Market Integration and Prosocial Behavior: Some Evidence from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Malcolm McLaren Dow, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology.

Market Integration and Prosocial Behavior: Some Evidence from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample.

• Malcolm McLaren Dow, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology and Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Northwestern University

• E. Anthon Eff, Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, Middle Tennessee State University

• From the literature: Experimental games conducted by ethnographers show that more generous behavior is seen in societies with higher levels of market integration.

• In this paper: Test to see if prosocial behavior (generosity, honesty, trust) is associated with markets, using Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, a data set containing wide range of human societies. Two econometric issues:– Galton’s problem– Missing data

Experimental games conducted by Ethnographers

• Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, et al. (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press.

• Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, et al. (2005). “’Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(6):795-855

• Efferson, Charles, Masanori Takezawa, Richard McElreath. (2007). “New Methods in Quantitative Ethnography: Economic Experiments and Variation in the Price of Equality.” Current Anthropology 48(6): 912-919.

• Lesorogol, Carolyn K. (2007). “Bringing Norms In: The Role of Context in Experimental Dictator Games.” Current Anthropology 48(6): 920-926.

Ultimatum Game

Responder has 2 options:1. Accepts $2, Proposer keeps

$8. 2. Rejects $2, Donor keeps

entire $10

• Proposer: Offers $2 to Responder

• Donor (ethnographer): Gives $10 to Proposer

Responder can “punish” Proposer by rejecting offer. Proposer has incentive to keep offer high.

Dictator Game

Responder has one option:1. Accepts $2, Proposer

keeps $8.

• Proposer: Offers $2 to Responder

• Donor (ethnographer): Gives $10 to Proposer

Fifteen societies in Henrich et al.

Mean in industrialized nations=0.45; mode=0.5

Source: Henrich et al. (2005: 801)

Noteworthy:1. High variation in ultimatum game offers.2. Many ultimatum game offers less generous

than in industrialized societies. 3. Much variation in game results can be

explained by society-level variables: especially market integration.

Source: Henrich et al. (2005: 809)

Relationship between Ultimatum game offer and market integration: Fifteen societies in Henrich et al.

Two possible reasons for variation in UG results over ethnographic cases.

• Games cued specific shared norms. Clearly happened in some cases:– Au and Gnau: proposers made generous offers which

responders rejected. (norm: status seekers give gifts that impose obligations)

– Lamalera: proposers made generous offers. (norm: defined protocol for dividing whale meat after hunt)

• Generalized prosocial dispositions—members of some societies are “nicer” on average than others.

Theoretical reasons for markets to encourage generalized prosocial dispostions

• Adam Smith: merchants need to have a good reputation to stay in business. The more commercialized a society, the higher its standards of “probity and punctuality.”

• Evolutionary game theory: “indirect reciprocity” leads to direct benefits through reputation effects (cooperation partners easier to find).

Test with model:prosocial dispositions=fn(markets; control variables)

Standard Cross-Cultural Sample

• World divided up into “culture regions,” one well-documented society picked from each of these, for total of 186 societies.

• Over 2,000 variables gradually added.• Full range of human societies, so that any

statement that claims to hold universally for humans can be tested.

Diverse sample. For example, many subsistence types…

Description No. Societies Gathering 9 Hunting and/or Marine Animals 9 Fishing 12 Anadromous Fishing (spawning fish such as Salmon) 8 Mounted Hunting 5 Pastoralism 18 Shifting Cultivation, with digging sticks or wooden hoes 33 Shifting Cultivations, with metal hoes 19 Horticultural Gardens or Tree Fruits 18 Intensive Agriculture, with no plow 23 Intensive Agriculture, with plow 32

Description No. Societies Nomadic or fully migratory 26 Seminomadic 24 Semisedentary 13 Compact but impermanent settlements 3 Neighborhoods of dispersed family homesteads 20 Seperated hamlets, forming a single community 17 Compact and relatively permanent settlements 75 Complex settlements 8

…and, many settlement types:

SCCS: Africa

Dependent variables

• Three dependent variables: degree to which society inculcates trust, honesty, generosity in children.

“The inculcated traits were coded, if possible, on the basis of reports of the pressures exerted by the people who train the child. The codes were also based on the behavior of the child and were inferred only with great caution from reports of the customary adult behavior or of adult ideology” (Barry et al. 1976: 91).

