MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 78 Docket: Cum-15-558 Argued: October 26, 2016 Decided: May 4, 2017 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Dissent: JABAR, J. MARIE GUNNING v. JOHN DOE MEAD, J. [¶1] In August 2013, Marie Gunning brought suit in the Superior Court (Cumberland County) against the anonymous publisher and writer(s) (collectively John Doe) of News as Viewed From a Crow’s Nest (Crow’s Nest), a publication distributed locally in Freeport, Maine, and accessible on the Internet, 1 which Gunning claimed had published defamatory statements about her in several of its issues. After a California court quashed a subpoena that Gunning served on the Crow’s Nest’s website host seeking to identify Doe, the Superior Court (Warren, J.) dismissed her complaint without prejudice for 1 Doe’s brief states that the Crow’s Nest is no longer available on the Internet.
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MARIE GUNNING JOHN DOE - Maine · that Gunning again sought to depose him, moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that Gunning was collaterally estopped by the California judgment
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[Gunning]mustmakeaprimafacieshowingoflibel....[She]failedtomakethisprimafacieshowing.TheCourtfindsthatwhilethecontentoftheCrow’sNestcouldbeseenasrudeanddistasteful,taking into consideration the context and contents of thestatementsatissue,itisaparody.ThespeechatissueintheCrow’sNest is protected under the First Amendment of theU.S.Constitution. Thestatementsarenotactionablespeechsuchthattheidentitiesofthewebsiteownerandpersonswhocommentor otherwisepublishmaterial printed in or postedonline at theCrow’sNestmustberevealedpursuanttothesubpoena.
thecourtisnotwritingonacleanslateonthatissue....[W]hetheror not this court agrees with the California ruling, the issue ofwhetherGunninghasmadethenecessaryprimafacieshowing[ofan actionable claim] was actually litigated in California, wasdecidedadverselytoGunning,andwasessentialtotheoutcomeoftheCaliforniaaction. . . .Noappealwassought. Accordingly, theCalifornia decision is entitled to collateral estoppel effect andprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingthesameissuehereinMaine.
[¶6] Accordingly, the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the
complaint for lack of service on the Does. Gunning appealed and Doe #1
4 Theelementsof a libel claimare “a falseanddefamatory statement concerninganother; an
unprivilegedpublicationtoathirdparty; faultamountingat leasttonegligenceonthepartofthepublisher;andeitheractionabilityofthestatementirrespectiveofspecialharmortheexistenceofspecial harm caused by the publication.” Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 5, 752 A.2d 1189(list headings omitted). Gunning’s false light claim is similar, except that it involves propagatingdefamatoryinformationthrough“publicity”ratherthanby“publication.”Id.¶17.Ifthestatementsin the Crow’s Nest are constitutionally protected, then they are not “unprivileged,” and Gunningcannotsatisfythesecondelementofalibelclaim.SeeSimmons,Zillman&Gregory,MaineTortLaw§13-11at13-19(2004ed.)(“[Adefamation]actionthatmeetsallstatecommonlawrequirementsfor recovery may fail because a recovery for the plaintiff would unconstitutionally abridge thefreedomofspeechandpress.”).IfGunning’slibelclaimfailsforthatreason,herclaimforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressfailsaswell.SeeShayv.Walters,702F.3d76,83(1stCir.2012)(“TheSupremeCourthasmadeitpellucidthatafaileddefamationclaimcannotberecycledasatortclaimfornegligentorintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress.”);Aultv.HustlerMagazine,860F.2d877,880 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no independent cause of action for intentional infliction ofemotional distress based on the very same acts which are insufficient to support an action fordefamation.”),cert.denied,489U.S.1080(1989).
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nationwide force”). Maine law, however, determineswhether the judgment
[¶9] In beginning that analysis, we have explained, applying
well-establishedlaw,that
[c]ollateral estoppel is the issue preclusion component of theprinciple of res judicata. It prevents the relitigation of factualissuesalreadydecided if the identical issuewasdeterminedbyapriorfinaljudgment,andthepartyestoppedhadafairopportunityand incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding. . . . Thecourt’s conclusion that collateral estoppel applies is a legaldetermination;ourreviewofthatconclusionisthereforedenovo.
request...toenforce,quash,ormodifyasubpoena,orforotherreliefmaybefiledinthesuperiorcourtinthecountyinwhichdiscoveryistobeconducted. . . .” Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.600(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).Thereafter,“[i]fasuperiorcourtissuesanorder...resolvingapetitionunderSection2029.600...apersonaggrievedbytheordermaypetitiontheappropriate court of appeal for an extraordinary writ.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).
the court in [a] second proceeding may conclude that issuepreclusionshouldnotapplybecausethepartysoughttobebounddidnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationinthefirstproceeding.Sucharefusaltogivethe first judgment preclusive effect should not occur without acompellingshowingofunfairness,norshoulditbebasedsimplyonaconclusionthatthefirstdeterminationwaspatentlyerroneous.
Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28cmt. j. Gunningdoesnotmakeany
7 Gunningdoesnot challenge the court’s statement that, by agreement, if the subpoenawere
quashed then she “hadno furtheravenues topursuedisclosureof the identitiesof JohnDoes#1and#2.”
