881 .... DECLASSIFIED MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER THAN MARINES JAN 1967 . APR 1968 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SIP OCT NOV DIC JAN FEB MAR APR 1161 1161 In April, a significant increase in the number of Marine sorties (788) flown in support of US Army units occurred, as com- pared to the previous high (149) flown in September 1967. Below is a graph which depicts I for a 13 day period during April, the increased number of Marine fixed wing attack sorties scheduled for support of US Army units, and the decrease of attack sor- ties scheduled for support of Marine ground units. 18 19 MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES SCHEDULED IN SUPPORT OF USMC AND US ARMY UNITS: 18 . 30 APRIL 20 21 23 24 25 APRIL DECLASSIFIED 26 _USMC SUPPORT -US ARMY SUPPORT 27 28 30 59
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MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER THAN MARINES ... · 881 .... declassified marine fixed wing sorties in support of other than marines jan 1967 . apr 1968 ja~ feb mar
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881 ....
DECLASSIFIED
MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER THAN MARINES JAN 1967 . APR 1968
JA~ FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SIP OCT NOV DIC JAN FEB MAR APR 1161 1161
In April, a significant increase in the number of Marine sorties (788) flown in support of US Army units occurred, as compared to the previous high (149) flown in September 1967. Below is a graph which depicts I for a 13 day period during April, the increased number of Marine fixed wing attack sorties scheduled for support of US Army units, and the decrease of attack sor-ties scheduled for support of Marine ground units.
18 19
MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES SCHEDULED IN SUPPORT OF USMC AND US ARMY UNITS: 18 . 30 APRIL
20 21 23 24 25 APRIL
DECLASSIFIED
26
_USMC SUPPORT
-US ARMY SUPPORT
27 28 30
59
DECLASSIFIED
The Commanding General, III MAF, after analysis of the effectiveness and responsiveness of the air support being provided Marine combat units under the 7th Air Force system, voiced his dissatisfaction with the system to COMUSMACV on 22 April and again on 4 May. And, on 8 May, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (the Tactical Air Commander for the Commanding General, III MAF) presented to COMUSMACV and later, on lOMay, to CINCPAC, the items of dissatisfaction generated thus far, by the single manager system. The concluding recommendation was that control of Marine fixed wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft revert to the Commanding General, III MAF.
Helicopter Operations
The intensity of combat in I CT Z during April was reflected in the highest monthly total of helicopter sorties flown since July 1967. Experiencing generally good weather, Marine pilots logged 50,134 sorties, as they transported 65,815 passengers and delivered 7,538 tons of cargo.
CH-46 aircraft carried almost 60% of the passengers and cargo helilifted during April as they compiled 20,838 sorties. Having flown a monthly average of only 3,959 sorties during the CH-46 modification program conducted in the 4th Quarter 1967, the helicopters have since contributed heavily to the increasing lift support provided I CT Z units. Thus far in 1968, a monthly average of 14,825 sorties has been flown by CH-46 helicopters.
The total sorties flown each month by Marine helicopters since May 1967 are shown by the graph on the following page.
Requirements for helicopter support to non-Marine units increased slightly during April. Of the total sorties flown by Marine helicopters, 8.4% were committed to other I CTZ forces. ROK Marines utilized 77% of the extraneous support, while US Army, Special Forces, and ARVN forces received 3, 8.5, and 11.5%, respectively. The following graph portrays helicopter support provided other than Marine units since March 1967.
MONTHLY PERCENT OF MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER THAN MARINE FORCES
APR 1967 . APR 1968
MONTHLY AVERAGE: 11.:01%
......... i
APR MAY JUN JUl AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR
1S61 1961
DECLASSIFIED
61
DECLASSIFIED
•••••• • Support of helicopter operations within the 1st Ma
rine Aircraft Wing was streamlined last month with the formation of a new helicopter group. To increase efficiency and control of the widely dispersed helicopter population, Provisional Marine Air Group 39 was activated at Quang Tri on 16 April. Assigned to ProvMAG-39 for combat operations are HMM-l63, HMM-262, and VMO-6.
Fixed Wing and Helicopter Losses
Declining significantly from the March figure of 18, Marine aircraft losses for April totaled six. Four aircraft (two fixed wing and two helicopters), in the process of conducting ordnance deliveries or in battlefield landing zones, were lost to enemy small arms fire. The two fixed wing aircraft (one A-4E and one TA-4F) lost during April bring the total number of fixed wing aircraft lost due to direct enemy action for the period March 1965 -30 April 1968 to 88. For the same period, helicopter losses now total 150, reflecting four helicopters (two UHIE's, one UH-34, and one CH-46) lost during April. During combat sorties in April, three fixed wing aircraft and three helicopters sustained major damage, while 37 fixed wing aircraft and 82 helicopters received minor damage. Enemy mortar and rocket attacks on airfields caused minor damage to eight aircraft.
DECLASSIFIED
62
DECLASSIFIED
SESESI • ~ ---
LOGISTICS
The logistic situation in I CTZ during the month was excellent. Material moved relatively freely and the lines of communication sustained a minimum of interruption. Thirty-two daily and monthly dry cargo handling records were established at the I CTZ ports, and cargo input to northern I CTZ by all delivery methods surpassed 5,000 SIT per day on several occasions And the tactical-logistical feat of reopening Route 9, the principal eastwest artery of northern I CTZ, eliminated the requirement to resupply the Khe Sanh combat base exclusively by air.
Khe Sanh Resupply
By 8 April, engineer operations to restore Route 9, while not complete, had progressed to the point that emergency air resupply operations to the Khe Sanh combat base were terminated. During the first eight days of April, 267 sorties (180 by Marine helicopters and 87 by Air Force fixed wing transport) delivered a daily average of 136 SIT of material to Khe Sanh. The amounts delivered, by supply class, were:
Class
(SIT)
I II (Rations) (General
Supply)
286.5 56.5
ill IV V Total (Fuel) (Special (Ammuni
Items) tion)
90.5 276 348.5 1,058
Additionally J 25 S IT of mail, six S IT of medical supplies, . and 568 passengers were transported to the combat base. The days of supply on hand at the end of the emergency operation on 8 April remained essentially the same as at the end of March, and were more than adequate
to sustain combat operations. r .... ~-------_
DECLASSIFIED
-63
DECLASSIFIED
Gi!!elt% • • garrison
was initiated,
With the termination of Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207 on 15 April, the Logistic Support Area (LSA) at Khe Sanh was phased-out and an LSA was established at Ca Lu. On 21 April operational control of the Ca Lu LSA was aSE;umed by Force Logistic Support Group Bravo.
Route 9
As an integral part of Operation PEGASUS / LAM SON 207, the 11th Marine Engineer Battalion, and Navy Seabee units, initiated construction operations to reestablish Route 9 as a dependable line of communication between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. This primary link between the westernmost combat base, Khe Sanh, and other northern I CTZ bases was closed from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu in September 1967 by torrential monsoon rains that washed out the road bed in many places, swept away three bridges, and loosened overhanging bluffs, tumbling landslides across the road. Susequently, during the fall and winter of 1967-68, this same segment of the route was subjected to a concentrated enemy interdiction campaign, as ten bridges were damaged or destroyed and innumerable trenches and craters were cut in the road. The Ca LuDong Ha portion of the road also was cut periodically; however, Marines in the area kept the road open, and engineer efforts to restore Route 9 were directed primarily toward the Ca Lu-Khe Sanh segment.
The 42 mile road, from its eastern terminus at Dong Ha to Khe Sanh in the west, has 49 bridges, 27 of which are along the 15 mile stretch between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. By 7 April, engineer work had progressed to the point that 21 of the 27 bridges in this western section of the highway were passable, with the six other spans
DECLASSIFIED
64
DECLASSIFIED
£ TS, • undergoing replacement or repair. Simultaneously, the roadbed was being rebuilt, large craters filled, cuts and holes patched, culverts replaced, and turnouts constructed, and on 9 April the roadway (exclusive of bridges) was capable of two-way traffic throughout, albeit at a reduced speed when passing. The final bridge was in place on 11 April, and the next day Route 9 was capable of sustaining 60-ton traffic across the width of northern I CTZ.
