I CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY KRAKOW, POLAND FEDERALISM AS FUEL FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT: BELGIUM’S POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES BY COREE BROWN Indeks Number: 1016765 Thesis written under the supervision of dr. Hab. Marek Kucia. submitted January 2008
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Master Thesis- Federalism as Fuel for Ethnic Conflict
MA Thesis entitled: Federalism as Fuel for Ethnic Conflict: Belgium's Political Evolution and Its Consequences. Submitted to Jagiellonian University, January 2009.
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I
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY
KRAKOW, POLAND
FEDERALISM AS FUEL FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT: BELGIUM’S POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
BY COREE BROWN
Indeks Number: 1016765
Thesis written under the supervision of dr. Hab. Marek Kucia.
submitted January 2008
II
TO MY NANA:
YOU ARE ALWAYS IN MY HEART AND MIND,
ENCOURAGING ME TO FOLLOW MY DREAMS
III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK
MY PARENTS FOR CONSTANT SUPPORT, ENCOURAGEMENT AND GROCERY
MONEY,
THE PEOPLE OF PEPINSTER, BELGIUM FOR SPARKING AN INTEREST,
RTBF FOR KEEPING IT INTERESTING,
THE DOCTORS AT DIETLA FOR KEEPING ME ALIVE SO I COULD FINISH,
&
GOSIA, BOBBIE AND HALINA FOR THEIR FRIENDSHIP, ENCOURAGEMENT
AND AN AMAZING YEAR!
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION 2
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 5
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 7
STATEMENT OF THESIS 8
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND THEORY
INTRODUCTION 11
THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 13
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONALIST DEMANDS 15
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS:
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES 24
CONSOCIATIONALISM: FROM PILLARS TO PEOPLE 27
MULTIETHNIC-MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 32
WHEN THE SYSTEM FAILS: SECESSIONISM 42
CONCLUSION: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF BELGIUM 46
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY: THE FEDERALIZATION OF CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION 47
IDENTITY FORMATION UNDER OCCUPATION: 1750-1830 48
STATE FORMATION FROM ABOVE: BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE STATE 53
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 1840-1910 57
DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT: THE 1920S AND 1930S 62
WORLD WAR II: COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE 68
CRISIS AND CHANGE: 1945 TO 1950S 69
ECONOMIC BOOM, ECONOMIC BUST: THE 1960S 72
THE FAILURE OF ACCOMODATION AND THE END OF THE UNITARY STATE: THE 1970S 74
TOWARDS A FEDERALIST BELGIUM: THE 1980S 75
BELGIUM 1993: THE END OR THE BEGINNING? 76
V
CONCLUSION 77
CHAPTER FOUR: ENTRENCHING ETHNIC CONFLICT: BELGIUM’S MOVE TOWARDS
FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT
INTRODUCTION 78
THE FEDERAL REFORM OF 1970: A RELUCTANT MOVE TOWARDS FEDERALISM 80
REFORM OF THE 1980S CONFLICT PREVENTION OR COOPERATION? 85
1989: REFORM UNDER DURESS 87
1993: THE “FINAL” REFORMS 89
2001 AND BEYOND 93
CONCLUSION 94
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYZING THE EFFICACY OF BELGIAN FEDERALISM:
THE MITIGATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
DIFFERENCE
INTRODUCTION 96
CAUSES AND NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BELGIUM 98
FROM CONSOCIATIONALISM TO FEDERALISM: WHAT REMAINS 103
BELGIAN FEDERALISM DEFINED 105
INSTITUTIONS, MECHANISMS AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 108
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 114
DOES A BELGIAN SOCIETY EXIST? 117
THE MOST EUROPEANS OF THE EUROPEANS: BELGIUM IN THE EU 123
THE PROBLEM OF BRUSSELS 128
CHAPTER SIX: THE FUTURE OF THE BELGIAN STATE:
BYE-BYE BELGIUM? DECEMBER 2007 129
WHAT COMES NEXT… 132
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
EST-CE QU’ELLE EXISTE, LA BELGIQUE ?
No, Sire, there is no such thing as a Belgian soul. The fusion of Flemings and Walloons
is not so much to be desired and, if one were to desire it, one would have to admit that it
is not possible
Advisor to the King
The Belgians have a nationality which one can ignore only by repudiating the extensive
evidence of their history and by taking into account none of the numerous
characteristics they still display today
Essay on Belgian Public Opinion 1815-1830
Belgium is a rare nation that is defined by not being two of its neighbors. Within its
borders live, in grumpy co-existence, six million Dutch speakers who are not Dutch, and
four million Francophones who are not French
The Economist
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Introduction
On the thirteenth of December, 2006, the programming of RTBF, the state-
funded network in Francophone Belgium, was interrupted by a shocking special report.
Newscasters announced that the Flemish Parliament, in an overwhelming majority, had
voted to declare its unilateral independence, seceding from the Belgian state. King
Albert II, in protest of the decision, left the country in a “fit of pique,” accompanied by
his wife, Queen Paola. Although his destination was at the outset unknown, it was
eventually revealed that he was heading to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where
inhabitants of the former colony were gathering to welcome him. As the events
unfolded, responses from the multiple federal and regional bodies housed in the small
state and the public came pouring in.
A Flemish parliamentarian in an interview declared it to be a “fantastic day”
which would become a national holiday, a day of Flanders‟ deliverance. Belgium was
declared to be an artificial unit, an “invention of a Liegois journalist.” The secession
was to be followed by referendums on several issues, allowing the Flemish public to
weigh in on several; including approving the prepared constitution, the type of political
system to be adopted, and the selection of the Flemish capital. Political leaders assured
Francophones in Flanders that the Council of Europe‟s statutes on minority rights would
be signed and respected. A parliamentarian from the far-right Vlaams Belang argued,
with somewhat flawed logic considering Flemish nationalism, that the Francophones of
Brussels would support the act, as they are “not Walloons, they are Flemings, Flemings
who speak French” (Dutilleul, 2006).
The Walloon parliament was hastily assembled to formulate its response, while
the President, when interviewed, mentioned that rumors had been circulating for several
days. He attributed the move to radical elements and explained that the consociationalist
system had collapsed because the Francophones and Flemings had very different views
on Belgian federalism. While the Flemish community pushed for the division of the
social security system, Francophones were content with the status quo. They had no
demands, and therefore no bargaining power. The mayors of Brussels-based Front
Démocratique des Francophones argued that this unilateral action must be resisted.
The President of the Germanic community explained that the small region would
face several options for its future in the coming weeks. It could become an independent
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microstate, seek incorporation into Luxembourg or Germany or remain with Wallonia,
which at the point of secession oversaw its regional governance.
The traffic around Brussels was at a standstill as people rushed towards the
Belgian capital in confusion. A growing mass gathered around the Royal Palace,
holding the Belgian flag, shouting “Vive le roi” and singing La Brabançonne in both
Flemish and French. Manifestations in Anvers, the stronghold of Flemish nationalism,
erupted in celebration of the declaration, which would allow them to “make their own
choices in solidarity with his neighbors” and a gentleman burst into hastily improvised
song of the Basques, Catalans, Occitans and Alsatians who would follow in their
footsteps. Viewers were advised to stay home in order to avoid provoking violence.
Forty-five minutes into the broadcast, an announcement was made, explaining
this reportage was a farce, designed to spark debate over the nature and fate of the
Belgian state. The broadcast, featuring well-known politicians from across the political
and linguistic spectrum and familiar reporters, gave little cause for viewers to doubt its
veracity. The emission began with the statement “this is perhaps not fictional” and the
same ambiguous message appeared throughout the emission. After this announcement,
the broadcast continued; reporters, Belgian politicians and European officials weighed
in on the international and domestic ramifications and practicalities should such a
division occur.
The political and social debate that followed the broadcast indicated that all was
not well in the land of beer and chocolate. The so-called “docu-fiction” sparked outrage
amongst French and Flemish-speakers and was so convincing that some diplomats in
Brussels called their home states in confusion.
Inspired by Orson Welles‟ War of the Worlds and touted as an attempt to draw
attention to the state of Belgium, a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic federation, the
controversial programming succeeded in its objective. RTBF and the producer of the so-
called “mocumentary” Phillipe Dutilleul faced intense criticism from Walloons, the
King and the federal government. Flemish nationalists expressed their appreciation
citing it as evidence of the artificial nature and precarious position of the Belgian state.
Dutilleul defined the project as “science fiction derived from a probable reality”
(Dutilleul, 2006 p. 187). The fact that the belief in the veracity of the newscast was so
widespread calls attention to the fact that the future dissolution of the Belgian state is
not an absurd or unthinkable concept for Belgians.
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Belgium‟s delicate internal composition was exposed and debated in the
international press, an unfamiliar experience for the nation known primarily for its beer,
chocolate and commitment to European integration.
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Historical Context
Some have described Belgium as an artificial state, a result of the machinations
of the great powers in the 1830s. At its origins, Belgium was dominated by Francophone
elites who attempted to forge a common Belgian identity with a distinctly French flavor.
The power of Wallonia was bolstered by early industrialization, while Flanders
remained relatively underdeveloped and largely agrarian. Religious and ideological
cleavages combined with linguistic issues to prevent a strong sense of national identity
from taking root. As Flanders developed, an intellectual class worked to develop a
Flemish body of literature and standardize the language. Linguistic laws passed in the
late nineteenth century ranked Flemish on par with French, in theory if not in practice.
Ethnic conflict was exacerbated by the First World War over the treatment of
Flemish-speaking soldiers in the Francophone dominated corps and of instances of
collaboration by some Flemish nationalists with the German occupiers. While Flemings
were afforded some linguistic rights and enhanced participation in government as a
result of the crisis, the Second World War would divide the country further. Extremists
on both sides of the linguistic divide participated with the Nazi occupiers and following
the war, divisive battles about the role of the king, religion and the fate of
collaborationists were waged. The question of the king would become especially bitter,
resulting in the only violent ethnic conflict Belgium has ever seen, with three people
killed in protests and rioting.
The postwar period marked a dramatic shift in economic and demographic
power. Flanders began to welcome foreign investment, channeling it into developing
modern and lucrative enterprises, while Wallonia‟s traditional mining sector fell into
decay. At the same time, a new breed of Flemish elites, well-versed in Flemish language
and nationalism, came to the forefront of politics, giving the Flemish movement a voice.
Finally, in the 1960s, the country was partitioned along linguistic lines, which
were to be permanent, allowing politicians on both sides to mobilize territorially.
Ethnoregional parties emerged in Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders, challenging the
traditional parties and advocating Belgium‟s federalization. In order to cope with these
demands, Liberals, Catholics and Socialists split according to their linguistic affiliation
and adopted regionalist goals. In 1970, the first step towards federalization was made.
This process would continue for more than twenty years until Belgium was declared a
federal state in 1993. At present, many politicians continue to press for further
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devolution of competences, although their original demands have been fulfilled and
even exceeded, lending credence to the theory adopted here that federalism has
perpetuated and even stimulated centrifugal forces.
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Research Questions
Throughout the text, we will explore the theoretical framework, historical
context and political situation against which ethnic conflict in Belgium occurs. It is our
goal to answer the following questions:
What is the nature of Belgium‟s political system?
How does this system, with its consociationalist and federalist aspects, serve to
minimize or perpetuate conflict?
What is the role of parties and party elites within this system?
How does Belgian society as a whole act within this system?
What influence does the far right on both sides of the linguistic divide have on
political currents?
What is the role of the European Union in Belgian‟s experience with ethnic
conflict?
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Statement of Thesis
In 1993, Belgium formally became a federal state, essentially fulfilling demands
that originated in the interwar period by both Flemings and Walloons. Despite the
devolution of many competences to the regional and community level, issues continue
to plague the political scene and many more competences have been devolved, at very
high costs for the federalist apparatus.
This, I argue, is a result of the unique nature of the Belgian state. From its
origins, elites worked to build a Belgian society. While this was essential for ensuring
stability and cooperation from a society beset by severe social, religious and ideological
cleavages, the paritocracy has become entrenched, leading to charges of corruption and
disillusionment with the existing party system.
As regional conflict intensified in the 1970s, eventually leading to the adoption
of a federalist system, traditional parties adopted the demands once exclusive to the
regional parties in order to retain power. The parties split, and at present, only one small
party, the electorally minor Belgische Unie, Union Belge, competes across linguistic
boundaries. The country‟s parties were divided along linguistic lines in the 1970s and
now, little communication much less collaboration occurs, partly as a result of the
different ideological backgrounds. Flanders advocates free market policies but at the
same time is politically conservative, while Wallonia retains its socialistic leanings,
necessary to procure the funds to prop up failing, aging industries while adopting
socially liberal policies.
Research has shown that despite the predominance of demands for reforms on
the basis of a need for regional autonomy, citizens are becoming actually less attached
to the regions. They are, however, demanding changes in employment, economic and
social policy which political elites must satisfy. It is true that the federal government has
been essentially enfeebled by successive reforms and may lack the political and
economic resources to enact necessary reforms, but it is often not given a chance. The
politicians argue that all problems are better solved at a sub-national level, granting
themselves greater control over political power and resources.
However, regionalist parties persist, advocating further separation and taking on
rightist ideologies, especially in Flanders. As a result, it has become politically
profitable to advocate regional autonomy because of the manner in which the state
attempts to pacify demands and minimize ethnic conflict. This failure of the government
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to respond at any level has led to widespread disillusionment with traditional political
actors. As a result, rightist parties such as the ultranationalist Vlaam Belang have
achieved significant electoral success within Flanders, although it is unclear the
percentage of support generated by ideological agreement or protest votes.
The federalization of the Belgian state is not a unique phenomenon in a larger
European context. Throughout Europe, once centralized states are engaging in some
form of economic or political devolution to appease minorities, improve the
transparency and efficiency of government mechanisms and lend the political process
legitimacy. Belgium‟s move towards federalism actually mirrors the European Union‟s
expansion of competences and deepened integration. Belgium has always defined itself
as intensely pro-European, although some argue that the expansion of Union control
over fiscal and monetary policy, one of the few areas left in the domain of the federal
government, has essentially served to hollow the federal center from above and below.
The European Union, with its seat in Brussels, serves as the glue which holds it all
together, in the eyes of some. However, the European Union, with its attempts to
increase citizen involvement, has expanded operations at the regional level. Belgium,
already highly integrated by necessity into international markets, has pushed for further
integration. The division of Belgium into small states of Flanders and Wallonia seems
increasingly economically and politically feasible.
Belgium seems to be held together only by a few factors but even these provoke
disputes. The monarchy, represented by King Albert, has historically been a rallying
point for Belgians but has, since the postwar period, been a source of communitarian
strife. While Flanders once overwhelmingly supported the king in the controversy after
the First World War, many now criticize King Albert for his apparently pro-
Francophone views.
Brussels, an area of contention, is often ignored in order to prevent the total
failure of negotiations remaining a sticking point, with neither side willing to cede this
largely Francophone city in Flemish territory. Could Brussels become a UN protectorate
or a European city? Only the future will tell, but refusing to address the contentious
nature of Brussels may be the only way to hold the Belgian state together.
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CHAPTER TWO
ETHNIC CONFLICT, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
LITERATURE AND THEORY
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French
Navarre to be a member of the French nationality than to sulk on his own rocks, the
half-savage relic of past times.
John Stuart Mill
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Introduction
The field of state-based ethnic conflict studies has remained relatively limited.
Scholars have resisted its study, believing it to be a transient phenomenon. Despite the
claims of scholars in the postwar world, ethnic conflict within multiethnic societies is
not an aberration, an unexpected bump in the road to modernity and post-nationalism.
The predicted homogenization of nation-states has yet to transpire.
As we have seen, the rapid changes spurred by globalization have perhaps
provoked more ethnic and national identification, as people naturally cling to what is
familiar, feeling lost in a world where nation, creed or village are supposed to be
meaningless. As Western Europe integrated, forming a new post-national entity which
successfully incorporated groups once divided by bitter hatred and centuries of conflict,
much of South-Eastern Europe crumbled into disorder and internal strife. It is for that
reason that state-based ethnic conflict is increasingly relevant and perhaps dangerously
neglected.
For our purposes, it is necessary to adopt a slightly more restrictive view towards
the causes and theories of ethnic conflict. We must focus on conflict which takes place
in the developed world, especially integrated Europe, which has eliminated or assuaged
ancient grievances between states while having a very limited role in internal affairs,
beyond assuring the accordance of minority rights. The resurgence of nationalism in
Europe may be particularly odd for social scientists in Europe, seeming "at odds with
the construction of a new and wider political order, often referred to a supranational,
which is seen as the culmination of the very trend to functional integration that is
credited with producing the nation-state" (Keating, 2004 p. 1).
