McNamara

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A GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE WITH ROBERT McNAMARA.

Gerard Toal ((Gearóid Ó Tuathail),

School of Public and International Affairs,

Northern Virginia Center,

Virginia Tech., Falls Church, Virginia 22043, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Published in GEOPOLITICS, 5, 1 (officially listed as Summer 2000 but appeared only in

Summer 2001).

Robert McNamara is a former Secretary of Defense who served in the

administrations of President Kennedy and Johnson. In 1968 he left the Johnson

administration to become President of the World Bank, a position he held until his

retirement in 1981. Since then he has served on the board of various corporations, leant

his voice to calls for a re-thinking of America�s nuclear strategy and, after considerable

reluctance with respect to Vietnam, pursued international dialogues on the events and

conflicts that occupied much of his time when in office.1 Between 1987 and 1992

McNamara participated in five major oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile crisis

that added significantly to the historical record. For McNamara, the conferences revealed

the crisis as even more dangerous that he believed, underscoring the need to rethink the

role of nuclear weapons in international politics.2 Prompted by the questions of

biographers, McNamara finally broke his silence on the Vietnam War in his well-

publicized memoir In Retrospect in which he famously wrote, �we were wrong, terribly

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wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why.�3 Remarkably, McNamara

subsequently threw himself into an even more ambitious set of conferences with his

former Vietnamese enemies between November 1995 and February 1998 that resulted in

the work Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy.4 The

volume summarizes the results of the U.S.-Vietnamese meetings and reproduces selected

transcripts of the fascinating dialogue between the parties. Although composed by

multiple authors, McNamara is the dominant author of the volume, framing all chapters

with his own introduction and conclusion.

McNamara�s career has inspired considerable journalistic analyses and scholarly

historical evaluation. In the Kennedy administration, McNamara�s work at the Pentagon

received considerable acclaim in the press and in political circles, leading some to even

suggest his name for Vice-President in Kennedy�s anticipated re-election campaign.

However, as the delusions and deceptions that sustained the Vietnam War in America

deepened, the popular portrait of McNamara turned fiercely critical. The press dubbed the

war �McNamara�s war� (a description he initially embraced) and he came to personify

the arrogance and illusions that drove it. Pulizer prize winning jounalist David

Halberstam�s 1973 book The Best and the Brightest codified this critique in a devastating

picture of McNamara as an arrogant technocrat with an obsession with numbers and

control.5 Deborah Shapley�s 1993 Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert

McNamara was not the first biography of McNamara but it is the definitive work so far, a

work of solid scholarship.6 Written with the help of a series of McNamara interviews,

Shapley�s work does not undermine the critical portrait of McNamara but does provide a

fuller account of his public career, and the events and personalities that shaped it. The

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work, however, lacks a theory of power and is somewhat underdeveloped in its

consideration of the evolution of McNamara�s intellectual thought. Paul Hendrickson�s

1996 award winning work The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and the Five

Lives of A Lost War weaves a detailed Jungian influenced psychological portrait of

McNamara�s time in office with the tragic and scarred lives of five ordinary Americans

damaged by the Vietnam War.7 A beautifully written book, his themes expand and

deepen the journalistic indictment of Halberstam with even greater attention to the

nuances and deceptions of McNamara�s tenure (McNamara did not co-operate with

Hendrickson�s study). Yet, powerful and honest as this work is, it perpetuates the

personification of the war in McNamara�s character at the expense of more structural

explanations of the conflict and forces that drove it. �McNamara studies� are still young

and future scholarly re-considerations are likely to be more distant from the emotional

vortex of the Vietnam War.

Our meeting on the 11th of October 2000 was by design a brief one in his office at

the Corning Corporation suite in downtown Washington D.C. As perhaps befitting the

first interview in the �geopolitical conversations� series, an enormous globe of the world

lay in the center of the office where we spoke.

AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM AND GLOBAL CONFLCITS.