Replacement of the tactical bridges with permanent spans started immediately, with three of the bridges being replaced by 26 April. Routine maintenance, shoulder clearance, and construction of turnouts also continued at the end of the month.
The Herculean task of placing Route 9 in a trafficable status was accomplished in 12 days, and required construction of ten bridges and major repairs to three others. The endresult, however, was reestablishment of the land line of communication to the Khe Sanh combat base. The map below depicts the location of the bridge construction effort along Route 9.
BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION/REPAIR· ROUTE 9: 30 MARCH . 11 APRIL 1968
Construction at the I CTZ ports during the past few months paid dividends in April, with 32 new daily and monthly cargo handling records established for the individual ports and I CT Z. At Dong Ha seven marks were set, and Hue/Tan My added six more. At Ghu Lai, over twice the rated daily capacity of 1,800 SIT was offloaded on 5 April when 3,940 SIT of material and supplies were introduced through the port facility. Records for daily and monthly off-load, back-load.. and through-put were also registered at Danang." Details of the monthly tonnage records are in the Statistical Highlights chapter of this edition. Wunder Beach, the Logistic Over the Shore (LOTS) site situated eight and one half miles east of Quang Tri City and open since 6 March, contributed an additional 34,244 short tons through-put to the I GTZ monthly total. Although these oper~tions are primarily the responsibility of the Naval Support Activity, Danang, III MAF units will be the ultimate recipient of the vast majority of this material.
There was but one enemy attempt to halt traffic on the Hue (Perfume) river during the month. On 30 April a small enemy element fired two B-40 rocket rounds at a US Navy patrol boat. The rounds missed and the movement of cargo continued uninterrupted. The eua VietDong Ha line of communication, the Gua Viet river, remained open until the last day of the month, when elements of the 320th NVA Division attacked two LGU's, stopping traffic until the next afternoon; the Marine response to this attack initiated the battle for Dong Ha.
Medical
Heavy demands were placed on the medical facilitie s supporting III MAF as a result of casualties sustained
DECLASSIFIED
66
DECLASSIFIED
during the Dong Ha battle. From 30 April through 8 May, 462 Marines in the operation were wounded seriously enough to require medical evacuation, with the majority of the casualties occurring the first three days. USS IWO JIMA (LPH- 2), at sea near the mouth of the eua Viet, initially was the primary recipient of the bulk of the casualties, the majority of whom were transported to the ship by helicopters. The Surgical Team (four doctors and 15 corpsmen) of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha aboard the IWO JIMA, augmented by the ship's medical personnel, provided initial wound surgery and served as a clearing station for further transfer of the wounded.
When the facilities of the IWO JIMA were exceeded, the overflow casualties were directed to the nearby USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) and USS REPOSE (AH-l6). At noon on 2 May the large influx of patients created an operating room backlog of six hours on the IWO JIMA, 12 hours on the REPOSE, and two hours on the VALLEY FORGE, and selected emergency and serious cases, including massive head injuries, were transferred by helicopter to the Naval Hospital, Danang. The casualty flow from in-country abated, however, and, through the efforts of the medical personnel, the back-log was reduced by the next day. Of the 462 evacuated casualties sustained by Marines during the nine day battle, 217, or 47%, were treated aboard the ships, with the rest being cared for by in- country medical facilities.
The chart on the next page displays the location of the in- country medical facilities organic to Marine units, and their capacities as of 30 April.
DECLASSIFIED
67
DECLASSIFIED
alzGilH,
-----------. ----r
ORGANIC MEDICAL FACILITIES
Location Unit Surgical Tables* Hold Capacity**
Danang 1st Hospital Co (Rein) 6 160
Phu Bai 1st Med Bn (-) 4 180
3dMedBn{-} 6 180
Dong Ha Co D, 3d Med Bn 4 30
Khe Sanh Clearing Platoon, Co C, 3d Med Bn
20 550
*Surgical tables are the number of operating tables that can be used simultaneously, with available personnel and equipment.