It is interesting to note that state-based ethnic conflict, in the form of regional
autonomy movements and ethnic mobilization, has actually intensified as the grand
European project has progressed. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that borders
dictated by the decisions of great powers and bloody wars throughout the centuries do
not always correspond with ethnic distributions and political realities. Some have also
argued that the nation-state is being weakened from above and below by the advent of
multi-level governance. We will examine the causes of this resurgence and the European
Union‟s role in its management.
Realizing the need to protect the rights of cultural minorities while sustaining the
central state, governments throughout the world and especially in Europe have adopted
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cultural protections. Some have done so on their own, others when mandated by larger
regional bodies, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union. In some cases,
the official recognition and protection of a distinct culture, language or religion has been
sufficient. However when it is not, power-sharing schemes, non-majoritarian in nature
have been designed to ensure representation and appease ethnic demands, especially
when these groups are politically mobilized or territorially based. Consociationalist
theories attracted attention in the 1960s when Dutch political scientists Arend Lijphart
proposed his theories of consociationalism as a means of mitigating conflict in
multiethnic societies.
Consociationalism relies on the existence of several pillars of society, whether
ethnic, religious or ideological. Federalism, typically identified with the German and
American systems, is another device for ethnic conflict management, useful only when
competing ethnic groups are territorially based. States often turn to federalism to
moderate these interests, as has India, Russia, Switzerland and Spain. This allows an
ethnic group some autonomous control over their territories. (Esman, 1994 p. 2). This
work will examine the causes and persistence of state-based ethnic conflict and
institutional strategies designed to manage it. It is important to remember that non-
majoritarian power-sharing strategies, including federalism or consociationalism, are not
designed to cure ethnic conflict or do away with ethnic identities, but to manage them in
a peaceful way, ensuring the survival of the state in question and the respect for rights of
its inhabitants. Both models rely on the presence of forward-thinking elites and both,
despite their merits and relative success in preventing violence in the Western countries
in which they are employed, have generated charges of elitism and democratic
deficiency, leading to political crises.
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The State of the Science
It was a common belief that economic development, urbanization and literacy
would create greater social and technological links between once feuding peoples,
serving to strengthen loyalties to the existing state and later to post-national bodies, such
as the European communities. (Gurr, 1994 p. 78). In Donald Horowitz's opinion, the
inattention of the social sciences to issues of ethnic conflict arose out a desire to relegate
this tribalism “to the dustbins of history.” He writes that this belief made it "easy to
perceive ethnic allegiances as purely vestigial affiliations, survivals of a traditionalism
whose lack of contemporary utility would be made apparent by the onslaught of modern
forces" (1985 p. 97). Despite these predictions, the postwar world has not seen a
decrease in nationalism and ethnic conflict. Very few societies (only 10% according to
Esman) possess the homogeneity required to ensure peace and in all societies, traditional
and modern ethnic groups have mobilized, at least at some level, politically. (1994 p. 2).
Neither the experience of prolonged prosperity, the decreasing salience of many
non-economic cleavages, the active intervention of the state, nor the irresistible
march of modernization significantly undermined traditional patterns of
majority-minority group conflict.
Fraga et al 1992 p. 5.
In fact, some scholars argue that the very process of modernization, which was viewed
as a antidote to primordialism, has in fact exacerbated existing problems as
“modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarities that prompts minorities to mobilize in
defense of their culture and way of life”(Gurr, 1994 p. 78).
The study of ethno nationalism evolved as the need to understand virulent ethnic
conflict became apparent in both European societies and abroad. In the 1950s and
1960s, models were developed to integrate multiethnic societies through peaceful and
non-majoritarian means, models which were intended to eventually lead to the
integration of ethnic groups. However, faced with nationalist success in Flanders,
Quebec and Scotland in the 1970s and 1980s, new fields addressing the political
mobilization of ethnic groups “ethno nationalism,” “minority nationalism” and “micro-
nationalism” emerged. As autonomists largely failed to achieve their stated goal of
independence, the studies sought to address their failure. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia and the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia allowed scholars
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to hone their skills. (Sorens, 2005 p. 304). Minahan identifies this as the third wave of
modern nationalism:
The nationalist revival, global in scope, has strengthened submerged national,
ethnic, and regional identities and has shattered the conviction that assimilation
would eventually homogenize the existing nation-states. The nationalist revival
is now feeding on itself, as the freedom won by many historically stateless
nations has emboldened other national groups to demand greater control of their
own destinies.
2002 p. xxii.
As ethnic conflict persists, both in the developing and developed world, more study is
necessary. Rather than focusing solely on the causes and manifestations of ethnic
conflict, scholars must look at successful techniques applied in countries with
territorially based ethnic groups which remain peaceful, such as Switzerland. The
European Union, which up until this point, has kept remarkably silent on cases of ethnic
conflict within its member states, may either foster or minimize ethnic conflict
depending on its approach.
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The European Union and Regionalist Demands
Hollowing from Above and Below
In a Europe where there is no majority, all nations are in a sense 'minorities', allowing
those who are minorities within their own states to project their concerns as part of a
wider issue'
Keating 2004 p. 137.
Introduction
Globalization and the regional integration that accompanies it have served to
undermine the nation-state.
The rapidly changing political and economic realities have swept aside the old
arguments that population size, geographic location, and economic viability are
deterrents to national self-determination. The revival of nationalism is
converging with the emergence of continental political and economic units
theoretically able to accommodate ever smaller national units within overarching
political, economic, and security frameworks
Minahan, 2002 p. xxi-xxii.
While the traditional state does remain the primary actor on the international stage, its
sovereignty is increasingly limited by its international obligations. International
organizations such as NATO have shown themselves willing to intervene in domestic
policy when it contravenes basic principles of human rights while regional bodies are
becoming increasingly influential in both economic and social affairs. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the European Union, which has become a significant source of
domestic policy and has expanded its competences far further than originally envisaged.
While many discount the role of the European Union in the rise of regional
autonomy (citing the minimal direct influence of Committee of the Regions on EU
policy and the persistence of the nation state as both the subject and the actor in of the
Union), the psychological impact of the Union which seems to make the nation state
superfluous in regards to its traditional functions (economic regulation, security) is
profound. The integration of a small region or a potential “microstate” into a larger
market independent of the traditional state is possible for the first time. To profit from
this certain regions have gone so far as to engage in international relations which were
once the exclusive and fiercely guarded domain of the nation-state. In addition, the
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Union, with its emphasis on rights for minorities and the peaceful mediation of conflict
is likely to be a moderating influence.
Regionalist Trends within the European Union
While globalization has weakened the nation-state, the predicted “death of
nationalism” has not occurred. Many European states are engaging in regional
decentralization to better cope with economic and social demands, although the extent
of this process depends on the nature of the regions themselves. Keating identifies
several characteristics of contemporary regionalism within Europe
• Regions become economic units in their own right;
• Regional identity strengthens;
• Regional institutions are established to deal with social, economic and political
issues;
• Regions seek investment from abroad;
• New development coalitions of public and private actors emerge at the regional
level;
• Inter-regional co-operation increases at international and European levels.
Keating, 2007 p. 19
While devolution seems to be a general trend in Europe, Keating et al explain that
contemporary moves towards decentralization are a result of different demands, often
reflecting the desire to manage economics while others, such as those in Spain, are
designed to protect local cultures and mitigate ethnic conflict. (2003 p. 21).
European states first engaged in decentralization after World War II, spurred by
the idea that regions rather than central governments could better deal with pressing
issues of economic development. The regions that resulted were not necessarily cultural
or linguistic entities. Some were determined according to their economic development,
designed to promote infrastructural development or investment, rather than a political
consciousness. (Keating, et al 2003 p. 7). Decentralization has occurred to a greater
extent in areas in which the territorial units are made up of national, linguistic or
religious communities, like in Belgium, than those which are units based on
administrative divisions or economic disparities, such as in Italy. (Kymlicka, 1998 p.
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130). Political nationalism was often unexpected, largely believed to be relegated to
Horowitz‟s dustbin of history.
As decentralization occurs, economic and ethnic regions have attempted to
project their interests on an international stage. Both Catalonia and Flanders engage in
what Keating terms “paradiplomacy”, promoting themselves as regions ripe for foreign
direct investment, with both the infrastructure and educated workforce to meet the needs
of foreign corporations. (Keating, 2004 p. 156). At the same time, they engage in
cultural nationalism, working to promote and preserve their language and culture.
Politically mobilized regions with the competences to do so set up missions to European
and international institutions to promote awareness and protect their interests. However,
international law rarely grants these missions standing in the institutions in which they
wish to take part.
The Regional Autonomists’ Vision of Europe
Europeanization is a popular theme among groups advocating regional autonomy
or outright independence. This is a reaction against prevailing political thought which
viewed regionalism as “backwards and regressive” and as a result, went incognito by
adopting “Europeanist” or “neo-Marxist internal colonialism ideologies” (Keating, et al
2001 p. 7). Despite the widespread pro-European sentiment, some have criticized the
Union for falling short of its goals. A specific vision of Europe is contained within
regionalist manifestos, including those of the Basques, Catalans and Flemish, who each
speak of a Europe of Regions. This vision is opposed to the present Europe of nation-
states, which they view as an artificial construct. While nationalists and autonomists
speak hopefully of a third level within European politics, the Convention on the Future
of Europe and the now defunct constitutional treaty proved a disappointment, doing
little to augment the powers of the Committee of Regions and focusing on the member
state as the primary political actor. (Keating, 2007 p. 17).
While this vision of Europe may be difficult to achieve, one must stress that
within an integrated Europe, ethnoregional mobilization has remained remarkably
peaceful and often manifests itself in political forms, less damaging and dramatic than
violence but no less telling or significant.
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Institutions and Representation
The growing importance of the regions was institutionalized in the Treaty of
Maastricht. Previously, Article 146 EEC restricted representation and voting within the
Council of Ministers to members of national governments. Due to intense lobbying by
both the Belgian regions and the German Lander during the intergovernmental
conference of 1991, the Treaty on the European Union reflected these concerns. (Laffan,
Stubb 2003 p. 78). Article 203 TEU allowed regional ministers to participate in Council
meetings, recognizing the devolution taking part in some countries which deprived the
central governments of competence in certain areas. However, the article stipulated that
each representative must present a unified voice, acting from “the policy position of the
member state as a whole and independent from the constitutional status the member
state representative enjoys domestically” (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1064).
This emphasis on unanimity may in fact promote cooperation. “A domestic
compromise is needed if one wants to achieve anything at the EU level. Regions,
therefore, depend strongly on internal arrangements. (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1064).
This is especially true in the case of Belgium which allows ministers from the relevant
policy area from both the communities and regions to participate in Council meetings
but requires consensus in order to cast a vote. In order to have a voice, the regions and
communities must find compromise. Policies regarding regional representation depend
on the competences vested in them by the nation-state and are not a result of European
Union decision-making. In Germany, one organization represents all Lander and they
are expected to come to a common decision. While the Belgian regions and
communities are expected to come to a consensus, each entity possesses its own
diplomatic corps. (Hooghe, 1995 p. 149).
The nation-state remains the primary actor at the EU-level, despite the principle
of subsidiarity. The states have, according to David Allen, retained control over access
through procedural requirements and may work to manage ethnic conflict and autonomy
through these policies.
It does seem that the effectiveness of sub-national access is determined more by
the nature of the constitutional arrangements in a particular member state than by
the Commission‟s partnership arrangements. In some cases central governments
have been able to strengthen their powers by using Commission procedures to
- 19 -
play one set of sub-national actors off against another, or by joining forces with
sub-national actors to do battle with the Commission
2000 p. 259-260.
Despite these restrictions in the main decision-making bodies, the regions and localities
have an institution in which they can act in an advisory capacity, although its
significance is debated.
With each treaty revision, the role of the Committee of the Regions has been
enhanced although it does not possess binding powers. The Commission and the
Council are obliged to consult the Committee on proposals which will have a regional
and local impact.
Maastricht Amsterdam
Culture Employment policy
Economic and social cohesion Environmental issues
Education Social policy
Health Transport
Trans-European Infrastructure Vocational training
As we will see in the following chapters, each of these policies now falls within the
competences of the regions and communities which together form the Belgian federalist
system.
While the committee is modeled after the powerful German Bundesrat, it is
described by some scholars as “internally divided” by a “debilitating diverse”
membership consisting of both of powerful regional authorities from Germany and
Belgium and representatives of small parishes in England. (Bomber, et al 2003 p. 63).
Because of this asymmetry, a group of stronger regions emerged which felt that the
Committee of Regions should be granted legislative powers, named “Regions with
Legislative Powers,” they
argued for a special status in the new treaty in recognition of their responsibility
in the transmission of European directives and application of European policies.
Neither the CoR nor the Convention, however, was prepared to allow this formal
asymmetry
- 20 -
Keating, 2007 p. 16.
Despite these weaknesses, the Committee may play an important role for socialization,
allowing representatives of politically mobilized regions to cooperate and exchange
ideas although its overall influence remains limited.
The Role of the European Union in Regionalist Conflict
The European Union, like the states which form its membership, has been forced
to divert more attention to the regions in recent years. The idea of regions as
international players in their own right was adopted by academics, governments and the
European Commission, becoming, by the 1990s, "the common currency of regional
political and administrative elites" (Keating, et al 2003 p. 18). According to scholars, the
Union served two important, although perhaps contradictory purposes in regards to
ethnic and nationalist conflict. Primarily, it has served to moderate national demands.
Even the most virulent nationalist seeks integration and acceptance into the larger
European body, although the regionalist conception of Europe may be very different
from the conception of a strong unitary state like France. Cooperation has increased
amongst the regions seeking autonomy or outright independence and the Basques,
Catalans, Flemish and Scots often speak of a Europe of Peoples or Regions rather than a
Europe of states. Keating describes this evolution as nationalism “tamed and
modernized” (2004 p. 137).
While independence within a highly integrated Europe seems for the first time
economically and politically viable, even for the smallest of states, these regions are
unlikely to engage in violence, considering the political consequences of such an action.
(Ghai, 2002 p. 157). "The Union has deeply redefined the notion of sovereignty and
autonomy, and has therefore given new (and less threatening) meanings to regionalism"
(Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 17). Even calls for independence have been
moderated as
nationalists in Wales and in Catalonia have explicitly renounced statehood as a
goal in favor of nation-building in a new form. The Flemish nationalists of the
Volksunie seem content to allow Belgium to continue as long as the region of
Flanders is also strengthened
Keating and McGarry, 2001 p. 9.
- 21 -
Despite this apparent downfall of the state, some minorities remain committed statehood
as the ultimate goal. "Paradoxically, the erosion of the ideology of state nationalism has
stimulated ethnic politics without diminishing the potency of self-determination as a
spur to ethnic activism" (Esman, 1994 p. 5). As the European Union has expanded its
competences, regionalist parties in Belgium, Spain and Scotland have looked at the
organization as a source of support for its ambitions. Majone explains
At a time when it becomes evident that the European state is too small for certain
essential tasks, such as military security and economic management, it also
becomes possible to argue that the nation-state is too large for other purposes.
Hence many regionalists view the movement toward greater European unity and
decentralization of state functions to the regional level as complementary trends
Majone, 1990 p. 72.
In the case of Belgium, European integration and regional devolution have followed a
remarkably similar course, serving as the ultimate example of multilevel governance.
As the EU asserts its influence over more aspects of life, it may undermine the
state which these regions rally against. In its quest for democratic legitimacy through
subsidiarity, the Union has augmented the role and influence of sub national bodies,
especially the regions. In fact, some would argue that the EU which grants regions a
voice (both through official representation and perhaps more significantly through the
distribution of structural funds on a local and regional basis), has served to empower
those regions, allowing them to gain political and economic expertise, which perhaps
strengthens their autonomist demands. “Especially regions with extensive competences
have a strong base from which they can mobilize. They are therefore more likely to shift
their political strategies to the European level" (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1060-1). Stolz
describes a professionalization of a political class which has shifted its ambitions from
the national level to the regional and supranational level. (2003 p. 245). Regions which
share a common mission are able to mobilize support for their interests at the
supranational level, largely bypassing the nation-state and seek support in Brussels.
Within the European Parliament, the European Free Alliance represents regionalist and
nationalist movements from various member states.
The Union is hesitant to grant moral or political support, especially for outright
secessionist movements, as nation states do remain the primary actors. However,
through their inclusion in the political dialogue, Europe serves as another source of
legitimacy and recognition, both and moderating their demands in the process, with
- 22 -
potentially dramatic consequences. The distribution of structural funds may put multiple
levels within a state in direct competition.
