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Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1996
Facial Feedback Hypotheses: Evidence, Implications, and
Directions I
Daniel N. McIntosh 2
This review evaluates four facial feedback hypotheses, each
proposing a certain relation between the face and emotions. It
addresses criticisms of the data, considers implications for
emotional and social processes, and advises directions for future
research. The current data support the following: Facial actions
are sensitive to social context, yet correspond to the affective
dimension of emotions; matches with specific emotions are unlikely.
They modulate ongoing emotions, and initiate them. These two claims
have received substantially improved support, in part due to
studies controlling for effects of experimental demand and task
difficulty. Facial action may influence the occurrence of specific
emotions, not simply their valence and intensity. Facial action is
not necessary for emotions. There are multiple and nonmutually
exclusive plausible mechanisms for facial effects on emotions.
Future work must focus on determining the relative contributions of
these mechanisms, and the parameters of their effects on
emotions.
Smile when you read this! Proponents of facial feedback
hypotheses claim that doing so cause you to like this article more,
and make your mood more positive. Skeptics disagree. Despite a
century of discussion of this question, research has been strongly
evident for less than 25 years, and our knowledge regarding facial
effects on emotion is changing rapidly. The most recent
comprehensive reviews concluded that facial actions influence
emotions (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Manstead, 1988).
Nonetheless, ques- tions about the interpretation of the data and
the importance of the effect
1I appreciate the helpful comments of Harry Gollob, Greg McHugo,
Catherine Reed, Craig Smith, and R. B. Zajonc on earlier drafts of
this paper.
2Address all correspondence to Daniel N. Mclntosh, Department of
Psychology, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208.
121
0146-7239/96/060~0121509.50/~ 1996 Plenum Publishing
Corporation
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122 Mclntosh
keep the idea controversial (Buck, 1984; Fridlund, 1994;
Matsumoto, 1987). Further, the nature and mechanisms of the
phenomenon are debated even among supporters. Less discussed are
reasons why psychologists should care about this phenomenon.
EVOLUTION OF FACIAL FEEDBACK HYPOTHESES
The idea that the face influences emotions has adapted and
mutated over the years, providing variation and viability to its
descendants. Psycholo- gists studying the effects of the face on
emotions trace their inspiration to Charles Darwin and William
James. Darwin (1872/1955) noted that enhanc- ing or inhibiting the
expression of an emotion alters the intensity of that emotion. He
wrote this in order to explain why expression is an important topic
for, and explicable from, a naturalist perspective; he also noted
that emotional expressions serve a social-communicative function.
However, so- matic influence on emotion is neither a primary
concern, nor integral to his theorizing. James (1890/1950) went
further, proposing that physiological changes, including facial
action, are the emotions. The body changes, and the subjective
experience of emotion follows. Somatic input is essential to the
theory. This contrast is one root of the debate surrounding facial
feed- back. For the "Jamesian" emotions theorists, a small effect
is important, as it pertains to understanding details of emotions
processes. Others typi- cally consider the effect interesting only
if it plays a role in "everyday phe- nomena" (Fridlund, 1994, p.
182).
Although a strong critique by Cannon (1927) muted consideration
of feedback, two ideas revived interest in the effects of facial
movement in the 1960s. First, Tomkins (1962) gave the face a
primary role in his emo- tions theory: "The face expresses affect,
both to others, and to the self, via feedback, which is more rapid
and more complex than any stimulation of which the slower moving
visceral organs are capable" (p. 205). This avoided Cannon's
criticisms by making visceral changes unnecessary, and by placing
the focus on a part of the body relatively untouched by Cannon's
analysis (see also Gellhorn, 1964). Building on this, Izard (1971)
indicated that dis- crete facial configurations are a primary
determinant of the quality of the felt emotion. As with James,
facial action is a fundamental component in this approach.
The second idea is based on the two-factor theory of emotion, in
which intensity of emotion is associated with generalized
physiological arousal, and the specific emotion is mediated by
cognitive processes (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Bern (1967)
built on this notion by discussing how emotional experience may be
based in part on cognitive self-perception processes. This theory
suggests that facial configuration may be one source of infor-
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 123
mation used in making self-attributions of emotions (Laird,
1974), but facial effects on emotion are not fundamental to it.
A decade later, these two theoretical branches bore empirical
fruit. Laird (1974) developed the self-perception view of emotional
experience and tested the role facial action plays. He indicated
that if people are in- duced to express an emotion, they may then
feel that emotion. Lanzetta and colleagues found that individuals
who feigned not experiencing pain during electric shock showed
fewer physiological and subjective pain re- sponses than those who
pretended to be experiencing unbearable pain (Lanzetta,
Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976; see also Kleck, Vaughan, Cart-
wright-Smith, Vaughan, Colby, & Lanzetta, 1976).
By the late 1970s, this theorizing and data gave currency to the
idea that facial movement could influence emotions. The term facial
feedback hypothesis was coined because the effect had become
somewhat separated from its theoretical parents (Ellsworth &
Tourangeau, 1981; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). The label
carries connotations regarding the nature of the process. For
consistency's sake, I use the term to denote the general area of
analysis, but note that not all proposed mechanisms assume that
facial effects involve feedback. Further, there are variations on
what rela- tion is suggested by the term. The diversity of
hypotheses labeled "facial feedback" has confused the debate about
such effects, making the associa- tion between facial patterns and
emotions less clear. However, careful con- sideration of the data
supports the existence of some specific relations, and provides
information relevant to emotions (and other) processes. It is time
to move past demonstrations of an effect, and to use the data as a
basis for addressing more sophisticated questions and applications.
The first step in this process is clarifying what is known.
EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY FACIAL FEEDBACK HYPOTHESES
There are four common general proposals related to facial
feedback. They may not be equally valid. To best grasp what we know
about this process, it is important to specify which hypothesis is
being tested. I have organized this review around the four
questions. Three are based on the scheme used in Adelmann and
Zajonc's (1989) review, although the cate- gorization of studies is
slightly different. The first does not imply causality: (1) Does
facial configuration correspond to emotions? The next two hold
facial actions as able to influence emotions: (2) Does facial
movement modulate emotions in the presence of other emotional
stimuli; and (3) can facial action initiate emotions, even with no
(other) emotional stimuli pre-
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124 Mclntosh
sent? The last question follows Tourangeau and Ellsworth (1979):
(4) Is facial action necessary for the presence of emotions? Note
that causality is not unavoidably implied in the necessity
hypothesis. It may be that par- titular facial configurations are
an essential component of emotions, but serve no causal function.
