Meiji Restoration in Japan Introduction In 1868, the long rule of the Tokugawa regime came to an end and full sovereign powers were restored to the new Meiji Emperor. Opposition to Tokugawa rule had been growing for a long time, but it was not until the 19 th century that several lines, ideological, of attack on the Shogun were available. From these various lines of attack, the Restoration leaders emphasized the theory that in ancient days, the Emperor had enjoyed great power and prestige and that the Shogun was a usurper who had taken all real authority away from the Emperor. Such a line of attack on the Shogun became more and more effective as Tokugawa power progressively declined. The Theories accounting for the Downfall of the Shogunate Page 1
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Meiji Restoration in Japan
Introduction
In 1868, the long rule of the Tokugawa regime came to an end and
full sovereign powers were restored to the new Meiji Emperor.
Opposition to Tokugawa rule had been growing for a long time, but it
was not until the 19th century that several lines, ideological, of attack
on the Shogun were available. From these various lines of attack, the
Restoration leaders emphasized the theory that in ancient days, the
Emperor had enjoyed great power and prestige and that the Shogun
was a usurper who had taken all real authority away from the
Emperor. Such a line of attack on the Shogun became more and more
effective as Tokugawa power progressively declined.
The Theories accounting for the Downfall of the Shogunate
Among historians, there have been two main schools of opinion on
what really caused the downfall of the Shogunate.
The first school believed that the Tokugawa system of government
might have continued essentially unchanged had it not been for the
forcible opening of the closed door by the United States and other
countries. It had been customary for these historians to refer to the
primitive nature of Japan's economy before 1867 and to treat the
Tokugawa period as though it were an era of almost stagnation.
Therefore, the school of opinion argued that it was only the coming of
the foreigners that undermined the authority of the Tokugawa
government and so ruined it.
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The second school of opinion, however, emphasized the undoubted
fact that the whole regime had been under indirect attack from many
directions inside Japan long before Perry arrived.
In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, rapid economic growth had
produced an advanced economy capable of ready transformation into
an entirely new political and social order.
By the middle of the 19th century, the antiquated political system
and absurd political and social philosophy of the Tokugawa were
more than 200 years out of date. The simple concept of the division of
classes into rulers, warriors and commoners had little relation to Japan
of the 19th century with its teeming cities, rich merchants, restless
samurai and discontent peasantry.
Despite the division of the land into a large number of feudal fiefs,
the people had developed a strong sense of national consciousness.
The growth of nationalism and the development of a modern
commercial economy had made Japan ready for the more efficient
political forms of the modern nation.
The coming of the foreigners, symbolized by the Perry expedition,
merely provided the final impulse towards a collapse that was
unavoidable.
The theory that the main cause of the Shogunate's collapse was the
forced opening of Japan to foreigners cannot of course be accepted,
but the 2nd school of thought has perhaps inclined to go too far in
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underestimating the impact of successful Western pressure on Japan
in the 1850's. It is hardly believable that the Shogunate would have
collapsed had it been able to resist the demands made by the United
States, Russia, Great Britain and other countries of the West. It must
be noted that so well had the early Tokugawa succeeded in creating a
system capable of preserving political stability that the machine was
still running relatively, smoothly. It was therefore necessary for an
external pressure to disrupt it. This pressure provided by the
foreigners was consequently fatal to the power of the Tokugawa
which had already been weakened by other forces.
Another point to notice is that the economic weakening of the
Tokugawa feudalism which has been serious by the early 18th century
and was actually not much worse by the middle of the 19th century.
Moreover, the Shogunate itself was on the whole better off than most
of the daimyo. It could debase the currency to its own advantage and
it controlled all the great cities and most of the economically
advanced parts of the country. It would be hard to argue that the
Shogunate fell from the economic difficulties, all the easier. The
downfall of the Tokugawa regime was thus the result of the
conjunction of 2 processes:
the internal decay of feudal society
pressure from the Western nations
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It was only through the coincidence of these two forces of internal
decay and external pressure that contributed to the so-called Meiji
Restoration in 1868.
The Parties Overthrowing the Tokugawa
The overthrow of the Tokugawa was finally accomplished through the
union of anti-Tokugawa parties. These parties included:
The lower samurai and ronin, particularly the great western clans
of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa & Hizen which provided the armies and the
territorial base of operations;
The kuge, i.e. the court nobility and the Emperor who served as
the ideological justification for the overthrow of the usurping Shogun;
The merchants, especially of Osaka and Kyoto, who contributed
money to the revolution;
The peasants who not only served as soldiers but whose general
discontent weakened the Tokugawa domains.
The leadership of this alliance was in the hands of the lower samurai,
some of whom were administrators, some were intellectuals or
warriors and all of whom were concerned that the Tokugawa had to
go. However, these samurai and ronin could not have overthrown the
Tokugawa only by their strength and determination. Less dramatic
than the political and military achievement of the samurai but more
far-reaching in accomplishing both the overthrow of the Shogunate
and the stabilization of the new regime was the financial support of
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the chonin, especially of Osaka where it is said 70% of Japan's wealth
was concentrated.
The official record of the House of Mitsui says, "The loans required
for the military operations of the Imperial forces were largely
furnished by the House of Mitsui". The Meiji Restoration thus was the
outcome of this coalition of merchant class with the lower samurai.
The political settlement of the Meiji and especially the abolition of
feudalism in 1871 can only be understood by an examination of this
feudal-merchant alliance?
The Feudal Merchant Coalition
In studying Japanese social history, it becomes apparent that one must
dismiss all preconceptions based on a class-struggle interpretation as
sometimes applied to the French revolutions. In the case of political
struggle against the feudal aristocracy against the Church and the
Crown and eventually winning a clear-cut victory in France. In Japan,
however, the interests of the feudal ruling class and the big merchants
became so closely connected that whatever hurt one easily injured the
other. Should a daimyo refuse to pay his debts or threaten the
merchant in order to obtain their cancellation, he soon found that
whenever he applied elsewhere for loan, he met with a polite but firm
refusal. The big merchants depended on the interest of the loans to
daimyo and samurai for their livelihood. The samurai and the daimyo
who together with their followers were compelled by the sankin-kotai
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system to spend 1/2 of their time in Edo, became the chief customers
of the chonin.
Quite logically then, the chonin felt that their own prosperity was
closely tied to that of the warrior and noble classes, their customers
and debtors. For this reason, the chonin never dreamed of attacking
feudalism as a system though they were prepared to finance a political
movement against the Shogunate in connection with rival feudal
elements. Takigawa Masajiro in his "Nihon Shakai Shi" or "A Social
History of Japan", therefore said, "The reason why this nascent class
of chonin did not even think of overthrowing the bushi class was the
latter were their customers and if they ruined their customers, if only
for a brief period, the shock to their own economic power would have
been disastrous. For this reason, the samurai were able to maintain
their position right to the Restoration, long after they had lost their
real power in the country." This aristocratic class therefore stood
shoulder to shoulder with the despised but economically powerful
merchant and usurer class. As the Tokugawa period advanced, these 2
groups drew closer together making possible the co-operation
between the big merchants of Osaka and the leading anti-Tokugawa
clans. Thus, the Meiji Revolution was not the story of a rising
business class which destroyed the structure of feudalism and
established its supremacy in a mercantile state. Still less was it a
democratic revolt transferring political power to representative of the
mass of the peasants and workers.
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The Rise of Satsuma and Choshu
But what really sealed the fate of the Tokugawa was its failure to deal
effectively in 1866 with the military opposition from the Satsuma-
Choshu coalition. Satsuma and Choshu were outer clans of daimyos.
They were tozama. Satsuma was in the southern Kyushu and Choshu
was in the western end of Honshu. They were both traditional rivals
of the Tokugawa. By the middle of the 19th century owing to the
economic and social changes they were in a position to challenge the
authority of the Bakufu.
Both Satsuma and Choshu had a combination of advantages.
1. They were among the biggest domains that had any hope of
influencing national politics.
2. Satsuma was officially ranked 2nd among the hans in tax yield and
Choshu the 9th; and there were altogether 165 hans in Japan. In actual
tax income they were actually the 4th and 5th. The wealth of Satsuma
and Choshu in the mid-19th century was probably a factor leading to
their success, for without adequate financial resources they would
have had neither the strong morale nor the western arms which made
possible their triumph.
3. In both clans, the ratio of fighting men to fix income was much
higher than the national average, giving them greater military
manpower than their economic strength would suggest. Satsuma had
about 27,000 samurais. Choshu had about 11,000 samurais.
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4. Another strength in the strength of Satsuma and Choshu was their
internal solidality and union. They were located far from the major
urban centres. Both (particularly Satsuma) were backward
economically and socially compared with some of the strongholds of
the Tokugawa. Hence the morale of their feudal warrior aristocracy
was less roded and they were able to take more effective action than
the hans located in economically more advanced area. Their very
backwardness contributed to their strength.
5. Satsuma was lucky to have to strong daimyo in Shimazu
Shigehide and later in his great grandson Nariskira, Satsuma also had
the advantages of trade and contact with the outside world through its
vessel domain, Ryukyu Islands, and had become a leading area in the
study of western science and technology. In Satsuma there were a
comparatively profitable mining industry, textile mills and trade
monopoly. The latter probed particularly successful with sugar
because Satsuma controlled the only parts of Japan where sugar can
grow well. Like most other hans it was burdened at the very
beginning of so-called "Tempo Reform". This effort enabled it in
clearing the han debt.
6. Choshu situated across the straits of Shimonoseki through which
all marine transport between Korea, China and Osaka had to pass was
able by means of trade and transport monopoly to accumulate
considerable wealth. The Choshu, led by young commanders of
exceptional ability, were armed and to some extent, clothed after the
European pattern. More revolutionary, however, was that these forces
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were not confined to the members of the traditional warrior class but
accepted small townsmen and peasants as volunteers. The military
competence shown by the Choshu commanders was to secure for their
own clan after the collapse of the Shogunate a dominant role in the
organization of a Westernized imperial army. Indeed for more than 50
years until after the First World War, the highest appointments in the
Japanese army were held as a rule by members of the Choshu clan or
their followers. On the other hand, the Choshu "Tempo Reform" was
started in 1838 and succeeded in cutting down the han expenditure
and holding down the ever mounting han debt.
Thus, both Satsuma and Choshu were in good position to challenge
the Tokugawa supremacy. The main political development of the
1860's proved to be a series of competition for national leadership
between Choshu and Satsuma until finally in 1866, the two reached
an understanding and entered into a secrete alliance to overthrow the
Shogunate.
Rivalry between Satsuma and Choshu for National Leadership
The movement for "The Union of Court and Shogunate" (Kobu
Gattai)
In the year 1857 the emperor sent a secret message to Choshu and 13
other hans seeking support in his opposition to the Shogun's power.
Choshu
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The Moderate Reform Party which was in power at the time
decided that Choshu should begin to take a part in national politics.
Their decision was motivated primarily by the long smouldering
resentment against the Tokugawa rule and by the memory of Choshu's
greatness before 1800.
These reformers proposed that Choshu should mediate in bringing
Edo and Kyoto together and this policy came to be known as "The
Union of Court and Shogunate".
They also suggested that the emperor should order the Shogun to
embark on the policy of "extension across the sea". Kyoto accepted
this proposal because it was the first open admission of its political
supremacy. The Shogun also accepted because he was delighted to
have full support from the imperial court for the foreign policy he had
been forced to accept. But in the end nothing came of the Choshu's
effort at mediation. The policy was undercut within Choshu itself both
by the opposition from the Extreme Pro-Imperial Party and by the
doubts of other influential reformers. Moreover, their failure was due
to the more daring bid for national leadership by Satsuma.
Satsuma
In 1862, Satsuma proposed itself as mediator between Kyoto and Edo.
To secure more Shogunate respect for the imperial court
To secure the release from confinement of Keiki (son of the Lord
Mito and defeated candidate for the Shogunship, was pro-emperor
and kept in confinement since 1859)
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The appointment of Keiki as the Great Elder and guardian of the
new Shogun.
Satsuma won imperial support for this proposal and with the court's
censor it proceeded to suppress the Extreme Pro-Imperial Samurais
from Satsuma and other hans. Then Satsuma presented the demands
to Edo. Yielding to pressure, the Shogunate accepted the demands and
made Keiki the Great Elder and Guardian of the Shogun, with Lord of
Hizen (Matsudaira Keiki) had strong imperial leanings as a form
believer in national unity. Under his influence the whole Tokugawa
hostage system ("Sankin-kotai") was abandoned and the attendance of
the daimyos 100 days every 3 years. These startling measures made
obvious a change that had already occurred. The Shogunate no longer
could exercise effective control over the hans.
Pro-Imperial Movement
Choshu effort
The Choshu was not content to see national leadership fall into the
hands of its Satsuma rival. Out beaten by Satsuma in the movement
for A Union of Court and Shogunate ("Kobu Gattai"), Choshu
adopted a new approach which took an open Pro-imperial stand and
supported the sentiment of "Expel the Barbarians" that was obviously
favoured by the Court. This change of policy united the Extreme Pro-
Imperial Party with the reformers, the Extremists were now rising in
influence in the han government. Choshu also gained the support of a
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few extremist court nobles and gradually won the control over the
imperial court. It was further strengthened by the official support of
Tosa (and of the major outer hans on the island of Shikoku).
So, in December 1862, the Choshu dominated Court got the
Shogunate to agree to the expulsion of the barbarians. The Shogun
was forced to set a date June 25, 1863 before which all foreigners
would be expelled, although he knew that it was impossible. So, by
this time the Choshu had placed the Shogunate in an impossible
position. The Shogunate was caught between the pressure from the
Kyoto Court and the superior military power of the West. It became
ineffective. It was unable to make any step of policy, as it merely
waited.
The Shimonoseki Affair
It soon turned out that Choshu's anti-foreign feeling had gone too far.
The folly of such an unrealistic foreign policy was soon revealed.
Choshu seeing that the Shogunate had taken no action to expel the
barbarians attempted to act alone on the expulsion order. So, on the
appointed day, its forts along the Strait of Shimonoseki at the western
end of the Inland Sea fired on the American, French and Dutch ships.
In response the American and French warships destroyed the forts on
July 16-20 - known as the Shimonoseki Affair. Alarmingly, the
Shogunate ordered Choshu to stop its action. But instead, the
Shogun's envoy was captured and killed.
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The Satsuma Coup d'etat (Restoration of Moderates)
Meanwhile, alarmed by this unrealistic foreign policy Satsuma had
taken more effective action in Kyoto aided by the domain issued in
Aizu (in northern Honshu). Satsuma organised a coup d'etat on
September 30, 1863 and troops were sent to the gate of the imperial
palace. The more moderate nobles were restored to control and the
court councils and imperial troops created under the Choshu
leadership were dissolved. The Choshu troops were forced to
withdraw from Kyoto to their own han.
Foreign attacks on Choshu and Satsuma
Choshu
At the end of May 1864, foreign ministers renewed their demands for
the opening of the Shimonoseki Straits, threatening to take action
themselves if Edo failed to do so. When Edo failed to give a reply, the
ministers organised a joint naval expedition against Choshu. In
September 1864, 17 foreign warships destroyed all the Choshu forts
on the Shimonoseki Straits and forced Choshu to agree to the opening
of the Straits. The Bakufu had to pay a war indemnity which was
abolished after the Bakufu agreed in June 1866 to a new commercial
treaty which reduced import duties to 5% and removed nearly all the
restrictions on foreign made.
Effects
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Choshu realized that their "Expel the barbarians" policy was
impractical. From then on there was a change of policy putting greater
reliance on westernized military units and on individuals who knew
and understood the West. Two of their samurais Inoue Kaoru and Ito
Hirobumi who had just returned from Britain persuaded Choshu to
adopt western ways. In the rapid modernization of Japan which
started a few years later, Choshu became the patron and backbone of
the new Japanese Army first with the French and then with the
German army as its model. The consequent pro-Britain attitude of the
Japanese Navy and the pro-German attitude of the Japanese Army
were to exert a strong influence on Japanese policy from then
onwards until the Pearl Harbour Attack.
Satsuma
In Satsuma the feeling of expelling the barbarians was also strong and
would be illustrated by the Richardson Affair on September 14, 1862.
This incident involved 4 Englishmen who were riding in the city of
Yokohama and encountered the procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu.
Richardson was killed by an enraged samurai who felt that the
foreigner had not shown proper respect for their great lord. The
British reaction was quick and by threats of naval power Britain
forced the Shogunate to pay an indemnity of L100,000. She also
demanded an indemnity from Satsuma and punishment for the
murderer. On August 15, 1863, the Satsuma forts at Kagoshima fired
on the 7 British ships which gathered there to force their demands.
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The British proceeded to destroy much of Kogoshima and to sink
most of the Japanese ships. Satsuma agreed to pay an indemnity of
$25,000 and this sum was to be borrowed from the Bakufu.
Effect
The incident naturally confirmed the Satsuma leaders' respect for
Western military power and also produced a deep interest on their part
in the British navy. The Lord of Satsuma was so impressed by this
display of naval force that, less than 3 years later, he invited the new
British Minister, and the Western naval ships for Satsuma. The
friendly relations thereby established between Britain and the House
of Satsuma played an important part, not only in the restoration of the
Emperor a few years later but also in the British Navy's being chosen
as the model on which the future Japanese Navy was founded and
built up. Meanwhile, the inability of the Shogunate to punish the
unruly clans or to obtain satisfaction from the foreign powers for the
attacks made on their nationals and their property had revealed the
growing powerlessness of the Shogunate. Many of the daimyo
considered that the treaties were not binding on them as they had not
been approved by the Emperor, who had in fact ordered the expulsion
of the foreigners. For the same reason, they were beginning to feel
themselves exempted from further loyalty to the Shogunate. The long
established authority of Edo was therefore rapidly being replaced by
the long-last authority of Kyoto. The movement to revive the
Emperor's supremacy gained strength very rapidly. Indeed, it was
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evident that, if the anti-Tokugawa forced were to combine, there
would probably be civil war in which the Shogunate might well be
defeated.