Regionalism and Risks
While most argue that the representation of small ethnic groups at all levels of
EU decision-making enhance democratic representation and promote diversity, the
populist roots of many movements advocating multilevel governance have given some
scholars cause for concern. While policies which allow participation on multiple levels,
according to Logno, allows the “more effective protection of distinctive cultural features
and greater democracy through enhanced capacity of communities to choose the form of
government to represent them” (2003 p. 479), some scholars fear parochialism and
discrimination as regions attempt to prevent the dilution of their recently acquired
powers. These movements wish to promote cultural cohesion within their region and are
therefore often resistant to external immigration, and promote a “Europe of Regions”
that is of total European heritage, rather than a more inclusive entity. The policies which
promote cultural diversity raise, according to Longo, “the possibility of the emergence
of an inward-looking, competitive, xenophobic and culturally protectionist bloc” (2003
p. 480). This has been shown in the case of Flanders, as the Vlaams Belang has adopted
harsh anti-immigration policies. These risks must be anticipated as the European Union
strives to meet the needs of both the nation-state and the regions
Europe of Regions: A Vision of the Future?
Despite the trends towards devolution and federalization, the organization of a
Europe of Regions may prove difficult because of competing visions of Europe and
resistance on the part of the member states. The nation-state remains the primary focus
of the European Union and is likely to resist any attempt, on the part of its own
regionalist groups or in the groups of its neighbors, to reorient Union policy. (Beyers,
Bursens 2006 p. 1058). Centralized states which do have territorially-based ethnic
groups within its borders are likely to be wary of measures which may encourage
regionalization or ethnic mobilization at home. In addition, some nation-states do not
face ethnic conflict or regional autonomy movements, due to either homogeneity or the
lack of mobilization on the part of ethnic groups. Many “regions” are simple
- 23 -
administrative units, possessing no cohesive identity than the national one. The diverse
nature of European member states, consisting of both highly centralized and highly
devolved systems, is likely to hinder efforts to create a Europe of Regions.
- 24 -
Ethnic Mobilization and Political Manifestations
Causes and Consequences
Social scientists seeking to understand ethnic conflict are split into two camps
regarding the impetus to engage in political and ethnic mobilization. Primoridalists hold
that ethnicity is "deeply rooted in historical experience," some arguing that it can be
viewed as a biological phenomenon while still others maintain that it is a result of
socialization into an ethnic community which involves absorbing the language, customs
and norms of a people. Esman writes that primordialists "tend to attach high value to
historical continuity, group sanctions, and social solidarity as determinants of human
behavior." (1994 p. 10).
Instrumentalists argue the contrary, describing ethnicity as a "highly adaptive
and malleable phenomenon" with few firm boundaries. Some view ethnic identity as
motivated by the potential for gain, arguing that "ethnicity is primarily a practical
resource that individuals and groups deploy opportunistically to promote their more
fundamental security or economic interests and that they may even discard when
alternative affiliations promise better returns." (Esman, 1994 p. 10).
Wimmer explains that instrumentalism only occurs when a given ethnic group
has sufficiently mobile elites, often of the middle class. It often begins with cultural
issues; educated elites resist assimilation, and push for further academic opportunities in
their language and inclusion of minority history into programs of academic study.
They thus draw on the ideal of ethnic representativity, of equality before the law,
and of the state's responsiveness towards 'the people', in order to demand a 'just'
representation in government, a recognition of their cultural heritage as part of
the nation's treasures, a treatment as equally valuable and dignified parts of 'the
people'
Wimmer, 2002 p. 3.
They point out instances of cultural and legal exclusion, in the case of Belgium, the
traditional francophone dominance of government and the emphasis on French as the
language of social mobility. Within Western Europe, this historical situation was termed
“internal colonialism” and became a point of mobilization for Basques, Bretons,
Corsicans, Scots and the Welsh. (Gurr, 1994 p. 78-79). Lead by these “political
entrepreneurs” ethnic minorities began to form organizations and push for legal,
economic and cultural inclusion.
- 25 -
Despite these differences, Esman argues that rather than being contradictory,
primordialist and instrumentalist theories are instead interrelated and even
interdependent. He writes that: "ethnicity cannot be policiticized unless an underlying
core of memories, experience, or meaning moves people to collective action" These
include historical struggles, cultural markets (including language and religion). They are
also fluid, capable of being “oriented to fresh goals” and “infused with new content"
(1994 p. 14). This is true in many Western countries as ethnic groups focus on reviving
and preserving their unique cultural heritage in order to mobilize politically and improve
the status of the group as a whole, especially in economic terms, within a larger society.
Ethnic conflict is perhaps more virulent than other forms of state-based conflict
because of the ability to frame the conflict in black and white terms of us versus them. It
is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify the exact factors which lead groups to
mobilize politically in any given case. However, the manifestations of ethnic conflict
can be categorized.
Gurr identifies four politically important types of groups that exist within the
confines of the modern state which can be divided into two categories, those who seek
separation or autonomy and those who work to gain access and participation within the
existing state bodies.
Autonomists/Separatists
Ethnonationalists: previously independent ethnonationalists seek to
reestablish their own states or control their traditional territory. Examples are
found both in the developing world and the West, as the drawing of national
borders rarely creates homogenous societies. While the use of violent tactics
in the West is rare, wars for national independence are frequent in the
developing world and often carry dramatic international consequences as the
events do not occur in a vacuum. (1994 p. 19).
Indigenous peoples: seek to control and protect traditional lands, resources
and culture, examples include the native peoples of the Americas and Asia,
the Australian Aborigine, and the Scandinavian Saami. (1994 p. 19-21).
Equal participation
Communal contenders: one of a number of culturally distinct groups in
pluralist societies, compete for a share of political power. Communal
contenders can include previously secessionist ethnic groups have since been
integrated into the political system. Examples of this shift represent hope,
- 26 -
according to Gurr, for effective politics of power-sharing and integration.
(1994 p. 23). This category can also include politically active religious
minorities, which combined with nationality and class differences can prove
especially damaging.
Ethno classes: seek equal rights and opportunities to compensate for
discrimination experienced due to their status as an immigrant or cultural,
linguistic or religious minorities. Ethno classes may be repressed and
excluded and as a result, adopt autonomist policies. (1994 p. 22).
When these groups mobilize, the government may seek to control the process with
various methods, including consociationalism.
- 27 -
Consociationalism: From Pillars to People
Introduction
The idea of consociationalism was introduced by political scientist Arend
Lijphart in the 1960s as an explanation for political stability in plural societies.
Lijphart‟s first case was his native Netherlands, although he and his adherents
eventually expanded the theory to incorporate Switzerland. Lijphart and those who
developed his theories furthers attribute the apparent stability to elite behavior, arguing
that elites will act to combat disintegrating tendencies. The theory is distinctly anti-
majoritarian, and consociationalists are agreed on the need to a key "mitigate the
unfortunate effect of majority rule in ethnically divided societies" rather than eliminate
these societal cleavages completely. (Horowitz, 1985 p. 570). However, the
consociationalist model has come under intense criticism for its somewhat idealized
views of the roles and motivations of governing elites. Critics argue that elites are
unlikely to act against their own personal and professional interests to promote unity and
that a society dominated by elite bargaining is unlikely to be viewed as legitimate in the
eyes of the people.
Consociationalism Defined
Lijphart‟s original definition of consociationalist system was "government by
elite cartel to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable
democracy" (Lijphart, 1969 p. 216). This emphasis on stability is the most important
aspect, as the main characteristics of consociationalism focus on balance and
cooperation rather than majoritarian policy formation. Consociationalism is anti-
majoritarian, mandating near unanimous consent from all major political pillars,
including religious, ideologically, ethnic, socioeconomic, and territorial, which explains
its success in highly segmented societies like Switzerland and the Netherlands.
in deeply segmented democracies, federal as well as unitary, stability and some
slow progress have often been ensured over long spans of time by a grand
coalition of major parties and interest groups promoting their specific interests
but also seeking a general consensus on a give-and-take basis
Duchacek, 1986 p. 100.
- 28 -
There are several common characteristics of a consociationalist structure,
including the emphasis of autonomy or self-regulation in areas which concern each
specific group; these typically include language use, culture and education. At the
federal level, power is shared in several areas. Parties are formed to represent the
interests of each group and according proportional representation in the parliament. The
principle of parity is respected in key sectors, including the cabinet, the civil service, the
security forces and media.
The goal of consociationalism is to prevent majority rule, allowing each political
actor a voice in society and often a veto. There is an emphasis on consent, each segment
is vested with veto powers or accorded alarm bell devices, as in the case of Belgium.
(Hechter, 2000 p. 136). Traditional majoritarian democracies may be perfectly
acceptable in cases of homogenous societies, but may not be “suitable when elections
are decided on ethnic grounds, as this means a permanent majority for one side, and no
group trusts the other enough to allow it to govern on its own” (Keating, 2007 p. 6-7).
Consociationalism is best suited for societies in which cross-cutting cleavages
occur, groups driven into conflict by purely racial or religious reasons are more difficult.
Unlike federalism, consociationalism can work even when ethnic, religious or linguistic
groups do not have a territorial component.
Several primary conditions have been identified by Lijphart and other scholars.
1. The elite leaders of each group must have to resources to satisfy the demands set
forth by their group
2. Elites must be willing and able to cooperate with the representatives of rival
groups
3. The leadership as a whole must be dedicated to the larger state and be cognizant
of the consequences of ethnic conflict and disunity. There is no room for
autonomist demands in a society which is to function through the adoption of
consociationalist models.
Morris Hale, 1997 p. 8-9.
The emphasis on the role of leadership has proved to be the at once the model‟s greatest
strength and greatest weakness.
- 29 -
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Consociationalist System
Several examples of consociationalist success do exist, including Switzerland
which has remained remarkably unified despite a multitude of linguistic, political and
religious differences. Consociationalism has also been a characteristic of Canadian
governance, although less effective to a certain degree. While scholars often propose the
exportation of the Swiss model to diverse countries in the developing world, it is not
clear if a society which was once beset by bitter or violent ethnic conflict or minority
suppression is capable of achieving the level of trust and cooperation required for a
consociationalist system.
Consociationalist systems require extensive contacts and cooperation in order to
function effectively, which can “further the recognition of the other groups as equal
partners, improve the understanding of their standpoints, and, by creating positive trust
spirals, foster cooperative attitudes” (Bächtiger, et al 1998 p. 83). However, this
cooperation does not always occur and should elites refuse or be politically unable to
engage in a dialogue, crisis often occurs.
The primary criticism of the consociationalist system is derived from the core
principle set forth by Lijphart, that of elite dominance. Scholars such as Donald
Horowitz, arguably taking a more skeptical view of human nature, warning of
opportunism. Elites, representatives of the modern era, were expected to reject the
tribalism and parochialism of the past, promoting a new unity. In many cases, they did
the exact opposite, preying on ethnic divisions for votes and power. "The very elites
who were thought to be leading their peoples away from ethnic affiliations were
commonly found to be in the forefront of ethnic conflict" (Horowitz, 1985 p. 97). These
elites, in their effort to gain electoral support or political strength are likely to exploit
linguistic and ethnic differences to mobilize support. Others argue that
consociationalism which has been lauded as a solution for internal strife in the
developing world, is unlikely to work in societies with a history of violent or intense
interethnic conflict.
As popular democracy seems to be a given, at least in European societies, the
consociationalist emphasis on elite bargaining and secretive negotiations seems to be a
throwback to another era. (Hechter, 2000 p. 137). "Standard consociational practices are
vulnerable to charges that they are elitist and undemocratic, since decision making is
- 30 -
largely a matter of negotiation and compromise among established leaders of the
variable communities" (Esman, 1994 p. 43). The consociationalist system, with politics
taking place in the high levels of government with little popular participation, is unlikely
to be viable for the long-term as the societal differences and conflicts remain
entrenched. While the zero-sum approach to politics is minimized by these trade-offs,
groups are defined in opposition to one another and the development of a larger identity
or national sentiment is impaired. "By promoting group as against individual rights,
consociationalism tends to inhibit intergroup cooperation. It is at least as likely that
leaders will use consociational institutions to gain maximum resources for themselves
rather than to defuse intergroup conflict" (Hechter, 2000 p. 137).
The approach can also lead to the rise of more radical leadership who accuse
those taking part in the bargaining process of betrayal. The presence of “counter-elites”
has often been ignored in consociationalist theory and consociationalism in its present
incarnation has failed to explain the rise of radical groups seeking autonomy. Horowitz
writes
Consociational theory assumes the existence of 'group leaders', but, even when
groups begin with a single set of leaders, compromise across group lines is likely
to show those leaders to be merely party leaders opposed by leaders of other
parties seeking the support of the same group
2002 p. 21.
The public is often susceptible by these messages, disillusioned by the paritocracy that
dominates governance and the appearance of backroom deals and clientelism.
Consociationalist emphasis on legislative representation of the societal cleavages
also falls short of promoting greater cooperation. While consociationalist legislative
bodies often mirror the societal cleavages, there is no mechanism that encourages
cooperation between the groups in the parliamentary rather than elite sphere.
Centrapetalists argue that groups should be encouraged to look outside of their
linguistic, ethnic or religious group for electoral support. This, according to Reilly,
would "work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation
in parliament" (2001 p. 21). In addition to promoting democratic competition, it could
also serve to moderate elite demands. As we will see in the Belgian case, no multiethnic
competition takes place, essentially dividing the political sphere. As a result, the
political parties are free to espouse increasingly radical messages.
- 31 -
Conclusion
Consociationalism has proved to be relatively transient as it relies heavily on
informal agreements and the goodwill of elites, rather than constitutional guarantees. In
his study, Daniel Elazar showed that classic consociationalist systems have a lifespan of
about two generations before they enter into political flux. (1991 p. 24). The case of
Switzerland appears to be the exception rather than the rule, perhaps because the Swiss
system incorporates elements of federalism. Often the social cleavages have taken on
territorial characteristics, making the adoption of a federalist system an obvious choice.
In federalist systems, once informal relations are constitutionalized and mutual
guarantees are made. However, they often retain some traits of their former selves, as
trust has been established between the multiple pillars and elites often retain their
importance. Lijphart himself argued that consociationalism and federalism are not
mutually exclusive, explaining that “federalism offers an excellent opportunity for group
autonomy if the groups are geographically concentrated,” as in the case of India,
Switzerland and Belgium. (Lijphart, 2002 p. 51).
Consociationalism and federalism, according to Hooghe, both propose a
"systemic response to territorial conflict majority rule should be replaced by federalism
or by a consociational regime" (Hooghe, 2004 p. 18). However, they each possess
several weaknesses, including an undue reliance on the goodwill of elites which perhaps
explains their fragile nature “Because strategies based on outbidding are often easier to
instigate and maintain than those based on cooperation, politics can quickly come to be
characterized by centrifugal forces, in which the moderate political centre is
overwhelmed by extremist forces” (Reilly, 2001 p. 2).
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Multiethnic-Multinational Federalism
In Theory and In Practice
Federalism has to do with the need of people and polities to unite for common purposes
yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities. It is rather like wanting to
have one's cake and eat it too. Since that is the natural human condition, at least half
the work of politics, if not 90 percent of it, is directed to somehow accommodating that
logically insoluble problem
Daniel Elazar, 1991 p. 33.
Introduction
Federalism has been credited by many scholars as an institutional means of
containing ethnic conflict while ensuring adequate representation of minority rights. It
has become increasingly popular in Europe for both multiethnic and homogenous but
economically disparate regions. The case of the United States, a traditionally federalist
entity, is often cited as an example. However, one must remember that the federalist
States were not created to mitigate ethnic conflict. Multiethnic and multinational
federalism has been remarkably effective in calming tensions when implemented
properly. However, several sometimes elusive conditions have proved themselves
important. They include the existence of several territorial units, a commitment of
political elites to the central state and symmetry in federalist demands. The
implementation of a federalist system can have two drastically different results. It may
weaken ethnoregionalist sentiment as the demands of ethnic groups can be fulfilled
within the state context. Conversely, federalization provides regional and ethnic leaders
political experience, confidence and a territorial base from which to mobilize. This can
entrench nationalist sentiment and lead to further demands for devolution and even
secessionism, which although rarely successful, is incredibly divisive.
Whatever the effects, it is important to note that, like any tool for mitigating
ethnic conflict, federalism will not make these problems disappear. Several scholars
express reservations. Bauböck writes that
A well-ordered federation is not a final settlement of claims that could have been
be enshrined in a foundational contract, but an institutional framework for
building mutual trust in an ongoing negotiation of claims
- 33 -
2001 p. 380.
Kymlicka explains
Federalism can help to keep certain multination countries together, but the best
we can hope for in such circumstances is a looser and more provisional form of
'togetherness' which coexists with ongoing questioning of the value of
maintaining the federation
Kymlicka, 2001 p. 94.
Despite questions regarding longevity, it may ensure peace and prosperity within the
state.
Trends in Federalism
Federalism entered the political spotlight in the 1950s and 1960s, along with
consociationalism, which are both considered forms of non-majoritarian democracy.
