Michael Freeman and the Rights and Wrongs of resolving private law Disputes Felicity Kaganas Brunel University, UK Christine Piper Brunel University, UK Introduction In 1983 Michael Freeman’s book, The Rights and Wrongs of Children, was published. Chapter 6 was entitled, ‘Children as victims of the divorce process’. It set out Freeman’s views on the way private family law should develop and it also identified the ways in which he hoped it would not. In this chapter, we will examine some of Freeman’s ideas and the extent to which they have been incorporated into the family law landscape. However, as Freeman says, ‘the annals of legal history are strewn with examples of institutions and practices which have had unintended (or unproclaimed) consequences’ (1983: 231) and it is on these that we will focus. We will suggest that, while Freeman was prescient in predicting some of the ways in which family law would change, and while some of his hopes have been realised, they have not always been realised in the way he intended or, indeed, in ways he could have foreseen. Some of these changes have brought about consequences detrimental to vulnerable family members but these effects, although anticipated by government, have been ‘unproclaimed’ and indeed 1
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Michael Freeman and the Rights and Wrongs of resolving private law Disputes
Felicity Kaganas
Brunel University, UK
Christine Piper
Brunel University, UK
Introduction
In 1983 Michael Freeman’s book, The Rights and Wrongs of Children, was published.
Chapter 6 was entitled, ‘Children as victims of the divorce process’. It set out Freeman’s
views on the way private family law should develop and it also identified the ways in which
he hoped it would not. In this chapter, we will examine some of Freeman’s ideas and the
extent to which they have been incorporated into the family law landscape. However, as
Freeman says, ‘the annals of legal history are strewn with examples of institutions and
practices which have had unintended (or unproclaimed) consequences’ (1983: 231) and it is
on these that we will focus. We will suggest that, while Freeman was prescient in predicting
some of the ways in which family law would change, and while some of his hopes have been
realised, they have not always been realised in the way he intended or, indeed, in ways he
could have foreseen. Some of these changes have brought about consequences detrimental to
vulnerable family members but these effects, although anticipated by government, have been
‘unproclaimed’ and indeed minimised. In other cases, the consequences of changes to the law
have proved to be very different from those intended by the lawmakers. And each failure to
give effect to those intentions has led the government to redouble its efforts and to seek a
solution in yet more legislation.
Co-parenting
Freeman wrote that ‘surprisingly little attention [had] been focussed on the children of
divorce’ (1983: 191). He observed that one of the effects of the ‘paucity of research’ was the
influence on thinking of ‘truisms and myths’ (1983: 192). These included the belief that the
‘non-custodial parent should play a minimal role in parenting decisions’ (1983: 192). This
‘conventional wisdom’ (1983: 209), however, was contradicted by the only longitudinal
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study of children in divorced families, Surviving the Breakup (Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980).
While Freeman discerned serious flaws in the research, he was persuaded that an on-going
relationship with both parents promotes children’s welfare (1983: 214-5). Joint custody, he
said, disrupts the parent-child relationship less than other arrangements and was ‘the ideal to
be sought’ (1983: 208). In addition, he noted that ‘everyone seems agreed that access is a
“good thing”’1 but that courts were allowing access decisions to go by default, and where
they were making orders, they were not enforcing them (1983: 215-6).
However, Freeman’s endorsement of joint custody and liberal access was not unqualified. He
said that joint custody, meaning an order giving both parents the right to make and veto
decisions about their children’s upbringing, could work where ‘a couple is capable of
reaching shared decisions in the child’s best interests’ and might be suitable only in a
‘minority of cases’ (1983: 208). Co-parenting was the ‘goal’ to aim for but it required
commitment and financial resources, he said. He envisaged it as part of an ‘amicable’ divorce
(1983: 208) and quoted Wallerstein and Kelly’s view that joint custody would not involve a
specific apportionment of time but should be seen, rather, as a ‘concept of two committed
parents, in two separate homes, caring for their youngsters in a post-divorce atmosphere of
civilized, respectful exchange’.2 Freeman did not envisage co-parenting as an arrangement
that would be appropriate for most divorced or separated families and he certainly did not
advocate it for parents in conflict. He did suggest that ‘decisions as to access are too
important to be left to the custodial parent’ (1983: 218) and that access visits should not be
‘diminished or stopped’ just because they are ‘unsettling’ (1983: 217). However, he also
acknowledged that access could be contrary to the child’s best interests and even ‘positively
harmful’ (1983: 215). He clearly interpreted the research as showing that continuing parental
involvement should be coupled with parental co-operation in order for children to benefit
(1983: 216).
Since Freeman’s book was published, the nature of the debate has changed and its shape has
reflected changing constructions of the ‘good’ post separation family and of children’s
welfare, as well as changing perceptions of the role of the law. Far from being ignored,
children’s experiences of divorce or separation have become the focus of intense scrutiny on
1 With the exception of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (Freeman, 1983: 215).2 Quoted in M. Freeman (1983) The Rights and Wrongs of Children (London: Frances Pinter) 214.
