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Contents
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
Series Preface ix
Acknowledgements xii
Notes on Contributors xiii
List of Abbreviations xv
Introduction: Challenges to Energy Security in the Era of
ClimateChange 1
Jonathan Symons
Part I Conceptualising Energy Security in the Era ofClimate
Change
1 Energy Security and Climate Security under Conditions of
theAnthropocene 13Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten
2 Unmasking the Invisible Giant: Energy Efficiency in
thePolitics of Climate and Energy 36Mark Lister
3 National Energy Security in a World Where Use of FossilFuels
Is Constrained 54Hugh Saddler
4 Can Energy Security and Effective Climate Change Policies
BeCompatible? 72Mark Diesendorf
Part II Climate Change and Energy Policy Formulationin
Asia-Pacific
5 Energy and Environmental Challenges in China 91Xu Yi-chong
v
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vi Contents
6 Energy Security and Climate Change Challenges: IndiasDilemma
and Policy Responses 111Tulsi C. Bisht
7 Conflicting Policies: Energy Security and Climate
ChangePolicies in Japan 126Akihiro Sawa
8 Russias Energy Security and Emissions Trends: Synergies
andContradictions 143Anna Korppoo and Thomas Spencer
9 Energy Security in Indonesia 161Budy P. Resosudarmo, Ariana
Alisjahbana & Ditya Agung
Nurdianto
10 Energy Governance and Climate Change: Central AsiasUneasy
Nexus 180Luca Anceschi
11 More Fossil Fuels and Less Carbon Emissions: Australias
PolicyParadox 198Leigh Glover
Part III Multilateral Energy Governance in the Era ofClimate
Change
12 Energy Security and Climate Change Tensions and Synergies
217Peter Christoff
13 Rethinking Energy Security in a Time of Transition 240Jim
Falk
14 Energy Governance in the Era of Climate Change 255Joseph A.
Camilleri
15 Interconnections between Climate and Energy Governance
275Jonathan Symons
Index 292
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1Energy Security and ClimateSecurity under Conditions of
theAnthropoceneMaximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten
All members of the international community face a shareddilemma.
To ensure well being for a growing population with unful-filled
needs and rising expectation we must grow our economies.Should we
fail, we increase the risk of conflict and insecurity.To grow our
economies we must continue to use more energy. Muchof that energy
will be in the form of fossil fuels. But if we use morefossil fuels
we will accelerate climate change, which itself presentsrisks to
the very security we are trying to build.
(United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 2007)
Introduction
This chapter sets out to revisit energy security and climate
security in lightof the Anthropocene. We draw on the notion of the
Anthropocene in orderto ask what it means for conceptions of
security that the environment hasbecome an effect of human agency.
The passage quoted above, which is astatement of the British
Government in the 2007 United Nation SecurityCouncil debate on
climate change and security, provides an ideal startingpoint for
our considerations. The dilemma that stems from the costly
down-sides of the prolonged pursuit of energy security could not be
expressedmore plainly: the term security appears inappropriate in
energy securityas pursuing it threatens its very aim.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has called
atten-tion to aspects of the same endemic danger, such as the
challenge green-house gas emissions from consumption of natural
resources present to theenvironment. But the challenge looms
larger. Jane Lubchenco (1998, p. 491),for one, lucidly points out
that:
As the magnitude of human impacts on the ecological systems of
theplanet becomes apparent, there is increased realization of the
intimate
13
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14 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
connections between these systems and human health, the
economy,social justice, and national security.
Another manifestation of the same dilemma is that the 2010 Gulf
Coast oilspill, which President Barack Obama called the worst
environmental disasterAmerica has ever faced (The White House,
2010), resulted directly from thatnations hunger for affordable
mineral resources. We therefore ask: how is itpossible that the
security of nations depends on oil consumption on the onehand
(Litfin, 2003), while the US President speaks of waging a battle
againstan oil spill that is assaulting our shores and our citizens
on the other? Or,in more general terms, why has energy security
policy caused widespreadinsecurities?
Tackling this dilemma in an insightful way, Simon Dalby (2009)
has hailedthe notion of the Anthropocene as a new paradigm for
global politics. TheAnthropocene, a term imported from earth
sciences, refers to a new geo-logical period in which human actions
have such an impact that we needto fundamentally rethink our
relationship to the environment (Crutzen andStroemer, 2000). Taking
the work surrounding this notion as a starting point,this chapter
offers a contribution to the unfolding debate on energy securityin
an era of climate change, in which the meaning and importance of
thenotion of the environment for contemporary security analysis has
been ofcentral concern (Krause, 2003).
Accepting that the Anthropocene is not only a geological era,
but is also aconcept that carries an urgent normative connotation,
we here explore twoof its implications for our understanding of
energy security. Firstly, rethink-ing energy security in light of
the Anthropocene means we cannot leavethe externalities of its
pursuit out of the picture. Attempts to rethink energysecurity for
the twenty-first century that do not live up to this criterion
areinadequate. Daniel Yergin (2006, p. 69), for instance, proposed
a broadeningof energy security so that it does not stand by itself
but is lodged in the largerrelations amongst nations and how they
interact with one another. Thiswidening does not reach far enough.
Nor can the inclusion of externalitiesbe accomplished by simply
adding the goal of limiting greenhouse gas emis-sions to the
traditional agenda of adequate, reliable, and affordable
energyresources (Verrastro and Sarah Ladislaw, 2007, p 103;
Bradshaw, 2009).
If these were viable solutions, we might ask why so little
progress hasbeen achieved in tackling the double challenge of
energy security and cli-mate change (Deutch, Lauvergeon, and
Prawiraatmadja, 2007, p. 2). An arrayof econometric studies point
to the intricate linkages, trade-offs and possi-ble synergies
between the pursuit of energy security and climate
mitigationpolicies (cf. Turton and Barreto, 2006; Lefvre, 2007;
Brown and Hunting-ton, 2008). Realising that fundamental insecurity
persists despite successfulattainment of energy security leads us
to reconsider the premises uponwhich thinking about security is
based. The first implication then is that
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 15
under the Anthropocene, the factuality of the modern separation
betweenmankind and nature is breaking down to uncover a contested
web ofrelations, not reflected in the confident ontology
underpinning energysecurity.
Second and related, we need to take one step beyond discursive
under-standings of (energy) security. To conceptualise security as
discourse and,subsequently, energy security as a discursive
political agenda, is to adopt thelanguage of radical constructivism
and to treat energy and climate secu-rity as merely socially
constructed. This comfortably removes from sightthe many
externalities of their pursuit. Instead, an adequate conception
ofenergy security needs to incorporate the material processes by
which weattain that security, and to conceptualise climate concerns
as a reality atthe intersection of its physical and social history
(Byrne and Glover, 2005,p. 6). The second implication of taking the
Anthropocene seriously is thatwe must methodically treat security
not as merely socially constructed butrather as also built up from
and threatened by the very material ele-ments that are mobilised
and assembled in its pursuit. Taken together, thesetwo implications
mark a shift in the way in which the relationship betweennature and
human society conditions our understanding of security.
