VII. MARRIAGEB. REQUISITES
FABIAN PUGEDA,plaintiff-appellee,vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS,
SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez,CLARA TRIAS,
assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,GABRIEL TRIAS, minors
ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRAand FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR.,
assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,TEOFILO PUGEDA, and
VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon
Portugal,defendants-appellants.G.R. No. L-16925March 31, 1962
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar
Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311,
1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412,
2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a
house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong
materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias,
Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims
participation in the said properties on the ground that the same
were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom
plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on
February 11, 1934.The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara,
Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias,
while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are
children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.The
plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between
himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with
conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764
of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest
therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No.
2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No.
2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest
in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer
in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said
properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as
co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above
described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be
given as share therein of plaintiff.The defendants surnamed Trias
and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties
described in the complaint, or that said properties had been
administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the
plaintiff, and by way of special and affirmative defense they
alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been
inherited by the defendants from their deceased father Mariano
Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in
possession and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years,
peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of
ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is
estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in
the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of
knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that
he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued
up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further presented a
counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this
amount being what was contributed by them in support of the
candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial
governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of
Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the
total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the
value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which
the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.The defendants
Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the
properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint properties
of the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the
properties had gone to the management and control of the defendants
Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits
thereof during the administration by them of said properties. As
cross-claim against their co-defendants, they allege that they are
each entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by their mother
as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as
a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad,
Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.Plaintiff denied
the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias,
answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all
the allegations contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda,
and further alleged that the cross-claim is improper as the same
should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants
Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any
further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.There
are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first
is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria
C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various
lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates of
sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned
to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the marriage of
plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim
for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him and
Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in
the possession of the defendants.On the first issue, the existence
of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified
that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or
Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the
office of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo
Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two
witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado
Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked
the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after
the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the
contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary
Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records
of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that
no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence
of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy
campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and
Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.The defendants denied
the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of
the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in
the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the
alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was explained by
the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the
register forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the
registry.Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after
the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which
was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was
baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a
sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal certificate
submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of the
spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said
birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian
Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.It is also not denied that
after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as
husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and
openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of
Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties defendants
themselves. The document contains the following significant
statement or admission: .WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only
children and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel,
Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y
Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias,
now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y
Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage with Fabian
Pugeda...... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties
hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista
property will be administered by one of the parties to be agreed
upon and for said purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all
earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the
improvement and welfare of the said property and for the payment of
all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and
for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y
Ferrer.The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he
testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that
plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on
January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the
chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses
to the celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as
well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer
lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934)
and there is a strong presumption that they were actually
married.On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to
prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .Art. 53. As to
marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a
certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted,
unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the
question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .The mere fact
that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father
and mother, while the latter wasin articulo mortis, failed to send
a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil.,
1) .Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).In our judgment the evidence
submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in
fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916
until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding
of the trial court to that effect.On the second issue the evidence
introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action
were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon
Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates
of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later
assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The
different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to
said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended to
this decision as Annex "A".On the basis of the facts about their
acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in
question were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be
adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal
properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate of 1/6
each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the
conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both
marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower
Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed
to the Court of Appeals.When the case was before the Court of
Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for
new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four
documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on
Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order
issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition
in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if
admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the
motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of
Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.Upon the return of
the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales
who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge
Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amounts to only P8,911.84,
while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses
Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found
that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda
and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore
ruled that the two marriages should participate in the ownership of
the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each
marriage in the installments in payment of the lands. The
dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as
follows: .IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby
renders judgment: .1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808,
1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650,
2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in
each individual lot;2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the
installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the
couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for
these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they
do not loss the character of conjugal property for payments were
made from the crops thereof;3. That since Mariano Trias during his
marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the
installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which
must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano
Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C.
Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among all the
children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second
marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;4. That lots
2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments
for these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano
Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal
between them one half of which must go to the children or heirs of
Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or
heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;5. That
Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced
after the death of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must
render an accounting of his administration within three (3) months
time from the date this judgment has become final.6. That
defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 154-156) .Against this ruling the appeal has come to
this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no
power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it
was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence.
They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be
boiled down to the three main issues set forth above. As the issue
of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the
second and more important question as to whether the land subject
of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the first
marriage or of the second or of both.A consideration of the legal
nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is
necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.A
study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120)
discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the government for
sale to actual occupants(actual settler and occupants at the time
said land are acquired by the Government).(Paragraph 3 of
Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares
that the landare not publicland in the sense in which this word is
used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed
by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of
Purposes, Id.) .The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are
as follows: .Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have been
thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set
forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such
settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the
price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United
States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest
the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall
be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section
one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...Sec.
