Michael Merry & Geert Driessen (2005) CE Islamic schools in three western countries: Policy and procedure.

Comparative EducationVol. 41, No. 4, November 2005, pp. 411–432

ISSN 0305-0068 (print)/ISSN 1360-0486 (online)/05/040411–22© 2005 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/03050060500300931

Islamic schools in three western countries: policy and procedureMichael S. Merrya* and Geert DriessenbaUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison, USA; bRadboud University Nijmegen, The

NetherlandsTaylor and Francis LtdCCED130076.sgm10.1080/03050060500300931Comparative Education0305-0068 (print)/1360-0486 (online)Original Article2005Taylor & Francis414000000November 2005MichaelMerryDepartment of Educational Policy StudiesUniversity of [email protected]

In this article, the authors compare Islamic schools in three countries: the United States, the Neth-erlands, and Belgium. In each country, the authors take care to situate Islamic schools within thebroader context of educational policy and practice. In particular, the authors examine the mecha-nisms for funding, choice and control, noting that for reasons specific to each context monitoringeither by the state or accrediting agencies poses both challenges and opportunities for Islamicschools.

Introduction

In this paper, we will compare the place of Islamic schools in three countries: theUnited States, the Netherlands and Belgium. The reasons for the choice of thesecountries have to do with the interesting differences that emerge in such a compari-son. Culturally, there is much to compare between the Netherlands and Belgiumowing to their geographical contiguity and political affinities. Both countries arerobust welfare states. Catholicism enjoys a strong influence in the Netherlands andBelgium, though it encompasses nearly all social institutions in Belgium, while theCalvinist tradition has historically been dominant in the Netherlands. The Dutchlanguage, as it concerns the Netherlands and the northern half of Belgium (Flanders),enhances the sameness, too. One also finds examples of non-denominational anddenominational schools in both countries, with a majority of children attending Cath-olic schools in Belgium, and either Protestant or Catholic schools in the Netherlands.

The United States offers an example of a highly industrialized western democracythat endeavours to maintain the separation of church and state. Yet despite itsresolute and well-intentioned claims, even a cursory glance at the political rhetoric of

*Corresponding author. 810 Chapin Street, Beloit, Wisconsin 53511, USA. Email: [email protected]

412 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen

American politicians, the practices in courtrooms across the country, and the privi-leging of Christian symbols and holidays in American public life reveals that the sepa-ration of church and state in the United States is far from clear. While church andstate battles have played out in public schools for various reasons, Islamic schoolshave inconspicuously grown in number and influence, mostly able to enjoy the free-dom accorded to various religious groups. With this freedom comes no direct federalaid and only minimal accountability to the state.

This picture is diametrically opposite to both the Netherlands and Belgium. Whilereligious education is widely available in both countries, in the Netherlands classes inreligion and life philosophy are required only in primary school, while in Belgiumeither religious instruction in any recognized religion (including Islam) or non-confessional ethics classes is compulsory for both primary and secondary levels. Thesecularization process in the urban areas since the 1960s in both countries has beenprofound, especially in certain Catholic provinces in the Netherlands and French-speaking Belgium. In the United States, in contrast, despite the reticence of publicschools and institutions on themes germane to religion, faith continues to be apowerful catalyst in public decision-making and political campaigns.

The Dutch situation in particular is a unique test case for the full funding of alldenominational schools, and not only those that have been historically privileged.This has to do with Dutch constitutional guarantees that have been in place for morethan eighty-five years. The Belgian situation is infinitely more complex; this is partlythe reason why we have chosen to include it in this study. Aside from its variouslanguage communities and regional governments, Belgium is unique in all of Europefor its large-scale provision of Islamic instruction in state schools. Many feel that thislargely explains why there have been so few proposals for more Islamic schools (Rathet al., 1991; Wagtendonk, 1991).

This study’s contribution lies mainly in its comparative analysis of the mechanismsfor funding, choice and control of Islamic schools between three highly industrializedwestern countries. While a great deal of discussion has been taken up in recent yearsconcerning the state funding and monitoring of religious schools (Judge, 2001;Underkuffler, 2001; de Jong & Snik, 2002), little has been done to compare thepolicies and procedural norms of Islamic schools between countries with sizableMuslim populations.

We must be clear at the outset that at no point in the following discussion can it beassumed that the ‘west’ equals ‘secular’ or that Islam equals ‘unified front’. Forstarters, secularism among the Muslim community itself is widespread in westerncountries, though Islamic identity is rarely questioned. Even non-practising Muslimswho smoke, drink alcohol, eat forbidden food, etc., seldom completely renounce theirMuslim identities. Also, an Islamic identity for many Muslims translates as little morethan a nationalist feeling; this is especially the case with the majority of Turkish-Europeans, for whom a public expression of Islam is discouraged. Finally, Islam,despite idealized portraits of a unified religion and a corresponding absence of inter-nal conflict by her apologists, is in fact fraught with internal tensions (Kazmi, 2003;Saadallah, 2004). Indeed, there is much dispute over the manner in which Muslims

Islamic schools in three western countries 413

are to express themselves qua Muslims in a western context. Similarly, by situatingIslamic schools in a western context, it cannot be assumed that Islamic schools are(a) undifferentiated or (b) occupy a ‘secular’ space. First, Islamic schools are quitedifferent one from the other; though a broad pattern of resemblance can be expected,schools operate according to different pedagogical goals and with varying levels ofadministrative efficiency. Second, no matter how much institutional Christianity hasbeen in decline over the past decades, the privileges for nominal Christian member-ship are still firmly established throughout Europe and North America.

Belgium

Muslims in Belgium

The two largest groups of immigrants in Belgium are Turkish and MoroccanMuslims. Collectively Muslims are estimated to comprise close to 4% (350,000) ofthe total Belgian population, but nearer to 10% of the population in the region ofBrussels-Capital with some 80,000 Turks and 140,000 Moroccans. Notwithstandingtheir acute differences, Moroccan and Turkish Muslims in Belgium show a similar,relatively young generational structure; they also typically are placed in the lowesttrack of education and are employed in semi-skilled or unskilled labour. In this way,the Muslim community as instantiated by these two ethnic groups impressivelymatches that of low educated Belgians living in the same relatively disadvantagedneighbourhoods (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002; Merry, 2005). While power relationsare undeniably present, some strive to be ‘integrated’ on the terms set by migrantpolicy (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1994; Blommaert & Martiniello, 1996), whileothers insist on remaining distinct, preferring to be recognized as minorities. This isless and less the case in the last fifteen years, as waves of second and third generationMuslims have naturalized as Belgian citizens.

Several successive occurrences gave rise to a strong reaction to Islam on Belgiansoil. These include the Islamic revolution in Iran, the American bombing of Tripoli,the Rushdie Affair, and the first Gulf War. Muslims have staged several protests(dubbed ‘riots’ by the media) in Brussels and Antwerp as well, and clashes with policehave sometimes been violent. In addition, the belief that foreign Islamic governmentsmay very well be plotting to infiltrate Belgian schools through Muslim teachers led toa growing sense of unease concerning the presence of Muslims. These items, coupledwith the concurrent rise of unemployment in the late 1980s, made Muslim immi-grants an easy scapegoat and the mayors of several Brussels-Capital municipalitiesexpressed grave concern over the provision of Islamic instruction in schools. Coincid-ing with these incidents was the rise of anti-immigrant (read, anti-Muslim) politics,particularly in Flanders. Worthy of mention here is the Vlaams Blok party. Owing toa strong cultural preservationist movement, the Blok has enjoyed unprecedentedsuccess for the past fifteen years. Much of its message has focused on the incompati-bility of Islamic culture with western cultures and values. At times its leaders haveopenly sought the deportation of Muslims to their countries of origin. It is largely in


reaction to the anti-Muslim rhetoric of groups like the Blok that Muslims have begunto organize themselves. The efforts, however, have not always been successful. In late2004, the high court in Belgium ruled that the Blok would not be allowed to continueunder its current name or with its previous agenda. It has since reorganized and oper-ates under the name, Vlaams Belang [Flemish Interest].

Belgian Islamic school(s)

Belgium is unique in the western world because of its wide-scale provision of Islamiceducation in public schools on demand (once a minimal threshold is reached). Suchinstruction has been provided since the 1975–1976 school year, when salaried postsfor Muslim teachers became legalized and available. Since that time, the law hasallowed for the teaching of Islam in public schools on the same basis as otherreligions; more than 700 Muslim teachers provide Islamic instruction and areemployed in the Belgian education system (Merry, 2005). For many years, theseteachers were contracted out by the embassies of the respective governments. Since1986 all instructors of Islamic education in Belgium are required to have eitherBelgian nationality or a minimum of five years residency, demonstrate the ability togive instruction in either Dutch or French, and receive a diploma recognized by theMinistry of National Education (Leman & Renaerts, 1996).

The Muslim Council, inaugurated in December 1998, alone may determine thecontent of the religious instruction, though generally the subjects taught include theQur’[amacr ] n (with recitation), the fiqh (Islamic law and jurisprudence), the sira (life ofthe Prophet and the period of the first four Caliphs), and Islamic dogma. Estimatessuggest that roughly 40% of Muslim children attend Islamic instruction in stateschools, while the majority attends the non-confessional ethics classes (Shadid & vanKoningsveld, 1995). Many Muslim parents feel that these classes are lacking insubstantive content, but given the relatively high degree of secularization among(particularly Moroccan) Muslim children, this concern seldom amounts to anything.To date, neither regional government has required that specific content be covered,nor has any systematic inspection of the lessons transpired.

One can trace many reasons why Muslim parents are not happy with the choicesavailable to them, particularly the schools with high concentrations of minorities.Even so, a large section of the Muslim population remains quite satisfied with the twohours per week of Islamic instruction provided by the Belgian state. One can also findIslamic instruction provided in some Catholic schools in which there is a heavyconcentration of minorities. This has meant that calls for Islamic schools in Belgiumhave been muted. For the handful of parents who insist on a total Islamic educationin which the values and ethos of Islam are incorporated into the entire school cultureand curriculum, few options remain.

While there have been several unorganized attempts to establish Islamic schools inBelgium, there remains only one Islamic primary school in Brussels, housed withinthe Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC). It is funded by the state, yet owing to its strongSaudi links, the orientation of the school is a rather orthodox one. Its student body

a


consists of two hundred primary school students, more or less, the majority of whomare in the kindergarten level (Renaerts, 1999). A significant number of its studentsare children of foreign diplomats. This school opened in 1989 amidst a storm ofcontroversy; indeed, its creation led to an incendiary debate over the Belgian consti-tutional guarantees of freedom of education. Its establishment can most certainly belinked to the refusal of two municipalities in Brussels for failing to make provision forIslamic instruction (Platti, 1990; Nielsen, 1992). These refusals were made on thebasis of there being no official representative recognized by the Belgian state toappoint teachers. Though there has been some discussion of establishing otherIslamic schools, resistance to more Islamic schools in Belgium has remained strong,notwithstanding the comparably liberal attitudes towards Islam.

Initial reactions to an Islamic school on Belgian soil were similar to those of thethen Secretary of State of Brussels, who argued that such a school would obstruct theaim of ‘integration’ that the Belgian government was pursuing. Similar scepticism wasvoiced by the Royal Commissioner of Immigration Policy, who insisted that the onlyacceptable Islam in Belgium was an ‘integrated’ Islam. Members of several politicalparties openly denounced it. One politician, when asked about the difference fromJewish or Christian schools, announced that neither of them ‘question the fundamen-tal rights and liberties of the Belgian society’. There really was no convincing argu-ment produced to suggest the illicit nature of founding an Islamic school (they areallowed in article 17 of the Belgian Constitution); rather, reactions had everything todo with the desirability of such a school (Dwyer & Meyer, 1996; Leman & Renaerts,1996).

In Belgium, despite an increase in calls for more Islamic schools—mainly from theArab European League, an Antwerp-based organization committed to empoweringEuropean Muslims—there is little being done about it and public debate has beenkept to a minimum. This is so for at least three reasons: (1) Islamic instruction, aspreviously stated, is widely provided in state schools; (2) most Muslim parents lackthe motivation and savvy to organize new schools; and (3) there is strong public oppo-sition to the idea, especially from the Vlaams Blok, which for the past fifteen years hasenjoyed as much as one-third of the vote in the province of Antwerp and in the lastelections became the largest party in Flanders.

The Netherlands

Muslims in the Netherlands

While the Netherlands shares a strikingly similar immigration history to Belgium, itsnumbers of Turks and Moroccans are almost exactly reversed. Estimates today putthe number of Muslims at more than one million in the Netherlands, or roughly 6%of the total population. Despite a centuries old liberal tolerance for which the Neth-erlands is renowned, many incidents of xenophobia and hatred have taken placeagainst Islamic institutions, including Islamic schools. Public opinion appears todemand a crackdown on a longstanding liberal immigration policy and opposition to


the presence of so many immigrants and asylum seekers has grown so much that theDutch government admitted only 0.6% of the asylum-seekers seeking refuge in theNetherlands in 2001, the lowest percentage in all of Europe (van Stokrom, 2003).Nevertheless, for those already in the Netherlands, the complete revision of the DutchConstitution in 1983 ensures equal protection (article 1) under the law regardless ofone’s religious or non-religious affiliation. This article provides the cornerstone onwhich minorities in the Netherlands are able to appeal for equal representation andtreatment.

In 2001, the Netherlands witnessed the unprecedented electoral success of PimFortuyn. Fortuyn, who sought to have the first article to the Dutch Constitutionthrown out, was assassinated only days prior to the May 2002 elections. While hisparty (LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn) did not enjoy the same magnitude of success as theVlaams Blok in Belgium, it was also demonstrably anti-immigrant, stressing theincompatibility of Islamic culture with western liberalism. This ‘incompatibility ofcultures’ rhetoric has been dubbed the ‘new racism’ (Modood & Werbner, 1997).‘Islam is a deteriorated culture,’ Fortuyn announced in De Volkskrant following areport that an imam had compared pigs to gays and found pigs more favourable(Meuleman, 2001). Fortuyn, an ostentatiously gay male, nevertheless managed toelicit broad support from average Dutch citizens and many immigrants rallied behindhim as well.

Until recently, cultural preservation has never been as strong a political issue in theNetherlands as it has in Flanders (de Witte & Klandermans, 2000). This is changing.Fortuyn opened the door to candid intolerance, and tensions continue to skyrocket.Recently, comments in a book published by an Amsterdam mosque advocating thathomosexuals be thrown from tall buildings headfirst led to several public denuncia-tions. Not only have some decried such hate speech as beyond the limits of freedomof speech, many also continue to point to the climbing crime rates and large numbersof immigrants who are unemployed. Security concerns and ‘integration’ of immigrantsare at the top of the list of constituent demands. The Minister of Education intendsto require immigrants to organize, fund and take Dutch courses (including passing adaunting exam) prior to entering the Netherlands.

Dutch Islamic schools

The first initiatives were taken in 1980, but it was not until 1988 that the first Islamicschools were founded. That it took so long was mainly because the Muslims whowished to found a new school often were inexperienced and did not speak the Dutchlanguage well. Moreover, most were not familiar with the complexities of the legisla-tion, the political balance in the city councils and the bureaucratic rules. Equallyrelevant was the fact that the people who took the initiative generally did not receivea great deal of cooperation from the central or local authorities; sometimes they evenfelt the authorities had a policy of actively discouraging the founding of Islamicschools (Teunissen, 1990; Rath et al., 1997). As regards the latter, in the cities ofUtrecht and Rotterdam, for instance, the process and success of founding an Islamic


school varied considerably. According to Rath et al. (1996), the reason for this wasthat in Utrecht Muslims were judged from a religious perspective, while in Rotterdamthey were judged with regard to their social and socio-economic characteristics. Theresult was that the Muslims in Rotterdam met with far fewer obstacles than those inUtrecht (Driessen & Merry, forthcoming).

Still, the pioneer work of the first schools and the establishment of the IslamicSchool Board Organization (ISBO) paved the way for the founding of later schools.In 2003, there were 41 Islamic primary, 2 Islamic secondary schools and 2 Islamicuniversities; each of them is supported by sections of the three major Muslim commu-nities: Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese (Dwyer & Meyer, 1995). It should be notedthat these still are only small numbers; there are more than 7000 primary and almost700 secondary schools in the Netherlands. The total primary school populationamounts to 1,550,000 students of whom 100,000 or almost 7% are of Turkish orMoroccan descent. Some 8400 students attend the Islamic primary schools, of which94.5% are disadvantaged; 40% of these students are Moroccan, 37% are Turkish, andthe rest constitutes a heterogeneous population of mainly asylum-seekers. Mostschools attract students from one specific ethnic group, either Moroccan or Turkish.

Islamic schools face many obstacles in maintaining an idealistic Islamic atmosphereconducive to promoting Islamic values and norms. Besides a severe shortage of qual-ified Muslim instructors, Walford (2002) elaborates other reasons why Islamic schoolsare not able—for the time being—to foster an exclusively Islamic culture within theschools:

(1) while Islamic schools are well-funded—owing to their high ethnic minority/low-income status student concentration these schools are typically given 1.9 timesthe base figure per student compared to other schools; see below—insufficientfunds exist for developing Muslim-oriented materials, or, for that matter, totranslate existing materials into Dutch;

(2) the challenges facing new Islamic schools are so great that resources are spreadthinly and energies are invested in other time-consuming projects;

(3) the very existence of Islamic schools is seen as a remarkable improvement overthe previous situation that many are content to make minor adjustments andmodifications to the existing curriculum. For some Islamic schools, this results ina school atmosphere that is little different from other Dutch schools, denomina-tional or not. This certainly applies to the non-Islamic schools that are attendedmainly by Turkish and Moroccan students.

Many studies have shown (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1991, 1995, 1996) thatIslamic schools in the Netherlands are far from homogeneous, though commonlyschools are organized along ethnic and ideological lines. A relatively high number ofthe schools is considered ‘liberal’ inasmuch as they reflect similar orientations toDutch society as non-Muslim schools. Other schools could be categorized as ‘conser-vative’ owing to the contents of religious instruction and the observation of theIslamic rules of behaviour by staff and students. The main difference from the ‘liberal’schools has to do with the orientation to the Islamic world and not to Dutch society.


What is important to point out, however, is that most Islamic schools—regardless ofa more ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ orientation—are quite disposed to make minoradaptations to the existing Dutch curriculum in order to ‘Islamicize’ the learningmaterials.

The United States

Muslims in the United States

It has always been difficult to guess the number of Muslims living in the United States.Estimates vary widely from two to seven million (Broadway, 2001), but three to fourmillion is probably accurate.1 While there are more Muslims in California than anyother state, the heaviest concentrations of Muslims are in New Jersey and New York,followed by Florida and Texas. In the Midwest, Illinois, Michigan and Ohio have thestrongest representation (Haniff, 2003). Recent studies2 indicate that 25% ofAmerican Muslims who regularly attend a mosque are of Arab descent, 33% is southAsian, while 30% is African-American. More than a third of American Muslims areconverts (D’Agostino, 2003; Cesari, 2004), 64% of whom are African-Americans,27% white, many with a Jewish background (CAIR Mosque Study, 2001; HartfordInstitute for Religious Research, 2002). The number of mosques in the United Statesincreased by 42% between 1990–2000, and while most studies continue to quote thefindings of the 2001 CAIR study which concluded there to be some 1200 mosques,other estimates place the number of mosques at more than 2000.

Prior to 9/11, American hostility toward Muslims—while tame compared toEurope—has typically resulted from overseas attacks on Americans by Muslims, suchas the 1979–80 Iranian hostage crisis or the 1982 bombing of US Marines in Beirut.The Rushdie Affair, the Gulf Wars, the continued spate of sensationalist anti-Islamicliterature in recent years, and most especially the stereotypes of a bloodthirsty Islamin film and popular media fuel a vague anti-Islamic undercurrent in American society.There can be no question that ethnic and religious profiling since 9/11 has targetedordinary Muslims and Islamic organizations in ways previously unimagined. Never-theless, the fact that English, and not Arabic or Urdu, continues to be the primarylanguage used in American mosques (Dirks, 2004), coupled with the fact that severalIslamic organizations (e.g., Muslim Public Affairs Council, Council for AmericanIslamic Relations) are able to bring considerable pressure to bear on government andthe courts, means not only that the majority of American Muslims feel quite assimilatedinto their respective communities but also that Islam has a viable political voice.

American Islamic schools

The earliest Islamic schools in the United States were being established in the late1970s, though the numbers grew significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. During thatsame time, two Islamic colleges were also founded in Chicago, and plans for anIslamic seminary are underway on the east coast. The reasons for the dramatic growth


in American Islamic schools mainly has to do with some parents’ desires to provide aculturally and religiously coherent learning environment for their children as well asthe relatively few legal obstacles community members face in establishing Islamicschools.

The formation of the Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA) in1991 marked the dawn of a new age in organized Islamic schools. Though growingpains were evident for several years and a series of halting attempts were made tocoordinate efforts across the country, there were serious obstacles present in the areaof representation, leadership and direction (Muhammad, 1998). There is no nationalagency directing the educational content in schools; most decisions are left to individ-ual states. As private schools, Islamic schools must do little more than acquire a spacefor learning and the staff adequate to providing rudimentary services. No minimumnumber of students is required. For now, most Islamic schools continue to borrowheavily from surrounding public and private schools for ideas on the school charter,lesson plans, textbooks and pedagogical concepts. This dependency on ideas andpractices of others has created a certain identity crisis for those who work in Islamicschools. Many teachers and administrators are convinced that apart from a distinctivedress code, Arabic language, and Islamic religious instruction, there is little that isdifferent about Islamic schools if compared to nearby religious or even public schools.

Because there is no central agency through which Islamic schools operate (ClaraMuhammad schools being excepted; see below), it is difficult to keep track of thenumber of schools. Estimates vary widely but some place the number of Islamicschools at as many as four hundred (Maughan, 2003), most of which are elementaryschools only. School governance can be difficult; Islamic school administrators arenotoriously overworked and underpaid. The average length of employment for anIslamic school administrator is three years, roughly half of the public school average(Saleh, 2000). Reports of inadequate administrative support, low pay, staff burnout,and school board ineffectiveness are common. Teacher retention remains an ongoingchallenge to Islamic schools (Ezzidine & Moes, 2004).

Islamic schools manifest some ethnic diversity, but in the main they continue to beorganized around ethnically dominant groups. Palestinian and Indo-Pakistani fami-lies are two groups that frequently organize Islamic schools. Ethnic minorities can befound in most Islamic schools, including some Caucasian converts, but one ethnicgroup typically dominates. Islamic schools may not discriminate in the admissionsprocess on racial grounds (according to Title VII of the Civil Rights legislation of1964), but notwithstanding this limitation, they may discriminate on religiousgrounds if they choose to.

Clara Muhammad schools

Headquartered in Fayetteville, Georgia, currently at least 40 Clara Muhammadschools are scattered throughout the United States and Bermuda, usually in largercities. Each school is individually governed and administered, although its curriculumis centralized. Its students tend to be predominately African-American, though


anyone regardless of race, class or creed may attend. These schools seek to promoteself-pride, cleanliness and self-determination, but also academic and moral disciplineoften not found in inner city schools. They operate under the banner, ‘intelligencewithout morality is a destructive force’ and have made tremendous efforts to developtheir own curriculum, independent of the materials and philosophy of other schools.One researcher explains, ‘their collective objective is to carry the spirit of Qur’[amacr ] n toenable the human intellect to be revived for the advancement of human society’(Muhammad, 1998, p. 92). Parental involvement may vary widely from one schoolto another, and many of the schools host a disproportionate number of troubledchildren, making the task of discipline and higher achievement formidable. There isalso, of course, an argument to be made for cultural coherence in Clara Muhammadschools. To the extent that the Clara Muhammad schools seek to redress the social-economic disadvantages of black American children, there is much that can becompared with Islamic schools elsewhere, particularly as it concerns identity forma-tion and the building of self-esteem.

African-Americans are conspicuously absent from most of the proceedings of theIslamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the majority of non-African-AmericanMuslims either have no knowledge of Clara Muhammad schools, or else very lowopinions on the basis of perceived ‘lifestyle’ issues, i.e., unruly behaviour, teenagepregnancies, and drug use. This may be the case because a number of Clara Muham-mad schools service an unusually high concentration of disadvantaged children, manyof whom are not even Muslim, but whose parents are looking for more discipline,character development, and better educational opportunities. Challenges facing ClaraMuhammad schools include the effort to be more ‘Islamic,’ and generating sufficientresources to maintain high quality instruction (Hakim & Muhammad, 1992).

Funding, choice and control

Belgium and the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, state interference in religious schools, resulting from completefunding, is quite high. According to Eurydice (2004, p. 41), ‘The relationshipbetween educational institutions and the government is characterized by a largemeasure of institutional autonomy; government merely creates the right conditions’.Still, compared to the American situation one can accurately speak of higher levels ofinterference. Belgium’s situation is remarkably similar, except that not all types ofschools are funded exactly the same. The language divide in Belgium means that theGerman-, French- and Dutch-speaking communities handle matters as they pertainto education. Education is simply not discussed on a national level, but is left to theregional governments.

State control in both countries means that the range of subjects and number ofhours of instruction in each is carefully specified. There must also be attention givento multiculturalism, meaning that no one perspective can eclipse others representedin Dutch or Belgian culture. Also required is attention to several world religions. All

a


students in both countries are required to take courses in religion and/or ethics,though only in Belgium is non-Christian instruction widely available. Religious orideological instruction can occur in any school, but the number of hours is tightlyregulated. In the Netherlands, each school must produce a ‘school plan’, which hasto be submitted to the Education Inspectorate for approval. Although there have beensome recent changes towards greater local management of schools, the normal prac-tice is for the government to set and pay directly for all teachers, buildings and schoolcosts. The number of teachers for each school, their salaries, and conditions of workare determined by the government. A very important feature designed to ensureequity is that private schools are not allowed to charge any ‘top up’ fees, and may onlycharge for extra-curricular activities including visits (Walford, 2001). Schools in bothcountries are required to appoint only qualified staff, but they may use religion andlifestyle as criteria in their selection.

As it concerns choice, both Belgium and the Netherlands allow complete freedomof education for state schools, though in Belgium schools are further divided accord-ing to communal (Flemish, German and French), regional (Brussels, Wallonia andFlanders), and municipal levels. The linguistic divide in Belgium also complicates thechoice available to Muslim minorities, particularly for Moroccans, but this is slowlychanging. Denominational schools in the Netherlands continue to show preferencefor children from the same religious background, while in Belgium this is no longerlegal, but continues surreptitiously, i.e., by requiring a certificate of baptism, or byinsisting on expensive school uniforms that poorer families are unable to afford.Furthermore, new laws require that state schools in Belgium no longer showpreference on the basis of language, nor may state schools in the Netherlands givepreference to native Dutch children. Provided there is room, no one who applies canbe turned away.

As in the United States, not all schools in Belgium and the Netherlands have thesame reputation. Important differences emerge. In the Netherlands, school testsresults and quality indicators are made public and can be cross-referenced; inBelgium, while very strict requirements are imposed on the material that teachers mustcover, every school has its own tests and reliable comparisons are difficult to come by.Both countries have attempted to provide intercultural education and instruction inthe mother tongue though efforts in both countries have largely failed (Hermans,2002; Driessen, 2004). As it concerns school funding, both countries allocate moremoney for schools with high concentrations of poor students. In Belgium, differentinitiatives correspond to the different regional governments. Wallonian policies haveattempted to put more money in schools with higher minority concentrations, whileFlemish policies have tried to ‘de-concentrate’ schools, thereby expanding the respon-sibility to be shouldered by more schools (Merry, 2005). The Netherlands has a verysystematic approach: ‘average’ Dutch children count for 1 point, working-class Dutchchildren count for 1.25, while ethnic minority children count for 1.9. This means thatschools with high concentrations of ethnic minorities can expect to receive nearly twiceas much funding for staff, school materials and programmes3. Despite these efforts,the position of Muslims in the Netherlands and Belgium on the whole has not


improved; indeed, one can locate reasons to believe that more local control, increasedparental choice and the publishing of school achievement levels have not substantiallycontributed to greater academic success (Mulder & van der Werf, 1997; Driessen &Valkenberg, 2000).

A closer look at the Dutch case

Full government funding is available to Islamic schools in the Netherlands oncecertain minimal requirements are met. Statutory requirements, having become muchstricter since 1993, now stipulate that there must be at least a 200-student minimum,the language of instruction has to be Dutch, the teachers have to be qualified, andthe curriculum has to comply with the stipulations laid down in the Primary Educa-tion Act. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that no other school already in exist-ence within a two-kilometre radius is able to replicate the aims of the school. Mostdifficult, school sponsors have to demonstrate that the number of students can bemaintained for a full fifteen years beyond the first five years. It is the municipalitythat grants permission for the schools to be established. If the proposals for a newschool accent the wrong thing(s), the process can take years to complete. Becausethese regulations have tightened in order to curtail the number of new schools beingestablished, it has meant that many schools, even across denominational boundaries,have had to merge in order to remain open. The number of new schools establishedsince 1990 has fallen dramatically (Walford, 2001). This legislation is fairly specificand explicit, making it hard for the local authorities to prevent the founding ofIslamic schools, though the process of founding such a school is nonetheless arduousand faces many challenges.

Yet while there continues to be a steady rise in the number of Islamic schools(10 schools are currently being added to the 41 mentioned above), the currentnumber does not even begin to meet the demand for more schools. According to astudy by van Kessel (2000), in the city of Amsterdam, where approximately 50% ofthe primary school children were of foreign origin and 6 Islamic schools alreadyexisted, there was a need for an additional 20 schools. In 2004, van Kessel (2004)concluded from a series of studies on school choice that 30–40% of the Turkish andMoroccan parents would send their children to an Islamic school if there were sucha school in the neighbourhood. Based on this preference he estimated that in theNetherlands as a whole there is, in addition to the 41 existing Islamic primary schools,a need for another 120 such schools (Phalet & van Praag, 2004; Driessen & Merry,forthcoming). With more demand for Islamic schools, there is typically a commensu-rate hesitancy, to put it mildly, on the part of local governing councils to cooperatewith the initiatives (Mureau, 2004).

Several recent investigations by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education (Inspectie vanhet Onderwijs, 1999, 2002, 2003) have concluded that almost all of the Islamic schoolshave an open attitude towards Dutch society and play a positive role in creating condi-tions for social cohesion. Furthermore, the schools’ instructional approach is cultur-ally sensitive, Dutch language instruction is prominently featured, contacts with other


schools and local educational and welfare institutions are apparent, and parentalparticipation remains an important goal. Only in a handful of schools was the religiouscontent questionable, but the reports have emphatically stated that Islamic schools areno cause for alarm. Other studies have demonstrated similar findings (Driessen, 1997;Driessen & Bezemer, 1999; Driessen & Valkenberg, 2000; Walford, 2002).

In 1998, the Internal Security Service (ISS; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1998)published a report on political Islam in the Netherlands. One of the domains the ISSstudied was the education at Islamic schools. Specifically, it had concerns with theinterference of foreign powers (e.g., Saudi-Arabia) and political-Islamic organizationswith the contents of education. The results of the ISS’ study showed that its suspicionwas not completely unfounded. Some schools received substantial donations from theAl-Waqf al-Islami organization, which propagates a very orthodox politic-religiousworldview and is intolerant towards liberal Muslims, Jews and Christians. The ISSconcluded that the number of radical Muslims in the Netherlands was very small, andthat there is no need to fear a growing power and influence in the short run. For thelonger term, however, the ISS expects these organizations to gain power as a conse-quence of the socio-economic malaise, marginalization and exclusion of Muslimimmigrants. The results, it hypothesized, might be polarization and disruption of theprocess of integration.

Each of the Dutch political parties knows that to deny rights to one group ofschools, or even some of the schools, is to espouse an untenable and potentiallyembarrassing position. More likely is an attenuated route to ‘integration’ viameasures to require Dutch language proficiency for immigrants prior to arriving inthe Netherlands and citizenship education requirements. For now, however, thepublic opinion is strongly against Islamic schools. The reasons typically are thatthey are socially divisive, nationalistic, or encourage intolerance and separatismfrom ‘liberal’ Dutch values. The challenge remains, nonetheless, for Dutch policy-makers, viz., whether Muslims living in the Netherlands will be attracted totolerant, liberal values when Muslims’ own freedoms to assemble are increasinglyunder intense scrutiny.

Yet each of these challenges, as of April 2004, constitutes the least of Muslim prob-lems in the Netherlands. In the spring of 2004, Minister of Education van der Hoevendetermined that any new Islamic school must have a school board comprised entirelyof members with Dutch nationality. Furthermore, they must now explain to theMinistry of Education how they plan to adhere to Dutch norms and values, and nomore than 80% of the student body can be from a disadvantaged background. Thisnew ruling—buttressed by public opinion following the murder of Theo van Gogh inNovember, 2004—undoubtedly portends negative consequences for the founding ofnew Islamic schools. Dutch Islamic schools, while at one time very promising in theNetherlands, now face insurmountable challenges from the Ministry of Education.How Islamic schools will even manage to find 20% students who are not from disad-vantaged backgrounds remains unclear. The new ruling under Minister van derHoeven would most certainly lead to an abrupt halt in the founding of new Islamicschools.


The United States

American Islamic schools, old and new, face daunting financial and logistical chal-lenges. There may be money available through the mosque, provided the school ismosque affiliated. Yet this mosque affiliation causes innumerable problems as itconcerns control, pedagogy and masjid politics. Very few Islamic schools, includingthose that are well established, are able to provide a school nurse, proper science labfacilities, social workers, music or fine arts classes, special education services, orguidance counsellors. Most also do not have a library or extracurricular activities.Institutional developments are slow, schools are understaffed, and correspondingstandards in many schools are poor. Many are still struggling to procure accreditationand state recognition, largely because they are unable to meet state requirements.Increasingly one hears calls for a national Islamic educational trust fund.

Private schools (including religious schools) in the United States receive no directfunding, either from the individual states or the federal government. Provided thatmonies are given to school boards and not to schools directly, schools may be grantedreal estate, income and sales tax-exemption and many private schools benefit fromtextbook and transportation subsidies. Only a few cities currently experiment withvoucher programmes, which allow those who qualify to attend other schools thatparticipate in the programme, including in some cases private religious schools. It isunclear how many Muslims are availing themselves of these different initiatives,though in Milwaukee, Wisconsin approximately 70% of the student body in bothIslamic schools (one is largely Arab-American while the other is a Clara Muhammadschool) are voucher recipients.

Many religious (including Islamic) schools make financial assistance available tofamilies who have difficulty paying the fees, but it is the exception rather than the rulethat a school can provide full scholarships, except in the more elite private schools.The majority of American private schools have a religious affiliation, though asignificant number of elite academies also exist which have no denominational basis.Religious schools are far more likely to have smaller budgets; this translates as lowerteacher salaries and fewer resources for school facilities and teaching materials. Thesame applies to Islamic schools. Despite noble aims and very committed staff, tightbudgets also mean that many Islamic schools are far from where they need to be tolive up to the claims of excellence they promise. Basic school facilities are a toppriority for Islamic schools seeking accreditation. If a school has no sinks, eyewash oracid cabinets for the science classes, this prevents the school from having the status itcovets and creates an additional strain on the staff, who must forego pay raises so thatthe school building may be upgraded.

The question of mosque affiliation also continues to be a difficult one for schools.Independence from the mosque provides more freedom to organize the schoolaccording to the aims of the school board, but independence also brings with it formi-dable challenges for school budgets. School fees for a typical student at a well-staffedIslamic school can run to several thousand dollars a year; this does not includeuniforms or textbooks. Parents also have to decide whether they want their children


involved in extracurricular activities that the school may not provide. As is the casefor public schools, American Islamic schools are only as good as their staff, facilitiesand parents make them. Many teachers lament how the fiscal limitations of theirschool curb the range of educational experiences their students are able to have,though positive home reinforcement continues to be the number one reason whystudents succeed (Lareau, 2000, 2002, 2003).

Since 1997, the Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA) hasardently pushed the accreditation issue for Islamic schools and it continues to be aprominent theme at regional and national education conferences. Schools seek outaccreditation for a variety of reasons. Mainly accreditation gives a school its seal ofvalidation or approval; it tells the parents and other schools that an accredited schoolmeets certain recognized standards. Being accredited does not guarantee quality,however. Private, nongovernmental agencies normally govern this domain, andquality controls vary widely. Therefore, a rather rigorous process must unfold with areputable accrediting agency if schools are to meet the requirements necessary forapproval, including recognition by the state.

Several religious denominations have their own accrediting agencies, most of whichare respected by the respective states, and state recognition is important in order toqualify for state funded programmes, scholarship commissions, foundations, and themilitary, to name a few. If an Islamic school recruits an accrediting agency that sharesan inspection team with members of the state board, it typically finds that qualitylevels remain high. If shortcuts are taken in order to receive the ‘accredited’ label,quality may be severely compromised. Before accreditation can occur, however, theremust first be appropriate health, safety, zoning, occupancy, fire and physical structurepermits. If a school must provide, say, a nurse or physical education activities in orderto receive state accreditation, staff typically do everything within their means to followthrough. An accrediting agency will usually be patient, moreover, with a school thathas two or three non-certified teachers if they play a critical role in non-certifiableareas (e.g., religion). The main items to determine, once these basic requirements areaccomplished, concern the role that parents will play in the internal affairs of theschool (Zarzour & Siddiqui, 2004).

For the time being, Islamic schools are well advised to use the existing accreditingagencies rather than look to an Islamic educational agency such as the CISNA,which cannot currently enable schools to implement a set of standards. States maynot regulate the content of religious instruction, but other religious accrediting agen-cies give a great deal of freedom for the religious character of schools to flourish(Zarzour, 2003), which makes the need for a specific Islamic accrediting agencyredundant. Furthermore, while the IQRA International Educational Foundation andthe International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) are making impressive efforts tosupplement existing curricula, no comprehensive set of curricular materials forIslamic schools presently exists. Most new schools look to neighbouring religiousschools (e.g., Jewish, Lutheran, Catholic) for school handbook and teacher contracttemplates, as well as curricular plans. From there, appropriate adjustments andmodifications are made. Each state may have its own laws concerning not-for-profit


organizations and schools. Nevertheless, states reserve the right to regulate healthand safety of all schools, and may ensure that religious schools are providing a servicethey claim to. Islamic school organizers know that it is first necessary to know thestate requirements and then act, openly and transparently, on them. This helps toavoid religious stereotyping and keep media distortion to a minimum (severalAmerican newspapers have falsely alleged that Islamic schools teach hate); also,active participation in the local community through a variety of committees (e.g., citycouncil, school and zoning boards) can facilitate the procedures and inspections.Such participation also aids in developing a healthy relationship with committeemembers who may find the school deficient in standards required for accreditationbut are inclined to offer suggestions for ways to improve.

Conclusions

For the small but growing number of Muslims who seek out an Islamic education fortheir children, public schools represent moral permissiveness and lower academicachievement. Others are dismayed with the extent to which schools ignore thecultural and religious identities of Muslim children. Notwithstanding the fact thatmany urban schools offer Muslim children fewer opportunities than suburban ones,the majority of Muslims living in western countries continue to be mostly satisfiedwith the public education available to their children (Parker-Jenkins, 2002). Yet witha growing unease in western societies towards militant Islam, and as materialism takesa foothold in the second generation, Muslims are increasingly eager to cultivatepositive Islamic identities consistent with western citizenship, even at a time whencitizenship for many Muslims in Europe is being denied and ethnic profiling contin-ues in the United States.

In all three countries studied, some Muslims feel that Islamic schools are a healthyalternative to public schools, though in Belgium, where Islamic instruction in thestate (and some denominational) schools is made widely available, the call for Islamicschools is less urgent. Despite there being a constitutional right to denominationalequality, talk of Islamic schools being set up in cities other than Brussels thus far hasbeen met with either disinterest or disapproval. This, however, may change as resis-tance to discrimination against Muslims becomes more organized and outspoken.One such group that is increasingly vocal in Belgian politics is the Arab EuropeanLeague, and establishing more Islamic schools is part of their political agenda. In theNetherlands, while full funding of Islamic schools is an attractive feature, theaccountability controls and lack of Muslim staff make the aims of Muslim educatorsextremely difficult to implement. Despite constitutional guarantees and the success-ful efforts of school organizers, there remain many hurdles to jump to organize anIslamic school and new legislation will make it even more difficult. There is evenreason to believe that greater state maintenance and control of religious schools hasthe effect of fostering a less religiously based school culture.

The minimal amount of federal or state control of religious schools in the UnitedStates does not mean that Islamic schools are doing whatever they want. Anxious to


have credibility in the eyes of the surrounding culture and give their children the besteducation they can afford—consistent, of course, with an Islamic educationalmodel—the overwhelming majority of Islamic schools eagerly solicit outside ‘interfer-ence’ from other schools and local government in order to bring the school up to par.Academic excellence is foremost in organizers’ minds; so is success. Most schools aretherefore accredited by the states in which they are established and, allowing for agreatly reduced school budget, schools usually emulate other reputable school modelssuch as state standardized tests, learning targets, and nationally recognized textbooks.Some educators are even encouraging a charter school model in order to receivegovernment subsidies. But one thing is abundantly clear: rather than shun account-ability, American Islamic schools enthusiastically embrace it.

Concerning choice of education in each of the three countries examined, the free-dom to establish Islamic schools in Belgium and the Netherlands exists principallybecause of their respective national constitutions, but in neither country haveMuslims found it easy to establish Islamic schools. No private Islamic schools exist ineither country nor are they likely to. Constitutional guarantees in the Netherlands inparticular have made it possible for Muslims to demand equal funding for Islamicschools, while for the time being Belgium has circumvented the issue by offeringwide-scale Islamic instruction in state schools. Notwithstanding its constitutionalguarantees, the Netherlands makes no consistent provisions for Islamic schools, andthus has been forced—on the strength of its own legislation—to support Islamicschools as long as minimal requirements are met. It would be untrue to say thatMuslims are being singled out on the issue of separate schools. Sikhs, Hindus andevangelical Protestants in the Netherlands have also waged legal battles to win theright to establish separate schools, some of them lasting years (Walford, 2001, 2002).Still, Muslims are commonly seen as a threatening political presence in a way that theother groups generally are not. Equality on paper, therefore, has not translated intoequality in practice. Notwithstanding the positive reports issued by the Dutch Inspec-torate of Education, Islamic schools continue to be viewed with distrust, and electionsmake Islamic schools easy targets for vilification as unemployment and crime pushpopular opinion against the presence of a visible minority group. In the wake of thevan Gogh murder, some mosques and Islamic schools became targets either forvandalism or arson.

In the United States, despite the fact that the number of Islamic schools continuesto climb, owing to the lack of direct state subsidies to private schools it is perhaps trueto say that private religious schools are equally disadvantaged. Still, with a muchwealthier and better-educated Muslim populace, many American Muslims are betterable to pay the steep fees that Islamic schools require to operate. These fees can bereduced once tax exemption status is procured and if/when schools establish links toa mosque to help shoulder the financial burden. Given the higher socio-economicstatus of Muslims in the United States, Muslims are better positioned to see thenumber of Islamic schools rise. Some Muslims are calling for Islamic charter schoolsor an expansion of voucher programmes while others caution against such initiativesknowing that state controls may interfere with the school mission. Most schools


operate according to curricular plans comparable or identical to surrounding publicor more established denominational schools. However, it is also likely that bettergovernance of school curriculum from an Islamic accrediting agency will emerge inthe next ten years.

Concerns over the quality of education for children in Islamic schools vary fromschool to school and cannot be indiscriminately applied. In most cases, there is aperiod of ‘growing pains’ at new schools in all three countries. Because of the heavyconcentration of disadvantaged children in Dutch Islamic schools, no promisingtrends presently exist pointing to better academic outcomes for Islamic schoolstudents. This is so despite generous funding for schools with large disadvantagedpopulations. There is no comparable evidence in either Belgium or the United States.In Belgium this is the case because only one Islamic school exists and it receives fullstate funding (many of its parents are also foreign diplomats), while in the UnitedStates Islamic schools are established by communities determined to do so, often withthe generous aid of donations and voluntarism of the Muslim community. Wheresome critics of Islamic schools continue to have lingering anxiety, however, concernsthe ability of Islamic schools to prepare children to live in a multicultural society andto reflect critically upon their inherited beliefs and cultural norms.

Notes

1. The 2001 CAIR study concluded that there are approximately 5–6 million, while that sameyear the American Jewish Committee estimated there to be 1.9 million. The State Universityof New York (SUNY) conducted another study, also in 2001, in which they concluded thereto be between 1.1 and 2.2 million. See Broadway (2001). The reasons for this uncertainty haveto do with the fact that both the US Census Bureau and US Immigration Service are forbiddento ask questions concerning one’s religion. Moreover, most mosques do not have formalmembership policies and it is rare to find accurate attendance records. Using ethnicity as anindicator of religious affiliation is unreliable for a variety of reasons not least because a largenumber of Arab-Americans are Christian.

2. The breakdown in ethnicity varies somewhat from study to study and, particularly since 9/11/2001, is sometimes guided by ideology. Another finding, with data supplied by the AmericanMuslim Council and gathered between 1986–1992, reports South Asians at 24.4%, African-Americans at 42%, Arabs at 12.4%, Turks at 2.4%, Iranians at 3.6%. See www.ugs.edu/islam/muslimpop_usa.html. Jocelyne Cesari is correct to say that a systematic comparison of different[Muslim] ethnic groups in the United States ‘remains to be written’ (Cesari, 2004, p. 4).

3. The Dutch Educational Priority Policy (Onderwijsvoorrangsbeleid or OVB) had as one of itsprimary purposes to supply schools with more staff, special teaching methods, and opportuni-ties for more contact with parents of ethnic minority pupils. However, one longitudinal studyin the 1990s demonstrated that the OVB had had very little impact on the achievement levelsof disadvantaged pupils. Three reasons are likely for this. First, outside of priority or targetareas, school staff were largely unaware of the extra resources. Second, no conditions were setfor how schools would use extra staff or resources; the only criterion was that the schools submita plan ‘describing problems, aims, activities, organizational structure and budget allocations’.Third, while some improvements (e.g., class size reduction) were observable, these were notlimited to the targeted groups but extended to all groups, thus maintaining the general achieve-ment gap. (Mulder & van der Werf, 1997). Some evidence suggests that the situation for disad-vantaged autochthonous Dutch children, most of whom live in the rural northern provinces and


count as 1.25, has deteriorated even more than it has for the allochthonous pupils. See Tesser,(2003), pp. 53–78. The Educational Disadvantage Policy (Onderwijsachterstandbeleid), whichtook over where the Educational Priority Policy left off, effectively gives more autonomy to themunicipalities and local school boards. This portends more difficulties in assessing both theappropriation of funding and the achievement of disadvantaged students.

Notes on contributors

Michael S. Merry recently completed his doctorate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His dissertation is a philosophical-comparative study of Islamicschools in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States. He has publishedseveral articles dealing with Islam and Muslim populations in the west.

Geert Driessen is a senior educational researcher at the Institute of Applied SocialSciences (ITS) of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His majorresearch interests include the position of immigrant children in education,inequality in education, first and second language acquisition, gender and educa-tion, parental participation, religion, denomination and education, and Islamicschools.

References

Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst [Interior Security Service] (1998) De politieke islam in Nederland[The political Islam in the Netherlands] (Den Haag, Ministry of Domestic Affairs).

Blommaert, J. & Martiniello, M. (1996) Ethnic mobilization, multiculturalism and the politicalprocess in two Belgian cities: Antwerp and Liège, Innovation, 9, 51–73.

Blommaert, J. & Verschueren, J. (1994) The Belgian migrant debate, New Community, 20, 227–251.Broadway, B. (2001, November 24) Number of US Muslims depends on who’s counting,

Washington Post, p. A1.CAIR Mosque Study (2001) Available online at: www.cair-net.org/mosquereport/ (accessed 8

August 2005).Cesari, J. (2004) When Islam and democracy meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States (New

York, Palgrave Macmillan).D’Agostino, M. (2003) Muslim personhood: translation, transnationalism and Islamic reli-

gious education among Muslims in New York City, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 23,285–294.

de Jong, J. & Snik, G. (2002) Why should states fund denominational schools? Journal of Philosophyof Education, 36(4), 573–587.

de Witte, H. & Klandermans, B. (2000) Political racism in Flanders and The Netherlands:explaining differences in the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties, Journal of Ethnicand Migration Studies, 26, 699–717.

Dirks, B. (2004, November 20) Na ‘11/9’ groeide in VS begrip voor Islam [Understanding forIslam in the United States grew after ‘9/11’], De Volkskrant.

Driessen, G. (1997) Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands: the pupil’s achievement levels,behaviour and attitudes and their parents’ cultural backgrounds, The Netherlands’ Journal ofSocial Sciences, 33, 42–66.

Driessen, G. (2004) From cure to curse: the rise and fall of bilingual education programmes in theNetherlands, paper presented to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)‘Effectiveness of Bilingual Education Programmes’, 18–19 November, Berlin. Availableonline at: www.its-nijmegen.nl/ (accessed 8 August 2005).


Driessen, G. & Bezemer, J. (1999) Background and achievement levels of Islamic schools in theNetherlands: are the reservations justified? Race, Ethnicity and Education, 2, 235–256.

Driessen, G. & Merry, M. S. (2006, forthcoming) Islamic schools in the Netherlands: expansionor marginalization? Interchange.

Driessen, G. & Valkenberg, P. (2000) Islamic schools in the Netherlands: compromising betweenidentity and quality? British Journal of Religious Education, 23, 15–26.

Dronkers, J. (1995) The existence of parental choice in the Netherlands, Educational Policy, 9,227–243.

Dwyer, C. & Meyer, A. (1995) The institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands and in the UK:the case of Islamic schools, New Community, 21, 37–54.

Dwyer, C. & Meyer, A. (1996) The establishment of Islamic schools: a controversial phenomenonin three European societies, in: W. Shadid & P. van Koningsveld (Eds) Muslims in the margin(Kampen, Pharos), 233–238.

Eurydice (2004) The education system in the Netherlands 2003 (Den Haag, Ministerie van Onderwijs,Cultuur en Wetenschappen).

Ezzidine, O. & Moes, M. (2004) Acquiring and retaining good staff for Islamic schools, paperpresented at the ISNA 5th annual Education Forum, 9–11 April, Chicago.

Hakim, R. & Muhammad, Z. (1992) The Sister Clara Muhammad Schools: pioneers inthe development of Islamic education in America, Journal of Negro Education, 61(2),178–185.

Haniff, G. (2003) The Muslim community in America: a brief profile, Journal of Muslim MinorityAffairs, 23, 303–311.

Hartford Institute for Religious Research (2002) Available online at: www.hirr.hartsem.edu/(accessed 8 August 2005).

Hermans, P. (2002) Intercultural education in two teacher-training courses in the north of theNetherlands, Intercultural Education, 13, 183–199.

Inspectie van het Onderwijs (1999) Islamitische basisscholen in Nederland [Islamic primary schools inthe Netherlands] (Utrecht, Inspectie van het Onderwijs).

Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2002) Islamitische scholen en sociale cohesie [Islamic schools and socialcohesion] (Utrecht, Inspectie van het Onderwijs).

Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2003) Islamitische scholen nader onderzocht [A further investigation ofIslamic schools] (Utrecht, Inspectie van het Onderwijs).

Judge, H. (2001) Faith-based schools and state funding: a partial argument, Oxford Review ofEducation, 27(4), 463–474.

Kazmi, Y. (2003) Islamic education: traditional education or education of tradition? Islamic Studies,42, 259–288.

Lareau, A. (2000) Home advantage: social class and parental intervention in elementary education(Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers).

Lareau, A. (2002) Invisible inequality: social class and childrearing in black families and whitefamilies, American Sociological Review, 67, 747–776.

Lareau, A. (2003) Unequal childhood: class, race, and family life (Berkeley, CA, University ofCalifornia Press).

Leman, J. & Renaerts, M. (1996) Dialogues at different institutional levels among authorities andMuslims in Belgium, in: W. Shadid & P. van Koningsveld (Eds) Muslims in the margin: politicalresponses to the presence of Islam in Western Europe (Kampen, Pharos), 164–181.

Maughan, S. (2003) Gauging the gap, Publishers Weekly, 250, 3.Merry, M. S. (2005) Social exclusion of Muslim youth in Flemish- and French-speaking Belgian

schools, Comparative Education Review, 49(1), 19–36.Meuleman, J. (2001) Headscarves, homosexuals, and imams in the Netherlands, ISIM Newsletter,

August, 33.Modood, T. & Werbner, P. (Eds) (1997) Debating cultural hybridity: multicultural identities and the

politics of anti-racism (London, Zed Books).


Muhammad, Z. (1998) Islamic education in America: an historical overview with future projec-tions, Religion and Education, 25, 87–96.

Mulder, L. & van der Werf, G. (1997) Implementation and effects of the Dutch educationalpriority policy: results of four years of evaluation studies, Educational Research and Evaluation,3(4), 317–339.

Mureau, C. (2004, March, 8) Gemeentes huiverig bij moslimscholen [Municipalities hesitanttowards Muslim schools], Algemeen Dagblad.

Nielsen, J. (1992) Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press).Parker-Jenkins, M. (2002) Equal access to state funding: the case of Muslim schools in Britain,

Race, Ethnicity and Education, 5, 273–289.Phalet, K. & Swyngedouw, M. (2002) National identities and representations of citizenship: a

comparison of Turks, Moroccans and working class Belgians in Brussels, Ethnicities, 2, 5–30.Phalet, K. & Van Praag, C. (2004) Moslim in Nederland [Muslim in The Netherlands] (Den Haag,

SCP).Platti, E. (1990) Les Musulmans et l’etat en Belgique [Muslims and the state in Belgium],

Islamochristiana, 16, 183–199.Rath, J., Groenendijk, K. & Penninx, R. (1991) The recognition and institutionalization of Islam

in Belgium, Great Britain and The Netherlands, New Community, 18, 101–114.Rath, J., Penninx, R., Groenendijk, K. & Meyer, A. (1996) Nederland en zijn Islam: een ontz-

uilende samenleving reageert op het ontstaan van een geloofsgemeenschap [The Netherlands andits Islam: a de-pillarized society reacts to the genesis of a faith community] (Amsterdam,Het Spinhuis).

Rath, J., Penninx, R., & Meyer, A. (1997) De Nederlandse samenleving en haar Islam: reacties opde opbouw van Islamitische instituties [Dutch society and its Islam: reactions to the establish-ment of Islamic institutions], Migrantenstudies, 13, 69–79.

Renaerts, M. (1999) Processes of homogenization in the Muslim educational world in Brussels,International Journal of Educational Research, 31, 283–294.

Saadallah, S. (2004) Islam, religious orientations and education, in: H. Daun & G. Walford (Eds)Educational strategies among Muslims in the context of globalization (Leiden, Brill), 37–61.

Saleh, M. (2000) Holding on to our administrators, Islamic Horizons, 29(3), 34.Shadid, W. & van Koningsveld, P. (Eds) (1991) The integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western

Europe (Kampen, Pharos).Shadid, W. & van Koningsveld, P. (Eds) (1995) Religious freedom and the position of Islam in Western

Europe (Kampen, Pharos).Shadid, W. & van Koningsveld, P. (Eds) (1996) Muslims in the margin: political responses to the

presence of Islam in Western Europe (Kampen, Pharos).Tesser, P. (2003) Ontwikkelingen in de schoolloopbanen van leerlingen uit achterstandsgroepen

[Developments in the academic careers of disadvantaged students], in: W. Meijnen (Ed.)Onderwijsachterstanden in basisscholen [Educational disadvantages in primary schools] (Antwer-pen/Apeldoorn, Garant Press), 53–78.

Teunissen, J. (1990) Basisscholen op Islamitische en Hindoeïstische grondslag [Islamic and Hinduprimary schools], Migrantenstudies, 6, 45–57.

Underkuffler, L. (2001) Public funding for religious schools: difficulties and dangers in a pluralisticsociety, Oxford Review of Education, 27(4), 577–592.

van Kessel, N. (2000) Verlangd onderwijs in de gemeente Amsterdam [School choice in the city ofAmsterdam] (Nijmegen, ITS).

van Kessel, N. (2004, March 6). Zorg om 120 extra moslimscholen [Concerns regarding 120 extraIslamic schools]. Algemeen Dagblad.

van Stokrom, R. (2003) Netherlands: anti-immigration and the road to intolerance, IndependentRace and Refugee News Network. Available online at: http://www.irr.org.uk/2003/december/ak000005.html (accessed 8 August 2005).


Wagtendonk, K. (1991) Islamic schools and Islamic religious education: a comparison betweenHolland and other West European countries, in: W. Shadid & P. van Koningsveld (Eds) Theintegration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe (Kampen, Pharos), 154–173.

Walford, G. (2001) Funding for religious schools in England and the Netherlands: can the pipercall the tune? Research Papers in Education, 16, 359–380.

Walford, G. (2002) Classification and framing of the curriculum in evangelical Christian andMuslim schools in England and the Netherlands, Educational Studies, 28, 403–419.

Zarzour, S. (2003) Legal issues facing Islamic schools, unpublished paper.Zarzour S. & Siddiqui, F. (2004) Legal issues, resources and tips for success for new Islamic

schools, paper presented at ISNA 5th annual Education Forum, 9–11 April, Chicago.

Michael Merry & Geert Driessen (2005) CE Islamic schools in three western countries: Policy and procedure.

Education

public schools

place of islamic schools

catholic schools

netherlands andbelgium

netherlands classes

western countries

catholic schools

islamic schoolshave