The Satsuma - Choshu Alliance (March 1866)
Satsuma and Choshu at the beginning were unfriendly. But their
difference had gradually disappeared after 1861 because Satsuma had
lost confidence in the Shogunate and doubted the real motive of the
Shogunate. They came to decide that Choshu was a better ally than
the Shogunate. Reconciliation between the two was brought about the
pro-imperial ronin from Tosa. On March 7, 1866, a secret alliance
was drawn up in Kyoto. This alliance meant the end of the Tokugawa
Shogunate.
Death of the Shogun and the Emperor
1866 - The Shogun Iemochi died and Tokugawa Keiki was his
successor. He prepared to further progress of the nation by opening
the country more fully to foreign intercourse.
1867 - Emperor Komei died and was succeeded by one who was not
so hindered by the traditions and hostility of the past, he was
Mutsuhito who took up his title as Meiji.
The Civil War
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It became the customs in the 20th century for foreigners as well as
Japanese to look back at the Meiji Restoration of 1867-68 as smooth,
aimest, bloodless transfer of power. But in reality, there was civil war
for several months. The Shogun, Keiki, voluntarily surrendered his
administrative powers to the youthful Emperor, Meiji, in November
1867. So ended the 2-1/2 centuries of Tokugawa rule, and on
December 9, 1867, the Imperial Restoration was formally proclaimed.
The ending of the Shogunate and the Restoration of the Emperor,
however, was actually the beginning of a further struggle before peace
was finally restored. Following the formal proclamation of the
Restoration, the formation of a new government was announced on
January 3, 1868. To the indignation of the ex-Shogun's supporters, not
only was Keiki excluded from its membership, his lands were ordered
to be confiscated. Keiki himself was prepared to accept this treatment
in silence but his adherents were not. He was persuaded to take up
arms and on January 27, 1868 met with overwhelming defeat at the
Battle of Fushimi. Following the defeat of his army, Keiki took ship
to Edo and ordered the city to be surrendered to the Imperial troops.
Elsewhere certain clans loyal to the Tokugawa fought on firmly. The
last area of resistance was at Hokkaido where an admiral of the
Shogun's navy held out for some months in 1869. Thus ended the
supremacy of the House of Tokugawa which provided Japan with 15
Shoguns.
The Changing Attitude towards Foreigners
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The forces that overthrew the Shogunate had long been associated
with the slogan "Expel the Barbarians" and it might have been
expected that with their victory, anti-foreign sentiment would become
more serious and widespread. There were, of course, still a few
isolated instances of anti-foreign agitation before Japan finally settled
down to the task of modernization, but prompt and drastic punishment
was given by the new government to those guilty of attacks on
foreigners. It was no part of the policy of the new men who ruled
Japan to antagonize, much less drive away, the barbarians. They
realized that to achieve a position of power in the world, their country
would have to be modernized. With all speed, it would have to catch
up with the technologically advanced nations of the West.
However, modernization could never be accomplished without
Western help and advice. A number of foreign technicians had
already been employed both by the Shogunate and by certain feudal
lords before 1868. But after that year, there were many more of them -
British, American, French, German and Dutch - engaged by the
Japanese government as pilots, railways and marine engineers,
financial and legal advisers, agricultural experts, university and school
teachers, military and naval instructors and at the same time, Japanese
were sent abroad to learn from the West. But among the Japanese,
there has never been the scornful indifference that has often
characterized the Chinese attitude towards foreigners. The Japanese
have never been too proud to learn. It appeared therefore strange
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reversal of the whole situation for the anti-foreign monarchical party
and, in effect, became pro-foreign almost overnight. In April 1869 the
Emperor and his court left Kyoto to take up residence in Edo which
was renamed Tokyo or Eastern Capital, had remained the imperial
and administration centre of Japan ever since.
Conclusion
The steps leading to the Meiji Restoration had been complex and
largely haphazard rather than simple, straight-forward and planned.
Conflicting interests had been drawn together in the final stages, but
there had been more disunity than unity among those who eventually
restored the throne to its legitimate position. In these respects, as well
as in the national aspects, the movement had a striking resemblance to
the Unification of Italy though the parallel cannot go too far. The
forces that were to win the national revolution came from the imperial
ideology that justified the revolution, the "Expel the Barbarians" spirit
that gave it power and the ambition of young samurai of relatively
humble birth that gave it daring drive. From then onwards, military
power rather than traditional authority, public opinion or political skill