Mar 14, 2016
South Asian StudiesVolume: VI
:
Waters Managing South Asia's
Volume VI, “Managing South Asia's Waters" of the South Asian Studies series was
prepared by members of one of the 14
research groups established under the
South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA)
Network, and assigned to examine the
problems of managing the region's water
resources, including policy approaches,
resource sharing, and water quality
issues. The volume also contains articles
previously published in the South Asian
Journal to supplement this analysis.
© 2006 Free Media Foundation
All rights reserved.
First printing June 2006Editorial collective: Imtiaz Alam (series
editor); Dr Akbar S Zaidi (series
coordinator); Zebunnisa Burki, Waqar
Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha (copy
editors); and Muhammad Adeel
(publication designer).Produced and designed at the Free Media
Foundation and South Asian Free Media
Association (SAFMA), Lahore, PakistanThe findings, interpretations, and
conclusions expressed in this book are
those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the South Asian
Journal or the South Asian Policy Analysis
(SAPANA) Network. The South Asian Journal and Free Media
Foundation encourage use of the material
presented herein, with appropriate credit.
South Asian Policy Analysis Network(SAPANA)
9 Lower Ground FloorEden Heights, Jail Road
Lahore, Pakistanwww.southasianmedia.net
ISBN 969-9060-07-7
iii
About SAPANA
ogether with the South Asian Free Media Association
(SAFMA), the South Asian Journal conceived a research
programme in 2005 to develop a “virtual” think-tank Tcomprising an interactive network of scholars from across South
Asia. From this initiative emerged the South Asian Policy Analysis
(SAPANA) Network - an autonomous, independent, and cross-
disciplinary research and analysis platform for initiating informed
policy debates, undertaking fresh research, critically evaluating
existing research and public policy, and proposing alternative policy
measures in South Asia.
As a first step, 14 working groups were set up under SAPANA to
carry out research and propose policy alternatives on issues crucial to
the region. The groups presented more than 80 draft research papers
at a conference organised by the South Asian Journal, titled
“Envisioning South Asia”, which was held in Islamabad (Pakistan) on
29-30 April 2006, and attended by more than 150 eminent scholars
from across the region. After incorporating the feedback generated
by the conference, these papers have been collated for publication as
a 14-volume series titled South Asian Studies. The series is intended
for public perusal, media review, public debate, and the
consideration of policymakers.
When SAPANA was formed, the need for “yet another think-tank”
was questioned, given that there are already numerous institutions
involved in similar work. We, at SAFMA and SAPANA, have found
that most current research in South Asia is either too
departmentalised or too technical for it to be accessible by a non-
academic audience; and that it is greatly influenced by official and
dominant technocratic paradigms.
SAPANA will endeavour to undertake critical, independent,
objective, practical, and pro-people research to pursue an alternative
policy agenda for sustainable development and the empowerment of
people. It will also engage the public and policymakers along with
other major stakeholders in order to sustain informed and
constructive dialogue between the state and civil society. In
collaboration with SAFMA, SAPANA will bring its research-based
findings within the domain of public discourse, rather than leave it to
the mercy of dust or termites.
The next phase will begin with formally establishing a board of
advisors comprising prominent and able academics and researchers
from across South Asia. It is hoped that SAPANA will establish itself
as a leading think-tank in South Asia within the first five years of its
inception. The major tasks that lie ahead are: (i) building a
comprehensive database of scholars and researchers who are either
based in South Asia or based overseas but specialise in the region;
(ii) planning research themes for subsequent years, arranging
workshops on these themes, and publishing the findings that
emerge; and (iii) organising a larger conference every two years to
bring together new themes, new research, and emerging scholars.
Apart from these tasks, SAPANA will design projects and
commission research that is of public and policy interest, and will
liaise with policymakers and governments through the media. As a
“virtual” institution, it will engage scholars and researchers on
specific undertakings, and thus set a new direction for the South Asia
of our hopes.