Cutting across all four questions is the issue of what emotional
outcome is supported. Is the face associated with the de- gree of
positive or negative affect only (dimensional versions), or is
there a link to specific emotions--anger rather than sadness, for
example (cate- gorical versions)? Tests of the hypotheses pertained
mostly to the dimen- sional question through the mid-1980s (Winton,
1986). One question for the present review, then, is to consider
the degree of support for the cate- gorical versions evident since
that time.
Instead of noting every study, I emphasize studies from the late
1980's onwards, as the last comprehensive reviews were published
then. Further, research since that time has addressed primary
methodolic criticisms and begun to fill some conceptual gaps; I
will focus on what has been learned. I spend little space on
between-subjects versions of the hypotheses. These hold that those
individuals who are more expressive should experience more intense
emotions. There is no such positive association. People who tend to
express more do not feel more, in fact, their physiology tends to
be less reactive (Buck, 1980; e.g., Lanzetta & Kleck, 1970).
Although re- lated to the phenomenon at hand, this area deserves a
separate review. The within-subjects versions are the hypotheses
presently at issue. Within individuals, does facial action
correspond to or cause changes in experience and physiology?
Do Facial Actions Correspond to Emotions?
This hypothesis simply states that facial patterns covary with
emotions. Supportive studies find that emotion associates with
visually observed facial activity (Buck, Savin, Miller, & Caul,
1972; Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980) and facial
electromyography (EMG; Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986;
Dimberg 1988). EMG not only changes as a result of manipulation of
emotions (i.e., the probability of a particular EMG pattern given
the associated affective state is high), but also predicts
self-reported emotions (i.e., the probability of an affective state
is high given a particular EMG state) (Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty,
& Tassinary, 1988).
These studies support strongly the dimensional version of the
corre- spondence hypothesis. Although many studies simply have not
checked for categorical effects (i.e., within-valence differences),
most that did have been largely unsuccessful or inconsistent
(Camras, Holland, & Patterson, 1993;
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 125
e.g., Brown & Schwartz, 1980; Fridlund, Schwartz, &
Fowler, 1984; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). Note that the lack
of correspondence be- tween specific facial patterns and particular
emotional experiences does not contradict the data showing that
people can identify archetypal facial pat- terns associated with
categorized emotions (see, e.g., Ekman, 1994). Know- ing that a
certain pattern is typical of anger, for example, is different than
consistently possessing that pattern when anger is felt.
The difficulty in finding categorical correspondence suggests a
funda- mental problem. There may be too many antecedents and
contexts for fa- cial movement for one-to-one relations between
muscle patterns and particular emotions to be the rule ('lhssinary
& Cacioppo, 1992). Note that this analysis leaves room for a
modulating or initiating function of facial action. Many variables
may influence facial action, reducing correspon- dence.
Nonetheless, particular facial patterns may still sway emotional
state. The lack of correspondence simply suggests nonfacial
influences on emo- tion, and nonemotional influences on facial
movement.
The social context of the actor is one variable that affects
facial dis- plays. A likely primary function of facial motion is
communication of inner state or intent to others. Buck (1980,
1994), for example, does a nice job portraying how facial actions
are influenced by both internal states and social factors. Going
further, some (e.g., Fridlund, 1994) argue that facial
configurations are a function of social context or communicative
intent only, not emotional state. Consistent with the notion that
there is strong social effect on facial activity, audience effects
on smiles are found as early as 10 months of age (Jones, Collins,
& Hong, 1991; for adult data, see Chovil, 1991, Kraut &
Johnston, 1979). There are two problems with the position that
social considerations are the sole influence on facial pattern-
ing, however. To begin, facial action can vary as a function of
affective state even when the movements are too small for observers
to notice (Ca- cioppo, Bush, & Tassinary, 1992). Thus, studies
finding no visible changes in connection with emotional stimuli or
state are not evidence that facial action and emotions are
independent. More important, social modulation does not preclude a
connection to emotional state. Recent work demon- strates that
facial movement is influenced by both factors. Cacioppo et al.
(1992) found that:(1) EMG varied with the affective content of
slides even when participants viewed them privately;(2) facial
responses were similar during social vs. asocial emotional stimuli;
and (3) movement varied with affective tone of stimuli even when
individuals were told to inhibit expres- sion to avoid
communicating their emotional responses. Hess, Banse, & Kappas
(1995) compared women's reactions to films varying in emotional
strength under conditions varying in sociality and interpersonal
relationship. Facial action was influenced by both social factors
and emotional intensity
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126 Mclntosh
(see also Kraut, 1982). The data show a clear correspondence in
valence between affective state and facial patterns. A categorical
association be- tween specific emotions and patterns is difficult
to find, perhaps because of other (e.g., social) influences on
facial motion.
Given the above findings, what are some directions for future
work? One is to follow the lead of Smith (1989), and search for
correspondences between specific facial movements (e.g., the
eyebrow frown), and distinct components of emotions (e.g.,
appraisals and physical changes). This level of analysis may allow
for more precise descriptions of what factors are as- sociated with
which facial actions, and which aspects of emotions. The di-
mensional findings are consistent with this approach; extending
this level of analysis to other dimensions and facial movements has
potential to un- tangle the mutual influences affecting the
correspondence between facial actions and emotional processes.
Does Facial Movement Modulate Emotions?
The modulation hypothesis states that facial action can affect
emotions during ongoing emotional experiences. This may refer to
intensity (e.g., frowning when already sad might make one sadder)
or quality of experience (e.g., smiling when sad may make the
sadness bittersweet). However, tests of this hypothesis have
focused on changes in intensity. The emotion theo- ries that formed
the early basis for facial feedback focused on the role of the face
in ongoing emotional experience (Izard, 1981; Tomkins, 1981). Thus,
demonstrations of modulation are important for evaluating these
views. Additionally, this is a potential causal function, and the
issue of cau- sality is implied in folk theories, in how people
interpreted the initial theo- ries (Ellsworth & Tourangeau,
1981), by Izard's (1981, 1990) propositions, and by the earliest
studies. Further, if a causal role is established, this in- creases
the practical implications of the phenomenon (Tourangeau &
Ellsworth, 1979). Whether it be by modulation or initiation, this
is the cru- cial question regarding facial feedback: Does the face
do more than express emotions; does it also change them?
When participants are instructed how to alter their faces muscle
by muscle, their responses to stimuli are sometimes influenced by
the pattern in which their faces are set (Laird, 1974; Rutledge
& Hupka, 1985), but not always (Tourangeau & Ellsworth,
1979). Exaggeration or inhibition of expressions while experiencing
stimuli also provide uneven support for the modulation hypothesis
(Bush, Barr, McHugo, & Lanzetta, 1989; McCanne & Anderson,
1987; Ohira & Kurono, 1993). Concerns about demand effects
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 127
(Buck, 1980; Manstead, 1988) and questions about the support for
the cate- gorical hypothesis (Winton, 1986) plague this work.
A recent study provides more solid support for the modulation
hy- pothesis, while also addressing persistent concerns. Using
imagery to gen- erate emotions, Hess, Kappas, McHugo, Lanzetta, and
Kleck (1992) compared the time it took individuals to reach four
emotional states during three conditions. In the "Feel" condition
participants generated an emo- tion. For the "Feel-and-Show"
condition they generated the target emotion and displayed the
facial configuration consistent with it. In the "Show" con- dition
they posed an expression. In the Feel condition, subjects took
longer to achieve the emotion state than in the Feel-and-Show
condition. The ad- dition of facial action facilitated the
self-generation of the emotions. These data address several
concerns. First, demand is an unlikely explanation for the effects,
as the measure is indirect, and participants did not know that
response latency was being assessed. Second, perceived task
difficulty was not associated with stronger negative and weaker
positive emotional feel- ings. Finally, because two positive and
two negative emotional states were used, and there were differences
in self-reported emotions consistent with facial expression, it
provides evidence for the categorical version of the hy-
pothesis.
When physiological measures are used, it is implausible that
partici- pants are simply conforming to experimental demand (Buck,
1980). Lan- zetta and colleagues (Colby, Lanzetta, & Kleck,
1977; Kleck et al., 1976; Lanzetta et al., 1976) report that
alterations of pain expressions during shock influence both
electrodermal response (EDR) and subjective report. These studies
show that facial and bodily action influence physiological and
subjective status. Although pain is not a clearly emotional outcome
(Buck, 1980; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979), the studies
reported by Lanzetta et al. included EDR assessment during
anticipation of electric shock. Facial posing during this
anxiety-provoking interval influenced EDR in the same way. Other
research also finds effects on emotional responses, although the
support is uneven (Ianni, Stettner, & Freedman, 1986;
Zuckerman, Klorman, & Larrance, 1981).
Some recent studies address the issue of experimental demand by
al- tering facial action by having people engage in
emotion-analogous facial movement. Effects of facial configuration
on responses provide support for the modulating function. Strack,
Martin, & Stepper (1988) instructed par- ticipants to hold a
pen in their teeth, lips, or nondominant hand. The first produces a
smile-like pattern, the second inhibits it, and the third is a con-
trol condition. Individuals found cartoons more humorous during the
simu- lated smile, and less humorous when their smiles were
suppressed. Zajonc, Murphy, and Inglehart (1989) created facial
actions analogous to positive
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128 Mclntosh
and negative configurations by having participants pronounce
vowels. In one study, speakers read aloud stories with either a
high frequency of the vowel ~/, or none of that vowel. Voicing
g/results in facial activity similar to a frown or scowl. If facial
action alters the affective impact of the stories, then the
participants should experience more negative feelings during the
high-ii story than during the no-t~ one. They did. Larsen,
Kasimatis, and Frey (1992) attached golf tees to participants'
brows. Contraction of the corrugator supercilii causes the tips of
the two tees to touch, and produces an action generally associated
with sad facial expressions, among others. When individuals kept
the tees together, they reported that sad photo- graphs made them
sadder than when they were instructed to keep the tees apart. They
found no differences between the tasks on rated difficulty, sug-
gesting that this is not the reason for the different emotion
rating.
In summary, reviews completed in the late 1980s concluded that
facial action modulated ongoing emotions (Adelmann & Zajonc,
1989; Manstead, 1988). Since these reviews, additional studies have
addressed this issue, and the majority have been supportive. The
greater number of scientists and methods that find the effect
increases confidence that it is not artifactual. Further, the more
recent positive efforts have responded to the methodo- logical
criticisms of the earlier ones, and address directly issues of
experi- mental demand, effort effects, and categorical effects.
Only work on the latter, however, begins to address the issue of
qualitative (vs. intensity) modulation; future work should address
this more directly. Despite the stronger empirical basis, however,
the number of studies with nonsignificant results suggests that the
effect is not large, the outcome may be moderated by unmeasured
variables, some research is using unreliable measures or invalid
manipulations, or some combination of these. One task is to estab-
lish clearly conditions under which facial action modulates
emotional ex- perience.
Can Facial Action Initiate Emotions
The second causal facial feedback hypothesis holds that people
can initiate emotions through facial movement. This has often been
considered a stronger hypothesis than modulation; however,
initiating an emotional state when none is present is not
necessarily a more powerful effect than altering an extant state
elicited by other stimuli.
Several studies demonstrate initiation (e.g., Duncan &
Laird, 1977, 1980), and more recently, categorical effects have
been addressed. In one study, participants contracted muscles
involved in fear, anger, sadness, and disgust, in turn, and rated
their emotions subsequent to each contraction
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 129
on these feelings, plus happiness, surprise, agreeableness, and
interest (Du- clos, Laird, Schneider, Sexter, Stem, & Van
Lighten, 1989). Fear ratings were significantly higher during the
fear expression than in any of the other three, and sad was higher
during the sad pattern. Anger and disgust were not significantly
differentiated from each other, but were from fear and sadness.
These data suggest that facial patterns can sometimes initiate emo-
tion-specific experience (see also Laird, Cuniff, Sheehan, Shulman,
& Strum, 1989). However, this work is vulnerable to potential
experimental demand effects.
Physiological measures are less likely to be products of demand,
and there is some evidence that physiology is altered by facial
manipulations. An early demonstration of autonomic outcomes of
facial patterns was re- ported by Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen
(1983). With replication, however, the number of physiologic
changes that reliably differ with facial expression has diminished
(Zajonc & Mclntosh, 1992). Most consistently produced are lower
heart rate (HR) increases during the disgust facial pattern than
dur- ing anger, fear, and sadness, and larger increases in finger
temperature during the anger configuration than in fear (Levenson,
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; see Shortt, Bush, McCabe, Gottman,
& Katz, 1994, for a partial rep- lication; cf Tourangeau &
Ellsworth, 1979).
Levenson et al. (1990) collected information on participants'
subjective experiences during facial expressions. Facial
configurations produced self- reports of the associated emotion on
a significant proportion of trials. Al- though the muscle-by-muscle
manipulation may cause some experimental demand to report the
associated emotion, the physiological differentiation they found
makes this less plausible. The connection of these outcomes to
facial patterning is bolstered by the finding that when
participants' faces best matched prototypical emotional
expressions, the physiological differ- ences were strongest, and
self-reported emotions most evident. In one ex- periment, Levenson
et al. address the concern that physiological differences are
related to variations in the difficulty required to pose the
expression, rather than emotion produced as a result of the
expression. No correlations between difficulty and the magnitude of
physiological change were signifi- cant, and sorting the emotional
expressions by difficulty did not produce groups that matched sets
found when grouping by autonomic nervous sys- tem (ANS) data.
Differential effort is thus not a likely explanation for the ANS
results.
Another example of facial actions initiating emotions is
reported by Zajonc et al. (1989). They had individuals pronounce /i
(analogous to a scowl) or o (relaxed face) for one minute. The
phoneme i/ caused a sig- nificant increase in forehead temperature,
which has been associated with negative feelings (e.g., Mclntosh,
Zajonc, Vig, & Emerick, in press; Zajonc,
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130 Mclntosh
Murphy, & Mclntosh, 1993; see discussion of the Vascular
Theory of Emo- tional Efference, below). Participants liked the o
sound better and rated it as more pleasant than a. In another
study, participants repeated several vowel sounds. Voicing/i
increased forehead temperature, ah, and e (which produces a smile
analog) decreased it. The least liked sound was ti; ah and e were
liked most. The findings have been replicated, with the effect of
voicing the vowels on mood remaining when level of difficulty of
speaking them is statistically controlled (Mclntosh et al., in
press).
Further evidence for an initiatory function of facial action is
provided by Hess et al. (1992). Participants' heart-rate patterns
were consistent across conditions in which they were asked to
simply feel an emotion, sim- ply display it, or do both.
Individuals physiologically responded in the dis- play-only
condition in ways similar to the conditions in which they were to
feel the emotion. Also, they reported feeling emotions when they
were asked to display an emotion, but not to feel it. This study
gives evidence of within-valence differentiation, providing support
for the categorical ver- sion of the initiation hypothesis.
A new type of data supporting the initiating hypothesis has
recently emerged. Based on brain lateralization of emotions
(Davidson, 1992), Schiff and Lamon (1989; Schiff, Esses, &
Lamon, 1992) examined the influence of unilateral facial action.
Coders blind to condition rated the number and valence of emotion
propositions used by participants in telling stories based on mood
sensitive pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT); there
is little chance that demand characteristics influenced these data.
Par- ticipants tended to feel sad or depressed when contracting the
left comer of their mouths. Following a right facial half-smile,
they felt positive and energetic. Although Wissing and Wessels
(1992) replicated these results, the effect may not occur among
women.
In summary, support for the initiation hypothesis has been
slower to obtain than for correspondence and modulation. Recent
work, however, provides stronger evidence for categorical and
dimensional versions using a variety of manipulations, and both
self-report and physiological outcomes.
Is Facial Action Necessary for Emotions?
The necessity hypothesis states that emotions cannot occur
without fa- cial activation. Although it has tended to be thought
of as indicating that facial movement is a necessary cause, it may
also refer to facial changes as being an inextricable component of
emotions, without such expressions themselves being causal. The
latter is essentially a strong correspondence hypothesis. Thus, the
low association between categories of emotions and
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 131
facial patterns argues against this position. More generally,
people experi- ence emotions during times of facial paralysis, most
commonly in REM dreaming when there is striate muscle paralysis
(see Fridlund, 1994, for expanded examples). These occurrences make
it difficult to maintain this hypothesis.
However, one version has not been empirically refuted, largely
because it is difficult to test. Perhaps central nervous system
(CNS) representations of facial expressions can meet the
hypothesized need for such patterns with- out actual facial motion
(Izard, 1977, 1990; Tomkins, 1962; cf Damasio's, 1994,
somatic-marker hypothesis). Facial action or a neurocognitive
repre- sentation of facial action may be necessary for emotions. It
is not clear how this is functionally different than a completely
central approach, except that it may predict different consequences
of damage to particular brain regions, as alternate structures
might be necessary for emotional experience if representations are
needed than if they are not.
Recurring Criticisms of Facial Feedback Studies
Fridlund (1994) has organized several of the frequent concerns
regard- ing facial feedback data. First, studies often contain
implicit suggestions to participants about how they should act
(Buck, 1980). As detailed above, recent work makes it unlikely that
participants know what is expected and respond in ways consistent
with the hypotheses. Regarding dependent vari- ables, the
physiological data would be difficult for subjects to generate in
response to experimental demand, and the individual differences in
re- sponse to the manipulations do not follow a pattern expected if
experi- mental demand were the cause (Laird, 1984). Further, the
latency measure (Hess et al., 1992) and TAT procedure (Schiff &
Lamon, 1989) are indi- cators of effects not sensitive to demand.
On the manipulation side, several studies have used tasks that are
unlikely to cue the participants as to the expected response (e.g.,
Strack et al., 1988; Zajonc et al., 1989).
Second, Fridlund (1994) suggests that these just mentioned
facial tasks (e.g., holding a pen in one's teeth) are silly or
embarrassing, and this is what causes the changes in emotion.
However, that both negative and posi- tive affective changes result
from the tasks makes this confound less plau- sible. For example,
why does voicing e make one feel silly, and voicing a make one
embarrassed, and not the reverse; why is reading a story with
many//'s more aversive than humorous?
The third concern is the confounding of negative faces with
difficulty. Because people can smile using only one muscle, the
zygomaticus major which pulls the corners of the mouth up, and
negative patterns need acti-
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132 Mclntosh
vation and coordination of more than one muscle, participants
may like the smile conditions better simply because they are easier
(Fridlund, 1994). This criticism is refuted by the studies that
find reports of effort or difficulty to be unrelated to the
manipulation or emotion. Further, smiles utilizing two muscles
(adding the orbicularis oculi, which crinkles the corners of the
eyes) are more associated with positive affect than those using
only the one (Ekman, 1992). This should not be the case if effort
is the cause of more negative feelings.
Fourth, specific to those studies in which people modify their
expres- sions during ongoing emotional experiences, those told to
modify their ex- pressions may regulate their facial configuration
by doing things (e.g., producing mental images) that also modify
feelings. As there are several affirmative studies that do not use
this manipulation, it is not a strong cri- tique of the
hypotheses.
Summary: The Status of Facial Feedback Research
Recent studies address long-standing criticisms of facial
feedback stud- ies, and provide a firmer foundation on which to
evaluate the propositions. Especially in the case of the initiation
hypothesis, recent work has dramati- cally increased the supportive
evidence. Further, additional support for categorical effects is
emerging. Nonetheless, the phenomena remain elu- sive. Despite the
stronger empirical bases for the effects, research on facial
feedback hypotheses leave a number of significant questions
unanswered. Scholars need to evaluate conditions under which facial
movement alters emotions, the mechanisms by which they do so, and
the size of the effect under different conditions and by varying
mechanisms. Further, the impli- cations of these phenomena need
exploration. These issues constitute the necessary next area of
scientific focus.
POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR FACIAL EFFECTS ON EMOTIONS
The primary research question should now be how facial feedback
in- fluences emotions. One way to categorize mechanisms is by
whether they are part of an emotions theory, or whether the effects
are due to a more general process. The Jamesian camp holds that the
influence of facial ac- tion on emotions is the result of the
emotions system (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1971; Tomkins, 1962).
For the others, the theoretical focus is on more general processes
(e.g., Buck, 1980; Fridlund; 1994; Laird, 1974). With the exception
of Laird, those supporting the latter mechanisms view the
effects
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 133
as minor. The Jamesian group views even minor effects as
important, due to their connection to understanding human emotional
processes.
"Jamesian" Mechanisms: Facial Feedback as Part of Emotions
Theories
CNS Connections. The dominant emotions-theory view of facial
feed- back effects sees facial movements as part of the package of
events that make up each emotion, or emotion program. These
hypothesized programs are viewed as coordinating people's responses
to emotion-eliciting situ- ations; they suppose a connection
between the motor cortex and other parts of the brain (especially
the limbic region; Kelley & Stinus, 1984) involved in
physiological changes during emotions (Ekman, 1992; Levenson et
al., 1990). Activating one part of the response set is thought to
stimulate the others. If voluntary expressive actions simulate the
innate emotional con- figuration, then the expression-specific
feeling state may be initiated (Izard, 1990). Neural tracts may
lead from facial muscles or skin to an integration center after the
expression is produced, or the feedback may occur earlier, for
example in the firing of the muscles (Matsumoto & Lee, 1993).
Leven- son et al. (1990) think it likely that commands from the
motor cortex to the facial nucleus are accompanied by parallel
signals to the ANS. Damasio (1994) describes a neural network by
which bodily states provide the input for the subjective feelings
associated with emotions.
Obviously, there is opportunity for much empirical
specification. Stud- ies of people with spinal lesions, lesions in
the distal facial nerve tracts, or temporary neuromuscular blocks
would address these possibilities (Matsu- moto & Lee, 1993).
For example, people with spinal damage may be more subjectively
emotionally excitable since the injury, yet experience less so-
matic emotional responses (Bemlond, Nieuwenhuyse, Fasotti, &
Schuer- man, 1991). Emotions are multicomponential phenomena,
involving subjective state and a variety of physical events.
Examining the effects of damage to part of the system provides data
on the organization of the system. The report of Bermond et al.
(1991) shows that aspects of emotions can be altered by physical
damage, but that the changes are not always coordinated among
components of emotions.
One concern with many CNS approaches is that they are based
heavily on the evidence for facial action creating specific,
categorical, emotion-re- lated patterns of ANS response. If facial
action is conceived as starting neurophysiological states
corresponding to emotions, this presupposes the existence of such
patterns. However, it is difficult to say whether the ANS changes
caused by facial action are emotional. Not all methods of gener-
ating facial actions and of inducing emotions consistently show ANS
pat-
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134 Mclntosh
terns (Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Zajonc
& McIntosh, 1992)
Some theorists may not expect a high degree of consistency,
however. One theory indicates that only facial muscle patterns that
closely match highly specific configurations should induce emotions
(Hager & Ekman, 1981; Levenson et al., 1990). Inexact or
partial replications of emotional expressions should not, thus,
induce the emotion or cause the physiological changes. In Izard's
(1990) scheme, partial activation may cause the feeling state, but
only if other areas of the face are not sending signals for other
emotions. Note, however, that it may be that central processes are
the key to facial feedback effects, even if current categorical
theories of emotions are incorrect; it would simply require some
modification of some CNS theo- ries.
Work on the effects of unilateral muscular contractions is also
based on a CNS connection between facial action and emotion. This
research focuses on the subjective experience of emotion, rather
than physiological changes. Results are consistent with studies of
brain lateralization of emo- tion (Davidson, 1992). Integrating
these methods will provide information on brain functioning in
emotions and on the parameters of CNS-face-emo- tion
connections.
Note that Izard's (1971, 1977) view differs from the purely
central views (Ekman, 1992; Levenson et al., 1990), as peripheral
feedback plays an important role. Izard (1990) notes that
mechanoreceptors in facial skin respond vigorously to facial muscle
movement and are sensitive to the slightest movement. It is this
patterning that provides distinctions among emotions. The next
proposed mechanism also goes beyond purely central mechanisms.
The Vascular Theory of Emotional Efference (I/TEE). Zajonc and
col- leagues (Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992; Zajonc et al., 1989,
1993) present a manner by which affect can be altered via facial
action that does not rely on self-perception, cognitive appraisal,
or activation of hypothesized CNS emotion programs. Brain
temperature is influenced by the cavernous sinus, a venous
configuration that envelops the internal carotid just before the
carotid enters the brain. Air inhaled through the nose cools the
blood of the cavernous sinus during normal breathing. Thus, nasal
breathing cools the brain (Kluger & D'Alecy, 1975). VTEE
assumes that cooling of the brain is hedonically positive (perhaps
due to temperature effects on neuro- chemical processes). Indeed,
direct cooling of the hypothalamus in rats leads to the same
behavior demonstrated by rats receiving pleasurable elec- trical
stimulation (Berridge & Zajonc, 1991).
In humans, there is evidence for the postulated chain of events.
Be- cause facial actions that resemble emotional patterns influence
the amount
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 135
of air inhaled via the nose (Mclntosh et al., in press), they
may have af- fective consequences. Repeatedly voicing//(producing a
scowl) decreases the amount of air individuals inhale through the
nose, leads to increased temperature at specific forehead points (a
measure of brain temperature increase; see Mclntosh et al., in
press for discussion), and generates nega- tive affect (Mclntosh et
al., in press; Zajonc et al., 1989). Direct manipu- lation of
breathing (e.g., pinching the nose shut) alters forehead
temperature and affect (Mclntosh et al., in press), and changing
the tem- perature of air inhaled changes forehead temperature and
affect (Zajonc et al., 1989). This mechanism explains dimensional
effects of facial move- ment only, and does not predict ANS changes
following facial action.
"Darwinian" Mechanisms: Facial Feedback as By-Product
Conditioning. Specific facial expressions may become conditioned
to certain subjective or physiological states. The typical presence
of a smile when one is happy, for example, may cause the smile to
become a classically conditioned stimulus for happiness.
Involuntary expressions are likely to be more strongly connected to
emotional responses than voluntary ones, as the former will more
consistently be tied to the emotion; voluntary expres- sions may be
formed, exaggerated, and suppressed based on social context (Buck,
1980). This view can account for facial effects on subjective expe-
rience and most physiological changes, both dimensional and
categorical effects, and modulation and initiation. Further, it is
also consistent with the differences found in between-subjects vs.
within-subjects tests of the hypothesis (Buck, 1980). Two findings
suggest that conditioning is not the sole explanation for facial
feedback data, however. First, it is not clear using this
explanation why a muscle contraction on the left side of the body
evokes a different subjective state than the same movement on the
right side, given that movements on both sides of the face are
consistently paired with the state. Second, it is difficult to
consider pairing of emotion and expression to be the sole reason
for the newer data supporting categorical effects of facial action
when there is such variable correspondence between expression and
discrete emotions.
Self-Perception. A second approach that predicts emotional
effects of facial action is self-perception theory (Bem, 1967).
From this perspective, the face provides data to the person
regarding what he or she is feeling. Findings for both initiation
and modulation are consistent with this model. Because this model
predicts categorical effects, those results are especially
important (Duclos et al., 1989); previous difficulty in finding
them has caused some to doubt this mechanism (Winton, 1986). The
effects of uni-
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136 Mclntosh
lateral contractions and emotion-analog tasks (e.g., pen
holding) are some- what inconsistent with this theory. For example,
Strack et al. (1988) point out that their findings using oral pen
holding counter a self-perception in- terpretation, because
subjects' attention is drawn away from the face, and the facial
configuration is constrained which should lead to participants dis-
counting its effect.
Dramaturgy. Fridlund (1994) describes a dramaturgical route by
which facial action could lead to altered emotions. People may use
sensations from their faces to assume a role. They then might
recruit memories or images to induce the emotion consistent with
that role. This shares with the self-perception mechanism the idea
of the face as data used by the person, but instead of the
information being related to how one is feeling, it is instead
relevant to how one should be acting. For example using an example
from Laird's (1974) study, when a person is "instructed to move
facial muscles to form a smile at a Ku Klux Klan slide [this
person] is being asked implicitly to take an amused stance toward
them" (Fridlund, 1994, pp. 178-179). If one forms an angry face, it
follows, one will take on an angry role, which may involve acting
angry by making a fist, yelling, and perhaps thinking angry
thoughts.
Note that Fridlund (1994) separates the behavior from the
emotion; "acting" angry is not "is" angry. This may be a
problematic distinction, in that the action may lead to experience,
even if experience incongruent with the socially-expected action is
suggested. In one study, subjects asked under hypnosis to display
one emotion and experience another reported being unable to
experience one incongruent with their expressions (Pasquarelli
& Bull, 1951). Nonetheless, this proposal suggests that
emotional behavior, at least, can be influenced by facial
patterning.
This analysis points to the necessity of understanding the
social context in which the facial action occurs. Unresolved here
are results of conflicting social requests. It would be interesting
to see the facial expressions, sub- jective reports, and ANS
changes in people asked to display anger, yet be sad. How would
role taking influence their responses? What effect would the inner
sadness have on the behavior? What effect would the anger dis- play
have on the felt sadness?
Multiple Causality
These different proposals should not be viewed as mutually
exclusive. The influence of the face on emotions is likely multiply
determined. No single proposed mechanism easily accounts for the
variety of findings. For example, VTEE does not address asymmetry
in brain activity associated
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 137
with certain smiles, but does uniquely predict differences in
temperature and breathing associated with affective changes (see
Mclntosh et al., in press). Part of the confusion in the literature
is probably due to different mechanisms contributing differentially
to varying findings. There may be different mechanisms for
categorical vs. dimensional effects, for physiologi- cal vs.
subjective effects, and for the combinations of these. For example,
perhaps only certain highly precise facial patterns activate the
CNS mecha- nisms producing categorical physiological effects, yet
less exact emotion- analogous configurations cause changes in
subjective valence due to breathing-related temperature changes
(VTEE). Some mechanisms might be more powerful, or more general
than others. Possibly the primary cause varies by emotion, with
disgust expressions inducing associated feelings via activation of
a central emotions program, and smiles creating positive feel- ings
due to classical conditioning, for example. Further investigation
into all the proposed mechanisms is necessary, as is careful
consideration of which effects are connected with which methods and
outcomes. Learning more about the mechanisms of facial feedback
will help us to understand emotions processes, point to influences
on emotions (including sources of individual differences), and will
assist in considering any applications of the effect. However, for
some purposes, the specific mechanism is not highly important if
the effect is large enough (Capella, 1993; Izard, 1990). Even if
the influence of the face is due to classical conditioning or role
playing, the effect exists.
IMPLICATIONS OF FACIAL EFFECTS ON EMOTION
Implications for Emotions Theories
Much of the drive in investigating facial feedback comes from
those in the Jamesian camp who view it as an integral factor in
human emotional processes. The findings regarding correspondence
are important here, as they demonstrate that the face is associated
with emotion, not just social communication. Indeed, this may be
all that is needed for the data to be consistent with some theories
(see Tomkins, 1962, 1981).
The evidence in support of the modulation hypothesis is quite
impor- tant to several emotions theories, specifically that of
Izard (1977, p. 64), in which facial expression can modulate
experience only when the expres- sion is "sufficiently veridical."
