Mediation in the Middle East

, , Aleksandra Babovic Nedra Cherif Olivier Stoullig

(1948-1967)First period- = 1 Count Bernadotte of Sweden st official UN mediator

→ truce in the fighting

- Ralph Bunche → armistice agreements btw Israel and neighboring states

- ( , , )UN Palestine Conciliation Commission US FR Turkey → total failure

- ’ . Pdt Eisenhowers secret emissaryR Anderson → ineffective

1967 - From the War to the Egypt Israeli Peace(1979)

- UN Special Representative GunnarJarring → failure

- African heads of states → failure

- . USSecretary of State W Rogers→ - -agreement for an Egyptian Israeli cease fire

- . USSecretary of State H Kissinger→ - - Egyptian Israeli and Syrian Israeli disengagement agreements

- . USPresident J Carter→ Camp David Accords , - Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty

Recent Mediations

- Oslo Accords (1993) → - limited third party mediation

- (2000)Camp David Summit → total failure

- (2003): , , , Quartet UN US EU Russia → , failure of the “road map” efficiency underquestion

- Egypt

…And also

- UN SG DagHammarskjöld

- Committee of the Red Cross

- President Tito of Yugoslavia

- KingHassan of Morocco

- . The American Qaker representative E Jackson

- - …The French Jewish intellectual MarekHalter

Lessons learnt from the past

Be prepared , to take significant risks including that of

.failure

, ’ .Facilitate the negotiation process don t dominate it

’ Don t threaten the parties to withdraw from the

.negotiation

’ . Don t rush the parties to a conclusion Deadlines are

.dangerous

Lessons learnt from the past

Try to understand and accommodate the particular

.negotiating styles of different leaders

Demonstrate a knowledgeable grasp of the history behind

.the issues

Be clear about the .limitations on all the parties

Other observations

- B e stronger than either party to a conflict

- Be , , in position to provide incentives assurances and guarantees

- ( )Importance of timing ripeness

- Importance to base the mediating process on already accepted negotiating guidelines

- Importance of confidentiality

- Careful use of leverage

US assets to mediate

- Historical involvement in the negotiation process

- Credibility

- Important resources for side payments

- Influence to guarantee the security of both Israel and

the Palestinians

1978, , In September at Camp David Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat worked out “The Framework of Peace in the Middle East” and

“The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and ( 1979 ). Israel” signed in in Washington

The willingness of the parties to have a direct contact and to reach an agreement

- ’ 1977: Sadats visit to Jerusalem in A psychological breakthrough

- : The double direct channels of communications positive and negative aspects

: The US not only mediator but also interested party in the mediation

- The US not only as amediatorbut also as an interest party in the mediation process

- , The USmediation role affected but not challenged by direct communication between parties

: Right time and right place to intervene The 1978 Camp David Initiative in

- : ’ The right time to mediate the conflicts ripeness

- : The right place to mediate David Camp

Giving incentives to the parties to reach anagreement

- ’ The way of dealing with partys core values

- The US ability to compensate parties for their concessions

, The effective use of pressures warning and threats

- Dramatization of the mediation process

- The use of warning and threats

’ : The degree of the president s personal involvement - the most original feature of the Egypt Israel peace

process→ ’ Presidents Carterpersonal involvement and commitment

transformed the conflict

’ Keeping mediator s contribution in perspective→ ’ The mediators involvement was built on previous basic

changes in attitudes

The willingness of the parties to be forced into an agreement

- True willingness of two personalities to reach an agreement

- - Absence of willingness in the Israeli Palestinian conflict → Parties persuaded that they can obtain more by using force

’ The mediator s unique position and power to ’ . influence parties interests in Camp David I vs the

particularity within the mediation context in Camp David II

- – Egyptian Israeli conflict over “land for strategic advantage” = a favorable context to US mediation tactics

- - Israeli Palestinian conflict over “land legitimacy andsovereignty” = the conflict is intractable and US intervention inadequate

?

Obama administration shift in policy

- More balanced position in its relations with other states

- Attaches great importance to the region

- , Speech in Cairo two state solution

Appointment of George Mitchell

- Success or failure of US efforts will heavily depend on the skills and credibility of the Special Envoy

- Helped resolve the Northern Ireland conflict- Not new to the Middle East- ’ Mitchells Views on Bush admin attempts to brokera deal

The Mitchell method- “ Mediators can succeed even when they fail, and fail

even when they succeed”- ‘ ’:The Mitchell principles

;advocating minimizing violence or the use of force

; supporting negotiation and the democratic process

creating willingness for protagonists to endorse and , implement existing agreements while encouraging

restraint from protagonists engaging in perceived acts ofaggression

2001Elements that led to its failure in

- Stumbling blocks

- Contrasting agenda setting

- ’ Divisive nature of the Bush Administrations policyinitiatives

Context and views of Mitchell and Obama administration as successful mediators in the

conflict

- 2009, , In with Mitchell back as mediator in the conflict are ?chances of success higher

- Support of a new administration

- BUT faces majorobstacles

, , Obstacles room for leverage and chances ofsuccess

- Hamas- /Netanyahu settlements- Proximity talks- Critics