viv
Preface: Water Issues in South Asia ixImtiaz Alam
Recommendations of SAPANA xiiiResearch Group
Executive Summary xviiDr Zaigham Habib
South Asian Water Concerns 22Ramaswamy R Iyer
A Policy Management Approach to 37Pakistan's Water ResourcesDr Zaigham Habib
Nepal's National Water Plan 62Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal
Water Resources Management 85in BangladeshGiasuddin Ahmed Choudhury
Bangladesh's Water Issues 107Emaduddin Ahmad
Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview 126Ramaswamy R Iyer
Pakistan and the Baglihar Hydro 136Electric Project Shahid Husain
Contents
Arsenic Poisoning and Domestic 151Water Supply in BangladeshDr M Abdul Ghani
Decentralizing South Asia's 161Rural Water SectorDr Satyajit Singh
Water Politics in Pakistan 173Dr Zaigham Habib
India's River Linking Plans 186Syed Shahid Husain
Nepal's Hydel Power for Export 197Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki
SAPANA Conference Declaration 209(Islamabad, April 2006)
viivi
ixviii
Acknowledgements
The South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA)
Network would like to thank all the contributors to
this volume - their insight into and understanding
of a tumultuous region and the challenges it faces
provides a myriad of insights that could help define
new options for and approaches to tackling South
Asia's most pressing issues. Contributors to the
volume include (in alphabetical order):
Emaduddin Ahmad, Dr Giasuddin Ahmed
Choudhury, and Dr M Abdul Ghani from
Bangladesh; Ramaswamy R Iyer and Dr Satyajit
Singh from India; Dr Upendra Gautam, Ajoy Karki,
and Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal from Nepal; and Dr
Zaigham Habib and Shahid Husain from Pakistan.
SAPANA would also like to acknowledge the
contribution of the series coordinator, Dr Akbar S
Zaidi; the research group coordinator, Dr Zaigham
Habib; and the editorial and design collective at
the South Asian Journal, Lahore - Zebunnisa
Burki, Waqar Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha for
their hard work and editing, and Muhammad
Adeel for designing the volume - without which
this volume could not have been published.
Finally, SAPANA is immensely grateful to the
Royal Netherlands Embassy and Royal Norwegian
Embassy for their generous support, without which
the production of this series would not have been
possible.
Water Issues in South Asia
f there is any single most important issue that mars bilateral
relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it is water.
The issues of cross-border water distribution, utilisation, Imanagement and mega irrigation/hydro-electric power projects
affecting the upper and lower riparian countries are gradually taking
centre-stage in defining interstate relations as both water scarcity
and demand increase and drought and floods make life too often
miserable.
Thanks to its location, size and contiguous borders with other South
Asian countries, it is India, in its capacity as both upper and lower
riparian, that has come into conflict with most of its neighbours,
except Bhutan, on the cross-border water issues. Given an
atmosphere of mistrust, upper riparian India has serious issues to
resolve with lower riparian Pakistan and Bangladesh and, despite
being lower riparian, with the upper riparian Nepal. This, however,
does not mean that India is solely responsible for certain deadlocks,
even though its share of responsibility may be larger than other
countries which have their own physical limitations and political
apprehensions.
As elsewhere in the world, and more particularly in the subcontinent
where population explosion continues and environmental
degradation worsens, water resources, like energy, are going to be
much lower than the increasing demand, even if they are harnessed
to the most optimum. Given the depleting resources of water, the
issues of human security, and water security as its most crucial part,
are going to assume astronomical proportions. The issues of water
Preface
xix
distribution and management are bringing not only countries of the
region, but also states and regions within provinces into conflict
since they are not being settled amicably within a grand framework
of riparian statutes respecting upstream and downstream rights.
What is, however, quite appreciable is that the countries of the
subcontinent have made certain remarkable efforts to resolve their
differences over water distribution through bilateral agreements.
India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960
allocating three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India and
three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. The IWT
has remarkably survived the ups and downs of Indo-Pak relations,
and despite wars the parties have upheld the Treaty. Although
serious differences persist over various projects being undertaken by
India over Jhelum (2 projects) and Chenab (9 projects) rivers, the
IWT provides a legal mechanism to iron out differences and settle
disputes as in the case of Baglihar Project. Similarly, the Ganges
Water-Sharing Treaty (GWST) was signed between India and
Bangladesh in 1996 and resolved the dispute over Farakha Barrage,
although differences continue on Bangladesh's share of water during
the lean period. Nepal and India also signed the Mahakali Treaty in
1996, but despite ratification by the Nepalese parliament, the Treaty
has remained stalled due to the politics of expediency.
Despite these treaties, serious differences over water sharing, water
management and hydropower projects continue to spoil relations
between India, on the one hand, and Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Nepal, on the other. Differences between India and Pakistan
continue to create ill-will between the two on around 11 large
hydroelectric projects India plans to construct, including the
Baglihar Project over which a neutral expert appointed by the World
Bank is about to conclude his arbitration that should be acceptable to
both sides. More than the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, the
issue of the waters of Jhelum and Chenab has the potential to once
again provoke people in Pakistan against India and push the two
countries to war.
Bangladesh, which shares 54 rivers with India as a lower riparian,
has serious differences with New Delhi that hinder agreement on
eight rivers, besides the continuing complaints by Dhaka over
sharing of water of Ganges. The Indian plan, which is now under
review, to build a big river-linking-project that includes diversion of
water from Ganges and Brahmaputra, has become yet another source
of antagonism between the two countries who have not been able to
sort out their differences over a whole range of issues that continue
to fuel political tension which, in turn, does not allow the resolution
of differences over water.
As an upper riparian, Nepal has a different relationship with India
and faces many problems in constructing its dams due to opposition
by the lower riparian and has serious doubts about the projects
proposed by India. Nepal's mistrust, beside other factors, has been
reinforced by what it perceives to be various unequal treaties --
starting from Sharada Dam construction (1927), 1950 Treaty and
Letters of Exchange of 1950 and 1965, Koshi Agreement (1954),
Gandak Agreement ((1959), Tanakpur Agreement (1991) and the
Mahakali Treaty (1996). Since 400 million people live in the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and Meghna region, India needs Nepal to meet its
energy needs and for management of water.
Besides many issues of water sharing among the countries of
subcontinent, crucial water and energy issues are critically affecting
the food security, environment and agriculture. Above all,
projections of scarcity of water present a doomsday scenario. There
are serious differences over water-sharing within different
states/provinces in India (Ravi-Beas dispute between Punjab and
Haryana and Cauvery dispute among the states of Karnataka, Tamil
Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry) and Pakistan (water sharing dispute
and construction of dams over Indus between Punjab and Sindh and
also NWFP). Rigorous exploitation of groundwater in India and
Pakistan is rapidly depleting aquifers, which is a cause of great
concern. Contamination of water and presence of arsenic in
groundwater has become a major concern, especially, in Bangladesh
and some parts of India and Pakistan.
Climatic changes that are being forecasted and low-water discharges
need to be addressed collectively. India should, as SAFMA's Delhi
Declaration calls, 'make more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its
neighbours problems relating to river waters. A new regional
understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-
Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water issues'. Regional
Riparian Statutes must be obligatory to resolve the bilateral water
xiiixii
disputes. RRR statute model, respecting Helsinki Convention
proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights should guide the
countries of subcontinent to avoid conflict over water and reach a
lasting understanding for the collective good of our peoples. Lastly,
the 'middle-path' adopted by Bhutan should guide the planners for
sustainable development that is environment friendly and is not
carried by supply-side approach of the big dam lobbies.
Volume VI, Managing South Asia's Waters, of South Asian Studies
Series addresses the major water issues of the countries of and the
South Asian region, besides addressing the water security, sharing
and management of waters among the upper and lower riparian. It
includes not only the research papers by the members of the Group
on Water, but also articles by leading experts published earlier in the
South Asian Journal.
Imtiaz Alam
Recommendations of SAPANA Research Group
The SAPANA research group assigned to examine issues of water
resource management in South Asia comprised the following people:
1. Dr Zaigham Habib (group coordinator), Pakistan;2. Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury, Bangladesh;3. Ramaswamy R Iyer, India;4. Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal, Nepal;5. Dr Satyajit Singh, India.
Increasingly, governments and concerned institutions are realizing
the need to address acute shortage of energy and water, incidence of
drought and floods that often bring miseries to the people and, at
times, states into conflict. The distribution and management of water
resources, though quite a divisive issue among the upper and lower
riparian regions across states, needs to be undertaken amicably
without depriving the lower and upper riparian regions of their due
to avoid a conflict over water issues which must not be politicized.
Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and
Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India
must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali
Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing
reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage
water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower
riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome
their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects
xvxiv
within the framework of the IWT, on the other.
There are other major water related problems that need to be
addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the
member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security.
There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can
be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would
involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all
concerned countries would have to agree.
The group's recommendations are summarised below. 1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by
increasing gap between increasing water demand and
insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing
new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional
conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water
needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new
management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the
socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and
institutional capacity. The following general and specific
recommendations could be made, based on the group
discussion:2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower
riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and
Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development
interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower
(Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and
multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and
the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option.
(proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example)3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of
decentralization and local management. Different models have
been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil
society, political acceptance and local institutional
implementation capacity as the key elements. The national
experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the
proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must
be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture.