These results thus maintain the plausibility of Izard's theory. The
CNS theories also remain plausible, especially as the evidence for
the initiation function grows. The work supporting categorical
effects is especially important, as these are predicted by these
theories. As
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138 Mclntosh
these findings are historically weaker and more controversial,
further work should address clearly the existence of categorical
effects. As our knowl- edge of neuropsychological processes related
to emotions grows, it is likely the CNS theories will be modified.
Data from the facial feedback studies are useful in that they might
point to neural systems that should be exam- ined for their
emotional function. Given recent advances in neuropsy- ehological
methods, it is an opportune time to do the empirical work necessary
to specify the CNS theories. The ambiguity of ANS specificity may
be less relevant if CNS patterns associated with emotions can be
iso- lated.
Facial feedback findings are also relevant to a central issue in
emotions theories: Is cognition necessary for emotions? Facial
feedback may be an example of noncognitive processes influencing
emotion, but this depends on one's definition of cognition, and on
which mechanisms are responsible for the effect. VTEE may not
require cognition. Some conditioning and CNS theories may require
only the simplest kind, and then only if cognition is defined to
include immediate perceptual knowledge (see Buck, 1980, 1994). The
dramaturgical and self-perception routes may need the complex
information processing of higher-level cognition. The most recent
work (e.g., Mclntosh et al., in press; Schiff & Lamon, 1989,
Strack et al., 1988, Zajonc et al., 1989) casts doubt on the
necessity of cognitive appraisal. Physical processes appear enough
to generate feelings. Just as evidence of more central processes
and cognitive and social influences makes a com- pletely
peripheral/facial theory of emotion untenable, so the facial
feedback data makes a completely cognitive theory less plausible
(Berkowitz & Devine, 1995).
Finally, the work in facial feedback is relevant to the question
of the existence of basic emotions (see Duclos et al., 1986). Work
on the cate- gorical versions of the hypotheses often presumes the
existence of basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992). Evidence regarding
categorical effects should be taken into account in the discussions
about the nature of emotions.
The relevance of these findings for understanding basic
processes of emotions notwithstanding, facial effects on emotion
are more likely impor- tant the larger their effects are. Matsumoto
(1987) reported a small to mod- erate effect size (.343), and both
proponents and critics of the hypotheses consider the results as
consistent with their views. More affirmative studies have been
published since. However, data from modulation studies indicate
that the consequences of facial patterning are much smaller than
the in- fluence of the stimuli (e.g., Kraut, 1982; Laird, 1974;
Lanzetta et al., 1976; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). "Turning
your frown upside-down" may make you feel better than not doing so,
but isn't likely to make you feel happy if your new car has just
been rear-ended. However, when the context
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 139
is less powerful than a car accident, the initiation function of
facial move- ment may play an important role. Once an emotion state
is, even weakly, initiated, memories, appraisals, and behaviors may
be influenced to be con- sistent with this state, and amplify the
original weak state caused by the facial pattern. Below,
implications beyond emotion theories are considered.
Implications for Emotion Regulation
Attention toward how individuals regulate or control their
emotions has increased recently (see Wegner & Pennebaker,
1993). The ability of voluntary facial action to modulate and
initiate emotions indicates that in- dividuals can regulate their
emotions by controlling their facial movements. Athletes who "put
on a game face" of anger, may increase the aggression with which
they perform.
This has both psychological and social applications. Wikan
(1989), for example, describes the role of expression as personal
and social emotion management in North Bali. There is social
pressure to smile during tragedy. Explicit in this practice is the
understanding of expressions as causes of inner feelings. If one is
socially pressured to smile in the aftermath of trauma, it may
decrease the feelings of depression that follow. On the other hand,
being coerced to display one emotion while feeling another creates
conflict (Hochschild, 1983); facial feedback research may shed
light on what occurs in these circumstances. Understanding the
individual and social uses of facial feedback to regulate emotions
has importance for both everyday emotion regulation and
psychotherapy (Gellhorn, 1964; see Izard, 1971, for an extended
discussion). This may be one method, for example, for people to
begin to alter affective responses to certain circumstances.
Implications for Social Processes
One active area of interest in facial feedback is in research on
emo- tional contagion, or socially-induced affect (Hatfield,
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Levenson, in press, Mclntosh,
Druckman, & Zajonc, 1994). This is fitting. Strong early
evidence for facial feedback came from studies of Lan- zetta and
colleagues (e.g., Lanzetta et al., 1976), whose initial work was
based in part on research demonstrating socially-induced affect
among monkeys (see Mclntosh et al., 1994; McHugo & Smith, this
issue). Facial mimicry is one way in which emotions may be socially
shared.
The early data led to exploration of the role of the face in the
vicarious instigation of affect. Vaughan and Lanzetta (1981) found
that participants who amplified their facial responses to the
other's pain showed increased
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140 Mclntosh
EDR and HR compared to those who inhibited facial movement, or
were given no instructions. Vicarious emotional experience appeared
mediated by facial actions of the participant. Combined with the
evidence that people mimic the emotional expressions of others,
facial feedback provides a mechanism for one person's emotions to
influence another's (e.g., Bush et al., 1989; Hatfield et al.,
1994; Mclntosh et al., 1994). Forming one's face, either
automatically or intentionally, into the same pattern as another
per- son's may, via facial feedback, lead to overlap of subjective
or physical emo- tional experience. Dyadic rapport is another
interpersonal process that may rely in part on facial feedback
(Capella, 1993). Mutual mimicry, and resul- tant shared emotions
may smooth social interaction. Rapport and empa- thy-and therefore
facial feedback--are important for a wide variety of normal social
functions (Hatfield et al., 1994; Levenson, in press; Mclntosh et
al., 1994).
Difficulties in such processes may be associated with pathology.
Early problems in mimicking others may be associated with autism,
and may lead to some of the social deficits autistic individuals
experience (Rogers & Pen- nington, 1991). Facial feedback is
involved in this, as, via mimicry, it could provide the subjective
experience of others' emotions that allows normal individuals to
develop understandings of others. Neurological problems with the
somatic feedback system may be associated with sociopathy (Damasio,
1994).
Finally, social context probably influences facial feedback
processes in at least two ways. First, how much individuals
express, and what they ex- press is strongly influenced by who they
are with (Fridlund, 1994); the facial feedback hypotheses suggest
that this will affect the emotions people have in such
circumstances. For example, when subjects are being observed dur-
ing electric shock, their facial movements, self-reported feelings,
and physi- cal arousal are all lower than when alone (Kleck et al.,
1976). Second, social cues are another influence on emotions; when
they are strong they may outweigh effects of facial feedback.
