatflirtswiththeWest.Superpowers’PositionontheArabIsraeliConflict

On 28 September 1970, President Nasser died and President Anwar Al Sadat came to power.

President Sadat stated that his primary objective was to recover all Arab territory lost to Israel in

1967 and to achieve a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 22. With reference to foreign

policy, President Sadat’s strategy was very different than the one followed by his predecessor,

President Nasser. The long-term objective in Sadat’s foreign policy was the transition from the

Eastern sphere of influence to the Western23. Following the 1967 defeat, Nasser was relying on the

Soviets to represent the Egyptian interests in Washington. On the contrary, Sadat mistrusted the

Kremlin and wanted to draw Egypt closer to the United States. According to George Gawrych,

Sadat sought to develop a meaningful dialogue with the United States, by using backdoor channels.

Sadat realized that the Soviet Union would not want to involve themselves in a new conflict

between the Arabs and the Israelis so as not to put themselves in a hostile situation with the USA.

In July of 1972 Sadat expelled the Soviets from Egypt on the grounds that they were leaking

information on the Egyptian plans to cross the Suez Canal. However, Washington failed to take

advantage of the situation. In the order of priorities amongst the United States foreign policy,

Middle East lacked behind the Vietnam War24. Thus the United States primary focus was on how to

20 Siniver, Asaf. The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford University Press, USA, 2013, p.31 21 ibid.p33 22 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, introduction. 23 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.205. 24 Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory, 1996, p.10

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find a solution with the Soviets and the communist China in order to end the Vietnam War. As a

result, Sadat was forced to return to the Soviets, and the Soviet assistance resumed again in greater

quantities and quality than before25. Sadat managed to convince the Soviet Union for more

assistance by sending a letter to Brezhnev describing the demands of Egypt in exchange for

allowing the Soviet presence in the country. Sadat’s justification of the expulsion was that the

Soviet Union enjoyed a privileged position in Egypt. The Soviet Union’s position was comparable

with the position the British High Commissioner enjoyed during the days of the British occupation.

However, unlike the British, the Soviets made nothing to contribute to Egypt’s plans. Furthermore,

Sadat wanted to put Soviet Union in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less26.

2.3DiplomaticEffortstoResolvetheArab-IsraeliConflictduringSadat’sPresidency

At a diplomatic level, Israeli Minister of Defense General Dayan suggested an interim

solution to the conflict between Israel and Egypt. According to Dayan’s suggestions, Israel would

withdraw a short distance from the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula, in order to enable the

Egyptians to reopen and operate the Canal. In return, the Israelis required demilitarization on the

East Bank of the Canal as this could serve as a buffer zone between the Israeli and the Egyptian

armies27. However, Golda Meir rejected the plan. On the Egyptian side, in February 1971, President

Sadat announced his proposal for a partial settlement with Israel in an interview to Arnaud de

Borchgrave, an editor of Newsweek 28. The partial settlement suggested by Sadat was similar to

Dayan’s. Nonetheless, the two plans diverged on two issues. On the one hand, on the degree of

Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and on the other hand on the nature of the Egyptian security forces

that would be allowed to cross the east bank. In light of these declarations, Sadat added that if the

25 ibid 26 Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p.231 27 Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: story of my life. Da Capo Press, 1992, p.63. 28 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.67.

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settlements were acceptable by Israel, he would be ready to recognize Israel and to live in peace

with them. Despite the efforts, the two parts never found the formula to solve their disputes.

In February 1971, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations representative, appointed to

implement Resolution 242 in accordance with the suggestions of both sides. Nevertheless, he

produced a proposal of his own which was very close to the Egyptian demands, thus the Israelis

rejected it29. During the following months the negotiations for a partial settlement continued but no

progress was made.

The last attempt for a political solution by Sadat was when he sent Hafiz Ismail in a meeting

with Kissinger in Paris February 1973, but the meeting failed to produce any result. Kissinger

informed Ismail that the United States regrettably could do nothing as Egypt was the defeated party

and Israel maintained her superiority30. The failure of the last attempt for a peaceful solution in the

Middle East placed not only a political but also an economical pressure on Egypt to wage war. In

the following section will describe the political failures of the years which ultimately led put

political and economical pressure on Egypt to seek a military solution to the problem.

Despite Sadat’s willingness to explore a political solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict -

Sadat even agreed to try U.S Secretary of State Rogers’ plan drafted in December 1969 during the

War of Attrition - his efforts were not successful. His failure was a result of a) The Israeli

unwillingness to settle with Egypt. As past wars had shown, Israel could take what it wanted from

Egypt by exercising the military option, b) The United States ignorance to be involved with what

the Americans perceived as a Soviet puppet state. The US did not want to mix with the Soviets over

a “war of influence” over Egypt, c) The Soviet perception of Egypt as a “client state”. The Soviets

29 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.19 30 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.205.

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believed that all client states policies should be influenced by Soviet military power and Soviet

economic aid. Sadat realized that the war was the only solution to change that situation31.

As it had been shown on the above chapter, the war was inevitable. After the diplomatic

deadlock, Sadat realized that a limited military victory over Israel would be the only solution to

force the Israelis to negotiate peace. The political and economical pressure and the need for peace

left him with no other choice but to go to war. From the past defeats from the Israelis, the Arabs, in

order to ensure victory over the Israelis, they decided to use the element of strategic surprise. The

element of surprise will be analyzed in the chapter that follows.

31 Edgar O’Balance, No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p.4

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3.0WhyandhowweretheIsraelissurprised?

This chapter will look at the intelligence failures and argue that the most important reason that

led the Arabs to surprise Israel was the failure of the Israeli intelligence to collect and interpret

information and signals respectively and therefore predict on time that the war was imminent. The

analysis will try to establish that the failure was a result of an outdated, resistant to change, very

rigid and incomplete national security concept.

Each country has specific ways of looking at its national security issues. Drawing a parallel

from social psychology, each nation possesses “schemas”, mental models, used every day to

navigate through complex national security situations. ‘’ A schema is a cognitive structure that

represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus. A schema contains both

the attributes of the concept and the relationship among the attributes’’.32 Schemas are helpful

because they enable people, and by extension nations, to function in a cognitively efficient way. As

certain kinds of situations or data become familiar, it is easier to rely on a tried and true model of

how to react than to rethink the situation anew. For instance, someone who drives in a highly

congested route to work every day may always drive the same route, because he is feeling more

comfortable driving the same way. It does not mean that is the easiest or the shortest way to his

work but overall it may reduce stress to have this taken-for-granted strategy to go to his work.

Schemas give us an approach to repeated situations and free up our minds for other more complex

and highly varying activities.

The chapter will be discussed in the following order: Firstly, the analysis will focus on the

failure of the Israelis to update their concept accordingly due to a series of miscalculations.

Secondly, the reasons that made concept was resistant to change will be examined. Thirdly, why the 32 Crocker, Jennifer, Susan T. Fiske, and Shelley E. Taylor. "Schematic bases of belief change." Attitudinal judgment. Springer New York, 1984. pp.184-186

18

concept proved very rigid will be discussed. Lastly, my analysis will try to establish why the Israeli

military concept was incomplete.

3.1OutdatedNationalSecurityConcept

As it is often the case with concepts and schemas, they are usually derived from

experiences.33 This was the case with Israel’s National Security Concept. Israel’s National Security

Concept was derived from the experiences that the state of Israel had during its previous

interactions with the surrounding Arab States. And is in the case of any other schema, the Israeli

National Security Concept may have initially seemed efficient but it soon became outdated. Israel

seemed to have settled in the confidence of her superior military capabilities and in the confidence

in her strategic depth of terrain that she enjoyed.