In his address at the Ben Gurion University in March 2000, the text of which

follows this article, McNamara makes an argument for what some have called �active

multilateralism� in U.S. foreign policy. During the 1992 presidential election, the

campaign of Bill Clinton articulated such a philosophy, signaling its commitment to work

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closely with international institutions like the United Nations to address the security

challenges of the post-Cold War era. Upon entering office, however, the Clinton

administration confronted a Congress skeptical of what was represented as the United

States �relinquishing sovereignty and control� to international organizations and

agencies. Even before the Somalia debacle of October 1993 -- though the deaths of US

troops there was due to an expansion of their mission by then Joint Chiefs Chair General

Colin Powell just before he left office and not the United Nations8 -- the policy of �active

multilateralism� was effectively dead as the U.S. distanced itself from active intervention

in Bosnian and later Rwanda. I asked McNamara if his philosophy could be described as

�active multilateralism.� He argued that his policy was against any unilateral use of U.S.

power (economic, political and military) with the single exception of the narrow physical

defense of the United States. This position, he suggested, was different from that of the

Clinton administration, the current Congress and, he suspected, the American people who

are often quite willing to countenance American unilateralism. A corollary of this, in

McNamara�s view, is that the United States is not nearly as supportive of the United

Nations, the Security Council and multilateral capabilities as it should be.

While this position has an appealing clarity in the abstract, the everyday political

practicalities and constraints of geopolitical crises render such a philosophy problematic.

First, a consistent commitment to multilateralism on the part of the U.S. may result in

institutional gridlock and geopolitical stalemate in certain crises. The lack of an effective

international response to the Bosnian war might be considered an example. Here lack of

forceful and �unilateral� U.S. actions (like lifting the arms embargo) had the effect of

endorsing a European-lead policy represented by UNPROFOR that adopted a neutral

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stance towards genocide. Second, a commitment to multilateral institutions like the UN

Security Council encounters the problem of the great power veto in that body. Because of

this, for example, the United Nations was unable to endorse and legitimize the NATO

campaign in Kosovo against genocide. McNamara�s response recognized the many

problems of multilateralism, and re-iterated the �shadow� Security Council concept

(without addressing how it might garner legitimacy). A consequence of multilateralism,

he suggested, is that some situations will remain chaotic. But they are very likely to

remain chaotic even if the US intervened unilaterally. �There are many situations --

internal conflicts -- that cannot be dealt with by external military power, especially the

unilateral application of US military power.�

When asked if he supported the so-called Powell Doctrine philosophy of the use

of US military power, McNamara demurred endorsing it as a particular doctrine. He re-

phrased the question: �would I be in favor of US intervention when what is not normally

considered the US national interest is not at stake, i.e. the security of the continental US

and Alaska and Hawaii, then yes, but I would only be in favor of intervening if there was

an objective that was important to achieve, i.e. to stop genocide, for example, and there

was a high probability that we could do it at a reasonable cost.� By reasonable cost,

McNamara made clear, he was taking about �blood, human lives� and further qualified

such intervention by arguing that a regional organization should be involved also, and

play a major role. Referring to Rwanda, he stated that he did not think US intervention

there at the time of the genocide would have necessarily been effective. Also, he noted,

the Organization of African States did not want to really get involved.

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�THE FOG OF WAR�

One of the most interesting aspects of Robert McNamara�s geopolitical career is

the development of a profound tension within his thinking between his modernist

technocratic training, philosophy and experience in U.S business, specifically the

automobile industry until 1960, and an emergent reflexive modernity in his thinking,

writings and public advocacy as he served in office and later as he confronted the

question of US power and nuclear weapons, and much later, the Vietnam experience and

the �lessons� to be learnt from it. The image of McNamara as the quintessential American

technocrat is well know. �If the body was tense and driven,� Halberstam wrote, �the

mind was mathematical, analytical, bringing order and reason out of chaos. Always

reason. And reason supported by facts, by statistics � he could prove his rationality with

facts, intimidating others. He was marvelous with charts and statistics.�9 Shapley echoes

this account remarking that �he relied on quantification extensively. In his first flush of

national prominence and power, he believed his techniques were yielding objective

answers�.along with his optimism and statistical management, McNamara brought to

each problem a full � and very American � measure of arrogance and ignorance.�10

Henrickson echoes Shapley�s conclusions commenting that her identification of the word

�control� as the most meaningful for McNamara �sounds harsh but isn�t.�11 Barry

Goldwater perhaps best summarized this vision of McNamara as technocrat when he

described him as �an IBM machine with legs.�12

What is less well know is the degree to which McNamara�s thinking became

reflexively modernist as he adjusted from making automobiles in Detroit to running the

largest bureaucracy of the US state and making defense policy in Washington D.C.. That

