Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations

USMC

US Marine Corps

USMC

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 147 000006 00

MCTP 3-03A(Formerly MCWP 3-33.1)

CD&I (C 116)

2 May 2016

ERRATUM

to

MCWP 3-33.1

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Change all instances of MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military

Operations, to MCTP 3-03A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations.

2. Change PCN 143 000106 00 to PCN 146 000006 00

3. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

PCN 146 000006 80

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changesthrough the Universal Need Statement (UNS) process. The UNS submission process is delin-eated in Marine Corps Order 3900.15A, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development Sys-tem, which can be obtained from the Marine Corps Publications Electronic Library Online(universal reference locator: http://www.usmc/directiv.nsf/web+orders).

The UNS recommendation should include the following information:

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Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine Corps Lo-gistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, MarineCorps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the MCCDCDoctrine world wide web home page which is found at the following universal reference locator:https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

For Official Use Only

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1775

28 September 2011

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task ForceCivil-Military Operations, is designed to assist Marines, whether serving in civil-militaryoperations (CMO) billets or in other capacities, to incorporate CMO across the range ofmilitary operations throughout each phase of an operation or campaign. Civil-militaryoperations are difficult to understand and execute effectively without adequate doctrine,expertise, and training. This publication provides a starting point for CMO planners asthey plan and fight in today’s complex operational environments.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1 provides a doctrinal foundation of Marineair-ground task force (MAGTF) CMO and serves as a guide for the commander and hisstaff, as well as for Marine Corps active duty and Selected Marine Corps Reserve civilaffairs units. The intent of this publication is to supplement joint doctrine by describinghow and why the MAGTF uniquely incorporates CMO into its expeditionary mission.This publication is a result of current lessons learned, after action reports and subject mat-ter expert collaboration of the joint Services and select Government agencies.

For additional information about Joint and other Service CA organizations and CMOdoctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, refer to Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations; Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations; and Marine CorpsReference Publication 3-33.1A, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Thesepublications provide a wealth of information on civil affairs and CMO doctrine, history,organization, capabilities and methodology, and should be included in the libraries ofMarine Corps civil affairs units and personnel.

This publication supercedes MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Mili-tary Operations, dated 7 April 2003.

Reviewed and approved this date.


BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

RICHARD P. MILLSLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000106 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to US Government agenciesonly; for official use only. Other requests for this document will be referred to HeadquartersUnited States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration, Capabili-ties Development Directorate, Fires and Maneuver Integration Division, Quantico, VA.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ______________________________________________________ iii


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Civil Dimension of Military OperationsHistorical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Civil-Military Operations in the Range of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Phase I: Deter (crisis defined). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action,

assess theater infrastructure). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities,

achieve full-spectrum superiority) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil

authority, redeploy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Forms of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6Types of Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Populace and Resources Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8Nation Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9Support to Civil Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9Civil Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9Civil Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Funding Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10METT-T, Civil Considerations, and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10Department of Defense Funding Authorities Available Under United

States Code, Title 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11Humanitarians Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11Humanitarian Assistance–Excess Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11Humanitarian Assistance–Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12Humanitarian Mine Action Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12Foreign Disaster Relief Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13The Denton Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13The Funded Transportation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13Security and Stabilization Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Department of State Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Civil-Military Operations in the Long War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14Act in the National Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14Serve in Expeditionary Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14Partners Outside of the MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15Watched by the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

iv _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Tactical Actions May Have Strategic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15Importance of Civilian Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15Operate in Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

MAGTF Civil-Military Operations in an Expeditionary Environment . . . . 1-15Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15Serving as an Initial Entry Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16Fighting From the Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16Seabasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16Interfacing with Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Operational Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16Minimize Civilian Interference, Maximize Civilian Support . . . . . . . . 1-16Meet Legal and Moral Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17Gain Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17Enhance Freedom of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17Isolate the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17Support the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18Win the Perception Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18

Chapter 2. MAGTF Civil Affairs Forces and Concept of EmploymentPersonnel and Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Civil Affairs Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Civil Affairs Detachments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Civil Affairs Teams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4MAGTF G-9/S-9 Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Reserve Component Civil Affairs Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Preplanned Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Contingency Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Concept of Employment for Civil Affairs Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7Phase I: Deter (crisis defined) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess

theater infrastructure) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve

full-spectrum superiority) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil

authority, redeploy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9Other MAGTF Capabilities in Support of Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . 2-9

Chapter 3. Civil-Military Operations PlanningCivil Affairs Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Decide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

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Develop/Detect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Deliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Evaluate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Civil Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Civil Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4The Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Integrated Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Continuous and Concurrent Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Civil-Military Operations Problem Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8Understanding the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Understanding Our Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Understanding the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Understanding the Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12Commander’s Initial Intent and Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12Civil-Military Operations Staff Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12Green Cell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14Red Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14Apply Inputs From Problem Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14Develop Initial Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14Identify Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . 3-15Update Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products. . . . . . . . 3-15Determine Battlefield Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Establish Priorities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Determine Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Determine Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Assign Required Course of Action Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Assign Purpose Then Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Determine Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Synchronize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Determine Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16Obtain G-9 Input. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Conduct Course of Action Refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Prepare Civil-Military Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Publish Commander’s Wargaming Guidance and

Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

Establish War Game Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19Conduct War Game Preparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19Conduct the War Game Turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20War Game Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22

Course of Action Comparison and Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22Evaluate Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22

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Compare Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23Establish Commander’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23Prepare the Commander’s Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25Update the Warning Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25

Orders Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25Preparation of an Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25Orders Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25Orders Crosswalk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26Commander Approves Order or Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26Development of the Operations Order and

Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27

Transition Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-28Transition Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29Confirmation Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29

Chapter 4. CoordinationCivil-Military Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Interagency, Nongovernmental, and Intergovernmental Organizations . . . . . 4-2

US Government Coordination and the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

US Government Interagency Partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Nongovernmental Organizations and

Intergovernmental Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Facilitation of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Information Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Civil Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

MAGTF Coordination in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8The Operational Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9The Relief System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10The Military Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10The Humanitarian Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11United States Agency for International Development’s Office

of Foreign Disaster Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12Sphere Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

AppendicesA Combat Standing Operating Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C District Stability Framework Quick Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

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D Sample Civil-Military Operations Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1E Examples of Annex Gs for Conducting Stability Operations. . . . . . . . . E-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications

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CHAPTER 1 CIVIL DIMENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants’ mind the leading ideas of civilization,the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty. In doing so, one shouldendeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all thisaccomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and re-spect of the native population.

—Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15, Small Wars Manual

Historical Background

When the Small Wars Manual was originallypublished in 1940, the Marine Corps had alreadyamassed a wealth of experience in conductingwhat is known today as stability operations. In2009, the Department of Defense (DOD), recog-nizing the importance of this trend, publishedDepartment of Defense Instruction (DODI)3000.05, Stability Operations, which stated thatstability operations were to be a core US militarymission and that its Armed Forces were to be pre-pared to conduct these types of operations with alevel of proficiency equivalent to combat opera-tions. Although stability operations were oftenrelegated to the background during the Cold War,they have been conducted with increasing fre-quency during the past 20 years in such places asPanama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, the Philippines,and Afghanistan. Furthermore, this DODIdirected that the Armed Services should be pre-pared to conduct stability operations activitiesthroughout all phases of conflict and across therange of military operations. Although no longerrelegated to peacekeeping operations or short-term contingency operations, DODI 3000.05states “stability operations missions may rangefrom small-scale, short-duration to large-scale,long-duration.” Inherent to stability operations isthe need to establish civil security and civil con-trol, restore essential services, repair and protect

critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarianassistance (HA). All of these tasks fall within thepurview of civil-military operations (CMO), andtoday’s Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)must be prepared to carry out this type of mis-sion whether it has civil affairs (CA) forcesassigned or not.

In any type of environment and across the rangeof military operations, Marine Corps command-ers must determine how best to engage the civil-ian populace to accomplish their missions. Thispublication provides a framework from which tounderstand, plan, and execute CMO for theMAGTF. The Marine Corps has been engaged inCMO since its inception, in places as diverse asHaiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Phil-ippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq,and Afghanistan. In some of these operations,civil-military considerations were paramount andtheir effective incorporation into planning oftendetermined an operation’s success or failure, suchas the operations in the Caribbean and CentralAmerica that were also known as the “BananaWars,” which were fought during the 1920s and30s. To capture these hard-learned lessons, theMarine Corps first published the Small WarsManual in 1940, it was later republished in 1990as FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual.

Though portions of the Small Wars Manual arenow outdated, it still contains many enduringtruths, particularly concerning CMO, that are as

1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


valid today as they were in 1940. For example,chapter 4’s discussions on civil-military relation-ships with host nation (HN) officials, indigenouslaw enforcement, and the civil population stillstands the test of time. One quote, perhaps, sums itup best, “Poor judgment on the part of subordi-nates in the handling of situations involving thelocal civil authorities and the local inhabitants iscertain to involve the commander of the force inunnecessary military difficulties and causepublicity adverse to the public interests of theUnited States.”

During World War II, the Marine Corps estab-lished a limited number of CA officer billets inthe Fleet Marine Forces manned by subject mat-ter experts (SMEs) directly commissioned fromacademia. While working with their Navy CAcounterparts, the officers conducted planning forthe military government of occupied Japaneseislands such as Bougainville, the Gilberts, theMarshalls, Saipan, and Okinawa. During theKorean and Vietnam Wars, the Marine Corpsestablished CA staff elements at the division andMarine expeditionary force (MEF) levels, knownas the G-5, which focused on CMO planning. Anoteworthy development during the Vietnam Warwas the Marine Corps’ establishment of the com-bined action platoon concept, which involvedembedding small teams of Marines in remote vil-lages as part of the overall pacification program.The combined action platoons lived with andshared the same food as the villagers. The pla-toons assisted the villages with rural developmentby earning the trust of the villagers and by deter-ring the attempts that the Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese forces made to separate the villagesfrom the central government. Though successful,the combined action platoon concept was notexpanded during the war and many of their les-sons learned were forgotten when the war ended.

To address the shortfall of CA expertise withinthe Marine Corps, the Commandant of theMarine Corps (CMC) directed the establishment

of the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG) in 1966,followed by the 3d CAG in 1985. Both CAGs,composed of Marines from the Selected MarineCorps Reserve, are assigned to United StatesMarine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES),but upon mobilization, support the MEFs withcivil affairs teams (CATs) and detachments. Dur-ing the Cold War and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, these forces were deemed suffi-cient to fulfill the CA support requirement of aMAGTF and support planning for the numerousHA/disaster relief (DR) operations that frequentlyoccur throughout the world.

In 2001, the Marine Corps, and the rest of the USArmed Forces, found themselves facing a newseries of CMO intensive challenges—first inAfghanistan, then in Iraq—that exceeded 3d and4th CAG’s ability to adequately address. This led,in 2004, to the creation of the first provisionalCAG, the 5th CAG, followed by the 6th CAG,both formed from MARFORRES units.

In order to keep the reserve CAGs within their 5to 1 dwell ratio limits, 5th Battalion, 10th MarineArtillery Regiment was designated as a CMOforce task-organized to provide CA support to IIMarine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF[Fwd]) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)2006–2008. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marine Artil-lery Regiment was designated a ProvisionalCAG, which means that it is not the unit’s pri-mary mission, however; it is a mission assignedto them due to a lack of available forces. The 2dBattalion, 11th Marine Artillery Regimentreplaced 5th Battalion, 10th Marine ArtilleryRegiment in support of II MEF (Fwd) during OIF2007–2009.

In January 2007, the President of the UnitedStates, on the recommendation of the Secretary ofDefense, announced that the Marine Corps wouldincrease its end strength from approximately180,000 to 202,000 by 2011. As part of the forcestructure increase, Headquarters, Marine Corps,authorized the creation of 173 additional active

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations _____________________________________________________ 1-3


duty CA billets during fiscal year (FY) 2008.Based on guidance from CMC and the MarineCorps Requirements Oversight Council, theestablishment of these billets would providequalified CMO plans and operations personnel tocommanders of the ground combat and com-mand elements in the three MEFs, including allactive duty infantry and artillery regiments aswell as the Marine expeditionary units (MEUs).The force structure increase included three, activeduty, 51-man CA detachments allocated to the10th and 11th Marines as well as III MEF.

Fundamentals

Civil-military operations apply at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels of war. Marinesdeploy across the globe to support regionalengagement strategies and further national goalsthrough the forward presence of expeditionaryunits. Marines are involved in multinationaltraining activities and exercises that contribute tointernational cooperation and stability. Marinesrespond to complex emergencies, such as naturaldisasters that overwhelm civil authorities. Marinesalso contribute to peacekeeping and peaceenforcement missions and they are prepared to useforce or the threat of force to deter conflict. Ifefforts to preserve peace fail, focused militarycapability is carefully employed to accomplishnational objectives swiftly and with as little lossof life as possible. Once hostilities conclude,military forces contribute to stabilization,recovery, and the peaceful transition of controlback to civil authorities. Therefore, militaryoperations are more than the simple application offorces, arms, and equipment. Each operation has acivil dimension. The civil dimension requires thatcommanders consider how their actions affect,and are affected by, noncombatants.

A CMO may require military forces to performactivities and functions normally the responsibilityof the local, regional, or national government.

These activities may occur prior to, during, orsubsequent to other military actions. They mayalso occur, if directed, in the absence of othermilitary operations. Designated CA units, othermilitary forces, or a combination of CA and otherforces may perform CMO. Therefore, a MAGTFwill need to carefully develop, nurture, andmaintain positive relations between themselvesand the indigenous people, governments, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their areaof operations (AO). Effective CMO assists mili-tary commanders in meeting their internationalobligations to civilians and achieve objectives.

Per Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-MilitaryOperations, the purpose of CMO is to facilitatemilitary operations, and to consolidate andachieve operational US objectives, through theintegration of civil and military actions whileconducting support to civil administration (SCA),populace and resources control (PRC), foreignhumanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assis-tance (NA) (JP 3-57), and civil information man-agement (CIM). The civil aspect of the opera-tional environment, by its very nature, changesrapidly, though certain things remain constant,such as the need to thoroughly integrate CMOinto MAGTF operations. Therefore, an under-standing of CMO terminology is critical to mis-sion success:

Civil-military operations are activities that acommander utilizes to establish, maintain,influence, or exploit relations between militaryforces, governmental and nongovernmentalcivilian organizations and authorities, and thecivilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hos-tile operational area in order to facilitate mili-tary operations, and consolidate and achieveoperational US objectives. Although CAMarines or other military forces may becomedesignated to perform CMO, the commander isultimately responsible.Civil affairs personnel are those designated ACand RC Marines and units organized, trained,

1-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


and equipped specifically to conduct CA oper-ations and to support CMO. Since this termapplies to people, it is incorrect to say that onewould conduct CA. Marines conduct CMO,not CA.Civil affairs operations are those military oper-ations conducted by CA forces that—

Enhance the relationship between militaryforces and civil authorities in localitieswhere military forces are present. Require coordination with other interagencyorganizations, IGOs, NGOs, indigenous pop-ulations and institutions, and the private sec-tor. Involve application of functional specialtyskills that normally are the responsibility ofcivil government in order to enhance theconduct of CMO.

JP 3-57 also identifies six CA functional spe-cialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, gov-ernance, public health and welfare, infrastructure,and public education and information. While CAforces assigned to the US Army Reserve possessthe personnel and capability to address all six ofthese functional areas, the majority of CA forcesin the AC of the Army and Marine Corps areconsidered CA generalists. The CAGs fromMARFORRES are manned , t r a ined , andequipped to perform two of the six functionalspecialty areas—public health and welfare andrule of law—because judge advocates and publichealth specialists are authorized within theirtables of organization. If a CAG is attached to aMAGTF, it provides the MAGTF with the capa-bility of conducting limited CA operations.

Civil-Military Operations inthe Range of Military Operations

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, recognizes that militaryoperations vary in size, purpose, and combatintensity within a range of military operationsthat extends from military engagement, securitycooperation, and deterrence activities to crisisresponse and limited contingency operations and,if necessary, major operations and campaigns asdepicted in figure 1-1. A MAGTF may be calledupon to simultaneously execute a variety of mis-sions across the range of military operations, andMarines might be required to conduct major oper-ations or campaigns in a third world country orregion; therefore, the MAGTF must be preparedto conduct CMO across the full range of militaryoperations anywhere in the world.

JP 3-0 also introduces an expanded six-phasemodel (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate,stabilize, and enable civil authority) for conduct-ing major operations and campaigns that also pro-vides a flexible arrangement for smaller, relatedoperations as shown in figure 1-2 on page 1-5(see chap. 2 for additional information).

Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare)

During this phase, CMO that are carried out aspart of NA are designed to support a com-mander’s security cooperation activities thatdevelop allied and friendly military capabilitiesfor self-defense and coalition operations, improve

Crisis Response andLimited Contingency

Operations

Major Operations andCampaigns

Military Engagement, SecurityCooperation, and Deterrence

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations



information exchange and intelligence sharing,and provide US forces with peacetime and con-tingency access. Civil-military operations (e.g.,medical, veterinary, and engineering) are con-ducted in conjunction with many security cooper-ation exercises and events that MAGTF forcesare engaged in around the world, such as CobraGold, African Lion, and New Horizons.

Phase I: Deter (crisis defined)

During this phase, MAGTF CMO planners andliaison teams coordinate with interagencypartners, IGOs, and, occasionally, NGOs whowork together to set conditions for the executionof subsequent phases of the campaign. Manyactions in the deter phase build on activities fromthe previous phase. During a build up of forces,the CMO task of PRC, such as publicizingcurfew information among indigenous popu-lations and institutions and planning to establishcontrol of dislocated civilians (DCs) to precludeinterference and facilitate tactical movement offorces and logistical support within the AO,becomes necessary.

Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure)

During this phase, the MAGTF, either separatelyor as part of a joint force, establishes conditions

for stability by providing immediate assistance torelieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. TheMAGTF forces must ensure that CMO remaincontinuous as the US Government (USG) worksto resolve the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority)

Even though the emphasis during this phase is ondefeating the enemy, CMO and stability tasks areconducted as needed to facilitate military opera-tions and to ensure a smooth transition to the nextphase. The CMO tasks of PRC and CIM predom-inate, especially with regard to civilians on thebattlefield and the prevention or possible pay-ment for collateral damage during operations. Asthe situation develops, CA planners, as part ofintegrated operational planning teams (OPTs) orworking groups, should attempt to validate oridentify new potential sources of conflict withinthe population to minimize future instability.

Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services)

During this phase, the MAGTF may be requiredto perform limited local governance, integratingthe efforts of other supporting/contributing multi-national, interagency, IGO, or NGO participantsuntil legitimate local entities are functioning.

SHAPEPhase 0

DETERPhase I

PreventPrepare

ENABLECIVIL

AUTHORITYPhase V

SEIZEINITIATIVE

Phase II

DOMINATEPhase III

STABILIZEPhase IV

CrisisDefined

Assure FriendlyFreedom of

Action

Access TheaterInfrastructure

EstablishDominant Force

Capabilities

AchieveFull-Spectrum

Superiority

EstablishSecirity

RestoreServices

Transfer toCivil Authority

Redeploy

Figure 1-2. Phasing Model.

1-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


This includes providing or assisting in the provi-sion of basic services to the population. The sta-bilize phase is typically characterized by a changefrom sustained combat operations to stabilityoperations. All CMO tasks occur in this phase,but NA tasks dominate as CMO facilitate human-itarian relief and restoration of civil order andservices as the fighting subsides and emphasisshifts from relief to reconstruction.

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy)

During this phase of a campaign, the MAGTFwill act in a supporting role to the lawful civilauthority in the region throughout the enable civilauthority phase. The MAGTF forces should workto transition all civil sector functions to legitimateauthorities as soon as practical. All CMO tasksare performed, including NA.

Forms of Military Operations

In today’s operating environment, Marines haveto be ready to both fight and build, depending onthe security situation and a variety of other fac-tors. The four forms of military operations thatthe Marine Corps and Army are expected to beable to carry out are offensive operations, defen-sive operations, stability operations, and civilsupport operations. For a description of primarytasks and purposes of each of these forms ofoperations, see figure 1-3.

Each of the three forms of military operationsdepicted in figure 1-3 (less civil support opera-tions) may be carried out in foreign countries to agreater or lesser degree. The exact mix ofoffensive, defensive, or stability tasks variesdepending on the situation and the mission. Com-manders weigh each operation based on theirassessment of the operation or campaign phaseand the situation in their AO. They shift theweight among the tasks of the different opera-tions as necessary to address situations in different

parts of the AO while continuing to pursue theiroverall objectives.

During stability operations, CMO comes to theforefront. The CMO planners and CA units willassist the MAGTF in planning and conductingsupport to civil security and civil control, restor-ing essential services, supporting governance,and providing support to economic and infra-structure development, all of which contribute toproviding a stable and secure environment. TheMAGTF CMO staff section (G-9/S-9), in coordi-nation with the operations staff section (G-3/S-3),is well suited to take lead in the planning andcoordination of CMO intensive stability taskssuch as restoring essential services, supportinggovernance, and providing support to economicand infrastructure development.

Marine Corps CA forces are required to performsome or all of their CMO tasks in every form ofoperation. Figure 1-4, on page 1-8, depicts howCMO tasks, which fall under stability operations,vary according to the overall nature of the opera-tion underway.

For example, during phases 0, the emphasis maybe on stability operations, with less emphasis onoffensive and defensive operations. Duringphases I and II, the emphasis will be on defen-sive operations. In phase III, offensive operationswill dominate. As the operation or campaign tran-sitions from phase III to phase IV and from phaseIV to phase V, once again, stability operationswill become dominant, as fewer offensive anddefensive operations may be required as thecountry returns to its preconflict state.

Types of Civil-Military Operations

Performance by military forces of activities andfunctions normally the responsibility of the local,regional, or national government may be includedin CMO. These activities may occur prior to, dur-ing, or subsequent to other military actions. Theymay also occur, if directed, in the absence of



other military operations. Designated CA mayperform CMO, by other military forces, or by acombination of CA and other forces.

The core CMO mission essential tasks (METs)are those primary tasks that Marine Corps forcesmust be fully capable of planning, supporting,executing, or transitioning through, with, or byoutside factors to mitigate or defeat civil threats.The mission essential CMO tasks are facilitatePRC, facilitate foreign HA, facilitate NA, managecivil information, and facilitate SCA (MarineCorps Task List).

Populace and Resources Control

The PRC assists HN governments or de factoauthorities in retaining control over their popula-tion centers, thus precluding complicating prob-lems that may hinder mission accomplishment.Populace and resource control measures seek toidentify, reduce, relocate, or access populationresources that may impede or otherwise threatensuccess. Populace and resource control measurescan be applied across the range of military opera-tions. The MAGTF CMO planners develop andcoordinate PRC in conjunction with HN and NGOresources, to include DC evacuation and camps.

Offensive OperationsPrimary

Movement to contactAttackExploitationPursuit

PurposesDislocate, isolate disrupt,and destroy enemy forcesSeize key terrainDeprive the enemy of resourcesDevelop intelligenceDeceive and divert the enemyCreate a secure environmentfor stability operations

PurposesDeter or defeat enemy offensiveoperationsGain timeAchieve economy of forceRetain key terrainProtect the populace, criticalassets, and infrastructureDevelop intelligence

Defensive OperationsPrimary Tasks

Mobile defenseArea defenseRetrogate

Stability OperationsPrimary Tasks

Civil securityCivil controlRestore essential services

Support to economic andinfastructure development

Support to governance

PurposesProvide a secure environmentSecure land areasMeet the critical needs ofthe populaceGain support for HNgovernmentShape the environment forinteragency and HN success

PurposesSaves livesRestore essential servicesMaintain or restore lawand orderProtect infastructure andpropertyMaintain or restore localgovernmentShape the environment forinteragency success

Civil Support OperationsPrimary Tasks

Provide support in response todisaster or terrorist attackSupport civil law enforcementProvide other supportas required

Figure 1-3. Forms of Military Operations.

1-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


For more details regarding PRC tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TTP), refer to MarineCorps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.1ACivil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

Populace control provides for security of thepopulace, mobilization of human resources,denial of personnel availability to the enemy, anddetection and reduced effectiveness of enemyagents. Populace control measures also includecurfews, movement restrictions, travel permits,identification and registration cards, and volun-tary resettlement. The DC operations involvepopulace control that requires extensive planningand coordination among various military andnonmilitary organizations.

Resources control regulates the movement or con-sumption of materiel resources, mobilizes mate-riel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy.Resources control measures include licensing,

regulations or guidelines, and checkpoints, (e.g.,roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs,and inspection of facilities. (JP 3-57)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The FHA consists of DOD activities, normally insupport of the United States Agency for Interna-tional Development (USAID) or Department ofState (DOS), conducted outside the United States,its territories, and possessions to relieve or reducehuman suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.Foreign humanitarian assistance can relieve orreduce the results of natural or manmade disastersor endemic conditions that might present a seri-ous threat to life or that can result in great dam-age to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarianassistance provided by US forces is limited inscope and duration. The foreign assistance pro-vided is designed to supplement or complementthe efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies

Shape

StabilityOffenseDefense

Deter

StabilityDefenseOffense

Seize Initiative

OffenseDefenseStability

Dominate

OffenseDefenseStability

Stabilize

DefenseStabilityOffense

Enable Civil Authority

StabilityOffenseDefense

Figure 1-4. Operation or Campaign Phases.



that have primary responsibility for providingassistance (see JP 3-29, Foreign HumanitarianAssistance , for additional information). AMAGTF participating in FHA will often take theform of a MEU, which is already at sea, and betasked to provide HA in a natural or manmadedisaster event. For more details regarding FHATTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Nation Assistance

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance(other than FHA) rendered to a nation by USforces within that nation’s territory during peace-time, crises or emergencies, or war, based onagreements mutually concluded between the USand that nation. (JP 3-57) Nation assistance oper-ations support a HN by promoting sustainabledevelopment and growth of responsive institu-tions. The goal is to promote long-term regionalstability. Nation assistance programs ofteninclude, but are not limited to, security assistance,foreign internal defense, and humanitarian andcivic assistance (HCA). All NA actions are inte-grated through the US ambassador’s mission stra-tegic plan. (JP 3-57) Commonly, NA performedby MAGTF forces takes the form of US militaryto foreign military training and HCA events, suchas medical, dental, or engineering-related projectsin conjunction with military operations and exer-cises. For more details regarding NA TTP, referto MCRP 3-33.1A.

Support to Civil Administration

The SCA helps continue or stabilize managementby a governing body of a foreign nation’s civilstructure by assisting an established governmentor by establishing military authority over anoccupied population. Support to civil administra-tion consists of planning, coordinating, advising,or assisting with those activities that reinforce orrestore a civil administration that supports US andmultinational objectives. (JP 3-57) Support to civiladministration occurs most often during stabilityoperations. During counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations, SCA is often managed utilizing linesof operations (LOOs), such as civil security,essential services, support to governance, andsupport to economic and infrastructure develop-ment. For more details regarding SCA TTP, referto MCRP 3-33.1A.

Civil Information

Civil information pertains to civil areas, struc-tures, capabilities, organizations, people, andevents (ASCOPE) within the civil component ofthe operational environment, which can be fusedor processed to increase situational awareness,situational understanding, or situational domi-nance. The process whereby civil information iscollected, entered into a central database, andinternally fused within the supported unit; higherheadquarters (HHQ); and other USG and DODagencies, IGOs and NGOs is called CIM. TheCIM process ensures the timely availability ofinformation for analysis and the widest possibledissemination of the raw and analyzed civil infor-mation to military and nonmilitary partnersthroughout the AO. Examples of CIM tasksinclude the following:

Conducting civil reconnaissance (CR) to find,analyze, and report civil information and coor-dinating with non-CA assets to achieve acoherent reconnaissance and execution plan. Synchronizing the collection and consolida-tion of civil information. Developing the civil components of the com-mon operational picture (COP). Increasing the supported commander’s envi-ronmental awareness. Assisting in the development of the supportedcommander’s COP and conducting inter-agency, IGO, NGO, and indigenous populationand institutions (IPI) coordination.

For more information concerning integration ofcivil information during the Marine Corps Plan-ning Process (MCPP), refer to chapter 3.

1-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Civil Support Operations

Although civil support operations are not a mis-sion essential or core task for Marine Corps CAforces, it is included due to the similaritiesbetween civil support operations and NA. Civilsupport is the overarching term for DOD’s SCA.The DOD’s role in the civil support mission con-sists of support to the Department of HomelandSecurity or other agencies for domestic emergen-cies and for designated law enforcement activi-ties. Civil support capabilities are derived fromDOD warfighting capabilities that could beapplied to foreign/domestic assistance or lawenforcement support missions. Additionally, civilsupport operations incorporate CMO tasks per-formed inside the United States—similar to CMOtasks conducted as part of stability operations onforeign soil. Marines may participate in civil sup-port operations when requested, such as in the1992 Los Angeles riots, California wildfires, andHurricane Katrina in 2005. For additional infor-mation on civil support operations, see JP 3-28,Civil Support.

Funding Authorities

Money in CMO is often the commander’s mosteffective weapon. Like all weapons, however, athorough knowledge of the weapon’s capabilitiesand limitations is imperative to its effectiveemployment. Funding authorities are normallyfound in the DOD Appropriations Act. In recentCOIN operat ions, Congress appropriatedadditional funds to commanders for the specificpurpose of dealing with COIN. Recent examplesinclude the Commander’s Emergency ResponseProgram (CERP), the Iraq Relief and Re-construction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, andCommander’s Humanitarian Relief and Re-construction Program Funds. Both the DOS and

the USAID are appropriated funds by the USCongress for foreign assistance under legalauthorities in United States Code, Title 22,Foreign Relations and Intercourse. These fundsare not expendable by commanders, though theyfund programs administered by USAID. Marinesresponsible for funding CMO activities in closeproximity to the activities of other governmentagencies (OGAs), such as USAID, need to beaware of the funding authorities available as wellas how those funding authorities can be em-ployed. Many adjacent funding authorities exist;for example, the Iraqi Security Forces Fund,which exists to provide support to all IraqiSecurity Forces. Projects under this fund couldinclude building construction, provision ofessential services, and immediate response toemergency situations. Though projects may looksimilar, the desired effect varies significantly.

METT-T, Civil Considerations, and Funding

A thorough civil considerations analysis and mis-sion, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and sup-port available—time available (METT-T)analysis of the AO is critical to identifying thefunding programs that will best meet the com-mander’s desired end state. Many funding pro-grams exist; some provide immediate response toa HA/DR mission (such as Overseas Humanitar-ian, Disaster, and Civic Aid [OHDACA] funds),while others are more suited to satisfy an imme-diate requirement for an essential service, such aswater purification CERP. Funding authorities canbe identified to support the commander’s desiredend state once the mission has been identified anda civil assessment has been conducted. In addi-tion, funding authorities are amended routinely,and some funding programs are temporary innature so maintaining currency of the fundingprograms available to an operational environ-ment is critical to effective CMO.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ____________________________________________________ 1-11


Department of Defense Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 10

The CERP enables local commanders in anyoperation to respond with a nonlethal weapon tourgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief andreconstruction projects and services that immedi-ately assist the indigenous population and that thelocal population or government can sustain. TheDOD defines urgent as any chronic or acute inad-equacy of an essential good or service that in thejudgment of the local commander calls for imme-diate action. Prior coordination with communityleaders increases goodwill. Standing operatingprocedures governing the authorities and submis-sion guidelines for CERP are contained withinUnited States Code, Title 10, and the NationalDefense Authorizat ion Act for FY 2006,extended by United States Code, Title 10, and theNational Defense Authorization Act for 2008.The Center for Army Lessons Learned Hand-book 09-24, Commander’s Guide to Money as aWeapons System, provides the full scope of capa-bilities and limitations for this program in its tac-tical application.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

A program administered by the Defense SecurityCooperation Agency that includes three segments:the Humanitarian Assistance Program, theHumanitarian Mine Action Program, and ForeignDisaster Relief Initiative. In broad terms,OHDACA programs support US military forces inmeeting two key requirements. The first is tomaintain a robust overseas presence aimed atshaping the international security environment ina manner that deters aggressors, strengthensfriends and allies, and promotes peace andstability in regions of tension. The secondrequirement is for US forces to respond effec-tively when called upon to assist the victims of

storms, earthquakes, and other natural ormanmade disasters. Funding authority providedby United States Code, Title 10.