8Althoughthetrialcourtwenttoconsiderablelengthstosetouttheanalysisthatitwouldhaveappliedhaditbeen“writingonacleanslate”ontheissueofwhethertheCrow’sNest’sstatementsconcerning Gunning constituted actionable defamation, including citing a test articulated inDendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), thatdiscussion was dicta given the court’s ultimate conclusion that Gunning was estopped by theCaliforniadecision.WehavepreviouslymadementionofDendritebuthavenotadoptedit,andwedonotdosotoday. SeeFitchv.Doe,2005ME39,¶¶26-27,869A.2d722(“BecauseDoefailedtoraise the issue in the trial court,wedeclineat this time toconsider theextent towhich theFirstAmendment affects the consideration of motions to disclose information about anonymous ISPsubscribers.”).Thus,thedissent’sdiscussionofthetrialcourt’sDendriteanalysis,anditsdeclarationthat“wehavenotaddressedwhether theDendrite ‘heightenedburden’orsomeotherproceduralhurdleatthecommencementofthesuitwillbethelawofourstate,”DissentingOpinion¶34,simplycreateandthenattackastrawman. Seesupra¶7. Wetakenoissuewiththedissent’sappealtosovereigntywhenitsaysthat“[t]helawinthisareaisevolvingandweshouldbemakingourowndecisionastowhatisthebestpolicyforMaine,”DissentingOpinion¶39,buttoday’sopiniondoes
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Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed.
JABAR,J.,dissenting.
[¶20] I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that a California
nothavetheeffectthatthedissentfears.TheCaliforniadecisioniscontrollingonlyinthiscase,andthenonlybecausethat iswhereGunningchoseto litigate. Inthefuture, theLegislature is freetomake any policy judgment in this area that it deems fit within constitutional constraints, and,contrarytothedissent’saccusation,seeDissentingOpinion¶¶28,37,39,ourjurisprudenceremainsverymuchourown.
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Althoughan issue isactually litigatedanddeterminedbyavalidand final judgment, and the determination is essential to thejudgment,relitigationoftheissueinasubsequentactionbetweenthepartiesisnotprecludedinthefollowingcircumstances:(1) Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,haveobtainedreviewofthejudgmentintheinitialaction;or...(3)Anewdeterminationoftheissueiswarrantedbydifferencesinthequalityorextensivenessof theprocedures followed inthetwo courts orby factors relating to the allocationof jurisdictionbetweenthem;or(4)Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughthadasignificantlyheavierburdenofpersuasionwithrespecttotheissueintheinitialactionthaninthesubsequentaction;theburdenhasshiftedtohisadversary;ortheadversaryhasasignificantlyheavierburdenthanhehadinthefirstaction;or(5)Thereisaclearandconvincingneedforanewdeterminationof the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of thedeterminationonthepublicinterestortheinterestsofpersonsnotthemselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was notsufficientlyforeseeableatthetimeoftheinitialactionthattheissuewouldarise inthecontextofasubsequentaction,or(c)becausethepartysoughttobeprecluded,asaresultoftheconductofhisadversaryorotherspecialcircumstances,didnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationintheinitialaction.
9 It is worth noting that the Dendrite court’s analysis emphasized that “New Jersey’s State
Constitutionaffordsevengreaterprotectiontopersons’rightstofreespeechthandoes[the]federalConstitution....”DendriteInt’l,Inc.v.Doe,775A.2d756,765(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2001).Othercourtshavethereforeapplieda“heightenedburden”toplaintiffsindefamationcasesbasedonstateconstitutionalprotectionsthatmayormaynotbecoextensivewiththeconstitutionalprotectionsguaranteed by the Maine Constitution, see id. at 766—protections that the Court here does notaddress.
identical, imposing a “heightened burden” on litigants pursuing a defamation claim against ananonymous defendant. The court attempted to define the issue before it by stating that “[t]hemotionstoquashbeforethecourtturnonwhetherGunninghasmetherburdenofdemonstratingentitlementtoproceedwithdiscoverywhenherrightsareweighedagainstwhattheLawCourthasstated as ‘the recognized right to anonymous speech,’” citing to our decision in Fitch v. Doe,2005ME39,¶26,869A.2d722.
InFitch,however,DoeandamiciurgedtheCourttoadoptthe“heightenedburden”testenunciatedin Dendrite, and the Court declined to address the question because Doe failed to raise a FirstAmendmentissueinthetrialcourt.Id.¶27.AstheCourttodayacknowledges,Court’sOpinion¶18n.8,wehaveneverheldthatDendriteisthelawinourstate,orotherwiseindicatedthatDendriteoranysimilar“heightenedburden”wouldcontrolcasesinwhichaplaintiffseekstobringadefamationcase.
did not even cite, the Maine Superior Court would conclude that because “one of the essentialDendriterequirements”—whetherGunningestablishedaprimafaciecasesufficienttosupportherlibelclaim—was fully litigated inCaliforniaanddecidedadversely toGunning,collateralestoppelprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingherclaiminMaine.
Gene R. Libby, Esq., Tara A. Rich, Esq., and Tyler Smith, Esq. (orally), LibbyO’BrienKingsley&ChampionLLC,Kennebunk,forappellantMarieGunningSigmund D. Schutz, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP,Portland,forappelleeJohnDoeZacharyL.Heiden,Esq.,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundation,Portland,PaulAlanLevy,Esq.,PublicCitizensLitigationGroup,Washington,DC,andGeorgeJ.Marcus,Esq.,Marcus,Clegg&Mistretta,P.A.,Portland,foramicicuriae Public Citizen, Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union of MaineFoundationCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2013-359FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY