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MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System
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Page 1: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

MEXICO

Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System

Page 2: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Functions of the Political System

Page 3: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

PRI DYNASTY 1928-2000

MORE THAN 70 YEARS OF POLITICAL POWER

Page 4: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Organization of the Dynasty

Interest Group Aggregation Peasants Organized Labor Middle Sectors

Business Community – officially on the periphery

Page 5: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

The Tlatelolco Massacre (1968)

Security forces fire into student demonstrations over expenditures for the Summer Olympics

300 + killed Major blow to the

political legitimacy of the PRI-center regime

Page 6: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Economic Crisis

• cheverría increased social spending during an oil production and price surge.– Did this through deficit spending.

• Falling oil prices along with higher interest rates caused inflation of peso and investment to leave.

• Bank of Mexico borrowed 360 million dollars to stop devaluation of the peso bringing Mexico’s deficit to $25 billion dollars.

• Echeverría let peso float and it then lost half of its value.

Luis Echeverría (1970-76)

Page 7: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Economic Crisis Intensifies

New oil sites found and developed

Development increased Mexican national debt to unprecedented levels.

Mexico became the 4th largest oil exporter in the world.

• With new oil revenue Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) vastly expanded social programs and developed state industries.

Page 8: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.
Page 9: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

1982 Elections 1982 Elections Miguel de la Madrid Miguel de la Madrid

PRI selects a young Harvard-trained economist as its presidential candidate Old guard marginalized ISI & social democracy

abandoned Neo-liberalism Loosening of control by

PRI

El Dedo Falls on Miguel de la Madrid

Page 10: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

National Elections of 1988

Reaction to the neo-liberal policies of Miguel de la Madrid

Left wing of PRI follows Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas out of the party

Manuel Clouthier of PAN receives 17% of the total vote

Dubious victory of Carlos Salinas

Page 11: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Reform: INTEREST GROUPS BECOME MORE AUTONOMOUS

NGO’s (Alianzas Civicas) Growing concern over civil rights Monitoring groups How much deception in apparent

democratization?

Page 12: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Consequences of Institutionalizing the Reforms

Rise of the Opposition at the State & Local Levels

Intra-urban experiences confirm growing capabilities of groups not tied to PRI

1997 congressional, state and municipal elections PRI loses its majority in the congress 8 governorships to the opposition Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas elected mayor of

Mexico – and permited to win office

Page 13: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

1994 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

PRI – from Luis Colosio to Ernesto Zedillo

Violence continues into the administration of President Zedillo Assassination of Jose

Ruiz Massieu (party president)

PRI and the drug cartel Assassinations (Cardinal

of Guadalajara) Chiapas revolt smolders International pressure

to democratize

Page 14: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Zedillo Institutionalizes Democratic Reforms –

Consequences

Rise of the Opposition at the State & Local Levels

Intra-urban experiences confirm growing capabilities of groups not tied to PRI

1997 congressional, state and municipal elections PRI loses its majority in the congress 8 governorships to the opposition Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas elected mayor of

Mexico – and permitted to exercise the office

Page 15: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 2000

Zedillo refuses to exercise the dedazo

PRD: the Last Hurrah for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas

Vicente Fox: from governor of Guanajuato to presidential candidate (PAN)

Page 16: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Presidential election results map. Blue denotes states won by Fox (19+DF), Green denotes those won by Labastida(11), Yellow denotes those won by Cárdenas

(1).

Presidential RESULTS: 2000

Vicente Fox 43.4%

Francisco Labastida 36.9%

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 17.0 %

Others 2.7%

Page 17: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

2006 Presidential Elections: Did they undermine or strengthen

democracy? Felipe Calderon

PAN political party Favored

emphasizing free markets

Focused on strengthening NAFTA

Help from US political consultants

Page 18: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador

PRD leaderOpposed turn to neo-

liberalism Populist mayor of

Mexico CityThe poor come firstSome ties to Hugo

Chavez

Page 19: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Roberto Madrazo: PRI

Governor of Tabasco from 1994–2000

President of PRI – 2002 2005

credited for bringing cohesion to a disjointed PRI after it historically lost the 2000 presidential election

neutralized political adversaries within the party.

Page 20: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

PRD Strongly Opposed NAFTA

Page 21: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

2006 Presidential Elections: RESULTS

Page 22: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

López Obrador: Challenging the official result

Claims fraudDemonstrations in Mexico CityThreatens to establish parallel government

Page 23: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Key Institutions that deal with Mexican Elections

Instituto Federal Electoral The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) is an autonomous, public organization responsible for organizing and overseeing federal elections in Mexico.

Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacion The Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) is the top judicial electoral authority to resolve electoral disputes at the federal level or appeals of State Electoral Tribunal rulings

Page 24: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Legitimation of Official Results President-Elect Calderon visits

Chile

Page 25: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Political Parties: Shifting Social Bases

Dramatic shift in the 2006 electionPRI’s most dependable base before 2006

was the rural voter; did well with women and older voters.

In 2006 PRD’s Obrador did best among rural voters.

PAN did best among urban voters prior to 2006, but in 2006 PRD finished ahead of PRI for the urban vote.

Page 26: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.
Page 27: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Political Parties: Shifting Social Bases II

PRD did well among women in 2006. Women were focused on economic stability.

Education mattered less in 2006.Social class mattered less as well.Regional divides seemed to define the 2006

election.

Page 28: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.
Page 29: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.
Page 30: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Mexico: Presidential Election(July 1, 2012)

Page 31: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Dominant Issue in Mexico’s 2012 Presidential Election

Violence & drug cartels President Calderon’s

policies Performance (47,000

killed in six years) Alternatives

Hugs not bullets Blocking drugs from

reaching the U.S. (behind the scenes accommodations)

Page 32: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Other Issues in Mexico’s 2012 Presidential Election

Little evidence of outright fraud

Intensification of tactics long employed by PRI (vote buying) PRI gift cards

Media bias toward PRI

Role of foreigners in petroleum industry

Carlos Slim – media mogul

Page 33: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Party of the Democratic Revolution

(PRD)

• Native of state of Tabasco • Exited with Cardenas when PRI

adopted neo-liberal reforms • Mayor of Mexico City• Edged out in the election of

2006 • Popular vote - 15,896,539• Finished second - 31.59%• Challenged outcome for second

time• Exploring possibility of

founding new political party

Nominee: Andrés Manuel López Obrador

Page 34: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN)

Native of Mexico CityLong time militant in PAN Ally of President

Felipe CalderónFirst female presidential

candidate of a major political party in Mexico

Popular vote - 12,785,728Josefina diferente Finished third - 25.41%

Nominee: Josefina Vázquez Mota

Page 35: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Partido Revolucionario Instucional (PRI

Native: state of MexicoLong-time militant in PRILeader of a new generation

of PRI party leadersGovernor: State of Mexico Repository of continuing

suspicion of PRI and its style of governing

Popular vote - 19,225,745Winner - 38.21%

Nominee: Enrique Peña Nieto

Page 36: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Presidential Election Results (in detail) (Mexico 2012)

Candidate Party Votes %

Enrique Peña Nieto Institutional Revolutionary Party

18,727,398 39.10

Andrés Manuel López Obrador

Party of the Democratic Revolution

15,535,117 32.43

Josefina Vázquez Mota National Action Party 12,473,106 26.04

Gabriel Quadri de la Torre New Alliance Party 1,129,108 2.36

Non-registered candidates 31,660 0.07

Invalid/blank votes 1,191,057 –

Total 49,087,446 100

Registered voters/turnout 77,738,494 63.1

Source: PREP (98.95% of polling stations reporting)

Page 37: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

States won by Peña Nieto in green, López Obrador in yellow, Vázquez Mota

in blue.

Page 38: MEXICO Interest Aggregation and the Hegemonic Party System.

Chamber of Deputies Election (Mexico 2012)

Party

Proportional representation ConstituencyTotalseats

+/–Votes % Seats Votes % Seats

Institutional Revolutionary Party

15,513,478 31.87 5,166,531 11.21 51

National Action Party

12,620,827 25.92 12,550,879 27.24 53

Party of the Democratic Revolution

8,996,089 18.48 – – –

Ecologist Green Party of Mexico

2,963,718 6.08 706,695 1.53 3

Labor Party 2,219,228 4.55 – – –

New Alliance Party (Mexico)

1,986,538 4.08 1,977,185 4.29 0

Citizens' Movement

1,943,855 3.99 – – –

Party of the Democratic Revolution–Citizens' Movement–Labor Party

– – – 13,088,355 28.41 70 70 –

Institutional Revolutionary Party–Ecologist Green Party of Mexico

– – – 12,533,771 27.20 123 123 –

Non-registered candidates

51,473 0.10 51,076 0.11 0

Invalid/blank votes

2,378,731 – – 2,351,092 – – – –

Total 48,673,937 100 200 48,425,584 100 300 500 0

Registered voters/turnout

77,547,511 62.76 – 77,547,511 62.44 – – –

Source: PREP, PREP (98.79% of polling stations reporting)