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his own reasoning slowly became �reflexive,� of course, does not mean that it necessarily

meant policy became such (it quite clearly did not in most instances; nuclear weapons are

a debatable exception). Reflexive modernism or reflexive rationality, in this instance, can

be defined as thinking which begins from an appreciation of the importance of human

fallibility in history, the danger if not inevitability of accidents and unintended

consequences in international affairs, and the inadequacy of instrumental rationality and

calculation in understanding social and political issues. Beck defines reflexive modernity

as a condition of self-confrontation for modernity, a moment where classic modernity

confronts its own �side effects� and the �unanticipated consequences� of its own

success.13 While it might be pushing it to describe McNamara�s long confrontation with

the consequences of his own record in office in these terms, there is nevertheless a strong

case to be made for McNamara slowly developing into a kind of �reflexive modernist.�

In her biography, Shapley recounts the profound impact a number of events had

on McNamara�s thinking. Some are not well know like the crash of Air Force B-47 in

North Carolina carrying nuclear bombs.14 Others are well documented like McNamara�s

endorsement of the disasterous Bay of Pigs invasion or his sobering confrontation with

the �Sunday punch� single integrated operating plan (SIOP) that was the

operationalization of Eisenhower strategy of �massive retaliation.�15 In Blundering Into

Disaster (the very title reveals a concern with the limits of rationality), McNamara

describes three separate conflicts -- over Berlin in August of 1961, over the introduction

of Soviet missiles into Cuba in October of 1962, and in the Middle East in June of 1967 �

where nuclear war might well have resulted despite the intentions of the participants. �In

none of these cases did either side want war. In each of them we came perilously close to

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it.�16 This type of awareness of the importance of unintended consequences in

international affairs was not particular to McNamara. Kennedy had read Barbara

Tuckman�s The Guns of August -- an account of the outbreak of World War I -- just

before the Cuban Missile Crisis and it greatly influenced his thinking. But awareness of

the catastrophic stakes in the nuclear age was something McNamara grasped early in his

tenure and stated publicly unlike his predecessors. Eisenhower may have secretly

appreciated that the nuclear age meant �assured destruction� but McNamara was the one

who publicly stated it and tried to make it the basis for a certain �crisis stability� � the

stability of mutually assured destruction -- in superpower relations.

While McNamara�s reflexive reasoning on nuclear weapons began early and

eventually lead him to advocate their elimination, his reflexive reasoning on Vietnam was

much slower, controversial and painfully public. Whatever one�s opinion about the nature

of McNamara�s �apology� for his Vietnam role, his memoir contains a powerful

statement on �human fallibility� and nuclear age geopolitics:

The point I wish to emphasize is this: human beings are fallible. We all make

mistakes. In our daily lives, they are costly but we try to learn from them. In

conventional war, they cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if mistakes

were to affect decisions relating to the use of nuclear forces, they would result in

the destruction of whole societies. Thus, the indefinite combination of human

fallability and nuclear weapons carries a high risk of potential catastrophe.17

The passage is obviously important to McNamara�s current philosophy for he repeats the

passage in Argument Without End and in his Ben Gurion address.18 Some critics will

view this as a transparent attempt by McNamara to justify his mistaken policies in

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Vietnam. But the point nevertheless stands and is not a trivial one. Indeed, McNamara

goes further in the endnotes, quoting the Canberra and Carnagie Commissions to the

effect that the retention of large numbers of nuclear weapons in perpetuity without their

use defies credibility. In the long run, the least likely event will eventually occur.

I asked McNamara about the status of such reflexive rationality in his thinking,

suggesting it began during or after his first year in office. He pointed out, however, that

this type of thinking goes back to a much earlier time in his career and experiences. He

first recalled his service as an analyst in the Statistical Control unit of the US Army Air

Force during World War II and the importance of the famous Clausewitzian phrase �the

fog of war� to his work. �The phrase �fog of war� is one of the most descriptive and

important phrases I can think of and very rarely do people understand it or accept it.�

�What I learnt was that the war is so complex, the application of military power is so

complex, that the human mind is incapable of controlling all of the variables.� One is

operating in conditions of uncertainty, one doesn�t have all the facts, one doesn�t have all

the information, one has to make a decision, and the decision may be wrong. �Any

military commander, if he is honest with himself, will recognize the mistakes he has

made in applying power, and he has killed people as a result.� Commanders tries to learn

from their mistakes but �there is not going to be any learning period with nuclear

weapons,� which is why, he stated, he has taken the position on nuclear weapons that he

has. The first information one receives is often wrong. It is often exceedingly difficult to

find out just what is going on.

Asked if this attitude was in contradiction with his training at Harvard in control

accounting and management, McNamara suggested it was �complimentary to it.� �The

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training in Harvard was to analyze and take account of all the factors you could, and, in a

sense, take account of those that are not there. I remember taking a bank management

class in Harvard and one of the statements of the professor that I remember to this day is

�provide for the loss you know is there but know not where.�� There are uncertainties in

life and they need to be recognized and most people do not put adequate weight on these.

One needs to take action recognizing the risks of uncertainties.

This exchange with McNamara calls into question whether one can really speak

of two forms of rationality at war with each other in McNamara�s though. Perhaps any

distinction between classic modernism (instrumental rationality) and reflexive modernism

(reflexive rationality) is overdrawn and the concepts hopelessly abstract and sociological

in face of the complexity and contradictions of particular individuals. Henrickson weights

in with the psychological analysis of McNamara writing of �a deep and rigid and almost

schizoid but in any case essentially deceitful code of opposites: opposite beliefs and

sensibilities and values and ways of living in and dealing with the world.�19 The tension

or clash is described in more mundane terms by McNamara himself when he writes, in

the �Lessons of Vietnam� section, that �[w]e failed to recognize that in international

affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no

immediate solutions. For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of

problem-solving, this is particularly hard to admit. But, at times, we may have to live

with an imperfect, untidy world.�20

GEOPOLITICAL POWER/KNOWLEDGE AND VIETNAM.

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For political geographers, one of the most interesting passages in McNamara�s In

Retrospect is where he admits that the top policy-makers in the Kennedy and later

Johnson administration really knew very little about Vietnam as a place and region.21

Rather, Vietnam was constituted and known as a location within the terms of the Cold

War geopolitics. The place itself was overwhelmed by the role it came to occupy within a

Cold War geopolitical script, a role that was neither inevitable nor, in hindsight, justified.

McNamara�s use of the term �geopolitics� is somewhat confusing for he first appears to

use it in opposition to �Cold War� thinking at the global scale. He sets up his knowledge

about Vietnam by beginning at the global scale and with the origins of the Cold War:

My thinking about Southeast Asia in 1961 differed little from that of many Americans of my generation who had served in World War II and followed foreign affairs by reading the newspapers but lacked expertise in geopolitics and Asian affairs. Having spent three years helping turn back German and Japanese aggression only to witness the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe following the war, I accepted the idea advanced by George F. Kennan, in his famous July 1947 "X" article in Foreign Affairs, that the West, led by the United States, must guard against Communist expansion through a policy of containment. I considered this a sensible basis for decisions about national security and the application of Western military force.22

From this premise McNamara proceeds to elaborate on the deeply anti-geographic

assumption of Cold War ideology (though not described as such by McNamara), namely

that Communism was monolithic. Again he de-personalizes his knowledge by

contextualizing it within his interpretation of the dominant geopolitical consciousness of

the time, a consciousness focused on power struggles at the global scale:

Like most Americans, I saw Communism as monolithic. I believed the Soviets and Chinese were cooperating in trying to extend their hegemony. In hindsight, of course, it is clear that they had no unified strategy after the late 1950s. But their- split grew slowly and only gradually became apparent. At the time, Communism still seemed on the march. Mao Zedong and his followers had controlled China since 1949 and had fought with North Korea against the West; Nikita Khrushchev had predicted Communist victory through "wars of national liberation" in the Third World and had

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told the West, "We will bury you." His threat gained credibility when the USSR launched Sputnik in 1957, demonstrating its lead in space technology. The next year Khrushchev started turning up the heat on West Berlin. And now Castro had transformed Cuba into a Communist beachhead in our hemisphere. We felt beset and at risk. This fear underlay our involvement in Vietnam.23

