March_Rochelle_Thesis_Final

Greening GDP:

Overcoming Challenges in Natural Capital Accounting

Master’s Capstone Submitted to the Faculty of the Bard Center for Environmental Policy

By Rochelle J. March

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

Master of Science in Environmental Policy

Bard College

Bard Center for Environmental Policy

P.O. Box 5000

Annandale on Hudson, NY 12504-5000

May 2015

  I

Dedication Page

I dedicate this work to my dear family—especially Jeannie Sharkey and Judy Kashman for their steadfast assurance, love and restorative meals—beloved friends, brilliant colleagues and helpful strangers. Special dedication to my mother and father, Marilyn and Wayne March, who have always believed in my abilities. Thank you for your love, genes and encouragement. And to the Planet, whom I am most indebted to and dedicate my life to healing and to saving its beauty, mystery and deep intelligence.

  II

Table of Contents Abstract……………..……………………………………………………………………..III Executive Summary……………..………………………………………………………...IV I. Introduction………...…………………………………………………………….………1

II. The Evolution of Greening Economics……………..……..………………………...…5

II.I A Changing Mindset: Natural Resource Depletion…….…………………..…................6

II.II Integrating Natural Capital into GDP………………………….………….…………...13

II.III Environmental Accounting and SEEA…………………….……………..…………...16

III. The Politics of Greening: A Review of the Literature...………..………….………..20

III.I Lead Agencies within Supportive State Structures…………….………………..……..21

III.II Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration……………………….….…………………….…....26

III.III Value for Decision Makers.…………………………………………………….….....30

IV. Country Implementation of SEEA: Successes and Setbacks………………….…....35

IV.I Germany—Early Adopter…………………………………………………...................35

IV.II Australia—Late Bloomer……………………………………………….…………......41

IV.III China—Attempt Aborted……………………………………………………….…....48

V. Discussion…………………………………………………………….............................55

VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations…………………….……………..……....65

VI.I Build Support Among Complementary Organizations Prior to SEEA Adoption…..….66

VI.II Collaborate Across Agencies to Embed SEEA into Additional Policy Mechanisms....67

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………......69

  III

Abstract  

Greening GDP: Overcoming Challenges in Natural Capital Accounting

 The absence of environmental considerations in national accounts can result in misleading economic signals about economic growth and development. While GDP may increase due to rapid liquidation of natural capital, this strategy can jeopardize long-term economic stability. In 1993, the United Nations introduced the System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) in order to encourage a compilation of national environmental accounts. These accounts provide measurement of the stocks and changes in stocks of a country’s natural capital, and how changes in these assets affect national wealth. This knowledge can provide a foundation for informed policy making for pursuing sustainable economic prosperity. To date, however, only 25 countries have partly implemented the SEEA framework for environmental accounting, and no single country has adopted all components included in SEEA. This thesis attempts to explain why. I analyze three cases (Germany, Australia and China) that have experienced a range of SEEA implementation. Distinct factors, such as the presence of an enabled lead agency, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and clear value of SEEA to policy makers, played a significant role in successful implementation of SEEA within these countries. Therefore, for greater utilization of SEEA as an effective tool for formulating international and national environmental policy, I recommend that lead agencies build support among complementary organizations prior to and during SEEA adoption, and that these agencies work collaboratively with other organizations to embed SEEA into other decision-making tools, such as those used for determining development rights and processes.    

  IV

Executive Summary  The System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) is considered the most

comprehensive framework for integrating environmental considerations into national

accounts. SEEA contains internationally agreed-upon standard concepts, definitions,

classifications, accounting rules, and tables for producing internationally comparable

statistics on the environment and its relationship with a nation’s economy. Proponents of

SEEA argue that converting natural capital into comparable, monetized components helps

represent a complete wealth structure that more accurately depicts economic activity and

national wealth. Despite this, only twenty-five countries have partly implemented the SEEA

framework for environmental accounting, and no single country has adopted all components

included in SEEA. This thesis attempts to explain why, and concludes with policy

recommendations for greater utilization of SEEA as a tool for formulating effective  

international and environmental policy.

The thesis first provides a background to the “greening” of economic thought that has

influenced the inception and formulation of SEEA. The methodology and technical

components of SEEA rest upon foundations provided by traditional neoclassical economic

theory. The SEEA framework, however, also benefits from conceptual and technical

additions from newer economic fields such as environmental economics, ecological

economics and the field of deep ecology. These fields find their influence within SEEA,

particularly in the manner resource rent is calculated using a “user cost,” valuation methods

for ecosystem services, and the use of “hybrid accounts” that combine both monetary and

physical variables.

  V

SEEA seeks to incorporate environmental factors into economic policy in order to

create green growth that does not compromise long-term national sustainability. Movement

towards a greener economy, however, rarely comes without structural change within

countries, and that can be politically challenging. A review of literature on the process and

politics that shape the greening of national accounting pinpoints several key factors that

determine success of national greening initiatives. These factors include the presence of a

strong lead agency a multipronged approach across collaborative entities, and a clear

understanding by decision makers of the usefulness of greening measures to achieve national

political agendas. These factors are present where nations have successfully implemented

SEEA.

To illustrate how these factors come together to either enable or block the adoption of

SEEA, the thesis analyzes the case studies of Germany, Australia and China. Each case

illustrates a range of SEEA implementation and describes how these aspects influenced

successful or unsuccessful SEEA adoption. They demonstrate how primary political factors

have played a key role in SEEA’s adoption and utilization within countries.

Germany, which adopted SEEA immediately in 1993, used and continues to use the

framework to inform national environmental and economic policy such as carbon taxes,

renewable energy subsidies, and to create sustainable development indicators. Germany has a

long history of a strong domestic environmental issues regime that began with a growing

grassroots green movement in the 1970s. Growing concerns over environmental focused after

the nuclear meltdown event at Chernobyl in 1986. At this time, the green movement took on

more of a political approach with the founding of the Federal Ministry for the Environment,

  VI

Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), and growing influence of a

national Green Party.

In the late 1980s, Germany’s green agenda began to take on an international focus as

Germany attempted to assume a leadership position as the primary advocate to an aggressive

international response to climate change. Germany was also able to leverage its long history

with environmental accounting, started in the early seventies, to accurately measure carbon

emissions reductions and help capitalize its leadership within the climate regime.

Implementing SEEA played both a practical and political role for Germany. Along with

grassroots and Green Party pressure, Germany was compelled to be a credible and

transparent compiler of its accounts in order to provide the traction and momentum for

pushing the international agenda on climate change mitigation.

Australia, a case of mixed adoption, did not compile SEEA until 2014, but the 2014

accounts were robust and have so far been used to inform policy concerning water scarcity

issues in the Murray-Darling Basin and carbon emissions reductions targets. Australia also

had a strong grassroots movement take shape in the 1970s that forced the Australian

government to take a more direct role in formulating environmental policy. While the public

outrage concerning environmental degradation and development projects, such as the

damming of Lake Pedder, influenced the rise of an Australian Green Party, the split between

Federal and State power, a preferential electoral system, and strong lobbying from natural

resource export industries, slowed legislature for environmental protection.

International pressures over a growing climate regime, however, pushed Australian

agencies, such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), to begin compilation of basic

environmental accounts. International criticism on the quality of these accounts, plus acute

  VII

awareness of rising environmental issues, including water shortages, climate change effects,

and biodiversity loss, helped increase the resources and responsibilities of Australia’s data

gathering agencies. Led by the ABS, collaborative support and buy-in culminated for

compiling full environmental-economic accounts for SEEA. ABS’s strategic approach to

engage stakeholders by gradually building up consensus, awareness of environmental

accounting, and conveying the mutual benefit of more accurate natural resource databases

and the ensuing effects on the nation’s economy, resulted in cross-collaborative efforts to

formalize Australia’s first SEEA.

China, a case of terminated adoption, initially saw creating its SEEA as valuable,

useful, and necessary for informing environmental policy. Ultimately, however, lack of clear

lines of authority, disparate incentives throughout China’s levels of political jurisdiction, and

the unfavorable picture the accounts painted of China’s growing economy resulted in the

termination of China’s SEEA in 2009. China had relatively little experience with

environmental accounting, and in 1997 began to work closely with Norway to implement

systematic environmental accounting and to apply SEEA. Building on its SEEA efforts, in

2004 China enhanced its environmental accounting system in the hope of creating a Green

GDP metric that could measure not only economic growth, but also environmental and social

welfare.

While China’s environmental ministry at the time, SEPA, fully endorsed efforts for

environmental accounting, the cooperating agency, the National Bureau of Statistics of China

expressed skepticism about the ability to accurately calculate natural capital and Green GDP.

SEPA also had to split funding for the endeavor with the Bureau of Statistics and received

manipulated environmental data from local government officials, whose performance was

  VIII

assessed according to the economic success of the area under their administration. The initial

release of the accounts in 2006 only used a small subset of the environmental costs assessed,

but these costs were already equivalent to 3% of national GDP; the prospect of a full cost

accounting revealing potentially negative adjusted growth was highly unpalatable for the

Chinese government. Although China began implementation of the SEEA framework, issues

with state governance, manipulation with data collection, and an unfavorable illustration of

national environmental costs ultimately halted the compiling of China’s national

environmental accounts.

As global environmental conditions worsen due to climate change, resource scarcity

and overpopulation, developing useful tools for creating effective environmental policy are

essential. SEEA can be such a tool, but as the previous cases showcase, it must be adopted

with certain national political and technical considerations in mind.

Keeping these aspects in mind, this thesis provides two specific recommendations to

stimulate more effective use of SEEA by policy and decision makers. Firstly, lead agencies

responsible for SEEA implementation must build support among complementary

organizations. Whether it is an Environmental Ministry or a Bureau of Statistics, the lead

agency in charge of SEEA implementation must appeal to collaborative entities to build

consensus, buy-in, and financial or technical support before and during compilation of

SEEA’s extensive framework.

Secondly, embedding SEEA into other decision-making tools, such as those used to

determine development rights and processes, could strengthen the framework’s impact and

effectiveness. For example, in the Sanya Province in China, as a condition for obtaining

development rights, developers are required to increase the province’s stock of natural

  IX

capital. If SEEA measurements were available to indicate the province’s stock of natural

capital to policy makers, policy mechanisms could incentivize construction development to

occur in a way that does not over-deplete valuable assets and services from natural capital.

Such development operations require the input and services from a number of agencies. Lead

agencies responsible for SEEA should take on a collaborative approach to achieve buy-in and

support from these complementary organizations in order for SEEA considerations to

influence development decisions and processes.

SEEA is a useful tool for both economists and natural scientists dealing with

interactions between the natural world and the human economy. Considering the previous

policy recommendations, institutional actors and decision makers can leverage SEEA to

better understand the value of their natural resources and, thus, formulate more effective

environmental-economic policies for achieving optimal national wellbeing.

  1

I. Introduction  

The System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) is considered the most

comprehensive framework for integrating environmental considerations into national

accounts (Smith, 2007; Alfsen & Greaker, 2007; Palm & Larsson, 2007; IUCN, 2013). SEEA

contains internationally agreed standard concepts, definitions, classifications, accounting

rules and tables for producing internationally comparable statistics on the environment and

its relationship with a nation’s economy (United Nations, 2014). Converting natural capital

into comparable, monetized components helps build a complete wealth structure that more

accurately depicts economic activity and national wealth (Li & Fang, 2014; Smith, 2007).

Despite this, only twenty-five countries have partly implemented the SEEA framework for

environmental accounting, and no single country has adopted all components included in

SEEA (ECORYS, 2012). This thesis attempts to explain why.

SEEA is built on the foundation of the System of National Accounts (SNA), which

was proposed by the United Nations in 1947 (United Nations, 1947). The SNA allows

comparison of national economic activity through the development of accounts that can be

aggregated to obtain indicators like the Gross National Product (GNP). National income

accounts are crucial because they constitute the primary source of information about the

economy and are widely used for assessment of economic performance and policy analysis.

However, national income accounts have a number of shortcomings regarding treatment of

the environment. For example, while income from extracting minerals or harvesting timber

from natural forests is recorded in the national accounts, the simultaneous depletion of

minerals and natural forest assets is not. Perhaps more importantly, essential life-support

  2

services provided by forest ecosystems are not recognized at all. This can result in

misleading economic signals about economic growth and development.

In the second half of the 20th century, rapid economic growth in some countries was

achieved through liquidation of natural capital, which motivated seminal work by Repetto

and the World Resources Institute. This work drew attention to the idea that in addition to the

economy, the environment also needed comparable, transferable, and international

accounting standards to account for growing resource scarcity and negative social

externalities from environmental pollution (Repetto et al., 1989). Their work also coincided

with the emergence of the concept of “sustainable development” by the World Commission

on Environment and Development in our Common Future (WCED, 1987).

In order to operationalize the concept of sustainable development, and establish a

global standardized framework, it was necessary to revise the SNA. During the 1992 United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,

adoption of Agenda 21 called for the establishment of a “programme to develop national

systems of integrated environmental and economic accounting in all countries” (European

Commission et al., 2012). In 1993, the United Nations convened to produce the first System

of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA), which was later revised in 2003 and in 2012

(European Commission et al., 2012).

SEEA is a useful tool for both economists and natural scientists dealing with

interactions between the natural world and the human economy. The central framework is

meant to be a multipurpose conceptual blueprint for understanding interactions between the

economy and the environment, and for describing stocks and changes in stock of

environmental assets (European Commission et al., 2012). Particular examples include

  3

assessment of the use and availability of natural resources, recording of emissions and

discharges to the environment from economic activity, and amount of activity undertaken for

environmental purposes (European Commission et al., 2012). If implemented fully, SEEA

provides relevant policy information at the national, regional, and international levels, fosters

international statistical comparability, and improves the quality of the resulting statistics and

understanding of measurement concepts employed (European Commission et al., 2012).

Adoption of SEEA, however, has been limited. Why has the system not been widely

adopted by countries to accurately measure and value their natural resources? Through a

review of SEEA literature focused on its technical and political components and case study

analysis of specific countries, this analytical literature review seeks to uncover why this tool

has been underutilized. Chapter 2 begins with an exploration of the greening of economic

thought that has evolved over time to culminate in a universally standardized policy tool,

SEEA. As adoption of a national accounting framework like SEEA also pertains to political

structures and considerations, Chapter 3 continues with a review of political science literature

that describes several key factors that determine the success of national greening initiatives.

Chapter 4 illustrates how these political considerations determine SEEA adoption through

three specific case studies. The case studies of Germany, Australia, and China demonstrate

how primary political issues, such as presence of a lead agency and state support, multi-

stakeholder collaboration, and clear value of SEEA to policy makers, have played a role in

SEEA’s adoption and utilization within countries. The thesis continues in Chapter 5 with a

discussion of the case studies and their implications. In conclusion, Chapter 6 provides policy

recommendations for alleviating these impediments in order to better utilize a framework for

nations to compare, formulate, and improve national and international policies concerning

  4

the environment, and thus, improve the state of national economies that rely on nature’s

assets and services.

  5

II. The Evolution of Greening Economics

SEEA, initially formulated in 1993, can be considered a result of an increasing “greening” of

economics seeking to align economic theory with environmental considerations through

systematic environmental accounting. Neoclassical economic thought, along with Neo-

Keynesianism, are the dominating theories of modern economics (Clark, 1998). Most

countries, which have economies tending towards free market systems, are found to possess

features similar to those favored by neoclassic theory. Neoclassical economics emerged

during a time of increased industrial activity aimed at maximum production and output. The

state of natural resources at this time was considered abundant and adverse effects from

production, such as pollution, were external to economic decisions (Versetti, 2010).

Although concerns over dwindling resources were not completely absent (e.g. Mathus,

1798), accounting for their depletion within economic models had not been developed.

In more recent years, however, the growing realization of nature’s limits prompted an

evolution of traditional neoclassical economics to try to account for biological and natural

considerations (Harris, 1995; Daly, 1977, 1991). The rise of economic subfields such as

environmental and ecological economics strive to apply natural considerations to economic

theory, as well as provide new models that may be more applicable for a resource-stressed

world (Gowdy, 2000; Daly, 1994; Pearce, 2002).

