Melanie's Thesis

Goldberg, Melanie Text in Context: Determining the PR Underdog in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

TEXT IN CONTEXT:DETERMINING THE PUBLIC RELATIONS

UNDERDOG IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Melanie GoldbergBrooklyn College Presidential Scholar 2013

With the Help of:Professor Paul Moses

Professor, Department of English, Brooklyn CollegeProfessor Lee Quinby

Director, Macaulay Honors Thesis Colloquium

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Preface

In January 2012, I had the privilege of being able to visit the Israeli border of the

Gaza Strip. Being a Jew, I could only stand a couple of miles from the border, and not

enter the strip, since Hamas bans all Jews entry. While I was with the Hasbara

Fellowships group, I snapped a few pictures of Gaza’s skyline, heard a few speeches I

currently can’t remember, and left with the memories of a blimp-like structure, operated

by Hamas, floating in the sky, constantly monitoring its people.

That evening, I met up with a friend in Jerusalem to tell her of my day’s activities.

I brought out my camera to help tell my stories. As I completed telling her the events of

the day, she flipped through the last of my pictures.

“Hey-wait, you didn’t tell me you visited Tel Aviv today too!” she commented.

“That’s because I didn’t,” I answered, confused.

She turned my camera towards me and I saw that she had gotten to the pictures I

had snapped of Gaza’s skyline.

“That’s Gaza,” I clarified.

The world’s image of the Gaza strip is one they receive from the media. That

image is one of a desolate war zone instead of what it truly is, a land controlled by its

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governing party Hamas complete with its own stock exchange (World Bank), because

that’s the message the media constantly sends (Hoffman). Very few westerners have ever

visited the region; therefore they solely rely on those images the media provides. In this

thesis I pursue the debate surrounding who first provides the pictures to the media, and

what the reporters then portray in their writing as a result. What they portray is what

educates their readers on the Middle East region and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is crucial

for those readers to be able to form a fully and fairly reported view surrounding the

incidents that occur there.

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Introduction

It may take a minute to believe someone’s fabrication, but it takes far longer to

change an initial perception. That’s what perpetually sticks in people’s minds. When it

comes to the media, every incident allows for a crucial short amount of time critical to

affecting the media’s angle when reporting. Certainly this was the case for the 2010

Freedom Flotilla incident involving Israel and its Defense Forces, the humanitarian and

activist groups, Hamas, and the Palestinians. On May 31st, 2010, members of the Israel

Defense Force raided the Freedom Flotilla as it attempted to breach the naval blockade

Israel was imposing on Gaza (Palmer 3). What resulted was the death of nine of the

flotilla’s members and numerous injuries on both sides. The remaining flotilla

participants were taken into custody by the Israeli authorities (Palmer 3). In this thesis, I

argue that the immediate media responses to this incident demonstrate a clear lack in

Israel’s 2010 crisis management PR showing stark evidence of their inadequate press

relationships.

The field of public relations is an area of the Arab-Israeli conflict that isn’t

explored often. PR, in short, is what dictates the different versions of incidents,

depending on which side provides the press release. It also allows for the context behind

each incident to be developed and explained. In a region so far removed from the

Western nations, and one as tumultuous as it consistently proves to be, context can play a

major part when interpreting each incident. Forming an unbiased context involves an

education in the region’s history and affairs, especially for members of the media. The

general public relies on the press to understand world affairs, and without the proper

amount of information provided to the media from both sides involved in each incident,

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the media end up presenting a biased version of an incident. Balanced PR exists to try

and provide both sides to every incident and establish the context behind them. This

thesis explores the historical necessity of good crisis management and adequate press

relationships necessary for Israel to be on equal ground with its neighbors in this

perpetual, ongoing conflict.

I use the Freedom Flotilla incident as a basis for my claims. In the coming

sections, I show that the initial media released after the incident proved that in the PR

battle, the pro-Palestinian humanitarian and activist groups had gotten their side of the

incident out to the media first, proclaiming Israel as solely responsible for the actions that

occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). Three months later, when the United Nations

Human Rights Council released their report on the incident, they too found Israel to be

solely responsible (UNHRC). This shows that even three months later, Israel still had not

adequately presented their version of the events that occurred, resulting in further

distortion of Israel’s world image. Finally, over one year later, the United Nations Palmer

Report was released, divvying the blame between the NGOs and Palestinians for

breaching Israel’s legal blockade on Gaza, and Israel, for forcefully stopping the flotilla

(Palmer). It also concluded that “the main goal of the flotilla participants was to bring

publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to breach the blockade”

(Palmer 29, Israeli Commission Report 278). This means that the main goal of the flotilla

was a highly organized publicity event while delivering aid was just secondary. However,

the media doesn’t have a year to come to this type of accurate conclusion. They have

immediate deadlines, and if Israel wants to stand on equal footing with those they are at

war with, they must develop a PR team comparable to those with which they fight. In a

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war as complex as the Arab-Israeli conflict, sometimes accurate interpretation of

incidents is all about the context.

In the following sections, I first present the context behind the actions that

occurred aboard the Freedom Flotilla by providing an extensive history of Israel and its

neighbors called “Background: A Brief History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict” (8-17). I

then delve into the significance of PR, especially in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in

“The Significance of Public Relations” (18-19) and “The Significance of Public Relations

Regarding the 2010 Freedom Flotilla Incident” (20-22). I then detail Israel’s 2010 PR

team in “Israel’s Public Relations Team in 2010” (23-26) Analyses of the initial press

releases given to the media then are presented in “Summary of the Early Press Releases

Regarding the Flotilla Incident By NGOs and Israel” (27-34) along with how those

releases affected the media’s initial reports in “Early Press Published – United States”

(35-38). I then show how the UN Palmer Report presents the most accurate analysis of

the incident and acknowledges the context behind it in “The Significance and Analysis of

The UN’s Palmer Report” (39-50). In there, I also mention the UNHRC document, and

explain how the Israeli version of the events still didn’t reach the key people prior to its

publication, resulting in the report once again remaining one-sided. Furthermore, I

explain why it is necessary that an accurate analysis be available in all initial reporting in

“The Necessity of Accuracy in Initial Reporting” (51). Finally, I conclude with how

proper public relations plays an important role in ensuring accuracy in the media,

complete with suggestions for Israel to reform its PR team, in “Suggestions for Israel’s

PR Modifications and Sample Press Release” (52-54). My goal with this is to help Israel

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improve its overall world image and provide factual knowledge of the Arab-Israeli

conflict to the world at large.

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BACKGROUND: A Brief History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In order to understand major historical events, it is necessary to look into the

background of what led those involved to any specific achievement or confrontation.

Middle Eastern affairs, especially those involving the Arab-Israeli Conflict, involved

many complexities throughout its long-struggle-filled history. Knowledge of basic Arab-

Israeli history allows the context behind each isolated incident to arise, this allowing one

to look at each incident objectively and form more substantial and accurate opinions.

Therefore, to understand the events that led to the raid on the Freedom Flotilla, I have

chosen to start at the very beginning of the current era of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; a

beginning that has led to a very eventful and deadly present, but will hopefully lead to a

calmer, more peaceful future.

The Jewish State of Israel is surrounded by those nations who call it their enemy.

At its northern border lies Lebanon; while to the east lie Syria and Jordan. Its south faces

Egypt, the Sinai and Saudi Arabia. Its western border is along the Mediterranean Sea and,

since 2005, also contains the Gaza Strip. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 put the notion

of a Jewish state into people’s minds, citing the first world power, Great Britain, as in

“favour of a Jewish ‘national home’ in what was known as Palestine” (BBC). By 1922,

the League of Nations formed a Mandate for Palestine, which designated Palestine as the

national home for the Jewish people under direct British Rule, and Transjordan as an

Arab state for the Arab Palestinians to be under the joint rule of the Hashemite family and

the British (League of Nations). However, this British rule angered some of the area’s

population, including the Jewish Palestinians whose ancestors had lived in that area since

before the destruction of the second temple. It also angered the Bedouins, and Arab

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Palestinians, resulting in internal battles (Jewish Virtual Library). The British were

unsure of how to mediate between the native Arab Palestinians and the native and

immigrant Jewish people for whom they had just created a state. The UN Partition Plan

of 1947 attempted to settle this matter by relinquishing the British of any power over the

region, and giving the Arab Palestinians a state that included Jordan, and most of the land

that’s outside Israel’s pre-1967 borders. The Jewish state was to be formed with the land

that was left but Jerusalem was to be ruled internationally (Israel’s Ministry of Foreign

Affairs).

Finally, on May 14th, 1948 the Jewish State of Israel was declared, allowing for a

full pullout of all British forces (Hasbara 135). The next day, the Arab Legion, which

included Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq, declared war on the newborn

Jewish state, hoping to ensure that the Jews would not keep their ancestral homeland

(Jewish Virtual Library). They claimed that the Arab Palestinians were being left out of

the conversation regarding the status of the land in Palestine, since it was their homeland

as well. However, by January 1949, their efforts proved fruitless, and the borders of the

state of Israel were officially finalized (Hasbara 185). The Gaza Strip, at Israel’s

Southern border near Egypt, was declared by the Arab League as an independent entity

governed by the All-Palestine government. However, it was not recognized by those

countries outside of the Arab League (Shlaim). In February 1949, Egypt and Israel signed

an armistice agreement that settled the borders of Egypt and the Gaza Strip with Israel,

leaving Egypt in control of the Gaza Strip and those who resided within its borders

(Gardus 369). Those same borders are still abided by today (Gardus 370).