(Elazar, 1991 p. 18). The federalist model has remained remarkably popular, especially
as political scientists struggle to come to terms with the fact that ethnic and national
identities have not been overtaken by modernist sentiment. Federalism‟s popularity is a
sign that a system of accommodation is increasingly necessary in countries in which
rights for minorities are guaranteed rather than suppressed. (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 96). "It
is now argued that the federal state format is the best conceivable one, given the strong
demand for democracy today, as well as the existence of many multicultural societies"
(Ersson, Lane 2000 p. 78).
Many former colonies, including India and Nigeria, have adopted federalist systems to
deal with suppressed ethnic identities and the inevitable conflict that results from
decolonization. In Europe, this federalist movement has been widespread, as both
multiethnic and homogenous ethnic states decentralize. Since the 1950s, Belgium, Italy
and Spain have adopted regionalist policies, France has granted certain powers to
Corsica, albeit reluctantly, and Austria, Germany and Switzerland, all possessing strong
federalist traditions, have remained committed and even intensified federalist aspects of
their society. (Elazar, 1991 p. 9). Despite this trend, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland
are each constitutionally federal states while Italy and the United Kingdom have
engaged in devolution or decentralization, in which the central state sets the goals or
principals while the regional units are responsible for implementation, a model not
unlike the European Union‟s principal of subsidarity. (Keating, 2007 p. 7).
- 34 -
Federalism Defined
A federalist system is defined as a political system "in which an overarching
government and regional government have joint sovereignty and governing authority,
with each holding final authority in some areas" (Brezinski, 1999 p. 46). Elazar explains
that while both the United States and Belgium are considered federal, the reasons and
processes of federalization are distinctive.
One of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose
simultaneously to generate and maintain both unity and diversity. This
ambiguity is reflected in confusion over the very use of the term. People use the
terms "federalism," "federalist," and "federalize" to describe both the process of
political unification and the maintenance of the diffusion of political power
1991 p. 64.
In the United States, federalism was implemented from the beginning, designed to
promote a greater unity while preserving the rights of the states which made up the
union. In Belgium, federalism was a response to demands of ethnic groups which
threatened the unitary nature and very existence of the Belgian state. For our purposes,
we will focus on federalism as a means to retain unity while recognizing and ensuring
diversity. We will adopt Will Kymlicka‟s definition of federalism as applied to
heterogeneous democratic states
a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division of
powers between a central government and two or more subunits (provinces/
Länder/states/cantons), defined on a territorial basis, such that each level of
government has sovereign authority over certain issues
1998 p. 119.
This federalization is often a result of overwhelming or explosive ethnic conflict which
force states to adopt some sort of power-sharing to meet ethnic and economic demands
put forth by the regions. .
The goals of a federalist system are
• To balance power within a Constitution by providing a countervailing force to
the central government so as to preserve democracy and enhance liberty;
• To maximise allocative efficiency by locating government functions at the
most appropriate scale and to rationalise administration and policy-making;
- 35 -
• To manage nationally diverse and divided societies by giving groups a degree
of self-rule while maintaining the overall unity of the state.
Keating, 2007 p. 8.
While federalism may be a highly effective means of moderating ethnic conflict and
ensuring the effective functioning of the states, federalism is not suited for all
multiethnic states.
Conditions for Multiethnic Federalism
Scholars have noted that the most successful federalist systems encompass
multiple religious, ethnic, or linguistic pillars as none “can reasonably feed ambitions of
becoming the single dominant one" (Colomer, 2001 p. 188).This inhibits
majoritarianism and ensures that the center remains a forum for conflict mediation,
rather than being hollowed by demands for greater devolution. Horowitz attributes this
to the diversity of interests and opinions contained within the different federal units.
Territory can partition groups off from each other and direct their political
ambitions at one level of government rather than another. Federalism, and
especially the proliferation of federal units, or regional autonomy can act in
effect as an electoral reform and can preserve multipolar fluidity
Horowitz, 2002 p. 25.
In the case of Belgium and Canada, the demands of two ethnic groups are often
overwhelming and conflict is almost entirely framed along ethnic lines. Elazar presumes
that a federalist system in which demographic and economic equality is necessary to
prevent centralization. "The constituent polities in a federal system must be fairly equal
in population and wealth or at least balanced geographically or numerically in their
inequalities if noncentralization is to be maintained" (1991 p. 170). However, this is
difficult, if not impossible to maintain, if one is to give credence to instrumentalist
theory which states that ethnic groups will mobilize in favor of devolution when they
feel that their status is threatened. In both Belgium and Spain, the groups most in favor
of further autonomy are those who hold a position of economic superiority. This can
undermine the federalist cause and the state must develop mechanisms to cope with the
inevitable conflict that arises.
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Elazar explains that there are no strict rules for federalism, emphasizing that, like
under a consociationalist system, relationships are more important than structures. "as
long as the proper relations are created, a wide variety of political structures can be
developed that are consistent with federal principles" (Elazar, 1991 p. 12). When faced
with continued ethnic conflict, federalized systems have several tools with which to
diffuse it and encourage greater integration. Bauböck outlines four of them
1. Concession granting greater autonomy to the contesting group and allowing
them special powers at the federal level. This can include vetoes over certain
issues or guaranteed representation.
2. Moderation undercutting support for extreme nationalists through free
elections.
3. Participation allowing minorities participation at the federal level, including
power-sharing schemes.
4. Multiple identities promoting geographic and marital mobility across
territorial boundaries and by promoting a greater federal citizenship.
Bauböck 2001 p. 381
The last, and probably the most important for the long-term viability of a federal
state, is often difficult to achieve, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched ethnic
identities. This has succeeded in the case of Switzerland, because according to Elazar,
people “think federal.” (1991 p. 78). However, in Belgium, where ethnic conflict seems,
at times, almost intractable, very few people cross ethnic and territorial boundaries for
marriage or for work and many French-speaking and Flemish citizens cannot
communicate with each other because of the decrease in multilingualism. (Billiet, et al.
2006 p. 915). However, the federal government has made progress in promoting a
greater Belgian identity as evidenced by recent polls, a phenomenon which we will
explore later.
Like in consociationalist societies, the role of elites is critical, as they can
mobilize in the interest or to the detriment of the federal state. Two crucial ingredients
for a successful federalism were identified by Thomas M. Franck “the transmission of
ideological commitment from charismatic leaders to the people (elite charisma) and/or
the transmission of broadly shared values (culminating in a federal value) from the
people to the leaders (popular charisma)” (Duchacek, 1986 p. 92). While federalist
principles may be enshrined in the constitution, a federalist system will not function
properly without the successful cooperation of governing parties.
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In severely divided societies, elites and parties may serve, at times, to undermine
the democratic legitimacy of the political process and also to gain political support
through populist and nationalistic policies. This reliance on elites is one of the
weaknesses of non-majoritarian power-sharing arrangements in which the general
population cannot make decisions through referenda.
An interesting characteristic of federalism, as noted by Erk and Gagnon, is the
presence of, and some might say, reliance on ambiguity. While federalism depends on
constitutionally guaranteed institutions and rights and the negotiation of all policies at
the federal level with input from relevant parties, some issues will remain unresolved.
constitutional ambiguity had become a sign of a broad consensus to eschew
polarization. When parties to the federal compact could not agree on the exact
terms of the union, they left the question about the nature of the political
community unclear. Compact between the provinces or compact between
peoples; in a way, they have been agreeing to avoid having to agree. At the same
time, the successful continuation of these arrangements was dependent on the
overall federal trust between the partners.
Erk, Gagnon 1998 p. 101.
This prevents either side from “winning” or “losing” and allows federal bodies to ignore
issues until they can be dealt with in a way satisfactory to all sides. However, this also
creates impetus for further reforms and is quickly seized by those unsatisfied by the
federal government. We will see this in the case of Belgium. Brussels, a Francophone
city in the heart of Flanders, has been disputed for decades with no clear resolution. It
has been compared to the child that preserves the union between feuding parents and it
is possible that should its status be irrevocably settled, it could increase calls for total
division on either side.
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Federalism and Mitigating Ethnic Conflict
Strengths and Weaknesses
Federalism has proved remarkably resilient, despite the presence of multiple
competing interests. In fact, Elazar notes that
No authentic federal system that has lasted for even fifteen years has ever been
abandoned except through revolutionary disruption (as in the case in Germany)
or foreign conquest (as in the case of Switzerland), and in most cases, including
the aforementioned two, federalism--showing remarkable resilience--has
ultimately been restored
1991 p. 156.
However, some would argue that this persistence is not necessarily a result of the
federalist system but due to a general feeling of trust and cooperation, something that is
nearly impossible to achieve in a political sphere recently beset by intense ethnic and
political conflict. Kymlicka asserts that
where federalism is needed to keep a country together, the odds that the country
will remain together over the long-term are not great. Federalism may be the best
available response to ethnocultural pluralism, but the best may not be good
enough
1998 p. 113.
The Federalization Process
Duchacek argues that "by timely concessions to, and constitutional recognition
of, territorial communities and their desire for self-rule, a formerly unitary nation-state
may be re-formed and its national unity saved" (1986 p. 92). However, this is more
relevant in theory rather than practice, as a unitary state is unlikely to divest itself of its
competences unless under extreme duress. "Because they start with a centralized
structure and because there is unease about the political implications of devolution,
national powers tend to be dominant, including, not infrequently, the power to suspend
regional governments" (Ghai, 2002 p. 157). This results in tensions between the
centralized government and ethnic groups, who sense this resistance.
As demands for federalization are likely to be precipitated by the mobilization of
ethnoregional parties rather than national governments, the national government may
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work to ensure its maintenance of power. "Indeed, federalism can and has been used by
majority groups as a tool for disempowering national minorities, by rigging federal units
so as to reduce the power of national minorities" (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 96). This may
occur by allowing some regional autonomy but limited representation, influence and
control at the federal level.
The Role of Elites
Consociationalist and federalist systems share several characteristics, the most
significant of those being the role of elites. Elites operating at the federal level may
promote trust through the construction of relationships. However, those elites may be
especially prone to mobilize on a territorial basis to ensure their electoral success.
"Federation may stimulate nationalist conflict because it provides potential nationalist
leaders with patronage and other resources that can be mobilized for nationalist ends"
(Hechter, 2000 p. 141). Horowitz rejects the assertion that the political elites that
advocate federalization will act in the interest of the larger state, rather than in the
interest of themselves or their ethnic group.
To the extent that the imputed motive is still statesmanship rather not to protect
cultural or than self-interest, the assumption that elites in divided societies are
likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue
advantage for their own group is extremely dubious
2002 p. 21.
The Problem of Asymmetry
It has been shown that federal states with multiple units benefit from enhanced
stability, it is rare that various groups that comprise a multiethnic state makes similar
demands, especially since ethnic conflict often arises from the perception of economic
or political disparity. As a result, symmetry is often difficult to achieve, especially
when the adoption of a federalist system is a result of minority demands. (Kymlicka,
1998 p. 130). Majorities are often reluctant to relinquish control. In the case of Canada,
Quebec agitates for greater autonomy and even independence while the rest of the
country resents this federalization and wishes to restore the unitary system, essentially
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rejecting “special privileges” for Quebec. Belgium‟s move towards federalism was
precipitated by Flemish demands and Wallonia resists further devolution.
Federalism and Society
Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that devolution to the regional levels can enhance
democratic participation by allowing greater competition on the lower levels, forcing the
parties to pay greater attention to the demands of the people. (1999 p. 50). This is true,
although perhaps to a limited extent. The territorialization of politics means that in some
cases, like in Belgium, no party competes on a national level. Parties must only be
responsive to their ethnic group and are thus unlikely to take into account the welfare
and desires of other groups, with whom they have now entered into competition. As
politics at the highest levels are negotiated by regional representatives rather than
subject to broad debate, this can limit political input.
While these issues of democratic participation are serious, perhaps one of the
most underrated effects of federalism is the social and cultural impact of the system.
This can be both positive and negative, undermining ethnic groups which may be
inclined to act in an oppressive and despotic manner while ensuring representation for
the minority by compartmentalizing conflict.
Federalism makes it more difficult for those who have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens to act in unison with each other. The influence
of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be
unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States
Kymlicka, 2001 p. 99.
However, within these ethnic regions, diversity is often viewed as a threat, immigration
from both other federal entities and from abroad, may undermine their influence. They
may work to prevent others from settling in the region or existing minorities from
engaging in public life. In the case of Belgium, the ethnoregionalist party Vlaams
Belang runs on an anti-immigration platform, advocating ethnic homogeneity as well as
independence.
“Multination federalism divides the people into separate 'peoples', each with its
own historic rights, territories, and powers of self-government; and each, therefore with
its own political community" (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 114). This political empowerment,
which is often vested with the powers and institutions of a state may be dangerous,
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according to Hechter, and may perhaps lead to further ethnic conflict and secessionism.
"When nations are given many of the accoutrements of real states, this also encourages
people to think and act according to national categories" (Hechter, 2000 p. 141).These
peoples, who are governed by political elites, are unlikely to either develop or retain a
common identity. In addition, each group is defined only by ethnicity, inhibiting
pluralism. Other identifications, such as class or religion, are likely to be ignored.
institutionalizing the federation along such lines is more likely to promote a
primordial nationalism, which in politically unstable polities increases the
likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and even civil war. Not only do such
arrangements tend to solidify and make permanent what might be temporary or
partial group identities, they also allow key policy areas to be hijacked by highly
partisan titular élites and thus increase the probability of tyranny by the minority,
which, it is contended, acts as an impediment to liberty for all
Smith, 2001 p. 345.
It is because of these characteristics that federalism does not pose a permanent solution.
However, its relevance and utility should not be dismissed because of the weaknesses
explored here. "In short, federalism is designed to prevent tyranny without preventing
governance. In this sense it seeks to provide a political remedy for political diseases"
(Elazar, 1991 p. 29). Federalism remains one of the most effective means moderating
conflict, preventing violence and allowing the effective operation of the state.
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When the System Fails: Secessionism
Secessionism and Power-Sharing Arrangements
In the case of Belgium, federalism was touted as a panacea for ethnic conflict,
meant to appease ethnic groups and ensure the continued existence of the state. Despite
these ambitions, calls for the further devolution of competences and even the dissolution
of the Belgium state continue. This, according to scholars, should not be met with
surprise.
The more that federalism succeeds in meeting the desire for self-government, the
more it recognizes and affirms the sense of national identity amongst the
minority group, and strengthens their political confidence. Where national
minorities become politically mobilized in this way, secession becomes more
conceivable, and a more salient option, even with the best-designed federal
institutions
Kymlicka, 2001 p. 113.
As a result, national minorities may view themselves as part of a confederation, rather
than a federal state, possessing the right to govern and even declare their independence.
Secessionism is often cited as a reason for resistance to the adoption of a
federalist regime. Critics argue that once given power, the federal units, especially those
constructed on a regional or ethnic basis will often agitate for more power. This has
been proven true in some cases, with scholars arguing that power-sharing enhances the
confidence of regional elites, leading them to believe independence to be viable and
makes the idea more palatable for the general population.
While the implementation of consociationalist and federalist systems may be
necessary to ensure the protection of minorities, enhance democracy and minimize the
risk of violent ethnic conflict, these techniques can often further secessionist causes.
Regional autonomist groups, especially those possessing the goal of independence, are
unlikely to be appeased by the devolution of competences, no matter how significant.
(Horowitz, 1985 p. 624).Some political scientists argue that the state can inhibit
secessionist tendencies by involving all political actors, not just those amenable to the
status quo, at the national level, allowing them to “acquire a collective responsibility for
the common good of that state" (Bauböck, 2001 p. 379).
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Factors in Secessionism
The impact of economic differentiation is, according to many scholars, one of
the most influential political issues. Sorens explains the appeal of secessionist groups
from an instrumentalist perspective, noting the influence of socio-economic factors
rather than a larger identity.
Secessionist parties in advanced democracies succeed not because they appeal to
a primordial past but because they are able to present independence or
wideranging autonomy as beneficial in political and economic terms.
2005 p. 307.
In this context, ethnic identity may serve as a rallying point, a symbol of difference, but
is not the primary motivating factor.
According to Horowitz, secessionist regions, while not exclusively, are more
likely to be those which face a lower level of regional economic development and
prosperity. Those prosperous groups in prosperous regions (like the Flemings in
Flanders) which depart from the norm are likely to do so because they have a regional
economic grievance. He writes, "Advanced regions usually generate more income and
contribute more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state than they receive. They
believe that they are subsidizing poorer regions." He cites the Basques and Catalans,
which at the time of his writing had far greater per capita incomes than Spain as a
whole. The Basque protest song of the period somewhat graphically referred to Spain as
"a cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its udder in Madrid," a slogan that
industrious Flemings might soon adopt. (1985 p. 249-50). In cases such as this,
Horowitz encourages states to do something that may seem counterproductive, devolve
further, allowing the region to tax and spend within its territory, thus taking
responsibility for its economic success or failure.
Secessionism as a Political Tool
Secessionism remains an important political issue, but in practice is rare as
citizens are reluctant to risk the possible political and economic consequences.