13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate
shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase
price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest
specified in the certificate, and he shall by such acceptance
become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all
accrued interest. .... Provided however, That every settler and
occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter into the
agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said
certificate and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to
do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the
part of the settler and occupant to comply with this requirement
shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be
ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased
or sold as in case of unoccupied lands: ....Sec. 15. The Government
hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold
under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all
installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has
been made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid
as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in
all respects subordinate to its prior claim.Sec. 16. In the event
of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is
provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a
deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be
entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate
upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for
the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies
before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the
interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed
shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine
Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the
death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders
thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold
his interest in the land before having complied with all the
conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the
certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of
the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for registration. (Vol. III, Public Laws,
pp. 315-316).A study of the above quoted provisions clearly
indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or
purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of
the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon
is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates
were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were
assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law
provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and
interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the
buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the
case of the Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al.,
G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice
Montemayor held: .... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the
conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full
price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is
considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased,
under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or
position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or
mortgagee.... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a
Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full
of the purchase price, altho the Government reserves title thereto,
merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in
the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even
before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser
thereof.We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar
lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a
person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of
land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the
land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder the
successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and
cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is
only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and
improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales
patent (Sec. 30).In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes
the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor,
subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon
is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies
and his widow remarries both she and the second husband are
entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his
wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in
Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before
the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned
to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to
the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.It is true that
the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject
of the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in
installments continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that
even after said marriage the certificates of sale were assigned to
Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage
continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid
as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the
properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .Mr. Viniegra:Q De los productos de
pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados,
recibia Vd. su participation?A No, seor.Q Nunca? .A Because I know
there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have
been informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the
products of the land.Q Therefore, from the products of these lands
- the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being
discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in
palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say ? .A
Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of
the lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be
paid.Court: .Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les
darian alguna participation?A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but
they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were
being paid from the products of the lands.Mr. Viniegra: .Q You do
not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after
paying the Bureau of Lands? .A How would I ask for I knew they were
still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was
until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid,
as a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were
cancelled.Court:Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .A Mi madre tenia la casa
en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me.
(Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp.
259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).There
is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the
case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was
instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by said
deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates
(Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of partition in said special
proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2
of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal
properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.The
above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described and
paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal
reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial
pronouncement on said nature of the lands in question. In the year
1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer
took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate
of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of
the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15,
1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of
partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the
friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with it
one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated
to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half
adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of
Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This
project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an
order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as
Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.The pendency of the
above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who
is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or
allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim
participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His
failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar
lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C.
Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar lands
actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was
approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had
already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure
to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate
proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from
asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said
properties.We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that
the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and
his wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans
of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such as
a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff
himself, the installments remaining unpaid were taken from the
produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into
account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the
children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated
in the settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased
Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of
the lands in which plaintiff could claim any participation is the
one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C.
Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not
shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous
political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had
devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to
politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties
of Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns
as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The
value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint
properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was not proved in
court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old
Civil Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit
of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership
properties, cannot be applied. But even if such useful improvements
had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action
to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934,
whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the
year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to
Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14 years,
that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the
improvements, if any, is therefore also barred.1wph1.tThe above
ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the
improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is
barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for
the construction alleged to have been made and the furniture
supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which
had the character of conjugal partnership property of said spouses.
In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of
partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition
is dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this
project of partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's
children with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made
therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as
usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This deed
of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not sign
it.The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above
deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended
to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties left
by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law
assigns to him. But in spite of his knowledge of this fact no
action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff
demanded his share in the properties and later brought this
action.The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before
plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he
may have had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to
have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge
Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the
estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set
aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on
the ground of prescription is sustained.Having disposed of the
claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider
the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by
the deceased Maria C. Pugeda, be divided among her children,
including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia
Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said
deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with
the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share
in the said estate left by her in usufruct.In view of our finding
that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his
wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of
limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her
properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each
heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by
eliminating the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and
increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.FOR ALL THE
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby
dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division
of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight
children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of
her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of
one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero
is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
PEDRO V. VILAR,petitioner-appellant,vs. GAUDENCIO V.
PARAISO,respondent-appellant.G.R. No. L-8014March 14, 1955In the
general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and
Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted
for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass
was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509,
and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the
latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes.
However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as
mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate
under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar
instituted the presentquo warrantoproceedings praying that Paraiso
be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation
as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be
declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of
respondent Paraiso.Respondent in his answer denied his
ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that
his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a
special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that
even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could
not be declared elected to take his place.After due trial, the
court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor,
being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his
proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring
petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to
do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent
from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that
portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of
sufficient legal grounds to do so.The case was originally taken to
the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while
petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent
raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are
indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, that court
resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of
sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory
that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme
Court.The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an
ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of
the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as
minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly
accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be
noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much
depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both
parties.The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent
was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to
1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his
license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of
the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent
transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during
the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for,
and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of
Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of
April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither
the head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as
minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to
his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as
minister.The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends
to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United of
Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as
such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage
in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of
his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27,
1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the
elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since
then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he
has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services
pertaining to that order.Which of these versions is correct?After
careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its
credibility and probative value, we have not found any reason for
deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never
ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the
resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the
law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal
office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to
resign as minister of the religious organization to which he
belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not
resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1The importance of
resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration
is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it
informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so
with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the
registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96,
new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure
the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon
respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the
reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon
the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who
in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing
full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a
municipal office.It is true that respondent attempted to
substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents
purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by
the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951,
but, considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we
have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them as
self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political
designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification
under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine
the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose
Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church,
because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the
impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such
seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious
activities of a well established religious order. As the trial
court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the
petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made
at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We
are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified
to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.As to the
question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be
declared elected, having obtained second place in the elections,
our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this
cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing
such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such
provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said
in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive
of the present case.. . . . In the first case when the person
elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were
eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election
in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and
has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuvalvs. Guray, 52
Phil., 645.)Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the
Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is
declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it
may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result, because
it permits the filing of the contest byanyregistered candidate
irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place
or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamosovs. Ferrer, et al.,
84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390.April 11, 2002]MERCEDITA MATA
ARAES,petitioner,vs.JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,respondent.Petitioner
Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Lawviaa sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent
is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.They lived together as husband and wife on the
strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the
vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore
of the Philippine Navy.Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed
against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.On 28 May 2001, the case was referred
by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June
2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent
judge to comment.In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge
averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to
Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize
the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.Respondent judge
further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its
resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for
the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
to give it would render the marriage void.Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in
the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only
gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be
delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault
and negligence.On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit
of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused
to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage
license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances
that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she
filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading
the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.Reviewing the
records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed
their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be
issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it.It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar
General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise,
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue
a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
record of their marriage.On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the
assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for
the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9
May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage
license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.The Office of the Court
Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction.A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.We agree.Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.The case at bar is not without
precedent. InNavarro vs. Domagtoy,[1]respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding
at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:A priest who
is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with.However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.[2](Emphasis
supplied.)In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6)
months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside
his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance ofthe law.We further
held that:The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not
experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.[3]In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
for violating the law on marriage.Respondent judge should also be
faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. InPeople vs. Lara,[4]we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add
an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer
the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite
the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.[5]Disciplinary actions of this
nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can
not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may,
for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be
bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
ROSALIA MARTINEZ,plaintiff-appellant,vs. ANGEL
TAN,defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-4904February 5, 1909The only
question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the
defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before
the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in
the Province of Leyte.There was received in evidence at the trial
what is called anexpediente de matrimonio civil.It is written in
Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice
of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have
mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the
justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day,
signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the
defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the
presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who
signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on
the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of
the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked
for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the
marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the
husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following
this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the
peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated
the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the
plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of
the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.The court
below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the
parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in
support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the
plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the
defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before
the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the
witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all
signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of
Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies
that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared
before the justice at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified
to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the
bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified
that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named,
and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the
justice of the peace at the time mentioned.The only direct evidence
in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never
appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to
the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question,
but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it,
and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a
paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the
marriage.There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims
supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered, is
not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was
visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was
there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot,
testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her
company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself
went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff
had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness
loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered.
She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named,
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a
Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her
mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the
plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her
consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to
the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the
justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the
ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother
was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office
of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the
mother later found them.The other testimony of the plaintiff
relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace,
who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and
certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to
overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant.The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely
criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears
that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical
attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she
was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due
to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in
stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in
the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house.
We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the
appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the
justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we
are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they
occurred.There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which
satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she
said she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This
evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were
all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote
letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was
proven. No. 9 is as follows:ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my
father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that
we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of
the house.Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to
do.Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so,
because I can not remain here.Yours, ROSAL.Letter No. 6, which
bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of
the 25th of September, is as follows:Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.ANGEL: It is
impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because
my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I
believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best
hour.Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose
of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store,
because I don't like to go without Pacita.The house must be one
belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about
it.Yours, ROSAL.It will be noticed that this corroborates
completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the
plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles.
Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the
marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:Sr. D.
ANGEL, TAN.ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also
yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the
tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the
purpose of loading lumber.Don't tell her that we have been civilly
married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate
the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day
that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this
morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we
must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being
married I must do it right.Tell her also that you have asked me to
carry you.I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order
that you may do what he wishes.Yours, ROSAL.Letter No. 8 was also
evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:Sr.