Outline of the chapter
In the following section, we first show how different scholars
in debatessurrounding security and the environment agree that our
notion of securityneeds to be rethought, as existing
conceptualisations, based on a traditionalmeaning of national
security, have proven of limited use in responding toenvironmental
concerns,1 to subsequently lay out what it would mean torethink
security in light of the Anthropocene.
The third section explores ways to incorporate energy securitys
external-ities into the analysis. It does so by building on
insights from the abovetheoretical debate while adding a conceptual
twist. From an actor-networktheory inspired perspective, we argue
that rethinking energy security inlight of the Anthropocene
requires first rethinking the relationship betweenpolitical
discourses on security and nature. We propose that taking
theAnthropocene condition seriously requires us to move beyond the
discursiveturn to consider energy security as an assemblage,
constituted by and depen-dent on both social and material elements,
and which in turn directlyimpacts upon both rather than being a
social construct divorced fromnature. The section continues to
analyse energy security and those agendasconcerned with its
externalities environmental and climate security asdifferent ways
of assembling the same elements from the biosphere. Show-ing how
these agendas constitute agencies by pushing and pulling the
sameelements reveals the interwovenness of, and feedback loops
between, socialand natural elements that are hidden by discursive
representations of theseagendas. Through examples, it shows how
alternate renderings of climate
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16 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
security have tended to assemble the climate as a security issue
in ways verysimilar to energy security agendas.
In the conclusion to this chapter, we argue that by considering
these alter-nate agendas as political agencies working on the same
elements in differentways, it becomes possible to pin down the
shortcomings of energy security.We identify a series of focal
points that must be addressed if the debate is tomove further, and
argue that the principles of inclusiveness and symmetrywould enable
us to unsettle our narrow understanding of security and createspace
for a broader range of concerns.
Conceptualising Security in the Anthropocene Era
Within critical security studies, security is understood as an
essentially con-tested concept. This entails recognition that
invoking security involvesspecific actors uttering speech acts that
reveal conflicting interests, and sub-sequently, that security
cannot be feasibly reduced to any single perspective.Security has
thus come to be understood as a way of speaking about
politicalissues; securitisation refers to the discursive process by
which an issue is ele-vated from normal politics and constituted as
a priority issue that warrantsextraordinary policies (Wver, 1995;
Huysmans, 2006). In this understand-ing, security is more socially
constructed than objectively determined(Barnett, 2001b, p. 2).
Whereas this approach accounts for the contested andshifting nature
of security, it also delinks discursive security from an
objec-tively determined realm to which nature belongs. Recognising
security ascontested and partial reveals that any such agenda
involves a contentiousarticulation of the relation between nature
and security; an articulationdeveloped by someone, for someone and
for some purpose (Buzan, Wver,and Wilde, 1998; Stern, 2005). Asking
who this agenda serves, instead ofaccepting energy security as a
universally shared goal, denaturalises the linkbetween energy
consumption and security.
Energy security: Securitising national consumption
Energy security is commonly understood as a political agenda
concernedwith governance of energy production and consumption in
service ofnational economies. Securitising an issue like energy
provision takes it out ofthe domain of normal politics and
constitutes it as an exceptional concern.Importantly, the elevation
of one particular kind of concern as a securityissue reduces the
broader environment to a slim object of political disagree-ment and
silences it as a concern. Consequently, the imposed
relationshipbetween nature and security is quintessentially biased
towards concernsstemming from a national interest, conflicting not
only with other nationalinterests but also with security
conceptions foregrounding subnational orglobal interests (cf.
Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz, 2007). Firmly rooted in therealist
framework that perceives the world beyond ones national borders
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 17
as anarchic and relations with other states as antagonistic,
energy securityhas been concerned with national referent objects
with pre-given inter-ests. These interests have been taken as
preservation of a fixed supply ofnatural resources to feed a
national economy in a manner that leaves ecol-ogy unproblematised.
With energy security successfully securitised, only avery limited
aspect of the relation between human agency and the
naturalenvironment receives political (and analytical)
attention.
Environmental and climate security: Broadening the scope
This narrow understanding of energy security while still in
broad use has come under heavy scrutiny, as is reflected in the
broad debate aboutenvironmental security. Ironically, energy
securitys continued and effectivepurchase has given rise to even
bigger threats to national security such asabrupt climate shifts
(Barnett, 2001a; Dalby, 2002; Liotta, 2005).
Subsequently, these externalities also became securitised
(Floyd, 2008;Trombetta, 2008). Since the mid-1990s, climate
concerns have increasinglyappeared in national security strategies,
framed as threats to national well-being (Dalby, 2009). Recent
efforts by various international institutions toseparate out
climate change into different measurable security issues (Brauchand
Zundel, 2008; Brauch, 2009) can also be seen as applications of the
sameprinciple, in which the relationship between mankind and the
environmentis fixed again by securitisation. Environmental security
becomes constructedin terms of technological and modernist
managerial assertions of controlwithin a geopolitical imaginary of
states and territorial entities (Dalby, 2002,p. 146). Again,
successful securitisations of particular aspects of the
relation-ship between human agency and the natural environment
constitute thelatter as a limited, stable and apprehensible object
in service of or threat-ening the former. In this process, the
reverse dynamic by which humanagency affects the natural
environment is by and large discarded.
Alternate securitisations such as environmental or climate
security, despitesome differences (Brzoska, 2009), are based on,
and ultimately lead to, thesame kind of reductionism as the energy
security agenda. This reductionismis made evident by the lack of
clear evidence for a straightforward path-way between environmental
change and conflict, for linkage between fossilresources and
interstate wars, or between climate change and societal col-lapse,
despite almost 30 years of research (Mcab and Bailey, 2007;
Dalby,2009). We thus witness the same principle at work both in
energy securityand in alternate securitisations that challenge it
by incorporating more mat-ters of concern. Both energy security and
climate security are thus contestedsecuritisations, each with a
limited and conflicting scope of matters of con-cern. To explore
why Anthropogenic insecurity persists despite the effortsmobilised
and concerns addressed by these agendas, we need to uncoverwhat
these dominant securitisations of energy and climate change
share.
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18 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
Nature black-boxed
The different agendas energy security, environmental security
and cli-mate security all present us with a reductionist account of
the naturalenvironment and how it is related to human agency. All
three agendas arepremised upon a modern, anthropocentric,
ontological separation of natureand society, in which nature is a
black box, a mechanical, factual entitythat requires mastery.2
Society, instead, is more fluid and determines whatcounts as a
matter of concern that requires us to act upon nature in a cer-tain
way. Indeed, it is the concern of a social subject that drives the
shiftingsecuritisations of natural objects. Energy security reduces
nature to a factualamount of barrels of oil per day, which is of
importance to the demands setby a human referent object. While
climate security broadens the concern tothe social repercussions of
this process, it is premised upon the same under-standing and
foregrounds the same social concerns. The content of
bothsecuritisations is social and disembedded from nature, which
merely formsa passive context to be acted upon.
The Anthropocene: Unleashing mankind as a natural force
The anthropocentric understanding underpinning the
aforementioned secu-ritisations is challenged by insights from
climate scientists; foregroundingthe notion of the Anthropocene,
they emphasise not human control over,but human influence on the
environment (Hulme, 2010). Recognising thecentral role of humankind
in geology and ecology since the IndustrialRevolution, Nobel
laureate Paul J. Crutzen proposed to call the period char-acterised
by that influence the Anthropocene. Crutzen and others
havesubsequently advocated a re-embedding of mankind in the
environment asthe point of departure for feasible social science
(Clark and Munn, 1986;Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; cf. Marsh 1874).