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The 1950’s held a period of mass immigration from Jews of Arab lands as well as

the remnants of the European Jewry after the Holocaust to Israel (Hasbara 135). This

allowed the country to grow and prosper, leading to a period of innovation. Since Israel is

mostly swampland, the new immigrants needed to make the land arable. By 1951, they

established the Hula Valley Reclamation Program, turning swamps into arable lands.

Israel also supported the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, accepting the new Republic of

Egypt within the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset (Jewish Virtual Library).

But peace would not last for long. By July 1956, Egypt decided to nationalize the

Suez Canal and block the strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Owen). Israel responded by

declaring war in October. A day later, Britain and France joined Israel in its war effort

(Owen). By March 1957, the canal was finally reopened to Israeli trade and policed by

the UNEF to ensure that this nationalization of a public resource would never happen

again (Jewish Virtual Library). However, Israel also maintained a military presence in the

Sinai Peninsula to ensure that its trade would not be blocked again. Israel only agreed to

pull out “when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is

about to enter the Canal Zone” (Alteras 246).

This war marked the beginning of a long range of hostilities in the region, as

terrorist attacks became a regular occurrence carried out by Israel’s neighbors (Jewish

Virtual Library). Then, with the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in

1964 (Hasbara 135), a declaration proclaiming that “it is a national duty to bring up

individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner” was sent out calling on every

Palestinian to “be prepared for the armed struggle and [be] ready to sacrifice his wealth

and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation” (Kadi 137-

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141). The PLO was established by Arab states in the Arab League Summit in Cairo in

1964 to ensure that an Arab state in “Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time

of the British mandate" would be formed. They also sought to "prohibit the existence and

activity of Zionism” and called for the use of all means necessary to make certain that

this was possible (Kadi 137-141). In 1968, Yasser Arafat was named the PLO’s head; he

pushed for the use of guerrilla warfare under the fedayeen organizations against Israel

(AP).

By June 1967, Israel was facing “imminent attacks from Egypt, Syria and Jordan”

(Hasbara 135). So the IDF launched a pre-emptive strike against the three countries, and

two of their borders, trying to ensure that they’d be able to defend themselves and their

state (Hasbara 135). Six days later, Israel declared victory and acquired the land that

formed the new defensible borders of Israel, which now included Judea and Samaria, the

remainder of Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights (Hasbara

135). That following September, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser declared in the

Khartoum Conference the “Three No’s: No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel,

and no recognition of Israel” (Hasbara 135).

The early 1970’s held Israel and Egypt’s War of Attrition, where Egypt launched

countless attacks on Israel’s positions in the internationally governed Suez Canal

(Hasbara 135). That was followed quickly by Egypt and Syria launching an unexpected

joint attack against Israel on Yom Kippur 1973, which held heavy casualties for Israel

(Hasbara 135). Although Israel was named the victor, the nation suffered a heavy loss,

including the resignation of their first female prime minister, Golda Meir. Israel’s Arab

neighbors, clearly not succeeding on the war front now realized that they could not

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“crush Israel by force” (Brown). Rather, they formulated a new agenda: one of

diplomacy, public relations, negotiations and propaganda.

A time of peace with Egypt would soon arrive, however, when the Camp David

Accords ended with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President

Anwar El Sadat signing a formal peace treaty on March 26th, 1979. The main features of

the treaty were mutual recognition of each other as sovereign countries to end the state of

war, normalization of relations between the two countries and the complete withdrawal

by Israel from the Sinai Peninsula as Egypt had agreed to leave the area demilitarized.

The agreement also allowed for the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba

to be from hereon out international waterways. Most notably, the Accords ended with

Egypt being the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel as a Jewish state (Camp

David Accords).

Although the borders were relatively calm at this point, Israel’s new enemy was

internal: the radical Islamic extremists who were part of the fedayeen and the PLO

(Jewish Virtual Library). The PLO declared the first Intifada on Israel that began on Dec

8th, 1986 and lasted for about seven years (Hasbara 135). Throughout this period of

extreme violence, over 3,000 Israelis were wounded and 160 Israelis were killed

(B’Tselem). Finally, this era of terror ended as the PLO and Israel signed a mutual

recognition agreement in September 1993, soon to be known as the Oslo Accords

(Hasbara 135). That marked the first time Israel would trade land for peace, by making its

first withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip in May 1994 (Hasbara 135). However,

almost immediately thereafter, Palestinian terrorists initiated a campaign of suicide

bombers throughout Israel (Hasbara 135). Israel did stick to their side of the Oslo

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Accords though, removing its army from big centers of Palestinian populations, including

Jericho and Hebron (Hasbara 135). Upon the failure of the Camp David Summit in July

2000, however, a full-fledged second intifada was launched and a “wave of suicide

bombings and armed attacks began” (Hasbara 134). By 2008, over 1,000 Israelis were

murdered in terrorist attacks, most of them civilians (B’Tselem).

In response to this era of terror, Israel erected the Security Fence to “serve as an

important function in national security,” and the Roadmap for Peace was announced by

the Quartet of the Middle East consisting of the UN, the EU, Russia and the US (Hasbara

134). This roadmap detailed a plan for a lasting peace and a resolution for the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict (Roadmap for Peace). It also pushed for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel

Sharon to announce his plan to unilaterally disengage from Gaza by 2005 (Hasbara 134),

since he felt that Israel must break the current stalemate of the peace process, and

performing this pullout would show how serious Israel was in wanting peace (BBC).

Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA) endorsed the disengagement plan

(Hasbara 134). From August to September 2005, Israel began its historic pullout of Gaza,

removing over 8,000 Jewish inhabitants of the area and removing a strong sector of its

agricultural economy (Hasbara 134). However, that didn’t cease the Palestinians’ rocket

fire as many had hoped (Hasbara 134).

Hope for peace was lost further when on January 25th, 2006 Hamas won the

parliamentary elections in Gaza (Hasbara 134), and even further when IDF Sergeant

Gilad Shalit was kidnapped while patrolling the Gaza/Israel border in June 2006 (Hasbara

133). Hamas, also known as “the Islamic Resistance Movement,” is designated a terrorist

organization by Israel and the US (Greenberg). Its charter cites that “Israel will exist and

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will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it,” “our struggle against Jews is very

great and very serious,” and “initiatives and so-called peaceful solutions and international

conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement”

(The Hamas Charter). Since they became the governing body of Gaza, it has become

increasingly difficult for Israel to have diplomatic relations with the inhabitants there,

complicating hopes for a peaceful solution even more.

To make matters worse for Israel, Fatah (the governing party of the Palestinian

Authority) and Hamas signed the Mecca Accord in February 2007, to become the first

ever unity government over the Palestinians in Gaza (Hasbara 133). By default, this

meant that the Hamas Charter’s statements were now accepted by the PA, which halted

any semblance of peace talks entirely. Throughout all this, barrages of rockets shot from

Gaza kept raining on Israeli civilians (Hasbara 133). However, the unity of Fatah and

Hamas didn’t last long. By June 2007, Hamas decided to take over Gaza, kicking Fatah

out, and angering the PA (Hasbara 133).

By December 27, 2008, with the rocket count from Gaza into Israel at over

10,000, and Hamas refusing to resume a cease-fire with Israel, the IDF announced

Operation Cast Lead in order to protect its Southern citizens (Hasbara 133). Its aim was

to stop the rocket fire constantly bombarding Israel. After three weeks, Israel announced

a unilateral ceasefire and twelve hours later Hamas announced only a one-week ceasefire

(CBC News). However, since Israel still had an obligation to protect its citizens, one

week of quiet was not enough. So, it decided to impose a naval blockade of the Gaza

Strip (Hasbara 133). So, to comply with international regulations, Israel allowed and still

allows limited numbers of humanitarian supplies from aid organizations to be delivered

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through the land crossings in Ashkelon. In May 2010, this included over 1.5 million liters

of diesel fuel and gasoline, fruits and vegetables, wheat, sugar, meat, chicken and fish

products, dairy products, animal feed, hygiene products, clothing and shoes. Whatever

items were prevented from entering were certain household items used to create

homemade rockets (Ehrlandger, Cooper). It was later exposed that to ensure that Gaza’s

citizens didn’t starve, Israel counted calories of what they let in so that no one could

claimed they died from lack of food. Constant pressure on Hamas was still applied by

these restrictions to try to find a peaceful solution and cease their rocket fire (AP).

By mid-2010 though, certain members of the international community felt that the

situation in Gaza was unsustainable. Therefore, the Free Gaza Movement, the European

Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza, the Greek Ship to Gaza Campaign, the Swedish

Ship to Gaza, the International Committee to End the Siege on Gaza and the Turkish

NGO, İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakf, or, in English, the Foundation

for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), partnered to form the

Freedom Flotilla (IHH 10-11). The IHH is on Israel’s banned NGO list for its links with

Hamas, and, as of this publication, the US government is currently debating whether it

should be on its list of foreign terrorist organizations for its possible links to Al Quaeda

(Christian Science Monitor). However, the IHH website proclaims that it “has worked to

prevent the violation of human rights and liberties, without regard to nation, religion,

language or race” (IHH 6). Currently, it fulfills its proclamation in 120 countries and

regions spread over five continents and is motivated to “create a collective

consciousness” (IHH 6). The entire flotilla movement was also heavily endorsed by

Turkey (IHH 6).