Humanitarian Assistance

Established in 1986, this program is designed toassure friendly nations and allies of our supportand provide basic humanitarian aid and services topopulations in need. The DOD and geographiccombatant commanders seek to help avert politicaland humanitarian crises, promote democraticdevelopment and regional stability, and enablecountries to begin to recover from conflicts. TheHA projects and activities accomplish these objec-tives in several ways: they support the donation ofexcess nonlethal DOD property and they also sup-port the provision of on-the-ground activities car-ried out by US military personnel aimed atassuring friendly nations of our support byimproving US military presence in countries. Suchactivities include assessment of needs; rudimen-tary construction of clinics, schools, and roads;and medical, technical, and logistical assistance.

Humanitarian Assistance–Excess Property

United States Code, Title 10 authorizes DOD toprovide nonlethal, DOD excess supplies to for-eign governments and civilian organizations(orphanages, schools, clinics) for humanitarianrelief purposes when requested by the local USembassy. The DOD processes, refurbishes, stores,and transports the property, and the DOS (or USembassy in HN) distributes the property to theintended recipients for humanitarian purposes.Examples of property available through this pro-gram include medical equipment and supplies,construction equipment, trucks and other vehi-cles, generators and other electrical equipment,school supplies, tools, furniture, tents, blankets,and clothing. Item availability is not guaranteedand depends on a variety of factors. Propertymust primarily benefit the recipient country civil-ians, is donated with no warranties or guarantees

1-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


and no post donation support, cannot be sold bythe recipient government, and can be donated tothe military only if used for civilian purposes.

Humanitarian Assistance–Other

United States Code, Title 10 provides authority tocarry out humanitarian projects, other thanHumanitarian Assistance–Excess Propertyprojects, that support the national security andforeign policy goals of the United States. Theseprojects typically include construction or refur-bishment of local infrastructure facilities, disas-ter preparedness or refugee repatriation training,exercises or seminars, assessment visits, andtechnical and logistic assistance for foreign recip-ients. Humanitarian construction projects are gen-erally limited to $500,000. Proposed projectscosting more than $500,000 require special justi-fication and review by Defense Security Cooper-ation Agency and DOD policy. The OHDACAfunds may occasionally be used to deploy USmilitary teams or DOD-related personnel to carryout diverse humanitarian projects worldwide.

Humanitarian Mine Action Program

The Humanitarian Mine Action Program is amajor component of the USG program andsupports DOD’s security cooperation strategy.Explosive remnants of war, which includelandmines, unexploded ordnance, and small armsammunitions, are the residues of civil wars andinternal conflicts on virtually every continent.Increasingly in these conflicts, these explosiveremnants of war deny civilian populations theirlivelihoods, uproot them from their lands, andpromote political instability. Today, explosiveremnants of war kill or maim at least 1,000people every month—most of them innocentcivilians. US military or civilian personnel do notenter active minefields or remove emplacedlandmines. The Humanitarian Mine ActionProgram, executed by the geographic combatantcommanders, provides significant training and

readiness-enhancing benefits to US forces whilecontributing to alleviating a highly visible,worldwide problem. The program aids in thedevelopment of leadership and organizationalskills for host country personnel to sustain theirmine action programs after US military trainershave redeployed.

Foreign Disaster Relief Initiative

In times of severe natural and manmade disasters,such as the Pacific Tsunami (2005), Pakistanearthquake (2006), the Burma Cyclone (2007),and the Georgia Conflict (2008), the US militaryhas been and will continue to be called upon toprovide aid and assistance because of our uniqueassets and capabilities. The OHDACA fundingallows the geographic combatant commanders toprovide immediate life-saving assistance to coun-tries in their regions.

The DOD plays a key role by providing effectiveresponse when asked by the DOS and theUSAID. The US military offers exceptional oper-ational reach and can be immediately deployed asa stop gap measure to limit the extent of emer-gencies. The DOD’s ability to respond rapidlyassists in the containment of crises and limitsthreats to regional stability by donating and/ortransporting relief aid within hours or a few daysof a disaster. The DOD’s capabilities for com-mand and control, logistics, transportation, com-munications, and cargo transport cannot bematched by other agencies or countries.

Emergency response, in the form of both suppliesand services, encompasses transportation, logisti-cal support, provisions of humanitarian dailyrations to maintain the health of moderately mal-nourished recipients until conventional relief pro-grams or targeted feeding can be resumed, searchand rescue, medical evacuation, and assistance tointernally displaced persons and refugees. TheDefense Security Cooperation Agency comptrol-ler’s office provides further details and guidanceon the specific focus of these programs and bud-get authorizations for current and future FYs.



The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

United States Code, Title 10 permits US militaryforces to carry out HCA projects and activities inconjunction with military operations overseas. TheDODI 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assis-tance (HCA) Activities, establishes policy andassigns responsibilities of DOD components. Mili-tary deployments for exercises and training are anintegral part of maintaining a forward US militarypresence, ensuring operational readiness to re-spond to crises, and preparing US RCs for wartimemissions. Activities must be conducted in conjunc-tion with authorized military operations by—

Promoting the security interests of both theUnited States and foreign country. Promoting operational readiness skills of theUS forces. Complementing but not duplicating any otherUS assistance. Serving the basic economic and social needs ofthe country’s people. Not being used by any individual, group, ororganization engaged in military or paramili-tary activity. Being approved by the DOS and funded withfunds specifically provided for such purpose.

Military deployment operations and maintenancefunds are authorized for incidental costs of carry-ing out this assistance by annual defense appro-priations acts (see United States Code, Title 10).

The Denton Program

The Denton Program permits DOD to providetransportation of privately-donated HA cargo toforeign countries using military transportation ona space available basis. The program is autho-rized under the Jeremiah Denton Amendment toUnited States Code, Title 10. There are no feesdue to the donating agency or organization forUSG transportation-related costs.

The Funded Transportation Program

Conducted under the authority available for HA,United States Code, Title 10, the Funded Trans-portation Program permits transportation of cargoand DOD nonlethal excess property worldwidefor NGOs and IGOs. This authority provides forthe actual cost of transportation and payment ofany associated administrative costs incurred.

Security and Stabilization Assistance

United States Code, Title 10 and the NationalDefense Authorization Act for FY2006 providesauthority for the DOD to transfer to the DOS upto $100 million per FY in defense articles, ser-vices, training, or other support for reconstruc-tion, stabilization, and security activities inforeign countries.

Department of StateFunding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 22

The DOS executes its funding authorities underUnited States Code, Title 22. Unlike the DODfunding authorities, DOS funds under UnitedStates Code, Title 22 are generally designed toimplement long-term, regional stability byaddressing essential needs. The MAGTF com-mander does not have direct authority to expendUnited States Code, Title 22 funds, however, thesefunds will be present within a MAGTF com-mander’s AO and can supplement his/her civil-military concept of operations. This requirescoordination via the interagency process with theUS embassy’s country team or appropriate DOSrepresentative. In addition, MAGTF commanderswill often find themselves working closely withprovincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), AdvanceCivilian Teams (ACTs), or field advanced civilianteam (FACTs), USAID disaster assessment andresponse teams, and other interagency playersiden t i f i ed dur ing the METT-T and c iv i l

1-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


considerations analysis of the operationalenvironment. An example of Title 22 funds thatare being executed within a MAGTF operationalenvironment is the Afghanistan Agricultural RapidResponse Program under the cognizance ofUSAID via regional PRTs within HelmandProvince. This program focuses on a region’slong-term agricultural development by means ofcompetitive investment in locally identifiedindustries. The desired effects from this programmay not be visible to the MAGTF that witnessedits inception, though it will become apparent insubsequent rotations. It is imperative that aMAGTF commander understands these programsand knows how to incorporate them into theoverall MAGTF concept of operations.

Civil-Military Operations in the Long War

In The Long War: Send in the Marines, the CMChighlights the importance of building partnercapacity and how doing so, including performingCMO, decisively contributes towards shaping theoperational environment.

The secondary military effort of [buildingpartner capacity] seeks to relieve some of theconditions that contribute to instability.Civil-military operations (CMO) constitutethe Marine Corps’ efforts to promote positiveinteraction between governments and citi-zens. Activities within this effort include theprovision of infrastructure improvements,humanitarian civil assistance, humanitarianassistance, disaster relief, and strategic com-munication. Marines will conduct civil-mili-tary operations alongside and in support ofhost nation military forces and governmententities as a means of strengthening theircommitment and the impact of their efforts.Advancement of these efforts leads toincreased regional security and stability asindividuals are empowered and governmentsare emboldened to eliminate systematic

oppression, injustice, and corruption. Insome cases, activities performed by Marineswill be designed to increase the legitimacyand reach of weak governments. . . theseactivities can serve as a catalyst to causemodification in the behavior of corrupt gov-ernments or governments that are unrespon-sive to the needs of their people.

In every effort, the ties between populacesand responsive governments will be strength-ened as progress compels citizens to take anincreased role in the advancement of theircommunity’s security, stability, and prosper-ity. These efforts not only help moderate theeffects of unstable environments, they buildgoodwill toward our country.

Commanders must ensure that they integrateCMO tasks into predeployment training programsthat include individual, MAGTF component, andMAGTF collective training tasks, especially insupport of regionally focused special purposeMAGTFs. In support of the long war, Marinesmust understand that many of their actions couldhave much larger, global implications, and, assuch, must keep in mind some key tenets.

Act in the National Interest

Whether demonstrating national commitmentthrough forward presence, exercising with alliesand strategic partners, engaging in armed combator providing relief to victims of a natural catas-trophe, all MAGTF operations are designed tosupport national objectives and policies.

Serve in Expeditionary Environments

The MAGTF usually operates far from home. Therequirements of a major theater war, a smaller-scale contingency, or an important theater engage-ment mission may demand that the MAGTF oper-ate in varied locations that may not be accustomedor adapted to a US military presence.



Partners Outside of the MAGTF

The MAGTF will have many partners and manyof them will not wear uniforms. The MAGTF willwork with other Services and AC, RC, andNational Guard members. The MAGTF will workincreasingly with representatives of various USGagencies, IGOs, and NGOs who bring capabilitiesand expertise not usually found in the MAGTF.Many of these organizations may not have workedtogether before and will not be subordinate to amilitary commander. They will understand prob-lems from their perspective and seek to resolvethem often without any obligation to accept mili-tary direction. Therefore, in accordance with theirorganizations guidelines, extraordinary effort andflexibility will be required to establish a unifiedeffort among partners.

Watched by the World

The efforts of the MAGTF will be observed,commented upon, and selectively portrayed to theworld and perceived differently by many viewers,some of who will not necessarily be unbiased.The perceptions created by MAGTF operationsmay result in changes to political realities thatmay, in turn, affect the mission. Therefore, CMOhas a powerful, complementary information oper-ations (IO) component. Not only do MAGTFactions matter, but the perceptions they create doas well.

Tactical Actions May Have Strategic Implications

Small, apparently local actions may have strate-gic consequences. An event at a single check-point may change the relationship between theMAGTF and local residents, allied partners, andNGOs, and may affect public opinion. Marinesmust be aware of the potential for their actions tocreate undesirable strategic implications.

Importance of Civilian Population

Civilians are more than just a part of the battle-field. Their presence, infrastructure, resources,

and moral and physical support will almostalways have military significance. In a COINoperation, the civilian population is at the centerof a struggle for legitimacy between the insur-gent and the counterinsurgent; each side aims toget the people to accept its governance or author-ity as legitimate. The adversary may also deliber-ately target civilians to promote or accelerateinstability or civil war.

Operate in Uncertainty

All military operations occur in an inherentlyuncertain and chaotic environment that is shapedby continuous human interaction. Civilian popu-lations, organizations, and leaders will causemuch of this uncertainty. The commander mustshape events within this context of unpredictabil-ity. Civil-military operations help the com-mander assess the civil situation and focusMAGTF efforts and those of other organizations.Although the MAGTF may not directly controlthe efforts of others, interaction, coordination,and cooperation with agencies external to theMAGTF may be critical to mission success.

MAGTF Civil-Military Operations in an Expeditionary Environment

Task Organization

The Marine Corps operates as a MAGTF: inte-grated, combined arms forces that include a com-mand element, aviation combat element (ACE),ground combat element (GCE), and logisticscombat element under a single commander. TheMAGTF is task-organized to accomplish a spe-cific mission. The MAGTF commander task-organizes his organic and assigned CA forces tohis major subordinate commands (MSCs) towhere they can best plan, coordinate, and assist inthe execution of CMO in support of the conceptof operations. Task organization permits a singlecommander to guide the civil-military interac-tions of the entire force and to integrate CMOinto his concept of a “single battle.”

1-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Serving as an Initial Entry Force

Marines are prepared to operate anywhere, pro-viding a joint force enabler in three dimensions—air, land, and sea. The MAGTF CMO helps shapethe civil dimension of the AO for current andfuture MAGTF, joint, or international efforts. Theperception the MAGTF creates, as the first USforce deployed to an operation will set the stagefor the remainder of the effort. The MAGTFCMO planner must create an operational archi-tecture and CIM system that supports the follow-on deployment of CA elements. The MAGTFCMO cannot be conducted independent of thewide variety of other governmental and reliefagencies that may already be present in the AO.

Fighting From the Sea

The Navy–Marine Corps team will continue toprovide a timely, worldwide response to unfore-seen and rapidly unfolding natural disasters andmanmade crises. Our forward forces will be firston scene in an emerging crisis and will providekey enabling capabilities for OGAs, private orga-nizations, and the introduction of follow-onforces and resources. They may also assume orfacilitate joint or combined task force commandresponsibilities, as demonstrated by the com-mand element of III MEF following the tsunamiin Southeast Asia in late 2004.

Seabasing

The ability to provide a sustainable logistic basesafely at sea allows the MAGTF to operate frominternational waters. The global fleet station is aseabasing concept from which to coordinate andemploy adaptive force packages within a regionalarea of interest. Focusing primarily on Phase 0(shaping) operations or campaigns, theater sup-port command, global maritime awareness, andtasks associated specifically with the war on ter-rorism, the global fleet station offers a means toincrease regional maritime security through thecooperative efforts of joint, interagency, and mul-tinational partners, as well as NGOs.

Interfacing with Civilians

The MAGTF will need to interact and attempt toin f luence a wide va r ie ty o f nonmi l i t a rypopulations, organizations, and leaders, and theirresponse wil l affect the manner in whichoperations are planned and executed. Cooper-ation with civilians, with an understanding of theirneeds, can mitigate potential frictions and canhelp keep MAGTF resources focused on op-erational objectives. Key leader engagements willbecome a p r imary too l o f t he MAGTFcommander in order to influence events and thevarious subgroups among the population. TheMAGTF CMO planners must consider thefollowing questions about civilian populations,organizations, and leaders:

What will they do? What does the MAGTF want them to do? How can the MAGTF make that happen? What does the MAGTF need to know to makethat happen?

Operational Support

All MAGTF operations receive CMO support.Where possible CMO synchronizes and inte-grates US interagency, IGO, NGO, indigenouspopulations, institutions, and private sector activ-ities with MAGTF operations.

Minimize Civilian Interference, Maximize Civilian Support

The MAGTF must assume that civilians willinterfere with operations, generally unintention-ally. Planning and execution must account forthis interference by avoiding actions and loca-tions that are likely to attract disruptive civiliansand the potential obstructions they cause.

The MAGTF must actively seek to use civilianphysical and human resources to operational ad-vantage. Civilian supplies and logistic resources,appropriately and legally acquired, can reducelogistic requirements. Equally important, by



effective interaction among the MAGTF andcivilian populations and organizations, theMAGTF gains access to capabilities and informa-tion it may lack. This might include language,cultural, tribal, social, geographic, or economicinformation. Collection of information fromcivilian sources in support of force protection, op-erational planning, and intelligence is facilitatedby CMO. Whenever possible, the MAGTF hopesto gain trust and inject confidence with friends andallies while avoiding the creation of grievances.

During COIN operations, support from the popu-lace is critical in obtaining information regardinginsurgents and insurgent activities. As the HNgovernment increases its legitimacy, the popu-lace will begin to assist it more actively. Eventu-ally, the people will marginalize and stigmatizeinsurgents to the point that the insurgent’s claimto legitimacy is destroyed.

Meet Legal and Moral Obligations

Under international law and US policy, theMAGTF commander has responsibilities to thecivilian populace in his AO. Adhering to theseresponsibilities has a positive effect on the rela-tionship between the MAGTF and civilians. Meet-ing our moral and legal obligations enhances thelegitimacy of the MAGTF in the eyes of the HNpopulace and the wider international audience.

Gain Situational Awareness

Civil information is gained during CMO in sup-port of the commander’s decision-making pro-cess and helps to identify opportunities andenemy vulnerabilities and centers of gravity, par-ticularly during COIN operations. Civil affairsspecialists and other members of the MAGTFconducting CMO must share information theyobtain with the G-9/S-9 and G-2/S-2 througheffective CIM. The CIM provides a methodologyto understanding the population in order to beginto design effective operations to gain control ofthe environment in order to defeat insurgents. Ifthe center of gravity is the population for the

insurgent and counterinsurgent, understandingthe population is the first step in defeating theenemy in a COIN environment.

Enhance Freedom of Action

Effective CMO influences the employment offorces and helps the commander take maximumadvantage of the AO. Civil-military operationshelp to extend operations to the fullest breadthfeasible by minimizing political and logistic con-straints. Civil-military operations help the com-mander to shape the AO. To counter CMO, theenemy may be required to disperse forces over abroad area, resulting in gaps that the MAGTF canexploit. For example, civil facilities and assetsmay allow the ACE to be forward-based, mini-mizing flight time to targets, increasing timeavailable to support ground maneuver, orenabling attacks on deep targets. During CMO,logistic lines of communications, airfields, andseaports can be made available to the MAGTF,enhancing support to the force. Finally, by devel-oping effective links to local governments andcommunities, CMO remove these stresses fromsubordinate commanders, freeing them to focuson mission accomplishment.

Isolate the Enemy

Civil-military operations can limit the enemycommander’s freedom of action, denying civiliansupport to the forces. These civilians might bewithin the AO, in neighboring countries, or else-where within the region. Enemy forces mayattempt to gain logistical support, information foruse as intelligence, and economic or political sup-port. Conducting CMO minimize the supportgiven to the enemy by solving civil problems,arbitrating grievances, and persuading the popu-lace of the legitimacy of US operations. Aggres-sive CMO deny the enemy a support base and anoperational environment by providing the popu-lace a more attractive alternative than that offeredby the enemy.

1-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Support the Force

Effective CMO will bring additional capabilitiesto the MAGTF, including support provided byHN, other USG agencies, and occasionallyNGOs. Support sustainment and access to logisticand support capabilities external to the MAGTFare provided by CMO. Supplementing MAGTFresources allows military capabilities to remaindedicated to supporting the force. By minimizingthe logistic footprint, CMO reduce force vulnera-bilities. However, integration of external re-sources may present new force protection andsecurity challenges.

Win the Perception Battle

Information shapes and influences the operatingenvironment. Crisis, amplified by the connectiv-ity of global communications, will ignite pas-sions; spark reaction; crystallize beliefs; andcompel people, nations, and organizations to thinkand act in accordance with their worldview and inreaction to the media. As a related capability toIO, CMO demonstrates in practical ways theMAGTF’s message and counters disinformationand propaganda.


CHAPTER 2 MAGTF CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

Personnel and Units

As CMO planners, special staff members, or asmembers of a CAT or civil affairs detachment,CA Marines are the commander’s principal advi-sors on CMO. They support the MAGTF com-mander’s need to plan, coordinate, and conductCMO across the full range of military operationsand throughout the conflict continuum. Theyassist the commander in understanding and visual-izing the civil component of the operating envi-ronment. The Marine Corps CA force consists ofdesignated AC and RC forces and personnel orga-nized, trained, and equipped specifically to pro-vide CMO support to the MAGTF and to performlimited civil affairs operations (CAOs). AlthoughCA is neither a mission nor an objective, it is thename for designated personnel and units.

Marine CA personnel are planners and execu-tors. As CMO planners, they consider the impactthe civil component has on military operationsand vice versa. They ensure that the MAGTFstaff integrates CMO throughout the MCPP aspart of the MAGTF single-battle concept. Asexecutors, they conduct assessments and gatherinformation in the field, manage reconstruction(in some cases developmental) projects, coordi-nate with a wide variety of civil and militaryorganizations, engage key leaders, and provideadvice to subordinate military commanders orcivilian authorities. Throughout the AO, theycoordinate local labor efforts, locate and managecivilian resources, gather and manage criticalcivil information, identify key facilities and pro-tected targets, disseminate information to the civilpopulation, and assist in the MAGTF’s conductof PRC.

The Marine Corps CA force currently consists ofthree active duty CA detachments, assigned to10th Marines, 11th Marines, III MEF commandelement, and two RC CAGs. A CA operationsofficer (military occupational specialty [MOS]0530) and CA chief (MOS 0531) are assigned toeach AC infantry regiment. Additionally, eachMEU has a CMO planner (MOS 0530) and CMOchief (MOS 0531) as shown in figure 2-1.

If no AC or RC CA forces are available, anyMarine unit may be temporarily designated as aprovisional or in lieu of CA force.

Civil Affairs Group

The mission of the CAG is to support theMAGTF commander with specially trained andorganized personnel in order to facilitate the plan-ning, coordination, and execution of CMO and toconduct limited CAO.

Two CAGs are part of MARFORRES. Located atCamp Pendleton, CA, the 3d CAG normally sup-ports I and III MEF. The 4th CAG is located atAnacostia, Washington, DC, and normally sup-ports II MEF.

The CAG is organized with a group HQ and fourCA detachments. The group HQ is organized intoa command sec t ion ; s t a f f sec t ions ; andcommunications, motor transport, and publichealth sections. The group HQ provides thenucleus of CA staff support to the MEF com-mand element and command and control ofsubordinate CA elements not attached to sub-ordinate MEF elements.

2-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Civil Affairs Detachments

There are currently two types of CA detachments,each with their own structure: RC CA detach-ments organic to a CAG and AC CA detachmentsat 10th Marines, 11th Marines, and III MEF.

An RC CA detachment assigned to a CAGusually supports the MSC of the MAGTF, suchas a regimental landing team or regimentalcombat team (RCT). Normal ly , such CAdetachments are attached to the supported unit toensure unity of effort, but remain under theadministrative control of the CAG. The RC CAdetachment consists of a HQ and three generalpurpose CATs of five Marines each as depictedin figure 2-2. While all CA elements can assistthe MAGTF in planning, coordinating, andexecuting CMO, the RC CA detachment is thesmallest element that can plan and conductlimited CAO, specifically public health andwelfare and rule of law. If not resident within theMAGTF, functional specialty expertise in the

other four joint CA functional specialties(economic stability, infrastructure, governance,and public education) may also be sourced fromelements of forces afloat, other Services, USGinteragency partners, IGOs, NGOs, HN organi-zations or private contractors.

In 2008, three AC CA detachments were added tothe Marine Corps structure. Currently, one CAdetachment is organic to the regimental HQbattery of both 10th and 11th Marines. The thirddetachment is assigned to the III MEF commandelement. Each AC CA detachment consists of upto 51 Marines, with 6 CATs and a detachmentHQ for 1st and 2d Marine Divisions of I MEFand II MEF, as shown in figure 2-3. The AC CAdetachments do not have functional specialistsand cannot conduct CAO without augmentation.

Civil Affairs Teams

A CAT is the smallest operational CA element. Itprovides CMO expertise and planning capability

(1) 0530 Maj and(1) 0531 GySgt per Regiment

8th MAR1/1/0/0

7th MAR1/1/0/0

6th MAR1/1/0/0

5th MAR1/1/0/0

4th MAR1/1/0/0

3d MAR1/1/0/0

2d MAR1/1/0/0

1st MAR1/1/0/0

(1) 0530 Maj and(1) 0531 GySgt per MEU

31th MEU1/1/0/0

26th MEU1/1/0/0

24th MEU1/1/0/0

22th MEU1/1/0/0

15th MEU1/1/0/0

13th MEU1/1/0/0

11th MEU1/1/0/0

2 LtCols* and 1 GySgt per MEF(III MEF has 1 LtCol)

III MEF2/1/0/0

II MEF2/1/0/0

I MEF2/1/0/0

GySgt gunnery sergeantLtCol lieutenant colonel

Maj majorMAR Marines

Legend

Figure 2-1. Civil-Military Operations Planners.



to infantry battalions, MEUs, or other majorsubordinate elements of the MAGTF as required.A CAT helps the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and

conduct CMO, but has no capability to conductCAO. Both AC and RC CATs have the capabilityto establish and operate a CMOC. The AC CAT

captaincorporaldetachmentgunnery sergeantlance corporallieutenant colonel

CaptCplDETGySgtLCplLtCol

lieutenantmajorposition filled by reservistMarine enlistedMarine officerReserve Component

LTMajmappedMEMORC

sergeantstaff sergeantUS NavyNavy officer

SgtSSgtUSNNO

Note: III MEF Civil Affairs Det structured the same, except no Det HQ or CAG Marines.

1 Capt2 SSgt1 Cpl1 LCpl

0530053105313034

CA Section:1 Maj1 GySgt1 SSgt1 Sgt

0530053105310531

Det HQ:1 Maj1 GySgt1 SSgt or 1 Sgt1 Sgt1 Cpl

05300531053105310531

CA Team:1 LtCol2 Capt1 Capt1 USN LT

0531053105310151

0530053044022300

1 GySgt2 Sgt1 Cpl1 LCpl

RC Breakdown:

CAT 11 MO6 ME

CAT 31 MO6 ME

CAT 61 MO6 ME

CAT 51 MO6 ME

CAT 41 MO6 ME

CAT 21 MO6 ME

CA Section1 MO4 ME

DET HQ1 MO3 ME

CAG mapped4RC MO1RC NO5RC ME

Legend

CAGIII

CADetachment

4/5/0/1

CADetachment

4/5/0/1

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CA Team2/3/0/0

CADetachment

4/5/0/1

CADetachment

4/5/0/1

HQ & Staff Elements9/45/0/0

Public Health Section0/0/1/1

Legend

# # # #

Marine officerMarine enlistedNavy officerNavy enlisted

156

Figure 2-2. United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve Civil Affairs Group

Figure 2-3. Active Component Civil Affairs Detachment.

2-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


typically consists of seven CA Marines, orga-nized as follows:

CAT leader (major, MOS 0530). CAT chief staff noncommissioned officer(NCO) (gunnery sergeant, MOS 0531). CA cultural specialist (staff sergeant or ser-geant, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).

The RC CAT consists of five CA Marines, orga-nized as follows:

CAT leader (major, MOS 0530). Assistant CAT assistant team leader (captain,MOS 0530). CAT chief (staff sergeant, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531). CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).

The RC CATs may require significant aug-mentation with additional transportation andcommunications assets as well as additionalsecurity elements before conducting inde-pendent operations in an uncertain or hostileoperational environment.

Command and Control

The commander’s principal staff officers com-prise the general staff in units commanded by ageneral officer and the executive staff for allother units. Principal staff assistants are responsi-ble to the commanding general (CG) and/or com-manding officer and are coordinated and directedby the chief of staff and/or executive officer.General and/or executive staff officers areresponsible for a broad functional area and helpthe commander coordinate and supervise the exe-cution of plans, operations, and activities in thatarea. A commander may elect to modify staff

organization based on the situation, perhaps bycreating additional staff sections and designatinga special staff officer as a member of the staff.When CMO are of increased importance, theMAGTF commander may augment his organicCMO cell within the G-3 and establish a G-9/S-9.See appendix A.

MAGTF G-9/S-9 Staff

Once established, the G-9/S-9 conducts an initialassessment to determine the CA force augmenta-tion requirements for the MAGTF. The sectionwill coordinate with other staff sections of theMAGTF by participating at various boards, work-ing groups, and the OPT as required. Typically, atthe MEF level, a G-9 watch officer will be estab-lished within the combat operations center. TheG-9/S-9 will send liaison officers (LNOs) tohigher commands and external organizations.

The G-9/S-9 considers the impact of operationson public order and safety, the potential for HAand DR requirements, support for civil authori-ties, and protection of culturally significant sitesand critical infrastructure. It ensures that civilconsiderations are effectively integrated into eachcourse of action (COA) considered by the com-mander. The MAGTF G-9/S-9 has staff planningand oversight of the following:

Assigned and attached Marine Corps andArmy CA forces. All aspects of the relationship between theMAGTF and external nonmilitary agenciesthat may be operating within the AO (NGOs,IGOs, USG agencies, and foreign governmentagencies). Preparation of Annex G (Civil-Military Opera-tions) to the operation order (OPORD). Coordination, synchronization, and integrationof civil-military plans, programs, and policieswith national and combatant command strate-gic objectives. Prioritization and management of projects sup-porting CMO.



Key leader engagements. Implementation of PRC measures. Coordination of CMO with higher and adjacentcommands, as well as major subordinate ele-ments of the MEF.

The MAGTF G-9 plans, coordinates, and pro-vides staff oversight of CMO through direct coor-dination with the supported unit’s operationsofficer. The supported unit’s operations officerplans and oversees the execution of the overalloperations effort.

At the MEU, special purpose MAGTF, or majorsubordinate element, future planning is theresponsibility of the S-3. At the MEF and Marineexpeditionary brigade (MEB), the G-5, futureoperations staff element, should include a CMOplanner. As a planner and advisor, the CMO plan-ner must ensure that the CMO staff element par-ticipates in the MAGTF planning effort. Dutiesinclude the following:

Serve as a member of the staff. Advise the commander on the potential impactof military operations on civilian populations. Assist the commander in meeting his legal andmoral obligations to civilian populations underhis control. Advise the commander of changes in the politi-cal environment that may change the militarysituation. Advise the commander on employment ofother military units and US assets that can per-form or assist CMO. Serve as the commander’s principal interfacewith external nonmilitary agencies that may beoperating within the AO; for example, the USinteragency, NGOs, IGOs, and HN civil agen-cies. Recommend priority intelligence requirements(PIR) to the S-2/G-2. Ensure the CMO effort is synchronized andcoordinated with other related staff functionssuch as IO, public affairs (PA), and militaryinformation support operations (MISO). Coordinate preparation of annex G, to theOPORD.

Reserve Component Civil Affairs Forces

Preplanned Support

While MARFORRES CA forces provide signifi-cant CMO capability, their utilization will requirethat a MEF prepare supporting plans in advancein order to mobilize and integrate them into aMAGTF operation. As a RC, the CAGs providecontinuous and worldwide support to the operat-ing forces, with much of this support being pro-vided prior to CAG unit activation. Preplannedevents and contingencies are usually supported inan incremental fashion.

Preplanned events support theater engagementstrategies and Service or joint exercises. TheCAGs also support deliberate planning efforts forstanding operational plans and deployments andreview the development of doctrine and training.

Many orders and authorization processes are usedfor preplanned support. Occasionally, inactiveduty for training periods, usually called drills, canbe devoted to types of CA support. With suffi-cient advance notice, annual training periods,generally 2 weeks, can be scheduled to provideappropriate support. When support is required forlonger periods, a number of overlapping annualtraining increments can be planned, providingcontinuous support to the commander. Specificmissions also may be authorized with Active dutyfor operational support orders, which are gener-ally limited to 179 days in a FY but may be muchshorter in duration. Active duty for operationalsupport orders are especially useful for regularcommitments, such as billets continuouslyinvolved in theater engagement.