They advocate a shift infocus from concerns such as building
pipelines, ever-deeper offshore drilling,the calculation of arable
land for food production and incentivising othernations to reduce
emissions, to shifting climate patterns, rapidly decreas-ing water
resources and the use of the atmosphere as a gigantic
emissionsdump. In other words, when global economic and consumption
dynamicsare considered an agency working upon nature, security
becomes linked todifferent matters of concern.
But ultimately, the challenge goes further: it requires the
reinterpretationof what security means in light of a different
interpretation of moder-nity (cf. Litfin, 2003). Starting with the
Industrial Revolution, mankind hasgained unprecedented control over
nature. Nature became, in the under-standing of the Enlightenment,
a force that can be understood, controlledand domesticated in a
mechanistic way, to serve shifting social interestsover time
(Bauman, 1995).3 Nature was made to behave like a classical
eco-nomic commodity and reduced to a passive factor of production
land.
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 19
Because nature appeared to react in a predictable way to our
interventions,economics, politics and social theory became divorced
from environmentalconsiderations (Barry, 1999; Steffen, 2004).
Yet with increased control came unprecedented influence we,
indeed,now live on a human-dominated planet (Lubchenco, 1998, p.
491). Iron-ically, due to human agency, nature has come to
constitute a severe threatto livelihoods and whole nations, as
illustrated by the small island statesthat are already beginning to
move their citizens to secure lands. Further-more, it is recognised
that global and local feedback loops between natureand human
interventions therein, as well as non-linear irreversible
dynam-ics, could lead to unforeseen disasters eventually
destabilising the globalecosystem (Hansen, 2005; Solomon and
Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-mate Change, 2007). As humans are
rapidly changing global ecologicalsystems often with unpredictable
and threatening results the mod-ernist understanding that a clear
and easily defined difference exists betweenobjective factors and
dynamics of nature and the contingent processes ofsociety is giving
way to numerous continuing border conflicts (Beck, 2002;Tsing,
2005). Adopting these premises, a different picture arises,
consisting ofintricate interwovenness, perpetual feedback loops and
the essential embed-dedness of the human enterprise in nature.
Social scientists have gone asfar as proclaiming the death of
nature in a naturalistic sense, that is, asan adversary to the
social, and replacing it with an ontology of nature as asocial
phenomenon (Jokinen, 1997). In the following section, we
explorewhat it means for our conception of security in the cases of
securitisationsof energy, the environment and the climate, to merge
the ontology of thesocial and the natural into one.
Energy Security, Environmental Security and Climate Securityas
Assemblages
This section draws upon insights from science and technology
studies ingeneral and actor-network theory in particular to provide
an analysis ofhow energy, environmental and climate security can be
understood as dis-tinct assemblages that enrol essentially the same
elements but to differenteffects.4 Securitisations of nature are
understood not as social constructions,but rather as associations
both of social and material elements, involvingpolitical and
economic practices, material flows, infrastructure and ecolog-ical
environments as well as human resistance and narratives of
nationalsecurity.5
Security assemblages that perform and shape the world are here
definedconceptually as networks of elements linked by actors or
programmaticagencies.6 This stance entails methodically moving
beyond the discursivefocus of securitisation. Rather than solely
constituting security discoursesabout some aspect of nature, actors
involve these aspects of nature by actively
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20 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
transforming them to fit a particular agenda (Rose and Miller,
1992; Latour,1993). As such, the contested discourses of energy,
environmental and cli-mate security are hybrid agencies consisting
of a complex blending of socialand biophysical factors (Forsyth,
2001, p. 150) working upon nature indefinite and finite ways
(Latour, 2004, 2005). In order to act upon suchvast assemblages,
all elements have to be translated into a language thatpermits
intervention, by separating out what matters into economically
orpolitically apprehensible concerns. The notion of translation is
pivotal foractor-network theory. It refers to all the negotiations,
intrigues, calculations,acts of persuasion and violence thanks to
which an actor or force takes, orcauses to be conferred on itself,
authority to speak or act on behalf of anotheractor or force
(Callon and Latour, 1992, p. 279). The notion thus
literallycaptures the transformation of elements through the
associations made byactors in a securitisation.
In line with the rich body of work surrounding such thinkers as
Arne Naessand more recently Bruno Latour, who have each in their
own way argued fora notion of the social that incorporates both
nature and mankind as mat-ters of concern (Callon, 1986; Mol, 1998;
Barry, 2001; Barad, 2003; Jasanoff,2005; Asdal, 2008; Bingham and
Hinchliffe, 2008; Morin, 2009; Gammon,2010), we here summarise our
analytical lens as based on the two criteriaof inclusiveness and
symmetry. Inclusiveness refers to the scope and breadthof a notion
of security in terms of the elements assembled as endogenousmatters
of concern rather than as exogenous matters of fact.7 Secondly,
sym-metry is a criterion that implies equal inclusion of both
social and naturalagencies and concerns. Thus, neither a notion of
security focusing primarilyon human concerns (as does energy
security), nor privileging environmentalconcerns (as do radical
variants of deep ecology) will suffice. Directing ourattention
instead to the hybrid agencies that assemble heterogeneous
ele-ments, hopefully avoids the bias that inevitably results in
one-sided researchendeavours and destructive or infeasible policy
agendas, which have helpedto bring about the Anthropocene era in
the first place.
Assembling energy security
Energy security is commonly understood as simply the
availability of suffi-cient supplies at affordable prices, that is,
a variable of national economicgrowth to be secured through
markets, political and, if necessary, militaryaction. By extension,
political and scholarly concern with energy security ispremised on
threats to the smooth functioning of national economies aris-ing
from sharp increases in prices, instability in oil-producing
countries orgeopolitical tensions. As such, hydrocarbon resources
in general, and oil andgas reserves in particular,8 are deemed the
lifeblood of civilization; for thisreason, they are a central
preoccupation of national security agendas (Zweigand Bi, 2005;
Amineh and Houweling, 2007; Marquina Barrio, 2008; Moranand
Russell, 2009).
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 21
While specific national energy security strategies may diverge
as exportand import countries follow diverging interests and
strategic policies appearto compete with market-based approaches,
their similarities by far outweightheir differences. The basic
assumptions have remained constant over time.The standard
contemporary understanding of energy security has not devi-ated
from the canonical definition offered by the US Department of
Energyin 1985 (as cited in Hirsch, 1987, p. 1472):
Energy security means that adequate supplies of energy at
reasonable costare physically available to US consumers from both
domestic and for-eign sources. It means that the nation is less
vulnerable to disruptions inenergy supply and that it is better
prepared to handle them if they shouldoccur.
Ever since Winston Churchill made oil dependence a core concern
of Britishstrategy, energy policies have shared an emphasis on
securing sustainednational energy consumption patterns and a
supply-side focus. The corematter of concern is thus the question
whether there will be sufficientresources to meet the worlds energy
requirements in the decades ahead (Yer-gin, 2006, p. 70).
Politicians commonly invoke the national rationale forthe
inevitable primacy of exploring new oil reserves, as President
Obamas(2010) assertion illustrates:
But the bottom line is this: given our energy needs, in order to
sustain eco-nomic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses
competitive, weregoing to need to harness traditional sources of
fuel even as we ramp upproduction of new sources of renewable,
homegrown energy.
The security community as well as energy companies present
energy secu-rity to their audience neatly cleaned up and seemingly
consisting of onlymarket efficiency and strategic concerns while in
fact it is made up just asmuch of material and other multifarious
elements. It incorporates naturalelements like the resource
endowments of national territories and techni-cal infrastructure
like pipelines or oil tankers as much as it does socialor
discursive ones: a successful securitisation of nature that
foregroundssecure access to energy (rather than for instance
environmental concerns),needs to assemble social actors consisting
of oil companies, US legislators,refineries and platforms, deep sea
drilling technologies, but also geother-mal tendencies, global
consumption habits and the downsides of
alternativetechnologies.
Numerous studies illustrate the multifaceted and continuous
assemblingefforts of different agencies that the pursuit of energy
security requires tokeep the globe-spanning energy security
assemblage in place. US and Chi-nese oil companies work hand in
hand with their respective governments,
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22 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
and, in the case of the United States, with the armed forces, in
orderto explore and extract crude oil (Klare, 2004; Mitchell,
2007). Oil com-panies, however, also must persistently organise the
coupled processes offinancial accumulation and crude oil extraction
to stabilise the world oilmarket. The specific materiality of crude
oil shapes not only the territo-rialisation of global productions
networks but also the internal politicalstructures of rentier
states (Bridge, 2008; Labban, 2008). At a local level, thesame
assemblage requires production, distribution and regulation
regimesacross the globe, which involve multiple disparate issues to
be enrolled andkept in place. Moreover, the car assemblage has
restructured entire land-scapes, has significantly changed urban
planning and architecture as well ascommon patterns of leisure and
work life. Car and oil companies, whichare integral parts of the
energy security assemblage, are also among theeconomically most
powerful global enterprises (Merriman (2009), see alsoUrry,
2007).
It is equally important for our purpose to note what energy
security doesnot incorporate as a matter of concern, namely,
corrupt regimes financedby fossil revenues and plutocratic
dictatorships and corruption in theglobal petroleum sector at large
(McPherson and MacSearraigh, 2007), theresource curse (Collier,
2007), biodiversity surrounding coal mines anddrilling platforms,
the military as a major environmental polluter (Deudney,1999;
McNeil, 2009) and the consequences of energy consumption on
theenvironment all elements impacted by the pursuit of energy
security. Dis-tribution conflicts over oil revenues sustain civil
wars, and can even threatenthe subsistence of states where resource
revenues reignite conflict along eth-nic fault lines, sustaining
the fragmentation of already weak states (Kaldor,Karl and Said,
2007; Watts, 2009).
Another example of how such externalities are actively silenced
out ofthe energy security assemblage by the conscious efforts of
agencies is thatin the United States, the Global Climate Coalition
organised by the fossilindustries successfully undermined a
widening of public and scientific con-cerns on the greenhouse
effect throughout the 1990s (Levy and Egan, 1998,p. 343; Antilla,
2005). Similarly, influential international relation scholars,by
invoking a supposedly established hierarchy of security issues,
activelysilence environmental concerns (Lacey, 2005). Through these
seeminglydisparate assembling agencies, energy security, with its
restricted scope ofconcern, has largely managed to hold these
elements stable as passive mat-ters of fact that react as expected
to interventions stemming from our energydesires and present no
cause for concern. By translating all elements intothe economic
terms of supply and demand, the energy security assem-blage
produces a parsimonious social matter of concern. At the same
time,this translation process silences and hides many elements and
concernsthat respond differently to petro-politics (cf. aliskan and
Callon, 2010).While these social and material effects are very much
linked into thenetwork of elements constituting the energy security
assemblage, they are
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 23
not represented as matters of concern and as such remain largely
invisibleborder conflicts.
Assembling environmental security
Environmental security is qualitatively different from energy
security in sofar as it does not represent a single parsimonious
global assemblage. Instead,it points to the competition between
interest groups that are differentlyaffected by energy production
processes such as mining, drilling or energy-related development
projects (Peluso and Watts, 2001). The many cases ofenvironmental
securitisations thus present us with a more diffuse and con-fused
array of matters of concern, ranging from local and
transnationalcompeting interest groups to wildlife diversity and
the preservation of theGold Coast of California. They dissolve the
rational language of resourcesupply and demand into a wide array of
affected contradicting interests ofhumans, animals and whole
ecosystems. By giving these actors a voice, envi-ronmental
securitisations are assemblages revolving around different
mattersof concern.
The US reactions to the huge underwater oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico inMay 2010 perfectly illustrate how energy and environmental
security are atonce linked and at odds. First, a draft climate bill
which was to encourageoil drilling in US territory was hastily
revised to take the opposing posi-tion (Broder, 2010b). Second,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger halted oilexploration projects along
the Californian Coast stating his most pressingconcerns on
television:
All of you have seen when you turn on the television the
devastation inthe Gulf. And Im sure that they also were assured
that it is safe to drill.I see on TV the birds drenched in oil, the
fishermen out of work, themassive oil spill, oil slick destroying
our precious ecosystem. It will nothappen here in California.
(Rothfeld, 2010)
The sort of environmental security Schwarzenegger evokes here
concernsoil, but it assembles it differently and draws in more
elements than energysecurity does including for instance birds,
fisherman and the ecosystem.Instead of aggregate national concerns,
it brings to the fore many of the con-sequences of oil production
that are otherwise silenced. As such, it exposesmatters of fact
that are silenced by the energy security agenda and makesthem
matters of concern. Whereas the environmental security agenda
isoften treated as a separate concern from the energy security
agenda, thisexample shows how environmental security is literally
attached to the sameassemblage of drilling platforms and submarine
ecologies as energy security an assemblage that is differently
enrolled by invoking environmental con-cerns. To put it
differently, the oilrig off the Gulf Coast, which had
previouslybeen a smooth-functioning technical element in an energy
security assem-blage, was revealed to be an unstable network of
elements that could not
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24 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
simply be transposed to the Californian coast without possibly
unacceptableenvironmental costs.
Where environmental securitisations gain in inclusiveness and
symmetryvis--vis energy securitisations of related assemblages of
elements, they pointto much less straightforward policy agendas.
The notion of security under-pinning environmental security is much
less wedded to the policy-readystate centrism underpinning energy
security. For instance, an environmen-tal securitisation of the
Arctic region extends the perspective from that ofa single state to
that of a hybrid referent object (consisting of biodiver-sity,
indigenous people and mankind through potentially rising sea
levels)threatened by crude oil production, industrial pollution and
rising localtemperatures (Martello, 2008; Kristoffersen and Young,
2010).
