Michael P. McDonald Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Assistant Professor, George Mason Univ. John Samples Director, Center for Representative Gov’t The Cato Institute
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Michael P. McDonaldVisiting Fellow, The Brookings InstitutionAssistant Professor, George Mason Univ.
John SamplesDirector, Center for Representative Gov’tThe Cato Institute
Congressional Elections
Gary Jacobson, University of California, San Diego
Congressional Quarterly’sCompetitive Elections, 1982-2006
Number of “toss-up” or “lean” races
84
67
58
51
41
10398
104
5853
47
29
51
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Num
ber o
f Com
petit
ive
Cont
ests
State Legislative Elections
Dick Niemi, University of RochesterLynda Powell, University of RochesterThomas Carsey, University of FloridaWilliam Berry, University of FloridaJames Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Average Incumbent Re-Election Rates to State Legislatures, 1992-2002
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Re-
Elec
tion
Rat
e
Lower Chamber, Single MemberLower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member
Open Seats in State Legislatures, 1992-2002
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Perc
ent Lower Chamber, Single Member
Lower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member
Percent Seats Won with <60% in State Legislatures, 1992-2002
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Perc
ent Lower Chamber, Single Member
Lower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member
Primaries
Steven Ansolabehere, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCharles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology James Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Competitive Primaries
1910-1938
1940-1958
1960-2000
U.S. House
Statewide
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Percent
U.S. HouseStatewide
Campaign Donations
James Gimple, University of MarylandFrancis Lee, University of Maryland
The Election Process Within a DistrictE
lection Outcom
e
National M
ood
The Election Process Within a District
District Partisanship
Incumbent Situation:
Scandal, Age, Ambition
Election O
utcome
Candidate Type:Incumbent, Quality
Challengers
Money Raised
National M
ood
Demographic Change
The Election Process Within a District
District Partisanship
Redistricting Term Limits
Incumbent Situation:
Scandal, Age, Ambition
Election O
utcome
Candidate Type:Incumbent, Quality
Challengers
Campaign Finance Laws
Money Raised
National M
ood
Demographic Change
The Rube-Goldberg Election MachineLegal Framework
Nathaniel Persily University of PennsylvaniaRedistricting
Michael McDonald, George Mason UniversityTerm-limits
Bruce Cain, University of California, Berkeley; and Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego
Campaign FinanceJeff Milyo, University of Missouri; and David Primo, University of RochesterKen Mayer, University of Wisconsin
Minor PartiesPaul Herrnson, University of Maryland
InitiativesJohn Matsusaka, University of Southern California
General Findings
Competition Varies Among Levels of OfficeTailor reforms to the office
Reforms Can Have Seemingly Perverse Effects on Competition
Example: Clean Elections encourage candidates to run where they have little chance of winning, which increases levels of constestation, but lowers overall levels of competition
Reforms Can Create Perverse IncentivesExample: Term Limits encourage candidates to wait for open seats
Reform Recommendations
There is no magic bullet, the electoral process is complicatedYou may only get one chance to get it right, choose wiselyConsider combining state constitutional amendments with statutes to fill in details and to provide flexibility if something doesn’t work as planned
Current Research
Examining Redistricting Effects on State Legislative Elections and Districts
Post-Redistricting Election Outcomes (including 2004 election and primary data)2000 Presidential Vote in State Legislative Districts before and after redistricting
(Would greatly appreciate help in AR, DE, KY, MI, MS, MT, OR, ND, NE, RI, SD, TN, UT, and WY)
Redistricting
Michael McDonaldThe Brookings InstitutionGeorge Mason University
Gerrymandering and Competition District 1 District 2 District 3 District 4 Total Competitive Districts
0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5
Expected Seats 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.0 Bipartisan Gerrymander
Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 Partisan Gerrymander
0.5 0.5 0.5
Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.0 Figure 2: Three Configurations of Four Equi-populous Districts in a Hypothetical Evenly Partisan Jurisdiction
Patterns in District Competition
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Num
ber o
f Dis
tric
ts W
ithin
Com
petit
ive
Ran
ge 45-55% Range
48-52% Range
1970 1972 1980 1982 1990 1992 2000 2002Note: Counts of the number of districts with a “Normalized” Two-Party Presidential Vote within a competitive range before and after a redistricting
Pro-Republican Bias in Congressional Districts
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
Republican Vote Share
Repu
blic
an S
eat S
hare
Post-RedistrictingPre-Redistricting
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