2
the part of researchers and policymakers. A new truism has replaced the old one: shared
parenting, or at least liberal contact, is best for children in almost all circumstances, as long
as it is safe. In addition, it is now asserted that litigation harms children and that parents
should agree without taking their quarrels to court. This is consistent with Freeman’s
endorsement of co-operation, co-parenting and liberal access. Indeed, he may not have
foreseen the extent to which his views have become the ‘new orthodoxy’.3 But what is
different is that nuance and circumspection have largely disappeared from the debate and
from the law. Over the years it has become more and more difficult for resident parents to
resist contact. Pressure from fathers’ rights groups, together with the impact of some child
welfare research studies, have combined, in a way that Freeman probably did not foresee, to
make paternal involvement in their children’s lives an almost unqualified ‘good’.
In contrast with the current position, the Law Commission debating joint custody in the
1980s was sceptical about what are now assumed to be the benefits of shared parenting in its
various guises. The Commissioners were not persuaded by the arguments fielded in favour of
More significantly, there are references to fathers’ dissatisfaction with the law and to the
assertions of fathers’ groups’4 that the law is biased in favour of mothers (DCA, DfES and
DTI, 2004: para. 18).5 The government rejected this accusation (DCA, DfES and DTI, 2004
Ministerial Foreword: 1), affirmed that the existing legal position was the correct one (DCA,
DfES and DTI, 2005: para. 10) and concluded that a presumption that time should be shared
equally between the parents would have no legal effect in practice (DCA, DfES and DTI,
2004, Ministerial Foreword: 2 para. 43; DCA, DfES and DTI, 2005: para. 13). In many
separated families, such arrangements would not be workable. In any event, the government
did not believe that an ‘automatic 50:50 division’ of the child’s time would be in the best
interests of most children and considered that it could be damaging: ‘Children are not a
commodity to be apportioned equally after separation … a one-size-fits-all formula will not
work’ (DCA, DfES and DTI, 2004: para. 42). It was not the law that needed to be changed
but adult behaviour in dealing with disputes (DCA, DfES and DTI, 2004: para. 43; DCA,
DfES and DTI, 2005: para. 8). This could be best achieved through developing ‘advice,
information, mediation, conciliation and enforcement processes’ (DCA, DfES and DTI, 2005:
para. 14).
In contrast, calls from fathers’ rights groups to tighten up the law on enforcing contact orders
have been treated more sympathetically. The Children Act6 was amended by the Children and
Adoption Act 2006 to make provision for Contact Activity Directions and Conditions and to
introduce new enforcement measures.7 Yet still the perception has persisted that courts are
biased and that resident mothers flout contact orders with impunity (Norgrove, 2011a: paras.
5.33-5.36). The perceived failure of the law to achieve the desired effects led to further calls
for law reform; even more law would be needed to solve the problem. In 2011 the Family
Justice Review panel recommended in its Interim Report that a statement be inserted into the
4 The most vocal groups were Families Need Fathers and Fathers4Justice. The former has moderated its stance over the years while the latter has maintained a more militant approach.5 Concern with allegations of such bias were also being voiced by the judiciary. See V v. V (Contact: Implacable Hostility) [2004] EWHC Fam 1215 paras. 4-10; Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) [2004] EWHCFam 727 para. 4.6 Section 11A ff.7 These are not widely used: Norgrove, 2011a: para. 5.35. Courts do not often order unpaid work: Trinder et al (2013) 43.l
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Children Act, emphasising the importance for children of a meaningful relationships with
both parents (Norgrove 2011a: para. 5.78). However, in its Final Report the panel, after
considering the effects of similar legislation in Australia, withdrew its recommendation. It
noted that it is already accepted in law that contact is in children’s best interests (Norgrove
2011b: para. 4.37). The proposed change could risk creating a perception that parents have
the right to equal time. It could lead to confusion, misinterpretation, false expectations,
increased litigation and ‘would do more harm than good’ (Norgrove 2011b, Executive
Summary: para. 109; Report: para. 4.29-4.40).
In its response to the Family Justice Review, the government reached a very different
conclusion. It favoured a presumption of shared parenting as a way of making parents more
likely to reach agreements (MoJ and DfE 2012: para. 64) and, it seems, of improving
compliance with court orders:
We … need to improve couples’ compliance with decisions …. [I]t means … making it
clearer that there is no in-built legal bias towards either the father or the mother. We believe
that where there are no significant welfare issues, we should reinforce the principle through
law, that it is in the best interests of the child to have a full and continuing relationship with
both parents. (MoJ and DfE 2012, Joint Ministerial Foreword: 3).
The Consultation document that followed stated that the aim of the Government was to
‘promote clearer alternatives to legal action’ (DfE and MoJ, 2012: para. 2.1). Legislation to
promote shared parenting, it said, was intended to ‘encourage more separated parents to
resolve their disputes out of court and agree care arrangements that fully involve both
parents’ (DfE and MoJ, 2012: para. 4.3; see also Djanogly, 2012).
The result is the Children and Families Act 2014 which will introduce a new section 1(2A)
into the Children Act 1989. This will apply in contested section 8 proceedings8 and it will
create a presumption ‘that involvement of [each] parent in the life of the child concerned will
further the child’s welfare’. The presumption will operate unless it can be shown that the
parent concerned cannot be involved in any way without putting the child at risk of suffering
8 Contact and residence orders have been replaced by child arrangements orders (s. 12, Children and Families Act 2014). Section 1(2A) will also apply in parental responsibility cases.
6
harm or that the parent’s involvement will be contrary to the child’s welfare.9 The purpose of
this amendment, say the Explanatory Notes to the Children and Families Bill, is to ‘send a
clear signal to separated parents that courts will take account of the principle that both should
continue to be involved in their children’s lives where that is safe and consistent with the
child’s welfare’.10 It is not intended, however, to promote equal division, or any other
apportionment, of the child’s time.11
Although Freeman saw shared parenting as something to be aimed for, he did not assume it
was suitable for the generality of cases and he probably did not foresee that the tide of
opinion favouring parental involvement after separation or divorce would bring in a
presumption promoting such involvement. Critics of the new presumption have predicted that
it will have negative consequences but these criticisms did not sway the government. And, in
addition to these foreseeable consequences, it can be predicted also that the government’s
professed aims in pushing through this legislation will not be achieved and that there will be
unforeseen consequences as well.
The Presumption and Court Practice
The government says that the reformed law will serve children’s best interests, is intended to
address the grievances of fathers’ rights groups and is meant to deter parents from using the
courts:12
The amendment would serve to reinforce by way of statute the expectation that both parents
should be involved in a child’s life, unless of course that is not safe or not consistent with the
child’s welfare. The Government recognises that courts already operate on this basis, but
nevertheless there is a widespread perception among those who use the courts that this is not
the case. The amendment will address this ... In doing so, it will encourage the resolution of
agreements outside court by making clear the basis on which courts’ decisions are made and
by ensuring that parents’ expectations are realistic when deciding whether to bring a claim to
court. The Government anticipates that over time, this change will contribute to a societal
9 See Children and Families Bill. Explanatory Notes, paras. 93-6.10 Paragraph 8, see also para. 92. See also DfE (2012: 4). 11 Paragraph 92; DfE and MOJ (2012: para. 4.4). This is the import of the new s1(2B) of the Children Act 1989, inserted by the Children and Families Act, s. 11.12 See also DfE and MoJ (2012: para. 2.1, para 4.3); Djanogly (2012).
7
shift towards greater recognition of the value of both parents in a child’s life, and to a
reduction of the perception of bias within the court system.
(DfE 2013: para. 63, Annex 1 of Annex B)
However, as the government concedes, the courts already operate on the basis of a
presumption13 or assumption14 in favour of contact. Most fathers who want it are awarded
contact (Hunt and Macleod, 2008: 19, 251, 253; see also Perry and Rainey, 2007). What is
more, Hunt and Macleod found that courts awarded contact even in cases where mothers
expressed multiple concerns including serious objections based on domestic violence, child
abuse, the father’s poor parenting, the father’s mental health problems and the father’s
substance misuse (2008: 9, 84, 16; see also Coy et al, 2012). Courts are also increasingly
prepared to order shared residence, even in cases where it might seem unworkable.15
So it may well be the case that the change will have little effect in practice.16 Indeed, an
examination of the statements emanating from government ministers suggests that the
government has no intention of attempting to influence the courts by means of the new
presumption (see Kaganas 2013: 259-60). For example, Tim Loughton MP, the then Minister
for Children and Families, said in the House of Commons:
[Shared parenting] may mean 10% of the time, 20% of the time, weekends, during the week,
holidays, staying at grandparents – whatever. I am not interested in that; that is for the judge
to determine. 17
Yet the new law may affect outcomes in some cases and may, as a result, jeopardise the
welfare and safety of mothers and children. Dewar, reviewing the effects of a similar
statutory provision in Australia18 reports that where cases were decided by the courts, an
increase in the proportion of orders for shared time suggested that children were being
13 Re M (Contact: Welfare Test) [1995] 1 FLR 274, 281. See Hunt and Macleod (2008: 191). See also Perry and Rainey (2007: 23). 14 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2002] 2 FLR 334 at p. 364.15 See Harris-Short (2010) for a review of the cases.16 See DCA, DfES and DTI (2004) Ministerial Foreword p. 2, para. 43. DCA, DfES and DTI (2005) para. 13.17 Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence. To be published as HC 282-I, The operation of the Family Courts: follow-up 13 June 2012 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmjust/uc282-i/uc28201.htm (accessed 25 September 2012) Q 29.18 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s. 60(CC)(2)(a) and (b) (as amended in 2006).
8
exposed to risk and that those parents least likely to co-operate were being ordered to do so
(2010: 383-4).
In his evidence before the Justice Committee, Ryder J. was of the view that the presumption
in the then Children and Families Bill would not change practice in British courts (Justice
Committee, 2012: para. 170). However, HHJ John Mitchell said that there is a ‘danger that
the presumption will be used by advocates and judges where they feel undecided or
overwhelmed’ (ibid: para. 173). And the ability of resident parents (usually mothers) to rebut
the presumption will no doubt be impeded by the withdrawal of legal aid from private law
family disputes in terms of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
(LASPO).
Focusing on Parents and Weakening the Welfare Principle
Whether parental ‘involvement’ is generally in the best interests of children is itself open to
doubt. While there is continuing support for Freeman’s view that co-operative co-parenting
serves children’s best interests, there is a considerable body of research pointing to the harm
caused by conflict, exposure to domestic violence and even erratic visiting (see, for example,
Fehlberg et al, 2011; Fortin et al, 2012; see also Justice Committee 2012: paras. 169-170).
The government, however, maintains that it is acting in children’s best interests. Yet there are
concerns that the existence of a presumption will undermine the paramountcy principle.19 For
example, the Law Society (Law Society, 2012) has argued that a presumption would
prioritise the relationship between the child and the parents at the expense of other
considerations, such as safety. The Justice Committee (2012: para. 170) said that attention in
court would be directed at rebuttal of the presumption and away from children’s best
interests. And, in a memorandum submitted to the House of Commons Public Bills
Committee, Jane Fortin and Joan Hunt stated that the change would lead to a ‘more simplistic
and broad-brush’ approach to cases (Fortin and Hunt, 2013: para. 8).20
The government’s other objective – to counter perceptions of bias and allegations of
unfairness emanating from fathers’ rights groups – may also divert attention from, or
19 See Kaganas (2013: 275-8) for discussion.20 See also Hamilton (2013). See further, Kaganas (2013).
9
undermine, the welfare of the children involved. Certainly, the Australian presumption is
thought to have had this effect. Where that presumption applies, the courts are directed to
consider orders for the child to spend equal time with each parent or, where this is not
practicable or in the child’s best interests, ‘substantial and significant time’. However,
research carried out by the Australian Institute of Family Studies (Kaspiew et al, 2009)21
revealed that the presumption appears to have led parents and professionals to understand that
it confers on parents a right to equal responsibility and equal time. This has meant that
litigation and negotiation has focused more on parental rights than on children’s welfare
(Kaspiew et al 2009: 216). Legal sector professionals, in particular, expressed the belief that
the consequences have included increased difficulty in working with parents to achieve child-
focused arrangements (ibid, Summary: 12). In addition, the law has failed to satisfy
Australian men and has even exacerbated fathers’ disaffection with the legal system; fathers,
expecting equal time, were unhappy when their expectations were not met (Kaspiew et al
2009: 216).
The UK government insists that it has avoided all the pitfalls of the Australian legislation by
removing any reference in the statute to shared parenting, by refraining from using words like
‘meaningful’ to define the relationships the law is designed to promote, by maintaining the
paramountcy principle, and by excluding the implication of equal or any other specific
allocation of time (DfE and MoJ 2012: para. 5.1). Indeed, the Bill was amended by the House
of Lords in response to concerns expressed by the Shared Parenting Consortium about the
possible effects of the presumption on the paramountcy principle and, in order to counter the
possibility that separating parents might assume that they are legally bound to share time
equally, a provision was introduced to clarify the meaning of ‘involvement’.22 When the
legislation comes into force, a new s. 1(2B) will be inserted in the Children Act 1989
providing that, ‘“involvement” means involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but
not any particular division of a child’s time.’23
21 See, further, Kaganas (2013: 275-8).22 ‘”Shared Parenting” amendment puts child welfare before presumption of equal access’, Family Law Week, 5 February 2014.23 The provision inserted by the House of Lords, in the version of the Bill dated 30 January 2014, referred to involvement that ‘promotes the welfare of the child’ (http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/childrenandfamilies/documents.html, accessed 17 March 2-14). The reference to welfare has been omitted from the Act.
10
Yet the presumption in the Children and Families Act, even with the new definition of
‘involvement’, is unlikely to ensure that parents focus on their children’s welfare rather than
their own battles. And it is unlikely to achieve the aim of increasing confidence in the family
justice system, not least because what is being delivered falls far short of what fathers’ rights
groups are demanding and what some men think it is delivering. It was already apparent from
public comments on the Bill made before the amendment that it was being understood by
some as giving equal rights. For example:
This Bill will help restore fairness, and allow fathers to play a rightful and equal part in the
upbringing of their child. It will also make children happier, and for them to know that their
fathers and mothers are both there to support them. Many thanks.24
It may be that the amendment may have the effect of leaving some fathers under no such
illusions. But it is also likely to inflame the ire already being expressed by some men who,
even before the amendment, understood the effect of the presumption correctly: ‘Anything
other than a presumption of 50-50 as a starting point for contact post-separation is
discrimination and a prejudice against (normally) separated dads and cannot be justified’.25
Similar sentiments are expressed in the sole comment added to a solicitor’s blog posted
within 24 hours of the passing of the Act:
It demonstrates the emptiness of the government’s promise to legislate for non-resident
parents, aka fathers, to remain significantly involved in raising their children after separation.
These changes achieve precisely nothing to strengthen the position of fathers in private law
disputes which account for by far the greater number of cases that end up in court.26
The Normative Function of Law
24 Robert, S., Children and Families Bill Public Reading: Additional Comments http://www.parliament.uk/business/bills-and-legislation/public-reading/children-and-families-bill/general-comments/?page=7 (accessed 24 April 2013).25 Ian, T., Children and Families Bill. Public Reading: Additional Comments http://www.parliament.uk/business/bills-and-legislation/public-reading/children-and-families-bill/general-comments/?page=9 (accessed 24 April 2013). See further, Kaganas (2013); ‘Caroline Opposes Lords’ Amendment to Children & Families Bill on Shared Parenting’ http://www.carolinenokes.com/uncategorized/caroline-opposes-lords-amendment-to-children-families-bill-on-shared-parenting/ (accessed 13 March 2014).26 Paul, ‘Comment’ left on Marilyn Stowe Blog, ‘Children and Families Act given Royal Assent’.
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Unlike these fathers, the proponents of the legislation have been predicting that it will have a
considerable impact. The government claims that the presumption will lead to more
agreements between parents and reduce the levels of litigation. It is assumed that the
messages that ‘radiate’ beyond law (Dewar 2010: 385) will lead parents to change their
behaviour so that they resolve their disputes out of court and agree care arrangements that
fully involve them both: ‘The legislation will become part of the consistent messaging that
influences the starting point both for families undergoing separation, and the professionals
who support them’ (DfE and MoJ 2012: para. 4.6).
The change in the law, then, is meant to send a message to parents and, it seems, to society
generally, that both parents should play a part in their children’s lives: ‘The aim of the
legislative amendment is also to reinforce the expectation at societal level that both parents
are jointly responsible for their children's upbringing’ (DfE and MOJ, 2012: para. 3.2). It is
assumed that this message ‘will make both parents take responsibility for their children and
persuade each (usually mothers) to accept the other’s (usually fathers) involvement in their
children’s lives’ (Kaganas, 2013: 281). This message embodies a view that has long infused
English family law. Its enshrinement in legislation attests not only to its axiomatic status but
also to an increasing emphasis on the symbolic and educational function of the law as a
means of changing behaviour.
However, law’s messages are not always heard by those at whom they are directed and, even
if heard are not always understood and given effect in the ways intended; as we have seen in
relation to aggrieved fathers, these messages can be misinterpreted and can have unintended
consequences. Certainly, the history of family law reform does not give support to the view
that the law can be fashioned to affect individual behaviour in predictable and desirable ways.
For instance, the introduction of equal and enduring parental responsibility was intended to
make parents take responsibility and to ‘lower the stakes’, so removing reasons to fight. Yet
parents still ‘fight’: the effect of the law has merely been to shift the site of battle to the issue
of contact.
Fehlberg et al (2011: 319), writing about the Australian presumption, pointed out that ‘the
evidence so far does not suggest that changing the law leads more families to enter shared
time arrangements, let alone “workable” arrangements (i.e. manageable for parents and
12
appropriate for children’s needs at different points in their childhood)’. Dewar, in turn,
observed that the legislation, which was designed to promote settlement between parents,
only had the effect of intensifying the pre-existing predisposition of parents to agree or
disagree (2010: 381-82). And in the UK, Kaganas and Day Sclater (2004) found that the
mothers opposing contact in their sample were well aware of the norm that contact is best for
children. However, they saw their resistance as justified since they knew that, because of
paternal shortcomings, contact was not best for their children.
So the legislation will not please fathers’ rights groups or eliminate perceptions of bias. It is
unlikely to affect to a significant extent the way in which the courts approach contact
disputes, although it may lead to a more simplistic approach in some cases. It is not likely to
reduce conflict and litigation, although LASPO may have the effect of preventing some
parents from using the courts.
Using law as the purveyor of messages in order to change hearts and minds, or at least
behaviour, does not appear to be a very effective strategy. However, it seems that law’s
messages sometimes do have an impact where those hearing them are not in a position to
resist them, particularly where these messages are used to ‘reinforce popular sentiment or
push popular sentiment’ (Zolotor and Puzia, 2010: 242; see also Kaganas, 2013). In
particular, they may influence out-of-court negotiations: parents bargain in ‘the shadow of the
law’ and their agreements will, to some extent, be shaped by it. Dewar found that the
Australian presumption has strengthened the bargaining position of men asserting their
‘rights’ relative to women and, in those cases, parents were less likely to take a child-centred
approach (2010: 382-3). He observed a reduction in the use of lawyers after the reforms and,
speculated that, whilst this could be interpreted as demonstrating the success of the reforms in
promoting agreement, it could also, given the prevalence of violence and abuse, be evidence
of arrangements being agreed to in worrying circumstances (2010: 383; see, also, Rhoades,
2012).
It seems likely that the main effect of the British reform will be similar. The new provision
might enable non-resident fathers to ‘persuade’ vulnerable mothers and children to agree to
contact pursuant to negotiation or mediation, particularly if those mothers are told that this is
what the law mandates.
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The Shadow of the Law
The impact of law’s messages, then, is felt primarily by those who are vulnerable and least
able to resist and, so, it can exacerbate their position. We should therefore be concerned, as
was Freeman, about the nature and content of the shadow cast by the courts and legislation on
bargaining positions. In chapter 6 of Rights and Wrongs, Freeman comments on the
continuing importance of law: ‘parents bargain in “the shadow of the law” so, whilst few
cases are contested, the contribution the courts can make is not negligible’ (Freeman, 1983:
226). His reference for ‘the shadow of the law’ derives from the work of Mnookin and
Kornhauser (1979) in which the authors talked of the bargaining ‘endowment’ that the law
and the courts applying it confer: ‘In other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no
agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips’ (1979: 968).
Freeman’s comments were clearly in the context of the judicial role and the content of court
orders and he urged the courts to make ‘better decisions’, not just to encourage different
outcomes but in order to provide a better shadow (1983: 226). Earlier in the chapter he had
argued that the ‘courts have a role to play’ in regard to contact and that, ‘If the norm is to be
“continued involvement”27 this is what the courts should stress’. For example, he said that
judges should question parental decisions not to ask for access (1983: 219). But he also said
that the views of children as to whether they wanted contact or not should be better
represented in contested cases (1983: 226-7).
Time has seen the fulfilment of Freeman’s wish that judges give a clear message that both
parents should have a continuing relationship and involvement with their children. This is an
idea and ideal that is and will continue to be shared by all those working in the family justice
system; the shadow of the law in this regard is clear. And it will perhaps be intensified by
governmental pronouncements and the symbolic use of legislation in creating the new
presumption (Kaganas, 2013). Whether the shadow of the nuanced reasoning in judgments in
difficult cases will be clear is another matter. Reviewing private family law in Australia,
Dewar argues that the law is complex, can only be understood by specialists and the
27 Here Freeman footnotes M. Richards, “Post-Divorce Arrangements for Children: A Psychological Perspective”, Journal of Social Welfare Law (1982) Vol 69: 133-151, 146.
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‘simplified messages that radiate beyond that are inaccurate and often harmful’ (2010: 385).
This is of concern in the context of the increase we note below in the number of new
alternative advice and dispute resolution bodies whose personnel often have no legal training.
Further, if the number of cases coming before the courts decreases, the breadth and
usefulness of the law from adjudicated cases may also diminish with a consequent effect on
the shadow of the law. Of course, the lack of good advice from solicitors may have the
opposite effect; it may lead to an increase in the number of cases reaching the courts.
Research over many years has shown that solicitors do not encourage the use of litigation
(see, for example, the review in Eekelaar and Maclean, 2013: 25-30) and Hunt has predicted
that without lawyers to discourage unrealistic expectations and to persuade clients to
compromise, there will be more litigation (Hunt, 2011: 384, 383). There is some evidence
that this has in fact occurred28 and there are certainly more litigants in person (LIPs): between
April and September 2013, almost half (45 per cent) of all parties involved with private
family law child proceedings, were unrepresented.29 However, the cases which are
adjudicated may not provide useful guidance for future disputants or even courts. Herring and
Powell have argued that the family courts are increasingly dealing only with unusual cases
and so are no longer working with presumptions which convey an easily transferable legal
message:
The courts have recognised that while it is possible to identify matters which generally benefit
children, it is wrong to assume that therefore the child in the particular case will benefit from
them. This is especially because, as emphasised in Re B, the cases that come before the court
do not represent the average case (Herring and Powell, 2013: 558).
If they are right, the reasoning in these unusual cases will not apply to the ‘average case’
because the judgments are so individualised. And in any event, parents seeking to resolve
their disputes outside the courts will not be exposed to the complexity of the reasoning of the
courts. Given that research indicates that about half of divorcing or separating couples seek
legal advice (Barlow et al, 2013: 307) and that legal aid to pay for that advice is now severely
28 See, eg Lawyersupportedmediation (2013) and (2014); see also, Sir James Munby, P., ‘A system based on the assumption that parties are represented must be radically re-designed to reflect the reality that parties will not be represented’ (2014: 167):29 Lawyersupportedmediation (2014). See also, C (A Child) & Anor v. KH [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, para. 4.
15
restricted (see Harris, 2013; Miles, 2012), law’s shadow may not reach the ‘average’
disputant. This will be of particular concern in relation to family law’s protective function.
Law as Protector
Freeman was also concerned that encouragement of private ordering should not downgrade
the ability of family law to protect the more vulnerable members of the family.
Not the least value of a ‘regime of rules’,30 of the forms and rhetoric of law is that it can on
occasion ‘’inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless’.31 … We must not let
our concern with the insensitivity of traditional legal mechanisms turn us away from the
unqualified good in the rule of law (1983: 233).
He was referring to the child as the one who needed protection (1983: 233) and in the Preface
to The Moral Status of Children (Freeman 1997) he wrote that in The Rights and Wrongs of
Children, ‘I underestimated the importance of giving children participatory rights’. How to
make the voice of the child heard and what weight to give it in informal ordering is still an
unresolved issue, notwithstanding initiatives and encouragement in relation to ‘child
inclusive’ mediation (CIM) over many years (see, for example, National Family Mediation,
1994; Parkinson, 2012). Walker, noting the long-standing divergent arguments amongst
mediators in regard to the inclusion of children, argues that ‘[g]iving children a voice can
make a significant difference to the outcomes achieved’ (2013: 192) and Australian research
with high conflict families suggests CIM provides benefits which can be sustained over at
least four years (McKintosh et al 2008) although a recent small scale study suggests
otherwise (Bell et al, 2013: 193-195). The Family Justice review also stated that CIM ‘should
be available to all families seeking to mediate, provided that it is appropriate and safe and
undertaken by well-trained practitioners’ (Norgrove, 2011: para. 4.106; see also Parkinson,
2013: 209). But while CIM remains contentious, the removal of law from the resolution of
private law disputes may mean that children’s views will be unheard.
It is not only children who might be silenced and even placed at risk in contact disputes. In
cases involving a significant imbalance of power and especially in cases involving domestic 30 He footnotes here D. Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law”, Harvard Law Review 89 (1976) 1685.31 He footnotes here E.P. Thomson, Whigs and Hunters, London: Allen Lane (1975) 266.
16
violence, it is also the vulnerable parent who may suffer. We are concerned about the effect
of domestic abuse on the process and outcome of private ordering (see Piper, 2013) and this
also concerned Freeman at the time of the passage of the Family Law Act 1996. That year he
published an edited collection entitled, Divorce: Where next?, in which he referred to such
abuse as ‘not a matter which can be easily swept under the carpet’ (Freeman, 1996: 2). It has
in fact not been swept under the carpet in that abuse is one of the exceptions to the blanket
withdrawal of legal aid in private family cases. Indeed we are not allowed – in policy and
legislation – to ignore domestic violence.
However there are unexpected consequences of this ‘exceptionalising’ of domestic violence.
First, it is in effect used to justify excluding from the exception those private law cases with
other problematic issues which make the protection of law necessary. And this overlaps with
the second consequence of the way the exception has been drafted and is understood. Even
with a definition of domestic violence which includes psychological abuse, the evidentiary
burden insufficiently acknowledges research about the way control is exercised by the
abusing partner, how this affects the vulnerable partner, and how difficult it is to provide
compelling evidence of some forms of abuse (see O’Hara, 2013). The way the exception will
operate also fails to take into account what is known about the victim’s psychological
difficulties in communicating about the abuse to those who can label the case as exceptional.
For vulnerable partners to be protected, all those who are gatekeepers to the availability of
legal aid for them will need to be adequately trained in methods of screening for domestic
violence. Otherwise, how will such professionals know there has been abuse? How will they
know whether there is a risk that it will continue, that it will affect the children and that it will
affect what happens in mediation or court adjudication (see Piper and Kaganas, 1997)?
Research suggests that, at present, screening in many of the relevant processes is not of
sufficient quality and duration. Research on in-court mediation (Trinder et al, 2010) and on
the pre-mediation session (the MIAM) for out-of court mediation (Morris, 2011; Morris,
2013; Barlow et al, 2013) provides evidence that there is often neither the time nor expertise
to screen adequately. Further, research on Parenting Information Programmes suggests that
courts do not see referral to them as problematic where there is abuse and that screening
before attendance at such programmes is also not adequate (Smith and Trinder, 2012: 440-
441).
17
The result – unintended though not unforeseen – of exceptionalising domestic violence is that
the law may not in practice protect many who have suffered abuse. There is, however,
another development which reduces the capacity of law to protect, and that is how law –
accurately and appropriately – is to be introduced into dispute settlement.
So far we have not contested the assumption that lawyers are more likely than other
professionals to take account of the shadow of the law. However, in Freeman’s edited
collection of 1996 one of us argued – on the basis of available research from the USA (see,
for example, Sarat and Felstiner, 1986), The Netherlands (Griffiths, 1986) and England and
Wales (see, for example, Davis et al, 1994: 72) – that both lawyers and mediators worked
with legal and non-legal norms (Piper, 1996: 70). Research on the practice of family
solicitors also suggested that solicitors themselves conflated legal and socio-political norms
in their explanations of legal concepts (King, 1999; Piper, 1999). Overlapping with this is a
normative discourse based on ‘child welfare science’. As Rebecca Bailey Harris and
colleagues concluded in their report on their empirical research about practitioners dealing
with section 8 applications:
In the absence of legal rules, other than procedural rules, disputes tend to be settled by
reference to norms. These are not in essence legal norms other than in the limited sense that
they are employed within a legal context. Legal knowledge is hardly relevant. It is essentially
‘welfare’ discourse expressed as legal principle (Bailey-Harris et al 1998: 27).
So for a long time we have known that it is quite difficult to isolate the shadow of law as such
in relation to settling parental disputes. But parents want to know what they should do and
they may not be able to distinguish between the legal and the non-legal norms being
purveyed. They value ‘partisan’ support if using a solicitor (Davis, 1988: chapters 8 and 9)
but are often very anxious simply to know what is ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ – something which
mediators do not always convey (Walker et al., 1994: 92):
Both Mr and Mrs Clifford found mediation helpful, but the search for norms remained
unsatisfied. Mrs Clifford said: ‘We were trying to find out what was the norm. We wanted
guidance but they said that as long as we were happy it was alright’ (Walker et al, 1994: 94).
18
However, if norms are, explicitly or implicitly, communicated they are, then, very powerful.
Yet the development of new forms of dispute resolution is making it increasingly difficult to
know what norms are being conveyed and whether they include more than the message of the
new presumption.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
When Freeman wrote Rights and Wrongs, mediation – then conciliation – was in its infancy
and he envisaged that an effective conciliation service ‘could do much to smooth relations
between parents and assist parents to preserve relationships with their children in the
aftermath of divorce’ (Freeman, 1983: 219). His main fear was that a consequence of more
private ordering would be a commodification of children. The empirical evidence available
does not tell us whether this has occurred (Ryerstedt, 2012) but we do know that the focus in
mediation is often a generalised ‘child’ rather than the actual child and that children are rarely
part of the mediation process (see, for example, Trinder et al., 2010).
Despite his reservations, Freeman viewed mediation as a helpful service. However, he
probably did not foresee that, alongside the enactment of yet more legislation to make contact
‘work’, there would be moves to promote mediation as well as an effort to curtail the use of
the law. He did not anticipate that for those engaged in contact disputes there would be only
the options of litigation in person, expensive lawyers’ fees or extra-legal help. As a result of
the adoption of what Eekelaar (2011: 311) has referred to as an ‘attenuated concept of family
justice’, the court is seen as relevant only when it comes to protecting the vulnerable:
The court’s role should be focused on protecting the vulnerable from abuse, victimisation and
exploitation and should avoid intervening in family life except where there is clear benefit to
children or vulnerable adults in doing so (Norgove, 2011a: Annex A).
Disputes between parents about their children are private and the consequences of individual
choice in this conception of the relationship between state and family, and they are not
significant enough to warrant the full panoply of the family justice system: ‘Where the issue
is one which arises from the litigant’s own personal choices, we are less likely to consider
19
that these cases concern issues of the highest importance’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010: para.
4.19.0).
However, while it is only mediation that is funded, it is not now, as Sir James Munby P. has
pointed out, the only alternative to solicitor negotiation and advice or court applications –
there are several other options:
You must never forget that, as one door closes, another opens. ADR – mediation,
collaborative law, arbitration, perhaps on the IFLA model or following the approach recently
adopted by Baker J – will I suspect play an increasingly significant role in your professional
lives’ (Munby, 2013: 402).
The IFLA is the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators, a not-for-profit company whose
members are Resolution, The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and the Family Law Bar
Association. So far it has trained around 100 arbitrators made up of solicitors, barristers and
retired judges.32 So those already operating as IFLA arbitrators are all legally trained and,
theoretically, able to use the law to protect clients and children.
A recent case has set a precedent for referring a matrimonial case to a different kind of
arbitration (see Rose, 2013). In AI v. MT,33 the court had, in earlier proceedings, endorsed the
use of rabbinical arbitration at the New York Beth Din (paras. 15-16) and the result was
upheld in the form of a consent order: ‘The outcome was in keeping with English law whilst
achieved by a process rooted in the Jewish culture to which the families belong’ (para. 37).
The content of the order was deemed to be in the child’s best interests and Mr Justice Baker
commented that,
it can be argued that arbitration is in line with the principle underpinning the Children Act
1989 that primary responsibility for children rests with their parents who should be entitled to
raise their children without the intrusion of the state save where the children are suffering, or
likely to suffer, significant harm (para. 32).
32 See: http://ifla.org.uk/what-is-arbitration/faqs/ 33 AI v. MT (Alternate Dispute Resolution) [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam).
He warned, however, that, ‘It does not … necessarily follow that a court would be content in
other cases to endorse a proposal that a dispute concerning children should be referred for
determination by another religious authority. Each case will turn on its own facts’ (para. 33).
This caution is justified; where arbitration bodies are not essentially civil legal bodies then
the norms used may be generated from diverse sources and disciplines and the words used –
such as the ‘welfare of the child’ – may have different meanings (see King and Piper, 1995:
chapter 1).
What we now have is a proliferation of bodies to help separating parents make joint decisions
but we do not know whether and how the shadow of the law features. For example, a legal
qualification is not a requirement in the Law Society’s latest criteria for mediators wishing to
be accredited under the Law Society mediation scheme (to conduct MIAMs and publicly-
funded mediation).34 And the internet provides evidence of the existence and development of
a confusing array of new groups and people offering ADR services and legal advice (see, for
example, Eekelaar and Maclean, 2013: 47-49; see also for telephone advice services, Smith et
al, 2013). Regulation is currently in the early stages. For example, the Department for Work
and Pensions launched the 'Help and support for separated families' (HSSF) mark in 2013,
now managed by the 4children organisation. This charity - originally the National Out of
School Alliance - reported 35 organisations achieving the mark in the pilot phase because
they had successfully demonstrated ‘commitment to helping separated parents collaborate
with their ex-partners in the best interests of their children as they go through their separation
journey’. 35
Whether all those offering these and dispute resolution services have a sufficient
understanding of the protective role of law is, as yet, unknown. And there is another site
which may draw on diverse norms, not necessarily drawn from law’s shadow, to inculcate the
message of joint parenting. There is now education to persuade parents to do the ‘right’ thing.
Education
34 See, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/accreditation/specialist-scheme/family-mediation/, accessed 19 July 2014.35 See, http://www.4children.org.uk/News/Detail/Organisations-line-up-to-help-parents-and-children-remain-a-family-after-separation, accessed 19 July 2014.