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The intentions of the flotilla were to try to breach the naval blockade set up by

Israel on Gaza (Palmer 27), so that they could ostensibly only provide the citizens of

Gaza with food and necessary supplies for life (IHH 20). However, on May 31st, 2010,

members of the IDF raided the Mavi Marmara boat resulting in the untimely and

unintentional deaths of nine of the flotilla’s members and numerous injuries on both the

Israeli and humanitarian sides, including gunshot wounds to two Israeli soldiers and a

fractured skull of another (Simmons 330). The remainder of the flotilla participants were

taken into custody by the Israeli authorities and were released and deported by June 3,

2010 (Palmer 3). The IDF then transferred all allowed goods that had been aboard the

flotilla to Gaza (Hasbara 133). Israel’s government claimed that these deaths aboard the

Mavi Marmara were unintentional but because the activists attacked the soldiers with

weapons, the soldiers were forced to react and retaliate (Simmons 330). From the video

footage released by the IDF, one can see the flotilla participants attacking the soldiers

with steel pipes, wooden clubs, knives and slingshots (IDF Blog). However, the members

of the Mavi Marmara vehemently deny this, and claim the IDF were the ones who

attacked them violently and brutally, and used excessive force (IHH 20-26). The

aftermath of this incident is still a blockaded Gaza, albeit lighter, rockets still being shot

at Israel’s Southern citizens, and non-existent Israel and Turkish relations (Eligur).

Although the UN investigation and subsequent Palmer Report found that both

sides were to blame for the deaths (Palmer 4), a survey of the initial media response and

reports released was one mostly sympathizing with the flotilla activists and solely

blaming Israel for what had occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). I believe that

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this initial media response is due to Israel’s lack of diplomatic public relations back in

2010, resulting from inadequate crisis management and insufficient press relationships.

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The Significance of Public Relations

With any incident, the media will become informed via press releases sent by

each involved party’s PR team. The media will then try and speak to top leaders,

witnesses of the incident as well as participants to get the full story of what had occurred.

However, only with the proper PR team sending out press releases in a timely manner

will the media know who the most knowledgeable people to speak to will be. The media

will then capitalize on those press releases by contacting the mentioned officials. That’s

when the story angle will be formed.

Governments contain PR teams to manage their reputations either through

promotional materials, or by getting the media to cover the positive aspects their country

offers. The United States specifically has the State Department to accomplish this (Seitel

270). That’s how they maintain their world image and how they can ensure that it stays

positive. However, PR doesn’t just consist of propaganda. Proper PR teams also contain

internal bodies to handle crises and to maintain the relationships with the media, so that

each side of every scenario is able to be heard by the media. The United States has

designated a sector of the Defense Department to ensure this happens (Seitel 272).

However, in contrast to the organization of the US PR body, Israel has an

inadequate PR team when it comes to their crisis management and maintaining media

relationships. Plenty of advocacy organizations, such as The David Project,

StandWithUS, Hasbara Fellowships and Israel Campus Coalition, work to ensure that the

positive attributes of the state of Israel are conveyed to the media and the general public

(Hillel). However, government propaganda differs greatly from crisis management.

Propaganda does not need a context, nor is it time sensitive. Crisis management is. Proper

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media relationships, too, are an essential part of any crisis management team. This

ensures that they can convey the involved party’s reasoning behind any incident, so that

both sides may be heard before the media deadline. Therefore, because Israel lacks such a

team, it has become increasingly difficult for it to maintain a positive world image in the

media, and, consequently, worldwide.

By contrast, the Palestinians have proven to be experts at maintaining their media

relationships and capitalizing on crises. Also, because plenty of human rights groups have

taken up their plight, including the six who promoted the Freedom Flotilla of 2010 (IHH

10-11), the press relationships these groups maintain and the releases they send out gain a

lot of traction. In addition, because Hamas has made it close to impossible for journalists

to enter the Gaza Strip (Reporters Without Borders), it has become increasingly difficulty

to report on the welfare of its current citizens. In turn, this makes it complicated for

humanitarian rights groups to envision what is currently taking place there. NGO

Monitor, an organization formed to keep an eye on human rights groups specifically

focused on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, believes that humanitarian

rights activists can only assume Gaza’s conditions from the releases (NGO Monitor)

created by the Palestinians and their supporters as well as the photo documentation

(Simmons 330) they provide. When the media reports on an incident in the Arab-Israeli

conflict, they use those humanitarian rights groups to be experts on situations and to

corroborate the information they receive via the Palestinians. Many journalists then

decide what information to use when publishing, and do not confirm these reports with

their own eyes.

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The Significance of Public Relations Regarding the 2010 Freedom Flotilla Incident

Israel’s giving of the entire Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in 2005 as a land for

peace initiative (Hasbara 134) has determined a lot of the political tensions surrounding

the country over the last seven years. It has yet to be deemed successful as a tactic to

attain peace, since it has caused war (Hasbara 133), constant fear amongst Israel’s

southern citizens as rockets rain down daily upon them (Hasbara 133-134), and a lot of

unnecessary Israeli world-image damage. Because of all this, the Gaza pullout has indeed

become one of the most monumental and controversial events in Israel’s short modern

history.

In 2006, Hamas, a group that is deemed a terrorist organization by the US and

Israel (Washington Post 10/2012), was democratically elected to be the governing body

of the citizens of Gaza (Hasbara 134). Since then, it has been difficult to report on the

welfare of its citizens because of the lack of access to the strip (Foxman). However, to

stop the raining of rockets on its Southern citizens, the IDF formed a naval blockade on

Gaza in September 2007 (Ehrlandger, Cooper). To comply with international regulations,

they still allowed limited humanitarian supplies from aid organizations to enter the Gaza

Strip (Ehrlandger, Cooper). Whatever they prevented from entering was to help

circumvent the homemade rockets from being created from certain household items

(Ehrlandger, Cooper). However, Israel would let everything in through the land crossings

in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, after proper inspection (Ehrlandger, Cooper). From

September 2005 to May 2010, there had been over 10,000 rockets launched leading to

twenty-eight casualties and countless other mental and physical injuries to Israeli citizens

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residing in the south (Hasbara 133). Therefore, the blockade was deemed legal by the UN

(Palmer).

However, many humanitarian rights groups were under the impression that Gaza

was in disarray and that its citizens were starving and suffering from Israel’s prevention

of goods into Gaza (IHH 10-11). Therefore, in 2010 the members of six NGOs formed

the Freedom Flotilla (IHH 10-11) and tried to breach the naval blockade (Palmer 27), so

that they could ostensibly provide the citizens of Gaza with only food and necessary

supplies for life (IHH 20). But on May 31st, 2010, members of the IDF raided the flotilla

killing nine of the flotilla’s members and resulting in other injuries to all parties involved

(Palmer 3).

In retrospect, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and member of Israel’s right wing

party, the Likud, Danny Danon determined that this incident presented a clear lack in

Israel’s crisis management PR as well as their inadequate media relationships. His book,

“Israel: the Will to Prevail,” indicates that Israel doesn’t have as strong a PR team as the

Palestinians and humanitarian groups (Danon 85). Israel’s government has an evident

lack in crisis management and media relations, and therefore they do not stand on equal

footing with the Palestinians and the humanitarian rights groups that support them. One

can see from the early media released on the incident that the Palestinian side was the one

advocated for (Simmons 330). According to the founder of a media watchdog

organization, Honest Reporting, Shraga Simmons in his book “David and Goliath,”

confirmed that the video footage the IDF captured from the helicopter which had dropped

the soldiers onto the Flotilla was released over ten hours after the incident and only with

Hebrew subtitles (Simmons 330). This further emphasized the world’s image of the

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incident, which had already been influenced by the earlier releases from the pro-

Palestinian NGOs. Three months later, upon the release of the UN Human Rights Council

report of the incident, it too found Israel solely to blame (UN Human Rights Council 53).

Again, this shows how Israel’s crisis management team could not properly get Israel’s

version out, further distorting the world’s impression of what had occurred aboard the

flotilla. However, it should be noted that Israel did not participate in the UNHRC

investigation because it was known as a vehemently anti-Israel entity.

It was clear that during the 2010 raid, the NGOs were the first to release their

version of the incident to the media and, therefore were the first to be contacted for

comment (NGO Monitor). Since they solely sympathized with the flotilla activists and

Gaza’s citizens, that story was the version initially presented (NGO Monitor). The UN

Human Rights Council report too sympathized with the flotilla (UNHRC 53). However,

the UN Palmer Report released in September 2011, over a year after the incident, cited

both the activists and the Israelis equally at fault for the raid and its outcome (Palmer 3).

This incident highlights Israel’s lack of a good PR team, especially when dealing with

crisis management and media relations, which inevitably leads to media distortion and a

faulty worldwide perception of Israeli actions. However, nothing is ever black and white.

So it is Israel’s obligation to get out the entire context surrounding each incident quickly

and efficiently so that it has a fair shot in objectivity when concerning a war as complex

as this.

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Israel’s Public Relations Team in 2010

It was frustrating for me the amount of time it took and the difficulty in finding

out what Israel currently has in place as their PR team and what they had in place back in

2010. As of this publication, I can only confirm the information I found out through

experts in the field currently residing in Israel. I have yet to find a website or book that

explains their system.

In January 2012, I was able to secure an interview with Avi Mayer, the director of

new media at the Jewish Agency for Israel, an 80-year old organization, that promotes the

Zionistic ideals and connections to Israel, and is dedicated to forging a commitment

between the Jewish people and the state of Israel, and the 2012 winner of the “Hasby”

award for excellence in social media. He explained that, “Israel's public diplomacy

strategy is overseen by the National Information Directorate, based in the Prime

Minister's Office. Every government agency, however, had its own spokespeople and

tends to interpret talking points in its own way. The IDF, the Foreign Ministry, the

Defense Ministry, the Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs Ministry, the Israel Police,

and the Government Press Office are all examples of government agencies that maintain

their own press operations, even when receiving guidance from the National Information

Directorate” (Mayer).

What Mayer was saying is that, because Israel functions as a coalition

government, their media operations are scattered. A coalition government means “a

cabinet of parliamentary government in which several political parties cooperate”

(Dictionary.com). Since there is no party in Israel that wins the majority in an election,

the party with the most votes must combine with others, sometimes even sacrificing their

23


mantras, in order to form a unity government. As of 2010, there were sixteen parties in

the parliament, two of them Palestinian (Isseroff). However, there was no uniform agency

that either spoke to the media, or maintained relationships with them. Rather, each

agency, controlled by its own political party in the coalition was responsible for dealing

with the media. This makes things difficult for journalists, since they get many different

versions of a story depending on whom they spoke with. In a crisis, like the flotilla

incident, this has proven to be highly detrimental to Israel’s image around the world.

The National Information Directorate was created six years ago, after the Second

Lebanon War in 2006 (To Inform is To Influence). This was because, to many, even

though Israel had a tactical victory in the war, the outcome was a “strategic loss” as Israel

had lost the war on public opinion. By 2008, when Israel invaded Gaza in Operation Cast

Lead, again there was a tactical victory, but there was still a clear lack in the information

being sent to the media. It became clear that their PR had gotten better, but was far from

perfect. “Journalists, videographers, social media writers (including Mayer) and bloggers

[were embedded] within the fighting units and sought to file information reports before

all others” (To Inform is To Influence). The National Information Directorate also

attempted to coordinate all the public affairs, but they mostly focused on the military

units in coordinating a unified message, not including the other involved parties (To

Inform is To Influence).

Two things should be noted in regard to the improvement of Israeli PR though:

the involvement and presence in social media and the release of information in Arabic.

This shows that in 2010, when social media was in use by forty-six percent of the world

daily (Kate, HeyWire) including the journalists, Israel didn’t use it at all. Approximately

24


twenty-eight percent of the world uses social media as their primary source of news

(Densley). If Israel is not represented there, people will not learn about it nor will they

hear its side. Only in 2009 did Israel set up an agency to handle all its social media

affairs. However, it still has yet to present a united message. The introduction of the

release of information in Arabic also was a new strategy for the government to take.

Beforehand, the Palestinians were just receiving information in their native tongue via

their media. However, now they could access Israeli information in Arabic as well, giving

them more of an education of the two sides of the conflict, and, hopefully, a better

preparation of knowledge if they were to begin peace talks again.

In June 2012, Former Israel Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said, “the state

comptroller’s critical report on the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 shows that only one

government body, the Foreign Ministry, should be in charge of Israel’s media relations.”

He elaborated that it should only be the foreign ministry because, “of the skill and

deployment that allow it to respond in real time and deal with the false versions being put

out by hostile parties, can take on these kinds of public relations missions to media

worldwide.” Lieberman noted that at the time of the flotilla incident, several different

official bodies, including the military spokesperson, the National Information Directorate

and the Ministry for Hasbara and Diaspora Affairs, were responsible for PR, creating

what he called “disorganization and problems” (Times of Israel).

These problems are evident when looking into the initial media released

surrounding the flotilla incident. However, as regards terrorist organizations and their

media relations, according to Mayer, he “can't comment on how terrorist organizations

run their media operations, but they do tend to have designated spokespeople, and they

25


also tend to develop relationships with journalists. Like other bodies, they also use social

media. And although terms of use would seem to bar the use of social media platforms

for terror purposes, they are not always strictly upheld” (Mayer). You can see examples

of this from the facebook pages “Free Gaza” with over 40,000 followers, and the “IHH

Official” with over 4,000 followers. Their pages consistently update themselves with

“breaking news” and photos, accessible to anyone. Both pages were created in late 2008

and include contact emails for anyone with questions. These pages are in addition to the

releases sent out by the NGOs that support the Palestinian cause and the IHH almost

immediately after the raid. The organizations were prepared to get their word out, while

Israel was greatly lagging behind at getting any unified message out to the media and to

the general public.

26


Summary of the Early Press Releases Regarding the Flotilla Incident By NGOs and Israel

The hours in the aftermath of the flotilla incident were crucial to all the parties

involved. It was their chance to get their version of what occurred out to the media.

Because the incident happened in the early hours of the morning, the media would be

reporting any new information as “breaking news” to which their audiences would

awake. At most, all the public had known before May 31st was that there was a Freedom

Flotilla sent with humanitarian aid which was trying to breach Israel’s blockade of Gaza.

Therefore, the media now did not only have to report on the incident, but they also had to

form the context in which it had occurred, called b-matter.

B-matter can come from a number of sources. Predominantly it comes from a

good PR team with good media relationships and skills to react quickly and effectively in

times of crises. The incident happens, the media learns about it through a general

newswire like AP or Reuters, and then the media turns to the PR team they have a

relationship with to learn more about the facts which led up to the incident.

From the early press releases I reviewed, thirty-five were sent by NGOs (Non-

Governmental Organizations) criticizing and blaming Israel solely for the incident and all

injuries and deaths which had occurred aboard the flotilla (NGO Monitor). I found

highlights of the early releases on NGO Monitor’s website, and then followed the links

mentioned to the specific NGO site which held the full release to corroborate that the

highlighted quote on NGO Monitor was indeed factual. NGO Monitor, a pro-Israel site

that provides information and analysis, promotes accountability, and supports discussion

on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian

agendas. The aim of NGO Monitor is to generate and distribute critical analysis and

27


reports on the output of the international NGO community for the benefit of government

policy makers, journalists, philanthropic organizations and the general public. They

intend to publicize distortions of human rights issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict and

provide information and context for the benefit of NGOs working in the Middle East.

They want to lead an informed public debate on the role of humanitarian NGOs. NGO

Monitor's objective is to end the practice used by certain self-declared 'humanitarian

NGOs' of exploiting the label 'universal human rights values' to promote politically and

ideologically motivated agendas. Their board consists of Elie Wiesel, Alan Dershowitz,

as well as countless other experts and dignitaries.

According to NGO Monitor, the initial press releases sent out by these self-

proclaimed “civil society” and “human rights groups” ignore “the video evidence of

violent activists attacking Israeli soldiers with knives and clubs, “accuse Israel of piracy

for intercepting the boats,” “obscure the role of radical Islamic Turkish group IHH, which

has extensive ties to Hamas and other terror organizations,” and “omit the involvement of

the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), a co-organizer of the flotilla and known for

its strategy of provoking violent confrontations with the Israeli military” (NGO Monitor).

In addition, all those releases failed to mention that the flotilla had refused to deliver

humanitarian aid via the Israeli port of Ashdod, and further refused to deliver letters to

kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit believed to be held by Hamas in Gaza. The releases

also omitted the fact that the flotilla members had been singing anti-Semitic and intifada

chants while on board (NGO Monitor).

What the releases state emphatically, though incorrectly, was that Israel solely

was at fault for what had occurred aboard the flotilla. Amnesty International released

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early May 31st saying, “Israeli killings of Gaza ship activists must be investigated…the

activists on the ships made it clear that their primary purpose was to protest against the

continuing Israeli blockade, which constitutes collective punishment and so is a breach of

international law” (Amnesty International). However, the organization refrained from

elaborating and pointing out that Hamas was shooting rockets at Israel’s southern citizens

in response to and in protest of Israeli government actions was also a form of collective

punishment and should be investigated as well.

War on Want, a United Kingdom NGO, sent a release calling for their

government to act, saying, “this form sends a letter…to demand the UK government hold

Israel to account for this brutal attack” (War on Want). Another release on May 31 st, from

the Gaza Civil Society which includes the Arab Cultural Forum, International Solidarity

Movement, Palestinian Network of Non-Governmental Organisations, Gaza Community

Mental Health Program and Red Crescent Society Gaza Strip, called for “a global

response to hold Israel accountable for the murder of foreign civilians at sea and illegal

piracy of civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid for Gaza” (Gaza Civil Society, NGO

Monitor). What both releases failed to mention were the videos released by the IDF that

showed the weapons like machetes aboard the Mavi Marmara and that those weapons had

been used violently against the IDF by the activists as the IDF attempted to take over the

ship. They also didn’t mention that Israel had offered countless times to transfer

humanitarian aid into Gaza through the port of Ashdod.

The Alternative Information Center called the incident, “a massacre and a piracy

in international waters against the Freedom Flotilla…the Israeli Navy perpetrated a new

crime against humanity when it attacked the Freedom Flotilla…Israel created a blood

29


bath against civilian ships carrying hundreds of internationals from many countries”

(AIC). Numerous reporters in the media picked up on these ‘hot’ terminologies, and used

them when reporting the incident. The use of these terms implicates Israel, which can

prove problematic when promoting accuracy in reporting. Since almost all these releases

were published either on May 31st or June 1st, the day of or the day after the incident, one

cannot be sure the information provided was corroborated with the correct and

knowledgeable people. Also, since the releases were from many different countries, they

reached a diverse array of a vast amount of people (NGO Monitor). The media could not

simply ignore a quantity of releases that vast, diverse and immediate. Therefore, they had

to capitalize on them, reporting the facts as the NGOs portrayed them to be, without

hearing Israel’s side since it hadn’t reached them yet, and without knowing who the

proper contacts were to reach out to.

Still, most importantly, the fact that the Freedom Flotilla organizers had been

anticipating such a media opportunity was not reported. Aboard the flotilla, one could

find members of “parliament, academics, journalists, authors, NGO representatives,

religious representatives, and activists” (IHH 15). The members on board were from

thirty-seven countries and who had representatives from important media organizations

from most of those countries with them. This allowed the IHH to get their story out first,

since they had their media partners aboard (IHH 15-16). On the flotilla were also

“Turksat satellite frequency and satellite phones, which the ship was using to

communicate with the media and international public opinion” (IHH 20). The IHH also

claimed “the ships of the flotilla were being watched live online” via a live blog (IHH

38). This showed that the planners of the flotilla wanted to ensure that anything and

30


everything that went on aboard the ships would be reported by them first, before anyone

else could get their version of the incident out. They made sure to understand the

immediacy of the media, and capitalized on it.

In addition, the flotilla was comprised of six ships, five of which went peacefully

to Israel’s port of Ashdod with their cargo (StandWithUs). The sixth, the Mavi Marmara,

which is the one we’re focusing on, carried 577 passengers (IHH 12), including babies,

women and the elderly (IHH 21). It was also the only one who protested the IDF

warnings. No reporter questioned why there were the elderly and babies on a flotilla,

which was heading to ostensibly deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, as has been

common for many terrorist organizations, including Hamas, the more children or those

deemed helpless affected by Israeli actions, the better the terrorists look in the media, and

the positive exposure they get as a result (Katz). The IHH even claims that during the raid

“it was announced via satellite frequency that these terrorist attacks [performed by the

IDF] should immediately be halted; this frequency at first had not been noticed and thus

not blocked and it was broadcasting the massacre that the Israelis were inflicting on the

civilian activists” (IHH 22]. As of the publication of this document however, this

broadcast of the alleged IDF attacks against the activists is yet to be found, online or

otherwise.

The video footage found online though is confirmed by the Palmer Report later on

(Palmer). It depicts the IDF approaching the Mavi Marmara, sending out warnings

saying, “you are now approaching an area of hostilities which is under a naval blockade.

The Israeli government supports the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the civilian

population of the Gaza strip and invites you to enter the Ashdod Port after which you can

31


return to your home port aboard the vessels on which you arrived” (IDF Blog). This

message was sent at about 9PM in English to the vessels part of the flotilla. The response

by the flotilla members, captured on the same video, stated obscenities like, “Shut the

fuck up,” “Go back to Auschwitz,” and “We’re helping Arabs go against the US. Don’t

forget 9/11 guys” (IDF Blog).

A second video shows the IDF trying to specifically board the Mavi Marmara

(IDF Blog). At around 4:30AM, it shows the soldiers attempting to board the ship via a

ladder and a raft. That’s when you can see that they are met with iron pipes, water hoses,

chains and electric disc saws to remove the ladders the IDF was using. Upon their failure

to board via the raft, you see the IDF in a Black Hawk helicopter carrying fifteen soldiers.

Recall that the Mavi Marmara had over five hundred participants on board. Only bringing

fifteen soldiers meant the IDF did not expect any sort of extreme confrontation, unless

they planned to lose such a battle. As the helicopter hovered over the ship you see a few

stun grenades being thrown on board the flotilla to ensure the soldiers could land safely

and carry out their mission of taking over and halting the Mavi Marmara. That cleared the

roof of the flotilla only for some brief moments, as the rope the soldiers used to board

was thrown down. However, almost immediately thereafter, one could see activists tie the

rope to the flotilla. Therefore, a second rope had to be thrown down for the soldiers to

begin to board. As every soldier slid down, it was clear that each was met with two to

four activists wielding weapons. According to the IDF and photo documentation

thereafter, those weapons included knives, iron bars and axes (IDF Blog). It became clear

that when another soldier slid down, a gun was fired, with the bullet hitting the IDF

soldier in the stomach. As the other soldiers realized they were being put in life-

32


threatening situations such as battling knife wielding activists, and being thrown around

from deck to deck, they opened fire with live ammunitions. Consequently, five soldiers

were stabbed or shot and three were thrown from the decks. That’s when a second

helicopter arrived, this time with twelve soldiers. These soldiers secured the roof quickly,

but were met again with violent resistance when trying to get to the lower decks. That’s

where the video documentation stops (IDF Blog).

The videos found on the IDF Blog, the IDF’s personal outreach to the public that

explains what actions it took paired with its social media accounts, are great and detailed,

and perfect for anyone who wants the context of the situation according to Israel’s take

on the events. However, the detailed video was not published until Israel’s Eiland Team

of experts concluded their investigation of the incident on July 13, 2010, almost a month

and a half after the incident (IDF Blog). Clips from the final videos were released though,

but only ten hours after the incident due to the fact that the helicopter with the video was

transporting the injured activists and soldiers to nearby Israeli hospitals for treatment

(Simmons 330). These clips showed the IDF being beaten and stabbed and other modes

of violence that occurred aboard the flotilla, which caused numerous injuries. However,

“ten hours was simply too late. In today’s instantaneous news cycle, where every split-

second determines who will get the “scoop,” reporters are compelled to leap to

conclusions based on pre-conceived notions” (Simmons 330). When stories are gathered

quickly and under pressure, the media rely on a very superficial understanding of the

event and its dynamics. So, the stories are not always completely accurate, since reporters

depend on the context via other sources, like a PR crisis management team.

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According to Shraga Simmons, newsrooms have shrunk 25-percent in the past

three years alone making it harder to quickly fact check stories and to do proper research

(Simmons 331). Simmons, as the founding editor of HonestReporting, a pro-Israel media

watchdog group, produced a film in 2010 exposing the distortion of the media coverage

regarding the flotilla raid, which garnered in upwards of 200,000 views on Youtube. He

also published, “David and Goliath,” a study of Western media bias in reporting the

Israeli-Arab conflict. The 500-page book is sourced with over 2,000 footnotes and

includes statistical studies that document a pervasive pro-Palestinian slant he found while

studying the media. He delves into the reporting that surrounded the Gaza Flotilla, as well

as what acts the Israel PR team took, while addressing those actions the Palestinian and

humanitarian groups took. In his book he also provides the distorted news reports from

the US, which were initially released. As Steven Waldman writes in his 2011 publication

The Information Needs of Communities: the Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband

Age, “Old-fashioned “shoe-leather reporting” – the kind where a journalist hits the street,

conducts interviews, probes and unearths key information – is too often replaced by a

superficial Google search” (Waldman). This leads to plenty of misreporting, and always

lengthy, yet barely ever read corrections pages. Lastly, although highly consequential,

this leads to faulty perceptions of incidents within the general public, since most of the

public learns about such things solely via the media.

34


Early Press Published – United States

Because Israel lacks an adequate PR crisis management team and substantial

media relations, I cannot blame the media completely for the way they initially reported

the incident. Clearly, the pro-Palestinian humanitarian groups and the Palestinians had a

handle on getting the releases out in the proper and timely fashion. However, it is still the

media’s duty to do their own research so that they know for sure that what the releases

say are indeed factual.

When it came to The New York Times report of the incident, one can see that the

initial article acknowledges the releases as well as the IDF video. However, it did not say

that the video represented the Israeli side, the side later to be determined as factual by the

Palmer Report (Palmer). Rather, it said the video was merely “supporting an Israeli

claim,” and subsequently quoted the Free Gaza movement saying the video was “a lie”

(Kershner). The BBC also contributed to the perpetration of the one-sidedness, saying the

idea of the activists possessing weapons was just “cheap [Israeli] propaganda,” despite

the video footage provided by the IDF, which explicitly shows the activists using

weapons against the soldiers (BBC). But it seemed, the media refused to give credence to

the IDF video, while just accepting the paper releases from the pro-Palestinian

humanitarians and Palestinians as factual without their citing any proof.

But even those initial articles weren’t the worst of them. Currently and in 2010,

most major news organizations relied on and subscribe to general newswires to get their

breaking stories, as well as what stories they should follow, and do additional reporting

on. These newswires usually just write the basics, trying to stick to the unbiased facts.

The most popular newswires include the Associated Press (AP) and Reuters. However,

35


when reporting the flotilla incident these two newswires did not stay completely

unbiased. The AP forced readers, and news agencies, to read deeper before even

mentioning what had occurred to the IDF as they boarded the flotilla, and therefore

delayed the facts as the Palmer Report would soon prove (Gutkin). Reuters was even

worse, citing a “Factbox” where it quoted Mavi Marmara activists’ testimony such as,

“When we went up to the deck, they emerged from the helicopters and military boats and

attacked us…we told them that we were unarmed. Our sole weapon was water”

(Reuters).

My problem is not with Reuters quoting Mavi Marmara activists’ testimony. It is

with Reuters giving unqualified credence to the testimony with the title “Factbox.” That

lends the presentation of the incident to be one-sided, when trusting the testimony of only

one party as factual, and completely discrediting the IDF video, which showed a different

version of the incident, and omitting that such a video even existed. What was even more

problematic was that the activist quoted, Mutlu Tiryaki, was not even aboard the Mavi

Marmara, but on a different boat of the flotilla that had surrendered peacefully to the IDF

(Simmons 332). Lastly, the biggest foul committed by Reuters was the picture it

published of an injured man; the caption read pro-Palestinian activist. In actuality, the

man was indeed an IDF soldier (Rozkovsky).

What Reuters committed was not so shocking. Reuters has had a reputation of

cropping out items from pictures that would otherwise be deemed sympathetic to the

Israeli cause. In 2006, during the war between Lebanon and Israel, they had numerous

incidents of creating more smoke, and reusing photographs from past incidents to

overdramatize Palestinian suffering (Simmons 333). For their photographers, this

36


incident proved to be no different, with them cropping out knives from the flotilla

activists’ hands, and even removing a pool of blood that was surrounding an Israeli

soldier (Simmons 333). Since Reuters is one of the top agencies that the media turns to

for reliable coverage of incidents, I hold them very accountable for the slanted coverage

provided by the other major news outlets. Because Reuters is providing the news, and

supposedly unbiased, it’s okay for the media to rely on them. However, with their

reputation regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, I think it’s about time the media took a

stand and stopped using Reuters as a source for accurate coverage of the incidents

surrounding the conflict.

However, some of the additional slanted coverage did not stop with the

misrepresentation of all the activists as completely “non-violent.” A CNN report stated

that “no country has the right to touch ships traveling in international waters” (Zakaria).

The New York Times added, “Israel’s operation in international waters…is unacceptable

under any clause of international law” (Kershner) and the Chicago Tribune headline read,

“Piracy on the High Seas” (Press).

The problem with all this misreporting is that, although the Palestinian and pro-

Palestinian humanitarian releases claimed otherwise, the international law according to

the San Remo Manual dictated that “it is permissible to attack a vessel on the high seas

when that vessel is believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or

breaching a blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to

stop” (San Remo Manual, Simmons 334). The U.S. Defense Department’s Handbook on

the Law of Naval Operations and the UN Charter on the Law of the Sea affirm this as

well (Simmons 334). So if the media organizations would have performed a little bit of

37


research on the release’s information, they would have found Israel’s blockade on Gaza

to be legal, and call the motives that pushed the ensuing flotilla incident into question, as

was soon to be done by the UN Palmer Report.

As I have argued, with a proper crisis management team, Israel could have sent all

this information in a release early on, and prevented a lot of these headlines. Sadly, this

was not the case. Sure, the media did not perform adequate research, and had gotten their

sources from one side, providing a distorted view of the incident to the public. But that is

in part due to Israel not providing their side to the media in a timely fashion. With a

proper PR team, complete with adequate media relationships and good crisis

management, Israel might have been able to give balance to the image of the flotilla

incident presented to the public by the media.

38


The Significance and Analysis of The UN’s Palmer Report

In the months following the flotilla incident many inquiries were conducted

leading to the various reports and opinions published. Although there is some

significance to the internal investigations done by both Turkey and Israel, I found that the

United Nation’s “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry in the 31 May 2010

Flotilla Incident,” also known as “The Palmer Report,” is the report most accurate,

delving into the two states’ inquiries as well as conducting research of its own. It is also

the report most internationally accepted, including by the United States.

Created by the UN Investigative Committee formed in response to the Israeli raid

on the flotilla, “The Palmer Report” established that “the incident and its outcomes were

not intended by either Turkey or Israel. Both states took steps in an attempt to ensure that

events did not occur in a manner that endangered individuals’ lives and international

peace and security” (Palmer 50). This means, that the blame was now divided between

the Israelis, the activists and the Palestinians. This was concluded after more than a year

of investigation into the incident. It was accepted by Israel as unbiased. However, Turkey

rejected it (Palmer 104-105).

Members of the committee included Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President Alvaro Uribe,

Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar and Mr. Suleyman Ozdem Sanberk. Two of these

members were representatives from Turkey and Israel, so that they could guide the

committee to the proper people to be contacted about the incident. The goal of the report

was to “bring a lasting solution to the situation in Gaza and to grant its people and those

of Israel the promise of normal daily lives” (Palmer 10).

39


The panel had six months to gather information to form educated conclusions and

operated on consensus (Palmer 13). Although it did not contain the power to exercise any

of the suggestions and conclusions it reached (Palmer 7), it hoped that the two countries

would heed the suggestions and exercise what they agreed with and/or deemed proper. It

is important to note that while the Turkish Commission had to answer to its own

government, Israel’s Commission was independent of any party (IDF Blog).

The report began by dissecting the Interim and Final Reports of Turkey’s

National Investigation. It cited that “there was a diplomatic understanding reached

between Turkey and Israel that the vessels in the convoy would not force a breach of the

blockade and would change their destination to the port of Al-Arish if necessary, and that

Israel in turn would refrain from using force against the vessels” (Palmer 17, Turkish

Commission Interim Report 10-11, 16-17). This is particularly significant because of

what had indeed occurred and what Israel had expected as it boarded the flotilla. The

final Turkish Report claimed then that Israel used “excessive force” (Palmer 20, Turkish

Commission Interim Report 16-17) before and after boarding, and it “breached the

principle of freedom on the high seas” since its naval “blockade was illegal” (Palmer 22,

Turkish Commission Interim Report 17). Finally, Turkey also requested that Israel “make

reparations for the wrongs committed, including through the provision of compensation

to the families of the victims” (Palmer 26, Turkish Commission Interim Report 60-62,

109-112).

The Palmer Report also summed up Israel’s National Investigation’s conclusions

in the same way. Of utmost significance was that Israel issued “a formal Notice to

Mariners and broadcast on maritime radio, and conveyed to relevant flag States directly”

40


its imposition of a naval blockade on January 3rd, 2009 on the Gaza Strip to prevent

“weapons, terrorist and money from entering or exiting the Gaza Strip by sea…only after

other options were considered” (Palmer Report 27, Israeli Commission Report 36, 53-58,

62-63, 111). Israel found the blockade necessary because “an armed conflict was taking

place between it and Palestinian terrorist organizations” because of the “thousands of

rockets and mortars [that] have been fired into Israel in ever growing numbers from the

Gaza Strip” since 2001 (Palmer 27, Israeli Commission Report 27-31.) Therefore, Israel

deemed its blockade lawful in response to a “prevailing security threat” (Palmer 28, Israel

Commission Report 58-61). In addition, Israel also felt that “the main goal of the flotilla

participants was to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to

breach the blockade” (Palmer 29, Israeli Commission Report 278). It concluded by

finding “that the actions carried out by Israel to enforce the naval blockade were legal

pursuant to the rules of international law” (Palmer 37, Israeli Commission Report 280).

This is particularly relevant since this confirms the context in which the activists formed

the flotilla, which then justified Israel’s response to it.

Upon analyzing both reports, it is important to note that the Palmer Report also

found it necessary to provide a context behind the incident (Palmer 38), as I have done in

the beginning of this thesis. A proper background, for example a brief history or quotes

from active figures, allows the public to come to more accurate conclusions of their own.

Also, most importantly, proper PR teams can provide the context quickly to the media,

who will then disseminate the full story to the public.

The most vital part of the context behind the flotilla incident that the Palmer

Report found was the legality of the naval blockade, as it was the “backdrop against

41


which the Panel must carry out its task of identifying ways to avoid similar incidents in

the future” (Palmer 38). It found the blockade to be a reactionary measure on the part of

the Israeli military, so it could provide security to its southern citizens. Therefore, the

report found the blockade legal under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that states

the “right of a nation to engage in self defence” (Palmer 39). It found that “Israel has

faced and continues to face a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza…

[resulting] in more than 5,000 [rockets being] fired between 2005 and January 2009,

when the naval blockade was imposing [putting] hundreds of thousands of Israeli

civilians in the range of these attacks” (Palmer 39). The recognition of the legality of the

blockade under the UN is particularly important because it put the measures of the NGOs

and other organizations that put together the flotilla under scrutiny. The report deemed

Israel’s blockade a “necessary step for Israel to take in order to protect its people and to

defend itself” (Palmer 40). Therefore, “the panel is not persuaded that the naval blockade

was a disproportionate measure for Israel to have taken in response to the threat it faced”

(Palmer 41).

Next, the report emphasized that the Arab-Israeli conflict has become one of an

international affair, due to the international calls by Hamas for others to follow their

example and attack Israel (Palmer 41). So, since the conflict involves an international

audience, so too, the law governing it is international law. It also warned those who

assume that Israel’s blockade is to punish Gaza’s citizens for electing Hamas should be

wary, since the naval blockade was imposed over a year after the election. Therefore, the

report found that the blockade was not imposed as a collective punishment. Rather, they

42


found it was just a matter of self-defense in the international spectrum on behalf of Israel

(Palmer 43).

The report then addressed the prospect of aid delivered by the flotilla, since the

flotilla claimed that that was its ultimate intention. However, it found that the “prospect

of delivering significant supplies to Gaza by sea is very low [and] indeed such supplies

were not entering by sea prior to the blockade” (Palmer 43, Israeli Commission Report

54). This creates a significant push to the theory that the flotilla incident was intended as

one of publicity, one far greater than the Israeli PR team in place could handle.

The report did note that the UN Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) report on the

incident and the Turkish Report do not agree with these conclusions because they do not

acknowledge the legality of Israel’s blockade (Palmer 44). The Palmer Report found this

disagreement a main cause for the miscommunication between Israel, the NGOs and

Turkey, all of which were obligated to contact and coordinate with Israel to deliver the

aid (Palmer 44). However, the two pro-Palestinian entities ignored such a necessity and

also ignored Israel’s offer to deliver goods via the port of Ashdod (Palmer Report 44,

Israeli Commission Report 110,121,139). It should be noted that the UNHRC report was

released three months after the incident and placed all blame solely on Israel (UNHRC).

However, this was not shocking since Israel refused to cooperate with this investigation

due to the known nature of the council being vehemently anti-Israel, passing an

unwarranted 32 anti-Israel condemnations (ADL). In the UNHRC’s short life, they have

also had Mahmoud Ahmadenijad and Moamar Ghadaffi in prominent positions within

their committees (ADL), further promoting their anti-Israel stance. It is a matter of

dispute whether or not it was smart for Israel not to participate in the investigation for

43


publicity purposes. However, since it did participate in Palmer’s investigation, most

would say its actions were correct in not participating with an anti-Israel one so soon

after the incident.

However, in contrast with the other two reports, the Palmer Report discovered

that the main organizer of the flotilla, the IHH, formed a document that clearly stated that

the, “purposes of this journey are to create an awareness amongst the world public…and

delivering humanitarian relief to the Palestinians” (Palmer 46, Turkish POC Response of

11 April 2011, Appendix 1, Palestine Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load: Gaza

Flotilla Individual Participation Form, Principles [“Principles”] 1). The IHH ensured that

the document was signed by all the flotilla participants (Palmer 46). This clearly shows

that publicity was the flotilla’s primary purpose and delivering the aid secondary.