D. ANGEL TAN.ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc
on Sunday of the steamerRosa, for the purpose of asking my father's
permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then
we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to
marry without his permission, you must request his consent.Tell me
who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married;
my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every
thing may be carried out, with patience.It was proven at the trial
that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamerRosaas indicated
in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The
plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with
the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant
never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in
Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and
commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of
procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for
damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the
decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff
appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.It is
claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of
the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant
testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders,
No. 68, section 6, is as follows:No particular form from the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take
each other as husband and wife.Zacarias Esmero, one of the
witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice
of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and
then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant
contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be
married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath,
before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses
of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by
the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both
contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form,
the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they
took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved,
such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission
of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can
only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when
they appeared and signed the said document which so states before
the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and
write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the
document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this
particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place
before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a
legal marriage.The defendant's original answer was a general denial
of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously
the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was
afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of
the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the
condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff
objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had
commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so
that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the
parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed
completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated
that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by
reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had
unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had
intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second
amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no
abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any
way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without
asking for a continuance.The judgment of the court below acquitting
the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardianad litem, Pedro
Madridejo,plaintiff-appellee,vs. GONZALO DE LEON, ET
AL.,defendants-appellants.G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants,
Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding as follows:Wherefore, the court finds
that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby
orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the
ownership and possession of the property described in the
complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo,
without cost. So ordered.In support of their appeal the defendants
assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial
court, to wit:1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage
between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.2. The lower
court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent
marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural
child, was legitimated.3. The lower court lastly erred in not
rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants.The
relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of
fact and of law raised herein are as follows:Eulogio de Leon and
Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon.
The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year
1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality
of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born
to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo
(Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan,
Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at
death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years
of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on
the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son
by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo,
as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de
Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.With regard to the first
assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary does not invalidate the marriagein articulo mortis, it
not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its
validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy
of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.Touching the second assignment of error, there has been
no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee,
is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The
only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of
his parents legitimated him.Article 121 of the Civil Code
provides:Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a
subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the
parents before or after the celebration thereof.According to this
legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be
effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of
wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or
after its celebration. The Civil Code has established two kinds of
acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for
the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother as
follows:Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be
made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public
document.Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by
the father, thus:Art. 135. The father may be compelled to
acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:1. When an
indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his
paternity, is in existence.2. When the child has been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the
defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of
that of his family.3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction,
the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment
of the issue, shall be observed.Article 136 providing for the
compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:Art. 136. The mother
may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:1. When the child
is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases
mentioned in the next preceding article.2. When the fact of the
birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.Let us see
whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been
acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
under any of the provisions above quoted.To begin with the father,
no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily
acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry
certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record
of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of
article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public
instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed by Pedro
Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges
Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo
testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with
necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and
although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil
registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the
legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.As to
the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the
data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in
the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and
which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the
kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus,
23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no
longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista,
29 Phil., 215).Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or
after their marriage.1awph!l.netDid Pedro Madridejo acknowledge
Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?The compulsory
acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the
Civil Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires
that the natural child take judicial action against the father or
mother, or against the persons setting themselves up as the heirs
of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a
natural son through a judgment of the court.In the instant action
brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be
acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent
to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his
right to the estate of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he
has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the
heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might
have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his
being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as
such.The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of
the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed
Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving
that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such
an admission would have been affective if the present action had
been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her
heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.In view of the
foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and
therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.Wherefore, the
judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants
absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any
right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the
natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329.March 8, 2001]HERMINIA
BORJA-MANZANO,petitioner, vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan,respondent.
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this
act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge
with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1]Four
children were born out of that marriage.[2]On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3]When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were separated.Respondent Judge, on the
other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married.What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4]According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.He then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.After an evaluation of the Complaint
and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.Complainant
answered in the affirmative.For his part, respondent Judge filed a
Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment.He therein invites
the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5]of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of
his staff upon his instruction.In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited
or communicated with their spouses anymore.Respondent Judge alleges
that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.We find merit in the complaint.Article 34 of the Family Code
provides:No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other.The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.For this provision on legal
ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time ofmarriage;4. The parties must
execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each
other]; and5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]Not
all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on
22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage.Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.Respondent Judge knew or ought
to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void.[7]In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage.And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as
the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.The fact that Manzano and Payao
had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial.Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a casethe marriage bonds
are not severed.Elsewise stated,legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.This
holds true all the more when the separation is merelyde facto, as
in the case at bar.Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the
Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage.Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who arelegally capacitatedto marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license.It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage.The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges,[8]who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence.It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9]And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]ACCORDINGLY, the
recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with
theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.SO
ORDERED.ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,respondent.NcmmisG.R. No.
133778. March 14, 2000]
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?Pepito Nial
was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court
of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:(1) Whether or not
plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of
the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;(3)
Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
death.[1]Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2]Hence, this
petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of
law.Scnc mThis petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration.[5]A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code,[6]the absence of which renders the marriagevoid ab
initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7]in relation to Article 58.[8]The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.[9]This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10]Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage
as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State.[11]This is why
the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"[12]and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]However, there are several
instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76,[14]referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case
is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status.[15]To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed
it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.Sdaa misoThere is no dispute that the marriage of
petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16]The
only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the
future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may
have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma
have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during t