3.1.1ConfidenceinIsrael’smilitarycapabilities.EnsuingbeliefinNo-AttackFirstbyArabStates

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the military concepts of the Israelis concentrated on

preparing for the next war as if it were to be the seventh day had the Six-Day War been extended.

The prevailing military dogma conducted by the Israelis to deter wars was based on the perceived

qualitative superiority of its armed forces.34 In case of a new war, the Israeli defense forces ought to

repeat their performance of 1967, which was based on pre-emptive strikes, destroying the enemy air

and letting the Israeli air force attack the enemy land forces with close-air-support missions. Thus,

in carrying out its military strategy, the Israeli forces greatly emphasized planes and armor. The

Israeli Intelligence Services estimated that if the Arabs did not commit to a notable air power

capable of intercepting the Israeli Air Force, the Arabs would not dare to launch an offensive

33 Ancona, Deborah, et al. Managing for the future: organizational behavior & processes. South-Western College, 1996. 34 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.4

19

against Israeli positions on the East Bank of the Suez Canal.35 On any potential ground offensive by

Egypt, the Israelis saw the Israeli presence and the development of the Bar-Lev line along the

Eastern Bank of the Suez Canal, as sufficient deterrence against Arab miscalculations. 36

Prior to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israelis had no reasons to negotiate with the

Arabs to establish peace in Middle East, because whatever they wanted they knew they could earn

by launching another attack, like what happened in the past. Due to their own superiority in terms of

military power, the Israelis presumed that what was good for them was also good for their Arab

enemies. The dominant player always sets the strategy. So if the Israeli strategy was favoring the

maintenance of peace, paradoxically meant that the Arabs had no reasons to worry about the Israeli

intentions. According to Handel ‘’ if the enemy thinks we underrate his strength and thus develop

aggressive intention against him, he might choose to take pre-emptive action, thus surprising us

before we surprising him’’37. This view demonstrates the way that the Israelis were evaluating the

Arab intentions.

The Israeli government was consistently calmed by the estimates of its intelligence services,

which repeatedly assured the political leadership and government that the chances of the Arab

countries initiating a war with Israel were low. The belief was based on the underlying assumption

that the Arabs would never wage a war that they could not win. Thus the state was unable to pre-

empt a non-existing threat, let alone seek to convince the United States to guarantee its security 38.

35 Shaleṿ, Aryeh. Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction. Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.34 36 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, p.114 37 Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the inevitability of surprise." International Studies Quarterly 21.3 (1977), p.478. 38 Meir, Golda. My life. GP Putnam's Sons, 1975, p.354.

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3.1.2ConfidenceinIsrael’sStrategicDepthofTerrain

Israel gained a lot of advantages in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Prior to 1967 Israel

was living in a precarious military situation because it lacked strategic depth in terrain. The natural

borders of Israel meant danger. Over the years, the Syrian troops on the Golan Heights looked down

on the Israeli villages in the Jordan Valley and harassed them with fire. In divided Jerusalem, on

many occasions Jordanian forces opened fire in the middle of the city and killed civilians.

Furthermore, an advance by Jordanian troops of less than a kilometer from areas along the main

road would have cut the main artery to the capital Tel Aviv. The Gaza Strip was under Egyptian

occupation and was like a dagger poised against main centers of the population in southern Israel

and along the coastline. Israel was surrounded by enemies and the General Staff of Israel

concluded that whenever there was a confrontation with its Arab neighbors Israel ought to take the

initiative because if the Arabs were permitted to take the initiative the attack could cut the country

in two and this meant disaster. This happened in 1967, when it became evident that the war was

approaching, the Israeli forces launched a pre-emptive strike against their Arab enemies. The lack

of strategic options had left the Israeli forces with no alternative but to take initiative on 5 June

1967 39.

The territories taken by Israel in the Six Day War extended its border four times, and for the

first time in its history afforded a strategic option. Egyptian forces control over the Israeli

population were now removed, and a desert barrier approximately 250 kilometers now separated

Israel from the Suez Canal. Also the Suez Canal was in itself a natural barrier, where the Egyptians

had to deploy special equipment to cross it and to attack Israeli cities they had to rush a long

distance across the Sinai desert. The cities that would suffer by hostilities in case of a new conflict

would no longer be Israeli, but the Egyptians along the Suez Canal. A similar concessional situation

was obtained in the Jordan and Syrian fronts. The city of Jerusalem was no longer within the range

39 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.53.

21

of the Jordanian artillery, and unrestrained of Jordanian troops. The distance needed to be covered

by the Israeli forces to prevent the Jordanian troops from cutting the country in two was only 10

miles, whilst the counter-attacking Jordanian Army had to cross the Jordan River (natural obstacle)

and then fight its way across the Judean desert. In the Judean Desert the Israeli forces enjoyed

advantages with the mountainous terrain, which could easily be defended for a distance

approximately 70 kilometers. On the Syrian front, although the Israeli line did not extend a lot, the

Israeli forces chased the Syrian Army from Golan Heights and made life easier for the Israeli

villages in Northern Galilee.40 Counting all these terrain advantages, the Israelis assumed that the

possibility of a strategic surprise on behalf of the Arabs was negligible. The time needed to cover

the distance of the conquered territories, was long enough to give the opportunity to the Israeli

reserves to prevent and repel a possible Arab attack.

3.3ResistanttochangingtheNationalSecurityConcept

Resistance to change usually does not come from a failure to come up with the right

blueprint for future practices. It often comes from people’s reluctance to give up their comfortable,

and often safe, old approaches.

Israel’s AMAN (Military Intelligence Service), was entrenched in the concept that Israel

would never be attacked without the Arabs prior securing that they would actually be in a position

to win the war and was therefore unwilling to assess and read any information that suggested a

different approach. On many occasions, advance warnings went unheeded and some lower echelons

of AMAN who suggested different interpretation to the concept, were either silenced or sidelined.

40 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), pp.4-5.

22

Thus a lot of information was not analyzed or was analyzed but not understood. Generally, any

information that did not fit with the concept was featured as irrelevant or unimportant41.

Furthermore, an Egyptian double agent Arshraf Marwan spread confusion within the

echelons of the Israeli intelligence services. In April 1973 Arshraf Marwan warned Mossad that

Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack against Israel on 15th of May. The particular military

deployment was monitored by the Israeli intelligence service and caused a partial military

mobilization by Israel whose cost was about 11 million dollars42. Since then, the Israeli government

wanted to avoid any similar situation of wasting such amounts of state finances in false alerts. The

false deployments and the ensuing, natural dislike by the government affected Mossad’s evaluations

and changed the lens of evaluating the reports in favor of minimizing the alerts. Arshraf Marwan,

assured Mossad that Egypt would not attack Israel unless they obtained advanced fighter-bombers

and Scuds. However, when President Sadat changed his policy and rejected buying fighter-bombers

Marwan, did not inform Israel about Sadat’s new intentions. Therefore Mossad did not change their

view about their projections that Egypt would attack only if advanced fighter-bombers were

obtained in advance.43

From that point onwards, reports were strictly aligned to the framework of the ‘’Concept’’.

In some cases, when employees of Mossad had an opposing opinion with the doctrine they were

sent off. Thus, the employees fearing to see the events as they were, they were reporting to the

leadership reports about what they wanted to read, not the seriousness of the situation44. Therefore,

the Israeli intelligence services, after the April incident exhibited a “groupthink phenomenon”. A

41 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.4 42 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.29 43 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, pp.73-74 44 Handel, M. (1977). The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise. International Studies Quarterly, 21(3), p.494

23

groupthink phenomenon occurs when members fail to disagree, to bring fears and doubts or to bring

up information that contradicts consensus decision-making.

3.4TheRigidityoftheNationalSecurityConcept–TheConceptwassynonymoustoaUniversalRule

Concepts encourage us to react to types of situations in certain ways. Because it is difficult

to collect additional, thorough data at each situation, the rules embodied in our mental models save

time. And for Israel, the universal rule that was that the “Arabs would not attack if they do not

possess a high probability of success. And they would only have a high probability of success if

they have a competitive air force”.