Schedules and locations for exercises and opera-tions often change. This can jeopardize preplannedCA deployments and may result in degradedsupport. Civil affairs group personnel arereservists and may have a limited ability to re-spond quickly to schedule changes. Coordination

2-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


for funding and the generation of individual ordersare required to prevent delays.

Predeployment exercises, such as MEU specialoperations capable workups and Mojave Viper,are prioritized for support. Supporting CA ele-ments sharpen staff integration by participating inpredeployment exercises with the deployingMAGTF. Preplanned exercises, such as MEFexercises or mission rehearsal exercises, serve asrehearsals and facilitate contingency support.

Contingency Support

When activated, CAGs are prepared to provide alevel of immediate support to MAGTFs engagedin contingency operations. Civil affairs support isprovided by echelon. Each CAG maintains a listof CA personnel ready to support time-sensitivecontingency operations. The CAG supports thedeployed echelon by reachback, using statesideassets to support forward-deployed elements.Support might include cultural, economic, orpolitical research and/or authorized coordinationwith US-based organizations. Follow-on incre-ments of the CAG might be subject to involun-tary activation such as Presidential SelectedReserve Call-up authority. Finally, the entireCAG may be mobilized in support of a MEF. TheCATs and detachments will often deploy prior tofull mobilization of other RC forces.

Concept of Employment for Civil Affairs Forces

Marines within the MAGTF must be prepared toconduct CMO. Marine Corps CA forces are wellpositioned to provide CMO expertise to theMAGTF throughout the range of military opera-t ions. The AC CA detachments and CMOplanners provide a full-time CMO planning andsupport capability to all standing MAGTFs andAC infantry regiments. This AC CA structure isaugmented by the RC CAGs as required.

Marine Corps CA is designed to supportoperational- or tactical-level MAGTFs through-out each phase of a large-scale contingency ormajor theater war:

MEU or battalion = CAT The MEU or battalion is supported by oneCAT. MEB or RCT = CA detachment The MEB or RCT is supported by one CAdetachment, with one CAT per battalion-sizedmajor subordinate element and a CA detach-ment HQ augmenting the GCE RCT S-3 CMOstaff element and MEB G-9 COM staff ele-ment. MEF = CAG The MEF is supported by one CAG, with oneCA detachment per RCT and other MSCs (asrequired), with CA augments to MEF G-9CMO element.

During phases 0 and 1, the CA support require-ment for a MEF and its MSCs is generally smallenough to be met by organic CMO planners andAC CA detachment. As the contingency pro-gresses, the MEF CA support requirement alsoincreases. This increased CA support require-ment is best met by the mobilization of a RCCAG. Once mobilized, the CAG typically will beemployed as follows:

HQ detachment will augment the MEF G-9,G-3, and G-5 staff sections and provide LNOsto higher and adjacent commands, the USinteragency, and HN entities. CA detachments (up to four) provide support tothe subordinate maneuver elements of theMEF. The detachment HQ will augment theRCT CA operations officer under the S-3, withthe CA teams being assigned to subordinatemaneuver elements.

The CA support requirement for the GCE divisionis provided by the AC CA detachment HQ for IMEF and II MEF (from 10th and 11th Marines,respectively) and directly from the CE of III MEF.



A CAG may provide additional CA support to thedivision as required as well as support to USArmy brigade combat teams.

To better illustrate CA concept of employment,the following subparagraphs discuss CMO tasksthat may be performed and the level of CA forcesrequired by phase for a major theater campaignconducted by a MAGTF consisting of a division-sized GCE, an ACE, and logistics combat element.

Figure 2-4 illustrates the level of commitment ofMAGTF CMO forces and the types of CMOtasks they perform throughout each phase of alarge-scale contingency or major theater war,ranging from phase 0 (shaping) to phase V(enable civil authority).

Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare)

During the shape, also referred to as steady-state,phase of an operation or campaign, CA forces,both AC and RC, will be involved in a variety ofpeacetime related operations, training exercises,

and military-to-military exchanges. Examples ofCMO tasks that might occur during this stageinclude NA and FHA operations. These mightoccur during the course of a MEU’s response to ahumanitarian crisis, such as an earthquake in thePacific, or participation in a joint trainingexercise such as Cobra Gold. Civil informationmanagement is conducted throughout the phasein order to systematically collect, process, andforward civil information to the intelligence cellfor use by the MAGTF commander in hisdecision-making process.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: One or more CA team(s), up toand including a CA detachment (fromeither the active duty detachment or theCAG), depending on the length andduration of the mission. Generally, oneCAT (AC or RC) is sufficient to support aMEU during operations conducted dur-ing this phase.

Phase 0Shaping

Am

ount

of C

MO

Perf

orm

edan

d C

A Fo

rces

Req

uire

d

Phase IDeter

Phase IISeizethe

InitiativePhase IIIDominate

Phase IVStabilize

Back to Phase 0Shaping

MoreCMO

LessCMO D-Day D+60 D+90 D+180

Phase VEnable

CivilAuthority

Civil InformationManagement

HumanitarianAssistance

Support to CivilAuthorities

Nation Assistance

Populace andResourceControl

Legend

Figure 2-4. Civil-Military Operations Level of Effort.

2-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Phase I: Deter (crisis defined)

During the deter phase of a major operation orcampaign, Marine Corps CA forces may con-tinue any ongoing phase 0 activities, scale themup or ramp them down, help in the planning andconduct of a noncombatant evacuation operation;begin planning for the movement and receptionof follow-on CA forces; and begin planning forphases II, III, and IV. The MAGTF may estab-lish a CMOC to coordinate CMO between theMAGTF and other partners.

Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure)

During the seize the initiative phase of anoperation or campaign, CA forces may continueongoing phase 0–I activities (FHA, NA, andCIM) and assist the MAGTF in the planning andconduct of PRC measures to be taken duringphase III in order to prevent the civilian popu-lation from interfering with offensive operations.In the MAGTF CMOC, coordination with other

USG agencies, such as USAID and DOS, as wellas international and multinational partners, if notalready begun, will focus on actions to be takenduring both phase III and IV. Support to civiladministration may be initiated; CIM will becontinuous, as the amount of data that must becollected, sorted, and interpreted will increase.

Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority)

During the dominate phase, AC and RC civilaffairs forces, now at full strength, primarilyconduct and support PRC in addition to otherongoing CMO, such as FHA, NA and CIM. Theprimary emphasis during this phase is ensuringthe MAGTF commander’s freedom of action.Battle damage and solatia payments may be asignificant task. Civil affairs forces are planningand supporting the execution of CMO at thebattal ion, RCT, division, and MEF level .Multiple CMOCs are in operation and CA LNOs

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: One or more CA detachments,giving the MAGTF three to six CA teams,depending on the mission. During phaseI, active duty CA teams from the CAdetachment assigned to the 10th and11th Marines or III MEF command ele-ment may be deployed in support of aMEU or MEB. Should the CA supportrequirement exceed the capability of theactive duty CA detachment, RC CATdetachments or an entire CAG may bemobilized by MARFORRES to supportthe MAGTF.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: During phase II, a MAGTF willnormally be formed by a MEF composedof a d iv is ion-sized GCE, a Marineaircraft wing, and a Marine logisticsgroup (MLG). This will exceed the actveduty CA detachment’s capabil i ty toprovide teams and planners to support aCMO staff section at all echelons ofcommand within the MAGTF and willrequire mobilization of RC CA forces. AMarine division constituting the MEFGCE will typically require as many asfour CA detachments, including onea t t a c h e d t o e a c h R C T o r o t h e rmaneuver element. Therefore, duringthis phase the MAGTF may require asmany as five CA detachments.



have linked up with higher, lower, and/oradjacent joint/coalition/multinational partners.Planning for post-phase III operations will becontinuously refined through the OPT.

Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services)

During the stabilize phase, Marine Corps andjoint CA forces will be in greatest demand. Theywill be required to support MAGTF CMO plan-ning and coordination along the various LOOs;man and operate CMOCs; carry out key leaderengagement; conduct CMO assessments; workwith DCs (to include possibly operating DCcamps); determine requirements to repair infra-structure; and work with USG interagency part-ners, NGOs/IGOs, the HN, as well as othermultinational partners.

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy)

At the beginning of the enable civil authorityphase, MAGTF CA forces will continue CMOtasks begun in phases 0–IV, but will begin to tran-sition responsibility to other organizations, such asother USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the HNgovernment. The main focus during this phase willbe on SCA, as the MAGTF assists the HN govern-ment in a building and/or rebuilding capacity.

Other MAGTF Capabilities in Support of Civil-Military Operations

The MAGTF has capabilities that may be used toassist in the conduct of CMO, particularly duringstability or COIN operations, such as medical,transportation, water purification, construction,and communications. However, it assumes civilsector responsibilities such as public works andutilities only as a last resort if no other agency ispresent and will transition those responsibilitiesto the joint force or civilian authorities as rapidlyas possible. For example, in the case of DC oper-ations, the MAGTF uses its own assets to per-form the following:

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assis-tance in identifying and assessing DC activi-ties, including locations and movement withinthe MAGTF AO.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: As during phase II, as many asfive CA detachments (4 RC and 1 AC)possibly augmented by additional CAdetachments (providing between 18 and24 CATs.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: During phase IV CMO require-ments may require the mobilization of thesecond CAG as well as the inclusion ofthe other two AC CA detachments. Asmany as six CA detachments, with up to24 or more CATs may be required toaddress all of the requirements that theMAGTF may encounter. These teamsmay require robust security, transporta-tion, and communications augmentation.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forcesrequired: Inititally, it would be the sameas during phase IV, but the numberwould decrease as benchmarks are com-pleted. Eventually, CA forces would onceagain reach phase 0 shaping levels, asthey redeploy or demobilize.

2-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Develop plans and provide operational over-sight and supervision in protecting, caring for,controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs,including the planning and operation of DCcamps. Plan movement control measures, emergencycare, and evacuation of DCs. Coordinate provi-sion of transportation, military police support,

military intelligence screening/interrogation,and medical services as required. Advise the commander, through the staff judgeadvocate (SJA), on legal and moral responsibil-ities with respect to DCs in accordance with USpolicy and international law.


CHAPTER 3 CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

“It used to be that the CAG headquarters would put their detachments in direct support ofthe RCTs, but they did not ‘own’ them, and so the CAG headquarters was technically stillresponsible for the accomplishment of those tasks in that regimental commander’s AO. Thetechnique that we employed gave the regimental commander complete responsibility for allthose tasks. So all the CA tasks in AO Raleigh were the responsibility of RCT-6, and thenwe resourced them by giving him a CA detachment to accomplish those things. . . . By giv-ing him all the tasks and all the tools and allowing him to execute it, he was better able tomanage and quickly respond to things that occurred in his AO, and I think that this was acritical aspect of the regiments’ . . . and the BCT’s successes, . . . was their ability to havecomplete responsibility but also have the resources and tools to execute those missions.”

–5/10 MCCLL 12 Nov 2008

Civil Affairs Methodology

Civil affairs methodology is a process used byCA trained Marines to plan, execute, and assessCMO tasks assigned to tactical CA elements. TheCA methodology is similar to the more familiartroop leading steps (begin the plan, arrange forreconnaissance, make reconnaissance, completethe plan, issue the order, supervise) used byMarine leaders at the company level and below.Using CA methodology, CA elements incorpo-rate the elements of the civil environment as theyplan and execute the CMO task. The six steps inCA methodology are as follows:

Assess. Decide. Develop/Detect. Deliver. Evaluate. Transition.

The first two steps pertain to planning. The nextthree steps pertain to execution. The last stepaddresses transfer of a CMO task to another unitor entity that will assume responsibility for theuncompleted CMO task.

Civil affairs methodology is a circular process.By incorporating an evaluation step, recommen-dations can be made to change how tasks arebeing executed and/or change the actual CMOtasks. These recommendations then force a returnto the first step of the process, creating a circularevaluation process.

Assess

Assess step begins with the receipt of the mission.Marines must review all mission-related material,to include operation plans (OPLANs), intelligencesummaries, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), thecommander’s intent, and joint common plans.From these sources, CMO planners must collectall relevant information, to include IGO, NGO,and IPI points of contact. Planners considerASCOPE as depicted in table 3-1, on page 3-2,and it is used primarily as a development tool tounderstand the civil dimension as follows:

Areas. Structures. Capabilities. Organizations. People. Events.

3-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


While Marines are familiar with METT-T, CAMarines must also address civil considerations,which include civilians, their environment, andtheir capacity; hence, the term ASCOPE. Civilconsiderations are just as important as METT-Tand must be incorporated when planning CMO.Civil considerations and METT-T are applicablethroughout the range of military operations(offense, defense, or stability). Both METT-T andASCOPE serve as a mental filter that enables

Marines to quickly assess and report the situationfrom the CMO perspective.

Decide

This step is characterized by developing how theCMO task is going to be executed. Depending onthe time available, the CA planner may choose todevelop more than one option on how to executethe assigned CMO task. The CA planner will also

Table 3-1. Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events Planning.

Areas Structures Capabilities Organizations People EventsTribe Religious shrines Water Family/clan Speeches Birthdays

Ethnicity Houses of worship Electrical Religious Face-to-face Religious gatherings

Religion Bars/teas shops Academic Ethnic Media/radio Major religious events

Economic districts Social gathering places Trash US/coalition Media/TV Major religious events

Smuggling routes Print shops Medical Governmental agencies

Media/print (newspaper)

Anniversaries of wars or battles

National Internet cafes Security Farmers or unions Visual (graffiti, signs) Holidays

Social classes Television Market (use and goods)

Community Visual (videos, DVDs) Harvests

Political districts Radio station Employment and commerce

Military or militia units Audio (pirated orillegal radio)

Reconstruction openings

Military districts Hospitals Crime and justice Illicit organizations Rallies or demonstrations

Town or council meetings

School districts Banks Basic needs Insurgent groups Restaurants Elections

Road system Dams Public health Gangs Door-to-door Sports events

Water sources Bridges Economic (jobs) Businesses organizations

Internet

Water coverage Police stations Religion Police Markets

Water districts Gas stations Displaced persons and refugees

Nomads Sports

Construction sites Military barracks Political voice Displaced persons and refugees

Religious gatherings

Gang territory Jails Civil rights, individual rights

Volunteer groups Parks

Safe area/sanctuary Water pumping stations

IGOs Family gatherings

Trade routes Oil/gas pipelines Political Gas lines

Power grids Water lines Contractors Bars/tea shops

Power lines NGOs Food lines

Storage facilities Labor unions Job lines



develop the measure of effectiveness (MOE) andthe measure of performance (MOP) for theassigned CMO task. For further information onMOEs and MOPs, see appendix B. These optionsneed to be tested against the operational environ-ment, need to meet the unit commander’s intentand guidance outlined in the order, and need tosupport other CMO related directives for the AO.

Develop/Detect

This begins the execution step of the CMO task.Marines conducting CMO must establish rela-tionships and build rapport with key leaders,IGOs, NGOs, and IPI representatives. Marineswill continue deliberate assessments in order toconfirm the plan and assumptions made duringthe assess step.

Marine forces engaged in CMO use the DistrictStability Framework (DSF) as a tool to detectpotential sources of conflict. Understanding thesefactors supports the commander and gives him anunderstanding of the AO. For more informationon DSF, see appendix C.

Deliver

In this step, properly executed CMO will mitigateor reduce the need for contingency/crisis actionoperations, particularly in its early stages beforearmed conflict has occurred. The deliver stepmay consist of full-scale projects managed byNGOs, o r s imply encourag ing the loca lpopulation to do it themselves, or doing every-thing in between. The complexities of thereconstruction and development effort and thecapabilities of the HN will determine how a planwill be executed. Monitoring must be continuousuntil the task has been completed. Coursecorrections may be required along the way untilthe task has been completed.

A set of targeted reconstruction and developmentefforts that lead to greater stability will be the endresult. The process of collecting, analyzing,planning, and executing targeted reconstruction

and development efforts is continuous. Asconditions change, planners must be able to re-assess and shift efforts accordingly. Over time,data will indicate whether stabilization objectivesare being met. Activities during this step includethe following:

Projects/programs (CERP, IO). Enhanced interagency efforts. Execution of CMO in support of RCTs/battal-ions.Support to local government/tribal key leaderengagement. Collection and consolidation of raw civilianinformation.

All of these activities must be linked to the sup-ported commander’s intent. The duration of thisphase is dependent on achieving the end state.For TTP concerning project management, refer toMCRP 3-33.1A.

Evaluate

The evaluation step includes detailed analysis ofcivil information using established metrics suchas MOEs and MOPs to provide the commanderand the staff an evaluation of the progress ofCMO. Planners use this crucial step of the meth-odology to determine the following:

Adjustments to the plan. New plans or operations, if needed. Mitigation of unforeseen/unintended conse-quences. Decision point for termination/transition of operations.

The outputs of this step include the following:

CMO briefings and reports. After action reports. Additional project nominations. Recommendations for new CMO tasks. Finalized transition plan. Termination, transition, or transfer timelines.

3-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


For more information on MOEs and MOPs, seeappendix B.

Transition

This final step is the transition of civil-militarytasks to follow-on forces, OGAs, or the localgovernment. Chapter 6 of MCRP 3-33.1A offersmore information on transition. Follow on forcesor organizations can be, but are not limited to,the following:

United Nations (UN) mandated peacekeepingforce or entity. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). European Union. African Union. USG interagency. IGOs. NGOs. HN government and/or private contractors.

Civil Reconnaissance

Daily interaction between Marine forces iscritical to the commander’s understanding ofthe operational environment. Every civilian int h e A O i s a p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e o f c i v i linformation. The CMO planners, in coordi-nation with the CA detachments, integrate CRinto the overall supported commander’s conceptof operations (CONOPs) enhancing the de-velopment of the COP. Effective CIM practicesare vital for capturing data and information.Potential sources of civil information from acoordinated CR plan include the following:

Observations made by combat elements sup-ported by CA detachments and teams in thenormal day-to-day conduct of operations. Results of DSF questionnaires (see app. C). Debriefings of Marines involved in variouscivic action projects, such as medical civicaction programs or veterinary civic action pro-grams, regarding local perceptions.

Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the AO thatmay identify trends. Interaction with CA forces and IPI spheres ofinfluence, including HN government officials,religious, tribal, and clan leaders. Gathering, providing, and sharing civil infor-mation using the appropriate databases such asCombined Information Data Network Ex-change (CIDNE), Asymmetric Software Kit,Marine Link, and geospacial assessment toolfor engineering reachback [GATER]. Marine Corps Intelligence Agency countrystudies. Department of State background notes found at http://www.state.gov. Contact with nonmilitary organizations andagencies. Nontraditional sources. Reachback support by SMEs; such as Centerfor Advanced Operational and Cultural Learn-ing, CMO branch, Security Cooperation Edu-cation and Training Center.

In order to maintain situational awareness, CRmust be conducted continuously to fulfill therequirement of updating the CMO assessments asconditions change. For detailed CR TTP, refer toMCRP 3-33.1A.

Civil Information Management

The goal of CIM is to create a collaborative infor-mation environment that consists of individuals,organizations, systems, infrastructure, and pro-cesses to create and share the data, information,and knowledge needed to plan, execute, andassess CMO. It will enable CA Marines to makemore informed recommendations to the sup-ported commander. As a component of the GlobalInformation Grid, CIM enhances CA capabilitiesfor the explicit purpose of information and knowl-edge collaboration. It offers commanders andtheir staffs the ability to create a shared situationalawareness so they can plan and operate with an



enhanced unity of effort. The CIM seeks to pro-vide the right information to the right people atthe right time in an understandable and action-able format or display. Civil information is gener-ated through collection, collation, processing,analysis, production, and dissemination. Theeffective management of the CIM benefits thesupported commander.

Anticipating and satisfying civil informationneeds for the supported commander are tasks forthe CA planners. The CA planner has the lead inproviding the key civil considerations that shouldsupport the commander’s intent in order to per-form the following:

Conduct CR to find, analyze, and report civilinformation. Coordinate with non-CA assets to achieve acoherent reconnaissance and execution plan. Synchronize the collection and consolidationof civil information. Develop the civil components of the COP. Increase the supported commander’s environ-mental awareness. Assist in the development of the supportedcommander’s COP. Conduct USG interagency, IPI, IGO, and NGOcoordination. Develop protocols for the storage, mainte-nance, access, and referral of civil information.

For more details regarding CIM TTP, refer toMCRP 3-33.1A and the Joint Civil InformationManagement Handbook. Examples of samplereports are found in appendix D.

The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps doctrinal philosophy ofmaneuver warfare describes planning as anessential part of command and control. The aimof command and control is to enhance the com-mander’s ability to make sound and timelydecisions. Effective decisionmaking requires both

the situational awareness to recognize the essenceof a given problem and the creative ability todevise a practical solution. An essential functionof planning is to promote understanding of theproblem, to define the difference between currentand desired conditions, and then to devise waysto solve the problem.

The commander plays a central and essential rolein the MCPP. Civil-military operations plannersaid the commander’s decision-making ability byproviding a civil perspective. Civil-military oper-ations planners conduct integrated planning withthe MAGTF staff throughout the planning pro-cess and are responsible for preparing the CMOstaff estimate and annex G.

Planning should never be viewed as an isolatedactivity or process. Rather, it should be viewed asa part of a continuum in which planning, execu-tion, and assessment are continuous activities.Environmental factors, enemy action, civil con-siderations, updated intelligence, changingresources, revised guidance from HHQ, and inputprovided as a result of operations all contribute tomaking planning endeavors highly complex andnonlinear. It must be recognized that planningrarely occurs in the same straightforward man-ner. Knowledge of the planning hierarchy istherefore essential to the effective application ofthe MCPP.

As described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publica-tion (MCDP) 5, Planning, conceptual planning isthe highest level of the planning hierarchy. Con-ceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, andintentions and involves developing broad con-cepts for action.

At the lowest level of the planning hierarchy isdetailed planning. Detailed planning is con-cerned with translating broad concepts into acomplete and executable plan. Detailed planninggenerally corresponds to the science of war and isan analytic process of decomposing the conceptinto executable tasks. Detailed planning worksout scheduling, coordination, or technical issuesinvolved with moving, sustaining, administering

3-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


and directing military forces. Detailed planningidentifies the actions necessary to accomplish theobjectives defined during conceptual planning.

Between the highest and lowest levels of theplanning hierarchy is functional planning, whichinvolves elements of both conceptual anddetailed planning. Functional planning is con-cerned with designing supporting plans fordiscrete functional activities like maneuver,CMO, lethal and nonlethal fires, logistics,intelligence, and force protection.

In general, conceptual planning provides the basisfor all subsequent planning. Planning should gen-erally progress from the general to the specific.However, conceptual planning must also beresponsive to the outputs of functional anddetailed planning. For example, the realities ofdeployment schedules (a functional concern) candictate employment schemes (a conceptual con-cern). Functional planning must in turn beresponsive to the detailed requirements of execu-tion. Conceptual, functional, and detailed plan-ning are seldom conducted sequentially becausethe situation and available information are contin-ually evolving.

Design is a continuous activity and must never beviewed as an isolated event occurring only dur-ing problem framing. It occurs throughout theplanning-decision-execution-assessment contin-uum. Continuous learning is one of the mostimportant aspects of design. As the problemevolves, the commander’s understanding of theproblem and how the command will conductoperations to achieve the desired end state mustalso evolve. Design, formulated by the com-mander, informs and is informed by planning andexecution, making design a basis for assessment.The purpose of design is to achieve a greaterunderstanding of the environment and the natureof the problem in order to identify an appropriatesolution. Design provides a means to learn andadapt. It is a way of organizing conceptual workwithin an organization to assist commanders inunderstanding, visualizing, and describing the

opera t ional envi ronment and to developapproaches to solving problems. Because theenvironment is dynamic, problems evolve as weinteract with them. As a result, design occursthroughout planning, execution, and assessment.See MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Pro-cess, for detailed information on design.

Tenets of the MarineCorps Planning Process

The tenets of the MCPP—top down planning, sin-gle-battle concept, and integrated planning—arederived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare.These tenets guide the commander’s use of hisstaff to plan and execute military operations.

Top-Down PlanningPlanning is a fundamental responsibility of com-mand. The commander must not merely partici-pate in planning, he must drive the process. Hispersonal involvement and guidance are keys toplanning. The commander uses planning toincrease his understanding of the environmentand the problem to support his decisionmaking.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil MilitaryOperations (G-9) provides guidance to both theG-9 working group and the G-9 CMO planner.The G-9’s personal involvement and understand-ing of the commander’s guidance are important toCMO planning.

Single-Battle ConceptOperations or events in one part of the bat-tlespace often have profound and unintendedeffects on other areas and events; therefore, acommander must always view the battlespace asan indivisible entity. Commanders set the stagefor a single-battle effort during planning, prima-rily through their intent. Intent allows subordi-nates to understand the problem while guidingand empowering them to take action as the situa-tion dictates, particularly when the unforeseenoccurs, while remaining consistent with larger



aims. The G-9 supports the MAGTF single battleconcept by ensuring that all CMO actions help toaccomplish the mission and the desired end state.

Integrated PlanningIntegrated planning is conducted to coordinateaction toward a common purpose by all elementsof the force. Integrated planning is facilitated byassigning personnel to the OPT who have anappropriate level of knowledge and understand-ing of their respective organization or activity. Inconventional operations, representatives fromeach of the warfighting functions such as fires,maneuver, intelligence, logistics, force protec-tion, and command and control may be sufficient.In stability operations and CMO, representativesfrom government agencies, the HN police andmilitary, intelligence community, political repre-sentatives, and others may be required. Similarly,humanitarian operations may involve representa-tives from OGAs, NGAs, and private relief orga-nizations. The key to integrated planning is toinvolve the right personnel from the right organi-zations in the planning process as early as possibleto consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions,and share information as broadly as possible.

Integrated Planning

The MCPP promotes understanding between thecommander and his staff regarding the nature of agiven problem and the options for solving it;therefore, CMO planners must analyze the civildimension of the operating environment, whichwill assist with the commander’s decision-mak-ing process.

The CMO planners are an integral part of theplanning process. The civil dimension of theoperating environment must be considered andintegrated into all MAGTF operations. The CMOplanners are expected to be SMEs on the civildimension of the operating environment andshould be active participants in all MAGTF plan-ning efforts. The CMO planners are the conduitbetween the G-9 principal staff officer and theMAGTF OPT as shown in figure 3-1. Staff per-sonnel and SMEs within the G-9, also known asthe G-9 working group, support the G-9 CMOplanners. The G-9 working group plans concur-rent with the MAGTF OPT and provides input asrequired. The G-9 working group will develop aCMO problem statement, conduct civil intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield (CIPB), createthe CMO concept of support, develop the CMOstaff estimate, and write annex G.

Special Staff/SMEs/LNOs

G-1 G-3 G-6G-5G-4G-2

Core OPT(FOPs/Plans)

MAGTF OPT

G-9 Working Group(Staff Representative and SMEs)

G-9 CMO Planner

future operationsFOPsLegend

Figure 3-1. Integrated Planning.

3-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Continuous and Concurrent Planning

A commander may initiate planning on his owninitiative, based on indications and warnings, oron guidance and direction from HHQ. Theplanning process is designed to promote under-standing between the commander and his staffregarding the nature of a given problem and theoptions for solving it. The plans that result maybe considered hypotheses, which will be testedand refined as a result of execution and assess-ment as shown in figure 3-2. Planning and COAdevelopment and evaluation are continuous acti-vities and are not isolated events that occur onlyonce. They occur throughout the planning–decision–execution–assessment continuum.

Six steps of the planning process are as follows:

Problem framing.COA development. COA war game. COA comparison and decision. Orders development. Transition.

These steps are discussed in the remainder ofthis chapter.

Civil-Military Operations Problem Framing

Problem framing is the first step in the MCPP.The purpose of problem framing is to gain anenhanced understanding of the environment andthe nature of the problem. This understandingallows the commander to visualize the operationand describe his conceptual approach, providingcontext for the examination of what the commandmust accomplish, when and where it must beaccomplished, and most importantly, the natureof the problem and the purpose of the operation.(See fig. 3-3)

During problem framing, CMO planners areresponsible for conducting problem framing fromthe CA perspective. The CMO planners analyzethe operational environment by looking at civilconsiderations such as ASCOPE analysis,

TransitionMissionAnalysis

CEOPT

G-9WG

COADevelopment

WarGame C&D

OrdersDevelopment

DevelopInitial CMO

Esimate

DevelopCMO COAs

and Conceptof Support

War GameCMO COAs

againstMEF COAs

DevelopCMO StaffEstimate

DevelopAnnex

G: CMOSupport

Plan

TransitionConceptof CMO

CMO Estimate toinform CE

Mission Analysis

CMO COAsintegrated in

CE COAs

CMO War Gameinforms CEWar Game

CMO C&DinformsCE C&D

CMO Annex GDevelopment informs

CE Orders Development

G-9 Planner BriefG-9 Input to WG

Commander’sInitialGuidance

Mission Analysis Brief andCommander’s Planning Guidance

Rough CutCOA Review

COA Development Brief,Wargaming Guidance andEvaluation Criteria

War Game Brief

Commander approves order





Commander selects COA

Time

comparison and developmentworking group

C&DWG

Legend

Figure 3-2. Concurrent Planning.



determining civil capabilities (CA, IGO, NGO,interagency), defining the nature of the problemfrom the CMO perspective, and supportingdevelopment of the commander’s mission and in-tent to ensure they adequately reflect the civilperspective. The CMO planners will also deter-mine CMO tasks, assumptions, limitations, andinformation requirements. Furthermore, CMOplanners will begin to develop the initial CMOstaff estimate shown in figure 3-4 on page 3-10.

Understanding the Environment

Understanding the environment is an importantaspect of design. The essential activities inunderstanding the environment include criticalthinking and an open and frank discussion by allparticipants, including the commander, to helpexpose a broad range of ideas to be considered.

The CMO planners must consider, but are limitedto, the following:

Existing HHQ design. HHQ mission, intent, orders, directives, andguidance. Intelligence products to include intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (IPB). Area studies/assessments. ASCOPE analysis. Key actors/relationships. Population/culture/language. Geography/demographics.

Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

To gain a greater appreciation for the operationalenvironment, CMO planners should conduct

Confirmation briefs

Tasks (specific/implied/essential)Shortfalls (resources/SME)COG analysisAssumptions/limitationsRFIsInitial staff estimatesCCIRs

Problem framing briefIPB products

COA development guidanceWarning order

Mission statementCommander’s intent

Situational Information

Outside Information

HHQ- Guidance and intent- WARNORD/OPORD- Intelligence/IPB products- Indications and warnings

- Government agencies- Other service- Open source

Commander and staff- Expertise- Experience- Judgement- Knowledge

Design

Staff Actions

- Understanding the environment- Understanding the problem- Commander’s initial intent and guidance

- Task analysis- COG analysis- Assumptions/limitations- Draft mission statement

Ongoing activities- Refine intelligence and IPB products- Alert/convene red and green cells- Running estimates- Refine area(s) of interest and area of influence- Shortfalls (resources/SME)- CCIRs/RFIs

RESULTSINJECTS ACTIVITIES

Ongoing Activities

Figure 3-3. Problem Framing.

Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement ofthe commander for this part of each step.

3-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


CIPB. The CMO planners conduct CIPB toassess the impact of friendly, adversary, and otheractors, as well as the local populace, on theCONOPS and end state. The CIPB helps plannersto understand relationships within interrelatedpolitical, military, economic, social, information,and infrastructure systems relevant to MAGTF

operations. The CMO planners conduct CIPB in asimilar manner that intelligence personnel con-duct IPB. First, planners evaluate the operationalenvironment’s effects on friendly and adversaryoperations by conducting a detailed ASCOPEanalysis of a unit’s AO. Once a detailed ASCOPEanalysis has been conducted for the unit’s AO,

Figure 3-4. Civil-Military Operations Staff Estimate.