**Hold capacity is the number of beds authorized or designated to be maintained.
Aviation Logistics
Implementation of the Maintenance Material Management (3M) reporting system was completed throughout the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during April. On 14 April the Wing received 51 vans designed for 3M use. Utilized to expedite the movement of replacement parts between the supply warehouses and the maintenance areas, these radio-equipped trucks will reduce supply response time and consequently the Not Operationally Ready (NOR) status of the Wing's aircraft.
The first production model of the air traffic control central, AN /TSQ-l8A, was placed in operation at Phu Bai
DECLASSIFIED
68
DECLASSIFIED
OEsR71
-------'------.,
on 22 April by Marine Air Traffic Control Unit- 68, thereby providing III MAF with greater capability to cope with the increased air traffic in I CTZ. Containing all of the communications equipment, aircraft navigational aids I and control facilities required to provide precision Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) for aircraft approaching and landing at Phu Bai during periods of low visibility, this new equipment has doubled the air traffic control capacity at Phu Bai. The system also includes equipment and facilities necessary to provide radar control of all aircraft operating in the Phu Bai area.
At the end of April, there were 41 aircraft undergoing Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) at aircraft plants in Japan. Seventeen additional aircraft were undergoing repair of battle damage at intermediate maintenance activities or repair facilities in Japan and the Philippines. The aircraft undergoing PAR or repair of battle damage are listed below.
A-4
F-4 RF-4 F-8 C-1l7 US-2 UH-1 UH-34 CH-46 0-1
PAR
11 6 4
1 3
12 4 41
REPAIR OF BATTLE DAMAGE
2
1 1 2
2 3 6
17
NORS {not operationally ready due to 8upply)/NORM (not operationally ready due to maintenance) data for selected Marine aircraft in III MAF are displayed on the next page.
No, Dtc Jon hbMo' .p,Moy Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct No, Doc Jon F.bMo, Ap'
1966 1961 1968
UH·1E [HElD] --------_._---:~ READINESS OBIECTly[ /0 60 SO 40
30t~~~~~~ .. ~~=-~::::~ 10 10
Nov De< Jon F.bMar Apr May Jun JulAug S.p Oct Noy Dec Jan F.bMor Apr
90 80 70 60
20 10
1966 1961 1968
CH·53A IHELO]*
No ... Dec Jon F.bMor AprMoy Jun JulAug S.p Ocl No", Dtc jon F,bMar Apr
1966 1961 1968 _ NORS _ NORM *R.::::o:~:~~.n\i~~~~~~ ____ ilipip
70
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Motor Transport Operations
With cargo flowing through the I CTZ sea ports at a record pace, the requirement for movement of material by motor transport to the northern provinces was reduced. Twenty- eight Rough Rider convoy operations, each consisting of an average of 67 tactical vehicles, were conducted. All of these convoys were either to, or originated at, bases north of the Hai Van pass. Throughout I CTZ, Rough Rider operations delivered 5,736 SIT of cargo and transported 5,383 personnel.
The operations of the five Marine motor transport battalions supporting III MAF, during April, were as follows:
The recent force-level increase in I CTZ has resulted in the Naval Support Activity, Danang, experiencing heavy demands for certain packaged petroleum items and fortification and construction materials. To prevent a critical stock drawdown and to ensure the most effective utilization of the items involved, CG, III MAF on 26 March, designated 42 items as command control material, requiring his approval prior to issue. Until the receipt of ample stocks, items in this category were temporarily being issued only to meet the most essential requirements of combat units. By 30 April, sufficient quantities had been received to remove issue restrictions on 32 of the items. The shortages had no adverse effect on III MAF operations. -,
~\l\\tU~~~~~~\t\UlI.
71
DECLASSIFIED
• SF
DECLASSIFIED
u~ jlJ 1 There were no changes of special significance in tfie other classes of supply during the month.
MuniUons Storage Facilities
Based on the current rate of combat operations, Force Logistic Cmnlnand has a Ininimum requirement for standard storage facilities for 36, 380 S IT oj Clas s V (ground) and 21, 000 SIT of Class VA (aviation) amrnunition. As of 30 April, standard storage was available for 29,539 SIT of Class V and 3,500 SIT of Class VA. The map below shows the location of the major ammunition storage sites, and a comparison of their current capacities and their anticipated capacities at the end of calendar year 1968,
CURRENT AND PROJECTED AMMUNITION STANDARD STORAGE FACllITlES* AT FtC DUMPS
LAOS
Fle TOTAL (short tons) CLASS v
30 Apr 66 29,539
31 Dec 68 63.880 ----------
CLASS VA 30 Apr 68 3,500
31 Dec 66 26,765
open storoge
13,450
13,950
HC Covered Storage. Earth (overed, corrugated sheet metol od ... once bose·type magozines Ammunition is segregoted by type, and the diitancH between mogozines or. dlhrmined by quonlity·dlstance sofely factors HC Open Sloroge Hardstand creas, Inclosed by built.up berm,. Ammunition is H9re9oted by type, end the disten(e~ between
(!reos ore determined by quontity-distance ,afety focton
.,100 7.280
DECLASSIFIED
11.989
28,650
CLASS VA
3.500 10,725
IS 30
Milu
CLASS VA
o 18.040
72
saCI!
DECLASSIFIED
CONCLUSIONS
- The April increase of some 7 ,000 civilians living in secure III MAF areas marks, for the first time since the Tet offensive, a modest, yet concrete revitalization of the pacification campaign within I CTZ.
- The 7th Air Force system for control of all US fixed wing tactical aircraft has resulted in discernible diminution in the quantity of tactical air support provided for support of Marine ground combat units.
- The enemy need for a dramatic victory from which he may wring a full measure of propaganda value is now more pressing. And, despite his early April defeat at Khe Sanh, and the severe casualties inflicted upon his regiments during their abortive early May thrust against Dong Ha, the tactical advantages offered by his DMZ sanctuary will continue to induce major enemy efforts against friendly formations and installations in northe rn I CT Z.
..tht!!1'
73
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
sets ...
---------_. . - .... .,.--.
ST ATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS - APRIL 1968
1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
a, I CTZ !DMZ Summary
At end-April, the confirmed enemy combat strength in the I CTZ /DMZ region was estimated at 42,290, including 35,495 NVA and 6,795 Viet Congo This represents a 1,735-man decrease from the 44,025 enemy estimated in the region at the end of March. Factors providing the basis for order of battle computations this month were the enemy accretion of an estimated 1,240 replacements through recruitment and infiltration, and the assessment of 2,975 killed against identified enemy units.
There was a decline in enemy activity during April, but this does not indicate enemy dormancy. Analysis of agent reports, aerial reconnaissance, and battlefield findings evidence a logistical buildup by the enemy, probably in preparation for renewed activity. Rice collection and munitions resupply efforts in the coastal plains, and the development of new roads, truck parks, and marshalling areas eastward from the Laotian border, all indicate that the enemy intends more effective support for his future endeavors.
-Enemy Lines of Communication
Enemy efforts to construct lines of communication into and throughout I CTZ continued at a high level during the month, particularly in the A Shau Valley-Quang Nam province area. Despite III MAF and ARVN operations in and east of the A Shau Valley, enemy engineers persisted in developing the extension of Route 548 leading south from the valley toward Base Area 607 in the tri- border area of RVN, Laos, and Cambodia. From Base Area 607, the road system turns eastward into the Happy Valley area of Quang Nam province.
I WJU!JWUJSS~f~~~ 74
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
628R ••
Enemy engineering accomplishments by end-April indicated an attempt to juncture the Route 548 extension with Route 4 in central Quang Nam. This would provide a motorable avenue of approach from Laos, through A Shau to western Quang Nam, and into the Danang area. Based on his rate of advance, it is probable the enemy is endeavoring to develop this road network prior to the onset of the southwest monsoon in mid-May, which will interdict vehicular movcrnent in the infiltration corridor through Laos. The following map displays significant enemy vehicular and construction activity revealed in the western sector of central I CTZ during April.
ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN CENTRAL I CTl
CD 6 April: Antiaircraft site, contoining 57mm weapons and a
G) 30 April Clcaring and survey operolion~ underway 10 this point.
W~~Ul£)£)~Gr;~~IDlI 8M8RIi'l'
75
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
The five maps which follow illustrate the enemy order of battle in I CTZ and the DMZ area during April. General locations of enemy infantry battalions are displayed on the first map, while specific locations of enemy units arc pictured on the four succeeding maps,
III North Vletnomese Arm~ 11
c>5'JVletCong
TOTAL-
64 NVA Battalions (In(ludn 16 Sl>pporl Battol,oM)
19 lJe Baltoliom
*Not shown on mop
ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I eTl/DMl AREA
CMl AREA ** 26 Infantry Ballohons
6 Suppo" BOllolions*
QUANG TRI
8 Infantry ScHollon,
25 50
kilom.tul
THUA THIEN
15 Inlonlry Bollolion!
QUANG HAM I~ Infantry Battalions
4 Support 801l0110n5*
QUANG TIN 3 Infantry Bollol'oOl
5 Support Ballolions*
QUANG NGAI S Infonity Battalions
I Supporl BOllolion*
42,290
•• The DMZ area Include. that portion of QUlng Trl provlnc::e which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ Itlelf, Ind the
Vln~ Lln~ Speclll Zone In NO't~ Vletnlm NVA unlta operating In t~11 vicInity Ir. conlld.rod DMZ AREA UNITS.
QJJ~oc;~~~~~W~~IDlI !!g8R ••
76
DECLASSIFIED
I
I I
DECLASSIFIED
SBBRM"
DMZ/Quang Tri Province
Significant enemy unit movement during the month involved the 52d Regiment, 320th NVA Division, and the 325C NVA Division. The shift of the 52d Regiment, from the vicinity of Con Thien to positions north of Dong Ha, preluded the abortive enemy attempt to attack the Marine base at Dong Ha. In western Quang Tri, the 325C Division, suffering from heavy losses during the battle for Khe Sanh, recoiled to Laotian border areas to refurbish and regroup, leaving the 304th NVA Division sole responsibility for enemy operations in the Khe Sanh area.
The confirmed enemy combat strength at end-month in the DMZ/Quang Tri region was an estimated 24,865, or 1,215 less than the end-March estimate of 26, 080. Contributing to this attrition was the loss by identified units of 1,685 dead, offset somewhat by the joining of an estimated 470 replacements.
~U/l
ENEMY ORDER or BATTLE oms
011* III Fronl Headquarters
D,\/i~'on Headquarters
Regimental Headquarter)
Infantry Battalions 26
Support Battalions
* Province e.pltal
4ht Armed Public Security Force
llt8n
2d Bn
3d Bn
* The DMZ arca includes that portion of Quang Trj provInce which lici north of Route 9. the DMZ Itself, Ind the
Vlnh linh SpeCial 20ne In NOl'th VietnaM. NVA unih operating in this vicinity ue considered DMZ AREA UNITS.
DECLASSIFIED
77
I
I I, 'j
r< , I
DECLASSIFIED
.b ..•. c. Thua Thien Province
Confirrncd cnen,y cOD1.bat strength in Thua Thien showed a decline during April, experiencing a 350-D1.an decrease to an estimated 6,295, from the cnd-March estimate of (" (,45. This adjustment reflects 675 eneD1.Y casualties, countered by an estimated 325 replacements. Operations by III MAF and ARVN units resulted in inforn,ation on three enemy units: the 8th BattaUon, 90th Regiment, 324B NVA Division, identified in contact five miles north of Hue as a result of the capture of 95 prisoners on 1 May; and the 803d Regiment, 324B NVA Division and the 29th Regiment, 325C NVA Division, engaged in the A Shau valley by III MAF attacks.
THUA THIEN M~ H.adquarters
Regimental Hecdquarters
Infantry Boltollon~ 15
* Province capital
10 20
Kilometers
\ U~OO~~~~~~~~~'" J .-- iiiQIUilf
78
DECLASSIFIED
f) D {l I/ t _I
I' t
DECLASSIFIED
.all'"
d. Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces
At end-April, the confirmed enemy order of battle strength was estimated to be 9,005 NV A and Viet Cong personnel, 315 less than last month's 9,320. Casualty assessments against identified units totaled 590, but this figure was partially offset by the provision of an estimated 275 replacements to known units.