The rigidity and universality of this rule was showcased in 1972. Despite Israel having no

concrete information about Sadat’s objectives, some information was gained from a change in the

position of the Egyptian government. The change concluded that in its fight against Israel, Egypt

would fight with the current available military means. AMAN focused on decrypting the Egyptian

war plan, and thus in April 1972 a 40-page detailed report revealed the estimates of the war plans of

Egypt. Maps were drafted showing the numbers and formations of a possible concentration of the

Egyptian Army along the Suez Canal. However, within this report the Israeli intelligence services

demonstrated that, militarily, the necessary condition was that Egypt would not initiate a war

against Israel unless it received advanced fighter squadrons enabling Egypt to attack the Israeli

hinterland and unless it received surface-to-surface missiles which could be used for deterring Israel

from attacking strategic targets. As for Syria, it was wider known that she was unable to launch a

war against Israel alone, and the only way to attack Israel was only in contribution with other Arab

24

countries especially Egypt. This meant that, according to the Israeli estimates, Egypt would not be

in a position to achieve air superiority before 1975 and Syria would not fight Israel alone45.

There were numerous other incidences that the rigidity of the universal rule did not allow

the Israelis to make the right projections and therefore draw the right conclusion. AMAN became

almost dogmatic and all this information was marked as irrelevant as the universal rule took

precedence above everything else. More specifically: a) In total, 50 aircraft from Libya and Iraq

reinforced the Egyptians in 197346. Nonetheless, DMI Zeira, the head of Israeli Intelligence did not

consider that these reinforcements changed the balance of military capabilities between Egypt and

Israel.47 b) The establishment of the Scud brigade by the Egyptians. AMAN disregarded this threat

under the guise of the Soviet commanding officers.48 c) The first concrete information Israel

received about the coming war came from Human Intelligence (Humint). President al-Sadat and

President Assad agreed to launch a two-front war against Israel before the end of 1973. The Syrian

president was forced to make this decision when Soviet advisers promised him that the Syrian

Army would occupy the Golan Heights in three days. Again, no verbal or written estimate of the

report given for this information.49 d) The personal warnings of King Hussein of Jordan to Golda

Meir about Syria and Egypt’s intentions in late September 1973. However, Meir failed to act on

this warning again because DMI Zeira’s explanation again was calming. 50 e) When the families of

the Soviet advisers evacuated Egypt on 4 October 1973 AMAN’s Major General Eli Zeira

suggested the following possible explanations for the move: a sudden crisis erupted the ties between

the Soviet Union and their Arab clients Syria and Egypt, Moscow feared an Israeli pre-emptive

45 Richard B Parker, The October War (University Press of Florida 2001), pp.87-90 46 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.277. 47 Bar-Joseph, Uri. Watchman Fell Asleep, The: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. SUNY Press, 2012, p.68. 48 Parker, Richard Bordeaux. The October War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida, 2001, p.87. 49 Bar-Joseph, Uri. Watchman Fell Asleep, The: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. SUNY Press, 2012, p.83. 50 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.5.

25

attack or the Soviets knew the plans of Egypt and Syria to attack Israel and wanted to protect their

citizens. Despite the consideration of these moves as extraordinary DMI Zeira did not argue clearly

that a war was approaching.51 f) On September 27th 1973, a mobilization by the Egyptian army was

featured by AMAN as a move to honor the death anniversary of President Nasser. Herzog refers

that ‘’in many cases the intelligent material went into details of various developments about to

occur. But these, did in fact occur, they were ignored.52 g) Syrian preparations of hospitals, shelters

and fuel facilities on disregarded by AMAN as bluff.53 h) Air Combat between Syrian air Force and

Israeli Air Force on September 13th, disregarded by AMAN as an incident which increased Israel’s

deterrent posture improving again that at least the Syrian Air Force standards could not been

compare with the Israeli ones.54 i) Reports from the frontline or from other intelligence services

(CIA), concluded that the Arabs will finally take the initiative by launching a war against Israel.

Under the fear of the cost of a general mobilization, and its consequences if the war did not happen,

DMI Zeira, the Chief of the Israeli Intelligence services failed to convince the Israeli political

leadership that the war was approaching 55.

3.5TheNationalSecuritySchemawasIncomplete

Israel’s National security concept was formulated in line with Israel’s ongoing experiences,

but it seemed to have missed some important features. As it is often the case with schemas, the

schemas included some implicit causal reasoning about why something was done. Lacking

complete information, the schema had faulty causal reasoning and encoded a stereotypical bias that

left an entire nation embarrassed. Two pieces of information were missing from the Israeli

Intelligence Agencies. The first was the different concept the Arab’s had about a conflict with 51 Dorrington, James. "The ‘Concept’, AMAN and the Israeli Intelligence Failure to Predict the Yom Kippur War." By Neil Wilson, Editor in Chief: 105. 52 Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p.45 53 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.16. 54 Bar-Joseph, Uri. Watchman Fell Asleep, The: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. SUNY Press, 2012, p.83. 55 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.15.

26

Israel.56 The second was the augmented military capability that the Arab’s acquired after their

defeat in the Six-Day war in 1967.

3.5.1ArabConcept

The Arab concept about a potential Arab-Israeli conflict was quite different from the one

that Israel had. The Arab concept did not include an all-out win on Israel at least on behalf of Egypt.

The Arabs had no intent to defeat Israel in an all out war but focused on implementing a limited

objective campaign instead. Their campaign and their objective were to recapture the territory lost

during the Six Day War. Unlike Israel, the neighboring Arab states had a lot of margin for a total

defeat in war. If the Arab forces were defeated the Arab states would not cease to exist. On the

contrary, if the Israeli army got defeated the state of Israel would probably cease to exist. Therefore,

the Arabs’ waging and loosing a war would not be a disastrous proposition unless their political

goals were not met57.

The Israelis were completely ignorant about the radical changes occurring in the Arab

military doctrine. For instance, Egyptians and Syrians changed their approach on how to control the

skies and instead of searching ways to possess a competitive air force, able to mess with the Israeli

Air Force; they searched into finding ways on how to neutralize the Israeli Air Force by land and

not by air. Hence, the Arabs instead of purchasing warplanes to balance the power between them

and the Israeli Air Force, they purchased the up-to-date soviet anti-aircraft systems, which proved to

be more lethal against the Israeli air attacks58. The deployment of the Egyptian anti-aircraft

56 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), pp. 134-135. 57 Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the inevitability of surprise." International Studies Quarterly 21.3 (1977), p.489 58 Shazly, S. (1980). The crossing of the Suez. San Francisco: American Mideast Research, p.19

27

umbrella made no sense to the Israeli Intelligence officers. They considered that the surface-to-air

missiles were a defensive weapon par excellence and therefore constituted no threat 59.

3.5.2ArabaugmentedmilitarycapabilityandtheArabefforttoconcealit

The outcome of the Six Day War acted as a catalyst in the Arab world and marked the

beginning of raising a complete re-evaluation of the military posture, especially by the Egyptians,

who conducted research and drew conclusions from every aspect of their defeat and put the

proposals for asking the Soviet Union for further support60.

The Arabs learned their lessons well from the defeat in 1967, when their forces made a poor

appearance, and the quality in their equipment and personnel training rose dramatically. Egyptians

created an anti-aircraft umbrella using their newly purchased, and the new anti-tank weapons that

the Soviets equipped the Arabs. Both pieces of equipment forced the Israelis to suffer heavy

casualties, later during the war 61.

