PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE This article was downloaded by: [Universitaet Heidelberg] On: 20 April 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 789689604] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Democratization Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863 Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics Mikael Wigell Online Publication Date: 01 April 2008 To cite this Article Wigell, Mikael(2008)'Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics',Democratization,15:2,230 — 250 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510340701846319 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340701846319 Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Universitaet Heidelberg]On: 20 April 2009Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 789689604]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863
Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in ComparativePoliticsMikael Wigell
Online Publication Date: 01 April 2008
To cite this Article Wigell, Mikael(2008)'Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in ComparativePolitics',Democratization,15:2,230 — 250
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510340701846319
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340701846319
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types andConcepts in Comparative Politics
MIKAEL WIGELL
This article addresses the conceptual challenges involved in mapping political regimes. Thefirst section offers a critique of regime typologies that adopt a uni-dimensional approach to dif-ferentiating between political regimes. The second section shows why a two-dimensional typol-ogy is better grounded in liberal democratic theory as well as for analytically grasping theempirical variation between political regimes and regime change. The penultimate section pro-poses a classificatory scheme on the basis of a clear set of defining attributes of the two con-stitutive dimensions of liberal democracy – electoralism and constitutionalism. Equippedwith this two-dimensional classificatory device the article proceeds in the last section topropose a regime typology with four main types of regime: democratic, constitutional-oli-garchic, electoral-autocratic, and authoritarian. This provides a conceptual map in which thecategories and subcategories developed by the literature on hybrid regimes can be locatedand analytically related to each other. The last section further divides the category ofdemocratic regimes into four subtypes: liberal, constitutional, electoral, and limited.
Note: The plus indicates the presence of the bundle of attributes listed at the top of each respective column.The minus indicates the absence of the bundle of attributes.þ/2 indicates that the bundle of attributes maybe either present or absent.
MAPPING ‘HYBRID REGIMES’ 243
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
minimal constitutional conditions established above. The ‘pure’ type of an authoritar-
ian regime can be called ‘closed hegemony’ (CH), that is to say a type of authoritar-
ianism where all the minimal defining attributes are missing. Moving upwards within
this category we may find cases in which some of the minimal electoral attributes are
present (free, fair, competitive, or inclusive elections). Moving rightwards we may
find cases where some of the minimal constitutional attributes are present (the civil
rights and freedoms enlisted above). However, the important point is that neither
the minimal electoral nor the minimal constitutional conditions are fully met,
which confines the case to some form of authoritarianism, whether it is a type of
closed or more ‘enhanced’ form of authoritarianism.
The category of electoral-autocratic regimes includes cases that fulfil the minimal
electoral conditions, but not the minimal constitutional conditions. The pure type
of an electoral-autocratic regime can be called ‘populist autocracy’ (PA), which is
a type of electoral autocracy where all the electoral conditions are met but without
fulfilling the constitutional minimum. Hence, in this categorical space we find
cases that combine the minimal electoral conditions with some or all of the expanded
electoral attributes and perhaps some of the minimal constitutional attributes. Regime
subcategories such as hegemonic-, competitive- and electoral-authoritarianism ident-
ified by the literature on hybrid regimes are perhaps to be found among these cases.
The main advantage with this conceptualization, however, is that it allows us to
locate and logically relate various forms of populist political regimes to other
regime categories. To take the paradigmatic example of Peronism in Argentina, it
seems empirically valid to place the Peronist regime of 1946–1955 in this category.
Most analysts of Argentine politics maintain that the Peronist government was elected
in open elections, in other words the Argentine regime met the minimal electoral con-
ditions as stipulated above (free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections). However,
many analysts certainly hesitate to give a clean record regarding the minimal consti-
tutional conditions in Argentina during that period. This is exactly how an insti-
tutional conceptualization of populism would have it – populist regimes are cases
of unfettered majoritarianism with little respect for constitutional rights and rules.
Peron’s Argentina was an intensely popularizing regime that enfranchised the
entire population and empowered the elected government with wide, but poorly con-
strained, executive power. The two-dimensional regime typology, with its consist-
ently defined thresholds, possesses an important advantage over a uni-dimensional
typology, in that it allows us to conceptualize populism as an electoral-autocratic
regime – a type of regime that scores high on the electoral dimension and low on
the constitutional dimension of democracy. A contemporary example of such a
regime is Venezuela under Hugo Chavez.
The antipode of an electoral-autocratic regime is a constitutional-oligarchic
regime. The category of constitutional-oligarchic regimes includes cases that fulfil
the constitutional minimum but not the electoral minimum. The pure type of a con-
stitutional regime is what can be called ‘liberal oligarchy’41 (LO). This is a regime
type in which all the constitutional attributes are present, including the expanded con-
stitutional conditions, but that does not fulfil the electoral minimum. In this categori-
cal space we may thus find cases such as the constitutional monarchies of the late
244 DEMOCRATIZATION
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
nineteenth century Europe, Latin American oligarchical liberalism of roughly the
same period, and possibly regimes such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong of
more recent date. They all combine high levels of constitutionalism with low levels
of electoralism.
Finally, in the category of democratic regimes we find cases that fulfil the pro-
cedural minimum of political democracy, that is both the minimal electoral and con-
stitutional conditions. The pure type of a democratic regime is of course ‘liberal
democracy’ (LD). Liberal democracy is the type of democracy that fulfils not only
the procedural minimum, but also the expanded definition incorporating all 16 defin-
ing attributes. The next section will further divide this particular regime category into
its subtypes, in other words, types of democracy.
Types of Democracy
In the conceptual space of democratic regimes (represented by the upper right-hand
‘box’ in Figure 3) can be found ‘democracies with adjectives’ such as ‘illiberal’,
‘delegative’, and ‘tutelary’. These subcategories have been invented to conceptualize
‘reduced’ forms of liberal democracy. In Table 3 I propose a conceptual model with
four (sub)types of democratic regime.
All four subcategories are political democracies as defined by the minimal elec-
toral and constitutional criteria. However, all except liberal democracy suffer from
certain institutional defects, either in the electoral dimension (constitutional democ-
racy), or in the constitutional dimension (electoral democracy), or in both dimensions
(limited democracy). Constructing ‘diminished subtypes’42 of liberal democracy
serves to create analytical differentiation among democratic regimes, without stretch-
ing the concept of liberal democracy to cases that deviate from certain standards and
practices inherent in the idea of liberal democratic rule. As such the model facilitates
comparison among cases both with regard to type and degree of democracy, which
can be applied in a comparative analysis of the origins and consequences of liberal
democratic quality. Figure 4 depicts the typology of democracy in a two-dimensional
conceptual space.
In the category limited democracy there are cases that fall short on some or all of
the additional defining attributes, both electoral and constitutional. It is likely that
most Central American democracies with the exception of Costa Rica as well as
Note: The plus indicates the presence of the bundle of liberal democratic attributes listed at the top of eachrespective column. The minus indicates the absence of the bundle of attributes.
MAPPING ‘HYBRID REGIMES’ 245
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
most African democracies fall into this category. In these countries many of the
defects that O’Donnell, Valenzuela and others have described are present. Improving
the quality of democracy in these countries will entail further popularization (improv-
ing electoral empowerment, integrity, sovereignty, and irreversibility) as well as lib-
eralization (improving executive, legal, and local government accountability, as well
as bureaucratic integrity).
In the category electoral democracy can be found cases that fulfil the additional
electoral conditions, but not the additional constitutional conditions. These are cases
that may show ‘delegative’ or ‘neo-populist’43 forms of rule. Their electoral insti-
tutions are effective for producing vertical accountability, but their limited consti-
tutional institutions fail to produce horizontal accountability.44 Thailand under the
Thai Rak Thai government belongs to this category, as well as South Korea under
the era of the ‘three Kims’.45 Argentina under the government of Carlos Menem,
1989–1999, is a paradigmatic example of an electoral democracy. His government
blatantly exploited Argentina’s limited constitutional institutions and traditions in
order to impose its structural reform programme. By taking advantage of the legiti-
macy provided by Argentina’s strong electoral institutions and its populist traditions
Menem was able to circumvent the weak constitutional controls provided by a poli-
ticized judiciary. At the same time, however, the sustainability of the structural
reforms was compromised exactly because of these limited constitutional conditions –
a bureaucracy with weak integrity and ‘brown’ legislators46 fighting to sustain their
local power bases through prebendalism.
In the category constitutional democracy can be found cases that fulfil the
additional constitutional conditions, but not the additional electoral conditions.
Hence, these are cases that may show ‘tutelary’ or ‘protected’ forms of rule. They
are a type of democracy with effective horizontal, intra-state checks and balances,
FIGURE 4
A TWO-DIMENSIONAL TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY
246 DEMOCRATIZATION
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
but limited opportunities for citizens to enforce responsiveness of the elected officials
to their immediate demands. Post-Pinochet Chile is a paradigmatic case of such a con-
stitutional democracy. The democratic opposition to Pinochet was forced by the out-
going authoritarian regime to accept conditions placed in the military constitution that
guaranteed a number of reserved policy domains and reserved positions in the Senate
to military appointees, as well as a grossly biased electoral system granting a decisive
edge to conservative candidates when votes are translated into seats. On top of that, a
National Security Council was inaugurated with its jurisdiction vaguely defined as
serving ‘the national interest’, but in reality functioning as a tutelary power ‘protect-
ing’ the regime from resorting to populism. It is also what the Thai military that over-
threw the Thai Rak Thai government seems to aspire. On the other hand, the Chilean
post-authoritarian regime has benefited from a very strong tradition of liberal-
constitutionalism and effective institutions of horizontal accountability. In fact,
with regard to the additional conditions of constitutionalism, Chile is an interesting
outlier in a region better known for populism than liberal-constitutionalism.
Whether this can explain some of Chile’s post-authoritarian socio-economic
success and stability is an intriguing question, not least when set against the socio-
economic crises to which Argentina’s electoral democracy has been prone.
Lastly, in the category liberal democracy can be found cases that fulfil all the
additional electoral and constitutional criteria. It is unlikely that many liberal democ-
racies exist in Africa. In Latin America, Uruguay and Costa Rica are possibly liberal
democracies. In Asia, at least Japan and Taiwan seem to belong to this category.
Liberal democracies depict high democratic quality and it seems reasonable to
expect that cases of liberal democracy will endure as stable democracies for a good
while longer. These do not suffer from any of the defects discussed above and can
thus be considered consolidated.
Conclusion
The field of comparative regime analysis has seen an enormous proliferation of
‘regimes with adjectives’, that employ qualifiers to highlight the hybrid or mixed
character of regimes in which democratic features to varying extents are combined
with authoritarian practices. However, these concepts have rarely been specified
according to logically consistent rules and it remains largely unclear how these
concepts relate to each other. The outcome has often been conceptual ambiguity
and empirical confusion over how to engage in conceptual travelling, obscuring the
precise lines along which comparisons are to be made.
The two-dimensional regime typology proposed in this article provides a device
for analytically locating these hybrid regimes and for ordering the semantic field of
comparative regime analysis. Based on a two-dimensional conceptualization of
liberal democracy it proceeds to create diminished subtypes that are logically
related to each other on the basis of a clear set of defining attributes. As such, it pro-
vides an analytically richer device for comparing political regimes and regime qual-
ities than uni-dimensional typologies. In addition to a simple graded, uni-dimensional
scale that only answers the question of ‘more or less’, diminished subtypes convey
MAPPING ‘HYBRID REGIMES’ 247
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
sharper, more disaggregated differentiation regarding ‘more or less of what’.47 The
typology proposed in this article provides a more nuanced understanding of the vari-
ations between regimes, and how different types of regimes may indeed overlap, by
introducing such diametrically opposite regime categories as electoral-autocracy vs.
constitutional-oligarchy, as well as subcategories such as electoral vs. constitutional
democracy. This serves to combine insights from both the dichotomous as well as the
graded approach, offering considerable analytical advantage over the conventional
uni-dimensional regime typologies that hitherto have come to dominate the field of
comparative regime analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is indebted to Gerardo Munck, Kenneth Shadlen and the two anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful comments. Financial support from the Academy of Finland is gratefully acknowledged.
NOTES
1. Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1(2002), pp. 5–21.
2. Various scholars have expressed their concern over the conceptual confusion resulting from the enor-mous proliferation of concepts based on qualifying adjectives. It is argued that these concepts are ofteninconsistently defined and rarely specified as to how they relate to other concepts. See, for instance:Ariel C. Armony and Hector E. Schamis, ‘Babel in Democratization Studies’, Journal of Democracy,Vol. 16, No. 4 (2005), pp. 113–28; David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives:Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), pp. 430–51;Gerardo L. Munck, ‘Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratiza-tion’, Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series, Working Paper #228 (1996).
3. Armony and Schamis (note 2).4. Some notable examples of such indexes of democracy include: Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘Issues in the Com-
parative Measurement of Political Democracy’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1980),pp. 370–90; Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, ‘Measuring Polyarchy’, Studies in Com-parative International Development, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1990), pp. 51–72; Axel Hadenius,Democracy andDevelopment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Tatu Vanhanen, ‘A New Dataset forMeasuring Democracy, 1810–1998’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2000), pp.251–65; and the Polity Dataset (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/). The Freedom House Index(http://www.freedomhouse.org/) is also widely used as a measure of democracy, although it is strictlyspeaking a measure of ‘freedom’, rather than democracy. For an excellent review of the various indexesof democracy, see Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy.Evaluating Alternative Indices’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5–34.
5. Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1994), pp.55–69; also Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: TheJohns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
6. William Case, ‘Democracy’s Quality and Breakdown: New Lessons from Thailand’, Democratization,Vol. 14, No. 4 (2007), pp. 622–42, 636.
7. For a discussion of some of these authoritarianisms with adjectives, see the collection of essays ‘Elec-tions Without Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 21–80, with contri-butions from Larry Diamond, Andreas Schedler, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, and Nicolasvan de Walle. For the seminal elaboration of the concept ‘bureaucratic-authoritarianism’, as well asfor some of the traits inherent in ‘populist-authoritarianism’, see Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernizationand Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973).
8. Diamond, Developing Democracy (note 5).9. Larry Diamond, ‘Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation’,
in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 53.
248 DEMOCRATIZATION
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
10. Gerardo L. Munck, ‘The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies’, World Politics,Vol. 54, No. 1 (2001), pp. 119–44, 125–6.
11. Diamond, Developing Democracy (note 5), p. 279.12. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987); Adam
Przeworski, et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World,1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
13. For a discussion, see Pierre Ostiguy, ‘Populism, Democracy, and Representation: MultidimensionalConcepts and Regime Types in Comparative Politics’, Paper presented at the 2001 LASA Conference,Washington DC, 6–8 September 2001.
14. Diamond, Developing Democracy (note 5), p. 16.15. Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Anıbal Perez-Linan, ‘Classifying Political Regimes in Latin
America, 1945–1999’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001),pp. 37–65.
16. Sartori (note 12) provides an excellent review of liberal democratic theory.17. See John Dunn, Setting the People Free. The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005). This
is not to ignore the normative appeal of the participatory model of democracy, but only to acknowledgethat contemporary democracies have followed the republican trajectory, but for a few partial exceptionssuch as Switzerland. It is the institutions and mechanisms of representative democracy that are the mainobjectives of recent comparative literature on hybrid regimes and democratization.
18. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy Is . . . And Is Not’, Journal of Democ-racy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1991), pp. 75–88, 83.
19. Robert A. Dahl,Polyarchy: Participation andOpposition (NewHaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).20. Carothers (note 1).21. On procedural minimum definitions, see Collier and Levitsky (note 2).22. Terry L. Karl, ‘The Hybrid Regimes of Central America’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1995),
pp. 72–86.23. For instance, Andreas Schedler, ‘The Menu of Manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2
(2002), pp. 36–50; Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (eds), The(Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (Notre Dame, IL: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1999); Karl (note 22); Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization,and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some PostcommunistCountries’, in Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization (NotreDame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), pp. 133–57; J. Samuel Valenzuela, ‘DemocraticConsolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions’, inScott Mainwaring et al. (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South AmericanDemocracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press,1992), pp. 57–104.
24. According to Giovanni Sartori, theories of democracy in the procedural tradition work from theassumption that electoral competition produces democratic consequences because of the feedbackmechanism produced by elected officials’ anticipated reactions. Sartori explains this logic asfollows: ‘Elected officials seeking reelection (in a competitive setting) are conditioned, in theirdeciding, by the anticipation (expectation) of how electorates will react to what they decide’. Fromthis perspective, ‘Democracy is the by-product of a competitive method for leadership recruitment’.Sartori (note 12), pp. 152–3.
25. For instance, Terry L. Karl, ‘Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America’, Comparative Politics,Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1–21.
26. Mike Alvarez et al., ‘Classifying Political Regimes’, Studies in Comparative International Develop-ment, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1996), pp. 3–36, 18.
27. Collier and Levitsky (note 2).28. For a discussion, see Valenzuela (note 23). Also Schedler (note 23).29. Schedler (note 23).30. Valenzuela (note 23), p. 67.31. Richard Snyder and David Samuels, ‘Devaluing the Vote in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), pp. 146–59. See also Schedler (note 23), p. 45.32. Valenzuela (note 23), pp. 62–3.33. Schedler (note 23), p. 41.34. Valenzuela (note 23). See also Hans-Joachim Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions and Democracy’, Democra-
tization, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2000), pp. 21–50, 37.35. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’ (note 5), p. 59
MAPPING ‘HYBRID REGIMES’ 249
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009
36. See O’Donnell, ‘On the State’ (note 23); Jonathan Fox, ‘The Difficult Transition from Clientelism toCitizenship: Lessons from Mexico’, World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1994), pp. 151–84; EdwardL. Gibson, ‘Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries’,World Politics,Vol. 58, No. 1 (2005), pp. 101–32.
37. O’Donnell, ‘On the State’ (note 23), p. 139.38. O’Donnell, ‘On the State’ (note 23).39. Ibid.40. A related question concerns regime quality. The typology assumes popularization and liberalization to
improve democratic quality by strengthening formal democratic procedures (i.e., electoralism and con-stitutionalism). The categorization is not concerned with the question what may constitute ‘authoritar-ian quality’. From a normative standpoint, ‘high quality authoritarianism’ relates to substantiveoutcomes, not formal procedures. The effectiveness of different political regimes to realize substantivegoals is a question for empirical analysis.
41. ‘Liberal oligarchy’ is advanced here as a more universal concept than Latin American ‘oligarchical lib-eralism’, that usually only refers to a certain period in Latin American history. In practice, the actualcases of that period also fall short of ‘liberal oligarchy’ as an ideal type.
42. For a discussion, see Collier and Levitsky (note 2). ‘Diminished subtypes’ are not full instances of aroot concept, in this case the concept of liberal democracy, although some of the attributes definingthe root concept are identified as present.
43. For a discussion of ‘neo-populism’ as a regime type, see Kurt Weyland, ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept:Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’,Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2001), pp. 1–22.
44. The concept of accountability has emerged as one of the key issues in comparative regime analysis.This re-emergence of accountability as key for understanding and improving democratic quality wasto a large extent influenced by O’Donnell, who conceptualized accountability as running in two direc-tions, vertical and horizontal. See Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democra-cies’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1998), pp. 112–26.
45. See Aurel Croissant, ‘Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of Delegative Democracy:A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea’, Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 3(2003), pp. 68–98; Hyug Baeg Im, ‘Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy atthe End of the “Three Kims” Era’, Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 5 (2004), pp. 179–98.
46. O’Donnell describes the interests of ‘brown’ legislators as limited to ‘sustain the system of privatizeddomination that has elected them, and to channel toward the system as many state resources as possible.The tendency of their vote is, thus, conservative and opportunistic. For their success they depend on theexchange of “favors” with the executive and various state bureaucracies and, under weakened execu-tives that need some kind of congressional support, they often obtain the control of state agencies thatfurnish those resources. This increases the fragmentation (and the deficits) of the state – the brownspots invade even the bureaucratic apex of the state’. O’Donnell (note 23), p. 140.
47. David Collier and Robert Adcock, ‘Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choicesabout Concepts’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 537–65, 561.
Manuscript accepted for publication November 2007.
Address for correspondence: Mikael Wigell, Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), London Schoolof Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.E-mail: [email protected].
250 DEMOCRATIZATION
Downloaded By: [Universitaet Heidelberg] At: 21:59 20 April 2009