SEEA is the world’s first universally standardized tool that can integrate

environmental considerations into national accounts in order to inform national development

agendas (Smith, 2007; Alfsen & Greaker, 2007; Palm & Larsson, 2007). This integration has

the potential to help inform national sustainable development and address global

environmental issues, such as climate change, ozone depletion, and oceanic acidification

  6

(Conca, 1995; Li & Fang, 2014). In order to understand SEEA’s intended role as an

internationally accepted and utilized policy tool, this section provides a background on the

evolving greening of economic thought that has influenced its inception and formulation.

II.I A Changing Mindset: Natural Resource Depletion

Within the field of economics, it is helpful to identify the slow but steady integration of

environmental considerations into economic theory through approaches taken at valuing

natural resource depletion. The SNA, as mentioned, does not account for natural resource

depletion, although it does include income generated from extraction of natural resources

(United Nations, 2015). SEEA, alternatively, does account for natural resource depletion, as

well as for services provided by nature in the form of ecosystem services, such as flood

mitigation from wetlands, genetic availability from biodiversity, and absorption of human-

made pollution by nature (Pearce, 2002). Tracing the conceptual development of natural

resource depletion chronologically helps illustrate the gradual greening of economic thought.

Dwindling Resources, Growing Populations: A Call for New Economic Models

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, conservation in the United States was

significantly visible (Schweikart, 2004). The conservation movement stemmed from concern

about the possible overexploitation of non-renewable natural resources and influenced

conservation regulation, such as the 1897 Forest Management Act (Muhn, 1992). Harold

Hotelling, a U.S. economist, responded to this call with his seminal article (1931) on the

economics of exhaustible resources. He began his paper with an introduction to this problem

by stating:

  7

Contemplation of the world’s disappearing supplies of minerals, forests, and other exhaustible assets had led to demands for regulation of their exploitation. The feeling that these products are now too cheap for the good of future generations, that they are being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in consequence of their excessive cheapness they are being produced and consumed wastefully has given rise to the conservation movement.

His article resonated with economists and members of the conservation movement

and is considered the beginning of a greening of economics, and the starting point for many

scholars (Solow, 1974; Tisato, 1995; Tientenberg, 1992; Pearce & Turner, 1990). Serious

political attention, however, was not given to Hotelling’s views regarding economics of

exhaustible resources due to political attention dealing with the Great Depression and WWII

(Rankin, 2011). Academically, however, Hotelling’s “r per cent rule”—that the user cost

required to achieve an efficient rate of extraction will rise each year by the rate of interest,

r—remains a key thread in the theory of exhaustible resource depletion (Dasgupta & Heal,

1979; Devarajan & Fisher, 1981). The depletion could be reflected in a net price or

“Hotelling rent” that describes increasing scarcity (Hotelling, 1931). Hotelling’s rent was the

first attempt to calculate the value of an exhaustible natural resource.

After World War II, the need for a systematic measurement of employment motivated

the development of accurate measures to aggregate economic activity. In the United States,

the first System of National Accounts (SNA) was formulated in 1947 to systematically

aggregate and measure the nation’s economic activity (SNA, 1947). The SNA, from which

the foundation of SEEA is based, is an internationally agreed standard set of

recommendations on how to compile measures of economic activity (United Nations, 2015).

The SNA describes an integrated set of macroeconomic accounts based on internationally

agreed upon concepts, definitions, and accounting rules. In addition, the SNA provides an

overview of economic processes, recording how production is distributed among consumers,

  8

businesses, government, and foreign nations. It shows how income originating in production,

modified by taxes and transfers, flows to these groups and how they allocate these flows to

consumption, saving, and investment. Consequently, the national accounts are one of the

building blocks of macroeconomic statistics forming a basis for economic analysis and policy

formulation (United Nations, 2015). The SNA is intended for use by all countries, having

been designed to accommodate the needs of countries at different stages of economic

development. It also provides an overarching framework for standards in other domains of

economic statistics, facilitating the integration of these statistical systems, such as SEEA, to

achieve consistency with the national accounts.

The SNA, however, used a definition of income that did not consider a future where

resource scarcity would be restricting factor. To account for this, Hicks (1946) introduced a

new definition of income that states national income should reflect the maximum quantity of

goods and services a nation can consume in the present without undermining the capacity to

consumer the same quantity of goods and services in the future. Post-WWII, there were

growing concerns about the sufficiency and adequacy of natural resources, especially in the

United States that led to several initiatives such as the Paley Commission1 (Resources of the

Future, 1952), but Hicks’s definition of national income would not be utilized within a

national accounting system for many decades.

A proliferation of seminal academic papers on resource scarcity and population

growth in the 1960s and 1970s (Bennet & Morse, 1963; Meadows et al., 1972; Nordhaus &

Tobin, 1972), plus Hotelling’s primary contribution, sparked further inquiry on how to                                                                                                                1  The Paley Commission’s 1952 report, Resources for Freedom, looked at the nation’s resource needs and adequacy considering past World War II shortages, the ongoing Korean War, and the intensifying Cold War to understand what might be in store for the country in terms of resource shortages amid growing international tensions.    

  9

incorporate resource scarcity into models for future economic prosperity. Solow (1974)

showed that, given a degree of substitutability between produced capital (man-made) and

natural capital (natural resources), a sustainable consumption economy could be designed.

Solow argued that an economy that accumulated enough produced capital sufficiently rapidly

would not feel the “pinch” from a limited shrinkage of exhaustible resources, simply because

it had countered resource scarcity by the services derived from increased produced capital

(Solow, 1974).

Based on Solow’s work, Hartwick (1977) derived a model of transforming

exhaustible natural resources into productive capital in order to sustain a constant level of

consumption. The model includes a rule that defines the amount of investment in produced

capital needed to exactly offset declining stocks of exhaustible natural resources (Hartwick,

1977). This rule, also known as “invest resource rent,” requires that a nation invest all rent

earned from natural resources currently extracted in order to maintain the standard of living

as society moves into the indefinite future (Hartwick, 1977; Van der Ploeg, 2008). While

Hotelling’s rent gave a valuation for resources extracted, Hartwick built upon this work by

determining a rent that could pinpoint the financial investment (e.g. invest resource rent)

needed in order to sustain economic wellbeing into the future.

Meanwhile, Weitzman (1976) continued work on integrating environmental

considerations into national income through a dynamic optimal growth model. In his 1976

article, Weitzman employed a dynamic optimization approach to show a natural expression

for a “green GDP” could arise from a utilitarian maximization perspective. His work

formalized green GDP, or Sustainability Net Domestic Product (SNDP), as the equivalent to

the interest generated by an appropriately managed stock of income-generating capital

  10

(Weitzman, 1976; Solow, 1986; Hartwick, 1996; Lawn, 2007). By utilizing purely

neoclassical theory and approaches, Weitzman attempted to address environmental

considerations by integrating them into a new form of income.

While Weitzman’s dynamic optimization approach was a significant contribution to

greening economic thought and is considered superior by a number of economists (Common,

1990; Hartwick & Olewiler, 1998; Hartwick, 2000; Asheim, 2000), it has also been heavily

criticized (Daly, 1996; Dasgupta & Maler, 2000; Cairns, 2000). Hotelling, Hartwick, Solow,

Weitzman, and others helped evolve economic thought concerning the environment, but in

practice, these theories were difficult to ground. There remains considerable debate

surrounding the methods used to value the cost of resource depletion, which is indicative of

the field’s ongoing evolution.

Philosophical Support for an Evolving Mindset—Deep Ecology

Economists sought to apply economic theory to increasing environmental concerns.

Simultaneously, the field of deep ecology began to reconsider, philosophically, nature’s role

in human wellbeing. The deep ecology literature pulls from several fields of study including

philosophy, ethics, anthropology, environmentalism, and cosmology (Sessions, 1987; Keller,

1997). The main concepts inherent in deep ecology stress the importance of environmental

egalitarianism, the intrinsic value of life, and minimal human interference on ecosystems.

While deep ecology cannot be used methodologically or technically to formulate economic

tools like environmental accounting, the concepts inherent in the literature have increased the

greening of economics by contributing novel discussion on the relationship between

humankind and nature.

  11

In terms of valuing resources, deep ecology completely rejects the use of monetary

terms as valuation, preferring that “the wellbeing and flourishing of human and non-human

life on earth have value in themselves” (Naess & Sessions, 1984). Anne and Paul Ehrlich

(1981) argued that nonhuman species have intrinsic value and right to exist. Deep ecology

conjectures that nature cannot and should not be valued based on economic and utilitarian

analysis. In fact, a major component of deep ecology is the belief that human interference in

ecosystems is unheeded and often has only negative consequences. Deep ecology sees any

disruption to the natural world as a reduction of human and nonhuman wellbeing (Sessions,

1987; Weber, 1999; Matson, 1987; Leopold, 1949; Commoner, 1971; Naess & Sessions,

1984).

A main principle of deep ecology is the idea of environmental egalitarianism, or that

all species have an equal right to live and thrive (Naess & Sessions, 1984). Based on this

work and on the writings of St. Francis of Assisi, the deep ecology movement dissuaded the

anthropocentric view of human kind dominating nature and called for a “democracy” that

valued the equality of all creatures (Sessions, 1987; Keller, 1997; Weber, 1999). Deep

ecology considers anthropocentrism as destructive, and prefers to consider humankind as part

of nature rather than superior to it.

White (1967) brought anthropocentrism into the basis for environmental debate by

arguing that Christianity must assume a large share of the responsibility for the

environmental crisis as a result of the worldview that sees humans as separate from and

superior to nature. White wrote that modern science and technology were permeated with

Christian arrogance toward nature, and that conditions would worsen until the “axiom that

nature has no reason for existence save to serve man was rejected” (White, 1967; Sessions,

  12

1987). While the practical use inherent in this line of thought is debatable, conceptually it

played and continues to play a role in pushing economists to green and reconsider traditional

neoclassical theories.

International Regimes Emerge to Tackle Environmental Challenges

Globally, international regimes began to formulate in the 1970s, increasing in the 1980s and

1990s, to tackle increasing environmental concerns. The United Nations 1972 Conference on

the Human Environment in Stockholm placed environmental problems firmly onto the global

agenda (Conca, 1995). At this time, many developed countries, including the United States,

Australia, Germany, and others, witnessed growing grassroots environmental movements

calling for national regulatory reforms, international commitments, and stricter policies

concerning environmental protection and management (Sheley, 2008; Kutting, 2004;

Munshi, 2000; Litfin, 1993; Jacobson & Brown, 1995). While both grassroots and

international pressure catalyzed significant pieces of legislation, there still remained a

substantial gap between theory and practice of sustainable environmental management.

In 1982, the United Nations’ held their second environmental conference in Kenya,

from which the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), commonly

referred to as the Brundtland Commission, was convened in 1983. Three years after the

initial convening, the Brudtland Commission released its 1987 publication of Our Common

Future (also known at The Brundtland Report), which outlined a path for global sustainable

development and served a key role in bringing sustainability into the public’s view (UNCSD,

2007). The Commission famously defined sustainable development as “development that

meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet

  13

their own needs” (WCED, 1987). The Report changed the terms of the environmental debate

by giving economics equal consideration with the environment, by stating that economics

and environment were inextricably linked and that economic development and reduction of

poverty were essential to protecting the environment (UNCSD, 2007). This nuanced

perspective would play a vital role in garnering early support for developing SEEA.

In addition to the Brudtland Report, the Commission led to the United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), a two-year series of preparatory

meetings culminating in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. At Rio, 150

countries agreed to Agenda 21 that called for national integrated environmental and

economic accounting. The move to link environmental progress with economic development

built upon past work by economists who attempted to define natural capital valuation and its

influence on economic wellbeing. In 1993, the United Nations convened to create SEEA, the

world’s first universally standard system for integrated accounting of both environmental and

economic national assets.

II.II Integrating Natural Capital into GDP

While the work of pioneering economists played a major influence in the SEEA framework,

the incorporation of natural capital into national GDP remains a highly contested subject.

Ultimately, SEEA was created as a voluntary, satellite account to the SNA, rather than

altering the SNA itself. The inability to reach unanimous agreement on a “green GDP,” and

the resulting effect of a voluntary environmental accounting system may be a main factor

influencing SEEA’s scarce adoption rate. This section reviews the continued work of

  14

economists to evolve the field in terms of integrating natural resource depletion and other

natural capital concerns into GDP.

Building off the work of Hicks, Hartwick, Weitzman, and others, economists

published milestone work on valuing natural resource depletion in the 1980s and 1990s.

Researchers at the World Resources Institute (WRI), such as Repetto et al., (1989), opted for

a “net price” approach to valuing natural resources, where essentially a country’s entire stock

of a given resource is a fixed asset. For example, a high-profiled study by Repetto et al.

(1989) involved an adjustment based on annual changes in the market value of stocks of

natural resource assets in Indonesia. In the case, the oil price hike of the early 1970s plus the

discovery of additional oil reserves resulted in an very high 52.9% rise in Indonesia’s 1974

National Domestic Product (NDP), 2 but Indonesia’s real GDP rose only by 8% in the same

year (Repetto et al., 1989). Additionally, the subsequent stabilization of oil prices and a

revision of known oil reserves saw the NDP fall to something just above the 1973 figure in

1975. In the same year, real GDP increased by 4.6% (Repetto et al., 1989). Consequently, the

entire value of the depleted resource is subtracted from GDP in the same way that

depreciation is subtracted from GDP to yield NDP, and results in highly volatile valuations

(Torras, 2006).

Results of this nature led El Serafy to question the use of the changing stock valuation

approach (El Serafy, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2006). Because of the large potential for radical

changes in green GDP, El Serafy believed the stock valuation approach rendered the

resulting measures “erratic and economically meaningless” (El Serafy, 1993). As the Repetto

case shows, it is possible for a resource-rich country to experience a period of non-renewable

                                                                                                               2  NDP being the term used by Repetto et al. for green GDP.  

  15

resource discoveries, yet meanwhile consuming its reserves at a rapid and unsustainable

pace. Over the discovery period, the nation’s green GDP could be rising—suggesting an

increase in sustainable productive capacity—even though the country would be operating in

an unsustainable manner (Lawn, 2007). These arguments showcase the superiority of

accounting for the cost of resource depletion over the practice of adjusting GDP for changes

in resource stock values.

While some economists argue that the entire cost of natural capital depletion should

be deducted from GDP, others do not. Led by El Serafy, a group of green national

accountants believed there was a fundamental difference between resources that existed in

the ground and resources that have been extracted for production services (El Serafy, 1989,

1996a, 1996b, 2006). The availability of the extracted resources compared to the current

unavailability of those in the ground means that the resource extraction process is a value-

adding process like other economic activity (El Serafy, 1989, 1996a, 1996b, 2006). When

resources are extracted in the present, however, they are no longer available for future

production processes. Therefore, only a certain portion of the resource extraction profits

should be classed as true income (El Serafy, 1989). El Serafy (1989) proposed a “user cost”

that should be invested to establish suitable replacement assets and also deducted from GDP

when calculating Hicksian income.3 Many green national accounting exercises have instead

subtracted the full cost of natural capital depletion, thereby ignoring the contribution made by

the resource extractive sector (Repetto et al., 1989; Young, 1990; Van Tongeren et al., 1993;

Sorensen, 2000; DGBAS, 2002). Although considered superior to most methods, the El

                                                                                                               3  The “El Serafy” method does not presume efficient resource pricing—resource rent growing at the same rate of interest according to Hotelling’s rule—because it is not dependent on an optimization model.  

  16

Serafy method is sensitive to the choice of the discount rate and reserve data, which is

contested by other economists (Neumayer, 1999; Constanza et al., 1991).

While efforts by Repetto, El Serafy, and others are crucial to determining how to

integrate natural capital into national income accounts, there still remains much dispute and

disagreement on actual methodologies for calculating the income from natural resource

depletion—the greening evolution of economics carries on. When international bodies came

together in Rio, however, discussion of a “programme to develop national systems of

integrated environmental and economic accounting in all countries” would not have been

possible without conceptual inroads made by economists, neoclassical and otherwise.