1. Mission. Mission statement results from problem framing.

2. Situation and Considerations

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Weather. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

(2) Terrain. How will aspects of terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

(3) Other Pertinent Facts. Analyze political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure as they relate to the area.

b. Adversary Forces. Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s)as they affect specific staff areas of concern.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) Friendly COA(s).

(2) Current status of resources.

(3) Current status of other resources.

(4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

(5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

d. Assumptions

3. Analysis. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determineadvantages and disadvantages.

4. Comparison. Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank orderCOA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix.

5. Recommendations and Conclusions

a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff per-spective).

b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.



planners then determine possible civil reactionsto the MAGTF’s concept of operations. Oncepossible civil reactions are determined, plannerswill identify key civil assets and personnel, andtheir likely location, for each COA. To conductCIPB, CMO planners analyze the following:

HHQ intelligence and IPB products. HHQ civil considerations analysis ASCOPE. G-4 physical network analysis, which providesinsights into infrastructure, roads, bridges, air-fields, and ports. Area studies and assessments. Terrain as it relates to CMO such as indige-nous population centers and likely movementcorridors for DCs. Weather such as seasonal events that mayaffect mobility or agricultural production. The enemy (from the viewpoint of how theenemy can affect the civil component). Consid-erations include, but are not limited to, the fol-lowing:

Capabilities to conduct sabotage, espionage,subversion, terrorism. The ability to affect planned operations.

For more information on civil and cultural con-siderations, refer to Drs. Barak A. Salmoni andPaula Holmes-Eber’s book, Operational Culturefor the Warfighter.

Understanding Our Capabilities

Understanding our capabilities is critical to allplanning efforts. The CMO planners must identifyassets that can be used in a CMO role, wherethose assets are located, and then be able to inte-grate those assets into the overall plan for CMO.The CMO planners also need to identify antici-pated CMO support requirements during problemframing. Once those capabilities are identified,CMO planners must compare capabilities versusrequirements and provide solutions/recommenda-tions to mitigate any identified CMO shortfalls.

Understanding the Problem

Armed with an appreciation of both the environ-ment and of friendly CA capabilities, the plan-ning effort focuses on understanding the problem.The essential activities in understanding the prob-lem are critical thinking and an open and frankdiscussion to help reveal the underlying nature ofthe problem. A problem is defined as the differ-ence between the current state or condition and adesired state or condition. Another way todescribe a problem is to view it as the differencebetween the state of affairs as it is now and thestate of affairs as it ought to be. Defining theproblem leads to an understanding of the differ-ence between existing and desired conditions.The CMO planners should synthesize their under-standing of the nature of the problem into a prob-lem statement.

There is no set format for a problem statement.Problem statements normally start with “How to”(what it is you wish to accomplish) and mayinclude the following:

What: The defeat/stability mechanism or theconditions to establish and prevent. Who: The opposing sides or the relationshipbetween competitors or forces. When: The time component or the relationshipbetween opponents in time. Where: The center of gravity or decisive pointthat gives the commander stating the problem acompetitive advantage.

The purpose of the operation is not expressed inthe problem statement. The following are twoexamples of potential problem statements:

How to employ coalition capabilities to supportan enduring capacity of local and provincialgovernance in the 202,000 square kilometers ofthe I MEF AO before anti-governmental forcesconsolidate in the region.How to provide a secure environment for peo-ple without insurgent influence, while legitimiz-ing the government and improving economicconditions throughout the AO.

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Understanding the Purpose

The commander, in the form of his commander’sintent, will convey the purpose of the operation.The commander’s intent is the commander’s per-sonal expression of the purpose of the operation.It may also include how the commander envi-sions achieving a decision as well as the end stateor conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish thepurpose. It may be derived from the purpose orthe “in order to” portion of the HHQ missionstatement or commander’s intent of the OPLANor OPORD.

Commander’s Initial Intent and Guidance

The commander’s initial guidance can be asdetailed or as broad as the commander desires.There is no prescribed format for the com-mander’s initial guidance. At a minimum, thecommander should provide his understanding ofthe environment and the nature of the problem.This guidance may also include his thoughts onthe operational environment, friendly and enemycenters of gravity, information requirements, andhis initial commander’s intent. Once the com-mander has established his initial guidance, theG-9 should also provide the commander’s guid-ance to the G-9 working group. The G-9 shouldarticulate the commander’s understanding of theenvironment and the nature of the problem fromthe CMO perspective.

Civil-Military Operations Staff Action

Having a better understanding of the operationalenvironment and additional guidance from theG-9, CMO planners can conduct a detailedanalysis of tasks, assumptions, limitations,shortfalls, and information requirements. Muchof the information available to the commandercomes from staff actions, primarily in the formof analysis.

The staff actions by the MAGTF OPT and theCMO working group are complementary activi-ties. The planning process provides venues forinteractions among the commander and the staff,the OPT, and/or subordinate units. When the staff

or OPT briefs the commander, they are represent-ing the collect ive planning efforts of theMAGTF, to include the CMO planning con-ducted by the G-9 working group.

Conduct Task AnalysisCommands rarely receive a mission. By under-standing the nature of the problem, including thepurpose of the operation, CMO planners can con-duct task analysis. Normally, commands receivetasks that planners analyze as a basis for determin-ing the unit’s mission. The principal source fortasks is the HHQ plan or order, but there may beother sources from which to derive tasks. Addi-tionally, as the problem and purpose are under-stood and a design conceptualized, the commanddevelops tasks based on this understanding. Usingthe commander’s initial guidance and HHQ ordersand annexes, the CMO working group identifiesspecified and implied CMO tasks. These tasksbecome the basis for a unit’s mission and can beapplicable to the force as a whole. Tasks can bespecified, implied, or essential:

Specified tasks derive primarily from the exe-cution paragraphs of the HHQ OPORD, butthey may be found elsewhere, such as in themission statement, coordinating instructions, orannexes such as Annex D (Logistics) andannex G. Any specified task that is germane toCMO should be identified and recorded. Implied tasks are not specifically stated in theHHQ order, but they are necessary to accom-plish specified tasks. Implied tasks emergefrom analysis of the HHQ order, the threat, andour understanding of the problem. Routine,inherent, enduring, or standing operating pro-cedure activities are not implied tasks. Essential tasks are specified or implied tasksthat define mission success and apply to theforce as a whole. If a task must be successfullycompleted for the commander to accomplishhis purpose, it is an essential task. The MAGTFOPT develops the mission statement from theessential tasks. The CMO planners should rec-ommend essential tasks, if applicable, forinclusion into the MAGTF mission statement.



Note: The CMO planners do not develop aCMO mission statement.

Determine Civil-Military Operations AssumptionsThe CMO assumptions are suppositions about thecurrent CMO situation or about future eventsassumed to be true in the absence of facts in orderto continue planning and allow the commander tomake a decision concerning a COA. They applyto friendly, adversary, and environmental consid-erations. A valid assumption should answer all ofthe following:

Is it logical? Is it realistic? Is it essential for planning to continue? Does it avoid assuming away a threat capability?

As planning continues, additional CMO assump-tions may be needed and previous CMO as-sumptions may be deleted. A record of CMOassumptions is maintained in order to track andvalidate them as they are confirmed or dis-approved. Assumptions are contained in OPLANs,but are not included in OPORDs. If the OPLANcontains assumptions that are not validated beforeexecution, the assumptions become part of theinherent risks of the operation.

If possible, all assumptions are forwarded toHHQ for validation. This ensures that the HHQcommander understands the potential risks that asubordinate command is accepting. It mayprompt the HHQ to pursue facts that support theassumption or to request additional information.

Determine Civil-Military Operations LimitationsRestraints (things you cannot do) and constraints(things you must do) that do not qualify as speci-fied tasks are collectively referred to as limita-tions. Limitations are carried forward into COAdevelopment and subsequent planning as they canaffect how operations will be conducted.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Resource ShortfallsBased on the mission and available resources, theCMO working group identifies critical resourceshortfalls in order to determine additional sup-port requirements. Shortfalls can include a needfor SMEs.

Recommend Commander’s Critical Information RequirementsOnly the commander decides what information iscritical, but the G-9 staff may propose com-mander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)to the commander. The CCIRs are reviewed andupdated as required. The two subcategories ofCCIRs are friendly force information requirementsand PIRs. Initially, CCIRs may reflect the nature ofplanning and identify intelligence or informationrequirements to assist with the planning anddecision process. When answered, CCIRs mayoften serve to inform the ongoing design and pro-vide information proving or disproving thehypothesis. As the planning moves forward andexecution is imminent, the CCIRs will normallychange in nature to reflect key information/intelli-gence requirements tied to decision points orneeded for execution.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Requests for InformationThe CMO planners identify information neces-sary to remove assumptions, support future plans,or conduct current operations. Based on the civilIPB and information requirements, includingCCIRs, the commander and staff identify gaps ininformation and intelligence. The CMO plannersforward requests for information (RFIs) to theappropriate staff section or to HHQ for answers.Over time, the number of RFIs can make thetracking effort very difficult. A software-basedRFI management tool and an individual tasked totrack RFI submission and response can helpaccomplish this task.

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Develop Initial Civil-Military Operations Staff EstimateThe G-9 staff gathers and refines information insupport of the CMO staff estimate. This estimateprovides a timely examination of factors that sup-port decisionmaking and can affect missionaccomplishment. Depending on the level of com-mand and the time available, the estimates couldbe a formal, detailed written document or aninformal verbal briefing. See figure 3-4.

Green Cell

The purpose of the green cell is to assist thecommander in assessing COAs from the civil per-spective. Depending on the size of the organi-zation, a green cell can range in size from anofficer with CMO experience to a task-organizedgroup of SMEs such as IGOs, NGOs, interagencyrepresentatives, political advisors, regional areaofficers, CA SMEs, or PA and IOs repre-sentatives. The green cell falls under the staffcognizance of the G-9 and conducts a detailedanalysis of the civil component. While the greencell’s principal duties center on CMO COAdevelopment and CMO war game, it should alsosupport the commander’s understanding of thesituation from the civil perspective.

Red Cell

The purpose of a red cell is to assist the com-mander in assessing COAs against a thinkingenemy. Depending on the size of the organization,a red cell can range in size from an intelligenceofficer to a task-organized group of SMEs. Whilea red cell’s principal duties center on COA devel-opment and the COA war game, it could also sup-port the commander’s understanding of thesituation and problem during the initial stages ofdesign as well as participate in the analysis ofenemy centers of gravity.

The red cell falls under the staff cognizance of theG-2 and is typically led by someone whose exper-tise most closely reflects that of the adversary.The red cell should inform both the MAGTF OPT

and the CMO planning efforts. The G-9 shouldconsider sending representation to the red cell tohelp ensure information fusion between the G-2and the G-9.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development

A COA, as shown in figure 3-5, is a potentialsolution to an approved mission. The COAdevelopment step is designed to generate optionsfor follow-on wargaming and comparison anddecision that satisfy the mission, commander’sintent, and the commander’s COA developmentguidance. The CMO planner’s develop CMOCOAs and CMO concepts of support that areintegrated into the options being developed byMAGTF planners.

To be distinguishable, each COA must employdifferent means or methods that address theessential tasks and incorporate the commander’sintent and guidance. During COA development,the OPT concentrates on two questions: What dowe want to do? How do we want to do it?

Apply Inputs From Problem Framing

The inputs to CMO COA development are prima-rily the results of CMO problem framing. TheCMO planners must continually review andupdate the results of CMO problem framing, par-ticularly in a dynamic environment. At a mini-mum, CMO COA development requires theproblem statement, mission statement, intent, andCOA development planning guidance that is pro-vided and approved by the commander duringproblem framing.

Develop Initial Courses of Action

Once CMO planners have updated their productsfrom CMO problem framing, to include updatingfriendly and enemy force locations, they areready to develop the initial CMO COA. Typi-cally, CMO planners will develop only one CMO



COA that is capable of supporting all of theMAGTF COAs. The CMO planners, as part of anintegrated planning effort with the MAGTF staff,will develop the CMO COA using the com-mander’s planning guidance and vision of shap-ing and decisive actions.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

The cooperative inclusion of local organizationsand authorities can strengthen the MAGTF’soverall concept of operations. For example, mili-tary police are more effective when teamed withHN police forces. Operational planners shouldattempt to consult with local authorities in order tomore thoroughly inform the decision-makingprocess. Actions that are informed by and executed

with HN forces enhance legitimacy of MAGTFoperations and aid mission accomplishment.

Update Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products

Planners are able to view the battlespace in termsof the adversary and the environment by usingIPB. Planners can determine how the adversarywill react to proposed friendly COAs, the purposeof adversary actions, the most likely and mostdangerous adversary COAs, and the type offriendly operations that the terrain and infrastruc-ture will allow. It is critical that planners continueto update and refine IPB to deepen their under-standing of the situation and to answer the twofundamental questions posed in COA develop-ment: What do we want to do? How do we wantto do it?

Tasks (specified/implied/essential)

Shortfalls (resources/SME)COG analysisAssumptions/RFIsApproved CCIRsInitial staff estimates

IPB productsUpdated planning products

COA development guidanceWarning order

Mission statementCommander’s intent

LimitationsAssess relative combat power

Develop initial COA(s):

Develop COA graphic and narrativeEnsure conformance withCOA criteriaPrepare COA briefing

Update IPB productsDisplay friendly forces

Commander’s wargaming guidanceIssue evaluation criteria

Refine COGs

- Commander’s input- COA refinement

Planning support tools andCOA graphic and narrative

Initial staff estimatesCommander’s designatedCOA(s) for wargaming Commander’s wargamingguidanceCommander’s evaluation criteria

Course of action briefUpdated IPB products

Initial estimates of supportability


Ongoing Activities

Figure 3-5. Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development.


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Determine Battlefield Framework

The battlefield framework is a technique ofbreaking the battlespace down into manageableaspects. The battlefield framework describes howthe commander will organize his battlespace andforces to achieve a decision. The commanderorganizes the battlespace in one of three ways:

Spatially: deep, close, and rear. Functionally: decisive, shaping, and sustainingactions. LOO.

This technique allows planners to operate withinthe single battle by translating the commander’svision of decisive action into a framework withwhich to develop initial COAs.

Establish Priorities and Objectives

The CMO planners must establish priorities andobjectives for CMO. Establishing clear prioritiesand measurable objectives will lead to greaterunity of effort and assist in promoting theMAGTF’s single battle. Initial measures of per-formance should also be developed in order tosupport each CMO objective.

Determine Tasks

Once CMO planners have established prioritiesand clear CMO objectives, they should deter-mine the tasks that are necessary to accomplishestablished CMO objectives.

Determine Requirements

Identify resources that are required to achieveestablished objectives, accomplish specified/implied tasks, and support the MAGTF schemeof maneuver. During this portion of planning,identify CA requirements and the type of capabil-ity or resource required to fulfill each require-ment. Civil affairs planners do not assign specificunits but they assign generic capabilities, whichwill assist MAGTF planners in identifyingresource shortfalls.

Assign Required Course of Action Capabilities

After mapping together known CA, HN, IGO,and NGO locations and capabilities, CMO plan-ners can identify the capabilities available tomeet the supported unit’s projected requirements.The CMO planners will begin by assigning CAforces to the MAGTF beginning with the maineffort and then each supporting effort, and thenthe reserve. Those requirements that have notbeen fulfilled by a specific CA capability areconsidered CA shortfalls.

Assign Purpose Then Tasks

Once CA forces have been arrayed, assign a pur-pose and then tasks to each of the MAGTF’s sub-ordinate commands. Begin with the main effortand then each supporting effort, and then thereserve. Each MAGTF element should be prop-erly resourced with CA assets in order to accom-plish the assigned CMO intensive tasks.

Determine Command Relationships

Civil military operations planners must determinethe appropriate command relationships betweenCA forces and the MAGTF unit that they areassigned to once CA forces have been assignedand tasked. Refer to JP 3-0 for a detailed descrip-tion of command relationships.

Synchronize

Once CMO planners have developed the CMOCOA, they should synchronize CMO efforts,arranging in terms of time, space, and purposewith the MAGTF COA. The CMO plannersrecord their efforts in the synchronization matrixand then depict the synchronization of CMOactions in time and space in the CMO COAgraphic and narrative.

Determine Control Measures

The CMO planners determine any necessaryCMO control measures, such as DC assembly



areas, DC campsites, and DC routes that will needto be integrated into the overall MAGTF plan forcontrol measures.

Obtain G-9 Input

The CMO planners review the initial CMO COAwith the G-9 to ensure the COA conforms to cur-rent guidance and also to the COA developmentplanning guidance provided by the commander.This is the opportunity for the G-9 to makecourse corrections before the CMO workinggroup conducts detailed CMO COA develop-ment and refinement.

Conduct Course of Action Refinement

Refinement of CMO COA consists of develop-ing and refining information organized into threebasic products: CMO COA graphic and narra-tive, CA force assignments and command rela-tionships, and the CMO synchronization matrix.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Graphic and NarrativeThe CMO COA graphic and narrative eachportrays how CMO will be integrated in theMAGTF COAs. Together, they identify who(notional task organization), what (tasks), when,where, how, and why (intent). The CMO COAgraphic and narrative are essential and insepar-able from each other. Together, they help thecommander and the staff to understand themethod by which the organization will conductCMO. The graphic portrays the CMO activities tobe conducted by the main effort and supportingefforts. The CMO narrative provides the purposeand tasks of the main and supporting efforts, thereserve, and the sequencing of the operation. Thegraphic may display civil-military activities,locations of relief organizations and DCs, keyinfrastructure, and culturally or historically sig-nificant areas.

The CMO COA graphic and narrative, whenapproved by the G-9 and the commander, formthe basis for annex G and for the CMO concept

of support in the execution paragraph of theOPLAN or OPORD.

Force Assignments and Command RelationshipsForce assignments and command relationshipscapture how the G-9 intends to structure andresource the force with CA resources. It can alsoestablish command and support relationships.Proper task organization ensures each unit isproperly constructed, sized, and resourced to sup-port the commander’s concept of operation.

Synchronization MatrixThe synchronization matrix is a working docu-ment showing the activities of the command andsubordinate elements over time. The matrix candisplay how units and tasks interrelate, providingadditional details that complement and amplifythe CMO COA graphic and narrative. The syn-chronization matrix is not used as a script or play-book for execution, but serves as a way to providestructure for the war game.

Prepare Civil-Military Briefing

The finalized products from CMO COA refine-ment such as the CMO COA graphic and narra-tive; CA force assignments and commandrelationships; the CMO synchronization matrix;the CMO concept of support; and any updatedfacts, assumptions, limitations, and shortfalls arebriefed to the G-9.

Publish Commander’s Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

Following the COA development brief, the com-mander will select or modify the COAs and sug-gest additional COAs for wargaming. Thecommander will also provide wargaming guid-ance and evaluation criteria.

Commander’s Wargaming GuidanceThe commander’s wargaming guidance mayinclude a list of friendly COAs to be wargamed

3-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


against specific enemy COAs such as, COA 1against the enemy’s most likely, most dangerous,or most advantageous COA. It may also include atimeline for the phase or stage of the operationand a list of critical events, such as shifting themain effort.

Commander’s Evaluation CriteriaBefore the staff can begin the COA war game, thecommander must choose the evaluation criteria tobe used to select the COA that will become hisconcept of operations. The commander estab-lishes evaluation criteria based on METT-T,judgment, personal experience, and his overalldesign for the operation. Commanders maychoose an evaluation criterion that is related tothe principles of war, such as mass or surprise.These evalua t ion cr i te r ia he lp focus the

wargaming effort and provide the framework fordata collection by the staff. The commander willapply the data collected during the war game tothe COA comparison and decision step.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game

The COA war game depicted in figure 3-6 exam-ines and refines the broad option(s) in light ofenemy capabilities and potential actions or reac-tions as well as the characteristics peculiar to theoperational environment. Planners war gamefriendly COAs against selected threat COAsthrough an interactive action-reaction-counterac-tion process. A free thinking red cell builds andfights the threat COAs.

Updated IPB productsPlanning support tools,COA graphic, and narrative

Initial estimates of supportabilityInitial staff estimates

Branches/sequelsApproved COAs forcomparison and decisionComparison criteria/guidance (required)

Commander’s designatedCOA(s) for wargamingCommander’s wargamingguidanceCommander’s evaluationcriteria

The wargamed COA(s) - Graphic and narrative

Planning support tools

Refined staff estimatesEstimates of supportability

War game results

COA war game brief

Updated IPB products

- Initial task organization- Identify required assets and shortfalls- Refined CCIRs- Critical events and decision points- Recommended COA refinements

Red cell brief

Refine IPB products

Conduct COA war game

Prepare COA war game brief

Refine staff estimates andestimates of supportability

- Gain understanding of possible adversary COAs

- Friendly action- Enemy reaction (red cell)- Friendly counteraction

COA refinementrecommendations


Ongoing Activities

Green cell brief- Gain understanding of possible populace actions

Figure 3-6. Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game.




The COA war game leads to a greater under-standing of the environment and the nature of theproblem, identification of potential branches andsequels, the sequence and timing of major events,and recognition of required modifications to eachCOA. The COA war game will:

Enable the commander and this staff to gain acommon understanding of friendly and possi-ble enemy COAs. This understanding willallow them to determine the advantages anddisadvantages of each COA and forms thebasis for COA comparison and decision. Involve a detailed assessment of each COA, toinclude staff estimates, as it relates to theenemy and the battlespace. Each friendly COAis wargamed against selected threat COAs. Assist planners in identifying strengths andweaknesses, associated risks, and asset short-falls for each friendly COA. Identify branches and sequels that require addi-tional planning.

Prior to wargaming, the commander designatesthe COAs for examination and provides wargam-ing guidance and evaluation criteria. Short ofactually executing a COA, wargaming providesthe most reliable basis for understanding andimproving COAs. Inputs to the CMO COA wargame are as follows:

Updated commander’s design. Updated civil IPB products. Planning support tools including the CMOCOA graphic and narrative and synchroniza-tion matrix. CMO staff estimate. CMO concept of support.

Establish War Game Rules

Wargame rules can include, but are not limitedto, the following:

War game CMO COAs independently. Do not compare one COA with another duringthe war game.

Use approved enemy and civil COAs. Remain unbiased and avoid premature conclu-sions. Keep to the established timeline for the CMOCOA war game.

Continually assess how feasible, acceptable,suitable, distinguishable, and complete eachCMO COA is. Record war game results by war game turn,including the advantages and disadvantagesof each CMO COA. Collect CMO COA refinement recommenda-tions and identify possible branches and se-quels for further planning.

Conduct War Game Preparation

War game preparation can include, but is not lim-ited to the following:

Determine war game organization. Gather the tools.

War game injects. Planning support tools. Synchronization matrixWar game worksheet. Decision support template/matrix.

Determine the MAGTF COA(s) to be war-gamed. Determine which enemy COA will be used. Determine which civil COA will be used. Select a war game method:

Box: Used when the war game is time-con-strained. The box method allows planners tofocus on specific areas such as coloredbeach, raid objectives, urban areas, and criti-cal events and decision point analysis. Belt: Used for terrain divided into well-de-fined cross-compartments, phased opera-tions, and when the enemy deploys in clearlydefined echelons or belts. Sequence of critical tasks: Allows for se-quential war game of major operationalmovements and enables evaluation of criticaltasks and reordering if necessary.

3-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Avenue in depth: Focus on one avenue of ap-proach at a time such as in offensive COAsand in defensive situations where canalizingterrain inhibits mutual support.

Any other aspects of the operation that thecommander wants to analyze in more detail.

Red Cell Brief A red cell representative will brief an overview ofthe enemy’s concept of operations including adetailed discussion of the most likely and mostdangerous COAs. The red cell brief shouldinclude a description of the enemy’s doctrine-based capabilities and not embellish the enemy tounachievable capabilities.

Green Cell BriefThe green cell should provide their overview ofthe civil situation to include a detailed discussionof the most likely and most dangerous civilCOAs. The green cell should provide a brief onthe current civil situation to include internal andexternal influences on the populace. It is criticalthat the green cell ensure civil actions are realistic.

Conduct the War Game Turn

A CMO COA war game turn covers all friendlyand enemy actions during a specific time interval.Each war game turn consists of three moves: onefriendly (action), one enemy (reaction), and onefriendly (counteraction). The CMO planners mayconduct wargaming using the enemy’s mostlikely or most dangerous COA. The commanderwill approve which enemy COA is wargamed bythe MAGTF OPT. This is the same enemy COAthat CMO planners should war game. The CMOplanners must also take into consideration the in-put received from the green cell.

Provided with the commander’s wargamingguidance, war game evaluation criteria, theMAGTF and CMO synchronization matrix,decision support products, updated civil IPB, andred cell products the CMO working grouporganizes and prepares to conduct the war game.

The steps involved in a CMO war game turn areas follows:

Describe friendly action using brief MAGTFactions from the OPT synchronization matrix. Describe CMO actions associated with friendlyaction using brief CMO actions from the CMOsynchronization matrix. Determine enemy reaction based on mostlikely or most dangerous COAs. Consult green cell in order to obtain mostlikely or most dangerous civil reaction inresponse to both friendly and adversaryactions. Determine MAGTF CMO counteraction. Uponcompletion of the red cell and green cell reac-tion, the G-9 working group determines CMOcounteractions and identifies recommenda-tions for MAGTF counteractions. Refine planning tools. Evaluate outcome on CMO COAs. Refine CMO COA. Record results on the CMO COA war gameworksheet and the CMO synchronizationmatrix. Record recommendations for modifications tothe CMO COA and potential branches andsequels. Record pros and cons of each CMO COAbased on commander’s and G-9’s evaluationcriteria.



Table 3-1 is an example of CMO input to theCOA synchronization matrix. The matrix is aplanning support tool designed to integrate theefforts of the force across the warfighting func-tions and to record the results of the COA wargame. The matrix depicts, over time, the diverseactions of the entire force that are necessary toexecute the COA.

Table 3-2, on page 3-22, is an example of a COAwar game worksheet that is used during the wargame to record friendly actions, enemy reactions,and friendly counteractions that are involved ineach COA. The COA war game worksheet cap-tures critical information identified during thewar game, such as potential CCIRs, decisionpoints, and named areas of interest.

Table 3-1. Sample CMO COA Synchronization Matrix.

Time/Event Pre D-Day D-Day – D+20 D+21 – D-60 D+61 – +80 CMO CA Forces Attach Det to (ME) RCT

4 CAT DS 2 CAT GS

Rule of Law Analyze, prioritize assessments

1 CAT supports local PTT/engineer assess-ment for Al Jaffar prison improvement project

Economy Analyze, prioritize assessments

2 CAT conducts assessment of local industry and market capacity/productivity vic Al Jaffar

1 CAT to assist local economic development roundtable vic Al Jaffar with HN and local officials/businessmen

1 CAT to monitor local economic conditions identify trade bottlenecks in Ar Sufka and Al Jaffar

Public Health Analyze, prioritize assessments

1 CAT supports local FSSG for Al Jaffar hos-pital repairs

Infrastructure Analyze, prioritize assessments

1 GS CAT to manage bridge repair project vic Al Jaffar and Ar Sufka

CATS in support of ME Man Bn assist HN in renovation of water treatment plant at Ar Sufka

2 GS CAT to support USAID effort in Ar Sufka wheat field irrigation project

Governance Analyze, prioritize assessments

Helicopter governance 1 GS CAT supports HN gov local government assessments

HN transition 1 GS CAT provides assistance to Ar Sufka water minister ISO HN renovation project

HN control 2 GS CAT with PRT sup-ports USAID and HN wheat field irrigation project vice Ar Sufka

Public Education Analyze, prioritize assessments

1 CAT (SE) Man Bn manages college and high school repairs vic Al Jaffar

DetDSFSSG GovGS ISO

detachmentdirect supportforce service support groupgovernment general supportin support of

Man BnMEPTTSEvic

maneuver battalion main effort police transition team secondary effort vicinity

3-22 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


War Game Brief

The CMO COA war game brief includes theadvantages and disadvantages of each CMOCOA and suggested modifications. It may alsoinclude the following:

Updated CIPB products. CMO problem framing and CMO COA devel-opment products:

Higher, supporting, supported, and adjacentcommanders’ mission statements (two levelsup). Tasks and intent provided by HHQ. Commander’s intent for subordinate units. Overview of CMO COA. War game technique used.

COA war game products and results: COA war game worksheet. Identification of any additional CMO tasks. Revised CMO COA graphic and narrative. CMO synchronization matrix.

Recommended branches and potential sequels. CMO resource shortfalls. New CMO requests for information. Estimated time required for the operation. Risk assessment.

Recommended changes to the commander’sevaluation criteria.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, shown infigure 3-7, the commander evaluates each friendlyCOA against established criteria, compares themagainst each other, and selects the COA hebelieves will best accomplish the mission.

Evaluate Courses of Action

Using his evaluation criteria, the commander orhis representative (deputy commander, chief ofstaff, or operations officer) will lead a discussion

Table 3-2. Sample COA War Game Worksheet.

COA Stage A Most Dangerous

Action Reaction Counteraction Assets Approx. Time

Dec Point CCIR Remarks

1CAT manages FSSG project for Al Jaffar hospital repairs and resupply

Local businessmen want contract

HN money and sup-ply delays

Hospital theft occurs

Hospital staff threat-ened by insurgents many of the staff leave

Conduct assess-ment of source of instability in alter-native area

Determine alt methods of fund-ing contract payments

Utilize local offi-cials to provide supplies

Provide PTT and local police force security to hospital

1 CAT Eng Plt 20 LN police secu-rity force

D+10 DP1 Hospital ceases operation

ApproxDPDecEng Plt

approx decision point decision engineer platoon

FSSGLNPTTTm

force service support grouplocal nationalpolice transition team team



about the relative merits of each COA. The staffwill record the advantages and disadvantages foreach. To the extent that operations allow, subor-dinate commanders, staffs, and planners shouldparticipate and provide input based on their esti-mates of supportability as shown in table 3-3 onpage 3-24.

Compare Courses of Action

Course of action comparison provides the com-mander with an understanding of the relativemerit of each COA and aids in his decisionmak-ing. The commander compares the COAs againstone another using the results of the COA evalua-tion. The commander may use a comparison anddecision matrix, shown in table 3-4 on page 3-24,to help him compare one COA against another.

Establish Commander’s Decision

The commander will select a COA. In making adecision, the commander may—

Select a COA without modification. Modify a COA. Develop a new COA by combining favorableelements of multiple COAs. Discard all COAs and resume problem framingor COA development, as required.

Once the commander has made a decision, heshould review the approved COA with subordi-nate commanders. With a decision, detailed plan-ning can accelerate once the entire command’sfocus is on a single COA. To facilitate detailedplanning, the staff uses the approved COA as thebasis for the concept of operations.

The wargamed COA(s) - Graphic and narrative

Planning support tools

Branches/sequelsApproved COAs forcomparison and decisionComparison criteria/guidance (as required)

Refined staff estimatesEstimates of supportability

Prepare the CONOPSCommander’s decision

Update the WARNORD/prepare the planning orderRefine IPB products

Evaluate COAsCompare COAs

Updated IPB productsPlanning support toolsUpdated CCIRsStaff estimatesEstimates of supportabilityBranches for further planningUpdate WARNORD/issue planning order

Approved COACONOPS

War game results

Updated IPB products

- Initial task organization- Identify required assets and shortfalls- Refined CCIRs- Critical events and decision points- Recommended COA refinements


Ongoing Activities

Figure 3-7. Course of Action Comparison and Decision.


3-24 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Table 3-3. Sample CMO Evaluation Matrix.

Commander’s Evaluation Criteria

COM COA1 CMO COA2 CMO COA3

Force Protection Potential riots due to lack of HN support

Tempo, Surprise More methodical, better sta-bility over long term, lower short term improvements

Shapes the Battlespace Supports DSF assessment as primary source of conflict

Asymmetrical Operations

Maneuver Economy of force, unity of effort

Teams not able to support each other

Decisive Actions

Simplicity Command relationships not clear, may cause confusion

Demanding CIM requirements

main supply routeMSR

1. Best COA is assigned the highest numerical value of the three COAs.2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1, 2, or 3) for that COA.3. Highest number is most suitable COA.

Notes:

Criteria

TOTALS

Weight COA#1

28

4

2

1

3 122 4 2 4

2 42 4

1 43 6

333

31 23 6

2 8

2 2 1 11 12 2

3 61 2

1

2

2

22 24

COA#2 COA#3

Fewer DCs on MSRs(faster movement)

Avoids collateraldamage

Engages key leaders

Gains cooperation ofcivilian populace

Preserves keyinfrastructures

Amount of HA likelyto be needed

Legend

Table 3-4. Sample Comparison and Decision Matrix.



Prepare the Commander’s Concept of Operations

The staff expands on the approved COA todevelop the CONOPS, which is the basis for (orcould include) supporting concepts such as theconcept of CMO. Within the context of militaryoperations, concepts are a vision of actions. ACONOPS is a general description of actions to betaken in pursuit of mission accomplishment.Embedded in the CONOPS is a complete descrip-tion of the COA with graphics and narrative. Pro-vided with the CONOPS and the concept ofCMO, CMO planners can proceed with func-tional and detailed planning that is essential forthe development of the annex G.

Update the Warning Order

With the preparation of the CONOPS, the com-mander will update his warning order or issue aplanning order to inform subordinate command-ers’ concurrent planning.

At the completion of this process, the MAGTFshould have the commander’s decision as towhich COA will be finalized and executed to sat-isfy the unit’s mission. At this point, the staffswill consolidate the planning products to date andbegin the process of orders development.

Orders Development

The purpose of orders development is to trans-late the commander’s decision into oral, written,and/or graphic communication sufficient to guideimplementation and promote initiative by subor-dinates. Orders development is a form of detailedplanning. When completed, the order becomesthe principal means by which the commanderexpresses decision, intent, and guidance.

The orders development step in the MCPP com-municates the commander’s decision in a clear,useful form that can be understood by those exe-cuting the order. An order is a written or oralcommunication that directs actions and focuses a

subordinate’s tasks and activities toward accom-plishing the mission. Various portions of theorder, such as the mission statement and staffestimates, have been prepared during previoussteps of the MCPP. The development of the orderbegins during problem framing and continuesthroughout the process as shown in figure 3-8 onpage 3-26.

The chief of staff or the executive officer, asappropriate, directs orders development. The chiefof staff or executive officer dictates the format forthe order, sets and enforces the time limits anddevelopment sequence, and determines whichannexes are published by which staff section.

Preparation of an Order

Orders appear in a variety of forms ranging fromdetailed, written documents with numerousannexes to simple verbal commands. Their formdepends on time available, complexity of theoperation, and levels of command involved. Staffestimates, subordinate commanders’ estimates ofsupportability, and other planning documentsform a plan or order’s annexes and appendices.

The order, in narrative form with graphics and arange of supporting documents, serves to focusthe command during transition. The order is thevehicle by which the commander expresses hisintent and assigns tasks to subordinates. Theorder ensures common understanding and servesto put every staff section and subordinate unit atthe same place, pointed at the same objective.

If a basic order has been published, a FRAGOmay be issued to subordinate commanders. What-ever the format, orders must be clear, concise,timely, and useful. Orders development alsoincludes two essential quality control techniques:orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

Orders Reconciliation

Orders reconciliation is an internal process inwhich the staff conducts a detailed review of theentire order. The purpose of reconciliation is toensure the basic order and all the annexes,

3-26 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


appendixes, etc., are complete and in agreement.It identifies discrepancies or gaps in the planningthat will require corrective action. Specifically,the staff compares the commander’s intent, themission, and the CCIRs against the concept ofoperations and the supporting concepts such asmaneuver, fires, and support. Priority intelligencerequirements and the intelligence collection planmust support the CCIRs.

Orders Crosswalk

Orders crosswalk is an external process in whichthe staff compares its order with the orders ofhigher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders toachieve unity of effort and ensure the superiorcommander’s intent is met. Similarly, con-firmation briefs and rehearsal of concept (ROC)drills can assist a commander in ensuring the

subordinate units understand the order. Foraddi t iona l in format ion regard ing orderspreparation, see MAGTF Staff Training ProgramPamphlet 5-0.2, Operational Planning TeamLeader’s Guide.

Commander Approves Order or Plan

The final action in orders development is theapproval of the order or plan by the commander.While the commander does not have to signevery annex or appendix, it is important that hereviews and signs the basic order or plan.

Development of the Operations Order and Civil-Military Operations

The G-9 is responsible for producing annex G.Civil-military operations products that were

Orders reconciliationOrders crosswalk

Refine IPB productsFinalize/complete order or plan

Updated IPB productsPlanning support toolsUpdated CCIRsStaff estimatesEstimates of supportabilityBranches for further planningWARNORD/planning order

Approved COACONOPS

Planning support toolsOutline FRAGOs for branches

Approved order or planRefined IPB and intelligenceproducts


Ongoing Activities

Figure 3-8. Orders Development.




created during the previous steps of the planningprocess, such as the CMO staff estimate, CMOCOA graphic and narrative, and the CMOsynchronization matrix, all support the ordersdevelopment process. Paragraph 3 (Execution) ofthe OPORD should include the CMO concept ofsupport, CMO tasks, and any CMO coordinatinginstructions. Further guidance for CMO iscaptured in the annex G. Other annexes that theG-9 may be responsible for are Annex V (Inter-agency Coordination) and Annex P (Host NationSupport). (See app. E for a sample annex G.)

Orders development considerations:

Only units have mission statements. Staff sec-tions should not create their own mission andintent. Annexes should refer the reader to thebasic order when discussing the mission or thecommander’s intent. When writing plans or orders, words matter.Writers must remain consistent in their use ofapproved terminology, particularly tacticaltasks. For example, there is a significant differ-ence between defeat and destroy. Updated standard operating procedures (SOPs)are critical to producing a concise order. TheSOPs need to be current, widely disseminated,and used if the order will reference the SOPs. The entire staff develops the order. Plannersdevelop and refine functional concepts through-out the process (concept of CMO and conceptof fires). The staff principals and their respec-tive sections are responsible for completing theannexes. The staff should ensure all tasks are either inthe basic order or no lower than an appendix.Tasks that appear in tabs, exhibits, or attach-ments often lose visibility by the subordinateunits and may not be accounted for and accom-plished.

Transition

The purpose of transition is to provide a success-ful shift from planning to execution. It enhancesthe situational understanding of those who will

execute the order, maintains the intent of the con-cept of operations, promotes unity of effort, andgenerates tempo.

Transition may involve a wide range of briefs,drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a success-ful shift from planning to execution, subject to thevariables of echelon of command, mission com-plexity, and, most importantly, time. At a mini-mum, the transition step includes a concept ofoperations brief along with the handover andexplanation of any execution tools developed dur-ing planning such as a decision support matrix orexecution checklist. If time and resources allow,the transition step may include ROC drills andconfirmation briefs by subordinate units.

Transition is a continuous process that requires afree flow of information between commandersand staffs by all available means. At higherechelons where the planners may not be exe-cutors, the commander may designate a repre-sentative as a proponent for the order or plan.After orders development, the proponent takes theapproved order or plan forward to the staffcharged with supervising execution. As a fullparticipant in the development of the plan, theproponent is able to answer questions, aid in theuse of the planning support tools, and assistduring execution in determining necessary adjust-ments to the order or plan.

Transition occurs at all levels of command. Aformal transition normally occurs on staffs withseparate planning and execution teams. Planningtime and personnel may be limited at lowerechelons of command, such as regiment and air-craft group or below; therefore, transition maytake place intuitively because the planners arealso the executors. For transition to occur, anapproved order must exist. The approved order,along with the products of continuing staffactions, forms the input for transition. Theseinputs may include the following:

Refined intelligence and IPB products. Planning support tools. Outline FRAGOs for branches.

3-28 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Information on possible future missions(sequels). Any outstanding issues.

Regardless of the level of command, a successfultransition ensures that those who execute the orderunderstand the commander’s intent, the concept ofoperations, and MCPP tools. Transition, asdepicted in figure 3-9, may be internal where asthe transition occurs between future plans orfuture and current operations or external wherethe transition occurs between the commander andhis subordinate commanders. Transition maycome in the form of briefs or drills and relocatinga planner to current operations for execution.

Transition Brief

At the higher levels of command, transition mayinclude a formal transition brief to subordinate or

adjacent commanders and to the staff supervisingexecution of the order. At lower levels, it mightbe less formal. The transition brief provides anoverview of the mission, commander’s intent,task organization, and enemy and friendly situa-tion. The commander, deputy commander, orchief of staff provides transition brief guidance,which may prescribe who will give the brief, thecontent of the brief, the sequence of the briefing,and who is required to attend. Time availablemay dictate the level of detail in the transitionbrief. Orders and supporting materials should betransmitted as early as possible before the transi-tion brief. The brief may include items from theorder or plan such as the following:

HHQ mission (tasks and intent). Mission. Commander’s intent. CCIRs.

Confirmation briefs

Transition briefDrills (rehearsal of concept)

Planning support toolsOutline FRAGOs for branches

Approved order or planRefined IPB and intelligenceproducts

Subordinate commandersand staffs that are—

- Ready to execute the order and possible branches- Prepared to plan sequels


Ongoing Activities

Figure 3-9. Transition.




Task organization. Situation (friendly and enemy). Concept of operations. Execution (including branches and potentialsequels). Planning support tools.

Transition Drills

A transition drill is a series of briefings, guideddiscussions, walk-throughs, or rehearsals used tofacilitate understanding of the plan throughout alllevels of the command. The commander and hissubordinate commanders conduct transition drillsalong with the staff that is tasked with executionof the plan or order. Typically, a transition drill isthe only drill used at lower levels of command,where the staff both develops and executes theplan. Transition drills are important techniquesduring transition that will ensure the greatestpossible understanding of the order by those whomust execute it. Transition drills improve theability of the commander and staff to commandand control operations. Transition drills alsoallow the commander to express his thoughts ondesign, thereby increasing the situationalawareness of the subordinate commanders and

the staff and instilling confidence and familiaritywith the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, andrehearsals are examples of transition drills.

Transition drills, such as ROC drills, include alarge-scale terrain map. The terrain map shouldbe large enough for all participants to view theROC drill, such as a gym floor or parking lot.During a ROC drill, staffs and commanders willliterally walk through the concept of operations toensure all participants have a clear understandingof the plan. While time and resource intensive,the ROC drill provides key visual reinforcementand allows for better retention of the information.

Confirmation Brief

Subordinate commanders conduct a confirmationbrief with their higher commander to confirmtheir understanding of commander’s intent, theirspecific task and purpose, and the relationshipbetween their unit’s mission and the other units inthe operation. The confirmation brief allows thehigher commander to identify gaps in his plan,identify discrepancies between his and thesubordinate commanders’ plans, and learn howsubordinate commanders intend to accomplishtheir mission.



CHAPTER 4 COORDINATION

“We are in fact minimizing the loss of life and mitigating the incredible human sufferingthat we see across the region. [Operation Unified Assistance] has been a unique militaryoperation from that perspective, in that we have been planning, assessing, deploying, andexecuting concurrently. It would be like . . . taking a family vacation and you were trying topack the car and decide where you were going while you were driving down the road.”

—LtGen Robert R. Blackman, USMC Commander,Combined Support Force 536 (www.defense.gov)

Civil-Military Operations Center

The MAGTF may establish a task-organizedCMOC to assist in the coordination of activitiesof engaged military forces with other USG agen-cies, NGOs, IGOs, local governmental leaders, orcivilian populations. Civilian agencies recognizethat the MAGTF’s resources and capabilities maygreatly enhance their ability to respond to domes-tic shortfalls; however, in accordance with UnitedStates Code, Title 10, MAGTF resources mustonly be used as a last resort. Each MAGTF mayhave more than one CMOC. There is no estab-lished structure and no two CMOCs are identi-cal. Its size and composition are situationdependent. This concept differs from thatemployed by US Army CA forces, which haveCMOCs of various sizes and structures embeddedin their tables of organization.

Since external organizations, such as NGOs/IGOsand the HN, cannot be compelled to use theCMOC, it must be seen as something that servesa useful purpose to them in order to encouragetheir participation. The CMOC must be easilyaccessible and may be placed beyond perimetersecurity. However, if the security situation dic-tates, the CMOC may be inside the perimeter.

The CMOC’s location must be known throughoutthe MAGTF. With their specialized training andfocus, CA personnel generally direct CMOC oper-ations under the guidance of the MAGTF CMOofficer. Depending on the situation, MAGTF sub-ordinate elements may establish a local CMOC.Figure 4-1, on page 4-2, is an example of aCMOC layout.

The CMOC must be organized to promote infor-mation exchange between participating civilian orHN agencies and organizations, including thosethat otherwise will not have a mechanism forcoordination and cooperation. They must be cul-turally sensitive, HN-language capable, and ableto provide a secure environment for all. Whenpossible, the CMOC can help identify civiliancapabilities that can satisfy civilian requirements,entirely avoiding the use of MAGTF resources.Major CMOC functions include the following:

Provide USG interagency partners, IGOs, andNGOs with a single, accessible POC for CMO. Facilitate collaborative civil-military effortswith joint and coalition forces and UN, HN,and other nonmilitary agencies. Assist in the transfer of authority and/or transi-tion of operations from the MAGTF to DOS,UN, NATO, HN, or other nonmilitary agencycontrol.

4-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian supportrequests, from the MAGTF and other US mili-tary forces. The CMO staff element attempts tomeet civilian requirements with civilian capa-bilities via coordination at the CMOC beforepassing validated support request to theMAGTF. See figure 4-2. Provide agency points of contact (POCs),agency capability lists, daily information sum-maries, population density, demographic, andDC overlays, which might be posted on a pub-lic information board.

Interagency, Nongovernmental, and Intergovernmental Organizations

The MAGTF operations are likely to be con-ducted in an interagency environment. Othergovernmental agencies, such as IGOs and NGOs,will often be involved in a crisis before the arrivalof the MAGTF. Interagency coordination forges avital link between the military and the economic,political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informa-tional entities of the USG, the HN, and NGOs.Effective communication and cooperationenables access to capabilities and resources not

typically under MAGTF control. Synchronizationof efforts leads to synergy with the application ofeach capability adding to the effectiveness of theothers. See appendix F.

Across the full range of military operations, anyMAGTF effort is likely to be an interagencyoperation conducted in support of US nationalinterests referred to as a whole of governmentapproach and could involve NGOs, IGOs, andHN partners. The relationship between militaryand civil authorities must be based on mutualtrust and confidence. Strong and effective com-munication is often the difference between suc-cess and failure. The MAGTF may find itself in asituation where OGAs may be operating parallelto the MAGTF rather than subordinate to it. Ifthis is the case, then the exchange of LNOs to themajor civilian groups from the G-9 or other avail-able staff would gain and maintain situationalawareness and smooth communications.

The MAGTF may also perform the following:

Identify all agencies and organizations that areor should be involved in the operation. Identify the resources of each participant toreduce duplication of effort and increase coher-ence in the collective effort.

Door Door

Door

Door

MeetingRoom

CIM Cell

HN Officials, NGOs, IGOsUSGCMO

Integration

HN Civilian Reception

Reserved forePRT/FACT

MeetingRoom

MeetingRoom

MeetingRoom

MeetingRoom

MeetingRoom

ionn

ePRT embedded provencial reconstruction teamLegend

Figure 4-1. Example of a Regimental Combat Team/Battalion Civil-Military Operations Center.



Determine mutually supportable objectives forthe operation. Define the desired end state and exit criteria. Define the types of information that can andcannot be exchanged. Establish agreed upon formats for data anddevelop means to share useful information. Plan for the transition of responsibilities toagencies with long-term duties and interests. Establish an interagency hierarchy whenpossible. Solicit from each agency, department, or orga-nization a clear understanding of the role thateach plays. Memoranda of agreement may berequired to formalize agreements. Define COAs for both military operations andagency activities. Identify potential obstacles to the collectiveeffort arising from conflicting departmental oragency priorities. Maximize the mission’s assets to support thelong-term goals of the enterprise. Establish interagency assessment teams.

US Government Coordination and the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization

President George W. Bush signed National Secu-rity Presidential Directive 44, Management ofInteragency Efforts Concerning Reconstructionand Stabilization, on 7 December 2005. Thismandated that the Secretary of State lead all USGefforts to plan for and conduct reconstruction andstabilization (R&S) efforts. This was preceded bythe creation of the DOS Office of the Coordina-tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)in July 2004. Pursuant to its mandate, S/CRS pub-lished the Interagency Management System forReconstruction and Stabilization in March 2007to provide the USG with an integrated, wholegovernment approach to R&S efforts. The CMOand the missions they support are complex andmay require the effective coordination of manyUSG agencies. Detailed coordination developsand maintains a common framework for planningand an understanding of common purpose. Manyagencies have unique skills, resources, and expe-rience. Cooperation and coordination based onrespect and moral purpose can unify the effort. To

Note:Civilian refers to HN, NGO,IGO, or interagency partners

CivilianRequest for

SupportCMO

CivilianCapabilityAvailable?

ValidSupport

Request?

Refer Request toAppropriate Civilian

Entity

FRAGO Issued toSupporting UnitDecline Request

MAGTFFuturePlans

FutureOps

CurrentOps

Yes

Yes

No

No

CMO Staff Element

operationsOpsLegend

Figure 4-2. Civilian Support Request Flow.

4-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


facilitate coordination, a clear chain of commandamong USG participants including the MAGTFshould be defined. For a detailed description ofinteragency coordination, see appendix E.

The Interagency Management System for R&Sprovides coordinated, interagency policy and pro-gram management for highly complex crises andoperations that—

Are national security priorities. Involve widespread instability. May require military operations. Will engage multiple US agencies in the policyand programmatic response.

The Interagency Management System for R&Smay also be used in engagements that do not re-quire military participation. It is not intended torespond to the political and humanitarian crisesthat are regularly and effectively handled byexisting government systems. It will assist chiefsof missions (COMs) at embassies, policy makersin Washington, DC, and military commanderswith managing complex R&S efforts at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Interagency Management System for R&Sconsists of the Country Reconstruction and Stabi-lization Group (CRSG), integration planning cell,and the ACTs, which may be augmented byFACTs if necessary.

The CRSG consists of a Washington-based inter-agency decision-making body, supported by afull-time interagency secretariat, that performsplanning and operations functions and mobilizesresources. The DOS regional assistant secretary,S/CRS coordinator, and the National SecurityCouncil (NSC) director co-chair the CRSG.

The integration planning cell consists of inter-agency planners and regional experts that deployto the relevant combatant command or to a multi-national HQ. Its role is to assist in harmonizingongoing planning and operations between militaryand civilian agencies and/or the USG and multina-tional HQ. Its members will be representative ofall relevant USG agencies, to include DOD.

To supplement an existing USG presence or toestablish a new presence, the CRSG may recom-mend, with the COM’s concurrence, that the Sec-retary of State deploy an ACT. The ACTprovides a skills-specific team with surge capac-ity that supports the ambassador in the develop-ment, execution, and monitoring of R&S plansfor a specific contingency. It provides inter-agency field management, deployment, and logis-tical capabilities and may develop and implementactivities through regional field teams as neces-sary. The ACT can operate with or without USmilitary involvement, but in cases where the mili-tary is involved, it can integrate with the jointtask force (JTF) and embassy operations. In allcircumstances, the COM bears ultimate responsi-bility for the execution of the R&S plan.

A FACT, responsible to the COM through theACT, coordinates USG efforts in an affecteddistrict. Similar in principle to PRTs in Opera-tions Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, it willbe comprised of civilians and the military, plussupport staff, and may be integrated with military(US or non-US) units as directed by the COM andJTF commander. With the ability to work inuncertain or hostile environments, it may adviseMAGTF personnel on political/civil factors in anAO. If acting as an “embassy forward,” ortemporarily fulfilling the functions of a USembassy, it may also assist American citizens,perform PA officer functions, perform nego-tiations and support local governance, andfunction as the ACT’s assessment tool to deter-mine when and how to implement USG R&Splans. Figure 4-3 is an example of how theInteragency Management System for R&S maywork in a contingency operation.

US Government Interagency Partners

Many agencies and organizations in the USG arestructured and equipped to apply resources to re-solve crisis, including diplomatic, economic, andinformational. Careful communication andcoordination are required to ensure mutual support



between the MAGTF and these agencies. Ex-amples of common partners are as follows:

USAID. DOS – S/CRS. Department of Justice. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assis-tance (OFDA) in a humanitarian crisis. Department of Agriculture.

Whenever participation by other US Governmentagencies in an operation is expected, MAGTFplanners may write annex V, as part of theoperations order. Formats for annex V can befound in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffManual (CJCSM) 3122.030C, Joint OperationsPlanning and Execution Systems (JOPES), Vol. II(Planning Formats).

Nongovernmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations

The NGOs and IGOs are likely to be alreadyworking wherever the MAGTF operates. Wherelong-term problems precede a deepening crisis,

NGOs and IGOs are frequently on the scene longbefore US forces arrive. They are often willing tooperate in high-risk areas and will likely remainafter military forces have departed. Generally,these organizations are guided by three princi-ples: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. TheNGOs and IGOs are flexible, focused, andinvolved in many diverse activities such as educa-tion, public health, technical projects, relief activi-ties, refugee assistance, public policy, anddevelopment programs. They often refer to theirefforts in a crisis as a response. The military refersto them as an operation. The MAGTF may not beable to share information, especially about futureplans or operations. However, cooperation thatidentifies common objectives and establishes aclear understanding of what information can andcannot be shared is beneficial to all parties.

These relief organizations may have substantialresources and can respond quickly and effectivelyto crises. They can assist in limiting the resourcesthat a commander would otherwise have todevote to an operation. Their extensive and long-term involvement, local contacts, and experiencein various nations also make these organizations

NSC

IPC

CRSG

CCDR

ACT

Area ofOperations

EmbassyCJTF

Washington, DC

FACTCorpsFACTMEF FACTMN-D

combatant commanderintegration planning cellmultinational division

CCDRIPCMN-D

command authoritycoordinating authority

Legend

Figure 4-3. Notional Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization in a Contingency Operation.

4-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


valuable sources of information about local andregional governments and civilian attitudestoward the operation. The large number of livesthey affect and the resources they provide makethem key centers for communication and coordi-nation. The relief organizations must be factoredinto the CMO assessment of conditions andresources and integrated into the MAGTF con-cept of operations.

The NGOs are voluntary organizations that writetheir own charter and missions and are legallydifferent from governmental and internationalagencies. Private donors, IGOs, and governmentsfund them. While not answerable to profit-making institutions, they are accountable to theirvarious donors for their resources. The NGOsvary from long-standing organizations withsubstantial staffs and budgets, to charitiesoperated by local community organizations orindividuals. Properly conducted, the relationshipbetween military forces and NGOs is neithersupported nor supporting, but rather an associateor partnership relationship.

Inherent differences between the cultures andorganization of military forces and NGOs presentchallenges to successful cooperation. To protecttheir freedom to operate, NGOs are likely to behesitant to identify too closely with the MAGTF.Collaboration or perceived collaboration withmilitary forces may endanger both the missionsof NGOs and the lives of their field staff, espe-cially when a particular response or operation hasstrong political or military implications. Theseorganizations often operate without detailed plan-ning, a by-product of their small staffs; however,they can also reorient their efforts and assets withgreat agility.

Common examples of NGOs are as follows:

International Medical Corps. CARE (an organization that provides humani-tarian assistance to fight poverty). Amnesty International. Doctors Without Borders.

The IGOs generally refer to international govern-mental organizations or organizations with a uni-versal membership of sovereign states; the mostnotable IGO is the UN. They are subject to inter-national law and are capable of entering intoagreements amongst themselves or with othermember states. When there is a UN presence in acountry affected by a humanitarian disaster, theUnited Nation Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will facilitatecivilian-military coordination before, during, andafter the crisis. While IGOs conduct operationsvery much like NGOs, their support may bedetailed to a designated civilian agency. Commonagencies found in areas where the MAGTF mayoperate include the following:

United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-gees (UNHCR). UN Children’s Fund. World Food Programme. World Health Organization. UN Development Programme. World Bank. International Committee of the Red Cross. International Monetary Fund. International Organization for Migration.

Facilitation of Effort

The MAGTF CMO is more effective when facili-tating the efforts of other organizations, such as arequirement to feed a group of DCs. It is notlikely that the MAGTF will directly feed the peo-ple themselves, but they would facilitate logisti-cal support for other agencies to ensure that thefood arrives at the appropriate place. TheMAGTF may also provide security for the foodconvoy or for other nearby organizations in adestabilized environment. By coordinating theiractivities, and by providing enabling capabilitiessuch as security, communications, and air or sea-port access, the MAGTF and other USG agen-cies accomplish the mission without unnecessaryuse of military resources. By developing and



advertising simple procedures and POCs, theMAGTF enables other agencies, many with sub-stantial resources, to meet requirements with min-imum use of MAGTF resources. Wheneverpossible, CMO seek synergy—the combinationof efforts and resources, which has a combinedeffect greater than those same resources if left towork in isolation.

Information Component

At the ground level, the actions between theMAGTF and civilian organizations put deeds intowords, providing positive, tangible examples ofUS intentions. Conversely, an adversary can por-tray MAGTF interactions with civilians in a neg-ative light. The information component of CMOmust not merely be anticipated, it must be aggres-sively exploited. It will help win public support,solidify coalitions, support diplomacy, and isolatethe enemy. Popular support contributes to thesuccess of CMO. The importance of coordinat-ing CMO with PA and IO cannot be overstressed.Information released through any one of thesechannels potentially affects all audiences; there-fore, good CIM practices are essential.

Civil Support Operations

Military operations inside the United States and itsterritories are limited by United States Code, Title18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and militaryregulations. However, military assistance may berequested when situations require resources be-yond civil capabilities. Guidance and direction forthe command and control of these operations varydepending on the mission and support to be pro-vided, but generally follow a similar pattern. TheFederal Response Plan outlines how federal agen-cies, including the DOD, assist state and localagencies that request assistance when a major dis-aster or emergency overwhelms their ability torespond effectively. Additional DOD directives,memoranda of understanding, and agreementsprovide details for military response for particularmissions such as DOD Directive 3025.1, MilitarySupport to Civil Authorities; Marine Corps Order

3440.7A, Marine Corps Support to Civil Authori-ties; and JP 3-28.

Depending on the type of emergency, a civilcommand and control focal point for federalresponse will be established. The Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA) has pri-mary responsibility for coordinating federalemergency preparedness, planning, management,and disaster assistance functions. Acting for thePresident, FEMA will appoint a federal coordi-nating officer who is responsible for coordinat-ing federal disaster assistance to states andterritories. Plans for other emergencies designatea distinct lead federal agency, (for example, theattorney general is responsible for the manage-ment of the federal response to civil distur-bance). Once a federal manager is selected, hemay request military resources from the DOD.

The Secretary of Defense retains approval author-ity for military involvement in civil support oper-ations. Typically, a military official will bespecifically designated as the defense coordinat-ing officer to orchestrate DOD support on scene.Upon assignment, military forces will usually beformed into a JTF. This JTF is typically placed insupport of the federal coordinating officer or thelead federal agency.

MAGTF Coordination in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The time available to plan for a real-time emer-gency is short, particularly in the case of disastersrequiring an FHA response from a MEU. In amatter of days, the supported geographiccombatant commander, joint force commanders,and MEU planners must develop and approve afeasible COA that ensures sufficient support, sus-tainment, and redeployment of US military forcesresponding to a disaster.

Relief planners in the affected HN and varioushumanitarian agencies that work within thatcountry will immediately conduct a needs

4-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


assessment. Outstanding needs and requirementsthat cannot be met internally are then convertedto appeals to the international community. TheUS military may then receive a request forassistance to provide immediate lifesavingsupplies, transportation, or security.

Lessons Learned

Lessons learned during previous FHA operationscan provide valuable insight for commanders andstaffs preparing for a similar operation. The fol-lowing factors include some of the key lessonsfrom FHA operations and highlight areas thatFHA forces have found to be extremely important:

Is the mission stated in terms of workingtowards restoration to pre-emergency status? Is mission success stated in terms not strictlydefined by US or western standards? Is the situation at end state sustainable by theaffected country and organizations remainingin the operational area?What is the legal authority for the operation?Do plans include SJA personnel and assets?What is the legal and fiscal authority to con-duct civil action projects?Is there a status-of-forces agreement in effect?If not, should a status-of-forces agreement orsome other type of international agreement benegotiated or implemented?What coordination and collaboration isrequired with the supported combatant com-mander, supporting combatant commanders,subordinate joint force commands, COM andcountry team, multinational partners, NGOs,IGOs, and OGAs?What are the command, coordination, and col-laboration relationships?Have civilian agencies involved in the opera-tion been encouraged to contribute their valu-able expertise and assistance?Have US forces recognized these agencies fortheir efforts in this regard?

What restrictions exist regarding the sharing ofinformation (sensitive or otherwise) with otheragencies and organizations?What are the liaison requirements?Are LNOs positioned in both higher and subor-dinate HQs as well as OGAs, medical facili-ties, NGOs, and IGOs, as required?Is seaport and aerial port infrastructure, toinclude road and rail access to the ports, inplace before forces begin to arrive? Has United States Transportation Commandbeen consulted as to transportation feasibility?Has the use of ports been deconflicted withHN, NGOs, and IGOs?Are interpreters available for the JTF, geo-graphic combatant commander, and other USagencies? Is adequate communications equipment avail-able for essential basic services?Is additional equipment or connectivity recon-figuration needed to provide direct communi-cations routing to principal destinations?What is the communications plan for commu-nicating with NGOs, IGOs, and multinationalforces? Do these entities require equipmentaugmentation?Are briefing formats appropriate for use inCMO? Do they emphasize conditions, activi-ties, and population support requirements? Areother participants in the FHA effort (inter-agency, NGOs, and IGOs) included in thebriefings?What are the information gathering and dis-semination requirements? Has MISO beenbrought into the planning process?During the planning process, has the joint forcesurgeon identified the CCIR, PIRs, and namedareas of interest pertaining to the health threatin the operational area and submitted require-ments to the supporting intelligence element?Have supplemental measures to the standingrules of engagement (ROE) been identified,approved, and published prior to deployment?Do multinational forces understand the ROE?Are they using the same or compatible ROE?



Are planned actions within the budgetary limi-tations of the operation?Has a finance officer been identified anddeployed early in the operation?Have Service-contracting teams been identifiedand deployed early in the operation?What logistic requirements are needed to sup-port the operation, and what mechanism is inplace to continually monitor logistic resourcesto ensure that urgent needs are met?Has a PA officer and necessary staff been iden-tified and deployed early in the operation?Has PA guidance been developed and passedto all members of the joint force?Has a joint information bureau been estab-lished to support the media?What means are available to provide informa-tion to the affected population about FHAoperations?

The Operational Environment

Before responding to a request for FHA, MAGTFplanners, working closely with their CMOplanner, must understand their operationalenvironment. Important elements of the opera-tional environment to consider when executing anFHA mission include the type of disasterinvolved, underlying causes, the security environ-ment, and the system of international reliefalready at work in the affected nation. There arethree categories of disasters: slow onset, rapidonset, and complex onset.

Slow onset. These emergencies are character-ized by the gradual decay of order over rela-tively long periods of time. They might becaused by events such as crop failure due todrought, the spread of agricultural diseases, ora deteriorating political situation that leads toconflict.Rapid onset. These emergencies are the usuallythe result from a sudden natural event such as awindstorm, hurricane, typhoon, flood, tsu-nami, wild fires, landslides, avalanches, earth-quakes, and volcanic eruptions. They may also

be caused by accidental or human-causedcatastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of ter-rorism, sabotage, or industrial accidents.Complex onset. The UN defines a complexemergency as a humanitarian crisis in a country,region or society where there is a total or con-siderable breakdown of authority resulting frominternal or external conflict and which requiresan international response that goes beyond themandate or capacity of any single agency and/orthe ongoing UN country program.

The USAID defines a complex emergency as anatural or manmade disaster with economic,social, and political dimensions. It is a profoundsocial crisis in which a large number of peopledie and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and dis-placement owing to manmade or natural disas-ters, while others may benefit from it. Fourfactors can be measured: the fatalities from vio-lence, the mortality of children less than 5 yearsof age, the percentage of underweight childrenunder 5, and the number of external refugees andinternally displaced persons. Common character-istics include the following:

Many civilian casualties and populationsbesieged or displaced.Serious political- or conflict-related impedi-ments to delivery of assistance.Inability of people to pursue normal social,political, or economic activities.High security risks for relief workers.International and cross-border operationsaffected by political differences.

Operational environment can be characterized bythe degree of control HN entities have to supportand assist in the operation. Forces conductingFHA will find one of the following environments:permissive, uncertain, or hostile. Regardless ofthe operational environment, force protection willremain the MAGTF’s paramount concern.

Permissive. The HN military and law enforce-ment agencies have control as well as the

4-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


intent and capability to assist FHA operations.This is most likely to be found in more devel-oped countries following rapid onset disasters.Uncertain. The HN government, whetheropposed or receptive to FHA operations, doesnot have very effective control of the territoryand population in the intended AO. This ismost likely to be found in less developed coun-tries that have lost government control of anarea following a disaster or in areas that tradi-tionally harbor insurgents or terrorist elementsthat may oppose US presence regardless of thehumanitarian mission.Hostile. Hostile forces have control as well asthe intent and capability to effectively opposeor react to the FHA operations a unit intends toconduct with violence or banditry. This envi-ronment is mostly likely to be found duringcomplex disasters or following a completebreakdown of infrastructure, which canseverely impair the mission.

The Relief System

An assessment of the situation should include adescription of the relief organizations such asNGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institu-tions, foreign governments and military forces,UN agencies, or any other pertinent elementinvolved in the FHA effort. Descriptions shouldinclude the relationships among the various agen-cies and their effectiveness. United States Agencyfor International Development will be critical inidentifying key players in multiple organizations.The range of civilian actors in a response is mostlydetermined by the permissiveness of the environ-ment. For example, the International Federation ofthe Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies typi-cally work in permissive environments; e.g., a nat-ural disaster, while the International Committee ofthe Red Cross works in uncertain or hostile envi-ronments. Sources of information on the relief sit-uation and organizations are as follows:

US country team assessments. Combatant commander country books.

Recent situation reports (SITREPS) from theOffice of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). UN secretariat assessments.

The Military Role

The USG participated in the development of theUN-sponsored Oslo Guidelines, which is a basicframework for formalizing and improving theeffectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreignmilitary and civil defense assets in internationalDR operations. While the USG endorses theiruse, the Oslo Guidelines are not binding, but dooutline the process for making military or civil-military requests through UNOCHA. Partnerssuch as NATO may be requested to assist in DRin accordance with the Oslo Guidelines as well.

The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign mili-tary assets should be requested only as a lastresort—when the use of military assets can meeta critical humanitarian need. The military asset,therefore, must be unique in capability and avail-ability and be used to fill a specific humanitarianneed as requested by the HN. The military candeliver three categories of assistance:

Direct assistance. The face-to-face distribu-tion of goods and services. Indirect assistance. At least one-step removedfrom the population; involves such activities astransporting relief goods or personnel. Infrastructure support. Providing general ser-vices such as road repair, airspace manage-ment, and power generation that facilitatesrelief, but may not be necessarily visible to orsolely for the affected population.

To accomplish whatever type of assistance theMAGTF may give, the commander must developan FHA mission statement. As with any othermission statement, it must provide specificdirection for achieving the desired end state via aclear and sustainable objective. The followingsample mission statement was used by UnitedStates Pacific Command, Operation UnifiedAssistance (2004–2005).



“United States Pacific Command provides assis-tance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka,Thailand, and other affected nations to mitigate theeffects of the recent earthquake and tsunami in theIndian Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support ofthe USG lead agency, and in coordination with in-ternational organizations, NGOs, and partner na-tions.”

There are a variety of responding organizationsthat require careful and continuous liaison inorder to avoid duplication of effort and to ensurethat MAGTF can quickly transition its supportactivities to civilian agencies.

The Humanitarian Community

By nature, responses to humanitarian emergen-cies are difficult to manage, with coordination ofNGOS, IGOs, and other actors creating a daunt-ing challenge. The UN is the primary providerand coordinator of HA around the world. By fol-lowing the principles of HA (neutrality, impar-tiality, and humanity), the UN seeks to advocateon behalf of disaster-struck people to the assis-tance community worldwide, and its majorresponse agencies and a brief description of theircapabilities follow.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsThe mission of UNOCHA is to mobilize andcoordinate effective and principled humanitarianaction in partnership with national and interna-tional actors to alleviate human suffering in disas-ters and emergencies, advocate for the rights ofpeople in need, promote preparedness and pre-vention, and facilitate sustainable solutions. Itscivil military coordination section ensures theeffective use of military and civil defense assetsin DR and HA operations.

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team As part of UNOCHA, this standby team of disas-ter management professionals deploys rapidly to

carry out an assessment of a disaster-strickencountry to support national authorities and theUN resident coordinator and to coordinate inter-national relief on-site. Frequently, the UN disas-ter assessment and coordination will establish anon-site operations coordination center that pro-vides a platform for coordination among thedisaster response parties. A virtual on-site opera-tions coordination center, maintained in Geneva,but available through the Internet, monitors HAefforts worldwide.

United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesThe UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinateinternational action to protect refugees andresolve refugee problems worldwide.

World Food ProgrammeThe primary task of the World Food Programmeis to furnish food in support of economic andsocial development projects in developingcountries, but it also provides substantial re-sources in emergencies on behalf of donorgovernments, UNOCHA, or the affected coun-tries. Because of its substantial resources, it can beregarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN indisaster situations.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent MovementThe movement is made up of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-eties, and the 185 individual national Red Crossand Red Crescent societies.

The mission of The International Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement is to—

Prevent and alleviate human suffering wher-ever it may be found. Protect life and health and ensure respect forthe human being in times of armed conflict andother emergencies.

4-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Work for the prevention of disease and for thepromotion of health and social welfare. Encourage voluntary service and a constantreadiness to give help by the members of themovement. Provide a universal sense of solidarity towardall those in need of its protection and assis-tance.

In addition to the humanitarian principles ofhumanity, impartiality, and neutrality, the move-ment adds independence (critical for its access toenemy prisoners of war), voluntary service, unity,and universality. The International Federation ofRed Cross and Red Cresent Societies has its ownemergency response teams that assess and coor-dinate international appeals to aid the affectedpopulation in a disaster.

The International Committee of the Red Crosshas the exclusively humanitarian mission of pro-tecting the lives and dignity of victims of war andinternal violence, specifically by visits to prison-ers of war, search for missing persons, transmis-sion of messages between family members,provision of basic health services, and meetingother urgent humanitarian needs.

The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies During wartime, national societies assist theaffected civilian population and support militarymedical services where appropriate. The NationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Societies acts as anauxiliary to the public authorities in their owncountries, offering services such as DR, health,and social programs. The International Federationof the Red Cross and Red Crescent serves as aspokesman for the individual national societies,provides them capacity-building mechanisms,and coordinates humanitarian aid globally in per-missive environments.

The International Organization for MigrationIn FHA scenarios, the International Organizationfor Migration assists in the search for practical

solutions to migration problems and provides HAto migrants in need, to include refugees, dis-placed persons, or other uprooted people. TheInternational Organization for Migration is theprinciple IGO in the field of migration.

The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) The Amer i can Counc i l fo r Vo lun ta ryInternational Action (InterAction) is the largestcoalition of US-based international NGOs focusedon the world’s poorest and most vulnerable pop-ulations. It exercises leadership in conflictprevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes,and peace building initiatives in post-conflictsituations. Additionally, through its more than165 members posted in every developing nation,The American Council for Voluntary Inter-national Action (InterAction) responds to naturaldisasters worldwide.

United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

The USAID’s OFDA is the USG’s lead federalagency for international HA and DR. Its missionis to save lives, alleviate human suffering, andreduce the economic and social impact of disas-ters. With approximately 250 personnel world-wide, they respond to an average of 70 disastersper year using a variety of methods. If the situa-tion warrants, they will deploy a disaster assis-tance response team that will coordinate theassistance mission for OFDA. These teams oftencontain technical experts in water and sanitation,health, shelter, structural engineering, and protec-tion and work through grants with partners suchas the UN, IGOs, and NGOs. Since they willalready be on the ground when the MAGTFarrives, a rapid link-up and exchange of LNOswill enhance cooperation and coordination in anyFHA mission where both the MAGTF and OFDAare operating.



Sphere Project

When planning any sort of humanitarian assis-tance or disasater relief operation, one area thathas proved a challenge is where to obtain accuratedata for determining logistical requirements tofeed, house, clothe, and care for thousands of vic-tims for short or sustained periods. For example,where do you turn when you need information re-garding the amount of water you need, bulk food,or tentage to house thousands of people? One ofthe best and most preferred sources for this infor-mation is the handbook produced by the SphereProject. The Sphere Project was launched in 1997to develop a set of minimum standards in coreareas of humanitarian assistance. The aim of theproject is to improve the quality of assistance pro-vided to people affected by disasters and toenhance the accountability of the humanitariansystem in disaster response. The objective of theSphere Project was to develop a humanitariancharter and associated set of minimum standardsin collaboration with leading NGOs, interesteddonor governments, and UN agencies to both dis-seminate the resultant products widely within theinternational humanitarian system and to encour-age their formal adoption and practice by reliefagencies and their donors.

One of the major results of the project has beenthe publication of the handbook, HumanitarianCharter and Minimum Standards in DisasterResponse. This handbook is designed for use indisaster response. While not a policy document, itis applicable in a range of situations where reliefis required, including natural disasters as well asarmed conflict. The handbook is designed for usein both slow- and rapid-onset situations, in bothrural and urban environments, and in developingand developed countries anywhere in the world.The handbook emphasizes meeting the urgentsurvival needs of people affected by disaster,while asserting their basic human right to lifewith dignity. The information contained in thehandbook is not prescriptive. Minimum standardsand key indicators have been developed usingbroad networks of practitioners in each of the sec-tors. Most of the standards, and the indicators thataccompany them, are not new, but consolidateand adapt existing knowledge and practice.Another source of information is the Field Opera-tions Guide for Disaster Assessments andResponse, more commonly known as the FOGhandbook, produced by USAID. While not asinclusive as the Sphere handbook, the USAIDhandbook follows the standards as laid down bythe Sphere Project and is more user friendly.



APPENDIX ACOMBAT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

The following is a generic, combat SOP for aMEF-sized MAGTF with a G-9 CMO staff oper-ating within the framework of a combined jointtask force (CJTF) conducting stability operationsin a friendly country recovering from the after-effects of a protracted insurgency.

Functions

The MEF G-9, when established, directs andcoordinates CMO within the MAGTF as well aswith the CJTF and adjacent units. The MEF G-9includes an executive section, a fiscal or budgetsection, an administrative section, a liaison sec-tion that may include interagency representation,a support section, an operations or plans sectionand an engagement section as depicted in figureA-1. The staff works, in support of the FACT, todevelop and assess local HN civil capacity. Threemajor components of this capacity are local andprovincial level government agencies and actors,the private sector, and civil society organiza-tions. The MEF G-9 works across all six logical

LOOs: governance, economic development, ruleof law, infrastructure, public health and welfare,and public education and information.

G-9 Section Duties and Responsibilities

G-9 Executive Section Provides CMO subject matter expertise andadvice to the CG in support of MEF opera-tions.Ensures that CMO support of the MEF opera-tion or campaign plan is linked to MEF logicalLOOs and achieves the commander’s desiredend states.Develops and recommends for approval theCMO priority of support and effort. Onceapproved by the CG, ensures that MEF CMOis executed in the appropriate priority.Directs CMO programs to achieve maximumeffectiveness given limited manpower, money,and time and prevents duplication of effortwith HN-led initiatives.

G-9Executive

G-9Budget

G-9Admin

LiaisonSection

SupportSection

OperationsPlans

EngagementSection

PlansOperationsIntelligenceCIM

CJTF CJ-9US EmbassyHN MinistriesFACT Augmentation

InfrastructurePublic HealthPublic Education/InformationRule of LawEconomicDevelopment

Figure A-1. Example Marine Expeditionary Force G-9 Staff.

A-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Serves as the deputy for the MEF resource allo-cation and assessment board, which is chairedby the deputy commanding general (DCG).Coordinates actions of the various CMOLNOs.Plans, coordinates, and conducts MAGTF sta-bility operations in its AO.Develops and communicates an understandingof the scope and scale of the CMO challengewithin the MEF AO.Identifies and obtains the resources (SMEs,equipment, funding, and ideas) required toconduct effective CMO.Integrates CMO with the actions of the otherelements of the MAGTF staff and ensuresCMO is fully synchronized with other lethaland nonlethal MAGTF operations.Orchestrates CMO programs across the sixLOOs.Trains, educates, equips, and deploys a func-tional staff section capable of planning andexecuting full spectrum CMO.

G-9 Operations/Plans Section Coordinates MAGTF stability operations withHN officials at the provincial and nationallevel, DOS FACT, CJTF, the US embassy, andNGO/IGO.Coordinates the G-9 staff section’s interactionwith other MEF primary and special staff.Coordinates staff actions and support with theCMO LNOs.Ensures orders from HHQ and this commandare properly drafted, staffed, promulgated andexecuted. Coordinates responses to requests forinformation from HHQ and requests for sup-port from MSCs.Ensures air and ground transportation require-ments are sourced and executed in accordancewith CMO requirements.Ensures daily CMO SITREPs and staff sum-maries and monthly command chronologiesare submitted.

Plans and coordinates routine and specialCMO training as required.Plans and integrates MEF support for and par-ticipation in DOS FACT programs and initia-tives.Coordinates and facilitates CMO planning con-ferences to include identifying conferenceobjectives, logistics, and budget and adminis-trative support.Represents MEF interests and capabilities toFACTs, USAID, and US embassy.Provides a CMO SME as a member of the tar-geting board, G-3 future operations OPTs, andother planning teams and working groups.Provides a central POC for reconciliation andengagement with HHQ, coordinating responsesto requests for information, draft FRAGOs, andcompliance with directives from the CJTF.

G-9 Support SectionEnsures distribution of computer assets withinthe G-9.Coordinates with the MEF G-6 regarding allchanges in requirements and/or computer,printer, or video teleconferencing maintenance.Coordinates data equipment support, migra-tion, and maintenance issues for all G-9 com-puter users. This includes NIPR [Non-SecureInternet Protocol Router], SIPR [SECRETInternet Protocol Router], DSN [DefenseSwitched Network], sVOIP [secure voice overinternet protocol] lines, and video teleconfer-encing capabilities.Publishes defense message system messagesfor country clearance requests required by trav-eling G-9 personnel.Processes all travel vouchers (DD [Depart-ment of Defense] Form 1351-2, TravelVoucher or Subvoucher) for Marines returningfrom temporary additional duty.Coordinates all conference scheduling and spe-cial events and meetings requiring video tele-conferencing support.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Oprations_______________________________________________________ A-3


Provides all general administrative require-ments; including the tracking of awards, let-ters, order writing for temporary additionalduty trips, and other correspondence requiredof G-9 personnel.Coordinates with MEF contracting office forall open purchase supply needs utilizing thewarfighter open purchase request router sys-tem. Ensure that all supply requests are pro-cessed and delivered through the MAGTFdistribution center.Arranges payment for all nontactical vehiclesand armored nontactical vehicles contractsexisting within the G-9 scope of responsibility.Maintains, tracks, and supervises all operationand support section equipment to include theG-9 consolidated memorandum receipts andtheater provided equipment accounts.Manages all bilingual, bicultural advisors/SMEs through the contracting company andensures payments are made for those assignedto the MEF G-9.Coordinates transportation for all flights andground transportation for those assigned to orin support of personnel within the MEF G-9.Coordinates the logistic and administrativerequirements for entry aboard the militaryinstallation of HN civilians, HN governmentofficials, and HN military personnel based onthe requirements of the G-9. This includesmeetings and engagements in support of themission of the personnel assigned to the G-9.Coordinates logistical support for engage-ments aboard military installations to includeconferences, meetings, and engagements.Ensures coordination is maintained for life sup-port needs aboard the base for billeting andworkspace requirements and maintenance.

G-9 Engagement Section Advises the MEF CG and DCG on mattersconcerning HN government and tribal rela-tions.Manages the MEF key leader engagement planfor interactions with governmental, religious,tribal, and other provincial notables.

Provides SMEs on tribal affairs.Tracks status of legislation emanating from theHN council of representatives and provincialcouncil.Provides lead elections planner for militarysupport to HN provincial elections.Assists and advises in the development of pro-vincial economic/health/education/rule of law/infrastructure plans by providing input on gov-ernance-related considerations.Conducts regular engagements with identifiednotables in support of MEF operations and infurtherance of the CG’s engagement priorities.

G-9 Budget SectionConducts weekly resource allocation andworking group meeting to determine if projectsare eligible for CERP funding.Conducts weekly resource allocation andassessment board to present CERP recom-mended projects to the DCG for decision.Promulgates MEF CERP guidance based oncongressional, combatant command, and CJTFpublished guidance.Coordinates daily with RCTs to provide CERPguidance for developing RCT/unit weeklyproject submissions.Drafts CERP waiver letters to CJTF for allprojects greater than $500,000.Provides updated CERP slides for the monthlytrends brief by the third of the followingmonth.Provides updated CERP slides for the weeklyDCG/embassy/HN funding brief by close ofbusiness each Saturday.Provides updated CERP slide for the weeklyoperations/intelligence brief.Provides updated CERP slides for the HNreconstruction management system/programreview board on the first Saturday of eachmonth.Provides updated CERP slides for the G-9CMO command brief as required.Completes CERP quarterly report by the firstday of the following quarter, based on FY.

A-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Completes CERP monthly report by the fif-teenth of the following month.Completes CERP quarterly report by 15 April,15 July, 15 October, and 15 January.

G-9 Liaison SectionLNO to CJTF CJ-9:

Ensures CJTF commander’s mission sets andoperational priorities are clearly known andunderstood by the MEF G-9 CMO staff.Ensures MEF G-9 planning considerations areincorporated in the CJTF CJ-9 (CMO) plansand orders. Coordinates with CJTF CJ-9 and US embassyfor the rotation and sustainment of DOSFACTs in the MEF AO. Coordinates with CJTF CJ-9 and task forcebusiness stability operations assessment visitsand monitors progress of state-owned enter-prise redevelopment in the MEF AO. Prepares and briefs CJTF CJ-9 staff daily onMEF economic and governance assessmentsprogress. Maintains continuous engagement with CJTFCJ-9 and CJTF strategic effects board in regardto status of CMO activities in the MEF AO. Coordinates with UN assistance mission tofacilitate UNHCR visits to refugee camps inthe MEF AO and monitors UNHCR plans forrelocation of refugees. Facilitates and assists US embassy planning forthe resettlement of refugees.Participates in infrastructure security workinggroup, internally displaced persons workinggroup, reconciliation and engagement cell,energy fusion cell, and elections workinggroup. Facilitates HN transportation network initia-tives and participated in transportation networkOPT. Engages HN transition assistance office inregards to electricity, oil, and rail. Enhancesworking relationship with USG agencies andinteragency.

Reviews and comments on CJTF CJ-9 draftplans and FRAGOs.Coordinates with the CJTF combined futureoperations staff section (C-35) nonlethal tar-geting working group and the CJTF actiongroup on development of HN key leaderengagements.

LNO to the HN governor:

Maintains close and continuous liaison withCJTF, the MEF’s operational HQ; a US Armybrigade combat team (BCT) (tactical control[TACON] to the MEF); DOS officials; and HNgovernmental officials at the district, provin-cial, and central government levels. Provides mentorship and advice to HN provin-cial governor. Coordinates appointments with HN govern-ment officials, local leaders, and dignitaries. Is responsible for and coordinates congres-sional delegations who wish to visit the provin-cial governor.Provides information to the MAGTF CG andDCG on provincial affairs from the governor. Is responsible for the personal security for theprovincial governor.

LNO to the US Embassy:

Coordinates and attends meetings betweenMAGTF personnel and embassy, CJTF, andHN officials and is the primary POC for allMAGTF personnel visiting the HN capital city. Develops working relationships with the fol-lowing:

US embassy sections. Political. Military. Economics. Rule of law coordinator. US Department of Justice attaché. US Department of Treasury attaché. US Department of Agriculture attaché. Office of legislative affairs. CJTF CJ-3 operations.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Oprations_______________________________________________________ A-5


CJTF CJ-5 plans and assessments. CJTF CJ-9 strategic effects. CJTF SJA. HN deputy prime minister. HN national security advisor. HN minister of planning. HN minister of finance. HN minister of industry and minerals. HN minister for women’s affairs.

Arranges logistic support for MAGTF keyleader engagement, to include the following:

Hotel, transportation, engagement sites, air-port assistance, and visas. Processing of country clearances (7 days re-quested).

Coordinates border issues for MAGTF withUS embassy:

Retrograde of MAGTF equipment to port ofentry. Inbound MAGTF fuel, and food supplies.

Facilitates information flow: Between the MAGTF contracting office andHN businessmen in order to understand pro-cess and maintain transparency by the coali-tion forces. Among the DCG, FACT economics andgovernance sections, G-9 engagement sec-tion, and HN expatriate businessmen.

Participates in development of economicforums such as—

International, national, and regional outreachconferences. Business education and professional devel-opment seminars.

Conducts liaison with former HN militaryofficers to facilitate reconciliation and engagewith force strategic engagement cell to arrangemeetings and provide translation support asneeded. Conducts liaison with local tribal key leadersto ensure tribal relationship with the MEF ismaintained. Coordinates US embassy support to bilateraland multilateral exercises as well as distin-guished guest visits. Drafts weekly SITREPs for both MEF DCGand CMO economics section.

Briefs US ambassador on MAGTF activities asrequired. Interacts with security personnel in NavalCriminal Investigative Service, Force Protec-tion and Intelligence Section based on need forsecurity or sharing of information. Develops and maintains database of all busi-ness contacts.

FACT augmentation section FACT operations/plans:

Lead planning teams and working groups withFACT members to develop work plans. Lead joint and interagency planning teams torevise the joint common plan. Integrate FACT section operations. Integration FACT operations with MEF, CJTF,and other agencies as required. Support the quarterly development of the HNeconomic development maturity model. Coordinate the FACT knowledge managementprocess with that of the G-9. Coordinate movement support for the FACTmembers. Coordinate logistic support for the FACTmembers.

Staff judge advocate:

Develop rule of law work plans and assess-ments. Conduct engagements with and mentorship formembers of the provincial judiciary. Coordinate the activities of RCT and FACTrule of law team members.

Public education advisor:

Develop public education work plans andassessments. Conduct engagements with and mentorship forprovincial educators and ministry of educationleaders. Coordinate the activities of RCT and FACTeducation team members.

A-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Advise the CG and MEF staff on all issuesrelated to the local education system to includeprimary, secondary, and university educationand adult literacy and vocational technicaltraining. Research education projects for possible QuickReaction Funds proposals, write project pro-posals and present to the Quick Reaction FundsBoard for approval. Implement project basedon the outcome of the Quick Reaction FundsBoard. Interacts with, as the primary engager, the HNprovincial council education committee. Identify CA education issues and implementCA concepts in a tactical environment. Provide a central POC for HHQ concerningeducational issues, formal requests for informa-tion, FRAGOs, and compliance with directivesfrom CJTF.

Medical planner:

Develop public health work plans and assess-ments. Conduct engagements with and mentorship forprovincial health directorate leaders. Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT publichealth team members.

Public information officer:

Develop public information work plans andassessments. Assist other FACT sections in development ofpublic information plans. Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT publicinformation team members.

Agriculture advisor:

Develop agriculture work plans and assess-ments. Conduct engagements with and mentorship forprovincial agriculture leaders. Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT agri-culture team members.

Daily/Weekly/Monthly Reporting Requirements

Daily CMO reports due to G-9 not later than1800Z. Weekly CMO reports due each Sunday notlater than 2200Z. Monthly CMO reports are duetwo days before the end the month not later than2200Z. For more information, see appendix D.


APPENDIX BMEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

The MOE focus on end state attainment by dem-onstrating the impact that completed actions havehad in shaping the desired adversary behaviors.The MOP focuses on task accomplishment andconfirms or denies that actions have been con-ducted correctly. The following are questions thatare answered by MOE:

Was the right thing done? Are additional or alternate actions required?

There are differences between accomplishing atask and creating an effect that is important. Mea-sures of effectiveness measure changes in systembehavior, capability, or operational environmentthat are tied to measuring the attainment of anend state, achievement of an objective, or cre-ation of an effect, and whether they are conform-ing to the commander’s intent. Measures ofperformance and measures of effectiveness areused collectively to provide an evaluation, identi-fying trends that can affect future operations.When CR is used, through the CIM process, itassists the CMO planner conduct evaluations that

form the basis for a continuing review of theoperation, campaign plan, existing orders, andsupporting activities. The CMO planner will beable to determine if operations should continue asplanned or be adapted to achieve the com-mander’s specified effects. Just as full integra-tion of all actions is essential to building aneffective plan, integration of these actions in theevaluation step is essential to evaluate how pro-grams are progressing toward their objectives.

The primary purpose of evaluation is to identifyprogress of operations toward the achievingobjectives at any point in time, which providesthe basis for plan adjustment. Through the effec-tive use of CR and CIM processes, MOPs andMOEs are used to develop combat assessments.Together, MOPs and MOEs support an overallassessment of objective achievement.

An MOE spreadsheet shown in figure B-1 pro-vides criteria to measure a program or initiative’ssuccess that directly supports the commander’sobjective. Identified in a quantifiable format, the

MOE Spreadsheet

Objective 1: Gain public support for US/coalition military forces and interim Iraqi government

Effect A: General populace supports US/coalition efforts.

Measures

Number of offensive gestures directed at US/coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians.

Number of instances involving anti-US/coalition graffiti.

Measures

Number of civil or religious leaders actively supporting US/coalition initiatives.

Number of civil or religious activities US/coalition representatives are invited to attend.

Number of anti-US/coalition demonstrations.

Number of pure Iraq events US/coalition representatives are invited to attend.

Effect B: Civil leadership at district and local levels supports US/coalition efforts.

10

Oct Nov Dec

12

9

12 11 5

4 3 5

11 8

9

Oct Nov Dec

20 20

8 10 12

25

Baseline

Positive

Neutral

Negative

Legend

Figure B-1. Example of a Measure of Effectiveness Spreadsheet.

B-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


collection of MOE provides trends to determinepositive progress toward a stated objective ordesired effect. The MOE spreadsheet allows theforce to track, by operational area and key terrain,where indicators are occurring to show whetherthe unit is having success or failure with a partic-ular effect.

NOTE: In operations that involve many non-military factors, the US Army uses the term“lines of effort,” that it has found to be atool, similar to LOOs, which allows the plan-ner to link tasks, effects, conditions, and thedesired end state.

The process of determining CMO MOE beginswhen CMO planners develop the civil-militaryLOOs or lines of effort. These LOOs roughly cor-respond with the five technical sectors of theDOS’s S/CRS, which includes security, gover-nance and participation, HA and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure,and justice and reconciliation. The CMO plannerthen determines CMO MOE to evaluate the effec-tiveness of those outcomes:

Appropriate. Measures of effectiveness shouldcorrelate to the audience objectives. If theobjective is to present information to those out-side the command, MOE should be general andfew in number. If the objective is to assist on-scene commanders, then the MOE should bemore specific and detailed. Mission-related. Measures of effectivenessmust correlate to the mission. If the mission is

relief, MOEs should help the commander eval-uate improvements in living standards, mortal-ity rates, and other related areas. If the missionexpands, so should the MOE. Planners shouldtailor the MOE to address strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels. Measurable. Quantitative MOEs reflect realitymore accurately than qualitative or subjectiveMOEs, and, hence, are generally the measure ofchoice when the situation permits their use.When using a qualitative or subjective MOE,clear measurement criteria should be estab-lished and disseminated to prevent mismeasure-ment or misinterpretation. Numerically reasonable. Measures of effective-ness should be limited to the minimum requiredto effectively portray the relief environment.Planners should avoid establishing excessiveMOEs because they can become unmanageableor collection efforts outweigh the value. Sensitive. Measures of effectiveness should besensitive to force performance and accuratelyreflect changes related to joint force actions.Extraneous factors should not greatly affect anestablished MOE. Useful. Measures of effectiveness should detectsituation changes quickly enough to enable thecommander to immediately and effectivelyrespond.

For additional information, see MeasuringProgress in Conflict Environments (MPICE).


APPENDIX CDISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK QUICK REFERENCE

The district stability framework (DSF) is a field-level analysis, planning, and programming toolspecifically created to guide and support stabili-zation efforts. The DSF helps users to identifylocal sources of instability (SOIs) and design pro-grams and activities to address them. It reflectsstability operations, COIN, and internationaldevelopment best practices by emphasizing thelocal population’s perspectives and developmentprinciples and measuring impact, not just output.

The DSF process has four basic steps, shown infigure C-1. To maximize effectiveness, all rele-vant actors and organizations in the area shouldideally be involved in the entire process, partici-pating in an inclusive stability working group.

Situational Awareness

The DSF uses four lenses to achieve a popula-tion-centric and stability-oriented understandingof the local environment: operating environment,cultural environment, local perceptions, andinstability/stability dynamics.

Operating EnvironmentThe operating environment refers to the physicalor tangible characteristics of the local area. TheDSF uses PMESII [political, military, economic,social, information, and infrastructure] andASCOPE (see table C-1) to help identify this in-formation. Significantly, DSF does not simplygenerate a list of facts about the operating envi-ronment, but also the relevance of those factors tothe local population and the practitioners’ stabili-zation mission. For example, don’t just identifythat the local government is dominated by one tri-bal group, but also that this inequity underminesthe legitimacy and support for the governmentamong other tribes.

Cultural EnvironmentThe cultural matrix, shown in table C-2, identifieswho the major cultural groups are, what they careabout and will potentially fight over, and howthey normally regulate society and solve disputes.The cultural matrix also identifies who the tradi-tional authorities are; disruptions to traditional

Monitoringand

EvaluationAnalysis

SituationalAwareness

Design

Figure C-1. District Stability Framework Process.

C-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


mechanisms/authorities; and how enemy, friendly,and other actors take advantage of these factors.

Local PerceptionsTo be effective, stabilization efforts must bebased on a deep understanding of local condi-tions, local grievances, and local norms, rather

than outsider assumptions. This understandingcan be gained through several possible mecha-nisms, including population surveys, focusgroups, key leader engagements, and pollingconducted by external organizations.

One of the most rigorous methods for collectinglocal perceptions is the tactical conflict survey,

Political: Political actors,agendas, governmentcapability and capacity

Military: Capabilities in the AO(equipment, mission, resourceconstraints)

Economic: Trade,development, finance,institutional, capabilities,geography, and regulation

Social: Demographics,migration trends, urbanizationliving standards, literacy/education level, etc.

Infrastructure: Basic facilities,services and installations

Information: Means ofcommunication, media,telecommunications, word ofmouth

E

P

O

C

S

A

Description Factors RelevanceKey elements of the formal, informal,and shadow systems of governmentthat significantly influence the localpopulation

Key elements that could influencethe security situation

Key elements that influence economicactivity in the area

Key elements that describe or couldinfluence traditional social dynamicsin an area

Effects on the physical infrastructure:sewage, water, electricity, educationalfacilities, health, facilities, andtransportation

Key elements that facilitate thetransfer of information to and amongthe local population

Why is a factor relevent tothe local population?