Assembling climate security
Climate security involves new programmatic agencies and further
extendsthe range of concerns assembled to include beyond local and
regionaltransformation and pollution of livelihoods long-term
increases in aver-age temperatures, the global interconnectedness
of feedback loops and allkinds of linkages between disparate
components of the biosphere (e.g. Over-peck and Cole, 2006; Lenton
et al., 2008). Since only climate and earthsciences can detect and
visualise the complex and increasingly non-lineardynamics of
fragile global ecosystems that eventually need to be actedupon
(Demeritt, 2001; Hulme, 2009; see also Taylor and Buttel, 1992),
thescientific community represents a central agency assembling
climate secu-rity (Mayer, forthcoming). The assembled elements are
translated into thealarming language of abruptness and tipping
points in ecological regimes(Risbey, 2008; see also Cox, 2002;
Pearce, 2006; Fagan, 2008), as for instancehere by US presidential
science adviser John Holdren: Climate scientistsworry about tipping
points thresholds beyond which a small additionalincrease in
average temperature or some associated climate variable resultsin
major changes to the affected system (ScienceDaily, 2010).
Furthermore, competing climate security assemblages refer to
differentreferent objects that have to be secured accordingly. For
instance, whereasclimate scientists warn against very rapid changes
in regional and local eco-logical systems with huge global
environmental repercussions, think-tanksand strategists assemble
the climate flickers as amplifying local conflictsover resources
and societal instability and leading to interstate rivalriesand,
ultimately, anarchy (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Borgerson,
2008;cf. Maas and Tnzler, 2009). Climate security assembled in the
latter wayechoes the environmental determinism of the 1990s and
directly circlesback to the logic of energy security (cf.: Judkins,
Smith, and Keys, 2008;Dalby, 2009). For example, a group of former
US generals recently concludedthat since climate change amplifies
the problem of unstable governments itdemands military
stabilisation operations worldwide. The generals invoke
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 25
the US resource supply as threatened: Political instability also
makes accessto African trade and resources, on which the US is
reliant for both militaryand civilian uses, a riskier proposition
(CNA, 2007, p. 20).
In the Arctic, where rapid temperature increase has surpassed
even recentscientific predictions (Leichenko and OBrien, 2008, pp.
91103), state agen-cies have started to react to rapid physical
changes and enrolled them asthreats to sovereignty and economic
interests. Studies show that the sea iceover the North Pole might
vanish completely within the next 30 years (Hol-land, Bitz, and
Tremblay, 2006; Wang and Overland, 2009), which in turnrenders
existing assemblages of state practices unstable. Climate change
isthus forcing the state system to confront its accepted
suppositions aboutthe relationship amongst land, state, territory,
and nation (Gerhardt et al.,2010, p. 999).
The rapid sea ice melting is enabling gas and oil exploration
and openingup the Northwest Passage as a major new shipping route
for world trade.Reacting to the exposure of multiple undetermined
border demarcations,the Canadian government is rapidly extending
its military presence at theAmerican continents northern rim in
order to control the Northwest Passageand to assert its sovereignty
claims (Byers, 2009). When Canadas ForeignAffairs Minister Lawrence
Cannon labels his country an Arctic superpower,he is mainly
referring to the abundant fossil reserves in the Arctic that
wouldmake Canada another Energy Superpower (Boswell, 2009).
On the opposite side of the Arctic ocean, Russias government
tries tosecure territorial claims and the interests of its national
oil companiesstretching over the whole North Pole by
re-establishing its strategic bearbombers patrol flights and
large-scale military drills (Zysk, 2010). Duringone of Premier
Vladimir V. Putins nature adventures to Franz Josef Landthat
received considerable attention in the Russian mass media, the
Pre-mier enrolled the polar bear, also figuring as national
personification, asan element of the climate security assemblage.
Emphasising at once Rus-sias profound strategic interests in the
Region, the dire consequences of iceshield reduction and sea ice
melting for the animals living conditions, thebear, he declared, is
the real master of the Arctic (Harding, 2010). In August2007,
Russian scientists, claiming the North Pole belongs to Russia,
placed atitanium Russian flag on the North Pole seafloor.
Although nationalist rhetoric abounds, Denmark, Russia and
Canada com-mitted in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration to solve their
territorial disputeswithin the framework of international law.
These nations are now fundinghuge scientific research projects to
map the Arctics continental shelves inpreparation for 2013, when
the United Nations (UN) seabed commission willfinally determine
which country owns the Arctic according to InternationalLaw. As
such, geologists and lawyers, who shall determine which nationsown
the exclusive rights of exploiting the large gas and oil reserves
underthe Arctic seabed (Byers, 2009; Gerhardt et al., 2010), are
drawn into climate
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26 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
security assemblages too. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars, seeing
huge poten-tial in the opening up of new trade routes, proclaim
their nations rightsin the Arctic region. The Chinese state
connects itself with the rapid ecolog-ical changes in the Far North
not only through research teams that makeinroads into the region,
but also via a formidable flotilla of new icebreakers(Jakobson,
2010; McLeary, 2010).
Other assembling agencies are also active. In contrast to these
competi-tive regional postures, the diplomatic context of the
ongoing internationalclimate negotiations does not primarily enrol
climate change as a threatto national sovereignty, territory and
petro-politics. The 2009 CopenhagenAccord that has been signed by
all major world powers, has set a 2-degreebenchmark for
stabilisation of the global average temperature (Broder,2010a).
Here, the stability of the earth system is assembled as the
mainmatter of concern, and ecological change in the Arctic is not
enrolled as asovereignty issue, but as chemical dynamic (methane
emissions) that pushesthe whole earth system over a threshold
(Sample, 2005).
Importantly, as the above examples show, environmental security
andclimate concerns push and pull the same elements that make up
energysecurity assemblages, albeit in different directions. As
discussed above, anoilrig off the Louisiana coast, while
constructed as an element in securingenergy supplies, can also be
mobilised as part of an environmental securityassemblage; and
climate concerns can be mobilised to fortify the militari-sation of
an energy security agenda. Whereas climate security
foregroundshuman and natural concerns more or less on an equal
level and includesmore elements than either energy or environmental
security assemblagesdo, it has proven more difficult to assemble
the political agencies necessaryto implement the agenda of climate
mitigation. By symmetrically includingthe technical and natural
elements and the social concerns assembled underthe headers of the
various agendas in our discussion, it becomes evident howeach
agenda links them differently and to what effect. Beyond mere
securiti-sations, these distinct renderings actively transform the
assembled elementsto different, and competing, effects. What is
also revealed is that the com-peting assembling efforts of energy,
environment and climate securitisationsare often blurred;
overlapping ambiguities are enrolled in varying ways, butthe
strategic agencies of those spearheading an energy security
assemblagealways appear dominant.
Conclusions
This chapter started with a central dilemma of current world
politics: weurgently need to balance the pursuit of energy security
with broader socialand ecological concerns. While various studies
made important inroads ininvestigating the conditions enabling such
a multidimensional balancingact, this chapter has argued that a
tenacious issue remains that existing
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 27
conceptions of security do not accommodate broader environmental
con-cerns. By revisiting the underpinnings of energy security in
light of theproblmatique of the Anthropocene, we argue that it is
only by consideringboth the consumption of hydrocarbon resources
and the consequences oftheir extraction and usage as endogenous
matters of concern that redefini-tions of energy security will
enjoy any success in unsettling unsustainableand treacherous
patterns.
The main theoretical contribution of this chapter lies in
conceptualisingagendas pursuing energy, environmental and climate
security not as socialconstructs but rather as assemblages.