II.III Environmental Accounting and SEEA

Although methods for environmental accounting are currently not considered in the SNA

when calculating GDP, SEEA does apply El Serafy’s user cost when calculating national

natural resource depletion. The most recent Central Framework for SEEA takes from this

economic literature and suggests several guidelines for handling resource rent, as well as

three different options for calculating it depending on the needs of the nation performing the

calculations. SEEA’s most recent 2012 edition also incorporates economic methodologies for

valuing ecosystem services.

The Central Framework for SEEA reflects a strong influence from more recent,

“greened” economics in terms of handling resource rent. SEEA suggests that resource rent

should be split between depletion and a return to environmental assets, which aligns with the

methodology proposed by El Serafy (European Commission et al., 2012; El Serafy, 1989).

Relatedly, in SEEA’s Central Framework the costs of mineral exploration should be

  17

deducted in the determination of the resource rent and the economic value of mineral and

energy resources should be allocated between extractor and the legal owner. Related to work

by Repetto et al. (1989), SEEA suggests that addition to the stock of natural resource (for

example, through discoveries) should be recorded as other changes in the volume of assets

rather than as a consequence of a production process. In regards to depletion, Repetto’s

influence is also seen in how SEEA recommends recording depletion as a deduction from

income in the production accounts, in a manner similar to that in which the deduction for

consumption of fixed capital is made in the SNA (European Commission et al., 2012).

SEEA also provides different methods for valuation of natural resource depletion to

service the varying needs of national practitioners. Resource rent contains three measuring

methods such as the residual value method, appropriation method, and access price method

(European Commission et al., 2012; Jinbo & Yu, 2010). Final accounting and any adjustment

to GDP are dependent on the methods used to derive them, which if unrepresentative, impair

the comparability of natural capital between countries (Li & Fang, 2014; Lintott 1996; Alfsen

& Greaker, 2007; Comisari, 2007; Peskin & Angeles, 2001; Bartelmus, 2007). Although

SEEA aims to provide several resource rent methodologies to service varying data

limitations, statistical expertise, and country-specific characteristics, this flexibility fuels

further disagreement on accurate comparability between nations.

The economics field has more recently witnessed intense interest in the valuation of

ecosystems, with probably the best-known effort here being the article by Costanza et al.

(1997). In the article, ecosystem service value (ESV) in 2009 was estimated at $149.6

trillion, compared to world GDP at $71.5 trillion (Constanza et al., 1997). As Costanza et al.

(1997) noted, “If ESV were actually paid for, in terms of their value contribution to the

  18

global economy, the global price system would be very different from what it is today.”

Consolidating ecosystem services into monetized, comparable factors is still an evolving and

highly contested practice, which can be seen in its nascent integration in SEEA.

The need to value not only resource depletion, but also unique and essential services

from nature has led to an emergence in ecosystem valuation, whose absence from the SEEA

framework was a consistent criticism (Walker & Pearson, 2007; Dietz & Neumayer, 2007;

Bartelmus, 2009; Peskin & Angeles, 2001). SEEA has tried to address these concerns by

creating an experimental framework, the SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounting

framework, for simplified ecosystem capital accounts that can be consulted in addition to

incorporating some ecosystem service valuation into most recent Central SEEA Framework

(United Nations, 2011; Weber, 2011; European Commission et al., 2012).

Literature showcases the differing perspectives among economists when determining

valuation of natural capital. Development of this body of literature, plus the addition of

philosophical perspectives from deep ecology, has influenced modern economic thought and

informed the creation of universal environmental accounting norms, as seen in SEEA. These

norms, however, are still far from being unanimously agreed upon, and further refinement

and research is required. The lack of standardized modes of calculating environmental

considerations may contribute to SEEA’s limited presence as a national policy tool.

The methods for valuing natural resource depletion in SEEA showcase what

perspectives have influenced the field of environmental accounting and played a role in

country adoption of SEEA. The history and political stance of countries also influences if

greening measures, such as compilation of environmental accounts, are adopted. Given that

the issue of SEEA’s limited adoption contains both technical and political considerations, the

  19

following chapter will review the politics of “greening” in order to further illustrate the

impediments SEEA has faced in its implementation.

  20

III. The Politics of Greening: A Review of the Literature

The world’s most serious problems today—water and food supply crises, severe income

disparity, profound political and social instability, greater incidence of extreme weather

events, and fiscal crises—often stem from environmental mismanagement (World Economic

Forum, 2014). Many of these problems, however, are not new.

Over four decades ago, the United Nations 1972 Conference on the Human

Environment in Stockholm marked the first international convening to address global

environmental issues. Over the two decades following this conference, an increasing set of

multilateral environmental agreements emerged that states crafted to address environmental

problems like ocean pollution, acid rain, climate change, the ozone layer, trade in endangered

species, biological diversity, hazardous waste trade, and environmental protection in

Antarctica (Sheley, 2008; Kutting, 2004; Munshi, 2000; Conca, 1995; Litfin, 1993; Jacobson

& Brown, 1995). At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)

over 150 governments gathered in Rio de Janeiro to endorse Agenda 21, a plan to promote

ecologically sustainable development into the 21st century (Sheley, 2008; Conca, 1995).

Environmental issues have remained high on both national and international political

agendas, as seen most recently with the 2014 joint agreement between United States and

China to peak and lower emissions (White House, 2014; UNFCCC, 2014).

International environmental agreements are important features of global

environmental governance (DeSombre, 2008). They set the stage for a long-term

environmental management regime that is commonly defined and pursued by many countries

at the global level, supported by both institutional and legal frameworks to advocate

  21

coordinated actions in tackling these environmental challenges and support countries to

transit towards greener growth (Bowen, 2012; Sheley, 2008; MacNeill, 1990).

Green growth is an international or national strategy for achieving sustainable

development (UNDESA, 2015; OECD, 2015). Green growth strategies focus on synthesizing

economic growth and environmental protection to build a green economy where investments

in both resource savings and sustainable resource management are drivers of growth (Bowen,

2012; OECD, 2015). In 2009, for example, the Republic of Korea organized its economic

recovery efforts around a green growth strategy where it altered its energy policy to be low-

carbon and began formulation and benchmarking of sustainable development indicators

(Bowen, 2012).

Movement towards a greener economy, however, rarely comes without structural

change within countries, which can be challenging (OECD, 2012; Winfield, 2009; Pathak,

2005). Several factors play a key role in the success of national greening initiatives, or

measures that stimulate sustainability and environmental management towards greener

growth. From reviewing the literature on greening measures, the key characteristics of

success of national greening initiatives that emerge include 1) presence of a lead agency

within a supportive state structure; 2) developing a multipronged approach across

collaborative entities; and a 3) clear understanding of the usefulness of greening measures by

decision makers to achieve national political agendas.

III.I Lead Agencies within Supportive State Structures

National governments take part in a governance process, which includes all actors involved

in influencing decision-making (UNDESA, 2007; Graham et al., 2003). These actors include

  22

both politicians and bureaucrats, and actors from the private sector and civil society. State

governance arises through the interaction of actors and institutions that formulate political or

public governance, economic governance, and social governance (UNDESA, 2007;

Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003).

Public governance relates to the process by which a society organizes its affairs and

manages itself. The authority of political or public governance is the State, government or

public sector (Manning & Kraan, 2006). Economic governance relates to policies, processes

and organizational mechanisms necessary to produce and distribute goods and services;

authority of economic governance falls on the private sector (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003).

Social governance, whose authority is civil society, including citizens, not for profit

organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), relates to the system of values

and beliefs necessary for public decisions to be taken (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). These three

aspects of governance are interdependent in a society in a way where governance is not

reduced to solely the realm of government (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003). The entire governance

process of a nation contains the interaction and input of these forms of governance through

different actors shaping the creation and reinforcement of social norms and institutions that

can address a collective problem (Hufty, 2011).

In terms of environmental issues, state governance structures are often built around or

incorporate greening measures that can improve the sustainability and ‘common good’ of a

nation (Bowen, 2012). Such national greening measures include the creation of sustainability

development indicators, energy policy and compilation of environmental accounts, among

others. These initiatives aim to target environmental problems that are typically complex,

uncertain, multi-scale, and affect multiple actors and agencies. For example, initiating a

  23

greening measure such as a carbon tax will have an effect on multiple industries, a vast

number of public consumers, and government agencies tasked with maintaining economic

stability (Reed, 2008). Successfully engaging, incorporating, and aligning such diverse

stakeholders for adopting greening measures is often difficult and, at times, impossible. Thus,

movement towards a greener economy can be trying and requires a well-organized and

supportive state governance structure that can effectively address these challenges (Bowen,

2012).

The Importance of a Lead Agency

Although environmental issues are often of a collective nature, greening measures benefit

from assigning a lead agency or agencies in addressing them. In his discussion of citizen

rights and the role of government, Hobbes (1651) argues that tackling the scope and

complexity of environmental problems requires a central agency for arbitration, coordination,

and enforcement. Due to their intricate enmeshment in all levels of a nation’s society,

environmental problems require leadership from a distinct entity, which is often the state

(Bess, 2000). Certain key attributes of sovereign states, such as autonomy, control, and

authority, can also be applied to lead institutions that may be more advantaged than the state

to implement environmental reforms (Paterson, 1999). These lead institutions, however, can

still benefit from a state structure that provides enabling support, such as funding and

authority, to carry out greening measures across the state.

Such supported institutions and lead agencies are prevalent within states and

responsible for greening measures. In Germany, the Integrated Environmental and Economic

Accounts works at the state level, where the lead agency is the State Office for Data

  24

Processing and Statistics of North-Rhine Westphalia, which has linkages to other statistical

offices across the country (Advisory, 2002). Australia’s successful implementation of the

Australian Environmental Economic Accounts (AEEA) was undertaken by the Australian

Bureau of Statistics (ABS) that was awarded the authority and autonomy to garner support

from other government organizations, establish an adequate funding budget for the data

collection, and lead creation of the first AEEA report in 2014 (ABS, 2012, 2013, 2014).

Therefore, assigning responsibility and accountability to a lead agency to carry out greening

measures has, in practice, been effective in countries such as Germany and Australia, as well

as countries like Canada (Statistics Canada) and New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand).

State Enabling Mechanisms: Funding and Authority

A key component of state support to lead agencies entails establishing clear and defined

expectations for funding and other economic concerns pertaining to greening measures.

Environmental problems challenge states to evolve new scientific and managerial

capabilities, including data collection and analysis, which is both time and resource intensive

(Conca, 1995). In the case of SEEA, the framework can be one of the most data intensive of

greening approaches, demanding robust physical supply and use data and establishment of

appropriate discount rates and valuations (ECORYS, 2012; Weber, 2007).

The securing of funding was a vital element in the development of greening measures

in Australia, where the Australian Bureau of Statistics obtained funding from a number of

stakeholder organizations (ABS, 2013). Without the initial funding from a partner entity, and

subsequent government support, the Australia’s SEEA may not have been created. In fact,

the scope and quality of environmental and natural resource data has proven to be a

  25

formidable obstacle for many nations with underdeveloped governance and technical

infrastructure (IUCN, 2013). SEEA requirements are likely to impose additional costs and

demands on the institutional capacity preparing the accounts (ECORYS, 2012; Weber, 2007).

These demands, if not supported adequately by governance structures, can distort greening

efforts.

China, in particular, is noted for the fragmented governance structures that did not

provide adequate funding pathways, which ultimately undermined greening efforts. In the

development of China’s SEEA, allegations surfaced that China’s official city and province

level environmental statistics had been manipulated by government officials fearful of

repercussions for poor economic performance (Guan et al., 2012; Emerson et al., 2012).

Although at the central government level, China’s environmental agency, SEPA, has high

bureaucratic standing and authority, its outreach had been fuddled by other government

entities vying for federal funding whose allocations were unclear (Li & Lang, 2010). In

China, lack of clarity on economic concerns and state structures related to implementing

greening measures led to circumvention by agencies with ulterior development and economic

agendas.

Any type of greening measure will require systemic adjustments to link economic,

environmental, and social policies, and institutions in order to identify possible synergies and

support (De Sherbinin et al., 2013; Conca, 1995; MacNeill, 1990). In doing so, however,

there must be clarity about trade-offs and uncertainties, as well as the political economy of

the changes required (OECD, 2012). Establishing a lead agency to initiate greening measures

is a beneficial strategy, but only when coupled with supportive state infrastructure that

provides adequate authority, funding, and control (Bess, 2002; Paterson, 1999). While

  26

several countries have implemented successful greening measures, such as environmental

accounts, other countries have not due to lack of state support (Rauch & Chi, 2010). Not only

is establishing norms of authority imperative for supporting lead agency responsibilities, so is

enabling access of an influential network of actors to lead agencies in order to enable

collaboration, financial support, and technical assistance.

III.II Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration

The complexity and range of stakeholders affected by environmental issues demands

decision making that is flexible to changing circumstances and embraces a diversity of

knowledge and values (Reed, 2008). Access to this multi-stakeholder network is often

essential when gathering the support needed in applying greening measures. Multi-

stakeholder collaboration can not only help inform the greening measure itself, establishing

connections across a network can result in vital support that may be essential to a measure’s

success (Stringer et al., 2007). By achieving agreement among actors in identifying a

problem and target solutions, goals and collaboration can enhance the likelihood of greening

measures being successful (POINT, 2011).

Greening Requires Cooperation from Complementary Agencies

Greening measures can often benefit from engaging stakeholders in formulation and creation

of the initiative; both from input contribution and increased chance of collective buy-in. A

broad network of stakeholder engagement results in diverse views that contribute to a fully

informed product and increase the likelihood of adoption (De Sherbinin et al., 2013). Hezri

and Dovers (2006), in their discussion of environmental quality indicators in Malaysia,

  27

contend that support of greening measures depend on the degree to which these measures

incorporate appropriate viewpoints from relevant stakeholders, are consistent with dominant

political and social norms, and are produced in a way that is seen as sufficiently transparent

and fair. Substantive inputs by relevant stakeholders increase the sense of institutional

ownership of the product, which in term can increase its momentum and policy uptake (Hezri

& Dovers, 2006; Orssatto & Clegg, 1999). These stakeholders must see the measure

legitimate, or as McNie (2006) writes about the implementation of the Danish Action Plan

for the Aquatic Environment, perceived to be “free from political bias” and “has the interests

of the user in mind.”

Yet care needs to taken with what is meant by the term “stakeholder” (De Sherbinin

et al., 2013). In many cases a stakeholder may simply mean representatives of different

branches of government or various government agencies. Casting a wider net for

stakeholders to involve in the policy process is a strategic way to improve policy uptake,

though such “involvement is more often advocated than realized” (Parson, 1995). Notable

side benefits of increased stakeholder participation in greening measures, notably green index

creation in Kuwait, include the contribution of “local knowledge” and improved cost

effectiveness (McNie, 2006; Lipschutz, 1997). Not only do measures need to be credible,

legitimate, and relevant to policy priorities, their success relies on inclusive composition

where divergent views of users and stakeholders are aired, explored, and constructively

integrated (UNESCO & SCOPE, 2006).

In addition to gathering stakeholder input, having an assessment process that involves

these stakeholders in the formulation process can be helpful. The process should seek to “co-

produce” knowledge by the involvement of other stakeholders, as well as ensure policy

  28

relevance (Clark et al., 2006). This approach has led to a trans-disciplinary science that

engages stakeholders from the outset in the framing of research questions, and could well

serve as a model for greening measures development (Hackmann & St. Clair, 2012; Paul-

Wostl et al., 2012). Introducing a new measure before structured policies are formed may

find difficulty without a “co-production” process with intended users (POINT, 2011).

Measures to be implemented as instruments in decision-making must be relevant to

the intended user, scientifically justifiable and measurable, and reflect conditions and

priorities of the target audiences (POINT, 2011). In a discussion about improving China’s

emissions and energy statistics, Guan et al. (2011) agrees that any successful policy for

sustainability requires policy developers and competing government departments to work

together to avoid undermining stakeholder’s efforts. A significant challenge remains,

however, in acquiring the time and resources required to engage a wide range of stakeholders

in an initiative’s design (De Sherbinin et al., 2013). While multi-stakeholder collaboration

has several key components that aid in the success of greening measures, the engagement

process can prove to be a lengthy and resource-intensive endeavor.