Vietnam, in other words, was a location within a global game, part of a script whose

previously significant locations were China, Korea, Cuba and West Berlin. It is only at

this point that McNamara personalizes his account:

I did not see the Communist danger as overwhelming, as did many people on the right. It was a threat I was certain could be dealt with, and I shared President Kennedy's sentiment when he called on America and the West to bear the burden of along twilight struggle. "Let every nation know," he said in his inaugural address, "whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."24

McNamara then outlines what he did know about Vietnam at the time, that �Ho Chi

Minh, a Communist, had begun efforts to free the country from French rule after World

War I.� McNamara recounts Japanese occupation, Ho Chi Minh�s declaration of

Vietnam's independence after Japan's surrender, and �that the United States had

acquiesced to France's return to Indochina for fear that a Franco-American split would

make it harder to contain Soviet expansion in Europe.�25 The exceedingly dubious

premises of this scalar geopolitics � a campaign to block Vietnamese independence in

order to shore up France and thus Western Europe � lead the US to subsidize the French

colonial apparatus in Vietnam. Here McNamara switches scales from global to regional

geopolitics describing a U.S subsidized �French military action� against �Ho�s forces,

which were in turn supported by the Chinese.� But that regional geopolitics were almost

inseparable from global geopolitics is evident as McNamara adds: �And I knew that the

United States viewed Indochina as a necessary part of our containment policy -- an

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important bulwark in the Cold War.�26

The crucial (mis)identification of the political movements and struggles

characterizing Asian politics in the 1950s by American policy-makers is noted by

McNamara as he discusses the geopolitical orthodoxy of the time, that which seemed

�common sense� and �obvious�:

It seemed obvious that the Communist movement in Vietnam was closely related to guerrilla insurgencies in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines during the 1950s. We viewed these conflicts not as nationalistic movements-as they largely appear in hindsight-but as signs of a unified Communist drive for hegemony in Asia. This way of thinking had led Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state, to call Ho Chi Minh "the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina."27

McNamara then discusses how this Cold War geopolitical orthodoxy was given

expression by Eisenhower:

I also knew that the Eisenhower administration had accepted the Truman administration's view that Indochina's fall to Communism would threaten U.S. security. Although it had appeared unwilling to commit U.S. combat forces in the region, it had sounded the warning of the Communist threat there clearly and often. In April 1954, President Eisenhower made his famous prediction that if Indochina fell, the rest of Southeast Asia would "go over very quickly" like a "row of dominoes." He had added, "The possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world." That year our country assumed responsibility from France for protecting Vietnam south of the 1954 partition line.28

McNamara records Kennedy�s commitment to this geopolitical orthodoxy, transitioning

from what he �knew� and was �aware� of to what he himself believed (i.e. that very same

orthodoxy):

I was aware, finally, that during his years in the Senate, John F. Kennedy had echoed Eisenhower's assessment of Southeast Asia. "Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia," he had said in a widely publicized speech in 1956. "It is our offspring. We cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs.' Two developments after I became secretary of defense reinforced my way of thinking about Vietnam: the intensification of relations between Cuba and the Soviets, and a new wave of Soviet provocations in Berlin. Both seemed to underscore the aggressive intent of Communist policy. In that context, the danger of Vietnam's loss and, through

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falling dominoes, the loss of all Southeast Asia made it seemed reasonable to consider expanding the U.S. effort in Vietnam.29

After this highlight summary of the dominant geopolitical narrative that rendered world

politics meaningful to U.S. decision-makers, McNamara then conceded the disjuncture

between this �global� geopolitical knowledge about Vietnam as a Cold War �bulwark� or

�domino,� and �local� geographical knowledge of Vietnam as a place with a particular

culture, history, people and sets of values. Again his argument is not one about personal

ignorance alone but of relative elite decision-maker ignorance about Vietnam:

None of this made me anything close to an East Asian expert, however. I had never visited Indochina, nor did I understand or appreciate its history, language, culture, or values. The same must be said, to varying degrees, about President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, military adviser Maxwell Taylor, and many others. When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognita.30

This lack of knowledge is accounted for in the following manner by McNamara:

Worse, our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance. When the Berlin crisis occurred in 1961 and during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy was able to turn to senior people like Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan, who knew the Soviets intimately. There were no senior officials in the Pentagon or State Department with comparable knowledge of Southeast Asia. I knew of only one Pentagon officer with counterinsurgency experience in the region -- Col. Edward Lansdale, who had served as an adviser to Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines and Diem in South Vietnam. But Lansdale was relatively junior and lacked broad geopolitical expertise.31

McNamara then goes on to make an argument that is, ironically, also made by David

Halberstam: the U.S.�s lack of expertise was a legacy of McCarthyism.32 Without men of

�sophisticated, nuanced insights,� the �we badly misread China�s objectives and mistook

its bellicose rhetoric to imply a drive for regional hegemony. We also totally

underestimated the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh�s movement. We saw him first as a

Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist.�33

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McNamara�s account of the geopolitical discourse that was used to constitute

�Vietnam� as a particular type of location, drama and �stake� within a larger regional and

global power struggle between Communism and the �free world� raises a series of

interesting questions. For critical geopoliticians, his account is a useful illustration of how

Cold War geopolitics worked in an anti-geographical way. The scale of the determination

of meaning was the global visions and paranoid fantasies of the geopolitical culture of the

United States in its worldwide competition with the Soviet Union. Vietnam was never

simply about Vietnam; the local and national scale of the country were always inevitably

nested within a larger geopolitical game at the regional and global scale. Here images like

the �domino theory� and the worldwide struggle against a �monolithic Communism� �on

the march� overwhelmed the local geography and history of a place like Vietnam.

The argument can, indeed, be taken further. It could be argued that the paranoid

simplicities of Cold War discourse could work only by actively ignoring or suppressing

local geographical and historical knowledge. It is this question of the relationship of

power to knowledge and ignorance that provoked some controversy after McNamara�s

book was published. A number of critics disputed McNamara�s claim that the U.S.

government �lacked expertise for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance.� One of

these critics was Louis Sarris, a Vietnamese affairs analyst for the State Department in

the 1960s, who wrote in the New York Times that McNamara�s above claim is untrue. �In

fact, there was, from the earliest days of our involvement in Vietnam, a number of

reliable analyses in the State Department, the C.I.A. and even the Defense Intelligence

Agency, let alone information from American officials and journalists in the field and

academic and military experts.�34 Sarris�s places the question of power and authority not

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knowledge at the center of his argument: �The basic problem was the unwillingness of

McNamara and other top policy makers to accept the relevance of information with

which they personally disagreed.� Sarris details what he considered the capitulation of

Dean Rusk and the State Department to McNamara�s Pentagon over the production of

knowledge about the military situation in Vietnam. Under an agreement between the two,

according to Sarris, the State Department would stop issuing independent assessments of

the military picture in Vietnam. State Department appraisals of the war �were off limits,

and in most cases our reports were kept within the department.�35

Sarris�s point about institutional power and knowledge dependency flows inside the

U.S. state provoked a letter of response by McNamara in which he clarified his argument

by narrowing it considerably. Sarris is wrong, he contended, because top U.S. decision-

makers like himself did not have �experienced senior advisors� who �had associated both

socially and professionally� with the top Vietnamese leadership like Thompson, Bohland

and Kennan supposedly did with the Soviets. Elaborating the point later in a footnote in

Argument Without End, McNamara wrote: �Who knew Ho Chi Minh? Who knew many �

or any � of his colleagues? Where was there a single individual who both had a nuanced

understanding of the North Vietnamese � and their Chinese allies � and the friendship

and respect of President Kennedy and Johnson? The answer is obvious: There was no

one.�36 In refining his argument to such a degree, McNamara actually strengthens the

connection between knowledge and power that is implicit in Sarris�s contentions. The

knowledge that would have counted, for McNamara, was the knowledge of those with

social entrée to the world of Vietnamese Communist Party elites and U.S. presidents, a

potential social power circle that was impossibly small.

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This dispute between, on the one hand, McNamara�s argument that �we lacked

experienced senior advisors� with knowledge of the Vietnamese and, on the other hand,

the argument that what the presidents advisors knew reflected the power structure they

represented and the power they wielded is particularly consequential in considering

Argument Without End. McNamara�s commitment to a naturalistic scientific

epistemology is evident in his framing of the �basic question� of the Vietnamese-U.S.

dialogues: �In the light of what now can be learned from the historical record, what U.S.

and Vietnamese decisions might have been different and what difference would they have

made on the course of the war � if each side had judged the other side�s intentions and

capabilities more accurately?�37 The question is a matter of the fullness and accuracy of

truth, and not a question of the relationship of knowledge to power for McNamara. The

central thesis McNamara seeks to advance in the volume is that the Vietnam War was a

tragic consequence of �missed opportunities� and �misperceptions� on both sides. The

�joint responsibility� is a contentious theme but one that McNamara insists upon. The

initial Vietnamese position, as articulated by Tran Quang Co, first deputy Foreign

Minister of Vietnamese government, is that �McNamara�s argument about the outbreak

of the war being a result of �misjudgements, miscalculations and misinformation� about

the other side is only applicable to the U.S. side. Vietnam had no choice but to fight.�38

Throughout the volume McNamara returns again and again to the �misjudgements,

miscalculations and misinformation� formula, suggesting that an �accurate� perception

would have avoided the �tragedy.� In reviewing the volume in the New York Review of

Books, the Asian historian Jonathan Mirsky writes:

It is irritating to read Mr McNamara�s repeated breast-beating about �American ignorance of the history, language and culture of Vietnam.� A quick reading of the

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Pentagon Papers shows how well informed some of the intelligence agencies were from the late 1940s on. Apart from the volumous Chinese and French literature on Vietnam�s history of fighting foreigners, which were available in translation, there were specialists in American universities, some of them writing in this journal during Mr McNamara�s time in office, who disputed Washington�s justification for the war. While not accurate in every detail, their analyses, if taken seriously in the White House, would have arrested, if not stopped, the war.39

Mirsky�s point poses the same issue as Sarris: was it �lack of knowledge� that accounted

for the Vietnam tragedy as McNamara apparently contends, or the impermeability of a

Cold War �mindset� to �counter-evidence� and �heterodox knowledge� that is to blame? I

would argue that much more consideration needs to be given to the latter. The whole

political culture and power structure that sustained and perpetuated Cold War geopolitical

discourse needs to be addressed. Historian Ernest May suggests the power of the

contextual political climate when he argues that �given the assumptions generally shared

by Americans in the 1960s, it seems probable that any collection of men or women would

have decided as did members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.�40 Put as a

variant of Heidegger�s famous aphorism about language, geopolitical discourses have

people rather than people having geopolitical discourses.

Since the question of geopolitical power/knowledge is complex and contentious, I

was unable to do little more than raise it briefly with McNamara. In response to critics

like Sarris McNamara stated that �they did not understand that I did not have contact with

people in the bowels of the State Department. I had contact with [Llewellyn] �Tommy�

Thompson, with Dean Rusk, with Chester Bowles, with George Ball.� He reiterated his

claim that Thompson was the unsung hero of the Cuban Missile Crisis � because he told

Kennedy he was wrong to assume Khrushchev would not remove the missiles from

Cuba41 � and that �there was no �Tommy� Thompson in relation to Vietnam and nobody

19

has suggested the name of anybody.� He vigorously rejected my suggestion that

�accurate knowledge� about Vietnam was in circulation at the time but was �not let in�

by top decision-makers. While there were lots of knowledges about Vietnam �out there,�

he noted, �the people Kennedy depended upon, the Tommy Thompson equivalents, were

wrong� (McNamara did note, at this point, that one of the few who was right was John

Kenneth Galbraith).

I tried a different tack to get at the question of power and knowledge suggesting

that his claim that the U.S. could have withdrawn from Vietnam in late 1963 or late 1964

�went against the Cold War.� Kennedy�s foreign-policy decision makers could have

come to a decision to withdraw from Vietnam in their internal deliberations but these

conclusions faced a geopolitical power structure and culture that would not readily have

accepted this intention to withdraw. Put differently, in order to get elected Kennedy had

demonstrated himself a �true believer� in Cold War discourse. To withdraw from

Vietnam would have seen him having to fight the hegemony of the Cold War discourse

he himself practiced and was defined by. McNamara conceded that this was �half right�

but responded, as he does in Argument Without End, that �it is the responsibility of

leaders to lead, not follow. It is their responsibility to resist the pressures of the majority

if the majority is misinformed or fails to understand and properly evaluate the full range

of options open to our country.�42 He stressed the importance of strong leadership, adding

that it would not have been easy. But �if I�d know then what I know now I am absolutely

positive I could have helped Kennedy or Johnson turn the public around. The fact is, the

media, the Congress, the academicians, the political leaders were all in favor of the US