While, the standards were rising, they were looking for methods to confuse the Israelis about

their real capabilities with various tactics. By spreading rumors that their armed forces had

inadequate maintenance or no spare parts for their anti-aircraft sites, while they successfully

concealed the additional equipment received by their armed forces, contributed to a large extend in

making the Israelis wrong estimations and achieve their objective62.

Underestimation was also observed in estimating the Arab capabilities to cross the Canal. As

President Sadat wrote in his autobiography, when they asked foreign countries to manufacture and 59 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.81. 60 Anwar Sadat and Raphael Israeli, The Public Diary Of President Sadat (Brill 1978), p.143. 61 Gawrych, G. (2000). The albatross of decisive victory. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, p.20 62 Handel, M. (1977). The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise. International Studies Quarterly, 21(3), p.473

28

to equip Egypt with high-pressure water pumps they laughed and replied ‘’ could any fire in the

world require such waterpower?’’63. It was apparent that the international community did not make

the link between the use of the pumps and the crossing of the canal.

In the above chapter, the reasons that led the Israelis to surprise were examined. As it is

demonstrated, the Israeli concept proved to be very rigid, outdated, incomplete and resistant to

change. As a result, the Israelis did not estimate that the war was imminent and the Israeli frontlines

were found unmanned and unbalanced. The strategic surprise on behalf of Arabs was an important

contributing factor for their initial success. On the following chapter, the reasons that led the Arabs

to their initial success will be discussed.

63 Sadat, A. (1978). In search of identity. New York: Harper & Row, p.251

29

4.0WhyandhowweretheArabsinitiallysuccessful?

This chapter will focus at the Arab’s initial success over the Israeli Military. It will argue that the

Arab’s initial success was due to the Israeli surprise as well as the Arab’s success to exploit both

strategic and tactical advantages against the Israelis. The reasons that led the Arabs to an initial

success will be discussed in this order: The chapter begins with an introductory analysis of the

actions taken by Egypt and the Arabs prior to the war to create an advantage over the otherwise

almighty Israelis. This section would like to establish that the Arabs made an effort to be well

prepared when facing the Israelis in battle. The Arabs were prepared both in a purely military way

by augmenting their arms and in a strategic way by designing deception before the impending

attack. Further, an analysis of the Israelis mistakes, which contributed to the Arab’s initial success,

will be presented. Moreover, the analysis will focus on each front separately (Southern and

Northern) and the ways the Arabs exploited the strategic and tactical advantages that helped them

succeed during the first days of the war.

4.1Warpreparations.EffortstocreateadvantagesovertheIsraelis

Before going to war, Sadat needed more support. Therefore he started to tighten his relations

with the leaders of the other Arab countries whose the long-time goal was the total conquer of

Israel. Amongst them were the Kuwaiti Abdullah Mubarak al-Sabah, the Saudi Arabian King

Faisal, the Lebanese Hamid Franjieh, and the Morrocan King Hassan II.64 In order to achieve

economic and military support by the Arab nations, Sadat began the ‘’theoretical war’’ against

Israel. Before promising military and economic aid, the other Arab nations asked to see the

Egyptian war plan. Thus, Sadat ordered General Shazly to provide a fake plan (Operation Granite

64 Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p.239

30

Two) to the other Arab leaders to convince them to support his war preparations65. Under these

conditions, Syria agreed to join the Egyptians as a front-line state. Thus Sadat could achieve a

strategic advantage, as the Syrians would open a second front in the north of Israel.

The spectacular victory of the Israeli Defense Forces during the Six Day War (1967)

changed the entire strategic doctrine of the Arab countries that surrounded Israel. Between the years

1967 – 1973 the Arab countries studied the behavior and performance of Israel during the Six Day

War and they proceeded to establishing radical changes in their military, in order to bridge the

quality gap between themselves and Israel. The years before the Yom Kippur war broke out, the

quality of the Arab arsenal was dramatically increased due to the effective training by the Soviets

and the up-to-date modern Soviet military equipment, especially in tanks and anti-aircraft systems66.

These weapons, once the war broke out allowed Arabs to make an initially successful onslaught.

The main obstacle that faced the Egyptian war planners was the vulnerability of their

military to Israeli Air Force deep penetration raids. The war planners emphasized gaining the ability

to attack Israeli hinterland. Thus in early 1973, Hawker Hunters and Mirage Vs aircrafts started to

arrive in Egypt from Iraq and Libya. On the eve of the war, the Egyptian air force numbered 30

Hawker Hunters from Libya as well as 20 Mirage Vs from Iraq, the aid that the other Arab

countries offered Sadat 67.

The attacking capabilities of the Arabs increased too. To make it feasible, the Arabs had to

launch an attack on Israel positions and make an onslaught within the occupied by Israel areas.

Again, in this area, the Egyptians and Syrians did not only enjoy the support of the Soviet Union,

but also the support from other Arab countries. Other Arab countries sent personnel and aircrafts to

65 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.36 66 ibid p.112 67 Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War: the epic encounter that transformed the Middle East. Schocken, 2007, p.464.

31

increase the attacking capabilities of Syria and Egypt. In addition, in March 1973 and following

intense diplomatic pressure for the arrangement not to go through, Egypt was equipped by the

Soviet Union with a brigade of surface-to-surface Scud missiles, which could strike Israel beyond

the frontline. These missiles arrived in Egypt with the Soviet instructors in late July 1973, and in

August 1973 the Egyptian forces started to train with them.68

Finally, it is important to mention that Egyptians put a heavy emphasis on creating the

element of surprise. Israelis had a complete intelligence failure with reference to predicting the

attack. However, the Egyptians made a conscious effort to deceive. Shazly analyzed the system the

Egyptians came up with to maintain confidentiality. The system allowed only a few key members to

possess knowledge of the entire plan. Information about the impending attack was brought down to

division commanders only 3 days before the attack and to platoon commanders hours before the

attack. 69

4.2MistakesthatwereexploitedbytheArabsduetotheIsraelisurprise

One of the main factors that contributed to the Arab success was the loss of valuable time on

behalf of the Israelis to mobilize their reserves, few hours before the hostilities begun. When early

in the morning of October 6th DMI Zeira concluded that the war was imminent, the Israeli Chief of

Staff David Elazar wanted to carry out a general mobilization despite the shortness of the time and

suggested a preemptive strike70. When he met the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, Dayan

disagreed with his proposal and suggested a partial mobilization. This disagreement was brought to

Golda Meir, who ordered a general mobilization but refused the suggestion of David Elazar for a

pre-emptive strike because this movement would lead the international community - including the

68 Parker, Richard Bordeaux. The October War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida, 2001, p.92. 69 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.211 70 Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p. 53

32

United States - to accuse Israel for being the actual aggressor.71 This entire situation caused a delay

of 4 hours and the call-up process began a 9:00 a.m. instead of 5:00 a.m.

Another factor that contributed to the Arab’s initial success was the ‘’unofficial restriction’’

by the international community, especially by the United States, on the Israelis to pre-empt. The

years before the war broke out, Kissinger expressed his personal view, that the United States ability

to help Israel in any war, would be impaired if the aggressor was Israel. However, during the crisis

of the military escalation on behalf of the Arabs, the subject of pre-emptive strike had never been

discussed, not because the United States did not want to deviate from this view, but due to the

Israeli stubbornness that the war was not imminent. Kissinger wondered, ‘’how could it have been,

since Israel had repeatedly told us that there was no danger of war’’ and blames Golda Meir for her

‘’initiative not to pre-empt without the United States advice’’72. In turn, the Israeli General Bren

Adan doubts about the effectiveness of a pre-emptive strike. He demonstrates that the Arabs were

‘’certainly alerted and prepared for that possibility, thus they deployed a highly sophisticated anti-

aircraft umbrella beyond their lines’’73.