Compiling the Stakeholder Network

The range of these involved stakeholders has widened in the history of greening measures.

Environmental issues, increasingly transnational in both their causes and solutions, typically

involve a diverse web of state and non-state actors including industry, scientists,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and indigenous peoples (Reed, 2008; Litfin, 1999).

The greening of international relations has entailed a movement away from a more traditional

state-centric orientation, to one in favor of transnational, public-private, networked and

  29

informational governance (Mol et al., 2006; Stringer et al., 2007; Litfin, 1999; Wapner, 1997;

Lipschutz, 1997).

Elias (1994) warns that new forms governing environmental issues involves a vast

array of actors whose actions are likely to interweave with one another in ways that may be

difficult to predict or control. For example, more recent forms of governance often include

the assumption that economic globalization can forge commonalities between previously

disparate entities (Karliner, 1995). Multinational corporations, states, and international

agencies begin to make up a collective governance mechanism working towards the same

goal: maximization of capital accumulation, or development (Paterson, 1999). Aligning with

these stakeholders to make that development sustainable is a key ingredient in formulating

and implementing national greening measures (Bowen, 2012; Patil et al., 2012).

Environmental accounting is one such greening measure that has greatly benefited

from a collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach. The successful development of national

environmental accounts often relies on effective coordination and engagement between

multiple stakeholders. This collaboration is critical to achieving a greater standardization of

environmental information that, in turn, provides the foundation for cost-effective delivery of

environmental accounts (ABS, 2013; ILO, 2011). In Australia, an opportunity existed to pool

resources and expertise between various collection areas in order to deliver improved

systems, delivery, and robust data series (ABS, 2013). In developing hybrid accounts (which

combine physical and monetary factors), Australia’s environmental accounts program

leveraged off the larger resource base of the nation’s economics statistics program, but also

agreed to share its work to mutually improve the accuracy of each entity’s records (ABS,

2013).

  30

Greening measures can be expensive, resource intensive, and time-consuming.

Environmental accounting, in particular, is a lengthy and demanding endeavor. In order for

greening measures to become more widely known and utilized, changes will likely continue

to inform their structure, adoption, and implementation (IUCN, 2012; ECORYS, 2012;

Weber, 2007). For this to occur, multi-stakeholder collaboration and support is imperative. A

key component of multi-stakeholder participation in greening measures is not only

engagement, but also an understanding and belief in the initiative’s ability to improve the

green growth of a nation.

III.III Value for Decision Makers

As mentioned, implementing greening measures can be expensive, time-consuming and

require extensive restructuring of governance norms, stakeholder networks, and information

systems. In order to justify the investment needed to comprehensively adopt greening

measures, their value and usefulness must be clearly apparent to policy makers (De Sherbinin

et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2011; Li & Lang, 2010). Political and social belief that environmental

accounting is essential for developing effective environmental policy is a key indicator if

such a greening measure will see successful implementation (Parson, 1995). Simple

utilization of the accounts, plus legitimacy of the information contained in them through

transparent collection and analysis methods, are key assets to consider when implementing a

greening measure meant for policy use (De Sherbinin et al., 2013; OECD, 2012; UNEP,

2008).

The Importance of Education in Familiarizing New Tools

  31

In a tight financial climate, whether during the debt crisis of the 1980s or the more current

global recession, the ability of an agency to secure external funding relies on its work to be

demonstrated as useful (Bowen, 2012). Conversely, there is little point in producing a type of

greening measure, such as an environmental account, if the information contained is never

used (ABS, 2013). Pilot environmental accounting projects established in developing

countries, such as China, for example, have failed because the practical benefits of natural

capital accounting could not be adequately demonstrated to the responsible policy makers

(ECORYS, 2012; Patil et al., 2012; Bowen, 2012). Even where a statistical agency produces

quality environmental accounts that are frequently updated, the risk remains that this data

may not be fully utilized by key decision-makers in government, industry, and communities

(ABS, 2013; Smith, 2007; Bartlemus, 2007; Richter, 1991). Educating the user of the

measure’s purpose and mechanisms can significantly aid in greening measures being valued

and utilized by policy makers (Smith 2007; Richter, 1991).

SEEA, especially, contains tools and structure that that are difficult for policy makers

to utilize. Inexperience with non-economic statistics and uneven influence of special interests

contribute to policy makers’ neglect of SEEA (Bartelmus, 2007). SEEA is statistically based

and difficult for policy makers to understand. Richter (1991) discusses how information in

physical units has never traditionally been used in economic policy and literature, and how

that confuses politicians. Additionally, its complexity and absence of sustainable

development definitions historically did not speak to the concerns of policy makers, leading

to its delay or incomplete implementation (Bartelmus, 2007; Editorial, 2007). Due to inherent

incompatibility limitations with economic and social statistics, environmental statistics have

generally been misunderstood in public policy analysis (Smith, 2007; Richter, 1991).

  32

Inexperience with specific statistical tools and knowledge of their value has hampered some

policy makers’ application of SEEA.

Differing Results from Transparency

In addition, certain greening measures may uncover new relationships that make policy

makers question if the original intent for the measure remains valid. For example, many

officials, mass media, general public, and experts have held views that an environmental

accounting system only plays the role of helping people to learn of national resource

depletion and environmental degradation, but does not lead to effective environmental policy

or conservation (UNEP, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2005). These views have led people to

question: Is it worth inputting a great deal of funds to establish such a measure, and are there

any alternative approaches that can yield similar results? (UNEP, 2008)

In the case of Botswana, for example, the answer was yes. A subgroup of SEEA

called WAVES, engaged government officials in Botswana to pilot SEEA water accounts to

understand the distribution of the country’s limited natural resource. Botswana’s national

water accounts in 2011, for example, showed that 45% of the country’s water went to

agriculture, but the sector only contributed 2% to GDP (WAVES, 2015). Policy makers were

stunned at the results from the water accounts, and have compiled them each year to order to

inform the country’s continued growth and economic diversification (WAVES, 2015). To

these policy makers, use of SEEA helped them determine how to best redirect the nation’s

economic development goals and was well worth the effort.

In the case of China, conversely, when it published results of a green GDP exercise in

2006 where a surprisingly high percentage of GDP was attributed to pollution, several state

  33

officials and industry representatives strongly lobbied for its termination (Economic and

Political Weekly, 2009). The foreseen value of the exercise was wiped away when the

exercise seemed to unearth more problems than solutions (Li & Lang, 2010). Greening

measures are often fully integrated only if they prove to fulfill their original purpose and

goals.

Greening measures like SEEA, however, attempt to use information provision to

catalyze shifts in political balances and help implement specific policies. Experiences from

developed and some developing countries have shown that transparency in policy

implementing does improve governance and effectiveness (UNEP, 2008). The required

consistency and transparency of environmental accounts ensures that all conditions and

restrictions of the system are taken into consideration (De Sherbinin et al., 2013). This is

essential for broad-based acceptance by the general public, necessary for consistent analyses

and prognoses based on interconnections between the economy and environment, and for

recognizing existing conflicts between objectives (UNEP, 2008).

Compiling data and information in a transparent way that is directly incorporated into

decision-making processes leads to improved results (De Sherbinin et al., 2013). For

Germany’s initial entry into SEEA, the principles of transparency, reproducibility of results,

and traceability of selection criteria were considered extremely important (Advisory, 2002).

The development of environmental accounts is meant to provide objective information and

not involve value judgments; the latter is reserved for decision-makers who utilize the

accounts. Comprehension, education, and ease of use are all important factors for nations to

consider when designing and implementing greening measures (ECORYS, 2012; ILO, 2011).

  34

A measure with these factors in mind will likely see more success, if only because policy-

and decision-makers understand the value behind implementation.

The politics of greening nations is complex. While different forms of political

systems and development matter, other factors appear to be more vitally important. From

looking at a variety of greening measures, key characteristics emerge that determine the

success of greening initiatives within countries. These include the importance of a supportive

state structure equipped with clear and coherent funding and authority structures, establishing

a multipronged approach for engaging a diverse set of stakeholders towards collaboration and

support, and, most importantly, clearly conveying the usefulness of greening measures to

those in control of its adoption. These key characteristics can ultimately lead to the success or

failure of greening measures that are part of national, political agendas. To ground these

observations, the following three case studies illustrate how enabled lead agencies, multi-

stakeholder collaboration, and apparent value to decision makers have ultimately directed the

level of SEEA implementation within countries.

  35

IV. Country Implementation of SEEA: Successes and Setbacks

As noted earlier, since its formation in 1993, SEEA has been implemented, partly, in only

twenty-five countries (ECORYS, 2012). SEEA’s limited adoption undermines its ability to

help establish international and national environmental policy. To understand the drivers of

this phenomenon, reviewing the experiences of three industrialized export nations, Germany,

Australia and China offers a spectrum of implementation from a robust integration of SEEA

in Germany, to delayed but robust implementation in Australia, to an initial, robust adoption

that was ultimately aborted in China.

Germany and Australia are developed countries with strong histories of

environmental accounting, protection, and regulation, while China is a rapidly developing

nation endowed with vast natural capital but limited regulatory regimes concerning the

environment. Regardless, China exhibited strong initial enthusiasm for SEEA and initiating a

robust environmental regime, being one of the two first countries to adopt Agenda 21 (Hailin,

n.d.). Reviewing the implementation process of SEEA in individual countries shines light on

specific aspects that influence successful or non-successful adoption of SEEA as an effective

policy tool.

IV.I Germany—Early Adopter

Germany, a country in Western Europe, has a population of 8.9 million people making it the

most populated country in the European Union. Germany has a democratic political regime

and highly industrialized economy with a national income of $3.2 trillion (CIA, 2015).

Germany has a federal parliamentary republic, and its federal legislative power is vested in

the Bundestag (parliament) and the Bundesrat, which is the representative body of the

  36

Länder, Germany’s regional states. This political structure allows multi-party influence,

rather than mostly bi-cameral as is the case in the United States and Australia. The political

system is laid out in the Grundegesetz (Basic Law), which remained in effect with minor

amendments after the German reunification in 1990. The constitution divides powers

between the federal and state levels.

Emergence of a Strong Green Grassroots Movement

The emergence of grassroots support for the environment in the 1970s was the result of

several factors. The 1972 Club of Rome report, The Limits to Growth, stimulated or focused

interest in environmental issues, and consequently opened the way for a movement to emerge

(Meadows et al., 1972; Jones, 1993). Most of Germany’s environmental groups formed

around 1983-1984, at a time of rising concern, particularly in West Germany, over acid rain

and forest death (Mitter & Wolle, 1989). In the 1970s and 1980s, Germany mined more coal

than any other country in the world, and by it, the nation emitted 5.6 million tons of sulphur

dioxide each year (Der Spiegel, 1990). The resulting acid rain killed 9,000 lakes and killed or

damaged thirty-seven percent of East German forests (Boston Sunday Globe, 1989). This

pollution also lowered agricultural production and damaged buildings and monuments

around the country (Jones, 1993).

Germany’s grassroots movement gathered momentum post-Chernobyl (Tschernobyl

wirkt tuiberall, 1986). After the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, green activist groups

began to seek more contact and cooperation with other groups, both domestically and

internationally. Grassroots organizations began to access more international channels

directly, for example with Greenway, a network of Eastern European environmental groups

  37

(Naumann, 1988). By the late 1980s, there were over one hundred environmental groups in

the German Democratic Republic, averaging between ten and thirty members each, with a

political core of perhaps fifty groups (Jones, 1993).

Grassroots Movement Propels Domestic and International Green Politics

As the environmental movement grew in the 1980s, it adopted a more political approach. The

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had

dominated German politics since 1949, but in 1983 the Green Party won representation at the

national level. From 1998 to 2005, the Party formed a coalition government with the SPD.

During the SDP-Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) coalition, Green Party member Jürgen

Tritton, became minister. The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,

Building and Nuclear Safety, or the Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und

Reaktorsicherheit (BMUB), established post-Chernobyl in 1986, also gained in power during

Tritton’s tenure. At this time, movement towards an environmental tax and ending nuclear

power became ministry priorities (BMUB, 2015).

In the late 1980s, Germany’s green agenda began to take on an international focus.

During the first call for a framework climate convention in early 1989, initiated by the United

Kingdom, Germany attempted to seize the initiative on climate policy during the second half

of 1989. This was prompted by the release of the Enquete Commission’s4 report earlier that

year, public criticism of Germany’s mediocre climate policy, and the growing strength of the

Green Party and environmental issues in German politics, which created significant

                                                                                                               4 The German Bundestag has set up a commission of inquiry (Enquete Commission) on the subject of growth, prosperity, and the quality of life.  

  38

incentives for the Kohl government at the time to pursue a more aggressive policy (Cass,

2007).

Leading up to the federal elections of 1990, the government utilized climate change to

bolster its green credentials by adopting an impressive CO2 emission reduction target and

identifying a series of domestic policies to achieve the target (Cass, 2007). Germany assumed

a leadership position as the primary advocate to an aggressive international response to

climate change. At the 1992 United Nations Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Germany’s

environment minister at the time, Klaus Topfer, significantly advanced the process of climate

protection, and in 1995 the German Environment Minister, Angela Merkel, went on to chair

the first Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention (Bruns et al, 2011).

Environmental Data Needed to Legitimize Climate Leadership

As Germany positioned itself as an environmental leader on the international stage by

promoting significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, part of that leadership meant

reducing Germany’s own emissions, and keeping accurate and credible records of that data.

Germany had already had a long history of compiling environmental data. Basic

environmental statistics, such as waste, water, and environmental expenditures, had been

recorded since the early seventies (Baltes & Nowak, 1974). In the last quarter century,

Germany applied geographical information systems and remote sensing for gathering of land

cover and land use statistics (Radermacher, 1993). Since 1989, there has been a special sector

for “German Environmental Economic Accounting (GEEA)” in the Department for

Economic and Environmental Accounting (DESTATIS, 2014). This sector has developed

  39

and risen in responsibility as companies and government agencies are obliged to provide

regular information on environmental topics (Advisory, 2002).

In the late 1980’s Germany planned to leverage its long history with environmental

accounting in order to capitalize its international leadership within the climate regime. In

addition to aggressively promoting the fifty percent reduction requirement within the EU and

in multilateral negotiations, Germany also sought to limit the role for sinks in the final GHG

accounting rules (Cass, 2007). Accurately accounting for reduced GHG emissions per capita

during the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 was also a significant motivator

for developing, funding, and federal support for comprehensive environmental-economic

accounts. By 1993, when SEEA was first released, Germany’s environmental regime was

well integrated into Germany’s national agenda.

SEEA Implementation in Germany

Germany’s early environmental-economic accounting framework was already used to inform

policy making when Germany modified several sections in 1993 to align with SEEA

framework (Radermacker, 1999). For example, emissions data showed that four fifth’s of

Germany’s greenhouse gases was caused from the production sector, therefore motivating the

nation’s first carbon tax (Cass, 2007; Radermacker, 1999).

The structure of Germany’s Federal Statistical Office created a facilitation of multi-

stakeholder collaboration and contribution to Germany’s SEEA. The division in charge of

environmental-economic accounting was situated within close proximity to other divisions

under the Agriculture, Environment and Foreign Trade department, as well as other

departments within the Federal Statistical Office. SEEA data is integrated and considered

  40

essential at all stages of the policy cycle, including problem description, analysis, measures

and performance control (Schoer, 2006). In 2002, the German government adopted the

National Strategy for Sustainable Development and developed a strategic set of 21 indicators.

Many of the economic and environmental and one of the social indicators of the National

Strategy are embedded into the expanded accounting system (Shoer, 2006; Advisory, 2002).

Today, Germany continues its environmental leadership and derives value from its

SEEA when using it as a base for policies that integrate environmental concerns into sector

policies, such as its carbon taxes, renewable energy subsidies, and for policies towards

sustainable development (Schoer, 2006). Germany’s SEEA is continually refined and

reassessed to validate its relevance and usability. The lead agency responsible for SEEA, the

German Statistical Office, continually amends methodologies and calculations for accounts

in Germany’s SEEA, and releases papers to the public and at conferences about its work

(Schoer, 2005, 2006; Mayer, 2007). Germany continually refines the sustainable

development indicators and the accounting methods stipulated in its SEEA to order to

effectively inform national policy and maintain its international leadership.

Conclusion

Implementing SEEA played both a practical and political role for Germany. On the one hand,

Germany positioned itself as an environmental leader on the international stage, promoting

significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Part of that leadership meant reducing

Germany’s own emissions, and keeping accurate and credible records of that data.

Furthermore, the collection of emissions reductions, along with other environmental

variables, helped inform Germany’s domestic policies that would contribute to its

  41

environmental leadership position. Along with grassroots and Green Party pressure, Germany

was compelled to be a credible and transparent compiler of its accounts in order to provide

the traction and momentum for pushing the international agenda on climate change

mitigation. While there are several similarities between Germany’s relationship with SEEA

implementation and that of Australia, there also remain several key differences.

IV.II Australia—Late Bloomer

Australia is a democratic nation with national income of $970.8 billion and a population of

22.8 million (CIA, 2015). Since the early 1980s, successive governments have deregulated

financial and labor markets and reduced trade barriers. Australia has become one of the

richest countries in the Asia-Pacific and seen economic expansion for over two decades

(CIA, 2015). Australia has a federal constitutional parliamentary democracy and

constitutional monarchy that was set up in 1901. Parliamentarians are elected to the federal

Parliament of Australia, a bicameral body. Australia has six states and two territories that are

structured within a political framework similar to that of the Commonwealth. Each state has

its own bicameral Parliament, with the exception of Queensland and the two Territories,

whose Parliaments are unicameral.

The Influence of State Structure on Greening Initiatives

Australia’s political structure and electoral system has had a significant influence in the

moderate success of national greening initiatives. Traditionally, states have not considered

the Federal level as having jurisdiction over environmental matters within their borders and

resented outside interference (Doyle & Kellow, 1997). Federal reforms under the Whitlam

  42

Australian Labour Party (1972-75) issued a number of environmental laws that serve as the

foundation of Australian environmental policy, but also were federally imposed upon states.

This led to intergovernmental conflict, and since 1990 the Federal level and

environmentalists—who have traditionally appealed to the Federal level—have sought more

cooperative relationships with states to avoid this conflict (Doyle & Kellow, 1997). This

newer, cooperative approach between institutional actors would play a key role in the

Australian Bureau of Statistic’s ability to build buy-in and support from multiple state

institutions in the 2010s.

Australia’s preferential electoral system for federal positions has inhibited the rise of

a Green Party influence. The preferential electoral system allows minor party preferences to

influence elections to some extent, but when coupled with compulsory voting, voters have to

include a primary party somewhere in the vote even if it Green Party candidates are their first

choices (Doyle & Kellow, 1997). This often causes primary party candidates to obtain

enough votes to dominant federal positions, even if Green Party candidates do claim a large

number of votes. In the Senate, there is a proportional electoral system and electoral pickings

for Green candidates are easier. To some extent, the ease of Green nominations in the Senate

has isolated it to that area and masked a need for institutional reform at the state level (Doyle

& Kellow, 1997). This dichotomy helps explain how a vigorous green movement lives

parallel to a rather poor record of environmental protection, compared to other developed

countries.

Grassroots Green Movements Catalyze First Environmental Legislature

  43

During the 1970s, widespread public concern about the environment, new and emergent

resource development needs, and various international obligations forced the Australian

government to take a more direct role in formulating environmental policy (Davis, 1985).

This also followed a number of major conservation controversies such as concerns over

national mineral and uranium mining, rainforest destruction, and over-development (Rolls,

1995; West, 1988). The first of the Australian green movement as a political force began

with protests over the Lake Pedder damming project in 1972. The project caused worldwide

publicity and brought the environmental movement to the mainstream in Australia (Rolls,

1995; Lester, 1995). Following this unrest, cornerstones of national environmental policy

were created through four major environmental statutes enacted between 1974 and 1976

(Davis, 1985).

Protection of the environment in Australia remains a major political issue (Beer et al.,

2006; Australian National University, 2008). In 2007, the First Rudd Government signed the

instrument of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, a challenging commitment considering that

Australia’s carbon dioxide emissions per capital were the highest in the world (D. Smith,

2007). Australia is also rich in natural resources like coal and lumber, whose exports to

rapidly developing neighbors like China, the Philippines, and Korea, have strengthened the

nation’s economy (Australian Government, 2013). Meanwhile, Australia has experienced

significant effects from climate change, including 2002-2011 being the warmest decades on

record at 0.52°C above the long-term average (Australian Government, 2012). Additionally,

water restrictions are frequently in place due to localized drought and population increases

(BBC, 2008; Australian Government, 2011). Keeping record of climate change

considerations, conserving Australia’s valuable ecosystems—like the Great Barrier Reef and

  44

Murray-Darling Basin—and managing increasing waste and emissions emerged as a priority

in 2011 and 2012 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012).

Increasing Environmental Issues and International Pressures Require Data Collection

In order to move forward with environmental issues, as well as participate in commitments

stemming from an increasing international environmental regime, the Australian Bureau of

Statistics (ABS) began collecting environmental data in 1998. These primary reports, called

State of Forests Reports (SFRs), provided information on Australia’s forests, but also were

created for meeting international reporting requirements under the Montreal Process (van

Dijk et al., 2014). Other international commitments that required data monitoring and

reporting, such as signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 and Australia’s contribution to the

UN 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity, further developed ABS’s role and

responsibility as the nation’s informational steward. Since 1998, ABS has issued annual

accounts for water, energy, and natural resources (van Dijk et al., 2014).

The Australia Bureau of Statistics was able to work closely with a range of

institutions on the development and implementation of environmental accounting due to

recent international pressures, and the need to have secure national environmental and

economic data. A review in 2007 of Australia’s environmental performance by the

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted progress in

environmental monitoring and reporting, but found there still was a lack of nationally

coherent data (van Dijk et al., 2014). Additionally, later that year, Australia issued the

National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 to require annual mapping of forest

cover change to account for emissions as part of the Kyoto Protocol. International

  45

environmental reporting requirements highlighted the disparities of Australia’s current

accounts and what was necessary to fulfill international standards (OECD, 2007).

Educating Stakeholders on Value of SEEA Accounts

With the acute awareness of rising environmental issues in Australia, including water

shortages, climate change effects, and biodiversity loss, several other federal acts increased

the resources and responsibility of Australia’s data gathering agencies, including ABS (van

Dijk et al., 2014; ABS, 2005). The integration of environmental data in economic accounts,

however, did not become a reality until ABS piloted the SEEA framework in 2012.

The ABS trialed the SEEA for a number of environmental questions and data types in

Completing the Picture—Environmental Accounting in Practice (ABS, 2012; ABS, 2013).

The report also served to inform and educate government decision-makers, policy analysts,

scientists, industry, and other groups on how environmental accounts could be used and

further developed in Australia (ABS, 2012). Apart from illustrating the value of consistent

and comprehensive accounting, the report highlighted how SEEA style accounts helped to

showcase interactions between the environment and economy (van Dijk et al., 2014). In late

2013, the Bureau of Meteorology recommended SEEA adoption in the Guide to

Environmental Accounting in Australia (BoM, 2013). The ABS was the clear choice to lead

its compilation due to its experience with analyzing both economic and environmental data,

and its extensive reach across a network of multiple state and federal organizations.

State and Complementary Agency Support Further Enable ABS

  46

The success of the SEEA pilots by ABS, plus international pressures and growing concern

among the public and policy makers around climate change impacts, heralded further support

to undertake a national compilation of Australia’s SEEA in 2014. A common feature of

ABS’s past responsibility compiling environmental data, such as for the SFRs, is that federal

and state financial resources support these measures, which helped resolved otherwise typical

cultural structural, financial, technical, and legal obstacles (Morton & Tinney, 2012). To

date, the federal government has invested more than $600 million in environmental data

collection activities, with additional investments from other federal and state agencies (van

Dijk et al., 2014).

For example, before Australia aligned to create its first environmental economic

account, ABS obtained partial funding from the National Water Commission to develop a

Water Account (ABS, 2013). Development of the Water Account enabled significant

improvements to be incorporated in subsequent editions, that later helped garner further

support and funding to create a full Australian SEEA (ABS, 2014). Without additional

funding from a partner entity, and subsequent government support, the Australian

Environmental Economic Accounts (AEEA) may not have been created. The securing of

funding from federal and state entities was a vital element for ABS to have the autonomy and

resources to compile Australia’s SEEA.

Additionally, ABS’s experimental 2012 SEEA accounts exposed the lack of

observations and methods for important variables that connected both environmental and

economic data. In particular, the experimental accounts had to rely on proxy measures or

observations in the absence of aggregate level data. In 2010, when ABS collaborated with the

Department of Sustainability, Environment Water, Population and Communities and the

  47

Bureau of Meteorology to compile the National Plan for Environmental Information (NPEI)

and the State of the Environment Report, this discrepancy arose but could not be addressed.

The need to have more accurate aggregate data became more acutely felt for several state

statistical and environmental entities, and support for ABS to compile the SEEA increased.

ABS was successful in leading a multi-stakeholder effort to compile Australia’s first

SEEA by identifying opportunities for mutual gain across entities. Notably, there was an

opportunity to pool resources and expertise between various collection areas in order to

deliver improved systems, delivery and robust data series (ABS, 2013). In developing hybrid

accounts (which combine physical and monetary factors), it was clear that estimates needed

to be consistent across both ABS and the nation’s economic statistics programs. This

requirement stimulated an ongoing collaboration that resulted in the implementation of

improved sources and methods in both the hybrid accounts and Australia’s System of

National Accounts (ABS, 2013). The collaboration avoided a potential duplication of efforts

as well as avoiding a possible lack of coherence in the departments’ efforts (ABS, 2013).

Australia’s environmental accounts program, in particular, leveraged off the larger resource

base of the nation’s economics statistics program, but not without unambiguous benefits

across multiple organizations from this collaboration.

Conclusion

Australia’s political state structure, federal electoral system and burgeoning economic growth

from natural resource exports played a role in delaying movement towards compiling a

national environmental-economic accounting system. Increasing effects from climate change,

however, plus growing international and domestic pressure concerning environmental

  48

commitments ultimately influenced Australia’s implementation of SEEA in 2014. In

addition, ABS’s strategic approach to engage stakeholders by gradually building up

consensus, awareness of environmental accounting, and conveying the mutual benefit of

more accurate natural resource databases and the ensuing effects on the nation’s economy,

resulted in cross-collaborative efforts to formulate Australia’s first SEEA.

Both Germany and Australia, industrialized and developed export nations, have seen

successful adoption and implementation of SEEA to inform their environmental agendas.

The case of China, alternatively, showcases an initial adoption of SEEA that was equally

enthusiastic to that of Germany and Australia, but due to an unsupportive state structure,

contrasting incentives, and technical issues, ultimately failed to come to fruition.

IV.III China—Attempt Aborted

China is the largest country in East Asia and, with 1.4 billion people, the world’s most

populous nation  (CIA, 2015). It is a socialist state with a strong centralized authoritative

political structure. China’s national income is $12.4 trillion and it is the world’s largest

exporter and importer of goods (White, 2013). China liberalized parts of its economy starting

in the late 1970s, and again in the early 1990s, to achieve impressive GDP growth through

greater integration into the world trading and financial systems. The size of its industrial and

manufacturing sector now rivals that of the United States, surpassing that of other large

industrial nations like Germany and Japan.

Political Regime and Environmental Governance

  49

Since 1949, when Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the nation

has been a single-party socialist republic run by the Communist Party of China. State power

within the People’s Republic of China is exercised through the Communist Party, the Central

People’s Government and the provincial and local representation of both entities. The

primary organs of state power are the National People’s Congress (NPC), the President and

the State Council. Currently, local government in China is structured in a four-level hierarchy

comprised of national, provincial, municipal and county. Each level in the hierarchy is

responsible for overseeing the work carried out by lower levels on the administrative strata.

Each level in the hierarchy is responsible for overseeing the work carried out by lower levels

on the administrative strata.

China has seen explosive economic growth in the latter decades of the 20th century at

8% to 12% annual growth (Lei et al., 2005). Although China’s rapid and continuing

economic growth since the 1980s has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, it

has also created massive and growing environmental degradation, including serious pollution

of air, soil and water (Economy, 2004). In 1988, the nation’s first environmental agency, the

National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), was formed to develop and enforce

standards and measures on all major environmental issues.

The enactment of various environmental laws, instruments and regulations was

paralleled by a stepwise increase of the bureaucratic status and capacity of NEPA. In 1998,

NEPA received ministerial status as State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA),

and by 2004 had grown to over 160,000 employees (Carter & Mol, 2007). In 2008, SEPA

was promoted further as the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Besides MEP, the

  50

State Development Planning Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission

are important national state agencies in environmental protection (Carter & Mol, 2007).

Institutionally, the national regulatory framework is vertically implemented through a

four-tier management system, including national, provincial, municipal and county. The

latter three levels are governed directly by their corresponding authorities in terms of both

finance and personnel management, while MEP is only responsible for its own operation on

the national level (Mol et al., 2006). This institutional structure would play a role in MEP’s

inability to effectively implement accurate environmental accounting.

Green GDP and China’s SEEA

China had relatively little experience with environmental accounting, and in 1997 it began to

work closely with Norway to implement systematic environmental accounting and to apply

SEEA. China implemented its own pilot studies, focused primarily upon pollution emission

accounting, including the Establishment of Green Accounting System of Beijing in 1998, the

Sustainable Development Indicator System Project with pilot studies in Sanming City and

Yantai City in 1999, and the Environmental Domestic Products case study in Jiangsu

Province (Liu & Guo, 2005). Until 2004, work focused primarily on monitoring pollution

emissions. In the early 2000s, continued environmental destruction brought a new urgency to

the Chinese government’s attempts to redefine national development to account for

environmental costs. In 2004, President Hu Jintao endorsed the concept of a “Green GDP”

and proposed developing a new accounting system that could measure not only economic

growth, but also environmental and social welfare (Rauch & Chi, 2010).

  51

Building on its SEEA efforts, China enhanced its environmental accounting system in

the hope of creating a Green GDP metric. In 2005, ten regions in China carried out a pilot

project in environmental accounting and Green GDP assessment. Experience from this

project provided for the wider application of environmental assessment to 31 provinces and

municipalities. Results of this national study were originally due out by the beginning of

2006, but the release of the results was delayed until September 2006. The delay likely

resulted from difficulties in collecting and processing data as well as internal debate as to

how to value physical assets (Rauch & Chi, 2010). The initial report found that losses due to

pollution costs accounted for 3% of national income, and had left out calculations for

groundwater or soil contamination (TerraDaily, 2006). While Mr. Pan Yue, Vice Minister of

SEPA, initially claimed in 2004 that a framework for a green accounting system world come

into effect within three to six years, national government support for the project was

withdrawn in 2007. The project was officially cancelled in March 2009 with no plans to

continue development of the national environmental accounts (China Economic Review,

2009).

Ambiguous State Support Undermines Lead Agency Efforts

Although at the central government level, China’s environmental agency had high

bureaucratic standing and authority, its outreach was fuddled by other government entities

due to unclear governance infrastructure and enforcement (Li & Lang, 2010). While SEPA

fully endorsed efforts for environmental accounting, the cooperating agency, the National

Bureau of Statistics of China expressed skepticism about the ability to accurately calculate

natural capital and Green GDP (Hua, 2005). SEPA also had to split funding for the endeavor

  52

with the Bureau of Statistics. Despite efforts to boost the authority of SEPA by promoting it

to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008, the new Ministry gained little

influence and had to compete for funding and authority with a number of other ministries—

from the National Reform and Development Commission to the State Forestry

Administration to the National Bureau of Statistics—in formulating and enforcing

environmental rules.

In addition, relational complexities between the centralized authorities in Beijing to

the outside provinces resulted in lack of implementation. Traditionally, performance of local

officials had been assessed according to the economic success of the area under their

administration. Irrespective of pollution or depletion, the stronger the local economic growth,

the better these officials would score (Rauch & Chi, 2010). Many local officials also had

direct stakes in local businesses, and so reluctance to enforce stringent environmental rules

was pervasive. These problems were compounded by the fact that local Environmental

Protection Bureaus are more subject to the authority of local government that fund their

budgets, than to MEP, to which they nominally report. This constant tension between

provincial and central authorities over pollution issues often resulted in inaccurate and

incomplete environmental accounting.

In addition, allegations surfaced that government officials, fearful of repercussions for

poor economic performance, had manipulated official city and province level environmental

statistics (Guan et al., 2012; Emerson et al., 2012). The dichotomy of interests between

agencies stemmed from unclear governance structures in terms of how territories and

governing individuals would undergo evaluation after the environmental-economic accounts

were complete (Li & Lang, 2010).

  53

This discrepancy had already surfaced in other greening measures in China, such as

the completion of Chinese environmental impact assessments of important construction

projects. Officials with linkages to construction companies, and who held the belief that the

projects give a considerable boost in GDP, often obstructed these the accuracy of these

environmental impact assessments (Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995).

Lieberthal (1997) describes the conflict in China between the “vertical lines of

authority,” such as the environmental agency at each level of the political system, and

“horizontal lines of authority,” which emanate from the territorial government at the same

level as the functional office. The author goes on to describe how vertical lines of authority

coordinate according to function (such as the environment) while horizontal lines of authority

coordinate according to the needs of the locality it governs (Lieberthal, 1997). In China, lack

of clarity on economic evaluation and governance structures related to implementing

greening measures led to circumvention of the accounts completion by agencies with ulterior

development and economic agendas.

Another challenge emerged from the cost of data collection. It takes both time and

financial resources to collect data and process it into a database. China’s developing country

status, combined with its sheer size, made the cost of gathering and processing the requisite

data needed for comprehensive environmental accounting, especially for calculating Green

GDP, extremely cost-intensive. The MEP particularly suffered from under-funding and

under-staffing, exacerbating the cost issue and leading to delayed release of the accounting

results for 2004 (CAEP et al., 2006).

Transparency of Accounts Uncertain and Unwanted

  54

The initial release of the environmental accounting results was far from the comprehensive

accounting suggested by SEEA framework. The release only used a small subset of the

environmental costs assessed, but these costs were already equivalent to 3% of national GDP;

the prospect of a full cost accounting revealing potentially negative adjusted growth was

highly unpalatable for the Chinese government (Rauch & Chi, 2010). Combining the

challenges of data collection with resistance by local officials to use environmental indicators

as performance metrics added to the abrupt cessation of SEEA implementation in 2009 (Qiu,

2007; Rauch & Chi, 2010).

Compiling the environmental accounts uncovered new relationships that made policy

makers question if the original intent for the measure remained valid. When results published

a surprisingly high percentage of GDP attributed to pollution, several state officials and

industry representatives strongly lobbied for SEEA’s termination (Economic and Political

Weekly, 2009). The foreseen value of the exercise was wiped away when it seemed to

unearth more problems than solutions (Li & Lang, 2010). China’s SEEA failed to be fully

integrated because policy makers were not prepared to deal with the account’s results.

Conclusion

To date, China has not resumed its efforts for environmental accounting, although individual

provinces have begun to experiment with integrating SEEA into local legislation. Although

China was supportive of the initial efforts for SEEA framework and began implementation of

the framework to determine national environment-economic accounts, issues with state

governance, funding for and manipulation with data collection, and an unfavorable

  55

illustration of national environmental costs ultimately halted the compiling of China’s

environmental accounts.

  56

V. Discussion

As national economies seek to “green” and drive greener growth, it is important to

understand the technical and political components that enable or disable national greening

initiatives, such as SEEA. The example of SEEA showcases how differences in technical

approaches, such as how to accurately value natural resource depletion, as well as political

considerations can influence the successful or unsuccessful implementation of a useful policy

tool. The cases of Germany, Australia and China particularly showcase how state governance

and political structures, leading agencies and collaborative entities, and the influence of

decision makers can alter the implementation of national greening measures, particularly

SEEA. This section provides a cross-comparison of these aspects within each of the case

examples, as well as discusses several other influential components that play a role in

national greening initiatives.

Time Matters—Greening Initiatives Rely on a Mature Environmental Regime

Differences in China’s political structure and environmental political regimes played a key

role in China’s non-successful implementation of SEEA compared to the successful adoption

by Germany and Australia. Countries with longer histories of governance focused on

environmental politics were more likely to implement greening measures. The more time

environmental agendas had to become interconnected with a nation’s underlying governance

structure, the more likely a greening initiative, such as SEEA, would be implemented and not

subject to significant change based on country politics.

Of the countries reviewed in this paper, Germany has the longest history and most

successful implementation of SEEA, with small possibility of SEEA becoming underutilized.

  57

Germany exhibited a robust and immediate adoption of SEEA in 1993 due to an already

standing history concerning environmentally focused politics, political parties, and gathering

statistics for environmental accounting. An environmentally aware populace from the 1970s

onward and, later awareness of the nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl, was instrumental in the

election of environmentally focused political leaders and the eventual power and standing of

Germany’s Green Party.

Like Germany, Australia also experienced an awakening of environmental awareness

beginning in the 1970s and subsequent leadership positions won by the Green Party. In

addition, like Germany, Australia experienced a leaning towards political leadership and

participation in international environmental regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol and federal

environmental laws. The state of Australia, being one of the first developed countries to feel

the adverse affects from climate change, influenced political leader sentiments. Disruptions

to the nation’s water supply and to its unique biodiversity—such as the Great Barrier Coral

Reef—played a role in the populace and leaders’ willingness to allocate funding and

resources towards greening initiatives like the environmental accounts.

Australia’s environmental agenda, however, is much younger in comparison with

Germany’s, with the first environmental laws put in place in the mid-1970s. Australia’s

environmental agenda is still developing, as can be seen in recent changes in political

regimes, such as the 2013 elections that resulted in a win by the Conservative Party that plans

to terminate the existing tax on carbon emissions (McGuirk, 2013). Although the compilation

of Australia’s SEEA was finished after the Conservatives won the vote, this political

leadership may influence future utilization and development of Australia’s environmental

accounts. A country formed in 1901 with environmental concerns first arising in the later 20th

  58

century, Australia is still integrating somewhat nascent environmental concerns into its

national agenda and is more prone to suffer from short-term political influences.

China’s environmental regime is much younger than Germany’s and Australia’s.

China’s first environmental agency, formed in 1988, put in place the country’s first

environmental laws in the 1990s and 2000s. The juvenile quality of China’s environmental

agenda is also hampered by the mono-political leadership that disables a minority Green

party to arise and herald popular support, such as in the cases of Germany and Australia. In

addition, the state governance structure in China, giving lateral power to MEP from the top,

but limited power when enforced through the four levels of hierarchical jurisdiction, made

implementation of China’s SEEA much more challenging. Lower levels of jurisdiction were

incentivized against MEP’s compilation of SEEA, and consequently provided inaccurate data

and forged accounts that undermined the accuracy of the environmental accounts.

Additionally, MEP did not experience the same amount of funding and autonomy given by

lead agencies for SEEA implementation in Germany and Australia. MEP had to compete

with a number of other ministries in formulating and enforcing environmental rules, and

receiving the budget to do so. Such limitations are representative of China’s limited

experience with developing its environmental regime.

Public Awareness and Grassroots Pressure Helped Build a Green Agenda

In federalist democratic countries, such as Australia and Germany, the emergence of an

environmentally aware citizenry has significantly propelled the political green agenda.

Germany’s long history of environmentalism and Australia’s newer, but robust, history

helped move the needle on the countries’ decisions to implement SEEA. Meanwhile, in a

  59

centralist unitary state like China, public awareness and grassroots pressure did not play as

significant a role in influencing the country’s decision to adopt SEEA. Although with the

advent of connected digital platforms, such as Weibo5 that engages Chinese citizens to

express individual views and collaborate on those views, may be changing the role of

environmental grassroots movements in China (Zhu, 2013; ChinaWatcher, 2014), at the time

of SEEA’s implementation in 2004, grassroots movements were small and did not influence

the political agenda.

Germany’s grassroots movement, already catalyzed from environmental problems

such as acid rain and forest death, gained significant traction post-Chernobyl (Jones, 1993).

The outreach of Germany’s green activists groups to likeminded international organizations

in order to build their forces, contributed to a social influence Germany politics could not

ignore (Jones, 1993). The Green Party gained political influence accordingly, which was also

supported from leveraging an opportunity to assume leadership for the international climate

change agenda. By the time the United Nations provided the SEEA framework in 1993,

Germany already had a mature environmental regime inaugurated by the country’s strong

grassroots movement.

Australia, too, experienced a strong grassroots environmental movement that

eventually resulted in Australia’s 2014 SEEA. Public concern over destruction of pristine

Australian landmarks for development, such as Lake Pedder, or environmental concerns

related to water scarcity, uranium mining, rainforest destruction, among other concerns,

strengthened Australia’s grassroots movement. This social unrest marshaled keystone

environmental statutes on the Federal level, as well as served as a foundation for the

                                                                                                               5  Weibo is China’s most popular social media website and online community that launched in 2009 and has over 503 million registered users (2012 estimate).      

  60

increasing influence of Australia’s Green Party. The Australian public grassroots

environmental movement was essential in bringing greening initiatives to the political fore,

and later assisted in the environmental initiatives of the Rudd Government, under which

Australia’s SEEA was commissioned.

Environmental grassroots movements, which began from the visceral reaction of

national populaces to environmental degradation and its negative effects, were integral to

developing a national green agenda. While these movements in Germany and Australia

paved the inroads for political traction, pressures in the form of international environmental

agreements and expectations contributed to successfully sustaining the countries’

environmental plans.

Lead Agencies Need Support to Convey Benefits to Collaborative Stakeholders

Multi-stakeholder collaboration played a significant role in whether a country successfully

implemented greening initiatives. Generally, the factors that led to this success were the

proactive and financially autonomous participation of a lead agency, often possible via

supportive state infrastructure and apparent benefit for the collaborating stakeholders.

The compilation of Germany’s environmental and economic accounts is, by nature, a

multi-stakeholder endeavor. Depending on the responsibilities of the division, data is shared

and utilized across Germany’s Federal Statistical Office, the BMUB, and the State Office for

Data Processing and Statistics of North-Rhine Westphalia, which has linkages to other

statistical offices across the country (Advisory, 2002). While Germany’s entire SEEA is not

led by one particular agency, collaborative multi-stakeholders are supported and funded

  61

through Germany’s state structure and fulfill their own departmental obligations by

contributing to the accounts.

Australia’s Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the lead agency charged with compiling

Australia’s SEEA, also benefited from being situated within a collaborative and supportive

state structure. ABS had access to the Department of Sustainability, Environment Water,

Population and Communities and the Bureau of Meteorology, with which it successfully

collaborated from the start in order to build the necessary buy-in for an environmental

accounting system. ABS also leveraged this network in order to attain the initial funding to

launch the project, specifically from the National Water Commission (ABS, 2013). Once the

project was launched, ABS also reached out to universities and other statistical agencies in

order to help supply data and analysis and collaborate on the accounts. Without collaboration

across a wide network of entities, it is likely Australia’s first SEEA would not have been so

robustly implemented.

In contrast, China’s state structure has highly non-conducive to collaborative

contribution and disabled potential stakeholder buy-in. The four-tiered hierarchical structure

of China’s political governance stalled MEP’s jurisdiction. In addition, alternative incentives

for federal funding conflicted with MEP’s goal of compiling accurate environmental

accounts, and ultimately undermined the program. Notably, MEP had to vie for funding with

several other agencies, which further discouraged them from working collaboratively with

MEP to compile China’s SEEA. While MEP was given authority to compile the accounts

from China’s centralized authorities, MEP was unsuccessful in formulating accurate,

comprehensive information from the other layers of China’s political structure.

  62

Using Tools that are Familiar and Useful to Decision Makers is Essential

The opinion that decision makers had about environmental accounting played a significant

role in whether their country successfully implemented greening measures. Implementing

SEEA was most successful when a country’s decision makers were already familiar with

environmental accounting and environmental statistics, which streamlined the learning curve

when implementing SEEA and using the framework as a relevant policy-informing tool. In

addition, when decision makers understood the benefits from compilation of the accounts

that could result in more accurate economic and environmental policy formation, SEEA was

not as easily curtailed. When these benefits were unclear for policy makers, or in some cases,

benefits were non-existent due to contrasting agendas, SEEA was difficult or impossible to

implement.

Germany had already begun collecting data for environmental accounting before

SEEA was an existing framework. This initial motivation paved a smoother path for decision

makers to understand and utilize the information from environmental accounts to shape

policy. This was further supported when a standardized, universal framework for

environmental accounting, SEEA, was issued in 1993. Policy and decision makers in

Germany often utilize environmental-economic data in order to formulate development

strategies, tax industries or determine certain environmental subsidies. The data of the GEEA

is used as a basis for policy, most recently for policies towards sustainable development.

Australia also had a significant history with accounting, albeit shorter than Germany’s

in terms of environmental accounting. Where ABS lacked adequate environmental data,

however, it leveraged a collaborative approach with other entities with statistical experience

to gather the necessary information. In addition, international commitments to lowering

  63

emissions, plus growing awareness of climate change effects, increased awareness

concerning the need to measure and benchmark the stocks and changes in stocks of

Australia’s natural assets. Australia also built the case for policy makers by educating them

of the potential usefulness of SEEA through its initial report Completing the Picture-

Environmental Accounting in Practice (ABS, 2012). These efforts contributed to decision

makers seeing an Australian SEEA as useful in informing Australia’s environmental policy

going forward. Australia compiled its first SEEA quickly and effectively, and how well

decision makers continue to utilize it will determine its prolonged implementation and

refinement.

China is also a country rich in natural capital, but due to exponential economic and

population growth, saw substantial degradation to the environment. Developing a China

SEEA was seen as a tool to help the country move towards greener growth by influencing

policy makers to take environmental considerations into account. Due to a number of

shortcomings from unconstructive state support and infrastructure, competing governmental

bodies and political entities, and inadequate funding and expertise, the accounts were

abruptly terminated. China had limited experience with environmental accounting, and had to

engage Norway to assist with initial pilots for calculating localized green GDP. Even with

this initial guidance, the National Bureau of Statistics of China still regarded natural capital

valuation as a debatable exercise. Additionally, the environmental accounts painted an

unfavorable picture on the Chinese economy that was so distasteful several governmental and

industry groups strongly lobbied for its termination (Economic and Political Weekly, 2009).

China intended the accounts to be a valuable policy and measurement tool, but SEEA turned

out to not be as warranted as previously assumed for Chinese officials. Germany and

  64

Australia compiled the accounts for similar initial reasons as China, but ultimately the

unfavorable information contained in the accounts was not seen as useful to the nation of

China, and the accounts were discontinued.

  65

VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The natural world has only recently begun to be considered for its “value” due to the

increasing realization that economic wellbeing—industrial and social alike—rely on the

assets and services of natural capital. The System of Environmental-Economic Accounts is

one such tool that seeks to quantify the amount, change in amount, and value of natural

resources. SEEA has seen limited adoption, however, and this thesis explores why this is the

case. Through a review of the literature on the politics of greening and exploration of country

case studies, several key aspects are identified that have supported SEEA’s adoption. These

include the presence of a strong state structure that enables lead agencies to collaborate with

stakeholders, the maturity of a nation’s environmental regime, and grassroots pressure

coupled with international regime pressures that help propel that maturity. In addition, it is

important that tools for greening are familiar and useful to decision makers to formulate

policy.

Keeping these aspects in mind, specific policy recommendations can stimulate more

effective use of SEEA by policy and decision makers. These recommendations are for lead

agencies responsible for SEEA implementation, such as environmental ministries and

statistical bureaus, and include that 1.) Lead agencies build support among complementary

organizations prior to and during SEEA adoption, and 2.) These agencies work

collaboratively with other organizations to embed SEEA into other decision-making tools,

such as those used for determining development rights and processes. By utilizing SEEA,

decision makers, institutional actors, and national populaces can better understand the value

of their resources through compiling environmental accounts, and thus, formulate more

effective environmental-economic policies for achieving optimal, national wellbeing.