Dependent variable: GenerosityGENER=V334 334. Generosity . = Missing data 82 0 = no inculcation or opposite trait - 1 = 1 2 = 4 3 = 6 4 = 4 5 = moderately strong inculcation 24 6 = 31 7 = 2 8 = 27 9 = 4 extremely strong inculcation 1

“Generosity… refers to the specific behavior encouraged rather than a general attitude, but a wide range of actions may exemplify generosity. These include giving and sharing of food, possessions, time, or services to others of the community or outsiders, e.g., sharing the product of a hunt among the community members whether or not they were active in it its attainment, or sharing and giving treats or toys. Expressions of kindness and affection are included, especially toward younger children or aged, ill, or infirm people. Reciprocity is not necessarily generosity.” (Barry et al. 1976: 95)

Generosity

Independent variables selected

• Three types of “sociality”: Nepotism, Reciprocity, Coercion (van den Berghe 1981). Prosocial behavior is most valuable for reciprocity, and therefore most likely to be encouraged in societies emphasizing reciprocity.

• Seven independent variables related to reciprocity:– Three market-related variables: extent of internal markets; external

markets; presence of true money.– Two dummy variables for presence of inheritance rights in

property: movable property and real property.– Two variables for cooperative activity: sharing of food; communal

use of land.• Twelve control variables.

variables Description Sign Markets markin Internal markets + markout External markets + money True money + Cooperation commland Communality of land + sharefood Shared food + Property inhreal Inherit land and structures + inhmove Inherit movables + Religion moralgods Gods support morality + Scarcity marrgood Goods exchanged at marriage - polygamy Polygamy - foodscarc Chronic hunger - ecorich Rich environment + Warfare warintern Frequent internal warfare - warextern Frequent external warfare + nsoc150 Number societies within 150 miles + Nepotism famsize Size of family - ncmallow Restrictions on cousin marriage + exogamy Exogamy + Coercion sanctions Coercion enforces authority -? Valuation of children valuechil Degree children valued +

Independent variables with expected signs

Two econometric problems in SCCS data

1. Galton’s problem2. Missing data

Galton’s problem

Observations not independent.• Common descent (language phylogeny)• Cultural borrowing (geographic distance)

In regression context, Galton’s problem will cause biased coefficients and biased standard errors.

Galton’s problem example:

alcohol wivesEcuador 1 0Iran 0 2Ireland 1 0Morocco 0 3Spain 1 0Yemen 0 4

Pearson correlation= -0.9332565, p-value=0.0065

An observed correlation between a pair of cultural traits across cultures could be due to the borrowing of the traits, as a package, from a common source (“horizontal transmission”), or could be due to their transmission, as a package, from a common ancestor (“vertical transmission”), or could be due to a true functional relationship.

Hypothesis: Religious specialists who drink alcohol have fewer wives.

Correcting for Galton’s problemspatial lag model:

yWyWXy DDLL (1)

Where y is an nx1 vector representing our dependent variable, X is an nxk

matrix representing the independent variables, β is a kx1 vector of

coefficients, WL and WD are weight matrices, for language and distance

respectively, λL and λD are scalar coefficients, and ε is a vector of errors.

The scalars λL and λD are the spatial lag parameters, allowing an estimate

of the effects of common descent or cultural borrowing on y.

Correcting for Galton’s problem (continued)

The spatial lags yL=WL y and yD=WD y are endogenous, since they will be correlated

with the error term ε. For small sample sizes, two-stage least squares remains the

simplest way to estimate this model (Dow 2007). In the first stage, estimate yL and

yD, using as instruments the spatial lag of the original independent variables (X) as

well as the spatial lag of any other exogenous variables (Z):

ˆˆˆ ZWXWy LLL (2a)

ˆˆˆ ZWXWy DDD (2b)

Then substitute these into equation 1:

DDLL yyXy ˆˆ (3)

Missing DataSociety markin markout money commland sharefoodNama Hottentot NA NA 1 NA NAKung Bushmen 1 4 1 3 6Thonga 4 4 3 3 6Lozi 3 3 1 3 NAMbundu NA NA 4 NA NASuku 2 2 4 2 2

Two solutions: 1. Listwise deletion2. Multiple imputation

Listwise deletionSociety markin markout money commland sharefoodNama Hottentot NA NA 1 NA NAKung Bushmen 1 4 1 3 6Thonga 4 4 3 3 6Lozi 3 3 1 3 NAMbundu NA NA 4 NA NASuku 2 2 4 2 2

• Lose three observations. Lose all of the information in the cells marked in red.• Of 186 societies, 156 would have been dropped using listwise deletion.

No longer testing against the full range of human societies sample selection bias. Losing the big advantage of the SCCS.

Multiple imputationSociety markin markout money commland sharefoodNama Hottentot 3 4 1 2 3Kung Bushmen 1 4 1 3 6Thonga 4 4 3 3 6Lozi 3 3 1 3 6Mbundu 4 5 4 3 1Suku 2 2 4 2 2

Society markin markout money commland sharefoodNama Hottentot 2 3 1 1 2Kung Bushmen 1 4 1 3 6Thonga 4 4 3 3 6Lozi 3 3 1 3 4Mbundu 3 5 4 5 3Suku 2 2 4 2 2

Society markin markout money commland sharefoodNama Hottentot 3 5 1 2 3Kung Bushmen 1 4 1 3 6Thonga 4 4 3 3 6Lozi 3 3 1 3 5Mbundu 2 6 4 4 2Suku 2 2 4 2 2

Replace missing values with imputed values, drawn from conditional distribution. Create several (5 to 10) new data sets with imputed values.

Multiple Imputation

• Developed methods for combining estimates from multiple imputed data sets into single estimate: Rubin, Donald B. (1987). Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: J. Wiley & Sons.

• Developed most popular methods for producing multiple imputed data sets: Schafer, Joseph L. (1997). Analysis of Incomplete Multivariate Data. London: Chapman & Hall.

• Intuitive justification for using multiple imputation: King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. (2001). “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation.” American Political Science Review 95(1): 49-69.

Results I

• Four models. All pass usual diagnostics.– Generosity as dependent variable– Honesty as dependent variable– Trust as dependent variable– Trust as dependent variable, with instruments for honesty and

generosity as independent variables• Imputed data sets sufficiently different that hard to find set of

independent variables fitting well to all.• Anomalous result: even though F-test rejects dropping

additional variables, many have high p-values (though no multicollinearity)

• Only trust has spatial effects, and then only for distance.

Signs of coefficients for reciprocity-related independent variables: unrestricted model (sign of restricted model

in parentheses, when significant).

Variable Description Exp. Sign

gener (Table 2)

honest (Table 3)

trust (Table 4)

trustGH (Table 5)

Markets markin Internal markets + + - - - (-) markout External markets + + (+) - + - money True money + - + - - (-) Cooperation commland Communality of land + - - - - sharefood Shared food + + (+) + + + Property inhreal Inherit land and structures + - (-) - (-) - (-) - inhmove Inherit movables + - (-) + - +

Results II

• Market-related variables do not have the expected effects (2:1 diminish effort to inculcate prosocial behavior).

• Rules for assignment of property rights through inheritance diminish prosocial behavior.

• Sharing food encourages inculcation of generosity.

Interpretation

• Initial expectation: Markets encourage inculcation of generalized prosocial behavior.

• Finding: Markets do not encourage inculcation of generalized prosocial behavior.

• Conclusion: UG results may have more to do with cuing of specific shared norms than they do with generalized prosocial dispositions.

• But? How can cuing of specific shared norms be systematically associated with market integration?

Hypothesis

• Capitalism erodes shared norms (Simmel). Capitalist societies are pluralistic, strangers can’t assume share same norms (Hayek).

• Shared norms make exchanges more predictable, generate trust. Lack of norms makes exchanges less predictable; proposers in games might make higher offers to compensate for risk (lack of predictability).

• Suggestive evidence from study by Lesorogol (2007).

Dictator game results: meat-sharing vs abstract.

Source: Lesorogol 2007: 923

Hypothesis (continued)

• Specific shared norms cued in UG offers. Shared norms different in each society, hence expect wide variation in offers across societies (which we see).

• Markets weaken shared norms, creating uncertainty, causing UG offers to rise in societies with more market integration (which we also see).

• No systematic association between market integration and generalized prosocial dispositions (shown in our models using the SCCS).