4.2.1ThestrategicadvantageanditsexploitationbyArabsonbothfronts

When the war begun, the Arabs gained tremendous strategic advantages. The most

important advantage was the split of the Israeli Defense Forces, which forced them to fight on two

fronts. According to Adan, the simultaneously attack on the Golan Heights and the Sinai ‘’ caused a

further split, at least in the initial phase, between the reserves and the small regular army, because

the reserves were not mobilized early enough’’74.

71 Meir, Golda. "My Life’’, An Autobiography." (1976), p.359 72 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, 477 73 Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), p. 80 74 ibid p.79

33

Another strategic advantage was the boosting of the Egyptian and Syrian morale, when other

Arab states, offered them military support, which contributed to the initial success. The Arabic

support ensured the common aim between other Arab states to destroy Israel. Three Mig-21

squadrons, one Mig-17 and two armored brigades were sent by Iraq. When the war broke out,

Morocco sent a tank regiment and Jordan another two armored brigades. The Iraqi aircrafts

contributed no little in the successful airstrikes, at the opening of the war 75.

4.2.2Southernfront

A strategic advantage on behalf of the Egyptians could be considered the massive

availability of forces. About 25-30 thousands troops crossed the canal only on the first wave of the

Egyptian attack. This came in contrast with the Israeli unmanned fortifications that it proved a non-

serious defense to deter the massive Egyptian advance. The Israeli defending forces were only 436

and some tanks were outnumbered and outgunned. The Israeli reserve force was not deployed in its

prepared positions and thus did not provide the necessary firepower; neither filled the gaps between

the strongpoints of the Bar Lev line76. As a result, the Egyptian losses, were only 200 instead of

Egyptian estimation of 10 thousands. The low rate of casualties enabled the Egyptian Army to

reinforce its troops at the frontline preparations for defensive warfare against Israeli counter

attacks77.

The reinforcement of the Arab’s success came also from the Israeli erroneous impressions

from the magnitude of the suffering of their losses and the misconception about the effectiveness of

their armored counter attacks. The night of October 6th, the Israeli Divisional Command ordered to

keep the counterattacks on. As a result, the Israeli tanks were sent as piece meal into the Egyptian 75 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.277. 76 Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 1996, p.29 77 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep (State University of New York Press (2005),pp.204-210

34

anti-tank forces. By the dawn of October 7th, the Israeli General Medler, reported to the General

Head Quarters that he lost two thirds of his tank force. From 270 tanks, which he started, he had

only 90 78.

4.2.3Northernfront

Regarding the northern front, one of the reasons that led the Syrians to a relatively

successful onslaught, was the inadequate Israeli Defense Force. When the attack begun, the Israeli

forces numbered only 177 tanks and 5000 infantry troops, ordered to resist the attackers. The

objectives of the Israeli efforts were to slow down the Syrian troops until the Israeli reserves reach

the front, prevent any major disaster and keep as many positions they could 79.

The Syrians had the same advantage as the Egyptians regarding the massive number of

troops. The Syrian strategy was as a first phase the advance of the masses towards Israeli

fortifications and overwhelming them. The plan was to sweep the Golan Heights and charge across

the Jordan River bridges, preventing the Israeli mobilization of the reserves to bear effectively on

the battle. During the first phase of the attack, the Syrians, having a massive number of troops,

formatted a large number of reserves beyond their frontline 80. The Syrian strategic advantage in

numbers, gave the upper hand to the army to make sacrifices of troops in order to step forward. The

Israelis developed a series of defensive obstacles (the anti-tank ditch in combination with the

narrow passes) to harden a possible Syrian attack. Due to the slow Israeli reaction and the

incapability to replenish its losses at the first hours of the war, bit-by-bit the Syrians managed to

break the resistance of the Israeli exhausted forces81. Another example of the advantage of the

advantage of the massive numbers of troops by Syrians was the situation of the south sector of

78 Safran, N. (1977). Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973. International Security, p.p., 145-146. 79 Safran, N. (1977). Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973. International Security, p.p., 145-146. 80 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.78. 81 Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p.p. 78-79

35

Kuneitra. It was a much larger area to be covered by approximately 80 tanks and the infantry units

were spread in more strongpoints. The Syrian shorter-range-fire disadvantage in comparing with the

Israeli tanks was overcome because of the massive Syrian advancing forces. Although the Israelis

had impressive kill ratio, the Syrians little by little advanced and pushed the Israeli tanks to

withdrawal. Furthermore, without the necessary infantry support, the Israeli tanks became more

vulnerable in the Syrian antitank units that were operating under the cover of darkness.

The attrition caused by the exhaustion of the defending Israeli forces due to the massive

advancing of Syrian troops provided them another strategic advantage on the Golan Heights. Before

the war, the Israeli High command expected a Syrian breakthrough from the northern sector of

Kuneitra, in case of war.

4.3ThetacticaladvantageanditsexploitationbyArabs

4.3.1Southernfront

The impassive Israeli attitude towards the Egyptians’ preparations and the failure to apply

countermeasures, favored the Egyptian tactic in its struggle to overpass physical obstacles. On the

Suez Canal, to wage a war against Israel, the Egyptians had to cross and face the Israelis on the East

Bank. In terms of crossing preparations, the Egyptians spent a lot of time on training in similar

terrain and crossings. Even though the Israelis monitored the crossing preparations of the Egyptians,

they did not take any countermeasures, believing that the Egyptians were trying to deceive them

about their war intentions. General Bren Adan wrote ‘‘we observed them practicing river crossings

opposite Balah Island and breaching barriers with water jets, as they dropped amphibious

equipment into the water to move armored vehicles, tanks, and other vehicles to the island…. the

fact that the Egyptians were training in the Israeli presence was showing that they had no serious

36

intentions to attack Israel’’ 82. Taking into account Adan’s narration, the Israelis considered the

situation as a bluff.

Knowing that the Soviets wanted to gain economical and political benefits in Egypt, the

Egyptians requested and received PMP pontoon bridges, as well as GSP and PT-S ferries 83.

Additionally, to breach the embankment of the Bar-Lev line, the Egyptian army acquired water

pumps from Britain and Germany to wash the sand away84. This equipment was used for the water-

crossing operation, which supported the initial Egyptian success.

Furthermore, taking advantage of the absence of the Israeli Air Force above the frontline,

the Egyptians succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal. It is should be noted that the Israeli Air Force

was busy hunting down the Egyptian helicopters loaded with commandos. These units were sent to

various points behind the Israeli lines in order to cut off the Israeli Defense Forces that were

defending the Bar Lev line. Furthermore the Egyptian Air Force turned the focus of the Israeli Air

Force in air battles above the Israeli cities and delayed them to react against the Egyptian crossing

forces to implement their mission. Thus, gave to the Egyptians the opportunity to advance without

any Israeli Air Force intervention 85.

The proper preparations and training on behalf of the Egyptians gave them the advantage to

execute their military plan successfully. According to the Egyptian General Shazly, the crossing of

the canal was the harshest test of the Egyptian planning. ‘’No equipment, no planning of bridgehead

tactics, no covering fire from the west bank, could stave off disaster if the crossing went wrong’’86.

Once the war broke out, the crossing of Suez Canal proved designed in the greatest detail and

82 Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), pp.74-75 83 O’balance, Edgar, No Victor, and No Vanquished. "The Yom Kippur War." (1978). 84 Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 1996, p.19 85 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.145. 86 Saad Shazly, The Crossing Of The Suez (American Mideast Research 1980), p.63

37

should be considered one of the best-orchestrated obstacle crossings in history. The Egyptians

engineers threw ten bridges over the canal; three bridges in the sector of El Qantara, three bridges in

the sector of Ismailia-Deversoir and four others in Geneifa-Suez. On the first two days of the war,

all the units of the infantry divisions crossed the Canal and on the night 7 October the armored

brigades attached to the infantry divisions crossed too. Within 36 hours the entire 2nd and 3rd

Egyptian Armies, crossed the Canal and created a bridgehead to a depth of 4-5 miles.

Becoming wiser from their past military failures, specifically their total destruction on the

Six Day War, the Arabs worked methodically and systematically to overcome their past

weaknesses, to avoid any similar catastrophic defeat and to improve the sectors that contributed to

military failures.

Knowing their vulnerability to the Israeli Air Force, the Egyptians equipped themselves with

modern anti-aircraft systems in order to confront the Israeli Air Force. To prevent penetration raids

from the Israeli Air Force, the Egyptians built up the world’s densest system of SAM-2, SAM-3,

SAM-6 missiles to protect the cities and to cover and the Suez Canal. The first hours of the war, the

SAM missile umbrella that deployed by the Egyptians enabled the Egyptian land forces to move on

with the crossing87.

The conversion of their previous armor inferiority to anti-tank superiority was the second

weakness identified by the Egyptians. In order to bridge the gap of the quality of the armored

forces, between them and the Israelis, in early 1973 President Sadat equipped his army with light

anti-tank weapons such as Rocket-Propelled-Grenades (RPG7), recoilless rifles and anti-tank guns,

while their most lethal anti-tank weapon in their arsenal was the AT-3 ‘Sagger’ wire-guided

87 Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 1996, p.20

38

missile88. The effectiveness of these weapons had an important contribution to the success against

the first Israeli reaction. When the first moves of the Israelis to throw the Egyptians back to the

canal begun, the anti-tank infantry units not only repelled the Israeli counter-offensive, but also

caused heavy casualties to Israelis 89.

Moreover, the Israeli ignorance of basic principles of the war, worked in favor of the

Egyptians. The Israelis fought without close infantry support and inadequate artillery support and

the anti-tank units. Thus, Egyptian Army easily destroyed the Israeli tanks. The 190th Armored

division had gone like a sheep to slaughter and Arieh Sharon spent the day ineffectively by

maneuvering and by little fighting90. Moshe Dayan featured that day in his memoirs ‘’Story of my

life’’ as total failure91. On the contrary, the Egyptian General Shazly wrote ‘’it was late afternoon as

I drove back to Center Ten, cheered by what I had seen….’92.

It can be clearly said that October 8th, Israel was faced with its worst defeat in its history.

That day two Israelis reserve-armored divisions were committed in the Sinai to launch a major

counter-attack on the Egyptian positions. The Israeli 190th Armored brigade badly mauled by the

entrenched infantry and its commander Asaf Yagouri was taken as prisoner of war. At 15:00 hours

the Egyptian launched an attack on Arieh Sharon’s forces on the Hamutal area and thirty minutes

later after destroying the Israeli forces Hamutal fell and the Israeli forces started retreating. The

reports from the division commanders made it clear, that the Israeli forces could not afford another

similar day of fighting. The victory of the Egyptians until October 8th was the result of the

exploitation of strategic and tactical advantages 93.

88 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003. 89 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.146. 90 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.192 91 Dayan, Moshe. "Story of My Life, 1976, p.503 92 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003 93 Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 1996, p.52

39

4.3.2NorthernFront

Similar to the Egyptians, the effectiveness of the Syrian anti-tank units contributed to their

initial success over the Israelis. The Syrian anti-tank units engaged the Israeli tanks with RPGs and

Saggers and caused Israelis heavy casualties. Despite the desperate efforts on behalf of the Israelis

to repel these attacks with infantry patrols, the difficulty to restore their casualties forced the Israeli

retreating and the Syrian advancing 94.

The anti-aircraft umbrella that the Syrians deployed behind their lines deterred the Israeli

Air Force in providing close air support to the ground forces95. In the same way with the Egyptians,

the Syrians knew that when the war begins the Israeli Air Force could play a catalyst role in the

course of the battle and they planned accordingly. The missile system that deployed covered an area

stretching 8km into the Occupied Golan Heights, giving the advantage of the initiations to the

Syrians because the Israeli Air Force had no freedom of movement. When the time for the Israeli

Air Force came to turn its efforts exclusively against the Syrians, the cost of its massive

intervention of the Israeli Air Force was 30 planes that downed by the Syrian anti-aircraft

missiles96.

Additionally, obtaining superior night equipment on the Syrian tanks helped the Syrian

forces to penetrate the Israeli lines. The infrared lights that equipped the Syrian tanks, made them

invisible under the darkness97. Unlike the Syrians, the Israeli forces did not have the advantage of

such optical equipment and they spotted the enemy tanks with inferior ways either by the noise or

by artillery flares that lit up the area. When the Syrian tanks rushed towards the Israeli forces during

the night in many occasions the tank battles were fought in distances of few yards. The advantage of

94 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.148. 95 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.82. 96 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.476. 97 Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p. 107

40

the darkness contributed also to the loss of the extreme range advantage that the Israelis enjoyed, as

the Syrians could reach the Israeli lines so close under the cover of the darkness.

In summary, the Arab’s initial success was mainly due to the element of surprise, which

found the Israelis unbalanced and unmanned. This was complemented by the exploitation of both

strategic and tactical advantages. Both the surprise and the exploitation were made feasible only

because Arabs worked meticulously on their battle plan and their capabilities months prior to the

attack. Eventually, the Arabs were surprised by the Israeli counterattack, a reaction that eventually

reversed the outcome of the war. How the Israelis regrouped and focused their military forces and

strengths respectively will be discussed in the next chapter.

41

5.0WhyandhowtheIsraelisseizedthebattleback?

The current chapter will look at the Israeli efforts to recover from the initial Arab success. It will

argue how the Israelis managed to seize the battle back, the exploitation of the strategic and

tactical advantages derived after the Arab initial success, as well as the exploitation of Arab errors

that offered the opportunity to the Israelis to recover. The discussion will begin with the strategic

advantages that emerged, then the tactical advantages that favored the Israelis and lastly the

exploitation of the mistakes made by the Arabs.

5.1StrategicadvantagesexploitedbyIsraelis

5.1.1NorthernFront

The reason of the Israeli success in turning the tide on the Golan Heights in their favor,

was the speedier than expected reaction of the reserves. The reserves were supposed to reach the

front within 48 hours from the first call up. Nevertheless, they reached the Golan Heights earlier

than expected.98 A part of the Syrian grand strategy was based on preventing the Israeli reserves

from reaching the front lines. Towards this end the Syrians failed abysmally. Despite the

successful advance the first hours of the attack, the Syrians did not manage to cut the routes that

the reserves would use to reach the frontline.

98Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.153

42

Moreover, the reserves that reached the front, balanced the Israeli strategic disadvantage in

numbers 99. In restoring the losses and the wounded, the Israeli replenishment capacity proved

greater than the Syrians. Thus, the strategic initiative gradually started turning into Israeli hands,

and the Israeli reserves started launching counterattacks100.

Furthermore, armored reserves and artillery attached on the Israeli fighting forces

contributed to the initial Israeli counterattacks. On October 8th, after a day of intense fighting, the

Israeli forces were covered by effective artillery fire for the first time since the war started. The

effectiveness of the newly arrived forces made the Syrians suffer heavy losses, which resulted in

evacuating damaged tanks and leaving behind their wounded. The result of the intense fighting

was obvious the following morning. The picture of the battlefield in Valley of Tears was

terrifying because of the Syrian heavy losses (about 600 tanks and armored vehicles and thousands

killed). On the contrary, the Israeli losses were only about 80 tanks, as a result of the effective fire

of the reinforcements101.

Amongst other factors that contributed to the Israeli success to recover, was the capability

from the Israeli Air Force to attack strategic targets. On October 9th, the Israeli Air Force struck

strategic targets within the Syrian territory, including the Syrian Defense Ministry and the Air

Force Headquarters 102. On October 10th, economic targets such as oil refineries, power stations

and ammunition refineries were bombed. These raids hurried the surrender of the Syrians and

sealed the Israeli success of the war on the northern front. Meanwhile on the same day, the Israelis

bypassed the 1967 lines and started advancing into Syria.

99 Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: story of my life. Da Capo Press, 1992, p.488 100 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.154 101 Herzog, Chaim. "The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973." (1998), p.113. 102 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, 87.

43

5.1.2Southernfront

The most important reason that determined the outcome of the war in Sinai was the

strategic advantage on the part of the Israelis of having the United States backing. In terms of

resupplies, the United States support to Israelis proved greater than the Soviet one to the Arabs.

This support helped the Israelis to return to the battle more reinforced. When the war broke out,

after the heavy air losses of the Israelis on October 7th and the tremendous armor losses on

October 8th, the pressure to the United States government by Golda Meir for an urgent resupply

package was fruitful. According to Kissinger, the United States offered ‘’ a large replacement

package worth $500 million that included sixteen F-4 Phantoms, thirty A-4 Skyhawks, 125 tanks

(including 65 M-60s), three Hawk Missile battalions and a whole range of other things’’103. On the

contrary, the Soviet support to the Arabs proved inadequate enough to cover the Arab supply

needs. Again Kissinger refers ‘’but this support was as yet far short of what the Soviets were

capable of doing. After the war, all Arab leaders complained to me that the Soviet airlift was

grudging and the sealift was slow, as if to rub in the Arab’s dependency’’104 . Moreover, the

United States provided important support into the Israeli operations, by offering valuable

information through satellite photographs and by the use of spy warplanes. According to Sadat

when the Egyptians transferred several hundred tanks to the east side of the canal, in order to

launch a major attack on October 14th, the United States satellites reported that movement to the

Israelis and they formed their forces accordingly 105 .

The clever strategy used by the Israelis, after the repelling of the Egyptian attack on

October 14th, forced President Sadat to surrender. The Israelis instead of launching face-to-face

103 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.512. 104 ibid, p.507 105 Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 259

44

attacks on the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies, -it could cause attrition and raise Israeli casualties-

chose to encircle them by crossing into the west bank of the Suez Canal and cut their resupplies

off.106 The hostilities ended by the infringement of the United Nations Security Council’s

Resolution 338 for ceasefire by the Israelis. This event concluded the Israeli efforts in encircling

the Egyptian Army and leading the Israelis to the total recover and success107.

5.2TacticaladvantagesexploitedbyIsraelis

5.2.1NorthernFront

The first tactical advantage that the Israelis exploited was when the Israeli Air Force

started to contribute more actively on the ground operations. Despite the losses of the previous day

(October 7th where some 30 aircrafts lost due to the Syrian SAMs), the dawn of October 8th the

Israeli Air Force started raising its aggression on the ground and inflicting heavy losses to the

Syrians. Safran noted ‘’the attacks began at first daylight with strong air support. It was slow

grinding work against strong Syrian armor and artillery, but Israeli aggressiveness and superior

tank gunnery were having their effect’’108.

In addition, the Israeli Air Force aggressiveness rose when a shift of elements of the anti-

aircraft umbrella occurred from the Golan front to the Syrian capital. The strategic strikes on the

General Head Quarters in Syria, forced the Syrian leadership to move elements of the anti-aircraft

umbrella from the Golan Heights to the cities 109. As a result the Israeli Air Force dared to launch

more air raids against to what remained of the Syrian anti-aircraft umbrella and the anti-aircraft 106 Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), pp.241-242 107 Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. 108 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.153 109 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.87.

45

threat almost eliminated. With the elimination of the anti-aircraft umbrella, the Israeli Air Force

took the advantage to provide better Close Air Support. The Israeli Ambassador to the United

States Dinitz reported to Kissinger: ‘We have now almost complete control of the air situation in

spite of the SA-6 deployed’.110 Kissinger regarded the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles as a major

obstacle for the Israeli Air Force raid.

Better organization and coordination, amongst the Israeli forces reinforced their

superiority. This superiority was substantiated when the Israeli forces repelled the final Syrian

counterattack. On the 0ctober 9th in the morning, the Syrians launched a ferocious assault along

the frontline and the day ended with a Pyrrhic victory on behalf of the Israelis. In the northern

sector, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade suffered heavy losses and almost overran. However, on the

nick of time, reserves arrived and supported them to launch a counter-attack on a broad front.

Similarly the 188th Armored brigade of Israel, which was almost totally destroyed, was supported

by reserves and airpower. This counter-attack forced the Syrians to halt and to start a tactical

withdrawal from the Golan Heights, while the bombardments and the attacks by the Israeli air and

land forces increased the rate of Syrian casualties dramatically111.

Lastly, the lack of coordination between the other Arab forces that committed to contribute

to the Syrian efforts was unable to limit the Israeli success. While Israelis were advancing, Syrian,

Iraqi and Jordanian forces, tried desperately to counterattack the Israeli forces. However, their

attacks were uncoordinated and ineffective. Consequently, these attacks made no sense in the

outcome of the war on the Golan Heights 112.

110 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.490. 111 Herzog, Chaim. "The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973." (1998), p.113. 112 Andre Deutch, Insight On The Middle East War (Angus and Robertson 1974), p.123

46

5.2.2SouthernFront

The strategy of the Israelis to encircle the Egyptian forces and cut off their supplies was a

result of a series of successful events. Important part of this strategy was the ideal choice of the

place to concentrate their attack efforts. The area of Deversoir was chosen because the Israelis had

a tactical advantage of the terrain’s topography in favor of them. Firstly, Great Bitter Lake would

protect the one flank of the crossing by keeping away the Egyptians. Secondly, it was more

conducive to a maneuver battle than El-Qantara because there was only one sweet-water canal and

a strip of agriculture development to be crossed. Lastly, there was a low concentration of Egyptian

forces in that area. It was the border between the two Egyptian Armies (2nd and 3rd) where the

Israeli forces would face less resistance. As a consequence of the third reason, the Egyptian Force

could be split into two 113. It should be mentioned that detecting the gap between the two Egyptian

armies, was the result of the United States efforts in helping the Israeli force. According to the

Egyptian General Gamasy, a United States spy plane provided the necessary information to the

Israelis.114

Furthermore, the Israeli’s crossing equipment and their capability to hide from the

Egyptians and transfer a monster roller bridge up to the point of the crossing, contributed to the

efforts made by the Israelis to cross the canal. On their way to Suez Canal, the Israelis found stiff

resistance by the Egyptians on the area of Chinese farm on October 15th and the progress of the

Israelis to establish a corridor to the canal became extremely slow. The battle lasted three days and

caused heavy casualties to the Israelis. Nevertheless the Israeli Forces drew the Egyptian attention

long enough until the Israelis brought their equipment to the canal undetected. The Egyptian

113 O'ballance, Edgar. No victor, no vanquished. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978,p.76. 114 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī. The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1993, p.276

47

attempts to restore their defenses in their initial dispositions were pushed back by the Israeli

counterattacks, thus the Chinese farm fell.115 By then the Israelis widened the corridor three miles

and the procedure of the Israeli forces to cross the canal begun.

The success of the Israeli General Danni Matt’s forces against Egyptian missile sites

reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian umbrella and gave more freedom to the Israeli Air

Force. The first Israeli crossed the canal on pontoons on October 16th. Once crossed the canal,

Matt’s forces wiped out and destroyed many armored personnel carriers and even seized four

Egyptian bridges but most importantly they launched counterattack on SAM’s sites.116 These

attacks had resulted in enabling a more active role on behalf of the Israeli Air Force and created a

crisis among the Egyptian Generals in Cairo. All the Egyptian efforts to destroy Matt’s forces

were uncoordinated and desperate, thus General Matt established and secured a bridgehead to the

point that the Israelis expected to make their cross117.