  66

VI.I Build Support Among Complementary Organizations Prior to SEEA Adoption

First, lead agencies responsible for SEEA implementation must build support among

complementary organizations, such as environmental and statistical agencies, academic

institutions, and agencies with economic development responsibilities, prior to attempting to

implement a compilation of SEEA accounts. This support will entail engagement with other

agencies in order to gather their input, which can play a vital role in how the accounts are

eventually utilized as well as achieve further buy-in and interest from complementary

organizations.

In addition, building support will include educating complementary organizations on

the benefit and need for compiling environmental accounts. These benefits will be

customized to the country’s pressures at large, whether that is public pressure for improved

environmental management, international pressure to adhere to environmental commitments

(e.g. Lima Accord), or need to improve the quality of data sets to better inform economic

policies (e.g. the case of Botswana). By explaining the benefits that environmental accounts

can provide, other organizations will be more likely to contribute to and support account

compilation. This may take the form of published documents, as in the case of the ABS’s

2012 Guide to Environmental Accounting in Australia, workshops, conferences, or other

forms of outreach.

The lead agency in charge of SEEA implementation must appeal to collaborative

entities to build consensus, buy-in, and financial or technical support for compiling SEEA’s

extensive framework. Once this is achieved, a lead agency can promote SEEA adoption

within its nation with the knowledge that it will be enabled by complementary organizations

  67

to later win funding, authority, and political support for the framework’s compilation and

eventual use by policy makers.

VI.II Collaborate Across Agencies to Embed SEEA into Additional Policy Mechanisms

Secondly, lead agencies responsible for SEEA should take on a collaborative approach to not

only adopt the SEEA framework for national environmental-economic accounting, but also

work to integrate SEEA considerations into other decision-making tools, such as those used

to determine development rights and processes.

For example, in the Sanya Province in China, as a condition for obtaining

development rights, developers are required to increase the province’s stock of natural

capital. Established in early 2014, a lead institutional actor, the DeTao Institute of Green

Investment, reached an agreement with the Sanya government to develop the first citywide

Natural Capital Balance Sheet of Sanya. The methodology follows SEEA framework, with

additions from Robert Costanza’s work on ecosystem services (Constanza et al., 1997;

Costanza, 1994), to adjust the existing China SNA and Sanya’s local value (Detao IGI,

2014). If SEEA measurements are available to indicate the province’s stock of natural

capital to policy makers, policy mechanisms could incentivize construction development to

occur in a way that does not over-deplete valuable assets and services from natural capital.

Another example includes an industry actor, Lafarge North America, who used a

family of geospatial and statistical modeling similar to the SEEA Experimental Ecosystem

framework to map and value two ecosystem services in one of its active quarry sites in

Michigan, United States (WBCSD, 2010). The analysis found that using and maintaining

existing natural ecosystems avoided the need for investing an estimated $2 million/year for

  68

erosion control and up to $51,000/year for nitrogen and phosphorous nutrient removal

(WBCSD, 2010). Through utilizing a natural capital accounting framework, this market actor

was able to make an informed decision as to the use and value of natural capital. Instead of

depleting natural capital and, relatedly depleting financial capital from facility investment

and maintenance, Lafarge was able to improve both economic and environmental conditions.

By integrating SEEA considerations into development commitments, accounting and valuing

natural capital can be done in a cost effective and practical manner that benefits multiple

stakeholders.

In order for development policies to integrate SEEA considerations, however, lead

agencies responsible for SEEA must collaborate with multiple agencies whose purview may

differ, but are responsible for activities that impact a nation’s natural capital (e.g. industry

actors, municipal leaders, Departments of Construction and Development, etc.). Lead

agencies may foster this collaboration through the tactics described in the previous policy

recommendation including engaging other agencies early on in the process, providing

education of SEEA’s benefits, and incorporating their ongoing input for effective utilization

of the SEEA framework to incorporate environmental conditions into a country’s

understanding of its national economic health.

  69

Bibliography Advisory Committee. (2002). Environmental-Economic Accounting—Fourth of final opinion

on the implementation concepts of the Federal Statistical Office. Alfsen, K. H. & Greaker, M. (2007). From natural resources and environmental accounting

to construction of indicators for sustainable development. Ecological Economics, 61, pp. 600-610.

Asheim, G. B. (2000). [Review of the book Economic Growth and the Environment: On the

Measurement of Income and Welfare, by Brekke, K. A.] The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), pp. 168-170.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (2012). Completing the Picture—Environmental

Accounting in Practice. Australia Government. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (2013). Implementing SEEA in Australia: estimates

and issues. Conference of European Statisticians Sixty-first plenary session, Geneva, Switzerland 10-12 June.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (2014). Australian Environmental-Economic

Accounts 2014. Catalogue No. 4655.0. Commonwealth of Australia. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (2005). Building a National Statistical Agency.

Excerpt from Building a National Statistical Agency: From CBCS to the ABS 1905- 2005.

Australian Government. (2011). National review of water restrictions in Australia. National

Water Commission. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20120227083656/http://www.nwc.gov.au/urban/more/national-review-of-water-restrictions-in-australia

Australian Government. (2012). Annual Australian Climate Statement 2011. Retrieved from

http://www.bom.gov.au/announcements/media_releases/climate/change/20120104.shtml

Australian Government. (2013). Background Paper: The Australia-China Trade and

Investment Relationship. Retrieved from http://dfat.gov.au/fta/chafta/fact-sheets/background-paper-the-australia-china-trade-and-investment-relationship.html

Australian National University. (2008). ANU Poll finds “it’s the environment, stupid.”

Retrieved from http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/polls-and-surveys/anupoll/polls/governance

Baltes, H. and Nowak, W. (1974). Umweltstatistikein Instrumendter Umweltplanung

  70

(Environment Statistics—an instrument for environmental planning). Wirtschaftund Statistik, 4(74), pp. 237.

Barnett, H. J. and Morse, C. (1963). Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Resource

Scarcity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future. Bartelmus, P. (2007). SEEA-2003: Accounting for sustainable development? Ecological

Economics, 61., pp. 613-616. Bartelmus, P. (2009). The cost of natural capital consumption: Accounting for a sustainable

world economy. Ecological Economics, 68, pp. 1850-1857. BBC. (2008, April 23). Saving Australia’s water. BBC. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7361210.stm Beer, T., Borgas, W. B., Frasser, P., Holder, P. and Torok, S. (2006). CSIRO Atmospheric Research: Major Issue: Climate Change. Prepared for the 2006 Australian State of the Environment Committee. Bess, M. (2000). Greening the Mainstream: Paradoxes of Antistatism and Anticonsumerism in the French Environmental Movement. Environmental History, 5(1), pp. 6-26. Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB). (2015). Tasks and Structure. BMUB. Retrieved from http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/bmub/tasks-and-structure/ Bureau of Meteorology (BoM). (2013). The environmental accounts landscape. Canberra:

Bureau of Meteorology, Environmental Information Programme Publication Series, vol. 1.

Boston Sunday Globe. (1989, December 17). West Germany may Benefit from Revolt. Bowen, A. (2012). ‘Green’ growth: What does it mean? Environmental Scientist, pp. 6-11. Bruns, E., Ohlhorst, D., Wenzel, B., Koppel, J. (2011). Renewable Energies in Germany’s

Electricity Market: A Biography of the Innovation Process. New York: Springer. CAEP, RUC, PRCEE, SEPA and CNEMC. (2006). China Green National Accounting Study

Report 2004, submitted to SEPA and NBS. Cairns, R. D. (2000). Accounting for Resource Depletion: A Microeconomic Approach.

Review of Income and Wealth, 46(1), pp. 21-31. Cao, S., Sun, G., Zhang, Z., Chen, L., Feng, Q., Fu, B., McNulty, S., Shankman, D., Tang, J.,

Wang, Y., and Wei, X. (2011). Greening China Naturally. Ambio, 40(7), pp. 828-831.

  71

Carter, N. T. and Mol, A. P. J. (2007). Environmental Governance in China. London: Routledge.

Cass, L. R. (2007). The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International

Norms, Domestic Politics, and Unachievable Commitments. SUNY series in Global Environmental Policy. New York: SUNY University of New York Press.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2015). The World Factbook: Australia. Retrieved from

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2015). The World Factbook: China. Retrieved from

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2015). The World Factbook: Germany. Retrieved from

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html. China Economic Review. (2009, March 4). “Green GDP” project cancelled. Retrieved

from http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/2009_03_04/Green_GDP_project_cancelled.html

Clark, B. S. (1998). Political Economy: A Comparative Approach. Westport, CT: Praeger

Publishers. Clark, W. C., Mitchell, R. B., and Cash, D. W., (2006). Evaluating the Influence of Global

Environmental Assessments. In Mitchell, R. B., Clark, W. C., Cash, D. W., and Dickson, N. M. (Eds.), Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Comisari, P. (2007). Depletion in SEEA—Narrowing down the options. Centre of

Environment and Energy Statistics. Prepared for the London Group meeting, Pretoria 26-30 March.

Common, M. (1990). Natural Resource Accounting and Sustainability. Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies Conference Paper. Australian National University.

Commoner, B. (1971). The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology. New York. Conca, K. (1995). Greening the United Nations: Environmental Organisations and the UN

System. Third World Quarterly, 16(3), pp. 441-457. Costanza, R., Daly, H. E., and Bartholomew, J. A. (1991). Goals, agenda, and policy

recommendations for ecological economics. In Costanza, R. (Ed.), Ecological economics: the science and management of sustainability (pp. 1-20). New York: Columbia University Press.

  72

Costanza, R., d’Arge, R., Groot, R. D., Farberk, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., Limburg, K., Naeem, S., Neill, R. V. O., Paruelo, J., Raskin, R. G., Suttonkk, P., Belt, M. V. D. (1997). The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature, 387, pp. 253-260.

Daly, H. E. (1977). Steady-State Economics. San Francisco: Freeman. Daly, H. E. (1991). Steady-State Economics, 2nd ed. Washington D. C.: Island Press. Daly, H. E. (1994). Operationalizing sustainable development by investing in natural capital.

In Jansson, M., Hammer, C., Folke, and Costanza, R. (Eds), Investing in natural capital. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Daly, H. (1996). Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston:

Beacon Press. Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G.M. (1979). The economic theory of exhaustible resources.

Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Dasgupta, P. and Maler, K. G. (2000). Green accounting welfare in Germany. In Cobb, C and

Cobb, J. (Eds.). The Green National Product. New York: University Press of America.

Davis, B. W. (1985). Federalism and environmental politics: An Australian overview. Environmentalist, 5(4), pp. 269-278.

Detao IGI. (2014). Future New Economy���: Sustainable Model towards an Ecological

Economy. Paper presented at Designing and Achieving a Desirable, Equitable and Prosperous Economy conference in Shanghai, China, 2.8-2.11, 2015.

Der Spiegel. (1990, January 8). Das Land der 1000 Vulkane. De Sherbinin, A., Reuben, A., Levy, M., and Johnson, L. (2013). Indicators in Practice: How

Environmental Indicators are Being Used in Policy and Management Contexts. New Haven and New York: Yale and Columbia Universities.

DeSombre, E. R. (2008). The Global Environment and World Politics. Baltimore, MD: The

Johns Hopkins University Press/Society for the History of Technology. DESTATIS. (2014). [Graphic illustration of DESTATIS Organizational Structure]

Organisation Structure. Retrieved from https://www.destatis.de/EN/AboutUs/SeniorManagementOrganisation/OrganisationChart.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

DESTATIS. (2014). Senior Management, Organisation. Retrieved from

  73

https://www.destatis.de/EN/AboutUs/SeniorManagementOrganisation/SeniorManage mentOrganisation.html Devarajan, S. and Fisher, A. C. (1981). Hotelling’s economics of exhaustible resources: Fifty years later. Journal of Economic Literature, 19(March), pp. 65-77.

Dietz, S and Neumayer, E. (2007). Weak and strong sustainability in SEEA: concepts and measurement. Ecological Economics, 61(4). pp. 617-626.

van Dijk, A., Mount, R., Gibbons, P., Vardon, M., Canadell, P. (2014). Environmental

reporting and accounting in Australia: Progress, prospects and research priorities. Science of the Total Environment 473-474, pp. 338-349.

Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS). (2002). Taiwan Area

Green GDP Trial Compilation Report. Taipei: DGBAS. Doyle, T. and Kellow, A. J. (1997). Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia.

South Melbourne: MacMillan Education Australia Pty Ltd. Economic and Political Weekly. (2009). A ‘Green’ GDP. Economic and Political Weekly,

44(49), p. 6. Editorial. (2007). Environmental accounting: Introducing SEEA-2003. Ecological

Economics, 61, pp. 589-591. El Serafy, S. (1989). The proper calculation of income from depletable natural resources. In

Ahmad, Y., El Serafy, S. and Lutz, E. (Eds.), Environmental Accounting for Sustainable Development (pp. 10-18). Washington DC: World Bank.

El Serafy, S. (1993). Country Macroeconomic Work and Natural Resources. Enviornmental

Working Paper No. 58. Washington DC: World Bank. El Serafy, S. (1996a). Weak and strong sustainability: Natural resources and national

accounting—Part 1. Environmental Taxation and Accounting, 1(1), pp. 27-48.

El Serafy, S. (1996b). Natural resources and national accounting: Impact on macroeconomic policy—Part II. Environmental Taxation and Accounting, 1(2), pp. 38-59.

El Serafy, S. (2006). The economic rationale for green accounting. In Lawn, P. (Ed.),

Sustainable Development Indicators in Ecological Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Monetary

Fund, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank. (2012). System of Environmental-Economic Accounting: Central Framework. (White cover publication, pre-edited text subject to official editing).

  74

Economy, E. C. (2004). The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenges to China’s

Future. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ECORYS. (2012). Survey of green growth / environmental sustainability accounting and

indicators. Technical Paper. UK: Department for International Development. Ehrlich, P. R. and Ehrlich, A. (1981). Extinction: The Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species. New York: Random House. Elias, N. (1994). The civilizing process (Volumes 1 and 2). Oxford: Blackwell. Emerson, J. W., Hsu, A., Levy, M. A., de Sherbinin, A. Mara, V., Esty, D. C., and Jaiteh, M.

(2012). 2012 Environmental Performance Index and Pilot Trend Environmental Performance Index. New Haven: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy.

Gowdy, J. M. (2000). Terms and Concepts in Ecological Economics. Wildlife Society

Bulletin, 28(1), pp. 26-33. Graham, J., Amos, B., Plumptre, T. (2003). Principles for good governance in the 21st

century. Institute on Governance, Policy brief No. 15. Guan, E., Liu, Z., Geng, Y., Linder, S., and Hubacek, K. (2012). The gigatonne gap in

China’s carbon dioxide inventories. Nature Climate Change, 2(8). Hackmann, H. and St. Clair, A. L. (2012). Transformative Cornerstones of Social Science

Research for Global Change. Paris: International Social Science Council. Hailin, Z. (n.d.). Local Authority Initiatives in Support of Agenda 21. Area Studies—China:

Regional Sustainable Development Review, 2. Hamilton, K., Ruta, G., and Tajibaeva, L. (2005). Capital Accumulation and Resource

Depletion: A Hartwick Rule Counterfactual. Work Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3480.

Harris, J. M. (1995). Ecological Economics: A New Perspective. The Good Society, 5(3), pp.

18-21. Hartwick, J. (1977). Intergenerational equity and the investing of rents from exhaustible

resources. American Economic Review, 66, pp. 972-974. Hartwick, J. (1996). Constant consumption as interest on capital. Scandinavian Journal of

Economics, 98(3), pp. 439-443. Hartwick, J. (2000). National Accounting and Capital. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

  75

Hartwick, J. and Olewiler, N. (1998). The Economics of Natural Resource Use, (2 edn.) Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Hezri, A. A. and Dovers, S. R. (2006). Sustainability indicators, policy and governance:

Issues for ecological economics. Ecological Economics, 60, pp. 86-99. Hicks, J. (1946). Value and Capital, (2 edn). London: Clarendon. Hobbes, T. (1651). The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. In Molesworth, W. (Ed.), English Works (pp. 2-11). Aalen, Germany: Scientia Hotelling, H. (1931). The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. Journal of Political

Economics, 39, pp. 137-175. Hua, Y. (2005). Wrangle over green GDP. Asia Times Online. Retrieved from

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC16Ad02.html Hufty, M. (2011). Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical Framework

(GAF). In Wiesman, U., Hurni, H., et al (Eds.), Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives (pp. 403-424). Bern: Geographica Bernensia.

International Labor Office (ILO). (2011). Greening the Global Economy—The Skills

Challenge. Skills for Employment (Policy brief). IUCN. (2013). Beyond GDP: Measuring Progress Towards a Green Economy. IUCN

Environmental Economics Occasional Paper Series on GDP as an Insufficient Tool for Measuring Progress Towards a Green Economy.

Jacobson, H. K. and Brown-Weiss, E. (1995). Strengthening compliance with international

environmental accords: preliminary observations from a collaborative project. Global Governance, 1(2), pp. 119-148.

Jinbo, W. and Yu, L. (2010). Research on natural resource issues in SEEA. Mechanic

Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), pp. 4734-4737. Jones, M. E. (1993). Origins of the East German Environmental Movement. German Studies

Review, 16(2), pp. 235-264. Karliner, J. (1997). The corporate planet: ecology and politics in the age of globalization.

San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Keller, D. (1997). Gleaning Lessons from Deep Ecology. Ethics and the Environment, 2(2),

pp. 139-148. Kutting, G. (2004). Globalization and the environment: Moving beyond neoliberal

  76

institutionalism. International Journal of Peace Studies, 9(1), pp. 29-46. Lawn, P. (2007). A Stock-Take of Green National Accounting Initiatives. Social Indicators Research, 80(2), pp. 427-460. Lie, P., Long, B., and Pamlin, C. (2005). Chinese Companies in the 21st century helping or destroying the planet? World Wildlife Fund survey. Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lester, M. (1995, February 26). Pedder: Lake of Sighs. Sunday Tasmanian.

Li, G. and Fang, C. (2014). Global mapping and estimation of ecosystem services values and gross domestic product: A spatially explicit integration on natural ‘green GDP’ accounting. Ecological Indicators, 46. pp. 293-314.

Li, V. and Lang, G. (2010). China’s “Green GDP” Experiment and the Struggle for

Ecological Modernisation. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 40(1), pp. 44-62. Lieberthal, K. (1997). China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy

Implementation. Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, China Environment Series.

Lintott, J. (1996). Environmental accounting: useful to whom and for what? Ecological

Economics, 16(3), pp. 179-190. Lipschutz, R. D. (1997). From place to planet: local knowledge and global environmental

governance. Global Governance, 3(1), pp. 83-102. Litfin, K. T. (1993). Eco-regimes: playing tug of war with the nation-state. In Lipschutz, R.

D. and Conca, K. (Eds), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics (pp. 94-117). New York: Columbia University Press.

Liu, J. and Guo, P. (2005). Comparable Green GDP and Its Implications to Sustainable

Development in Western China. Western China Conference, Yinchuan, Nig Xia, China.

MacNeill, J. (1990). The Greening of International Relations. International Journal, 45(1), pp. 1-35. Malthus, T. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population. London: J. Johnson. Manning, N., and Kraan, D. J. (2006). The metrics of tracking change in the public sector. Call for Papers for the Eleventh International Research Symposium on Public Management. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Matson, W. I. (1987). A New History of Philosophy. New York.

  77

Mayer, H. (2007). Calculation and analysis of a hybrid energy input-output table for

Germany within the Environmental-Economic Accounting (EEA). Paper presented at the 16th International Input-Output Conference. Istabul, Turkey: EEA Online Publication.

McGuirk, R. (2013, September 7). Conservatives sweep to Australia election victory. USA

Today. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/07/australia-election-labor-abbott/2779205/

McNie, E. (2006). Reconciling the supply of scientific information with user demands: an

analysis of the problem and review of the literature. Environmental Science & Policy, 10(17), pp. 17-38.

Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., and Behrens III, W. W. (1972). The Limits to

Growth. New York: New American Library. Mitter, D. and Wolle, S. (eds.). (1989). Ich liebe euch doch alle! Befehle und Lageberichte

des MfS, Januar-November 1989. Berlin: Basis Druck Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. Mol, A. P., Neil, J., and Carter, T. (2006). China’s Environmental governance in transition.

Environmental Politics, 15(20), pp. 149-170. Morton, S., Tinney, A. (2012). Independent review of Australian government environmental

information activity: final report. Canberra: DSEWPaC. Muhn, J. (1992). Early Administration of the Forest Reserve Act: Interior Department and

General Land Office Policies, 1891-1897. Bureau of Land Management. Retrieved from http://www.foresthistory.org/Publications/Books/Origins_National_Forests/sec17.htm

Munshi, I. (2000). ‘Environment’ in Sociological Theory. Sociological Bulletin, 49(2), pp.

253-266. Naess, A. and Sessions, G. (1984). A Deep Ecology Eight Point Platform. In Session, G.

(Ed.), Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism. Boston and London: Shambhala.

Naumann, J. (1988). Briefe, April report. Neumayer, E. (1999). Resource Accounting in Measures of Unsustainability: Challenging the

World Bank’s Conclusions. Environmental and Resource Economics, 15, pp. 257- 278.

Nordhaus, W. and Tobin, J. (1972). Is economic growth obsolete? In Economic Growth, The

  78

National Bureau of Economic Research, Fiftieth Anniversary Colloquium. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2003). Governance and development. Conference at the Institute for

Studies of International Applications. Oslo, Norway. OECD. (2015). What is green growth and how can it help deliver sustainable development?

Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/whatisgreengrowthandhowcanithelpdeliversustainabledevelopment.htm

OECD. (2012). Green Growth and Developing Countries. [Consultation Draft]. OECD. (2007). Environmental performance reviews: Australia. Paris: OECD. Orssatto, R. J. and Clegg, S. R. (1999). The political of ecology organizations: Toward a

framework for analyzing business environment relationships. Organization & Environment, 12, pp. 263-279.

Palm, V. and Larsson, M. (2007). Economic instruments and the environmental accounts.

Ecological economics, 61, pp. 684-692. Parson, E. (1995). Integrated Assessment and Environmental Policy Making: In pursuit of

usefulness. Energy Policy, 23(4/5), pp. 463-475. Paterson, M. (1999). Interpreting Trends in Global Environmental Governance. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 75(4), pp. 793-802.

Patil, P. G., Lange, G. M., Jain, S., Mealey, E., Narain, U., Angeles, M. S. D., Behrendt, H., Naikal, E., Cantrell, J., and Aguilar G., (2012). Moving Beyond GDP: How to factor natural capital into economic decision-making. The World Bank.

Paul-Wostl, C., Giupponi, C., Richards, K., Binder, C., de Sherbinin, A., Sprinz, D., Toonen, T., and van Bers, C. (2012). Transition towards a new global change science: Requirements for methodologies, methods, data and knowledge. Environmental Science & Policy, 28, pp. 36-47.

Pearce, D. (2002). An Intellectual History of Environmental Economics. Energy

Environment, 27, pp. 57-81. Pearce, D. W. and Turner, R. K. (1990). Economics of natural resources and the

environment. Hertfordshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Peskin, H. M. and Angeles, M. S. D. (2001). Accounting for Environmental Services:

Contrasting SEEA and the ENRAP Approaches. Review of Income and Wealth, 47(2).

  79

POINT. (2011). POINT Policy use and influence of indicators—Current use of and emerging needs for indicators in policy. A synthesis of the findings of the POINT project (No. 15). The Bayswater Insitute.

Qiu, J. (2007). China’s Green Accounting System on Shaky Ground. Nature, 448(2), pp.

518-19. Radermacher, W. (1993). The STABIS and CORINEL Land Cover projects: milestones on

the road to a greater spatial component in official statistics. In The impact of remote sensing on the European statistical information system—Proceedings of the seminar Bad Neuenahr, 22-24 Sept. 1992. Luxembourg.

Radermacker, W. (1999). Indicators, Green Accounting and Environment Statistics:

Information Requirements for Sustainable Development. International Statistical Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique, 67(3), pp. 339-354.

Rankin, W. (2011). Minerals, Metals and Sustainability: Meeting the Future Material Needs.

Collingwood, Victoria: CSIRO Publishing. Rauch, J. N. and Chi, Y. F. (2010). The Plight of Green GDP in China. Consilience: The

Journal of Sustainable Development, 3(1), pp. 102-116. Reed, M. S. (2008). Stakeholder participation for environmental management: A literature

review. Biological Conservation, 141, pp. 2417-2431. Repetto, R., Magrath, W., Wells, M., and Rossini, F. (1989). Wasting Assets: Natural

Resources in the National Income Accounts. World Resources Institute. Resources of the Future. (1952). Resources for Freedom. Report of the President’s Materials

Policy Commission. Richter, J. (1991). Environmental Accounting: Some Non Technical Remarks. Paper

presented at IARIW Conference, Baden. Rolls, E. (1995). Lake Pedder: Let’s Show the World We Care. The Sun Herald (Sydney,

Australia). Schoer, K. (2005). Policy use of Environmental-Economic Accounting in Germany. Federal

Statistical Office Germany, Environmental-Economic Accounting (EEA).

Schoer, K. (2006). Calculation of direct and indirect material inputs by type of raw material and economic activities. Federal Statistical Office Germany, Environmental- Economic Accounting (EEA).

Schweikart, L. (2004). A Patriot’s History of the United States. Sentinal HC, pp. 378-379.

  80

Sessions, G. (1987). The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review. Environmental Review: ER, 11(2), pp. 105-125.

Sheley, E. (Ed.). (2008). Environment: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Chapter: 6 Deforestation. New Haven: Yale University Press.

De Sherbinin, A., Reuben, A, Levy, M. A., Johnson, J. (2013). Indicators in Practice: How

Environmental Indicators are Being Used in Policy and Management Contexts. New Haven and New York: Yale and Columbia Universities.

Sinkule, B. J. and Ortolano, L. (1995). Implementing Environmental Policy in China.

Westport: Praeger. Smith, D. (2007, May 22). Australia’s carbon dioxide emissions twice world rate. The Sydney

Morning Herald. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/australias-greenhouse-emissions-twice-world-rate/2007/05/22/1179601374518.html

Smith, R. (2007). Development of SEEA 2003 and its implementation. Ecological

Economics, 61, pp. 592-599. Solow, R. M. (1974). The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics. The

American Economic Review, 64(2), pp. 1-14. Sorensen, K. (2000). Environmental Accounts in Norway. Paper prepared for the 26th General

Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth. Cracow, Poland, August 27-September 2, 2000.

Stringer, L. C., Reed, M. S., Dougill, A. J., Rokitzki, M., and Seely, M. (2007). Enhancing

participation in the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Natural Resources Forum, 31, pp. 198-211.

TerraDaily. (2006, September 7). Environmental pollution costs China 64 billion dollars in

2004. TerraDaily. Retrieved from http://www.terradaily.com/2006/060907094049.z78gdn6u.html.

Tientenberg, T. (1992). Environmental and natural resource economics (3rd ed.) New York: Harper Collins.

Tisato, P. (1995). Exhaustible Resource Depletion: A Modified Graphical Approach. The Journal of Economic Education, 26(1), p. 51-57.

Torras, M. (2006). Ecological Inequality in Assessing Well-Being: Some Applications. Policy Sciences, 38(4), pp. 205-224. Tschernobyl wirkt tuiberall. (1986). The original document is undated. Die taz, which ran

excerpts from the petition on 23 June 1986, 10, dates to the petition to 5 June.

  81

United Nations. (2015). The System of National Accounts (SNA). Retrived from

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.asp United Nations. (2014). System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA). Retrieved

from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp United Nations. (2011). Revision of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting

(SEEA): SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounting. Consultation Draft. Retrieved from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seearev/Chapters/SEEA_EEA_v1.pdf

United Nations. (1947). Measurement of National Income and the Construction of Social

Accounts: Studies and Reports of Statistical Methods No. 7. Geneva: United Nations Publications.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). (2008). Green Accounting Practice in

China (Draft report). UNEP-Tongji Institute of Environment for Sustainable Development (IESD).

UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). (2007). Indicators of Sustainable

Development: Guidelines and Methodologies. New York: United Nations. UNESCO and Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of ICSU (SCOPE). (2006). Indicators of Sustainability: Reliable Tools for Decision Making. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001500/150005e.pdf.

UNDESA. (2015). Green growth. Sustainable Development: Knowledge Platform. Retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1447

UNDESA. (2007). Public Governance Indicators: A Literature Review. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2014). Making those first steps count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php

Van der Ploeg, F. (2008). Voracious Transformation of a Common Natural Resource into

Productive Capital. Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies. OxCarre Research Paper No. 2008-02.

Van Tongeren, J., Schweinfest, S., Lutz, E., Luna, M. G., and Martin, G. (1993). Integrated

Economic and Environmental Accounting: A Case Study for Mexico. In Lutz, E. (Ed.), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment—an UNSTAT—World Bank symposium (pp. 85-107). Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Versetti, A. (2010). History of the Neoclassical Economics—Analysis of Failure of the

Neoclassical Thought. Cambridge: University of Cambridge.

  82

WAVES. (2015). A Dynamic Exchange on Natural Capital Accounting. Wealth Accounting

and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services. Retrieved from http://www.wavespartnership.org/en/dynamic-exchange-natural-capital-accounting

Walker, B. H. and Pearson, L. (2007). A resilience perspective of SEEA. Ecological

Economics, 61, pp. 708-715. Wapner, P. (1997). Governance in Global Civil Society. In Young, O. R. (Ed.), Global

Governance: Drawing Insights from Environmental Experience (p. 82). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Watts, D. (1988). Development and Renewable Resource Depletion in the Caribbean. Journal of Biogeography, 15(1), pp. 119-126.

WBCSD. (2010). Lafarge. WBCSD Ecosystems. Retrieved from

http://www.wbcsd.org/web/ecosystems/RTSummaries/Lafarge_CEV_Summary.pdf WCED. (1987). Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weber, T. (1999). Gandhi, Deep Ecology, Peace Research and Buddhist Economics. Journal

of Peace Research, 36(2), pp. 349-361. Weber, J. (2007). Implementation of land and ecosystem accounts at the European

Environment Agency. Ecological Economics, 61, pp. 695-707.

Weber, J. L. (2011). Issue paper on an experimental framework for simplified ecosystem capital accounts. Expert Meeting on Ecosystem Accounts, 5-7 December 2011, London UK.

Weitzman, M. L. (1976). On the Welfare Significance of National Production in a Dynamic

Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(1), pp. 156-162. West, J. (1988, March 17). Nuclear fallout leaves Govt’s promises in tatters. Herald. White, Jr. L. T. (1967). The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis. Science, 155(3767),

pp. 1203-1207. Winfield, M. S. (2009). Charting Sustainable Development in Canada 1987-2007. In Toner,

G. and Meadowcroft, J. (Eds.), Innovation, Science, Environment 1987-2007 (Chapter 5). McGill-Queen’s University Press.

White House. (2014). FACT SHEET: U.S.—China Joint Announcement on Climate Change

and Clean Energy Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c

  83

World Commision on Environment and Development (WCED). (1987). Our Common

Future. United Nations. World Economic Forum. (2014). Gobal Risks 2014, Ninth Edition. Geneva: World

Economic Forum. Xu, A., (2014, March 12). Grassroots Environmental Movement—the starting point for

constructing a Chinese civil society? ChinaWatcher. Retrieved from http://youthvoicechina.blogspot.com/2014/03/grassroots-environmental- movement.html

Young, M. (1990). Natural resource accounting. In Common, M and Dovers, S. (Eds.),

Moving toward Global Sustainability: Policies and Implications for Australia. Canberra: Centre for Continuing Education, Australian National University.

Zhu, L. (2013). Social Media and Public Diplomacy: Foreign to China’s Environmental

Movements. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 4(1), Art. 7.