DIRECTIONS AND QUESTIONS
Research has demonstrated that the face can influence emotions.
And, there are a number of potentially important implications of
this phenome- non. However, the area is in need of development and
refinement. One issue for subsequent work is discerning the
circumstances under which the effects are most powerful. First,
overall effect size should be reevaluated, adding the recent
findings to those used in Matsumoto's (1987) metaana- lysis. In
doing this work, the notion of one study, one vote should be
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 141
avoided; certain manipulations, measures, and procedures are
more con- vincing than others. Further, an examination of the
effects for the different hypotheses would be useful. The power of
facial action may vary with in- dividual differences, the facial
manipulation used (muscle-by-muscle, ana- log patterns,
amplification), varying outcomes (memories, ANS, CNS, subjective
experience), and the social context.
Some individual differences have been found relating to
sensitivity to internal cues (Laird, 1984). Katkin (1985), for
example, has found clear individual differences in the ability to
consciously detect heartbeats. People who possess more accurate
autonomic self-perception may be more likely to experience facial
feedback effects--physical cues may be more powerful for them. A
quite consistent finding is that when environmental cues are
minimized, men detect physiological changes more readily than women
(Katkin, 1985; Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992). This suggests that
facial feed- back effects would be more powerful among men than
women, especially to the extent self-perception of somatic cues is
responsible for the effects. Compatible with this is Wissing and
Wessels' (1992) finding that unilateral facial contractions worked
only for men.
However, much research finds effects of facial action in
mixed-gender samples, and Ohira and Kurono (1993) found effects in
a sample of Japa- nese women. Two possibilities are suggested.
First, only some mechanisms may be gender related; work should
attempt to determine if mechanisms of facial feedback differ across
gender. Second, any gender difference may be cultural, and by
implication, so might some facial feedback effects (see Pennebaker
& Roberts, 1992 for discussion of possible causes of the gender
difference). In general, finding individual, gender, and cultural
differences in facial feedback and related effects may help
untangle the mechanisms responsible for the phenomena. If there are
cultural differences, for exam- ple, the mechanisms should be
evaluated with respect to how well they can account for these.
Katkin's (1985) work also suggests a situational effect on
visceral self- perception. Accuracy of heartbeat detection
increases with physically or psychologically-induced arousal. This
suggests that in situations of high arousal, somatic feedback
effects (including facial) may be enhanced.
One potentially relevant difference in manipulation is whether
the fa- cial motion is voluntary or posed. Facial actions are under
dual neurological control. Voluntary and involuntary (or, perhaps,
constructed vs. over- leamed, see Fridlund, 1994) facial actions
involve different neural paths (Matsumoto & Lee, 1993). Izard
(1990) claims that this is one reason why studies in which the
experimenter manipulates participants' faces show lower effect
sizes than those using spontaneous faces. He (Izard, 1981, 1990)
suggests that for voluntary facial movements to elicit or regulate
emo-
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142 Mclntosh
tion strongly, the movements must be congruent with ongoing
cognitive processes.
How different are voluntary and involuntary patterns? Smith,
McHugo, and Lanzetta (1986) demonstrated that the pattern of muscle
activation in posed happiness, anger, and sadness were highly
similar to that generated during imagery of past experiences of the
respective emotions; however, during sadness, muscle activity over
the brow was more evident in the im- agery task than in the posed
expression. Is this difference (and potential ones of similar
magnitude) enough to affect facial feedback effects? Some say so.
Hager and Ekman (1981) indicate that only faces that very closely
match basic emotion patterns will elicit emotions; effects of
precision of expression are discussed by Levenson et al. (1990).
The differences in in- nervation and muscle action between
voluntary and manipulated facial ac- tions may influence the extent
of facial feedback. Future work needs to continue to determine the
degree differences in facial patterns related to this manipulation,
and evaluate whether this difference is significant for facial
feedback effects.
One important direction would be to further link facial feedback
ef- fects with data on more general somatic feedback effects (see
Buck, 1984; Fridlund, 1994). One example of this is Duclos et al.
(1989), who examined both facial and posture feedback. Another is
Schiff and Lamon (1994), who extended their work on unilateral
facial contractions to squeezing a ball in either the right or left
hand. Their findings were parallel with those of the facial
contraction studies reported above. Most of the proposed mecha-
nisms for facial feedback are relevant to postural, and perhaps
vocal feed- back effects, for instance (Hatfield et al., 1994). For
example, can breathing as one does while angry cause feelings of
anger by activating the emotions program also initiated by an angry
facial pattern? Expanding the research more completely to the body
will provide information on both the mecha- nism and the power of
facial feedback effects.
CONCLUSION
Recent evidence bolsters previous work demonstrating that facial
ac- tion corresponds to emotions, and can modulate and initiate
emotional ex- perience. There is still no evidence that facial
action is necessary for emotions. Evidence for categorical effects
has grown. Support for the phe- nomena is not always obtained,
however. This is likely due to causes of facial movement beyond
emotional state (e.g., communicative intent), and to influences on
emotion in addition to facial feedback (e.g., cognitive ap-
praisal). Further, a lack of knowledge regarding the parameters of
feedback
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Facial Feedback Hypotheses 143
processes makes finding the effect more difficult. Future work
may isolate a more constrained process that is more reliable.
A focus on determining the contribution of various mechanisms to
fa- cial feedback effects is necessary. Knowledge of how facial
actions influence emotions will advance understanding of emotions
processes in general, and will clarify the role of the face in
emotional and social domains. Such in- formation will also assist
in defining the parameters within which feedback effects occur.
Determining mediators and moderators of facial feedback will
provide a more solid foundation on which to examine both basic
ques- tions and applications of this phenomenon.
Even if the Jamesian mechanisms (i.e., those that include facial
feed- back as integral to emotional processes) are not supported,
the existence of facial feedback effects has significant
implications. Facial influence on emotions may play a particularly
important role in an array of intrapersonal and interpersonal
dynamics (e.g., emotion regulation and socially-induced affect).
Research on these applications of facial feedback effects should
proceed in parallel to development of investigation of the basic
phenomena.
A quarter-century of rapidly expanding research has laid the
ground- work for exploring complex and difficult questions about
facial feedback processes. To progress, the field must move past
replication of demonstra- tions of such phenomena to focused work
on discerning their mechanisms, parameters, and applications. This
work has started, with several programs of research now addressing
some of these points. There is much more to be done; the next 25
years should be an exciting time to investigate this element of
emotional and social processes.
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