5.3MistakesthatwereexploitedbyIsraelisduetotheEgyptiandecisionsandactions

An important reason that contributed to the Israeli plan to recover was the unutilized

strategic advantage of the two-front-war on behalf of Egypt. As it had been highlighted on chapter

‘’why and how Arab’s initial success?’’, one of the most important advantages of the Arab initial

success was the split of the Israeli Defense Forces into two fronts. Despite the total success in

repelling the Israeli attack on October 8th the unwillingness to risk casualties by launching an

attack outside of the anti-aircraft umbrella, unwittingly offered the Israelis the demanding time to

115 Adan, Avraham. On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War. Gower Publishing Company, Limited, 1980,p.p.245-307. 116 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.261 117 Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p.225.

48

concentrate a large amount of reserve forces. 118 While the Israelis were holding a more heavily

defensive strategy and the reserves were been brought to the front, the Egyptians were not tempted

to deviate from their original plans and to seize the opportunity to take the advantage of the

situation. Instead of advancing towards the Sinai Passes, the Egyptians once they crossed the canal

they focused on their preparations to build a comprehensive and strong defense line, thus gave

time to the Israeli forces to regroup and to be reinforced by reserves 119.

Exogenous factors that influenced Sadat’s strategy led him to make fatal wrong decisions

and unexpectedly facilitated the Israeli war efforts to seize the battle back. The Israeli onslaught

in Syria from October 9th and then, forced the Syrians and the other Arab leaders who joined them,

to put political pressure to president Sadat. The political pressure sought to convince Sadat to

launch a major counter attack on the Israeli forces, in order to turn the attention of the Israelis and

remedy the pressure on the Golan Heights. 120 As a result, Sadat gave in to the external political

pressure and took the wrong decision -as it proved- to launch a major attack on the Israeli

defensive positions at the Sinai Passes. The most important error, beyond Sadat’s decision to

launch an attack to Sinai Passes, was the ignorance of the fact that the Israelis built a strong,

comprehensive and heavily defensive line on the Sinai Passes enabling them to halt an amass

advance of the Egyptian Forces. In addition the Egyptian anti-aircraft range was not extended up

to this point. Thus the Egyptian troops were exposed to the Israeli Air Force threat. The Israeli

superiority on the quality of the tanks and the extreme range of their guns quickly influenced the

course of the battle. The capability of the Israeli Air Force to destroy anything that moved out of

the Egyptian anti-aircraft umbrella, affirmed that Sadat’s decision was hasty and not estimating

118 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, pp.305-316. 119 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī. The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1993, p.187 120 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), p.158

49

properly the possible consequences. At the end of the battle, Egyptians lost a significant amount of

tanks (250 Egyptian against less than 30 Israeli losses) and casualties (about 1000) thus the

balance started tilting in favor of Israelis.

Furthermore, Sadat’s stubbornness to refuse to withdraw notable force from the East Bank

of the Suez Canal to the West Bank when the Israeli crossed the Canal, led the Israelis to establish

a bridgehead on the West Bank. Back in Cairo, a serious command crisis was created when the

Israeli General Matt crossed the canal121. Given the command of President Sadat for the Egyptian

Armies to hold their positions gained until 8 October, General Shazli had been sent from Cairo to

assume command of the Second Army on 18 October122. Once he return back to Cairo, for a

meeting with other Egyptian generals and Sadat, Shazli characterized the military situation as

critical and suggested a withdraw of four armored brigades from the east bank to the west bank in

order to prevent the Egyptian forces to encircle by the Israelis. When the meeting concluded Sadat

decided to no withdraw which left the rear of the Egyptian Armies uncovered and made it even

easier for the Israelis to encircle them.

The examination of strategic advantages that emerged during the course of war, the tactical

advantages that favored the Israelis and the exploitation of the Arab mistakes discussed above,

unfolds the strategic scheme used by both rivals and their counter reactions to each other attacks.

Also the strategic way that the Israelis reverse the outcome of the war, offers an insight on how to

manage and handle crisis in similar situations.

121 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.228 122 El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.321

50

6.0Conclusion The examination of the political, military and intelligence aspects of the Yom Kippur War, given

in this study, provided a better understanding on how the two rivals (Arabs and Israelis),

confronted the various situations that emerged from the course of the war.

The element of surprise in Yom Kippur War is a good example in terms of military

strategy. History has a way of repeating itself and the element of surprise was used in the past in

the Operation Barbarossa by Hitler against the Soviets, Pearl Harbor by the Japanese against the

United States and in this case in the Yom Kippur War. In the chapter ‘’why and how were Israelis

surprised’’, the assessment of the element of surprise teaches the leadership to be vigilant, never

underestimate its opponent’s capabilities and be flexible in handling and dealing with emerging

crises situations to avoid costly errors. An example is the mistakes made by the Israeli leadership

and intelligence, which led them to their initial defeat. The Israelis made wrong assumptions

according to the mistaken position presented by intelligence, the misreading of the real picture of

the period before the war, the belief that the Egyptians would not declare war against them and

that Syria without Egypt would not be able to fight a war. They based those assumptions on their

easy victory in the Six Day War and they did not change this way of thinking to the changing

circumstances of the following years123. Until the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli intelligence stated

that there was a low probability for the war to occur. The main strategic mistake of the Israelis was

the misreading of the seriousness of the threat, which proved to be extremely damaging to Israel.

The chapter ‘’why and how were the Arabs initially successful’’ presents the

methodicalness, coordination and cooperation which lead led to the successful implementation of

plans. The years before the war broke out, the Arabs made the ideal preparations in order to bridge 123 Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.270

51

the gap of the quality of military standards between them and Israelis. The value of these

preparations was fruitful in the crucial first hours of the war. Beyond the morale boosting on

behalf of the Arabs, it broke the myth of ‘’invincibility’’ of the Israeli Defense Forces. The Arab

initial success was the result of the combination of all the above factors.

In the chapter ‘’why and how the Israelis seized the battle back’’ the fighting rivals did not

determine the outcome of the war by using their own resources. Exogenous factors such as the

superpower intervention helped to reverse the situation. The Israeli choice to have the United

States as a strategic ally helped them, in terms of military supplies, and intelligence information to

fight and win the war. The Egyptians and Syrians relied on the Soviets who reluctantly helped

them in terms of support and military equipment 124.

The hostilities ended on the 25th October when the cease-fire from the United Nations

Security Council took effect. Meanwhile other Arab states threats -to the West and especially to

the United States- used the oil embargo to create the necessity for a political solution to the Arab-

Israeli conflict. From that point onwards, the conflict followed negotiations to end the war

officially 125. The Suez Canal and a part of the Sinai Peninsula returned to Egypt with the Camp

David accords in 1978. Some parts of the Golan Heights were also returned to Syria in 1974126.

On the Israeli side, the most significant consequences of the Yom Kippur War included the

destruction of the myth of the Israeli invincibility and brought radical changes in the political life

of the country. For the Arabs, the boosting of the morale due to the Arab initial success and the oil

124 Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.512. 125 Siniver, Asaf. The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford University Press, USA, 2013, p.3. 126 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.93.

52

embargo redefined the Arab strength in the international community127. The Yom Kippur War as it

was, verified Carl Von Clausewitz’ quotation ‘’war is the continuation of politics by other

means’’.128 The war was fought in order to break the Israeli stubbornness to agree a politic

solution. The war used as a tool in the policy of the Egyptian President Sadat. On the military

level, Egypt lost, however, on the politic level, with the Camp David Accords, Sadat achieved

what he sought.

127 Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977): 133-170. 128 Von Clausewitz, Carl, and On War. "edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret." On War (1976), p.58.

53

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