Kymlicka points out, that despite these demands and the democratic participation of
secessionist parties in the west, these parties have “never received a democratic mandate
for secession, and no referendum on secession has succeeded” (2001 p. 116).
- 44 -
This statistic may indicate the use of secessionism as a bargaining chip to push
for greater devolution. “While secession often leads to civil war, the threat of secession
may be an effective if risky strategy leading to increased autonomy” (Helms, McBeath
1983 p. 26). It may also be that calls originate from within radical groups, such as
Flanders Vlaam Belang, and while they are vocal, they do not necessarily represent the
wishes of the population, who is satisfied by the rights accorded by a federalist system.
Secessionism: European Trends and Influences
European integration has served to both inhibit and enable secessionist demands
in member states. Secessionist movements in advanced economies are often thwarted by
the fact that this prosperity may depend on integration within the greater economic
entity which supplies infrastructure, labor and consumers for its products. The argument
that the division of a state into independent parts would create economically and
politically untenable microstates have been undermined by several factors: the presence
of very small states within the Union, the reduced necessity for a nation within a united
Europe to maintain significant military forces, and economic integration which fosters
transborder trade. This would reduce the cost of independence for both parties, by
“preserving market access and factor mobility” and allowing “small states to externalize
costly items, such as negotiating common standards or support for declining sectors, or
maintaining a national currency" (Keating, 2001 p. 30-1).
However, secessionism is unlikely to be supported by neighbors, especially in an
integrated Europe within which borders are secure and a balance is maintained. In
Europe, autonomy movements and secessionism are rarely supported, morally or
fiscally. This tendency is derived from, I believe, from two primary factors: the delicacy
of international or in this case European politics, and fears over encouraging ethnic
conflict and autonomy movements in ones own state. Irredentism is virtually
unthinkable, the Netherlands would be unlikely to support a movement in the Flemish-
speaking part of Belgium which advocated reunification, and France, apart from some
extremists, has lent little support to the small Walloon reunionist group. France would
be equally reluctant to recognize a Basque or Catalan state for fear of antagonizing the
Corsicans or Bretons, who have finally been placated.
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Secessionism and Minority Rights
Theorists, while supporting self-determination in theory, often reject
secessionism as a viable alternative. "populist nationalism may take root, with its
targeting of ethnic and other social and political minorities as scapegoats for the
economic and social ills of the community" (Jenkins, Sofos 1996 p. 27). Regions are
rarely homogenous and the rights of minorities within the territory must be respected,
something that is especially worrisome as secessionist groups often thrive off of populist
demands, leaving immigrants and minority groups at risk.
The legitimacy of secession is almost always contested by some people within
the seceding territory, raising questions about the size of majorities required to
achieve it and the rights of minorities, who may themselves demand the right to
secede, or to remain within the host state
Keating, 2001 p. 28.
This could lead to potentially violent conflict and one that must be accounted for when
forming policy.
Conclusion
Secessionism, or at least the success of groups advocating independence, is a
very real risk for any multiethnic state. In states which employ power-sharing
techniques such as consociationalism and federalism, it is perhaps a greater risk. Some
states are reluctant to implement these means for fear of encouraging independence-
oriented groups. However, they may do so at their peril. Federalism and
consociationalism allows ethnic groups a voice, and may moderate their demands. A
unitary state in which no concessions are made may encourage desperation and violent
resistance among its minorities. Repression against these minorities is unlikely to be
tolerated within an integrated Europe.
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Conclusion:
Ethnic Conflict in Theory and In Practice: The Case of Belgium
Existing literature does not often anticipate the case of Belgium, focusing instead
on small, subordinate minority groups. However, because of the unique historical
transition of Flanders, these proofs can often be applied. Attempts to explain the actions
of the government (as a separate entity ruling from above) ignores the fact that Flemings
and Walloons make up the government while Catalans, Basques and Scottish, while
accorded greater standing in recent years are less influential.
Most theories deal with ethnic conflict arising from a disgruntled minority, like
that which occurs in the Basque, Catalan and Quebec cases. These groups often form a
small minority in the larger population although they are no less disruptive (they may be
prone to violence or terrorist acts in response to majoritarian principles which render
them voiceless), Belgium is distinctly different. Most claims for autonomy and
secession come from Flanders, although Wallonia has engaged in ethnic mobilization, it
is on a much smaller and more moderate scale. Flanders, while often studied in the
context of minority rights and autonomy, is in fact a demographic majority in the larger
Belgian state, forming 65% of the population. In addition, it is distinctly wealthier than
its southern counterpart.
Ethnic conflict in this case, arises not from minority status, but from several
distinct factors. Flanders, with its capitalist, market-oriented system has done very well
while the traditional industries of Wallonia have suffered. Flanders resents the Walloon
socialist system that props up ailing industries at the expense of the federal government,
whose coffers Flanders fills at a disproportionate amount. Historical memories of
Francophone dominance are also often invoked, especially by Flemish nationalists. The
issue of Brussels is probably the most symbolic, a francophone city, a European capital,
in the heart of Flanders, the Flemish parties have attempted to prevent its suburbs from
becoming increasingly francophone. Some scholars argue that Brussels, and the conflict
that it represents may be the glue holding the Belgian state together. We will examine
these centripetal and centrifugal forces in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CONFLICT
RELATIONS BETWEEN FLEMINGS AND WALLOONS FROM BELGIUM’S ORIGINS TO
PRESENT
Introduction
While both Flemish and Walloon nationalists attempt to frame the progression of
Belgian history as a story of oppression and opposition, power shifts have been frequent.
These shifts shaped all aspects of Belgian politics and social life, including education,
the role of the church in society and even foreign policy. Belgian nationhood has
coalesced only when under threat, first emerging in 1789 with the Brabant Revolution
against Habsburg rule. Despite the failure of the revolution, it planted the seeds for a
common identity, allowing Belgium to develop its unique nature during French and
subsequent Dutch rule. Even in the heady days of independence, the nation was beset by
both internal and external factors which threatened its unity. It was only through the
cooperation of the two principal political groups, Liberals and Catholics and the help of
powerful neighbors hoping to preserve the delicate continental balance that the Belgian
state survived.
However, this cooperation would not last long. Conflict and power struggles
between Liberals and Catholics would shape Belgian politics in the 19th century and
would eventually become imbued with ethnic and linguistic significance. The
emergence of the Flemish Movement, and the eventual Walloon response, would call
into question the very nature of the Belgian state. Faced by German invasion in both
World Wars, Belgium would be divided by charges of collaboration and irredentism. As
Flanders gained both economic and demographic strength, especially in relation to the
aging industry and populace of Wallonia, the continued dominance of political life by
Francophone elites seemed increasingly unwarranted. The economic disparities spurred
calls for federalism as both sides hoped that increased regional autonomy would allow
each to address its unique economic and social conditions as it saw fit. Despite the
adoption of a devolved system in 1970, calls for increased autonomy have continued,
reinforced by mainstream support for extremist movements such as the Front National
and Vlaams Blok. Both politicians and the public have a tendency to attribute economic
or political difficulties to the other side and the future of the Belgian state seems
increasingly uncertain.
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Identity Formation under Occupation:
1750-1830
Belgium was shaped by outside influences, rather than a common ethnic or
religious identity. In some ways it benefited from foreign rule, which provided both the
necessary economic resources to develop infrastructure and political structures and a
common threat against which to develop a national or regional identity.
Austrian Rule and the Development of Belgian Political Traditions
Because of the expense required to directly administer far-flung provinces, the
Austrian regime relied upon a highly devolved political structure. From 1750, the
Austrians administered their western territories through a sophisticated system of
administrative, judicial and religious bureaucracy, filling positions from the ranks of
local bourgeois and nobility. Like much of Europe, these bureaucratic elites were
educated in the French language. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 187). Mabille explains that this
experience created a tradition of regional and provincial autonomy; later attempts at
centralization by either foreign or domestic powers were resisted, especially by elites
eager to retain their influence. (1996 p. 20). In the public consciousness, provincial roots
took precedence over any identity imposed from above as
the scale of political authority in Belgium made it impossible to identify with a
nation (with the institutional and territorial framework of a state), in which the
principalities would belong. The principalities had their own institutions and
their delimited territories. In Belgium, the principalities‟ inhabitants saw their
identities as local (the town, the village) and regional (the principality) on one
hand and religious on the other
LeFebrve, 1997 p. 18-9.
This would later present an obstacle for the future unitary state which later arose.
The Brabant Revolution- The Development of Belgian National Consciousness
In December of 1789, Belgian conservatives formed a volunteer corps and
defeated their Austrian rulers at Turnhout. This victory led to a general uprising and the
localities, with the exception of Luxembourg, proclaimed their independence and
- 49 -
formed a Confederation of the United Belgian States. Vos describes two motivations for
the revolution, arguing that on the one hand, it was mainly encouraged by “the
traditional resistance to the centralization policies of the Emperor which encroached
upon the privileges of the favored classes, that is the nobility and clergy” but also that a
“minority of rebels sought justification for their revolt in the ideas of the
Enlightenment.” (1993 p. 131).
The leaders of the Brabant Revolution envisaged a highly decentralized Belgian
state in which the sovereignty of each province was guaranteed and the central
government had competences over only those aspects of life related to national interests,
allowing the fiercely independent provinces to cooperate and coexist while facilitating
some coalescence of national identities. (Manhés, 2005 p. 95). In fact, this fledgling
state had a system remarkably similar to that of today.
However, the movement was undermined by disputes amongst its leaders, the
ranks of whom included traditionalists and those admirers of the revolutionary French
system. (LeFebrve, 1997 p. 22-3). As each vied for political power and influence,
Belgium returned under Austrian control after just one year of independence. Perhaps
the most important aspect of this aborted independence was the developing Belgian
national identity, described by Vos as consisting of three elements, restoration, the
creation of national symbols, including a the flag, leadership and a uniquely Belgian
history, and the religious sentiment, predominantly Catholic, of the revolution.
The failure of the revolution drove some Belgian patriots towards France, the
government of which had originally adopted a policy oriented towards the creation of
independent but amicable republics on its frontiers. (Manhés, 2005, p. 96). While this
policy would quickly change from one of cooperation to one of occupation, the
language, culture and administration of France would have a profound impact on the
fledgling Belgian state.
Belgium under Revolutionary France
At first France advocated the incorporation of Belgium into the ideal Republic,
bound by common values and ideals. However, in 1795, the increasingly extremist
French regime voted to annex the Belgian territory and began imposing revolutionary
ideals upon the conservative Belgian society, including secularization and francification
of society. Despite these hardships, the annexation by France and improvement in
- 50 -
infrastructure gave Belgian merchants, who had benefited from the investment and
improved standard of living during Austrian rule, access to a greater market, actually
spurring Belgium‟s precocious industrial revolution. (LeFebrve, 1997 p. 24). Despite
France‟s rhetoric of self-determination, the country was treated as occupied territory,
rather than as an integral part of the Republic, burdened by high taxes and requisitions
(Bitsch, 2004 p. 64). They also advocated centralization, something completely contrary
to the provinces which had experienced a remarkable degree of autonomy under the
Austrian empire.
The repercussions of France‟s harsh assimilation policies are still present in
modern Belgium. The territory under Austrian rule had a linguistically heterogeneous
population, with the general population speaking Walloon or Flemish, while their rulers
spoke French. This led to a division of Belgian society by class lines, with elites,
anxious to retain their power, employing French while the rest of the population spoke
their regional dialects. (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 26). This spurred regional differentiation as
well, as the Walloon region, with its raw materials and developed infrastructure could
actually benefit from the French occupation, while the largely agrarian and inherently
traditional Flanders could not.
While the inhabitants of the Belgian provinces were legally equal citizens of the
French republic, the reality was often far different. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 65). The imposition
of secular policies “reinforced the Flemish community consciousness against the
French, already associated with centuries of wars and attempts at annexation”
(LeFebvre, 1997 p. 27). Linguistic policies also spurred a reaction by the Flemish-
speaking segments of the population, who perceived the imposition of the French
language by the Republic as “an attack on their cultural, linguistic and religious
identities” (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 26). In Wallonia, the transition was eased, owing to the
fact the fact that the upper and middle classes already spoke French. However, the
workers of Wallonia faced harsh conditions and were subject to draft into Napoleon‟s
army which in fact served as a form of francification, exposing them to the French
language and culture. (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 34).
Despite attempts at resistance, by 1814, when the Netherlands took control of
Belgian territory, French was the common language of Belgian elites, regardless of their
sphere of social activity and region of origin or of residence; it was also, therefore the
language of upward mobility. The French occupation had several important
consequences for the Belgian territory including the integration of Liege into the rest of
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the Southern Netherlands, the centralization of once fiercely independent provinces and
the birth of an assimilated Francophone bourgeoisie which took its place alongside the
traditionally French-speaking noble classes. (Vos, 1993 p. 132). The new occupiers
would have difficulty combating these trends.
Belgium under the Netherlands
In 1814 an agreement was signed in London detailing the amalgamation of the
Southern Netherland Territories with the Northern, affirming the principle of “one state,
two countries.” Fitzgerald describes the new state, undertaken with little consideration
of the views of Belgium‟s populace, as a “buffer between France and Prussia as part of
the 'reconstruction' of Europe undertaken by the Congress of Vienna” (1996 p. 21).
Belgium‟s status was vastly improved from its experience under French rule as the
region rivaled Holland in population, had increased visibility and saw Brussels regain its
status as a capital. Despite these advantages, Belgian nobles voted largely against the
union with Holland, reflecting the influence of the Catholic Church which feared the
rule of a Calvinist king. Notwithstanding these overwhelming objections, the agreement
went forward, a result of what satirists called “Dutch Arithmetic.” (Manhés, 2005 p.
102). Like under French rule, the approach towards the Dutch occupiers was dictated
more by social class and the desire to retain social standing than regional or ethnic
affiliations.
William the First adopted a policy designed to disengage Belgians from French
language and culture. In 1823, Dutch became the official language of administration and
justice in the Flemish region and Brussels and planned to apply this policy to Wallonia.
(Zolberg, 1974 p. 188).The Dutch were aware that this policy went against well-
established trends and would be met with considerable resistance. It was rejected by the
bourgeois of both regions who by now spoke almost exclusively French, the language
which was once and would be again connected with social mobility. William‟s policy
waged against the clergy also undermined further identification of the largely Catholic
Flemish with the Dutch. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 71).
The Dutch rule did serve an unintended purpose, increasing awareness of
Flemish culture, formed in contrast to Dutch and French traditions. Dutch rule led to a
greater acceptance of Flemish culture, revealing to the middle class a “hitherto almost
unsuspected, or actively repressed, existence of a modern literary and scientific culture
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in a standardized language almost identical to what was regarded as a mere “dialect” in
Belgium” (Zolberg, 1974 p. 191). This segment of society formed the core of the
Flemish intellectual class which would later be influential after independence.
Despite a shared history the incorporation of the Southern Netherlands into a
United Kingdom of the Netherlands failed. Fueled by revolutionary and romantic ideals
and deeply dissatisfied with the policies of King William I, both liberals and young
Catholics, especially from Flanders joined forces. The movement against Dutch rule
began in Liege and quickly spread to larger cities throughout Belgium, fomented anti-
Dutch sentiment and advocated greater liberties. Shortly before the revolution, the
Dutch administration began repressing dissidents. Bitsch writes that
Fourteen years of common life had actually enlarged the gulf that separated
Belgians from Dutch and the King William the First. This period permitted the
crystallization of a national Belgian sentiment which had been developing for
some time and which took a distinctly anti-Dutch tone
2004 p. 72.
These issues would culminate in the revolt of 1830 which would grant the Belgian state
its independence.
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State-Formation from Above
Belgian Independence and the Development of the State
Impetus for Revolution
The economic prosperity that Belgium experienced had no effect in calming
demands for autonomy and even independence. Periods of economic downturn would
naturally turn revolutionary. The failure of the Dutch administration to identify with the
people combined with an economic crisis that let to immigration and unemployment
would give the movement popular support. Many Francophones were also inspired by
news of France‟s July Revolution. A rapprochement that occurred in the 1820s between
liberals and increasingly progressive Catholics allowed the revolution to generate
popular support.
The Revolution
In Brussels on August 25th
1830, a theatre production ignited patriotic fervor
when it showed the fight of Napolitans against their Spanish oppressors. Demonstrations
followed during which the Branbacon flag was flown. A group of bourgeois, faced with
increasing disorder, formed a citizen‟s army which restored order to the streets. The
nobility advocated a dual administration under which Belgium would have a high
degree of autonomy. In the very beginning, the movement was led primarily by
Walloons, as the Church, highly influential in Flanders, distrusted a revolution inspired
in part by that of France, which it viewed as anticlerical and dangerous. However, anti-
Dutch activities eventually spread, with the Church seizing the chance to free itself from
the Protestant Netherlands and gain influence in the new Belgian state. Citizens,
deserters from the army and the French all joined in the effort to expel Dutch troops
from Belgian territory.