The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan
and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector.
5. All infrastructure developments should consider long term
conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies,
including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and
regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom
engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to
political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical
options must be formulated across the appropriate local
hydrological and political boundaries.6. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and
increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the
growing challenges for the planning and development. The
secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable
distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and
regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector
as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines.7. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the
knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.
xviixvi
Executive SummaryDr Zaigham Habib
he Himalayan water resources are shared by India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. South Asia is generally facing
deficit of useable water for the existing and future needs, Tdeterioration of water resources, management inefficiencies,
development concerns and water legislation. The infrastructure
development is considered inevitable in the region for the
hydropower generation and to meet water demands. While facing
problems in the selection of technical solutions, water sharing within
and across the countries and water productivity; all countries are
experimenting management changes to various degrees. Five papers
from the South Asia water group review country specific and trans-
boundary issues, brief highlights from different papers are given
below:
Ramaswamy R. Iyer summarizes water issues of South Asian
countries, trans-boundary water conflicts between India and other
countries while emphasizing alternative approaches. For the water
crises of India, he suggests; “through a combination of two
approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost
economy and efficiency in water-use and of resource-conservation,
and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable'
water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and
watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though
the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and will call for careful
management.
The economic and water sector reforms in India are generally
accepted as a public-private partnership. “This is another
prescription of economic `reformers' that seems to be gaining a
measure of acceptance in India. The paucity of financial resources is
pushing the Governments, Central and State, to think in terms of
inviting private sector participation in dam-and-reservoir projects,
which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state.
The new National Water Policy 2002 includes a clause that
specifically provides for this. Turning from projects to services, the
idea of privatizing utilities has been in the air for some time, and now
it seems to be getting extended to water supply in some States.”
Mr Iyer summarizes anti big infrastructure views, also using them in
the context of trans-boundary issues. Anti-dam lobbies argue that
the economic, environmental, social and human consequences of
these projects can not be fully compensated, while the small-scale,
local, people-centred alternatives are available. Similar logic is
mentioned in the context of trans-boundary disputes,” Bhutan is its
deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its
determination to preserve them….. an `alternative' view in Nepal
disfavours large, technology-driven, foreign-funded, export-oriented
projects imposed by the state or foreign investors on the people, and
favours decentralized, relatively small, environmentally benign
projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily
for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other
countries.”
Dr. Bishnu Hari Nepal's paper is focused around the theme,” water is
to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source
of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come
principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the
neighbouring countries.” While emphasizing the use of advance
technologies he criticizes anti-infrastructure movements. The 'eco-
romanticists', water-mafias and 'dollar farmers' make sometimes
'opposition for opposition's sake' and create havoc to the normal
folks. The paper describes surface and groundwater water resources
of Nepal, current uses, hydroelectric potential, trans-boundary issues
with India and a regional model.
Currently, Nepal is using less than 10% of its rivers inflow of 225
billion cubic meters annually and producing 606 MW
hydroelectricity out of 83,000 MW capacities. While, only 40 per
cent of the households use electricity generated from different
systems and the actual energy needs met from fuel-wood,
agricultural waste and animal-dung is 88.64 per cent of the total
energy consumption. Out of the remaining percentage, the hydro-
xixxviii
electricity contribution is of 1.66 per cent, contribution of renewable
energy resources is 0.52 percent and fossil fuel (petroleum and coal)
comes to be 11.18 per cent.
Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan for
2002 to 2027 suggest physical developments, joint trans-boundary
projects for hydropower and management reforms in the sanitation
and irrigation sectors. The Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems
(FMIS) already covers 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area,
some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users
Association (WUA),while some are jointly managed by the
government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the
community-managed systems are better than the government-
managed projects.
The scope of joint reservoir and electricity generation projects by
Nepal and India is high, however, as India is the main user of this
electricity, there is conflict of interests on location, ownership, price,
etc. Dr. Nepal proposes a trans-boundary regulatory mechanism
outlined through his SA-RRR-S (South Asian Regional Riparian
Rights Statutes) model. The Model proposes that the countries of
South Asia could take a distance of 8 KM as a distance of mutual
agreement downstream and upstream right of acceptance by
managing the system of the provision of consent from the respective
country for any kind of water and disturbing development activity
within the respective country's territory.
In a very interesting paper Dr. Satyajit Singh reviews water sector
reforms experiences of the South Asia in the context of local
governments, good governance, and communities. He put current
decentralization efforts as the centuries old quest for appropriate
institutions for good governance, formulated by different schools of
thoughts in different social or institutional contexts. The paper
argues that local governments are central to the discussions around
good governance. A shift from communities to local governments
becomes necessary in order to ensure the sustainability of the
community institutions as well as to provide a stable channel for
public fiscal transfers from the centre or the state to the actual
beneficiaries. The local government model provide better defined
structural relations with the central state, while it is accountable at
the local level and is allowed to make choices between public versus
private services. An important assertion is that capacity is an issue at
the central level, which should be able to design institutes at the local
level. “It is an attempt to bring in a convergence between the
institutional and the livelihood paradigm”. While rural communities
in South Asia are directly affected by the swings in the financial and
trade markets, national and state governments are also realizing that
good governance for rural infrastructure and service delivery are best
handled at the local government level.
In this reforms model, the state focuses on policy, strategy and
capacity building of the local government for managing, contracting
and supervising NGOs, private and community groups. The services
are delivered by the public, private, civil society organizations or
their partnerships. The success of decentralization process is linked
with urgent needs, outcomes in the local political economy and the
local capacity. However, many aspects of the implementation process
and achievable impacts of decentralization remain to be understood.
Crafting a balance between local autonomy, state authority and
legitimate national goals is difficult, local governments have neither
the capacity nor the local accountability to act autonomously to
realize the expected benefits of decentralization. decentralization
that works across sectors to provide functional clarity and
operational freedom to local governments. The capacity of
communities and local Governments is essential for success.
India provides examples of different level of decentralization and
success. The sector reforms in Karalla are successful, as they are fully
integrate with decentralization program and the functional local
governments, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), which are largely
respected by the communities. Bangladesh has adopted major
reforms agenda through five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply
Project. However, delivery mechanism is highly centralized as the
ministry delegates responsibilities to the local public departments
and NGOs. This supply driven approach is not able to response
peoples needs, problems in reporting are mentioned while the
expected results are not achieved. “Unlike in India where the local
government unit actually manages the water projects, the local
government in Bangladesh facilitates and regulates the 'private
sponsors'”.
Giasuddin Choudhury's paper on water management in Bangladesh
xxixx
highlights existing water policy approach of the country and
describes different issues linked to water quality, low productivity
and boundary issues with India. Bangladesh has been closely
working with the international donors during the last twenty years
and has come up with national policy documents, between 1992-99,
in the sectors of environmental, forest, energy, Drinking Water
Supply and Sanitation, fisheries, agricultural, industry and water.
The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was prepared in
2001 and approved by the National Water Resources Council in
2004.
Bangladesh faces water control and quality problems; groundwater
pollution, floods resulted from high river flows and inadequate
drainage, and increasing demand for winter irrigation. The arsenic
levels are above the safe limit, exposing about 75 million people to
this toxic substance on a daily basis. The water use efficiencies are
low, while water is subsidized along with other inputs. The country
also needs to manage land due to drainage issues and rapid
urbanization. The national water policy of Bangladesh states, “Water
will be considered an economic resource and priced to convey its
scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its
conservation”.
The trans-boundary conflict with India originates from the fact that,
“Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which
fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream
withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have
deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows,
especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods
of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious
environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh.” The
diversions from Ganges and water control at Farakka have been a
major concern for Bangladesh, because of its direct impact on
supplies to the irrigated land of Bangladesh. With the help of WB,
Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) was signed between Bangladesh and
India in 1996. However, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project is
considered to pose great threat to Bangladesh. The paper suggests,
that Bangladesh needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation
with Bhutan, Nepal and India. The Ganges flows can be augmented
by construction a reservoir at the Sunkosh River in Bhutan, similarly,
Sapta Kosi High Dam in Nepal, could bring significant benefits to
Bangladesh.
The paper by Dr. Habib from Pakistan reviews water scenario of
Pakistan, indicating the scope and implications of different measures
available to address the water scarcity and resource conservation in
the country. The country is already utilizing more than 75% of its
rivers inflow of 178 billion cubic meters, more than 100%
groundwater and major part of the rainfall falling in the plains.
Different sectors and areas face qualitative and quantitative water
shortage in terms of water access, allocation and actual availability.