How does it affect stability?











Identify the major culturaland/or tribal groupsin your AO

Identify the things thesegroups care about orconsider to be valuable— both material andintangible

Identify cultural codes,traditions, and values thatthe major cultural groupslive by

Identify the traditional authoritiesto whom the locals respect and/ornormally turn to for assistance

Describe what new actors orconditions may have disrupted thetraditional conflict resolutionmechanisms and/or undermined theinfluence of traditional authorities

Identify how conflictsbetween individuals andgroups have traditionallybeen resolved

2) Their Interests1) Major Cultural Groups 3) Cultural Codes, Traditions, and Values

4) Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

5) Traditional Authorities 6) Disruptions to These Mechanisms/Authorities

7) How Malign Actors/Stabilizing Forces Leverage These Factors

Describe how malign actors leverageand/or exploit these cultural factorsto their advantage

Consider how stabilizing forcesleverage these factors

Table C-1. Operating Environment Matrix.

Table C-2. Cultural Matrix.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations _____________________________________________________ C-3


which is a simple, four-question survey that canbe used by military units on patrol, civilianagency implementing partners, and HN govern-ment and security forces. Each question is fol-lowed up by asking the question “why” to ensurefull understanding of the interviewee’s responseand perspective. The four questions are:

Has the number of people in the villagechanged in the last year? Why?What are the most important problems facingthe village? Why?Who do you believe can solve your problems?Why?What should be done first to help the village?Why?

The responses to this survey can then be aggre-gated and represented graphically, allowing for aquick visual understanding of local perspectives,whether represented as a snapshot in time or aschange over time (see fig. C-2).

Instability/Stability DynamicsFinally, DSF identifies potential instability andstability factors in the local environment. Factors

of instability include grievances of the local pop-ulation (taken from various local perceptions datasources), events that create a window of vulnera-bility in which stability may be undermined, andkey individuals who are fomenting instability. Onthe other side of the equation are factors of stabil-ity such as resiliencies in the society (institutionsand mechanisms that help the society functionpeacefully), events that present a window ofopportunity to enhance stability, and key individ-uals who are helping to enhance stability. Eventsare usually the same in both matrices; whetherthey end up reinforcing stability or instabilitydepends mainly on how they play out (see tableC-3 on page C-4).

Analysis

After gaining situational awareness, DSF pro-vides tools to analyze and identify potentialsources of instability, their causes, the desired ob-jective(s), and the impact indicators that willmeasure progress in addressing each SOI.

The four situational analysis lenses typically resultin a long list of problems, needs, and grievancesthat could be driving instability. A primary

PhysicalSecurity

24%

LandDisputes

22%

Healthcare13%

Education11%

Justice/Conflict

Resolution17%

Corruption(police)

9%

Infrastructure(roads)

4%

What is the most important problemfacing the village?

Sample local perception quotes:

“Taliban justice is swift.”“Nobody is safe here.”“Elders can’t solve our problems anymore.”“Police take our money.”“Judges support those who pay them.”“Government doesn’t help the jirgas.”“Coalition forces endanger us.”“We have no doctor or clinic.”“The government should do more to protect us.”“Police are not competent to solve or prevent crimes.”“We avoid the police; they only help themselves.”“The only Islamic schools are in Pakistan.”

Figure C-2. Example of Tactical Conflict Survey Data.

C-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


purpose of analysis is to narrow this list down to amuch smaller number of issues that are actuallySOIs. To begin narrowing down the list, DSF willgroup together issues that are closely related orlogically connected in a symptom-cause relation-ship. For example, the problems of poor bordercontrol, police corruption, and violent crime mightall be grouped together under the heading of phy-sical insecurity. If physical insecurity is an SOI,the DSF process will break these issues apartagain later to address them in detail. Next, eachproblem or group of related problems is entered inthe SOI analysis matrix, shown in table C-4, andvetted against the three instability criteria. Thesecriteria ask the questions, does this problem—

Decrease support for the government or legiti-mate governance institutions? Support for thegovernment must be based on what locals actu-ally expect of their government—not what out-siders might expect of their own governmentback home. Legitimate governance institutionsrefers to NGOs that help the society regulateitself, such as a tribal council.

Increase support for malign actors? This usu-ally occurs when the malign actors are either:1) directly helping to solve the problem, suchas, providing security to a community that thepolice never visit; or 2) successfully leverag-ing the issue in their propaganda, such as, if wewere in charge we would reform and expandthe police.Undermine the normal functioning of society?The emphasis here must be on local norms. Forexample, if people have never had electricity,the continued lack of electricity can hardly beundermining the normal functioning of society.

The final step on the SOI analysis matrix is toprioritize the identified SOIs using local percep-tions. Practitioners should normally focus first onSOIs that are a priority grievance for the localpopulation. Otherwise, locals may perceive thestabilization efforts as being disconnected fromreality and focusing on problems that don’t reallymatter to them.

What potential or anticipatedfuture situations could create anopening for key actors and theirfollowers to further underminestability?

What potential or anticipatedfuture situations could create anopening for key actors and theirfollowers to further reinforcestability?

Events

Factors of Instability

Factors of Stability

Grievances

Resiliencies Events Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions

Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions

What issues or problems arethe local populace concernedor upset about?Whom do they blamefor these conditions, andhow severe are they?

Which individuals or institutions areleveraging popular grievances andevents to create instability?What means do they possess,what are their motives, and whatactions are they taking?

What processess, relationships,or institutions enable the society tofunction normally and peacefully?Are there any previousresiliencies that have beenor are being undermined?

Which individuals or institutions in thesociety are attempting to preserveand strengthen stability?What means do they possess, whatare their motives, and whatactions are they taking?

Table C-3. Factors Matrices.



After identifying and prioritizing a discrete num-ber of SOIs, practitioners fill out a tactical stabil-ity matrix (TSM) for each one (see table C-5 onpage C-6). The TSM helps further analyze anddesign activities to address each SOI. The TSMconsists of nine colums: the first six columns sup-port the analysis process, while the final threesupport the design phase. The columns in theTSM are filled out by identifying the following:

The targeted SOI.Perceived Causes—how locals perceive thissituation and why they think it exists. Usuallypresented as representative quotes from the lo-cal populace.

Systemic Causes—the root causes of the SOIor the underlying conditions that led to theproblem and allow it to continue.Objective—a succinct statement of the goal orendstate that will address the SOI. Often sim-ply the reverse of the SOI.Impact Indicators (also MOEs)—changes inthe environment that would indicate progresstoward reducing the systemic causes andachieving the objective.Impact Indicator Data Sources—where theinformation to track the impact indicators canbe obtained.

Instability Criteria SOI Prioritization

Is the SOI aprioritygrievance forthe localpopulace?

Does theissue meet 2of the 3instabilitycriteria?

Does this issuedisrupt the normalfunctioning ofsociety? Explain

Does this issueincrease support formalign actors?Explain

Does this issuedecrease support forthe govt/legitgovernance? Explain

PotentialSources ofInstability

Justice/Conflictresolution (includeland disputes)

Barakzaidominategovt

Lack ofhealthcare

Poor roadinfrastructure

Civilian govtcorruption

Insecurity (includepolice andcivcas)

Lack of education(include radicalmullahs)

Yes. Formal andtraditional mechanismsseen as ineffective

Yes. UnderminesNoorzai support,increases resentment

Probably. Provincialgovt healthcare excludes Nawa

No. Governor isactually working to builda new road

No. Corruptioncomplaints directedsolely at police

Yes. civcas, insecurity,police ineffectivenessreflect poorly on govt

No. Despite limitations,people are grateful foreducation improvements

Yes. Taliban increasetheir reputation bysolving disputes

No. Taliban not takingadvantage

No. Taliban does notprovide healthcare

No. Taliban are notbuilding roads

No. No evidence thatTaliban exploits thisissue

No. Taliban are alsoblamed for civcas, notproviding security either

No. Taliban use this topromote radicalmadrassas in Pakistan

Yes. Traditionallysolved by shuras, nowa source of violence

No. Barakzai havedominated for severaldecades

No. Nawa has neverhad healthcare

No. Road network hasalways beenrudimentary at best

No. Locals notconcerned; apparentlywithin normal bounds

Yes. Insecurity andpolice problemsexceed local norms

No. Despite low levels,education has actuallyimproved since 2001

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes (#1)

No

Yes (#3)

No

No

Yes (#2)

Yes (#4)

civilian casualtiesgovernment

civ/casgovt

Legend

Table C-4. SOI Analysis Matrix.

C-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Activities—things you will do to mitigate thesystemic causes and achieve the objective.Taken from activity design worksheet.Output Indicators (also MOPs)—metrics thatindicate progress toward the completion of anactivity. Ask yourself; how can I confirm thatthe activity is progressing or has been com-pleted?Output Indicator Data Sources—where theinformation to track the output indicators canbe obtained.

DESIGN

In the design phase of DSF, practitioners design,prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activi-ties. This process starts by brainstorming poten-tial activities that will address each of the

systemic causes of the SOI. These ideas are thenscreened and refined using the three stability cri-teria, the seven design principles, and resourceavailability. The activity design worksheet helpsto guide this process as depicted in table C-6.

The stability criteria are essentially the mirrorimage of the instability criteria. Any proposed ac-tivity that does not meet at least two of these cri-teria should be eliminated.

Proposed activities that meet the stability criteriashould then be refined using the seven design prin-ciples. To the extent possible, practitioners shoulddesign or modify each activity so that it will—

Be sustained by the local government or soci-ety.Maximize local involvement to create localownership.

Analysis Design

Source ofInstability

Causes(Perception)

Causes(Systemic) Objective Impact

Indicators

ImpactIndicatorsDataSources

Activities OutputIndicators

OutputIndicatorDataSources

Lack ofgovt/traditionalconflictresolutionmechanism

Fosterconflictresolutionmechanismslinkedto govt

Talibanprovidesswiftjustice

Judgessupportthose whopay themthe most

The elderscan’t solveourproblems

Govtdoesn’thelp thejirgas

Formaljusticesystem isslow,inefficient,hard toaccess

Justiceofficials arenot paid infull/on time

Traditionalconflictresolutionstructuresareundermined

Govt officialsfocused onformaljusticesystem

Increasednumber ofdisputesresolved bygovt-recognizedentities

Decreasednumberof disputesresolved byTaliban

Decreasedviolencelinked tolanddisputes

Increasednumberof landdeedsregistered

Numberof justiceofficialstrained

Payreformsenacted

Mobiledispute unitestimate

Numberof jirgasheld

Numberof jirgaswith govtinvolvment

Numberof IO radiospots

Tacticalconflictsurveys

Govtrecords

Publicsurveys

Patrolreports

Interviews

Assessments

Tacticalconflictsurveys

Govtfinancialrecords

Patrolreports

Radio

Interviews

Assessments

Supporttraining forjusticeofficials

Facilitatejudicial paysystemreform

Establish amobile Govtdisputeresolutionunit

Facilitatejirgas

Link jirgasto govt

IO campaign

governmentgovtLegend

Table C-5. Tactical Stability Matrix.



Minimize the tradeoffs between short-termpositive effects and any potentially negativelong-term impacts; such as, unintended conse-quences.Leverage or support the programs of OGAs,IGOs, NGOs, and the HN government.Be appropriate to the local political and cul-tural context.Strengthen governmental accountability andtransparency.Include the flexibility to adapt if circumstanceschange.

Next, practitioners screen each proposed activityagainst their available resources, time, money,personnel, and appropriate expertise. Those activ-ities, for which the necessary resources exist, areentered into the activities column of the TSM.Practitioners then complete the TSM by identify-ing output indicators and output indicator datasources that will enable them to determinewhether each activity is proceeding as plannedand, ultimately, when it has been completed.

In the final steps of the design process, theselected activities are prioritized and syn-chronized. They should be prioritized based ontheir anticipated impact on the SOI. They shouldalso be synchronized in time and space to buildupon and reinforce other activities and operationsconducted by stability working group members.A synchronization matrix shown in table C-7, onpage C-8, can help stability working groupmembers accomplish this.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The monitoring and evaluation matrix shown intable C-8, on page C-8, is a program managementtool to help track the output and impact of individ-ual activities and takes place during and after theimplementation of stabilization activities. Most ofthe information comes directly from the TSM,with additional columns added to establish a base-line for the impact indicators and to measurechange against this baseline. Monitoring and eval-uation is conducted on three levels: output indica-tors, impact indicators, and overall stability.

Stability Criteria (must meet 2 of 3) Design Priciples Resources Select

BrainstormPossibleActivities

Does theactivityincreasesupport forgovt/legitgovernance?Explain.

Does theactivityincreaseinstitutionaland societalcapacityand capability?Explain.

Does theactivitydecreasesupport formalign actors?Explain.

Is ActivityRealistic?

Tim

e

Expe

rtis

e

Pers

onne

l

Mon

ey

Flex

ibili

ty

Acc

ount

abili

ty/T

rans

pare

ncy

Cul

tura

lly/P

oliti

cally

App

ropr

iate

Leve

rage

Sup

port

From

Oth

er O

rg.

Shor

t Ter

mvs

Lon

g Te

rmR

esul

ts

Loca

l Ow

ners

hip

Sust

aina

bilit

y

Generate a list ofpotential activitiesthat will addressthe systemiccauses andcontribute toachieving theobjective for agiven SOI.

Explain how theactivity willincrease supportfor the govtand/or legitimategovernanceinstitutions.

Explain how theactivity willdecrease supportfor malign actors.

Explain how theactivity willincreaseinstitutional andsocietal capacityand capability.

Do you, oryour partners,have theresources tocomplete theactivity?

If not,eliminatethe proposedactivity.

Based on thestabilitycriteria, designprinciples,and resourceavailability,should theactivity beimplemented?

For each potentialactivity that meets atleast 2 of the 3stability criteria,refine the proposedactivity to make itmeet as many aspossible of the 7design principles.

governmentorganization

govtOrg.

Legend

Table C-6. Activity Design Worksheet.

C-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


SOI #1: List Source of Instability Being Targeted

Timeframe

Operations

Key Events List Specific Events

List Activity #1

List Activity #1

List Activity #3

List Activity #5

List Activity #3

List Activity #4

List Activity #2

List Specific Events List Specific Events List Specific EventsList Specific Events

List Activity #2 List Activity #3 List Activity #4 List Activity #5

ListSystemicCause #1

Example:USAID

Example:DOS

ListActivity #1

ListActivity #1

ListActivity #2

ListActivity #3

ListActivity #4

ListActivity #2

Example:Military

Example:USDA

ListSystemicCause #2

Actor #1

Actor #2

Actor #3

Actor #4

Shaping Ops (list specific) Clearing Ops (list specific) Building Ops (list specific)Holding Ops(list specific)

January February March April May June

Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk 3 Wk 4

OperationsUnited States Department of Agricultureweek

OpsUSDAwk

Legend

Measure of Performance Measure of Effect

SOI Activity OutputIndicatorData

OutputDataSources

ImpactIndicator Baseline Change

ImpactDataSources

Objective

Taken fromthe TSM

Taken fromthe TSM

Data foroutputindicatorsidentified onthe TSM

Taken fromthe TSM

Taken fromthe TSM

Baselinedata forImpactIndicatoridentified onthe TSM

Change inbaselinedata

Taken fromthe TSM

Taken fromthe TSM

Table C-7. Synchronization Matrix.

Table C-8. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix.



As practitioners track these three levels ofmonitoring and evaluation, they should identifylessons about what worked, what didn’t, and whatcould be done to improve their stabilization effortsas they repeat the DSF process in the future.

Output IndicatorsOutput indicators are monitored during the imple-mentation of an activity, until it is completed. Im-plementation of an activity is tracked by MOP.They answer the question, “Is the activityprogressing?” and, in the long run, “Is the activitycomplete?” Examples might include the number ofmiles of road paved or number of police trained.

Impact IndicatorsThe effect that an activity has achieved ismeasured by MOE. They are generally evalu-ated only after an activity is completed. Exam-ples might be decreased travel time for a roadproject or decreased criminal activity for a po-lice training activity.

Overall StabilityRather than measuring the impact of individualactivities, overall stability takes into account thestabilizing impact of all activities conducted overa longer period of time, as well as the influenceof external factors. It simply asks, “Is stabilityincreasing or decreasing?” The key to measuring

overall stability is establishing good indicatorsand tracking them at repeated intervals, startingas early as possible.

The best overall stability indicators reflect thelocal population’s perceptions of stability, not theperceptions or assumptions held by outsiders.They are based on the question, “What will localpeople do or say differently if they feel the en-vironment is getting more stable?” The followingare examples of suggested indicators of overallstability within Eastern Afghanistan (see fig. C-3on page C-10):

District government recognition: how manylocals take their problems to the district gov-ernment for resolution? (reflects trust and con-fidence).Local-on-local violence: a direct measure ofinsecurity.Bazaar activity: reflects freedom of movementand investor confidence.Host nation security force presence: reflectssecurity force confidence to range farther andmore frequently into insecure areas.Population freedom of movement: reflectssecurity conditions.Local perceptions of their government: directmeasure of public confidence in government’scompetence, transparency, and relevance.Local perceptions of security conditions: directmeasure of perceived safety.

C-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Legend

Freedom of MovementEconomic HealthDistrict Government Recognition Governance Perceptions

Security PerceptionsAVERAGE STABILITY INDEXANSF PresenceAfghan on Afghan Violence

Figure C-3. Example of an Overall Stability Index.

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APPENDIX DSAMPLE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS REPORTS

Normally, each MAGTF will require the CMO staff element to submit a daily, weekly, ormonthly CMO report. This report provides a timely summary of significant CMO in theAO. This report is usually unclassified. Formats vary and are based on the SOP of eachMEF or subordinate element of the MAGTF. Reports may be submitted electronically orin hard copy. Using possible logical LOOs as an organizing construct, the followingreports are examples of CMO reports.

D-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1



Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ____________________________________________________ D-3

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Daily MAGTF G9

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Copy no. ____ of ____ copies ISSUING HEADQUARTERS PLACE OF ISSUE (may be in code) Date-time group

PERIOD COVERED: from DTG to DTG

(U) REFERENCES: List maps (serial number, sheets, edition, scale) or charts

1. (U) Activities of the Last 24 Hours

a. (U) Civil Affairs Situation at End of Period. Location of CA units and major activi-ties of each and any important changes in CA operational zones or areas, principal incidents, and events since last report. Indicated on map or overlay annex whenever possible.

b. (U) Governance. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Civil administration.

(2) (U) Labor.

(3) (U) Civil defense.

c. (U) Economic Stability. Use annexes as necessary and practicable.

(1) (U) Economics and commerce.

(2) (U) Food and agriculture.

(3) (U) Property control.

(4) (U) Civilian supply

(5) (U) Public finance.

d. (U) Infrastructure. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public works and utilities.

(2) (U) Public transportation.

(3) (U) Public communications.

D-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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e. (U) Rule of Law. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Legal.

(2) (U) Public safety.

(3) (U) Courts and detention facilities.

f. (U) Public Health and Welfare. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public health.

(2) (U) Public welfare.

g. (U) Public Education and Information. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public information.

(2) (U) Public education.

h. (U) Other (as needed).

(1) (U) Dislocated civilians.

(2) (U) Arts, monuments, and archives.

(3) (U) Cultural affairs.

i. (U) Miscellaneous. Indicate any special recommendations and requests, such as special CA personnel problems existing or anticipated, requests for additional forces, recommendations for lifting of PRCs and restrictions, recommendations for troop indoctrination, and other matters not properly covered in the paragraphs above.

2. (U) Activities Planned Next 24 to 48 Hours

3. (U) G-9 Comments (as needed)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name Rank and Service Title

Authentication:Annexes:Distribution:


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CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT 1: DAILY SITREP

Period Begins: 051700ZAUG09 Period Ends:061659ZAUG09 POC: Capt. B. US Marine

ATMOSPHERICS:

Kandahar: Nothing significant to report. Baghran: On 5 Aug 09 atmospherics were positive. Lashkar Gah: Nothing significant to report. Garmser: On 6 Aug 09 atmospherics were negative. The local population avoided con-tact with patrols and failed to respond to friendly gestures.

DETACHMENT ACTIONS LAST 24 HOURS:

Det HQ: Nothing significant to report. Kandahar: On 5 Aug 09 CA Team 1 met with project contractors. Baghran: On 6 Aug 09 CA Team 2 attended mayor’s meeting and visited projects forassessment. Lashkar Gah: Nothing significant to report. Garmser: On 6 Aug 09 CA Team 4 attended the education and fuel committee meeting.

NEXT 24 to 72 HOURS:

Det HQ: Det CO and 1stSgt will travel to CMOC in Musa Qala for battlefield circulation.Will remain overnight and return to base on 7 Aug 09. Kandahar: On 7 Aug 09 CA Team 1 will attend city council meeting. Baghran: On 7 and 8 Aug 09, CA Team 2 will hold meetings with key managers of theflour mill in Baghran. On 9 Aug 09, the team with inspect progress on all pendingprojects in the Kajaki area. Lashkar Gah: On 7 Aug 09, CA Team 3 will conduct an inspection of the Boys HighSchool. On 8 Aug, the team will conduct a 24-hour administrative standdown. Garmser: On 7 Aug 09, CA Team 4 will conduct a meeting with the mayor of Garmser.Detachment Commander’s Comments:

Nothing significant to report

D-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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DAILY CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM REPORT

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1. PRECEDENCE: URGENT/PRIORITY/ROUTINE

2. FROM: DTG: LOCATION: PERIOD COVERED (from -- to):

3. TO:

4. INFO:

5. SUBJECT: CMO SITREP #

LINE 1: CA TEAM STATUS (include personnel, equipment status, and current teamlocations):

LINE 2: DC INFORMATION: DC Camp #1:

(a) Number of DCs that arrived at camp last 24 hours.

(b) Where they came from?

(c) Why they left previous location (did they know MISO themes? If “stay put,” whydid they leave?)?

(d) Number of DCs who departed camp last 24 hours.

(e) Reason for departure.

(f) Current camp population.

(g) Population numbers by type.

Age # Males # Females

50 years or more 16 to 49 years 15 years or less

D-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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(h) Status of DC camp administration.

(i) Status of logistical support available.

(j) Critical current/future needs.

LINE 3: STATUS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR ABIL-ITY TO SUPPORT/CONTROL THE LOCAL POPULACE:

GREEN—GO; fully functional. AMBER—Meets most of population needs. RED—Only emergency needs met. BLACK—NO GO; nonfunctional.

(a) Population center and estimated population:

(1) Security: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(2) Health/Medical: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(3) Food/Water: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(4) Shelter: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(5) Utilities/Services: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(b) Population center and estimated population:

(1) Security: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(2) Health/Medical: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(3) Food/Water: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(4) Shelter: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(5) Utilities/Services: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

LINE 4: STATUS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES:

(a) Provided by NGO/IGO.

(b) Provided by US agencies.

(c) Provided by US military.

(d) Assessment of current and future supplies to meet needs.


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LINE 5: STATUS OF HOST NATION/FOREIGN NATION/INDIGENOUS NATIONSUPPORT:

(a) Support currently provided.

(b) Unused capability available for US/allied forces.

(c) Assessment of ability to meet future needs.

LINE 6: FRIENDLY MISO (effectiveness):

(a) Theme 1 (effectiveness/recommendations).

(b) Theme 2 (effectiveness/recommendations).

(c) Theme 3 (effectiveness/recommendations).

LINE 7: NARRATIVE:

(a) Significant actions, events, or incidents.

(1) Point #1.

(2) Point #2.

(3) Point #3.

(b) Summary of significant meetings.

(1) List of attendees (name of officials/organization and title/position).

(2) Location of meeting and time.

(3) Issues (resolved/unresolved).

(4) Future actions, meetings, and recommendations.

(c) Assessment of current CMO (including effectiveness of PRC measures, if any).

(1) Point #1.

(2) Point #2.

(3) Point #3.

LINE 8: FUTURE OPERATIONS: (narrative, include unsourced needs):

6. DISTRIBUTION:

D-10 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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7. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

8. DRAFTER:

9. RELEASER:

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations __________________________________________________ D-11

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PERIODIC/WEEKLY CMO REPORT NO. _____ (Omit nonapplicable paragraphs and subparagraphs)

CLASSIFICATION

1. FROM (issuing unit): DTG: LOCATION: PERIOD COVERED (from -- to):

2. CMO SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD (Location of CA teams/units and major activities of each; any important changes in CA operational zones/areas; major incidents and events, including meetings, since last report; use map or overlay where possible):

3. CMO COLOR CODE ASSESSMENT (see color code legend below):

GREEN—(GRN) GO; fully functional AMBER—(AMB) Meets most of population needs RED—(RED) Only emergency needs met BLACK—(BLK) NO GO; nonfunctional

D-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


4. SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS ON CURRENT CMO STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS (include identification of resources or decisions needed to imple-ment future plans):

5. DRAFTER:

6. RELEASER:

GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS GRN AMB RED BLK REMARKSPublic administration

Legal

Public safetyPublic healthPublic welfarePublic educationLaborPublic financeCivil defense

ECONOMIC FUNCTIONSEconomics and commerceFood and agricultureProperty controlCivilian supply

PUBLIC FACILITIESPublic works and utilitiesPublic transportationPublic communications

SPECIAL FUNCTIONSCivil informationDislocated civiliansArts monuments and cultural affairs

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APPENDIX EEXAMPLES OF ANNEX GS

FOR CONDUCTING STABILITY OPERATIONS

E-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ____________________________________________________ E-3

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Copy no.___ of ___ copies CG, III MEF CAMP ROBERTSON, MINDANAO 26 Sep 09

ANNEX G (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO III MEF OPERATIONS ORDER01-09 (Operation ZAMBOANGA DAWN) (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) (U) Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (b) (U) Department of the Army FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (c) (U) MCRP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (d) (U) DOS Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 29 March 2007 (e) (U) Commander JTF Philippines Joint Campaign Plan (JCAP), 17 Aug 2009 (f) (U) Commander JTF Philippines OPORD Operation Zamboanga Dawn (OZD), 12Sept 2009 (g) (U) Memorandum of Understanding with US Department of State, 21 Aug 2009

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. This annex provides guidance and tasks for planning and executing III MEF CMO in support of III MEF OPORD 01-09.

b. (U) III MEF CMO. III MEF. Conducts CMO that require coordinated actions by all its subordinate elements. The CA forces execute tasks in support of MAGTF CMO at both the tactical and operational level. The following describes the method of employment for III MEF CA forces.

(1) (U) Civil Affairs Planners. The CA planners and SMEs augment the G-9 staff in order to plan, task, and coordinate III CMO efforts in Mindanao.

(2) (U) Civil Affairs Detachments. 1 x CA detachment is attached to each RCT/BCT in order to execute CMO tasks in the commander’s AO. The CA detachment conducts CMO planning; engages key leaders; and initiates, tracks, and reports on CMO projects. Each detachment operates with multiple CA teams that support maneuver battalion CMO tasks/initiatives. The CA teams are staffed and trained to conduct tactical level CMO; provide self-sufficient convoy/fixed-site security; conduct local leader engagement; and assess, initiate, and track projects.

E-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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(3) (U) CA Liaison Officers. Liaison officers work with numerous external organi-zations in order to facilitate CMO in the III MEF AO. Organizations can include, but are not limited to: Joint Task Force-Philippines (JTF-PI) J-9, US DOS, USAID, and the HN. III MEF G-9 coordinates/directs the efforts of the all CA LNOs.

(4) (U) US Army CA Company. JTF-PI will augment III MEF CA forces with an Army general-purpose CA company in order to accomplish CMO tasks. The CA companies deploy with extensive planning capabilities civil affairs planning team-alpha [CAPT-A] that add weight to CA force efforts at the MEF, RCT/BCT and team level.

c. (U) Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

d. (U) Friendly. III MEF remains committed to coordination and cooperation with the various commands, agencies, IGOs/NGOs, and HN ministries operating within Mindanao.

2. (U) Mission. See OPORD.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander’s Intent. See OPORD.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. CMO follow and support III MEF concept of opera-tions. III MEF forces conduct CMO to reinforce the security and transition LOOs by improving the governance, economic, development, and rule of law abilities of the provincial and municipal governments in order to set the conditions for restoration of HN control and foster general stability.

c. (U) Lines of Operations. Based on the memorandum of understanding between JTF-PI and the DOS dated 21 August 2009, III MEF will follow five LOOs to coordi-nate the activities of all military and nonmilitary participants in order to ensure a whole of government approach towards the stabilization within the JTF-PI AO. For further discussion of the LOOs, refer to the OPORD.

(1) (U) Rule of law.

(2) (U) Economic development.

(3) (U) Security.

(4) (U) Infrastructure (including sewage, water, electrification, and trash removal).

(5) (U) Public health.


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d. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) 3d CAG Reinforced (Rein)

(a) (U) Provide support to DOS ACT and FACTs pursuant to memorandum of understanding with DOS.

(b) (U) Provide support to CA organizations that are operational control/TACON to III MEF or operating in the III MEF AO.

(c) (U) Attach one CA detachment to each RCT/BCT.

(2) (U) Commanding Officers, GCEs

(a) (U) Responsible for the security LOO. Provide continuous CMO support to the municipal governments in order to strengthen the security, set the condi-tions for HN control, and foster general stability.

(b) (U) Provide logistical and administrative support to ACT and FACTs pursu-ant to memorandum of understanding with DOS.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Inform III MEF G-9 of significant mission-limiting CMO constraints and deficiencies beyond MSC capability to correct.

(2) (U) RCTs/BCT and G-9 are responsible for appropriate CMO and effects assessments, project nominations, oversight of CMO projects, and project management.

(3) (U) RCT/BCTs, G-9, and III MEF comptroller are responsible for fund-ing certification.

(4) (U) RCT/BCTs and G-9 catalog and report ongoing and planned CMO projects and reconstruction assessment.

(5) (U) RCT/BCTs, G-3, IO staff, and G-9 synchronize III MEF-approved infor-mation operation themes with CMO actions.

(6) (U) The G-9 will collect all Infrastructure Reconstruction Coordinating Board outputs and is responsible for the submission of all CMO-related reports to JTF-PI J-9.

f. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. See OPORD.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

E-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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a. (U) Military Resource Requirements. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

b. (U) Civilian Personnel. See Annex E (Personnel).

c. (U) Civilian Facilities and Supplies. See Annex D.

5. (U) Command and Signal. See Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex J (Command Relationships).

a. (U) Command

(1) (U) III MEF exercises command over all assigned forces in its AO. The HN government maintains authority over its municipal governments in accordance with the Republic of the Philippines Constitution.

(2) (U) The G-9 conducts long-range CMO planning and is responsible for the following:

(a) (U) Proponent for the infrastructure, economic development, public health, and rule of law LOOs to include the prioritization of economic reconstruction and development projects.

(b) (U) Proponent for DOS ACT and FACT programs in the Mindanao Province.

(c) (U) III MEF staff lead for long range CMO planning and policy develop-ment, political-military interactions, and integration of governance, economic development, public health, and rule of law LOOs with MSCs, COM US Embassy Manila, and USAID.

(d) (U) Integrates and facilitates III MEF infrastructure, economic develop-ment, public health, and rule of law LOOs to support activities with US Embassy Manila through operational channels.

(e) (U) Provides support to the ACT/FACTs by—

1 (U) Developing strategies to stimulate sustainable economic growth and generate local employment.

2 (U) Engaging and facilitating IGO/NGO actions and involvement throughout the III MEF AO.


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3 (U) Facilitating MSC resolution of US COM and coalition force issues arising from ACT and FACT deliberations to the JTF-PI J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff through operational channels. In coordination with the III MEF comptroller, develop III MEF CERP policy and alloca-tion guidance to improve reconstruction priorities in the provinces.

b. (U) Signal. MSCs submit CMO reports in accordance with Annex R (Reports).

APPENDICES: (Omitted).