Militarily, Belgium did not have the strength to hold off Dutch troops
indefinitely; however, its timing was fortuitous. It benefited from a unique combination
of internal and external factors, including foreign support for Belgian independence and
the promise increased liberties and exercise of powers. LeFebrve describes the period in
which “Europe‟s smaller lands briefly profited from the failure of leadership once
vested in that continent‟s larger national units” (1997 p. 5). The fledgling Belgian state
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benefited from the distractions of other European powers. While Prussia and Russia
were initially willing to intervene in favor of the House of Orange, Louis-Phillipe
abstained, as the French public supported Belgian independence. Prussia, faced with an
uprising in its Polish territories, also abstained. Belgium found support for its quest for
independence among the English who wanted to establish a state capable of defending
itself on France‟s northern frontiers. (Manhés, 2005 p. 101). England negotiated the
treaties which led to the recognition of Belgium by the great powers and helped defend
it against Dutch revanchisme. The nature of political leadership was also important, and
resulted in a union of the young generation from across the political spectrum, "the first
generation of Catholics who no longer wished for the restoration of the Ancien Regime
and the first generation of liberals who no longer feared this restoration" (Mabille, 1996
p. 23). The movement found its greatest support among the popular and middle classes
of Brussels, and in other Walloon towns, joined later by rural elements and the Flemish
provinces.
The Formation of the Belgian State and Language Policy
Belgium‟s first constitution was highly progressive, allowing freedom of
religion, education, association and the press. It also allowed, in Article 23, for the
freedom of linguistic usage. However, this was more relevant in theory than practice as
the political class believed that a cohesive Belgian state would not be possible unless
French was the only official language. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 191).
Although Belgium was linguistically heterogeneous, most of its inhabitants lived
in linguistically homogenous regions. A majority of those in the north of the country
spoke a dialect of Flemish. This formed a majority, about 60% of the Belgian
population, however these dialects had yet to be standardized. Those in the south spoke
Walloon or Picard while only a small, urban, industrial minority used standard French as
its primary means of communication. Francophones were not necessarily of Walloon
origin; a large segment consisted of Flemings who had adopted French as a means of
social mobility. Those who spoke French were the upper stratum of society, forming the
political class which shaped the Belgian state. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 182-3). However, the
status of French, Flemish and Walloon languages was not determined without debate,
and historians differ on the motivations for the choice of French.
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Vos attributes the adoption of French as the single national language to three
factors; including the belief that a one-language policy was critical for a stable state, the
conviction of the cultural superiority of the French language to that of the vernacular
Flemish or Walloon dialects, and the feeling that national identity could not form around
the language of the most recent overlord. (1993 p. 133). However, Alain Deickhoff
views the motivations in a slightly different light, arguing that Belgium was largely a
product of elite and bourgeois elements, with little input from the lower classes. He
explains the primary considerations as
the traditional usage of French as the language of central administration, its
cultural and ideological prestige as the language of freedom and progress, its
usage, in both Wallonia and Flanders, by the bourgeois
However, Dieckhoff also recognized the role of language in the formation of a national
consciousness. (1996 p. 10).
Resistance from Within:
Orangists and Reunionists
Although inhabitants of Belgian territory were generally in favor of
independence, there were some sources of dissent, advocating either union with the
French state or with the Low Countries. In Belgium, Orangists and Reunionists adopted
similar arguments in favor of reunion with the Netherlands and France respectively,
arguing that an independent Belgian state was not economically viable. (Bitsch, 2004 p.
86). Orangists, who promoted the maintenance of ties with the Low Countries were
present among the industrialists of both the north and the south largely abstained from
the election of national representatives, effectively eliminating themselves from the
political dialogue. Notably, the Orangists were not Flemish nationalists but were
Francophone who feared “the negative economic consequences of separation and the
dominant position which the Catholic Church was likely to achieve in an independent
Belgium” They disappeared completely with the international recognition of the Belgian
state in 1839. There was also a pro-French contingent, largely comprised of those who
had come of age during the French occupation. This group was more active than the
Orangists and the first acts of the national congress often reveal a pro-French bias.
(Mabille, 1996 p. 25-6).
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Choosing a King
Belgium‟s progressive political leadership seemed to make a strange choice
when it advocated the formation of a parliamentary monarchy to rule Belgium.
However, they believed that a king would enhance the fledgling state‟s status on the
international stage and would provide a figure around which Belgian identity could
coalesce. The choice of a king was a difficult one, as a member of the House of Orange
with which Belgium was engaged in conflict until 1838, could obviously not be
selected. The Belgian parliament was originally closely tied to France, with many
members advocating the Duke of Nemours, a choice others feared would merely be a
prelude to annexation by their powerful neighbor. Finally, Leopold de Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha was asked to become monarch. Linked through marriage with the British royal
family, Leopold I was a cunning statesman and competent to lead the military, a trait
which would serve him well as the Belgian state was attacked by the Netherlands
shortly after his inauguration. This foray was halted by Belgian and French troops and
the resulting stalemate forced an acceptance of the Belgian state, with some territorial
concessions on the part of Belgium in 1838. When independence was recognized by the
international order, the process of state-building could begin. Fitzgerald describes the
new state as coming into existence “both as a reaction against its arbitrary fate resulting
from historical accident and the machinations of the great powers, and at the same time
as the direct result of those very machinations” (1996 p. 6).
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The Rise of Nationalism and Regional Differentiation
The End of Unionism
Unionism, the alliance between liberals and Catholics through which Belgium
came into being, was necessary until the recognition of Belgian independence by the
Netherlands in 1839. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 108). However, this alliance would not survive
without the presence of a common external threat. Several scholars date the death of
unionism to 1847, although its decline was evident as early as 1840. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.
26). Belgium, considered by some as an artificial state, did not have a normal period of
reprieve after independence, but was beset by severe cleavages that would shape the
state. The primary issues as identified by Mabille were centralization, secularization and
industrialization; language policy would later be added to this list of contentious issues.
Often these issues took on a regional dimension and remain important factors in today‟s
politics.
Belgium: A Secular State?
The role of the church immediately became a point of contention, with the
primary parties having different conceptions of the role of the church in education and
social services. This debate was waged between clerical parties and liberals, who were
often militantly anti-clerical. The main battle took place over education; liberals felt that
the establishment of Catholic universities and primary schools represented a dangerous
monopoly. Attempts to moderate the influence of the Church in public education met
strong resistance from Catholics. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 112). A regional dimension became
evident, as Wallonia, highly influenced by secular French ideals, resisted the Catholic
monopoly and more traditional Flanders resented attacks on the Church. These issues
first emerged in the early days of the Belgian state and reemerged with a vengeance
after World War II. (Mabille, 1996 p. 30).
The Debate over Industrialization and Economic Development
At the end of the 1840s, Belgium faced a severe economic crisis, especially in
Flanders whose domestic textile industry was destroyed by the mechanization of the
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trade. This, combined with poor harvests, led to famine, disease, emigration and most
importantly, increasing levels of social and political discontent. The economic
expansion which took place in Belgium and much of Western Europe from 1850 to
1873 was unique, marked by a dramatic regional disequilibrium. Wallonia profited
while Flanders still reeled from the destruction of its traditional textile industries.
The Birth of the Flemish Movement
Shortly after independence, the Flemish population confronted a severe regional
economic imbalance, a perceived foreign policy overtly oriented towards France and the
dominance of French-speaking elites to the exclusion of the Flemish. At its origin, the
Flemish movement was not anti-Belgian, nor did it advocate federalism or autonomy. Its
raison d’être was simply to improve the status of the Flemish language within the
Belgian state and was seen by many as a response against the francification of the
Belgian state and population. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 120). Although the Flemish language did
not face outright persecution, its inferior status hindered social mobility among Flemish
speaking citizens and served to solidify a monopoly on power of Francophones.
Walloon elites often adopted a paternalistic attitude towards their Flemish counterparts.
Their relative social and economic underdevelopment was attributed to use of a
provincial dialect and the adoption of French was believed to be the means of economic
development.
Several scholars argue that the movement, as it developed, aimed to "fortify the
independence of the Kingdom by the rejection of French influence, promoting a national
tradition in fact anti-French and anti-Dutch" (Wils, 1996 p. 52; Vos 1993 p. 134). It was
highly influenced by the literary world, many of whom wrote in French to reach a wider
audience while promoting the standardization of the language, adopting Dutch spelling
and grammar. In 1840, the movement launched a petition demanding bilingualism in the
Flemish provinces which received 13,000 signatures. This movement generated support
from wide segments of society p. the clergy, which saw the French language as a vessel
for anti-clericalism and impiety, the creative world which was heavily influenced by
Romantic ideals and especially by the Flemish middle class who confronted a glass
ceiling in the social sphere as a result of a French-leaning administration and the
advanced economic development of Wallonia.
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Despite this action and the fact that a majority of Belgium‟s citizens spoke
Flemish, their demands were largely ignored. Their ranks swelled in the 1840s, when
Flanders was hit by a severe economic crisis. Flemish disillusionment increased,
bolstered by the region‟s economy which grew in the late nineteenth century and
suffrage movements which made the political spectrum more accessible to the general
population. Both the Flemish Movement and that of Wallonia which arose as a response
to Flemish demands emerged outside the party structure, although party affiliations are
evident from the early days, reflecting different traditions and interests. Walloons had a
tendency to align with liberals and socialists while the majority of Flemings supported
the religious-based parties.
The Rise of the Party System
The need for unity and the influential role of King Leopold I are, according to
Yves Manhés , the elements which prevented the immediate development of political
parties. It was not until 1846 that the Liberal Party was created, heavily influenced by
freemason and anticlerical thought. Until the formation of their rightist counterpart in
1884, they held a monopoly on power, despite a return to unionism in the 1850s and
Catholic government in the 1870s. The party‟s anticlerical stance pushed Catholics to
form their own party. In the late 1870s and 1880s, socialist currents in the form of
workers parties began to develop, bringing Flemish and Walloon organizations under
the umbrella of the Belgian Workers Party.
The Walloon Movement
The Walloon Movement did not spring from deep-seated cultural identifications
or political discrimination but was in fact, a reaction against the Flemish movement,
with practical demands. The Movement rejected the proposed introduction of
bilingualism in Wallonia and monolingualism in Flanders where many French-speakers
had found lucrative careers. The movement was first supported by the liberals and
socialists who distrusted the Flemish Movement‟s close ties with Catholicism. This
actually served to reinforce Flemish identification with clerical movements. (Vos, 1993
p. 137).
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Attempts to Reform the System
In 1856, the Belgian government created an official Commission of Grievances
which in 1859 published a report addressing linguistic issues in Belgium. It advocated
general bilingualism in Flemish areas and French-unilingualism in French-speaking
areas. (Vos, 1993 p. 134). However, this did not solve the underlying problem faced by
Flemish nationalists. If French was to remain the dominant language in education,
administration and industry, the trend of francification would continue, as the middle
classes saw the French language as key to social mobility. Francophones argued against
reforms, which would pose a threat to the current linguistic monopoly and oust
exclusively French speakers from leadership positions in Flanders. Small changes were
enacted to appease the movement, including the introduction of subsidies for Flemish
literature. However, this was not sufficient and the Flemish movement organized with
the realization that their demands were unlikely to be met without concentrated action.
In the 1870s, Flemish politicians pushed through several laws regarding
linguistic issues. This was a result of several shocking cases in which unilingual
Flemish-speakers faced legal action in a language they did not understand resulting in
severe punishments, including the death penalty. In 1873, a law was passed regarding
language usage in the courts, 1878, in the administration and 1883, in official secondary
education. However, these laws did not imply the implementation of bilingual policies
but applied only to unilingual Flemish speakers. (Vos, 1993 p. 135). It was only in the
1880s and 1890s that the first bilingual policies were passed, which dealt with monetary
policy, postage stamps and the official newspaper. In 1898, Flemish efforts were noted
with the recognition of the equality of French and Dutch, however symbolic.
Politicization of the Flemish Movement
The Flemish movement evolved in the second half of the nineteenth century,
shifting its focus from linguistic and literary identity to linguistic equality and
bilingualism. “It was under no illusions that Dutch-speakers in Belgium would have to
be bilingual if they were to play a role in public life. Yet it wanted French-speaking
officials in Flanders to bear at least some of the cost of bilingualism” (Vos, 1993 p.
134).
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In 1900, boosted by increased political participation, the Flemish movement
expanded its political program to reflect this evolving interest from solely linguistic
issues to incorporate a broader “cultural nationalism.” Vos argues that this identity was
distinct from the larger Belgian identity and promoted “culture as a whole, on group
solidarity and emancipation, on economic, social and educational development of the
Flemish nation and on the creation of new „Flemish institutions.” (1993 p. 136-7).
Within this framework, nationalists pushed for a unilingual territory and state support to
enhance economic development in the region. It was within this economic context that
the movement gained widespread acceptance. Flemish-speakers who were at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis their French speaking counterparts became increasingly
politically engaged. The Flemish movement found itself being absorbed into mainstream
political parties, especially with traditionalist Catholic parties, rather than liberals who
were strongly anti-clerical, anathema to Catholic Flanders. The view that the Catholic
and Flemish identities were intrinsically linked became widespread. (Vos, 1993 p. 135).
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A Common Threat- A Common Hope?
Belgium in the First World War
As Europe tottered towards the brink of war, Flemish politics were reaching a
new level, emphasizing a national cultural revival rather than solely linguistic rights.
Vos explains that this movement was not like later movements, as it remained
compatible with Belgian patriotism. (1993 p. 137). Electoral reforms had expanded the
vote to a greater proportion of the population, increasing support for both the Catholic
party and reforms of linguistic policy. In Belgium‟s first years, politics were dominated
by the Catholic and Liberal parties, who tended to undo the other‟s policies when taking
office. In the 1880s, the socialist Belgian Workers Party entered the political arena,
gaining particular support among the workers of highly industrialized Walloons, but
little in Flanders, where they were distrusted for their supposedly anti-clerical views.
One of the key issues in this period was the creation of a Flemish university. This
movement gained significant support from members of all three parties, Catholic,
Socialist and Liberals. In 1910, a petition was signed by 100,000 citizens. (Fitzgerald,
1996 p. 31). However, its implementation was interrupted by the tensions which led to
the First World War.
Albert I sought guarantees of Belgian neutrality from Germany. When he failed
to do so, he began increasing the military resources of Belgium, despite strong
opposition. In 1913, obligatory military service was finally passed. It was during the
military occupation that Belgian nationalism and regional identities were put to the test.
The Flemish movement was both strengthened and radicalized during the war
due to the treatment of Flemish soldiers in the Belgian army. From 1910 to 1914,
several reforms were proposed to end the unilingual nature of the armed forces.
However these reforms were largely unsuccessful and those which did succeed did so
only in 1913 and therefore lacked the time to be fully implemented before the outbreak
of war.
The German occupiers sought to undermine the Belgian state, dividing it into
Walloon and Flemish administrations, and favoring the Flemish region. (Manhés, 2005
p. 138). The occupiers engaged in Flamenpolitik and pandered to nationalists by
promising the long-awaited Dutch-speaking university in Ghent. During the war, a front
movement developed which envisioned the postwar Belgium as a federal state with self-
government for the region. However, only a minority of Flemish-speakers supported the
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German occupiers, notably the Activists which formed a puppet government and
advocated an administrative division of the country. (Vos, 1993 p. 137). The majority of
the population remained loyal to the unified Belgian state, hoping only for reforms to
increase equality among the two groups once the war ended.
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Democracy and Dissent
The 1920s and 1930s
Belgium struggled to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the German occupation,
increase political participation and democratic development and cope with the
nationalist and fascist forces sweeping Europe. While Belgium would quickly return to
its prewar prosperity, it was highly integrated in the international system and would be
vulnerable to the global economic crises of the period. King Albert, for his part,
promised a new society in which national cohesion would be strengthened. While
charges of collaboration on both sides seemed to threaten the very fabric of Belgian
society, it served in fact, in some groups to strengthen Belgian identity as people were
anxious to disassociate themselves with the extremist and collaborationist activities that
took place during the Great War.
Electoral Reforms
Universal male suffrage was introduced and used to determine the results of the
first elections in 1919. The liberals, long accustomed to dominance, faced the greatest
electoral losses. The Catholics would remain an integral part of the coalition
governments during the entire interwar period. In periods of economic and social crisis,
broad coalitions were formed. Despite or perhaps due to these reforms, the government
coalitions were highly unstable but then, as in now, ministerial positions were often
occupied by the same elites, lending consistency.
Radicalization of the Flemish Movement
Due to his participation during the war, Albert I was aware of the detrimental
effect of excluding Flemish speakers and he affirmed the necessity of a bilingual army
and of greater linguistic equality. (Manhés, 2005 p. 143). However, these reforms were
slow in coming and Flemish proponents of linguistic equality quickly became
disillusioned.
The Flemish movement, which had gained strength in the prewar period, was
discredited by accusations of collaboration and found itself divided. The majority of
Flemings retained their prewar stances, advocating increased linguistic equality and
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cultural cohesion. Vos describes their goals as “unilingualism in Flanders and a form of
cultural autonomy via a legally guaranteed replacement of French by Dutch in public
life” (1993 p. 138). This goal was not incompatible with the unitary structure of the
Belgian state and these moderates pushed for reforms from within the existing party
system, drawn especially to the Christian Democratic Party. A radical minority
supported by disillusioned soldiers and young intellectuals developed into Flemish-
nationalists, advocating the federalization or in some cases, the dissolution of the
Belgian state, which would entail Flemish independence or incorporation into the
Netherlands.
However, as demands were unfulfilled, there was a gradual evolution of the
Flemish movement, which “created an environment and a mental framework within
which the commitment to Belgium gradually gave way to a solely Flemish-nationalist
sentiment. This sentiment was to attract not only the radical political nationalists, but
also the strategically moderate supporters of the language laws. “There was now a
Flemish culture alongside the official and still much stronger officially bilingual Belgian
culture, which in turn had assumed a slightly more Francophone character” (Vos, 1993
p. 139). This would increase the efficacy of political mobilization and differentiation.
There was also an economic motivation, as the discovery of coal in Flanders
further accelerated the shift in industry as these resources were exploited. Following the
First World War, financial institutions and industries were centered in the Flemish cities
of Brussels and Antwerp. This would empower the middle classes of Flanders and lead
to a greater push for regionalization. This was viewed by ruling elites as a threat to their
economic and political power and was resisted, especially by Francophones.
Greater Cohesion among Walloons
The Walloon movement capitalized on the disgrace of Fleming collaboration and
distrust of the nascent Flemish identity which seemed to threaten both the Belgian state
and Francophone dominance therein. Vos writes that after
the end of the war everything that was Flemish was regarded as unpatriotic by
French-speakers, Belgian patriots and left-wing opinion. A wave of
francification engulfed the country. The language laws of the thirties were
continually broken to the detriment of Dutch. At the same time the southern
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provinces saw a revival of Walloon-Belgian sentiment. This was considered
perfectly compatible with respectable Belgian patriotism”
1993 p. 140.
Rather than serving the interests of the state, this solidified Flemish distrust of their
counterparts, emphasizing the dominance of Francophone and often overtly French
interests.
Flirtation with Fascism
In June of 1936, a broad coalition was formed to lead the government. While the
government did make changes, including the implementation of a 40-hour workweek,
public opinion largely felt that the reforms failed to address serious political, economic
and international problems. In the 1930s, both Flemish and Walloon militants were
increasingly attracted by the fascist ideologies sweeping Europe. Some turned to these
extremist parties, including the VNV, the Flemish National League, which emphasized
the necessity of greater discipline and Flemish nationalism. Rex, based in Wallonia had
the largest electoral support among the extremist groups, coming in fourth after the
traditional parties. Rex rejected the capitalist nature of Belgian society and advocated a
return to authority and the implementation of corporatism. The effects of these parties
were compounded by a lack of unity within the Catholic union, which split along
regional lines, the Flemish wing advocating Flemish nationalism and going so far as to
negotiate with VNV. (Manhés, 2005 p. 147-8). The traditional political actors were
forced to grapple with these new forces in a time of increasing crisis. In 1937, in order
to appease the demands of the Flemish right, those who had collaborated with the
German occupation were granted amnesty.
Preparing for War
After the First World War, Belgian‟s politicians remained committed to
neutrality, despite its obvious failure to prevent German invasion. Faced with internal
turmoil but secure in its economic position, Belgium did not seek to enhance its
influence on the international stage, with the exception of its limited colonial activities
in Africa. It was not until the 1930s that the geographically vulnerable state began to
view Hitler‟s Germany as a threat. Leopold III attempted to develop a new security
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policy, one of mains libres.. By this point, the threat of fascist Germany was becoming
increasingly real, and this policy was endorsed by a once resistant government coalition.
However, the policy which entailed closer relations with France was cited by Flemish
nationalists as further evidence of Walloon dominance, a dominance which would put
the country in opposition to one of its powerful neighbors. (Manhés, 2005 p. 150). The
lack of time coupled with the absence of strong internal support for militarization,
Belgium was ill-prepared to defend itself. Despite courageous efforts, was quickly
overrun and placed under German military occupation.
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World War II: Collaboration and Resistance
King Leopold III, following the example of his father in the first conflict, refused
to evacuate in face of the German army despite the objections of the government-in-
exile which had relocated first to France and then to London. He hoped to protect the
country and negotiate safety for Belgian prisoners of war. Objections to and support for
this act would divide the country immediately following the war and lead to his
abdication.
While a common threat can often promote greater unity and cohesion in a state,
for Belgium, the German invasion and occupation only served to augment ethnic
conflict. The Walloon Rexists entered into the Nazi camp with their leader affirming the
German character of the nation and advocating its annexation. (Bitsch, 2005 p. 155).
Initially, Flemish nationalists collaborated with the Reich, in hopes of gaining
independence with the support of the powerful Germany. Germany once again engaged
in Flamenpolitik, supported by the VNV and De Vlag which pushed for annexation of
Flanders into the Reich and negotiated the release of Flemish prisoners. Both Walloons
and Flemings were subjected to forced labor and deportation of large segments of the
population, which quickly lead to disillusionment with the fascist cause. The majority of
the collaborationists quickly realized that Flemish independence was not part of Hitler‟s
grand vision for a postwar Europe and renounced the fascist collaboration and adopted a
pro-Belgian, anti-federalist stance.
This change would come too late, as Walloons would not easily forgive this
betrayal, while conveniently forgetting the actions of the Rexists. They perceived fascist
leanings as characteristic of both the Catholic Flemings and King Albert. As a result
some advocated an independent republic of Wallonia or absorption of the region into
France. One of the most significant political developments was a Walloon Catholic
party which would foster a greater sense of ethnic identity. Mabille writes that the war
and politics of occupation gave birth to a Walloon national conscience that would only
accept Belgium “under certain conditions” (1996 p. 73). The war would force a dramatic
change in Belgian politics.
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Crisis and Change:
1945 to 1950s:
Belgium was both economically and politically damaged by World War II,
having split definitively into factions, with anger and recriminations on both sides. The
Walloons emerged from the war radicalized, demanding a federal state, on equal terms
with the Flemish nationalists who were by now tainted by their flirtations with the Nazi
regime and weakened by charges of collaboration. Although Francophones had long
dominated Belgian society, they feared that acquiescence to Flemish demands
compounded with demographic and economic shifts would leave them vulnerable to
majority rule.
Fortunately, Belgium was able to regain its economic prosperity quickly,
enhanced by cooperation between all social elements, employers were pleased with state
supports, workers and unions benefited from reforms enhancing their stability and
positions. However, this growth took on a regional character, with the majority of new
investment going to Flanders rather than Walloon industries which were struggling even
before the war. These issues quickly culminated in a crisis, manifesting in a bitter
dispute divided largely along linguistic lines over the fate of Belgium‟s monarch.
The Question of the King
While previous kings were viewed as a symbol of unity, the question of the fate
of King Leopold III catalyzed the Belgian public. Leopold remained in Belgium and
negotiated with Hitler over the fate of Belgian soldiers taken prisoner by the German
army. He was taken to Austria and liberated by American troops but his status remained
unclear, polarizing public opinion. The Catholics, overwhelmingly Flemings, supported
his actions and advocated his return to power while non-Catholics disputed his right to
rule. In 1950, a referendum was held to decide his fate and the results showed the stark
divide between Flanders and Wallonia, with Flanders voting 72 percent in favor of his
return to power, in Wallonia he received 42 percent in favor and fared minimally better
in Brussels, receiving 48 percent of the vote. Despite receiving a total of 58 percent in
favor, rioting erupted over his return, resulting in three deaths. As a result, the king
abdicated in favor of his son Baudouin. (Manhés, 2005 p. 163). Catholics in Flanders
viewed this as an affront to their pride and yet another instance in which the majority of
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Flemish voices were overruled by a Francophone minority. This, according to Louis
Vos, combined with the persecution of former Flemish-nationalist collaborators,
strengthened, their sense of Flemish identity. (Vos, 1993 p. 140).
The Ramifications of Collaboration
While the majority of the population remained loyal to the Belgian state,
collaboration with the Nazi occupiers did occur in both the Flemish and Francophone
communities. The judicial system dealt first with those guilty of baring arms against the
Belgian state, which included those individuals, armed or not, who were at the service of
the German army or its auxiliary branches, including the SS. This also applied to
women and children who had worked with the German division of the Red Cross.
Political cooperation was more ambiguous and those prosecuted included journalists for
the German paper and members of those supported by the Reich. The courts adopted a
different approach from that imposed after the First World War, realizing that economic
contacts were inevitable, and even beneficial, and therefore not punished. (Manhés,
2005 p. 159).
However, the charges of political collaboration fell largely on Flanders and the
Flemish were considered pro-German because of the nature of Flemish nationalism. The
repression of both collaborators and the Flemish movement themselves was considered
by many to be a contributing factor the rise of a new breed of Flemish nationalism. Vos
writes that “the punishment caused dissatisfaction among large sections of the Flemish
people who felt that many idealists were punished simply because of their Flemish
sympathies” (1993 p. 139).
The Flemish movement was now considered tainted by its fascist affiliations.
Instead of breaking the Flemish movement, Flemish organizations experienced an
increased mobilization of the Flemish movement within cultural parties and
parliamentary initiatives. The revitalization was fostered by Catholic educational and
social organizations.
The School Crisis
The question of secular versus religious education had always been a factor in
Belgian politics. Opinion was drastically different between Catholics, who had a long
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established system of education, liberals and socialists. In the tumultuous years shortly
following the war, Christian Democrats had increased state funding of religious schools
and, according to the opposition, increased the role of the Catholic Church in state
affairs. (Manhés, 2005 p. 163). When a coalition of socialists and liberals came to power
in 1954, they attempted to implement major changes, reducing and restricting financial
aid to religious institutions. (Vos, 1993 p. 141). In 1955, legislation was proposed that
would increase control over the educational system and limit funding to those areas in
need of it. This action resulted in massive protests in Brussels and forced the proponents
to retreat. In 1958, the question was resolved with the School Pact, a result of
cooperation of all major parties, recognizing the freedom of school choice and free
education at all levels. However, the fallout from this battle would persist, in particular,
strengthening Flemish Catholic identity, especially among the younger generations. The
issues of collaboration, the monarchy and educational policy dominated the postwar
political scene. However, as these contentious issues were resolved, emphasis returned
to linguistic and regional policy which had yet to be resolved.
The Return of Regional Movements
While the Walloon movement gained support in the aftermath of the war, the
Flemish movement was slow to develop, due to charges of collaboration and
disorganization. In 1945, at the first Walloon Congress held in Liège the first votes were
shocking, with the majority of participants voting for the dissolution of the Belgian state
and the reattachment of the region to France. A second vote found this view to be
reactionary, and the majority of voters advocated a division of Belgium into linguistic
communities while maintaining the existence of the larger Belgian state. It was not until
1947 that the Flemish reorganized under the auspices of the Algemeen Vlaams Komitee,
incorporating the cultural organizations that existed before the war. It is notable that
candidates in favor of autonomy were not present in this organization until 1949.
(Manhés, 2005 p. 152). These organizations and political parties perpetuating
autonomist and federalist demands would become very important in the next decade.
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Economic Boom, Economic Bust: The Shift of Economic Power to Flanders
Introduction
The 1960s were a turning point in Belgian history, characterized by dramatic
shifts in the balance of economic and demographic power, a strengthened Flemish
movement and a concentrated Walloon defense. After the war, the more moderate wing
of the Flemish movement reinvigorated itself, adopting the ideology of the Christian
workers. Advocating economic regionalism, Flanders sought to address its relative
economic underdevelopment with a series of policies, including educational initiatives,
which served to strengthen Flemish as the language of enterprise. Its growing economic
power helped it push through these reforms and increased its assertiveness. (Keating, et
al 2003 p. 75).The Walloons on the other hand faced economic and demographic
stagnation rather than underdevelopment and reacted out of fear rather than confidence.
Political parties formed to represent these disparate and often opposing interests.
Growth of Regional Parties and the Strengthening of the Walloon Movement
The parties designed to represent regional rather than ideological interests had
their strongest electoral showing in the late 1960s and 1970s. While support ebbed in the
late 1970s, regional parties had clearly become a permanent feature in the Belgian
political scene, vital in forming necessary majorities for reforms. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.
125). They also served to force traditional Belgian parties, including the Socialists and
Christian Democrats, to incorporate regionalist rhetoric into their party platforms to
retain dwindling electoral support.
Dissatisfaction with the economic situation in Wallonia led to increasing strikes
in the 1960s. The bitter strikes of 1960-1, a result of severe decline in the aging
industries of the south, led to greater unity among the Walloon movement. (Fitzgerald,
1996 p. 125). Eventually these organizations entered into the party system, with the
Parti Wallon which formed in 1965 and the Rassemblement Walloon which followed.
These parties sought federal reform and revitalized the Walloon national movement.
They were supported by workers who felt that a regional government, which was likely
to favor socialist policies and state intervention, could better address the extreme
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structural problems which faced the region. By nature, the Walloon Movement was
ideologically left-wing and contrasted with its Flemish counterpart, which is inherently
rightist, emphasizing the preservation of culture and a common national identity.
Attempts at Reform
The need for a serious reform became increasingly evident in the 1960s. While
both Dutch and Walloons agreed on the need, the means were the subject of intense
debate. The Flemish advocated devolution of powers to language communities, which
were viewed as cultural institutions while Walloons defended economic autonomy for
the southern region, powers necessary to address the economic decline that had beset the
once prosperous region, Brussels wanted to retain its Francophone nature. (Keating, et
al. 2003 p. 77).
In the early 1960s, the government led by Lefevre and Spaak finally sanctioned
the principle of unilingualism in Flanders and Wallonia, with a bilingual Brussels. As
part of these reforms, the institutions addressing issues of culture and education were
divided along linguistic lines and legislation was passed dealing with language policy.
In 1962, a new linguistic frontier was drawn with four Flemish provinces, four
Francophone provinces and the division of Brabant in accordance with linguistic
distribution. These lines were fixed, as linguistic questions on the census were
disallowed at this point. (Manhés, 2005 p. 173). These reforms represented a fulfillment
of traditional demands, but a whole new slate had emerged in the postwar period,
including the demand for cultural and political autonomy for linguistic communities.
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The Failure of Accommodation and the End of the Unitary state-
The 1970s
In the 1960s, a unilingual territory was finally realized in Flanders. The 1960s
saw the emergence of a class of Flemish politicians who had been educated entirely in
Dutch-speaking schools and/or universities and who were thus more vocal in demanding
a strict observance of the language laws. (Swenden, 2003 p. 3). These political elite
often adopted the nationalistic rhetoric that would be key to mobilizing voters and
forcing change among traditional parties. Their discontent with the status quo
manifested itself in Leuven, when Flemish nationalists that demanded that the French
speaking portion of the Catholic University be relocated to Walloon territory. After
strikes and violence, these demands were met, but like all attempts, they only
perpetuated further strife, as anti-Flemish sentiment developed in Wallonia and
Brussels. As a result of these tensions, both Walloon and Flemish nationalist parties
gained at the ballot box. To meet these demands, the government sought structural
solutions, including constitutional reform in 1970 which created cultural councils and
regional authorities, divesting competences over cultural affairs and economic
development respectively to these institutions. This reform and its impact will be
analyzed further in chapter four. The unitary structure was no longer effective in the
management of regional demands and had to be replaced. While the need was evident,
the means were subject to intense debate.
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Towards a Federalist Belgium, the 1980's
In the early 1980s institutional reform was put on hold in order to deal with
economic problems besetting the country. However, the intended reforms could not be
delayed for long. Flanders had become more assertive, approaching the matter as a
“powerful national entity.” The merger of the linguistic community and regional
government allowed it a greater range of maneuver than that of the Francophone
community and the Walloon region, which did not possess this degree of administrative
and territorial continuity, as they encompassed both the German community and ever
contentious Brussels. (Manhés, 2005 p. 176).Wallonia also suffered for its constant
emphasis on economic issues and a lack of strong national consciousness.
A Stronger Cultural Council and Regional Governments
The regional governments were also formed, realizing the goals of the 1970
reforms. The regional council would eventually be directly elected, and the number of
members would be proportional to the number of deputies at the national level.