20

program in Vietnam, all through 1966 and most through 1967. They could have been

turned around by a strong president without any question, in my mind.�

Robert McNamara�s public career is a complex geopolitical life. In his memoir he

wrote of President Johnson as �towering, powerful, paradoxical figure� quoting Walt

Whitman�s poetry to the effect that he �contained multitudes.�43 He could have written

similar words about himself (though he was very different from Johnson). McNamara is

also a towering, powerful and paradoxical figure with more than a few contradictions and

multitudes of his own. That he has much to answer for is without doubt. That he has also

tried to answer, even if it is in ways critics find objectionable, is also beyond doubt. His is

an examined life, and will undoubtedly continue to be so.

Acknowledgement.

I would like to thank Robert McNamara for kindly agreeing to be the subject of the

inaugural �geopolitical discourse.� Thanks are also due to Gisela Claper of Ben Gurion

University for her kindness is helping arrange the interview with Mr McNamara.

NOTES.

1 McNamara�s first publication was The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New

York: Harper and Row, 1968) which collected his Cold War liberal thinking on security

as development and not simply weapons systems. He wrote that �for too long we have

come to identify security with exclusively military phenomena and most particularly with

military hardware. It just isn't so, and we need to accommodate ourselves to the facts of

the matter if we want to see security survive and grow in the southern half of the globe�

21

(p. 150). The problem, however, is that this was not the foreign policy practice of the

administrations McNamara served. McNamara�s also collected his World Bank

philosophy into two volumes, and wrote Blundering Into Disaster (New York: Pantheon,

1986) as an intervention into the debate about the nuclear weapons in the mid-1980s.

2 See James G Blight and David Welsh, On The Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine

the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second edition. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).

3 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. (New York:

Vintage, 1995), p. xx.

4 Robert McNamara, James Blight, Robert Brigham, Thomas Biersteker and Col. Herbert

Schandler, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New

York: Public Affairs, 1999).

5 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Penguin, 1973).

6 Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara

(Boston: Little Brown, 1993).

7 Paul Hendrickson, The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and the Five Lives of A

Lost War. (New York: Vintage, 1997).

8 This, at least, is the position argued by Bill Clinton in an interview with Joe Klein of the

New Yorker. See to be supplied.

9 Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 268.

10 Shapley, Power and Promise, p. 138-139.

11 Paul Hendrickson, Living and the Dead, p. 85.

12 Quoted in Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 102.

13 See, for example, Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).

22

14 Shapley, Power and Promise, p. 119.

15 Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 109-111; Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon

(New York: Touchstone, 1983), pp. 263-285.

16 McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 6.

17 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 342.

18 McNamara, Argument without End, p. 11.

19 Living and the Dead, p. 23.

20 In Retrospect, p. 323.

21 �[I]it is very hard, today, to recapture the innocence and confidence with which we

approached Vietnam in the early days of the Kennedy administration. We knew very little

about the region.� In Retrospect, p. 39.

22 Ibid, p. 30.

23 Ibid, p. 30.

24 Ibid, p. 30.

25 Ibid, p. 31.

26 Ibid, p. 31.

27 Ibid, p. 31.

28 Ibid, p. 31.

29 Ibid, p. 32.

30 Ibid, p. 32.

31 Ibid, p. 32.

32 Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 128-130.

33 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 33.

23

34 Louis G. Sarris, �McNamara�s War and Mine,� New York Times, Op-Ed, 5 September

1995. Reprinted in In Retrospect, pp. 391-396.

35 Ibid, p. 396.

36 Argument Without End, p. 429.

37 Ibid, p. 17. Emphasis in the original.

38 Argument Without End, p. 49.

39 Jonathan Mirsky, �The Never-Ending War,� New York Review of Books, XLVII, 9

(1999), pp. 54-63.

40 Ernest May, �Lessons� of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American

Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 120-121. Quoted in

Argument Without End, p. 7.

41 See, Argument Without End, p. 429.

42 Argument Without End, p. 397.

43 In Retrospect, p. 98.