Progressive variants of security stud-ies, including those critical
of the traditional energy security agenda, havetended to treat
security as part of the discursive realm, either as a discourseor
as a securitisation, divorced from both technical problems and
physi-cal reality, thus requiring a different conceptual toolbox.
In doing so, theyrun counter to the central tenet of the
Anthropocene that modern humanagency is currently the biggest
natural force.
Drawing on insights from actor-network theory, this chapter
entails threemain points. Firstly, in conceptualising security as
assemblages embedded inand linked to the very natural objects they
concern, it becomes apparenthow competing programmatic efforts
working upon nature in fact consti-tute it as an object amenable to
intervention. They are not mere discursivenarratives by politically
organised groups of humans about nature, but rathertransformations
of nature. As an effect, as Dalby (2002, p. 194) puts it, wehave
learnt to represent nature as an unproblematic object, knowable
viaclassification and experiment, and above all infinitely
manipulable in theservice of human purpose.
Secondly, actor-network theory allows us to narrate the effects
of com-peting discourses in a distinct way. The concurrent
existence of competingdefinitions of the relationship between
nature and security (that assemblefrom the same heterogeneous
variety of elements but differently) pointsto the jostling inherent
in politics in an inherently unstable world (Cal-lon and Latour,
1992). A move in one node of these vast and complexassemblages
reverberates all over because of the different feedback loopsand
interdependencies between elements: one human intervention
medi-ated by technology impacts on the environment, which in turn
responds,leading to constrained human acts that modify the
assemblages as awhole. By bringing the effects of these assembling
efforts into the pic-ture as matters of concern, the condition of
the Anthropocene becomesapparent. Rather than critically lamenting
capitalist social constructs orabstract but dangerous dominant
discourses, we have shown how assem-blages of energy, environmental
or climate security only persist because ofthe active assembling
efforts of actors and programmatic agencies. High-lighting these
efforts is an essential part of actor-network theory and hasthe
advantage of revealing concretely the specific political agencies
that,
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28 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
geared at sustaining energy security, impact on nature in
complex andvaried ways.
Finally, through the notions of inclusiveness and symmetry, our
approachuncovers the paradoxes of energy security by bringing the
material back intoanalysis of energy security. Inclusiveness brings
to the fore the externalitiessilenced by energy security, and
symmetry shows that material and naturalelements are as much a part
of securitisations of energy as are discursive ele-ments. We were
thus able to shed a different light on the question of howit is
possible that we might successfully attain energy security (e.g.
success-fully securitise the environment in a particular way) and
yet deepen globalinsecurities.
Energy security is the most powerful amongst the securitisations
of naturewe discussed. It forms an assemblage that holds stable
uncountable associa-tions between huge material and financial
flows, and enrols a wide array ofactors and agencies. Neither
environmental nor climate security, which aremostly small and
regional or locally based assemblages, reach the parsimonyand
global scale of energy security. Under its header, the use of
fossil fuels,national political legitimacy and the structure of the
international systemhave become deeply intertwined. By analysing
how the agencies upholdingenergy security assemblages neatly
separate out the relevant concerns con-cerns in a language
consisting of market efficiency and strategic tools, as wellas how
material linkages to such externalities as pollution, climate
changeand other environmental concerns become silenced, it becomes
possible toassess the success of energy security. Energy security,
with its restricted scopeof concern, is anchored in an
anthropocentric myth of limited social con-cerns prevailing over an
extensive natural context that can be filled anddrilled with the
proper technology.
The downside of this immense power is, ironically, the paradox
of theAnthropocene: whereas human impact on ecological systems is
growingquickly, it is at the same time hard to see how society has
increased itscontrol over nature, when in fact converging lines and
fragile complexinterdependencies are laid bare by climate change.
If the multiple forms ofinterwovenness of environment (encompassing
the climate) and humanswere assembled as sharing the status of
matter of concern against whichto measure interventions, energy
security agendas would be less parsimo-nious, but energy
consumption would possibly be better attuned to itsconsequences for
the biosphere.
One of the main difficulties remaining is formulating policy or
creatingprocesses and institutions for the pursuit of balanced
energy and climatesecurity under conditions of the Anthropocene,
that is, when nature isno longer naturalistic, and security no
longer a socio-political construct.Answering this question is
beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet, it becomesclear that
conceptually, nature cannot be held constant as a matter of
fact
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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 29
to be acted upon by humans according to their shifting social
concerns.Instead of this anthropocentric worldview, the reality of
(often differently)assembled referent objects including those
actors that are habituallysilenced as pure facts or others that we
usually isolate from their surround-ing (ecological) systems should
form the starting point when formulatingsecurity matters of
concern. It is only by acknowledging this condition, forinstance
through the methodology of inclusiveness and symmetry, that
onecould begin to conceive of a notion of security that will not
ultimately renderus more insecure.
Notes
1. Susan Strange (1999) already stressed the systematic failure
of the internationalsystem to limit environmental pollution. Simon
Dalby (2002, p. xxiii) asserts that[the] limitations of
international relations thinking are especially acute when mat-ters
of global environmental politics and environmental security are
concerned.Anthony Giddens (2009) links the political economy of
energy security to cli-mate politics, and calls for radical changes
in human interaction with nature toavoid disastrous climate change.
Still others point to the intersection of energysecurity, climate
change, food and water scarcity that places huge pressure on
theinternational security (WBGU, 2007; Lee, 2009).
2. This argument has often been voiced as a (postmodern)
analysis or critique againstmodern social sciences, cf. Latour
(1993, 2004, 2005) and Beck (1995).
3. Also see aliskan and Callon (2009); Hall and Klitgaard
(2006); Latour (1993);Polanyi (2001), for criticisms of the
disembedding of different aspects of societyand the complicity of
different social sciences herein.
4. This section draws heavily on the work of actor-network
theory (ANT) (Callon andLaw, 1982, 1997; Callon, 1986; Latour,
1987, 2005; Law and Callon, 1988; Callonand Latour, 1992; Law,
1991, 1992, 2008; DeLanda, 2006; Law and Mol, 2008). Fora more
in-depth discussion and empirical applications of ANT within
internationalsecurity studies, see Schouten (2010, 2011).
5. Securitisation theory explicitly bases itself on a linguistic
approach called speechact theory deriving from the work of Searle
(1965) and Austin (1962).
6. While the term assemblage is a core ANT term referring both
to a network ofheterogeneous actors (be they material, human,
discursive or natural) and any dis-cursive representation of such a
network (Latour, 2005), the term has also beengaining purchase in
security studies to refer to networks of security actors
cross-cutting public/private, formal/informal and local/global
divides. See Abrahamsenand Williams (2009, 2011) and Schouten
(2010) for a discussion of assemblagesthat links both
approaches.
7. As with much of the discussion in this section, this
distinction between mattersof concern and matters of fact derives
from Latour (2005); any actant or elementcan be assembled as a
black box, that is, a stable building block, or as a
capriciousconcern.
8. Due to the relative abundance and equal distribution, its
material characteristics,and the lack of a global market coal (and
biomass) is rarely a concern of energysecurity.
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30 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene
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Index
actor-network theory, 16, 19, 278adaptation, see climate
changealternative energy, see renewable energyAmu-Darya,
183Anthropocene, 1415, 18, 28, 242anthropocentrism, 3, 18, 20, 27,
28AOSIS (Association of Small Island
States), 225, 234Aral Sea, 191Arctic, 246
territorial disputes, 25ASEAN, 161, 166, 171Ashgabat, 181,
191Asian Development Bank, 189Asian Financial Crisis, 162,
164Asia-Pacific region
definition of, 3Astana, 181, 191Australia
Australian Alliance to Save Energy, 50Australian Greens Party,
207Australian Labor Party, 204, 205, 208,
232Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme,
657, 207, 210, 211Council of Australia Governments,
205emissions targets, 204, 206, 235energy efficiency, 404,
202energy security, 638, 2023energy trade of, 221, 232Energy White
Paper, 44, 46, 59, 201Liberal Party/National Party coalition,
204, 205, 207Ministerial Council on Energy, 65National
Electricity Market, 634National Emissions Trading Taskforce,
206National Energy Security Assessment,
198National Greenhouse Response
Strategy, 206New South Wales GHG Abatement
System, 206
politics of emissions pricing, 5Prime Ministerial Task Group
on
Emissions Trading, 206Renewable Energy Target, 65, 67role in
climate negotiations, 199,
2034, 205, 208, 2323separation of energy security and
climate policy, 65, 203supply-side bias, 446, 199201
Azerbaijan, 191, 192
Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 181, 189Bali Action Plan, 119, 263, 264Bali
Conference, 204, 264, 269BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa,
India,
China), 119, 225behavioural economics, 469Beijing, 92, 97, 104,
105, 107, 109Beluga sturgeon, 193Berdymukhammedov, Gurbanguly
M.,
184biomass, 29n8, 42, 77, 78, 79, 92, 97,
100, 113, 114, 115, 122, 135, 169,171, 172, 289
Bishkek, 181Black Sea, 150Blair, Tony, 207Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 145Bovanenko gas field, 145Brazil
emissions targets, 235Bush Administration (George H.W.), 262Bush
Administration (George W.), 228
California, 9, 23, 24, 43, 78Canada, 8, 22, 133, 134, 205, 220,
223,
230, 232, 235, 237emissions targets, 235security interests,
25
carbon credits (international), 6, 1389and Australia, 66, 69and
Japan, 139, 140
292
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carbon dioxide (CO2)atmospheric concentrations, 734,
244, 2802, 285carbon capture and storage, x, 39,
768, 801, 86, 202, 210, 263climate change and, 2,
261deforestation and, 162, 1634,
173, 175energy production and, 38, 7484, 99,
11819, 131, 149, 152, 264,276, 282
ocean acidification and, 281pricing of, 5, 46, 263, 287, 289
Carter Doctrine, 227Caspian Environmental Programme, 193Caspian
Sea, 4, 191, 1923, 194Central Asia, 8, 150, 151, 18095, 229Central
Asia Power System, 1934Centre for Science and Environment
(CSE), 118China
Assets Supervision and AdministrationCommission, 106
Clean Development Mechanism, 287Communist Party, 105domestic
determinants of climate
policies, 957, 22930emissions targets, 99, 235energy efficiency,
93, 96, 97, 99, 101,
102, 1045, 229, 230energy security, 92, 957, 1002, 107,
108Five Year Plans, 93, 229Medium- to Long-term Energy
Conservation Plan, 93Medium and Long-term Energy
Development Plan (20042020),93
Ministry of Environmental Protection(MEP), 104, 106, 107
Ministry of Finance, 106, 107Ministry of Land and Resources,
106Ministry of Water Resources, 106National Development and
Reform
Commission (NDRC), 101, 106,107
National Energy Administration, 106,107
National Environmental ProtectionAdministration, 106
National Peoples Congress, 106role in climate negotiations,
2245,
227, 229, 2378, 284State Administration of Coal Safety,
106state capacity, 6, 284State Council, 99, 1067State Council
National Energy Leading
Group, 106State Energy Commission, 106State Grid Corporation,
101
Churchill, Winston, 21Clean Development Mechanism, 116,
119, 139, 224, 277, 282, 287clean fossil fuels, see carbon
capture and
storageclimate change
adaptation, ix, 120, 173, 192, 248,2834
as collective action problem, 283developing world mitigation
and
adaptation funding, 116, 119,139, 224, 265, 276, 2867
framing of, 51impacts of, 72, 2434, 281
ice coverage, 258sea level, 258temperature, 258
and justice, 9, 14, 91, 120, 248, 269,276, 288
mitigation, emissions abatement, 5,389, 41, 276, 282
see also climate securityclimate debt, 276climate negotiations,
see UN Climate
Negotiationsclimate policy, linkages to energy
security, 14, 68, 1523, 268, 275climate security, 78, 246,
834,
21819, 2434ClimateWorks Australia, 41coal, x, 2, 7, 22n8, 38,
44, 49, 55, 56, 57,
77, 84, 227, 255, 256, 289in Australia, 634, 67, 68n4,
199201,
224, 232in Central Asia, 183, 184, 185in China, 967, 101in
India, 113, 115, 116in Indonesia, 16870, 173in Japan, 1345, 137
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294 Index
coal continuedpeak coal, 73in Russia, 149, 154, 157in the UK,
59in the United States, 256
Cold War, 128Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), 150, 184Copenhagen Accord, 26, 130, 131, 211,
265, 266, 282Copenhagen COP, see UN climate
negotiations, UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change1992
(UNFCCC)
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, 265,272, 276
Croatia, 145Crutzen, Paul J., 18, 242
Dalby, Simon, 14, 27Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Gulf of
Mexico 2010), 14, 23, 223Dushanbe, 181
economic globalisation, 7, 133, 219, 277,280
electricitydistributed generation, 41, 43, 50, 82,
252fair and secure access to, 289
in Central Asia, 181in China, 923, 101in India, 11314, 121in
Indonesia, 170, 171, 172, 176,
177in Japan, 126, 132in Russia, 154
network infrastructure, 42, 43, 60, 91,93, 108, 151, 162,
2556
energy companiesE.ON, 154Gazprom, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151,
155RAO UES, 146Rosneft, 147RWE, 154
energy efficiency (end use), x, 67,3651, 68
administrative barriers, 47of building sector, 40electric
productivity, 3940
and IEA, 567social acceptability, 467split incentives, 47see
also country entries
energy market liberalisation, 55, 57, 151,2778
in Australia, 648in China, 22930in Indonesia, 164in Russia,
1467, 154, 1567in the United Kingdom, 59, 63
energy security, definition of, 1, 3, 13,1617, 21, 545, 74, 80,
91,2412, 275
and climate negotiations, 21738and climate security, 745,
21819,
2434and demand, 3651differences developed/developing
countries, 91and energy vulnerability, 218and Great Powers
competition, 229,
278and sustainability, 252and water scarcity, 181, 242
energy state, typologyenergy-exporting states, 144, 2202,
226, 2301energy-importing states, 8, 219,
2212, 226energy independent states, 219,
2212, 226energy technology
and history, 2557and politics, 824
environmental externalities, 2, 3, 289see also carbon, social
costs
European Union, 8, 118, 130, 144,151, 153, 181, 262, 264,
265,270n2, 277
emissions targets, 235Energy Charter Treaty, 151
fast neutron reactor, see nuclearenergy
feedback loops, 15, 19, 27, 281Ferguson, Martin, 198, 199550ppm
scenario, 263, 264, 280, 281450ppm scenario, 38, 263, 264, 266,
280, 282
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France, 128, 219, 221, 234emissions targets, 235
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, 12,1267
G-20, 266Pittsburgh summit, 173
G77 in climate negotiations, 225, 230G8 Hokkaido Toyako summit,
129G8 LAquila summit, 130Gandhi, Indira, 117Garnaut, Ross, 207,
248, 280gas, natural, 8, 72, 74, 230, 231, 232, 256
in Australia, 199200in China, 92, 96, 106in India, 11314,
123n1in Indonesia, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171,
172n1in Japan, 126, 133, 137, 138peak supply, 73, 223in Russia,
143, 145, 1467, 148, 149,
1501, 155, 156, 157in Turkmenistan, 180, 1845in Uzbekistan, 182,
185, 189see also LNG
generation IV nuclear reactor, see nuclearenergy
Geneva Declaration, 261geoengineering, 281geothermal energy, see
renewable energyGermany, 148, 221, 231, 234, 245
emissions targets, 235Gillard, Julia, 205, 207Gleneagles Plan of
Action on Climate
Change, Clean Energy andSustainable Development, 57
Global Climate Coalition, 22, see also oilindustry
global energy governance, 2, 245,25573, 276, 282, 28690
Global Environment Facility (GEF), 263global financial crisis,
62, 72, 93, 104,
207, 223, 268greenhouse gases, 72, 240
and agriculture, 72, 245emissions pricing, 5, 46, 263, 287,
289emissions targets, 2246, 2318,
2614, 267in the European Union, 273, 280,
286
and emissions tradingin Australia, 66globally, 224, 277in the
United Kingdom, 63
social cost of emissions, 2, 289see also carbon dioxide,
country
entries, climate change
Hawke, Bob, 204, 205Holocene, 242Howard, John, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208,
232Hu, Jintao, 100hydro electricity, see renewable energy
Ilulissat Declaration, 25India
emissions targets, 119, 235energy efficiency, 116, 120,
122energy security, 11416energy trade of, 113, 114, 116Integrated
Energy Policy (IEP), 111,
112, 11416, 1212Jammu and Kashmir (state), 246National Action
Plan on Climate
Change (NAPCC), 111, 112,11721, 122, 123
National solar mission, 120, 122opposition to binding
emissions
limits, 9, 119Planning Commission, 11213role in climate
negotiations, 11819Rural Electrification Scheme, 121Srinagar
Statement, 246
Indonesiaemissions targets, 176, 235energy efficiency, 161, 166,
172, 175energy security, 1702energy subsidies, 5, 162, 163,
170energy trade, 168, 169, 173, 222forestry, 5, 162, 1634, 175Law
No. 17/2007 on the Long-term
National Development Plan(2005 2025), 170
Law No. 30/2007 on Energy, 161, 162,170
Law No. 5/2010 on the Medium-termNational Development
Plan(20102014), 170
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296 Index
Indonesia continuedMinistry of Energy and Mineral
Resources, 161, 172National Electricity Company, 170Presidential
Decree no 5/2006 on
National Energy Policy, 168, 170role in climate negotiations,
1734
Inel, 154Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 13, 37, 256, 259, 262, 270,271
First Assessment Report, 259, 285Fourth Assessment Report, 38,
117,
224, 244, 259, 280Second Assessment Report, 261
International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), 95, 100, 250
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2, 54,57, 60, 65, 68, 77,
153, 193
and developing countries, 100and energy security, 60, 152, 270,
279establishment of, 7, 556projections of global GHG, 151shared
goals, 56, 578World Energy Outlook, 378, 578, 263
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 118,231, 278
Iran, 78, 144n1, 193, 221, 229, 242emissions targets, 236
Italy, 145, 221, 231, 234emissions targets, 235
Jakarta, 163, 164Japan
Agency for Natural Resources andEnergy under the Ministry
ofEconomy, Trade and Industry, 128
Basic Act on Energy Policy, 129Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),
131,
140emissions reductions, 6, 1301, 137,
138, 140n2emissions targets, 129, 1301, 135,
138, 235energy efficiency, 129, 130, 137, 139,
140energy trade of, 127, 1289, 131, 134,
135Hatoyama, Yukio, 131, 138
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan(LDP), 131, 132
Long-term Energy Supply andDemand Outlook, 129
New Growth Strategy, 130role in climate negotiations, 12930
Java-Bali, 1634Joint Implementation, 156, 224JUSCANNZ-plus
group, 237
Kalimantan, 163Karimov, Islam, 182Kazakhstan, 8, 181, 247
emissions structure, 1889energy legislation, 186, 192flaring,
191hydrocarbon reserves, 180, 182,
183, 184Keating, Paul, 204Kyoto Protocol, 8, 119, 139, 140,
206,
209, 2245, 231, 245, 2603, 285and Australia, 205, 232entry into
force, 260, 261and Japan, 12930, 131and Russia, 143
Kyrgyzstanelectricity, 184emission structure, 1823, 1878energy
insecurity, 181, 185hydropower capacity, 180, 186water issues,
193
LNG, 64, 126, 128, 132, 133LPG, 45, 156, 200Lubchenco, Jane,
13
Major Economies Forum on Energy andClimate (MEF), 266
Malaysia, 163, 189Manua Loa Observatory, 285market failure, 4,
5, 6, 489, 50, 201,
210, 288Medvedev, Dmitri A., 148Mexico
emissions targets, 236Middle East, 78, 282
gas, 133instability, 1278, 133, 223, 233and Japan, 127, 128oil,
1, 229
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minilaterialism, 266, 270MRV (Measurable Reportable
Verifiable
Commitments), 138, 140, 224, 230,286
Nabucco pipeline, 148, 151nature-society relationship,
1819neo-liberal economic policies, 54, 209New South Wales, 43, 68,
206
NSW Owen Inquiry, 43New Zealand, 205, 237, 247Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 115Nord Stream, 231northwest passage, 25Norway
climate leadership, 237nuclear energy, conventional, 73, 75,
81
associated CO2 emissions, 75in China, 92, 93, 100expectations,
250generation III, 75, 81generation IV, 76in India, 113, 114, 115,
121in Japan, 128, 129, 130, 1324, 135,
137, 138and nuclear proliferation, 76popular opposition,
251risks, 84waste, 75, 76
Obama Administration, 14, 21, 228, 284Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets
(UK), 623oil industry, 147, 188Olkiluoto nuclear reactor,
75Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), 55, 250countries, 94, 118, 148, 279and
IEA, 94, 118, 279, 282
Organization of the Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC), 2, 147,
164, 168,203, 211, 219, 230, 270, 278
Papua, 163Papua New Guinea, 163petroleum, 7, 20, 215, 724, 78,
91
in Australia, 56, 64, 200, 211, 218in Central Asia, 182in China,
2, 6, 912elasticity of demand, 223
in India, 113, 116in Indonesia, 161, 162, 163, 16870,
171, 172in Japan, 1278, 133, 134,