1-Population and Resource Control 2-Dislocated Civilian Operations 3- CMO Resource Management 4- Duty to Care for Dislocated Civilians 5-Humanitarian Assistance Program Effects Coordination 6-Economics Plan

OFFICIAL:

C. A. Marine Colonel, USMC AC/S G-9 Conventional Ops

E-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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Copy no. ____ of ____ copiesHEADQUARTERS COMBINED TASK FORCE-

INDOLAYSIA (CTF-IL) CAMP SMITH, HAWAII1 Feb 2009

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER (001-1) (Operation AUTUMN FORGE) (U) MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING PHASES II AND III OF A JOINT CAMPAIGN (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Planning Order, DTG 200830ZJan 12 (b) USPACOM OPORD, DTG 261805Z Jan 12 (c) Annex P to CTF-IL OPLAN (AUTUMN FORGE) Foreign Nation Support, (Feb 12) (d) Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (e) FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (f) FM 33-1, Psychological Operations (g) FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (h) Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongov-ernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I (i) UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies (Dec 82) (j) USAID Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response (Jun 94) (k) Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Response Hand-book, 2004

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General

(1) (U) References (d) through (g) provide the legal foundation and expected scope of CA activities and CMO.

(2) (U) This annex provides guidance concerning relationships between military forces, civil authorities, US agencies, UN agencies, international volunteer agen-cies, and civilians in the AO.

E-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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(3) (U) The III MEF AO, from the Republic of Northern Indolaysia (RNI) border to the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, is a densely populated tropical region with concentrations of villages and towns in the low-lying areas and the coastline, encompassing approximately 22 million people (2000 Census).

(a) (U) III MEF can expect to encounter significant numbers of DCs as it moves deeper into the southern Malay Peninsula. III MEF resources to sup-port DC operations will be austere. To coordinate the overall CMO effort in the III MEF rear area, III MEF will activate a CMOC.

(b) (U) During phases I through III, due to the success of the theater-wide “stay put” policy for civilians in zone, we expect no more than 5,000 DCs a day in our AO. Any DCs requiring transfer to DC camp facilities will be moved through the III MEF zone to RNI, where they will come under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

(c) (U) As III MEF advances down the peninsula from the north during stage III, parts A and B, it will not encounter any large urban area before it reaches the city-state of Singapore. However, nearly all villages or towns of 5,000 peo-ple or larger are located along major supply routes or avenues of approach.

(d) (U) CTF-IL expects that no more than 20,000 people will become DCs, with an average number of 5,000 appearing each day within theirzone. Included in this number are third country nationals and released Singaporean hostages.

(e) (U) Although I Corps will bear the significant burden of the largest popula-tion center, Kuala Lumpur, III MEF must maintain the ability to handle DCs.

(f) (U) All III MEF personnel must show appropriate respect for the Islamic beliefs of both RNI and Indolaysian citizens and must be sensitive of cultural differences.

(4) (U) Indolaysian Civilian Population

(a) (U) Within the Malay Peninsula, up to 70 percent of the Indolaysian civilian population will be ethnic Malayan Muslims. The remainder will be Javanese, Hindus, ethnic Chinese, third country nationals, and other ethnic groups. We estimate that most of the population to be neutral to the III MEF presence, though there will be pockets in zone that we expect to be hostile towards III MEF forces. Within this population, we expect to encounter several

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations __________________________________________________ E-11

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insurgent groups hostile to III MEF, Indolaysian special purpose forces, Indolaysian village militias, and Indolaysian intelligence agents who will remain behind after their forces have withdrawn.

(b) (U) CMO will initially be met with minimal cooperation from any remain-ing Indolaysian government officials. In addition, the effects of long-lasting sanctions, eroded public services, a limited food supply, and fear will affect Indolaysian civilian attitudes toward III MEF forces. III MEF forward ele-ments may encounter visible signs of suffering, hunger, and disease. Collateral damage will be exploited by Indolaysia to gain international sympathy. Dam-age to Islamic shrines, other protected targets, and civilian casualties could turn civilian population against III MEF forces. Indolaysia could possibly delay evacuations of populated areas in the immediate path of our advancing forces until the last moment to cause DC traffic to spill onto main supply routes in the path of III MEF forward elements.

(c) (U) Expect some civilians to attempt to interfere with friendly operations with and without malicious intent. Civilian actions that hamper friendly forces could possibly be aided or encouraged by Indolaysia military, special forces, or local militias.

(d) (U) We expect that many DCs will be either wounded or injured. Units should expect significant portions of the population to be undernourished with the elderly and infants in the worst condition. Significant public health prob-lems relating to water supply, medical care, pollution, and public sanitation also afflict the populace. III MEF may also experience a flow of DCs out of the west from the Army forces zone in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur. Many Indolaysian government officials will flee advancing US forces, leading to breakdown of some public services (see annex B of OPORD for enemy forces).

b. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) See annex B.

(2) (U) We expect that some Indolaysian military forces will attempt to disguise themselves as civilians, either as DC or as members of the local populace in urban areas in order to blend in to avoid capture or to form the basis of insurgent groups loyal to the government.

(a) (U) Indolaysian military forces may use civilians as human shields and hide amongst civilians in order to approach III MEF forces and carry out attacks.

E-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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(b) (U) The enemy may integrate DCs into their scheme of defense by inter-jecting them onto high-speed avenues of approach to blunt friendly attacks and disrupt logistic efforts.

(c) (U) They may conduct operations such as laying improvised explosive devices on main supply routes and alternate supply routes, gathering and reporting intelligence, etc.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) CTF-IL Commanders CMO Guidance.

(a) (U) CTF-IL, through Commander, 351st Civil Affairs Command, will serve as the theater executive agent for CA in the joint operations area. Initially, the hosting foreign nation RNI will operate and secure DC camps. Elements of the RNI marine brigade will be available to secure DC camps in the CTF-IL rear area and perform static guard duties. There will be no movement of HN sup-port beyond RNI border without coordination through C-9.

(b) (U) Foreign Nation Support (FNS). CTF-IL has concluded a number of FNS agreements with RNI representatives that include transportation, fuel, water, engineer, security, medical, and military police support. These assets will be available upon request. Units that require FNS will contact III MEF CA officer, who coordinates its release with CTF-IL C-9 rear through 377th The-ater Support Command. A list of apportioned FNS assets that can be released by CTF-IL.

(2) (U) Senior operational commander’s structure guiding CMO.

(3) (U) Other US Government agency battlespace plans and activities (See annex V).

d. (U) Assumptions. See annex B.

2. (U) Mission. See OPORD.

3. (U) Execution. III MEF will conduct CMO in its AO to reduce civilian interference with operations and to lessen the impact of operations on the civilian population. CA units will assist in identification and acquisition of foreign nation resources and services and ensure that commanders are kept advised of their moral and legal responsibilities toward the civilian population. All elements of III MEF must be prepared to assist the conduct of HA/DR efforts in the AO, including Singapore. CMO is a function of com-mand and will be performed by all components of III MEF and integrated into each stage of the operation. CMO planning for the III MEF main battle area will be conducted by the


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4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) commanding officer, acting as the III MEF assistant chief of staff (AC/S), G-9.

a. (U) Concept of the Operations (phase III stages, A and B). Annex G provides guid-ance and defines responsibilities for the conduct of CA and CMO in support of opera-tions to liberate Singapore and to defeat Indolaysian forces in the III MEF AO. CMO priorities of effort for the operation are to conduct DC operations, maximize use of the FNS, limit the diversion of III MEF resources to support DC operations, and respond to HA needs of the Indolaysia population. The conduct of HA and DR within the RNI are the responsibility of the HN’s civil defense organization, which will pro-vide weapons of mass destruction protective equipment such as masks, protective suits, and decontamination for its own people. All III MEF personnel will maintain favorable relations with the RNI population and their representatives and NGOs/IGO.

b. (U) CMO Actions by Stages and Parts

(1) (U) Stage A, Part 1 (Shape/Deceive) and Stage A. Part 2 (Feint/Air Assault). During these parts, the III MEF will shape and secure key terrain to prepare for main effort offensive operations in our area to begin phase III (dominate). III MEF expects to encounter few, if any, DCs during this stage. CA and CMO tasks for this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Maximize FNS to meet III MEF’s logistical requirements.

(b) (U) Minimize diversion of III MEF’s resources to support DC requirements.

(c) (U) 4th CAG will be prepared to establish the III MEF CMOC collocated with the III MEF rear command post.

(d) (U) Incorporate no-fire areas/protected targets into their planning for loca-tions that contain arts, monuments, archives, or other culturally/religiously sig-nificant items. Refer to appendix 4 of this annex for currently known no-fire area/protected targets.

(2) (U) Stage A, Part 3 (Amphibious Assault/Secure MEF Objectives A/B/C, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Maneuver Route 3). During this part, III MEF’s main offensive operations begin. No large urban population areas will be affected during this stage. CA and CMO tasks during this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Continuing of stage A, parts 1 and 2 tasks.

(b) (U) Conducting CMO assessments in AO.

(c) (U) Handling DCs per instructions founds in paragraph 3.c of this annex. For locations of dislocated civilian collection points (DCCPs), dislocated

E-14 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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civilian assembly areas (DCAAs), DC evacuation routes, and DC camps, see appendix 2 of this annex.

(3) (U) Stage B, Parts 1 (Defeat IL in Zone/Secure Objective D) and Stage B, Part 2 (Consolidation). During this stage, III MEF will defeat Indolaysian military forces in zone. CA and CMO tasks during this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Continue of stage A, parts 1, 2, and 3 tasks.

(b) (U) Initiate PRC in areas under III MEF control as required.

(c) (U) Initiate contact with remaining Indolaysian government officials.

(d) (U) Be prepared to establish DCAAs.

(e) (U) Be prepared to conduct HA and DR operations within AO.

c. (U) DC Operations. This paragraph provides guidance concerning the handling of DCs.

(1) (U) Units in contact with DCs will report their location to their chain of com-mand, protect them if possible from the effects of hostile or friendly fire, render first aid if necessary, and ensure that they have been screened for weapons. Units will attempt to redirect DCs to their homes; however, those who cannot return home will be directed to the nearest DCCP.

(2) (U) Priority of Handling DCs. At DCCPs, units will again attempt to direct DCs back to their homes. Should this not be possible, DCs will then be moved to a DCAA located in division or corps/MEF rear areas. DCs will be then directed to neighboring towns where they have extended family or tribal/cultural relation-ships. The last resort will be to move them to designated DC camps. If the popula-tion of a DCAA exceeds 4,000 or if DCs have been in the DCAA for over 72 hours, they will be moved or directed to DC camps.

(3) (U) To arrange movement of DCs from DCAAs to DC camps in the CTF-IL rear area, units will coordinate transportation with their MEF transportation officer. Ensure that DCs are searched for weapons and screened by counterintelli-gence personnel before they are allowed to enter a DCAA. The DCs with obvious signs of disease should be evaluated immediately by medical personnel and segre-gated from the rest of the population. Backhaul of DC to the rear should be used as much as possible.

d. (U) CA Assessments. Units will conduct assessments of all population centers con-taining 5,000 or more people in the III MEF AO and report status to 4th CAG com-manding officer within 24 hours. Units will task-organize CA teams that will conduct


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assessments of urban areas. As a minimum, these teams will consist of a CA team A or CA detachment from the units supporting CA battalion or CAG, CA specialty teams, and security elements.

e. (U) CMO Crises/Emergencies. Units that encounter situations involving mass civil-ian casualties, food and water supply contamination, use of weapons of mass destruc-tion against civilians, incidents of media interests, or epidemics in zone will immediately report to 4th CAG commanding officer. Units will task-organize an assessment team with appropriate expertise in order to take action or make recom-mendations. Additional requirements will be identified and coordinated byIII MEF CMOC.

f. (U) Population and Resource Control Measures. The PRC will be conducted in accordance with references (e) and (g). Commanders at division level are authorized to implement PRC within their AO inside Indolaysia. III MEF units will refrain from taking control over populated areas unless absolutely necessary for mission accom-plishment and will relinquish control to civil authorities at the earliest opportunity once the area is evaluated to be stable and secure.

g. (U) Requisitioning. Inside Indolaysia, requisitioning is authorized in accordance with procedures outlined in references (e) and (g).

h. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) Logistics combat element (3d MLG) (-)

(a) (U) You are the main effort for CMO.

(b) (U) Receive TACON of 118th Military Police Battalion.

(c) (U) Be prepared to establish, operate, and sustain DCCPs, DCAAs, DC routes, and emergency DC rest areas in zone per III MEF DC opera-tions overlay.

(d) (U) In coordination with USG interagency ACT and FACT, conduct assessments of Singapore and Indolaysia population centers in MEF AO in order to determine HA/DR requirements needed to maintain life.

(2) (U) GCE (3d Marine Division [-] [Rein], 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and United Kingdom 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines)

(a) (U) Conduct CMO in AO.

(b) (U) Be prepared to establish hasty DC operations until quick turnover to 3d MLG.

E-16 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

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(3) (U) Aviation Combat Element (1st Marine Aircraft Wing [Rein])

(a) (U) In coordination with USG interagency team and NGO/IGO, be pre-pared to load and deliver HA/DR supplies to affected areas as necessary.

(b) (U) Conduct aerial assessments of any actual or suspected DC camps or large groupings (500 people or more) of civilians in rural or remote areas of Malayan Peninsula.

(4) (U) 3d Intelligence Battalion

(a) (U) Identify indigenous Indolaysian leadership who may harbor positive feelings towards III MEF presence and who may be willing to cooperate with the coalition in order to promote a stable and secure environment.

(b) (U) Identify and locate any Indolaysian internment facilities holding Singaporean leaders and their families in the southern Malayan Peninsula.

(5) (U) 12th PSYOP Battalion (-) (Rein)

(a) (U) Support CMO in III MEF AO with MISO products (radio and televi-sion broadcasts, leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts) stressing the “stay put” policy as specified in Tab D (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Infor-mation Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to CTF-IL OPORD 01-10 (AUTUMN FORGE) beginning H-hour.

(b) (U) Support III MEF and USG interagency stabilization and transition operations with public information broadcasts and printed products.

(6) (U) 4th Civil Affairs Group

(a) (U) Establish III MEF AC/S G-9 staff element.

(b) (U) Establish an III MEF CMOC collocated with III MEF rear area.

(c) (U) Provide CA detachments to 3d MLG as required.

(d) (U) Support requests for Army specialty team to conduct CA assessments of occupied urban areas in Indolaysia.

(e) (U) Assist/advise Commander, III MEF on DC operations.

(f) (U) Synchronize activities of USG interagency ACT, FACTs, and NGO/IGO to support III MEF CMO through CMOC. Conduct a daily 1100 hours CMOC meeting at III MEF command post (see coordinating instructions of this annex).

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ___________________________________________________ E-17


i. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Each subordinate HQ will conduct daily CMO estimates and submit daily reports or requests for FNS. III MEF subordinate units will submit their reports to 4th CAG commanding officer.

(2) (U) Units evacuating DCs through their zone into DCAAs in the III MEF rear area will coor-dinate the movement in advance with the III MEF CMOC and the G-4 transportation officer to insure that the hand-off of responsibility is properly executed.

(a) (U) DCs will not be abandoned or allowed to remain at any location for longer than 4 hours without food and water by US personnel.

(b) (U) Positive control of DCs is the key to success during DC operations. Units must develop and maintain rosters of DCs while they are in our care and ensure the rosters accom-pany the DCs when transferred to other locations.

(3) (U) III MEF CMOC will hold meetings at 1000 hours daily via III MEF rear command post. Representatives from III MEF medical, military police, engineer, 3d MLG, IO, military intelli-gence, G-4, and judge advocate general, as well as the USG interagency ACT, are required to attend. Representatives from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and select NGO and/or IGO will be invited.

(4) (U) Supported commands are responsible for providing administrative/logistic support to attached or operationally controlled CA units and contracted FNS.

4. (U) Administrative and Logistics

a. (U) See OPORD and appendix 3 of this annex for FNS.

b. (U) To compute daily HA/DR logistical requirements for DCCP and DCCA, as well as affected civilian populations in the CTF-IL AO, see references (i) and (j).

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command

(1) (U) Command and control of CMO in the III MEF rear area will be exercised by 3d MLG.

(2) (U) All CA units within III MEF AO will be under TACON of 4th CAG.

b. (U) Signal. See OPORD.

APPENDICES: (Omitted).

1-Area Study 2-DC Operations Overlay 3-Foreign Nation Support 4-No-Fire Area List 5-Civil-Military Operations Priority Information Requirements 6-Nongovernmental/Intergovernment Organizations Present in Zone

E-18 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1

OFFICIAL:

A. L. DALY Lieutenant Colonel, USMC AC/S G-9, III MEF


GLOSSARYSECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Active ComponentACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat elementAC/S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assistant chief of staffACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advanced Civilian TeamALMAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All MarinesAO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operationsASCOPE . . . . . . . . .areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and events

BCT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade combat team

C-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined civil-militaryoperations staff section

C-35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined futureoperations staff section

CA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairsCAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil affairs groupCAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairs operationsCAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairs teamCCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical

information requirementCERP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander’s

Emergency Response ProgramCG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commanding generalCIDNE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Combined Information

Data Network ExchangeCIM. . . . . . . . . . . . civil information managementCIPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil intelligence

preparation of the battlefieldCJ-3 . . . . . . . . combined joint staff for operationsCJ-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . combined joint staff for plansCJ-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined joint staff

for civil-military cooperationCJTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combined joint task forceCMC . . . . . . . .Commandant of the Marine CorpsCMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil-military operationsCMOC. . . . . . . . . civil-military operations centerCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCOIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . counterinsurgencyCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chief of missionCONOPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . concept of operationsCOP. . . . . . . . . . . . . common operational pictureCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil reconnaissance

CRSG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Country Reconstructionand Stabilization Group

CTF-IL . . . . . . Combined Task Force-Indolaysia

DC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dislocated civilianDCAA . . . . . . . .dislocated civilian assembly areaDCCP . . . . . . dislocated civilian collection pointDCG . . . . . . . . . . . . deputy commanding generalDOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of DefenseDODI . . . . . . Department of Defense instructionDOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of StateDR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . disaster reliefDSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . district stability framework

FACT . . . . . . . . . . . field advanced civilian teamFEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Emergency

Management AgencyFHA . . . . . . . . . . foreign humanitarian assistanceFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manualFMFRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet Marine

Force reference publicationFNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . foreign nation supportFRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary orderFY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fiscal year

G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or higherintelligence staff office

G-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or higheroperations staff office

G-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or higherlogistics staff office

G-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or highercivil affairs staff office

G-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or highercommunications system staff office

G-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or highercivil-military operations staff office

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

HA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . humanitarian assistanceHCA . . . . . . . . humanitarian and civic assistanceHHQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . higher headquartersHQ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . headquartersHN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . host nation

Glossary-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


IGO . . . . . . . . . . . intergovernmental organizationIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operationsIPB . . .intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIPI . . . . . .indigenous populations and institutions

J-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations staff sectionJP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publicationJTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task forceJTF-PI . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Task Force-Philippines

LNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . liaison officerLOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line of operations

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMARFORRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

Marine Corps Forces ReserveMCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publicationMCPP . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Planning ProcessMCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publicationMEB . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary brigadeMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMEF (Fwd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine

expeditionary force (forward)MET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mission essential taskMETT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy,

terrain and weather, troopsand support available—time available

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unitMISO . . . military information support operationMLG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine logistics groupMOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . measure of effectivenessMOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .measure of performanceMOS . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialtyMSC . . . . . . . . . . . . major subordinate command

NA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .nation assistanceNATO . . . . . .North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .noncommissioned officerNGO . . . . . . . . . . .nongovernmental organizationNSC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Security Council

OFDA . . . . Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceOGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .other government agencyOHDACA . . . . . . . . . . . .Overseas Humanitarian,

Disaster, and Civic AidOIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operation Iraqi FreedomOPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operation plan

OPORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation orderOPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational planning team

PA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . public affairsPIR . . . . . . . . . . priority intelligence requirementPOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . point of contactPRC. . . . . . . . . . . populace and resources controlPRT . . . . . . . . . . . .provincial reconstruction team

R&S . . . . . . . . . . reconstruction and stabilizationRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reserve ComponentRCT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . regimental combat teamRein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reinforcedRFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . request for informationRNI . . . . . . . . . . Republic of Northern IndolaysiaROC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rehearsal of conceptROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement

S-2. . . . battalion or regiment intelligence sectionS-3. . . . . battalion or regiment operations sectionS-9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regiment

civil-military operations sectionSCA. . . . . . . . . . . . support to civil administrationS/CRS . . . . . . . . . . . Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and StabilizationSITREP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . situation reportSJA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff judge advocateSME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subject matter expertSOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . source of instabilitySOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedure

TACON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical controlTSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical security matrixTTP . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United NationsUNHCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United Nations High

Commissioner for RefugeesUNOCHA . . . . . . . .United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United StatesUSAID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States Agency

for International DevelopmentUSG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States GovernmentUSPACOM . . . . United States Pacific Command

ZULU . . . . . . . time indicator for Universal Time

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ____________________________________________ Glossary-3


SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

civil administration—An administration estab-lished by a foreign government in (1) friendly ter-ritory, under an agreement with the governmentof the area concerned, to exercise certain author-ity normally the function of the local government;or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United Statesforces, where a foreign government exercisesexecutive, legislative, and judicial authority untilan indigenous civil government can be estab-lished. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs—Designated Active and ReserveComponent forces and units organized, trained,and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairsoperations and to support civil-military opera-tions. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations—Those military opera-tions conducted by civil affairs forces that (1)enhance the relationship between military forcesand civil authorities in localities where militaryforces are present; (2) require coordination withother interagency organizations, intergovernmen-tal organizations, nongovernmental organiza-tions, indigenous populations and institutions,and the private sector; and (3) involve applica-tion of functional specialty skills that normallyare the responsibility of civil government toenhance the conduct of civil-military operations.Also called CAO. (JP 1-02)

civil information management—Processwhereby civil information is collected, enteredinto a central database, and internally fused withthe supported element, higher headquarters, otherUS Government and Department of Defenseagencies, intergovernmental organizations, andnongovernmental organizations to ensure thetimely availability of information for analysis andthe widest possible dissemination of the raw andanalyzed civil information to military and non-military partners throughout the area of opera-tions. Also called CIM. (MCRP 5-12A)

civil-military operations—The activities of acommander that establish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between military forces, govern-mental and nongovernmental civilian organiza-tions and authorities, and the civilian populace ina friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area inorder to facilitate military operations, to consoli-date and achieve operational US objectives.Civil-military operation may include performanceby military forces of activities and functions nor-mally the responsibility of the local, regional, ornational government. These activities may occurprior to, during, or subsequent to other militaryactions. They may also occur, if directed, in theabsence of other military operations. Civil-mili-tary operations may be performed by designatedcivil affairs, by other military forces, or by acombination of civil affairs and other forces. Alsocalled CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An organiza-tion normally comprised of civil affairs, estab-lished to plan and facilitate coordination ofactivities of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates with indigenous populations and institu-tions, the private sector, intergovernmental orga-nizations, nongovernmental organizations,multinational forces, and other governmentalagencies in support of the joint force com-mander. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

civil support—Department of Defense support toUS civil authorities for domestic emergencies,and for designated law enforcement and otheractivities. (JP 1-02)

civil support operations—The overarching termfor the Department of Defense’s support to civil-ian authorities. Civil support operations aredivided into three broad categories of domesticemergencies, designated law enforcement sup-port, and other activities, based on the civil sup-port definition. These categories, in many cases,can overlap or be in effect simultaneously,

Glossary-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


depending on the particular circumstances of theincident. (Excerpt from JP 3-28)

combatant command—A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing mission undera single commander established and so desig-nated by the President, through the Secretary ofDefense and with the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatantcommands typically have geographic or func-tional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander—A commander of oneof the unified or specified combatant commandsestablished by the President. (JP 1-02)

country team—The senior, in-country, US coor-dinating and supervising body, headed by thechief of the US diplomatic mission, and com-posed of the senior member of each representedUS department or agency, as desired by the chiefof the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarilyused by the Department of Defense that includesa displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, aninternally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee,or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 1-02)

force protection—Preventive measures taken tomitigate hostile actions against Department ofDefense personnel (to include family members),resources, facilities, and critical information.Force protection does not include actions todefeat the enemy or protect against accidents,weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Departmentof Defense activities, normally in support of theUnited States Agency for International Develop-ment or Department of State, conducted outsidethe United States, its territories, and possessionsto relieve or reduce human suffering, disease,hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civil-ian and military agencies of a government in anyof the action programs taken by another govern-ment or other designated organization to free and

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

host nation—A nation which receives the forcesand/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATOorganizations to be located on, to operate in, or totransit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistanceto the local populace provided by predominantlyUS forces in conjunction with military opera-tions and exercises. This assistance is specifi-cally authorized by Title 10, United States Code,Section 401 and funded under separate authori-ties. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programs conductedto relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions suchas human pain, disease, hunger, or privation thatmight present a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss of property.Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces islimited in scope and duration. The assistance pro-vided is designed to supplement or complementthe efforts of the host nation civil authorities oragencies that may have the primary responsibil-ity for providing humanitarian assistance. Alsocalled HA. (JP 1-02)

indigenous populations and institutions—Ageneric term used to describe the civilian con-struct of an operational area to include its popula-tions (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants,and all categories of dislocated civilians), govern-mental, tribal, commercial, and private organiza-tions and entities. (JP 1-02)

interagency—United States Government agen-cies and departments, including the Departmentof Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination—Within the contextof Department of Defense involvement, the coor-dination that occurs between elements of Depart-ment of Defense, and engaged US Governmentagencies for the purpose of achieving an objec-tive. (JP 1-02)

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations ____________________________________________ Glossary-5


intergovernmental organization—An organiza-tion created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty)between two or more governments. It may beestablished on a global, regional, or functionalbasis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined pur-poses. Formed to protect and promote nationalinterests shared by member states. Examplesinclude the United Nations, North Atlantic TreatyOrganization, and the African Union. Also calledIGO. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person—Any person whohas been forced or obliged to flee or to leave theirhome or places of habitual residence, in particularas a result of or in order to avoid the effects ofarmed conflict, situations of generalized violence,violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed aninternationally recognized state border. (JP 1-02)

joint force—A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assigned orattached, of two or more Military Departmentsoperating under a single joint force commander.(JP 1-02)

joint task force—A joint force that is consti-tuted and so designated by the Secretary ofDefense, a combatant commander, a subunifiedcommander, or an existing joint task force com-mander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

migrant—A person who (1) belongs to a nor-mally migratory culture who may cross nationalboundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native coun-try for economic reasons rather than fear of polit-ical or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02)

multinational force—A force composed ofmilitary elements of nations who have formed analliance or coalition for some specific purpose.(JP 1-02)

nation assistance—Civil and/or military assis-tance rendered to a nation by foreign forceswithin that nation’s territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based on agree-ments mutually concluded between nations.

Nation assistance programs include, but are notlimited to, security assistance, foreign internaldefense, other Title 10, US Code programs, andactivities performed on a reimbursable basis byFederal agencies or intergovernmental organiza-tions. Also called NA. (JP 1-02)

natural disaster—An emergency situation post-ing significant danger to life and property thatresults from a natural cause. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization—A private,self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedi-cated to alleviating human suffering; and/or pro-moting educat ion, heal th care, economicdevelopment, environmental protection, humanrights, and conflict resolution; and/or encourag-ing the establishment of democratic institutionsand civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

operational control—Command authority thatmay be exercised by commanders at any echelonat or below the level of combatant command.Operational control is inherent in combatant com-mand (command authority) and may be dele-gated within the command. Operational control isthe authority to perform those functions of com-mand over subordinate forces involving organiz-ing and employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giv-ing authoritative direction necessary to accom-plish the mission. Operational control includesauthoritative direction over all aspects of militaryoperations and joint training necessary to accom-plish missions assigned to the command. Opera-tional control should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations. Nor-mally this authority is exercised through subordi-nate joint force commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders. Operationalcontrol normally provides full authority to orga-nize commands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operational controlconsiders necessary to accomplish assigned mis-sions; it does not, in and of itself, include authori-tative direction for logistics or matters of

Glossary-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


administration, discipline, internal organization,or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

populace and resources control—Control mea-sures that assist host nation governments or defacto authorities in retaining control over theirpopulation centers, thus precluding complicatingproblems that may hinder joint mission accom-plishment. Populace and resources control mea-sures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or accesspopulation resources that may impede or other-wise threaten joint operation success. Also calledPRC.

provincial reconstruction team—An interiminteragency organization designed to improvestability in a given area by helping build the legit-imacy and effectiveness of a host nation local orprovincial government in providing security to itscitizens and delivering essential government ser-vices. Also called PRT. (JP 1-02)

solatium payment—A monetary compensationgiven to indigenous personnel to alleviate grief,suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries andproperty or personal loss due directly or indi-rectly to US Government/military actions. A sola-tium payment is nominal in amount and is not anadmission of liability by the US Government.

refugee—A person who owning to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons ofrace, religion, nationality, membership of a par-ticular social group or political opinion, is outsidethe country of his or her nationality and is unableor, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him-self or herself of the protection of that country.(JP 1-02)

stability operations—An overarching termencompassing various military missions, tasks,and activities conducted outside the United Statesin coordination with other instruments of nationalpower to maintain or reestablish a safe and secureenvironment, provide essential governmentalservices, emergency infrastructure reconstruction,and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement—An agreementwhich defines the legal position of a visiting mili-tary force deployed in the territory of a friendlystate. Agreements delineating the status of visit-ing military forces may be bilateral or multilat-eral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visitingforces may be set forth in a separate agreement,or they may form a part of a more comprehen-sive agreement. These provisions describe howthe authorities of a visiting force may controlmembers of that force and the amenability of theforce or its members to the local law or to theauthority of local officials. (JP 1-02)

support to civil administration—Actions thathelps continue or stabilize management by a gov-erning body of a foreign nation’s civil structureby assisting an established government or byestablishing military authority over an occupiedpopulation. Support to civil administration con-sists of planning, coordinating, advising, orassisting with those activities that reinforce orrestore a civil administration that supports USand multinational objectives. Also called SCA.

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperationtoward common objectives, even if the partici-pants are not necessarily part of the same com-mand or organization - the product of successfulunified action. (JP 1-02)


REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Federal Statutory Laws

United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces United States Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure United States Code, Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities 3000.05 Stability Operations

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)

2205.2 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)

3122.030C Joint Operations Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES), Vol. II, Planning Formats

Joint Publications (JPs)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 3-0 Joint Operations 3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization

Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I. 3-28 Civil Support 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 3-57 Civil-Military Operations

United States Army

Field Manual (FM)

3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare 33-1 Psychological Operations

References-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-33.1


United States Marine Corps

Marine Corps Doctrine Publications (MCDPs)

5 Planning

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-33.5 Counterinsurgency 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-33.1A Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP)

12-15 Small Wars Manual

Marine Corps Order (MCO)

3440.7A Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities

Miscellaneous United States Marine Corps

ALMAR 061/05, Assignment of Secondary CMO Mission to the Artillery Regiments/Battalions

Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) 2.0

MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP), Pamphlet 5-0.2, Operational Planning Team Leaders GuideThe Long War, Send in the Marines

Miscellaneous

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), Artillery Battalion Conducting Civil MilitaryOperations in Iraq

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response Handbook

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies, Dec 82

Joint Civil Information Management Handbook

Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Response Handbook, 2004

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies, Dec 82

The Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-24, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System

National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

Drs Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holms-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter, (Marine CorpsUniversity Press, 2008)

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations _________________________________________ References-3


Department of State, Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5-500, US Army Commander’sAppreciation and Campaign Design

United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessmentand Response, Jun 94

United States Institute of Peace, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), Mar 08.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations

Documents