Enemy units were relatively inactive during the month, but scattered reports of increased, future efforts against Danang persisted. Reports also suggested that the 2d NVA Division has deployed southwest from its endMarch location in the vicinity of Base Area 116, possibly westward to the Laotian border, to resupply and reorganize.
J
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
DUm Dum NU TIM
Mlillary Region Headquarters 1
Dlvisicn Headquorlers 0
Infantry Regiment Heodquaden
Support Regiment HeadquarterS
Infantry Batlohorn 15
Support BotlQll0n~
* Province capital
~aK3'1t8y QUANG TIN
fGK32d8n
DECLASSIFIED
1st Regt C 2d Diy
60th Sn
90th Bn VC
~GK40th
ctsJ701h In IVQ,TAM KY
. \~Tadl!l;' . VC
79
DECLASSIFIED
BPI. 'iii'
e. Quang Ngai Province
On 30 April, the confirmed Quang Ngai province enemy combat strength was estimated at 2,125, reflecting a gain of 145 over the 31 March total of 1,980. Factors contributing to this order of battle adjustment wcre 170 replacements, and as se ssment of 25 cneluy casualties.
Reports received during the month continue to target key installations in Quang Ngai for future attacks, which are to be controlled by a newly formed, yet unidentified, regimental headquarters.
QUANG NGAI
QUANG NGAI
In fanlry BQItQI,on~
Supparl Baltal,on1
* Pro.lnce capital
o 10 20 I !
kilom.hfi
@12Oth Bn ~ 48th Bn
~- * QUANG NGAI
elslSn c ~406thBn
l b,:: .. vc
107th Bn -oue PHO
DECLASSIFIED
80
DECLASSIFIED
... f. 2. ENEMY LOSSES FOR I CTZ
Killed Caetured Weaeons Enemy losses to III MAF /SLF
By Marines 1,782 30 267 By US Army 3,449 89 2,148 Monthly Total 5,231 119 2,415
1968 Total 25, 113 675 7,219
Enemy losses to other forces
By ROKMC 372 7 38 By RVNAF 1,888 135 667 By Special Forces /ClDG 88 10 63 Monthly Total 2,348 152 768
I CTZ Monthly Total 7,579 271 3,183 1968 Total 39,533 1,853 11, 597
3. III MAF /SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 1968
By U. S. Army By Marines Total
13,136 Patrols 61, 909 5,032 Alllbushes 24,567
1,164 799 118 78 Company operations 1,696
1
6
141,192
322 3
7
7.216
50,134
Sniper posts 1,434 Battalion operations 12* Regimental or 24*
larger operations C olllb at / cOlllbat 28,624
support sorties Helicopter sorties 601, 993
*Since lllonthly figures' include operations continued frolll previous lllonths, they are not used to cOlllpute cUlllulative totals.
DECLASSIFIED
81
DECLASSIFIED
4. MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF USMC/SLF UNITS
Unit Date From/To
1st Hosp Co 10Apr Chu Lai/Danang 1st Med Bn 12Apr Danang/Phu Bai HMM-164 (SLF Bravo) 14Apr LPH-8/Phu Bai HMM- 362 (SLF Alpha) 15Apr Phu Bai/LPH-2 HMM- 363 (SLF Alpha) 15Apr LPH-2/Phu Bai ProvMAG-39 16Apr Activated at Quang Tri BLT 3/1 (SLF Bravo) 17Apr Cua Viet/ Ca Lu 2dBn, 26th Marines 18Apr Khe Sanh/ Camp Carroll 2dBn, 1st Marines 20Apr Ca Lu/Khe Sanh 2dBn, 9th Marines 20Apr Camp Carroll/Ca Lu 2dBn, 1st Marines 22Apr Khe Sanh/Phu Bai 3dBn, 5th Marines 25Apr Danang/ Phu Bai HMM-164 (SLF Bravo) 28Apr Phu Bai/LPH-8 26th Marines 29Apr Phu Bai/Quang Tri
5. UNITS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL LANDING FORCES
SLF Alpha (TG-79.4)
Battalion Landing Team - 2/4 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 363 (1-15 April) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 362 (15 April -
continuing)
SLF Bravo (TG-79. 5)
Battalion Landing Team - 3/1 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 164
IilicEE!
82
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
f ~ 6. III MAF CIVIC ACTION [tIl n t _ ~J
c. It , c -:1
2~~dl C? 'iCC')
C-: r ~~ r.fJ ~' 0i) C?".-..> c'" _"l
~.)
Cumulative By US Army By Marines III MAF total
37,240 81,866 Persons given 3,002,823 medical treatment
77 3,104 Persons given 75,023 dental treatment ~(
1 66 Persons given 2,789 medical or dental training
154, 709 nO,893 Pounds of food 6,521,123 distributed
4,024 2,370 Pounds of soap 243,789 distributed
1,582 7,864 Pounds of clothing 302,735 distributed
Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.
SHes H'is
84
DECLASSIFIED
IS •
DECLASSIFIED
h. Class II Supply Requisitions
Processed Fill Rate Obligations on hand
end-month
c. Resupply Status
FLC
70,177 63% 82,740
(1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ)
3dFSR
42,259 33% 39,710
40,255 MIT
Received from CONUS (25,865 MIT) Received from intra- WestPac (14,390 MIT)
(2) Air Shipping Status
Received from CONUS (4,232 SIT) Received from intra - WestPac (4,377 SIT)
d. Resupply Status Within RVN
(1) Surface Shipping Status
Danang to Chu Lai (33,463 SIT) Danang to Hue/Phu Bai (53,599 SIT) Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (42,004 SIT) Danang to Thon My Thuy (5,133 SIT)
(2) Fixed Wing Shipping Status(USMC and PACAF)
Danang to Chu Lai (336 SIT) Danang to Phu Bai (483 SIT) Danang to Dong Ha (3,181 SIT) Danang to Khe Sanh (870 SIT) Other intra - I Corps APOE's (2,706 SIT)
-One Class SO/55 ferry at Danang. One Class 55/60 raft and one Class 60 ferry at Chu Lai.
-13,343,873 gallons.
SF? •
87
DECLASSIFIED
..
i.
DECLASSIFIED
• • edical and Dental Services
(1) Medical
Patients admitted to III MAF facilities 2,453 Battle injury (914) Non- battle injury (235) Disease (1,304)
Evacuated out-of-country 535 Deaths in III MAF facilities 7 Returned to duty 625 Hospitalized as of 30 April 324
(2) Dental
Total Procedures Operative and Crown and Bridge Prosthetics Oral Surgery Preventive Dentistry Number of Sittings
43,839 23,195 422 4,069 2,665 12,488
j. Monthly Tonnage Records
(1) Off-load
Port
Danang HuelTan My Hue/Tan My Dong Ha I CTZ I CTZ
Record
222,471 SIT 49,529 S/T 76,597 M/T 44,179 SIT 360,174 S/T 538,819 MIT
Old Record
211,917 S/T 21,345 S/T 34,980 M/T 41,815 SIT 308,528 S/T 503,348 MIT
Date
Jan 68 Mar 68 Jan 68 Mar 68 Jan 68
Mar ~.
~~ ~.
DECLASSIFIED
\)~, '(, ~
I BECnEl'
88
DECLASSIFIED
rerpT • • (2) Through-put
Port Record Old Record Date
Danang 370,148 SIT 308,233 SIT Mar 68 Danang 553,678 M/T 547,526 M/T Mar 68 Hue/Tan My 51,464 SIT 25,592 SIT Mar 68 Hue/Tan My 82,648 M/T 45,599 M/T Mar 68 Dong Ha 49,614 SIT 46,602 SIT Mar 68 Dong Ha 81,887 M/T 80,201 M/T Mar 68 I CTZ 519,047 S/T* 419,888 SIT Mar 68 I CTZ 793,897 M/T 739,383 M/T Mar 68
(3) Back-load
Port Record Old Record Date
Danang 147,677 SIT 111,813 SIT Mar 68 Danang 218,516 MIT 195,433 MIT Mar 68 Dong Ha 44,179 SIT 41,815 SIT Mar 68 I CTZ 158,873 SIT 126,753S/T Mar 68 I CTZ 255,078 MIT 236,035 M/T Mar 68
*Does not include the throughput of 34,244 SIT at Wunder Beach.