Therefore, this further implicates Turkey and the NGOs on the circumstances

surrounding the incident, and the context that led the IDF to board the flotilla as “the

panel seriously questions the true nature and objectives of the flotilla organizers” (Palmer

46). The report added that considering the number of people on board the ships, the

quality of the goods aboard, and the lack thereof of humanitarian goods on the largest

vessel, the Mavi Marmara, they question its reasons and purpose (Palmer 47). The final

straw for the report was the number of journalists on board on the ships, which “gives

further power to the conclusion that the flotilla’s primary purpose was to generate

publicity” (Palmer 47).

Furthermore, “the flotilla passengers committed that they would “not obey the

decisions, warnings or demands of the government of countries in the region regarding

the ship” (Palmer 46, Turkish POC Response of 11 April 2011, Appendix 1, Palestine

44


Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load: Gaza Flotilla Individual Participation Form,

Guarantee [“Guarantee”] 12). So, even though Israel had clearly warned the flotilla ships

not to breach the blockade as one could hear from the IDF video recording, the flotilla

clearly had no intention of changing course or stopping (Palmer 49). It should also be

noted that it is very likely the flotilla didn’t even intend to reach the port of Gaza since

“no adequate port facilities exist in Gaza capable of receiving vessels the size of the Mavi

Marmara” (Palmer 47) and the members rejected the suggestions for the alternative land

routes (Palmer 47, Turkish Commission Report 17, Israeli Commission Report 123).

Lastly, Hamas was said to be preparing a celebration to meet the flotilla, further

reinforcing its ties to the terrorist movement (Palmer 47, Israeli POC Response of 11

April 2011, Annex O, at 2-3).

Next the report acknowledged that even though most participants did agree not to

bring aboard any weapons on their journey, the IHH had forty activists who did not pass

through security in Istanbul and were in charge of the Mavi Marmara vessel (Palmer 48,

Israeli Commission Report 206-208), one of which actually described himself as the IHH

security guard (Palmer 48, Turkish Commission Report, Annex 5/3/xvi at 2). This shows

that there was every possibility of these forty carrying arms, as no one had checked them.

This also reinforces Israel’s claim that they were not the only ones using live fire. The

Palmer Report also emphasized that they found the whole flotilla “a dangerous and

reckless act” considering the amount of people involved and the clear risk of force being

used to stop it (Palmer 48). Therefore, the report found that “the actions of the flotilla

needlessly carried the potential for escalation” (Palmer 48) and it is even “clear to the

Panel that preparations were made by some of the passengers on the Mavi Marmara well

45


in advance to violently resist any boarding attempt” (Palmer 56, Israeli Commission

Report 210-215).

This point is very important when reporting on this incident, since it enforces that

blame is due to the NGOs and participants involved, particularly the IHH. It shows what

the previous reports and media publications had neglected to mention: that Israel had

tried to halt the escalation, but they had no choice but to stop the flotilla participants as

they consistently refused to listen and abide by their legal blockade of Gaza. How many

times was Israel expected to warn the flotilla before it raided the vessel? The report found

that Israel had done its due diligence and had to capitalize on the chance to protect its

citizens from the harm caused to them by Gaza almost daily.

The report then detailed how diplomatic efforts were used to try and stop the

flotilla before it departed Turkey. It was satisfied by Israel’s “extensive and genuine

efforts” in diplomacy, either by offering to deliver the goods through their land crossings

or by its continuous talks with Turkey (Palmer 50). However, the report believed that

more could’ve been done on Turkey’s part to warn the passengers that force was to be

used if they did not abide by the blockade and Israel’s wishes. The report said that “more

could have been done to warn…and to dissuade them from their actions” (Palmer 50).

That’s why when Israel warned the flotilla activists that “all necessary measures” would

be taken to enforce the blockade,” it was justified for them to say so (Palmer 51, Israeli

Commission Report 131, 138). Also, since the flotilla had made no indication of

changing its course, “it was reasonable for the Israeli Navy to conclude that the vessels of

the flotilla intended to proceed to Gaza” (Palmer 52). However, the report still did

suggest that since the last of the four warnings was at 2:00 a.m., another warning closer

46


to the raid could have been issued (Palmer 52, Israeli Commission Report 138, Turkish

Commission Report 20), which might have prevented the escalation of violence aboard

the vessels since it would not have been a surprise.

In Israel’s Eiland Team’s Report published in July 2010, Israel accepted this, and

additionally mentioned that they had wished for and intended to use less force. They

thought “the take-over operation by surprise just before dawn was motivated by the

desire to avoid publicity as much as by operational considerations. This was reinforced

by the communication blackout imposed against the Mavi Marmara” (Palmer 53, Israeli

Commission Report 120-121, 141, Turkish Commission Report 20). This is a very

important point when considering Israel’s PR team in 2010. The team actually thought

that a discreet raid of a large vessel carrying a large amount of people could actually be

kept quieter than one with proper warnings. They also thought that the media would

adhere by a communication blackout and not assume the worst upon only hearing one

version of the events. This is utterly illogical when dealing with a crisis. If you want the

media to hear your side of the events, then you must make sure you are adhering to all

protocol and policy so that they cannot misinterpret any of your actions. This is

especially true if you lack relationships in the media, like Israel does, and have a bad

track record with the media, which is often critical of your actions. Their intentions made

no sense and clearly proved to be very ineffective.

Finally, the report concluded that the blame due Israel was that it had “a too heavy

response too quickly” as the Mavi Marmara didn’t present “an immediate military threat

to Israel” (Palmer 53). Therefore, the report ultimately shared the same conclusion as

Israel’s Eiland Team’s report stating, “clear warnings and the controlled and isolated use

47


of force may have helped avoid a wider and more violent confrontation such as the one

that occurred” (Palmer 53, Israeli Commission Report 273). Both determined Israel’s

actions “to board the vessels with such substantial force at a great distance from the

blockade zone with no final warning immediately prior to boarding was excessive and

unreasonable” (Palmer 54). However, since the report was of the impression that the

flotilla should never have been formed to breach Israel’s legal blockade of Gaza, it

believed there would have been no violence if the activists aboard would have abided by

international law by honoring the blockade and using the land crossings offered by Israel

and Egypt to transfer the goods aboard the ships.

The report then described what they concluded occurred aboard the ships. It still

was unsure over who started shooting live fire first, but it cleared the IDF personnel

descending from the first helicopter as starting it (Palmer 56-57). It knew the IDF faced

“significant, organized and violent resistance” (Palmer 57) either in the form of “metal

bars, slingshots, chains and staves” as was clear from the evidence of members of the

flotilla wearing “life or bullet proof vests and gas masks” in anticipation of violence

before the IDF even boarded (Palmer 56, Turkish Commission Report Annexes

7/5,7/13,7/15). It also found that “firearms were taken from IDF personnel” (Palmer 57).

Since both sides were injured by live fire, it found significant proof to concur that both

sides made use of the weapons. Also, the report discovered that three soldiers were

indeed taken below deck, and “mistreated and placed at risk during the incident” (Palmer

58). This is why the Israel’s Eiland Team’s report pleads that their actions were

“consistent with their rules of engagement and the exercise of self defence” (Palmer 58,

Israeli Commission Report 279). However, the report still found it “difficult to identify

48


specific incidents described by soldiers as related to a specific casualty from among the

nine activists who died during takeover” (Palmer 58, Israeli POC Response of 11 April

2011, at 28). Due to the chaotic nature of the events, the report understood that it was

hard to make decisions in a split second. Still, it found “no adequate explanation provided

for the nine deaths” and was not comfortable with the level of force used by the IDF in

the incident (Palmer 60). Nonetheless, the report found both sides equally at fault for the

deaths: the activists on the Mavi Marmara for preparing to respond violently to a

takeover, and the Israelis, for not adequately warning of a violent and forceful takeover.

That is how the report concluded its investigation of the Mavi Marmara (it later addressed

the other ships that didn’t meet the IDF violently), complete with suggestions for what to

do in the future to prevent such incidents and a commendation of Israel’s actions since

the incident to ease the blockade it still holds over Gaza (Palmer 69, Israeli Commission

Report 94).

It has been proven in the past that flotillas are not an effective way to deliver

supplies to Gaza. UN Officials and the Quartet have stressed that “such convoys are not

helpful in resolving the basic economic problems of Gaza” and that “they needlessly

carry the potential for escalation” (Palmer 67, Briefing by Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-

Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to the Security Council on the situation in the

Middle East, including the Palestinian question, U.N. SCOR, 65th Session, 6363th mtg. at

3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6363 (July 21, 2010). A Freedom Flotilla should never have been

formed, as it would surely not help the situation, and, if anything, worsens it. Violence

and breaching of international law should never be used as a method of getting publicity,

even if both parties are actively participating in the media. The problem with this incident

49


was that Israel was not as active in the media as the flotilla and its supporters were.

Therefore, precedence dictated that those who participated on the Freedom Flotilla would

get their side out first, no matter the outcome. However, perhaps if Israel had a better

image in the media, the activists would have thought twice about their tactic of breaching

the blockade to attract publicity.

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The Necessity of Accuracy in Initial Reporting

The general public relies on the media when they want to know what is occurring

in the world. When flipping through the morning paper, or scanning the webpage, people

ordinarily scan the headlines. They don’t usually read the correction pages. They focus

on the few words that stand out. Therefore, it’s imperative that the media get the full

story published, the first time. People don’t generally check updates. They just rely on the

story they read initially to be factual.

Because of the complexity surrounding the flotilla incident, it was difficult for the

media to discern the full story at first. Therefore, a debate can be made over whether it

was ethical for them to only publish half of the story, before they acquired the releases of

the other side. The media outlets had an obligation to maintain their standards of getting

the story out quickly, and appease their advertisers who expected them to be the best.

However, accuracy can be neglected when such actions occur and when speed is put

before facts.

Nonetheless, in the current media spectrum, a country cannot expect an outlet to

put accuracy before their revenues. They’re in the business to survive and beat out the

competition. Therefore, it’s the country’s obligation to reach out to the media quickly via

their complete PR teams. Vice versa, it is the media’s obligation to seek out both sides to

comment on an incident. In order for Israel to complete its PR team, it must modify what

it currently has in place so that the media situation surrounding the flotilla incident never

will occur again.

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Suggestions for Israel’s PR Modifications and Sample Press Release

Good PR is important because it dictates the context surrounding every incident

that occurs in a region, whether it is good or bad. It also helps maintain the reputations of

those involved. The best way to get your side across is by an immediate press release sent

to already established press contacts. Context and reputations are especially important

when it comes to politics and war. By providing the background to a situation that is

occurring, a good PR team allows for the general public to form their own opinions on

the situation. However, for Israel’s PR team to be on equal footing with that of the

Palestinians and their supporters, Israel must modify its current team. Below are my

suggestions for modification:

Firstly, a totally new division of crisis management must be established. A crisis

erupts; the PR team acts quickly to educate the media why the crisis is occurring. For

example, a press release should have been sent immediately to the press explaining the

Israeli raid on the flotilla, complete with the video footage. Instead, one was sent ten

hours after the incident, while the Palestinians and their supporters had theirs sent that

morning within the first few hours of the incident.

Secondly, each PR team member should have good media relationships and press

contacts. These press relationships or those individuals in media can be called upon

quickly and relied on to tell an unbiased version of the events. For example, if Israel had

a relationship with a reporter at each publication, it is possible that their stories wouldn't

have had to be updated with the Israeli version of the events. Rather, it would have had

both sides from the start.

52


Below is a sample press release of what I believe Israel could have sent out to the

media immediately following the incident.

****FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE****

BREAKING: IDF MET WITH VIOLENT RESISTANCE AS IT ATTEMPTS TO HALT FLOTILLA ATTEMPTING TO BREACH LEGAL BLOCKADE OF GAZA

The Israel Defense Forces were violently attacked by members aboard the Mavi Marmara early May 31st, as it tried to halt it from breaching Israel’s legal blockade of Gaza. In a video taken by the Israeli helicopter on the scene, one can see the soldiers being shoved, beaten and thrown from the upper decks as they tried to take over the ship. One can also see that the participants were prepping to violently resist the IDF here.

As of this release, there are 9 confirmed dead activists and numerous injuries on both sides. Israel has airlifted the severely injured to nearby hospitals where they will be provided with the proper medical attention. Israel has also confiscated all materials aboard the ship in order to conduct a proper investigation.

The Mavi Marmara was a member of the Freedom Flotilla, a coalition of alleged humanitarian aid ships bound for the Gaza Strip. Its message was “to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to breach the blockade and to provide aid.” It was funded by a number of humanitarian and activist groups including the IHH, which has been said to have links to the terrorist organization, Hamas. This is the same flotilla that refused to deliver aid to the captive Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, being held as a prisoner in Gaza for the past four years.

Israel had been in contact with the coalition for a number of weeks and had repeatedly asked it to deliver the aid through the land crossings via Israel or Egypt. The coalition had refused.

In repeated warnings before the attack, which can be heard here and here, the IDF calls for the Mavi Marmara to stop and redirect its course to the land crossings. As the video reflects the IDF was met with insults such as “go back to Auchwitz,” and profanity. There was no indication of the Mavi Marmara planning to change its course.

According to the UN, Israel’s blockade of Gaza is completely legal as it is a war zone, since Israeli civilians are being attacked daily by rocket fire from Gaza. Since 2000, over 12,000 rockets have been fired. This situation is unsustainable and Israel has a duty to protect its citizens. Israel also delivers aid to Gaza weekly, as you can see from this chart.

Aboard the ship, no humanitarian aid was found. Instead the IDF discovered a number of weapons, which can be viewed here.

53

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvS9PXZ3RWM

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=531892970166911&set=a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305&type=1&theater

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dE2StbDL_Q&list=UUawNWlihdgaycQpO3zi-jYg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKOmLP4yHb4

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZlSSaPT_OU&list=UUawNWlihdgaycQpO3zi-jYg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bU12KW-XyZE


None of the other ships met the IDF with resistance. All the members have been taken to the port in Ashkelon and will be deported as soon as possible.

Press Contact: Name, Phone Number, Email

###

Although you cannot see the links to the videos throughout the release, you can

imagine from my previous descriptions what they portray. If Israel had capitalized on the

information they had and disseminated it to the media in a quick and timely fashion,

much of the distortion within the media surrounding the incident may have been

prevented. In turn, this promotes accuracy and a full picture of the incident so that the

public can interpret it for themselves. This is why good PR helps the general public in

educating them, along with helping the entity it represents.

54


Conclusion

I want to conclude by making it clear that the purpose of this thesis is not to

exonerate Israel nor is it to condemn the Palestinians and their supporters. Rather, I seek

to show that with every story, there is a necessary context to be acknowledged. Nothing

is ever black and white. I showed that sometimes the media does not do their full job, and

that, for now, articles written immediately after an incident should be accepted with

speculation. Also, sometimes too, it’s not just the media’s fault. Public relations teams

are a major player in how the public views events, especially those so removed from

them as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, my research showed that when it comes to those

events, the pro-Palestinian PR teams prove to be much stronger than the Israeli one at the

moment.

My incident to highlight this major discrepancy between the two teams is that of

the Freedom Flotilla of May 2010. I went into great detail over the different releases,

articles and reports published immediately thereafter, and then a year later. I showed that

with proper communications and research, the proper conclusions can be reached, as we

see from the publication and overall international acceptance of the Palmer Report

(Palmer).

I also then noted that the main reason the Freedom Flotilla was organized was

determined as one of publicity, and one of high caliber (Palmer). Israel has never even

come close to planning such a stunt. That in itself shows how advanced pro-Palestinian

PR teams are, since they had the knowledge to know that such a stunt would generate

their desired attention. However, as the Palmer Report later noted, “the events of 31 May

2010 should never have taken place as they did” (Palmer 3). They divvied the fault on

55


both the NGOs and Palestinians for breaching Israel’s legal blockade of Gaza, and Israel,

for stopping the flotilla in a forceful manner (Palmer). This conclusion showed that with

the proper research, or with the proper PR teams in place providing information from

both sides, accurate reports can be made and the general public can be given the full truth

by the media.

I know that to many, PR leaves a bad taste in their mouths: the taste of cover-up.

However, to fully understand the events taking place in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to

form an educated opinion about that which occurs, one must know the context behind

each incident. That involves extensive knowledge of Israeli history and culture. While I

don’t expect everyone to know this information, I do feel the average person relies on

journalists who cover the conflict to provide them with adequate background information,

information that is not simply found in a google search. If Israel would form a proper PR

team, complete with adequate media relationships and crisis management, I do believe

similar misunderstandings and the undue tarnishing of Israel’s name will be more

unlikely to take place in the future.

In reference to Palestinian propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu once said, “unfortunately, if you repeat a falsehood endlessly, it assumes the

cache of truth” (Lazaroff). The Prime Minister is right, however this does that mean that

Israel has no chance of redeeming its biblical legacy of being a “light unto the nations.” I

firmly believe that if Israel forms a proper PR team, it will have a better chance of

standing on equal footing with the Palestinians in the media. Then and only then, will

Israel stand a chance in the “war of words” in the international arena, and world

audiences at large.

56


Addendum

As I was editing the final draft of this thesis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu made a public apology to Turkey for that which occurred aboard the Mavi

Marmara almost three years prior. On March 22nd, 2013, with US President Obama’s

encouragement, Netanyahu stated, “that the tragic results regarding the Mavi Marmara

were unintentional and that Israel expresses regret over injuries and loss of life.” It was

added that “in light of the Israeli investigation into the incident, which pointed out several

operational errors, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to the Turkish people for any

errors that could have led to loss of life and agreed to complete the agreement on

compensation” (Pipes).

However, it should be noted that the apology rung clear with that which was

stated in the Palmer Report. Israel only apologized for the amount of force they used

when raiding the ship. They did not apologize for the blockade, and will not. According

to the Palmer Report, there is no reason they should. Nonetheless, one can question the

usefulness of a delayed apology, all these years later. Sure, it would be nice if Turkish-

Israeli ties can be normalized once again. But is this a realistic possibility? According to

Israel’s current Minister of Economy and Trade Naftali Bennett, that may not be the case.

He said, “since the apology was made public, it appears (Turkish Prime Minister)

Erdogan is doing everything he can to make Israel regret it, while conducting a personal

and vitriolic campaign at the expense of Israel-Turkey relations. Let there be no doubt, no

nation is doing Israel a favor by renewing ties with it. It should also be clear to Erdogan

that if Israel encounters in the future any terrorism directed against us, our response will

be no less severe” (Pipes). He added that it seems that the PR on the Turkish front is still

57


emphasizing how they weakened Israel, and endorsing plans to continue to use terror as

an option when opposing Israeli actions. With a partner like this, Israel’s words of

apology are useless and empty. Sure, they publicized their apology. But without showing

the Turkish response, they are bound to be stuck in the same cycle once again. The side

of the apology is shown; now it’s up to Israel to show the true colors of its partner, so that

the two sides of the story can be seen, and an educated understanding can be developed

by the general public.

58


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http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/1947+UN+Partition+Plan.htm

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Melanie's Thesis

Documents

joseph ciechanover itzhar

san remo manual

jewish virtual library

national review online

christian science monitor

international solidarity movement

israeli occupation archive

islamic resistance movement