Competences were divided between the state and the region. Regional economic policy
was perhaps the most important, as Wallonia struggled to invest in and subsidize its
ailing industries while Flanders adopted more market oriented policies. The regions
were financed by allocations from the state although taxation was envisaged.
From 1988 to 1989, constitutional reforms were enacted allowing the expansion
of regional powers and adding additional institutions. In 1990, these fledgling
institutions were put to the test when the Francophone community failed to meet its
financial responsibilities in its education system and relied on the national government
for handouts. Manhés writes that “in economic fields, the fracture between Flemings
and Walloons led to fears of the existence of a collective will to live” (2005 p. 177).
Wallonia feared Flanders‟ economic dominance while Flanders resented subsidizing
failing industries in the south. These points of contention contributed to the rejection of
governmental actors in favor of regional rightist parties in the elections of 1991.
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Belgium 1993: The End or the Beginning?
The government which took power in 1992 began a new round of constitutional
reforms, which included an additional transfer of competences to the communities and
direct elections to community institutions. It affirmed the federal nature of the system in
the first article of this constitution and ended the special status of the Brabant region,
which was previously bilingual, dividing it between the regions. This was meant to
solve the regional conflicts which had divided the country for so long. Walloons,
allowed the power to manage their economic affairs, were content to stop here. However
the Flemish demands continued, aided by the persistence of the extreme right.
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Conclusion
Belgium‟s “final” federalization would only last for 2002 and throughout this
period, strife between the two main ethnic groups would continue. The extreme right,
while losing some electoral support, remains an important factor in Belgian politics,
especially within Flanders. Although parties such as Vlaams Belang and Front National
focus on issues such as immigration and economic policy, their party platforms remain
antagonistic to the Belgian state.
The balance of power between Flanders and Wallonia has shifted dramatically
from the early period of French dominance. The movements representing regional
interests have evolved also, the Flemish Movement began a small, marginalized group
struggling for linguistic recognition, to the main force of Belgian politics, while
Wallonia lost its historic dominance and was prodded towards a federal state by its
Flemish counterparts. One is unable to predict the future. The large majority of demands
have been met, with a high degree of competences divested to the communities, yet
demands continue and the devolution of the state will eventually reach its limits.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ENTRENCHING ETHNIC CONFLICT:
BELGIUM’S MOVE TOWARDS FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT
The unitary state with its laws, structures and functions has been outmoded by reality.
The communities and regions must take their place in the renovated structures of the
states, better adapted to the country’s specific situations
Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens
Introduction
Belgium‟s move towards federalism was a slow process, pushed forward only
under intense pressure. The first challenge to the unitary state came more than a century
after its foundation, when a meeting of Francophone leaders in 1945 voted in favor of an
autonomous Wallonia in a federal Belgium, a move largely in response to the Belgian
experience in World War II and the already evident decline in economic productivity in
Wallonia. However, the leaders quickly retreated from this position and the federalist
mantra was then adopted by the Flemish nationalists that emerged in the 1950s. "Ethnic
demands and conflict management strategies were initially non-territorial, but
increasingly acquired a territorial aspect" (Hooghe, 2003 p. 73). Despite rising calls for
federalization, the established leaders resisted reforms until absolutely necessary, when
their political grip was weakened by electoral support for the regionalist parties. At the
time of the first reform, all agreed that something had to be done to appease the
population and sustain political control, although no end point was envisaged.
All of the major parties had an interest in protecting their unified control of the
policymaking process. The Catholics and Socialists, however, could tolerate
limited reforms if it meant they could be dominant regional actors in Flanders
and Wallonia, respectively. Such reform would require the dissolution of
parliament, the holding of constituent elections, and a two-thirds majority to pass
new constitutional amendments. Despite the fear of amending the existing
governing system, the major parties knew that the two-thirds rule guaranteed
consociational bargaining, ensuring their control of the amendment process
Newman, 1996 p. 76.
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Despite Prime Minister Eyskens assertion that the unitary state was dead, many
scholars argue that the reforms of 1970 were not meant to introduce a federalist system,
but were designed to preserve the unitary state in the face of federalist demands by
making small concessions to regionalist groups. Parties which operated on both sides of
the linguistic divide still existed, although they had disappeared by the time of the
subsequent reforms. They remained committed to a unitary state, feeling that a total
federalization would threaten their monopoly on power and the viability of the Belgian
state itself. (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 903). This piecemeal approach was unsuccessful. The
failure to implement reforms lead to the collapse of several governments and the
ethnoregionalist parties continued to garner votes.
In response, the traditional parties adopting regionalist platforms in the 1980s as
they ceded electoral support to regionalist parties such as Vlaams Unie and Vlaams Blok
in Flanders, Front Démocratique de Francophones in Brussels and the Rassemblement
Walloon in the South. Despite a drop in support for the regionalist parties during this
period, Belgium continued on its path towards federalism. By now the traditional
parties, in their regional reincarnations, had adopted distinctly ethnoregionalist
platforms, realizing this was the only way to retain influence. In 1993 the federalist
nature of the Belgian state was formally declared in the constitution. Belgium had been
transformed from a unitary state struggling to grapple with regionalist demands to a
federal state struggling with the same issues.
Despite its flaws, the Belgian system has been remarkably effective in
minimizing conflict, preventing an outbreak in violence or outright secessionism,
largely because it maintained consociational characteristics which prevented a
majoritarian system from taking root and completely alienating one side or the other.
(Deschouwer, 2002 p. 159). However, as a consociationalist system relies on secret
negotiations and favors, stability has come at the expense of the Belgian polity‟s
confidence, which is increasingly disillusioned with the elite-driven political system.
The division of politics into regionalist camps has not helped the already fractured
Belgian society, which seems to rally only in the face of scandal or sport. The extreme
right feeds on this dissatisfaction and calls for further regionalization of competences
persist.
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The Federal Reform of 1970: A Reluctant Move towards Federalism
Throughout the 1960s regionally based political parties mobilized support in
favor of federalization. After the linguistic lines were made permanent in 1964, it was
possible to speak of federalism along territorial lines. Once what Lefebvre calls the
“formal territorialization of the linguistic problem” was complete, pressure intensified
further as the ethnoregional parties had a concrete base from which to mobilize support.
(2003 p. 127). It was this competition, rather than a belief in federalism, which forced
the establishment to deal with the problem. Pressure eventually emerged from both sides
of the linguistic divide but was initiated by Flemish nationalists. Already faltering
economically, the Francophones feared they would face further problems if the drive
towards federalism was the result of a unilateral effort of the Flemings. Caselli and
Coleman offer this theory which can be applied to the Walloon response:
a majority that would otherwise prefer peaceful coexistence, engages in
repression and discrimination against the minority in order to prevent the latter
from attempting a grab for power. Similarly, in a multi-group world, a group that
would otherwise prefer peace may be induced to participate in an aggressive
coalition in order to preempt the constitution of an alternative aggressive
coalition that excludes it
2005 p. 4.
In an interesting reversal of roles, the Rassemblement Walloon advocated economic
autonomy to protect Walloon interests against the central government which it accused
of being a dominated by the North. (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998 p. 53). The RW drew
support from socialist voters who were concerned about the maintenance of Wallonia‟s
social welfare system in light of the faltering economy and the Flemish economic
dynamism and belief in free market principles. Their platform in 1968 advocated
reforms to "assure for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels the largest possible autonomy in
their political, economic, social and cultural organization." (Newman, 1996 p. 70-1).
Brussels was even more wary as the Francophone enclave feared cooperation
between the Flemings and Walloons would lead to its total exclusion. The Front
Démocratique de Francophones, founded in response to the linguistic measures of the
1960s and the rise of ethnoregionalist parties in both Flanders and Wallonia, ran
primarily on a platform of linguistic choice for education and administration and was
supported by both Flemish and Francophones who continued to view the French
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language as key to social mobility. “The FDF was first and foremost a liberal defender
of individual rights rather than a true community party" (Newman, 1996 p. 73).
Originally, the party remained committed to a unitary Belgian state but as federal
reforms seemed inevitable fears arose that it would be excluded from decision-making
carried out by the Walloon and Flemish regions, and it adopted a federalist platform that
would put Brussels on equal footing with the other units. (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998 p.
56). After the first reforms, the FDF became almost passionately federalist, advocating
Brussels as a region of its own, running on the slogan of “Bruxellois, master in your
own house.” The Flemish side rejected this as it would allow a two-one balance in favor
of the Francophones rather than the parity that prevailed. As a result, compromise
compromis à la belge, as Carter terms it, left the issue for another day. (2002 p. 15).
Several institutions and procedures were introduced in order to ensure
cooperation among the linguistic groups and the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict.
Significantly, these mechanisms maintained traditional consociationalist tendencies of
mutual vetoes and compromise. There was a formal devolution of power to the regions
and cultural communities, which was necessary because the linguistic border and the
territory were not congruent in all situations. Linguistic regions and cultural
communities governed by community councils which consisted of members of the
national parliament. These councils had full legislative powers in several defined areas.
Citizens living in formally bi-lingual Brussels were assigned a community on the basis
of the language they habitually spoke. (Pilet, 2005 p. 399). The regions, Flanders,
Wallonia and Brussels had, at this point, no special authority but this was to be granted
later in specific social and economic areas. Brussels and the German population also had
smaller cultural institutions. (Newman, 1996 p. 77).
In the central government, the principle of linguistic parity was to prevail despite
demographic differences. The Belgian cabinet which was to consist of equal numbers of
French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers as was the Brussels administration.
In regards to the legislative, new rules require the consent of a double majority in
order to enact further institutional reforms and implement the reforms proposed in this
constitutional session. This principle stipulates an overall majority of two-thirds and a
simple majority in each language group. (Deschouwer, 1999 p. 102). This prevents the
Flemish, by now a demographic and economic majority, from advocating further
devolution or actions without the consent of the Francophone minority. (Lefebvre, 2001
p. 127).
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An alarm bell procedure also restricts unilateralism and majority rule. When
legislation is proposed that one linguistic group considered potentially harmful, they
could vote to suspend further debate. It requires support from twenty-five percent of the
given language group. At this point the national government is required to propose a
solution within 60 days. Although the alarm bell procedure has yet to be used, it has had
a moderating influence on political actors, obligating them to negotiate and find an
acceptable solution for all parties involved, and avoid the political fallout of a stalemate.
This procedure, essentially a veto, is typical for the Belgian consociationalist system
which is designed to prevent majoritarianism and encourage compromise. The original
Belgian constitution required a two-thirds majority for any constitutional change. These
measures could only be enacted following the dismantling of the parliament and new
elections and were meant to ensure that parliament could not change the constitution
without support from all major political actors. (Hooghe, 2004 p. 19).
The articles did not entail extensive devolution of competences to the regions,
thus showing the reluctance of the establishment to dismember the central government.
Many felt that the reforms would stop here, having offered some guarantees. The
measures, including the roles and competences of the communities required extensive
implementation by the parliament and would now be subject to the stringent double
majority procedure. As no one had a grand vision of a federalist Belgium, attempts to
pass the implementing legislation would prove to be the foil of six governments between
1970 and 1980. The measures were finally pushed through by a coalition led by
Wilifried Martens but would be revised as demands for further regional autonomy and
meaningful competences intensified. (Covell, 1982 p. 451).
The 1970 reform, with its emphasis on compromise rather than majoritarian rule,
implemented a system which favored conflict management over efficiency. Political
elites, threatened with alarm bell procedures and vetoes, are forced to reach a
compromise, or pay politically for their inaction. Deschouwer writes of the reforms
“Either there is a compromise that is acceptable for both communities, or there is no
longer any government” (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 905).
Despite its success in mitigating ethnic conflict for the moment, the division of
language groups would signal the death of multilingual political parties and by the end
of the decade, they would have dissolved completely. The reform served to polarize the
once united national parties and in effect institutionalized ethnic conflict, framing every
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political debate along linguistic lines and encouraging political entrepreneurs to adopt
increasingly aggressive political platforms.
As the mainstream political actors co-opted the regionalist and federalist rhetoric
of the ethnoregionalist parties to maintain electoral support and meet demands, the
parties lost momentum. Flemish and French-speaking actors spoke increasingly for their
community or region in the first place, and began systematically to observe a Flemish-
French or regional balance in national politics" (Hooghe, 1995 p. 138). In the late
1970s, Volksunie and the Rassemblement Walloon were drawn into coalitions designed
to pass the necessary legislation laid out in the constitutional reform. This would allow
their entry into the traditional Belgian system but would be at their peril, drawn into
what Newman describes as a “Faustian bargain that helped ensure the creation of a
federal Belgium at the expense of party unity and support” (1996 p. 61).
The manner in which these reforms were carried out further distanced the
Belgium people from their government. Newman explains that
it was not the voters who determined the scope or direction of regionalization in
Belgium. Rather the major parties had used regionalization as a way of dividing
the ethnoregional parties so that they could control the political agenda. In a
sense, they had moved toward regionalization with limited input from the
ethnoregional parties
1996 p. 92.
Only the Volksunie, which was older and more experienced than FDF and RW and
competed on a more diverse platform, would be able to withstand these tactics.
Volksunie, accused of selling out by more radical elements in the Flemish nationalist
movement, began to develop a more comprehensive party platform, adopting stances on
militarism and environmental policy. (de Winter 1998 p. 33). However, they were
undercut by Vlaams Blok, a splinter group that advocated Flemish independence and
adopted increasingly xenophobic rhetoric.
After the mid-seventies, the regional parties lost seats in parliament, from 44 in
1974 to 13 in 1991. (Eatwell, 1997 p. 43). However, they had accomplished their
objective, setting Belgium on the path towards federalization and forcing the
mainstreaming of regionalist ideologies. The halted, reluctant reforms perhaps created
more resentment and encouraged the push for autonomy, especially among the Flemish.
By reason of the alarm-bell procedure, the requirement of concurrent majorities
for special laws, equal representation in the national government, and a
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multiparty political system that requires coalitions, the francophone political
parties have considerable leverage in the national parliament to ensure that their
interests are taken into account in any negotiated deal. Many Flemish resent
these antimajoritarian elements, which they often characterize as antidemocratic"
Mnookin, 2007
The emphasis on parity, despite the obvious demographic and economic differences
coupled with historical resentment of Flemish dominance spurred many Flemish
nationalists to increasingly radicalized positions.
The Egmont Pact
In 1977, it was clear that more progress towards a federal state must be made.
This progress had been hindered by the fragile nature of coalitions. In order to do so
effectively a broad majority coalition was formed, incorporating both traditional parties
and regional movements. The government needed to reconcile differing needs, as
Flanders sought to ensure the recognition of linguistic, territorial and cultural unity
while Wallonia sought the means to counter its economic decline independently. The
Egmont Pact would have created powerful regional institutions which could tax and
conclude international agreements. These institutions were to be run by elected
assemblies and legislatives, largely free from centralized control. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.
128). While these aims fulfilled the demands of the parties, they included constitutional
reforms which needed to be implemented in stages, rendering the process vulnerable to
fluctuations in coalitions and political tides. In the end, the CVP rejected the agreement,
arguing that the project was unconstitutional, would undermine the federal state and hurt
Flemish living in the periphery of Brussels, thus halting the process. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.
130). Notably, in 1978 the final division of Belgian political parties was complete, they
were now divided along linguistic lines and each found varying levels of political
support amongst the region. (Manhés, 2005 p. 175). However, just a few years later, a
similar model would be adopted and would this time succeed, even though the question
of Brussels would be frozen in order to ensure cooperation.
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Reform of the 1980s Conflict Prevention or Cooperation?
The legislation of 1980 was difficult to enact but necessary to fulfill the reforms
adopted in 1970. This entailed a regionalization including the expansion of regional
autonomy and the granting of new, and exclusive, competences to the community.
Unlike the German system in which the national body sets general goals and allows the
Lander to implement specific statutes, the regions, communities and federal government
were each given exclusive competences over specific areas and the acts that each made
were given equal status as national law.
The goal of this reform, according to Hooghe, was to minimize conflict by
creating “watertight compartments” on every level. This effort was complicated by the
fact that regional and community councils were not yet directly elected and made up of
members of the federal parliament. In addition, the regions and communities relied on
the federal government for funds, lacking the power of tax although this reform allotted
greater resources. The regions were financed by the central government and the sums
were determined on the basis of three equal criteria: population, personal income tax
paid and territorial surface area. The Communities received their funding on the basis of
a 45/55 rule, reflecting the demographic makeup of the French and Flemish
communities. (Gérard, 2001).
The existence of cultural and regional bodies also created divisions as there was
no broad agreement on “whether the territorial or the nationality principle should take
priority” (Hooghe 2003 p. 86). This problem was only relevant for Wallonia and the
Francophone region, as 1980 brought the formal merger of the Flemish Community and
Flanders as a region. This system was decidedly asymmetrical and allowed Flanders to
act more efficiently and strengthen regional identification. (Manhés, 2005 p. 176).
Regions are considered territorial entities, granted power over aspects such as