On the supply management side Pakistan is faced with regional
disagreements and technical inabilities for the surface water
development, water productivity and conservation of water quality,
groundwater aquifer and natural aquatic systems. Not only
projected, currently allocated river water is more than actual canal
diversion, making shortage sharing a critical process during the
major part of year. Recycling through groundwater aquifer has
increased the actual water use efficiency in fresh aquifer areas, while
causing groundwater depletion and a need to maintain the
discharge-recharge balance. The drainage projects and water use
practices have failed to arrest water logging in the saline zone. The
low yield and traditional cropping patterns are the major
performance concerns for the agriculture sector. The livelihood
orientation, low investment potential and failure of markets to
stimulate agriculture production are the main causes. Feasible
technical options in the sweet and saline zones are not properly
identified and implemented. The paper suggests sustainable
recharge-discharge balance in the fresh aquifer zone and water
saving at the conveyance level development guidelines.
In the context of institutional reforms, clear and locally accepted
water management model is still far away, existing dichotomies are
obvious from the ongoing disintegrated processes of decentralization
and reforms in the political and resource management sectors. The
institutional changes in the water sector are initiated and directed by
the donor as part of the package (notably World Bank and ADB)
leading to the pilot studies. No efforts are yet carried out for the
evaluation and formulation of these experiments.
2322
South Asian Water ConcernsRamaswamy R. Iyer
his paper aims at presenting a synoptic and objective
overview, in very broad terms, of the principal national
concerns and issues relating to water in South Asian Tcountries. For the purpose of the paper, ‘South Asia’ refers only to
the countries in the subcontinental mainland, i.e., Pakistan, India,
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Besides, it is concerned largely with
the northern part of the subcontinent where different countries are
linked together by the Himalayan rivers.
National PerspectivesPakistanThe major part of Pakistan -- leaving aside the inland drainage area
of Balochistan, as also the southern coastal region -- is in the Indus
Basin.
Water Deficit?Most writings on the water resources of Pakistan refer to water
scarcity (present or imminent), but it is not clear how much of the
projected water and food deficit will remain if the ills of poor water
management and inefficiencies in irrigated agriculture (on which
there is general agreement) are remedied.
Water-Logging and SalinityThe allocation of the three western rivers of the Indus system to
Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, and the development of
irrigated agriculture that followed, certainly brought much
prosperity to the country or to some sections of the population, but
an unanticipated outcome was the emergence and spread of the ills
of water-logging and salinity. Out of a total of 18 million hectares
(mha) of irrigated land in Pakistan, about 6.22 mha are said to be
affected by this menace. In response to this the Government of
Pakistan launched different Salinity Control and Reclamation
Projects (SCARP), starting in 1959. These do not seem to have been
very successful. Among the criticisms of the SCARP approach are
design defects, severe environmental impacts, and the creation of
secondary problems that are as bad as the original ones that the plan
had intended to remedy. The impression that one gets is that
Pakistan is still struggling with a gigantic problem to which
satisfactory answers have not yet been found.
Inter-Provincial ConflictsAnother major national concern is the persistence of inter-provincial
conflicts over water distribution. These conflicts have a long history,
going back to the middle of the 19th Century when human
intervention in the natural flow of the river through the construction
of barrages and canals began. The old inter-provincial conflicts and
the attempts to resolve them were followed after Partition (1947) by
the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus, which was resolved by the
Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The problems of water-sharing among
the provinces in Pakistan continued, and were dealt with by several
committees and commissions. The settlement currently in force is
the Indus Water Accord of 1991. However, there are important
unresolved issues with a crucial bearing on water distribution. Issues
of flood management, not discussed here, also have inter-provincial
angles.
Kalabagh ControversyA new dimension has been added to water-sharing disputes by the
contentious Kalabagh Dam Project. This Project is the centre of a
major controversy in Pakistan. The arguments are familiar. The case
for the project is argued on the basis of a projected water shortage
and the need for and possibility of one more dam on the Indus
system. The opponents of the project argue that water is not available
for the dam, that the project is not needed, and that it will have
serious environmental and human impacts. There is also an inter-
provincial angle: Sindh is afraid that with the Kalabagh dam, more of
the Indus water will be diverted by Punjab, with serious
consequences for it (Sindh); and the North Western Frontier
2524
Province (NWFP), while it might derive some benefits, is seriously
worried about submergence of land, displacement of people, and
water-logging problems.
Two ApproachesAt the heart of the Kalabagh controversy lies the confrontation
between two divergent approaches to water-resource policy,
planning and management, encapsulated by one writer (Bengali,
2003) as the 'techno-centric approach' vis-à-vis the 'socio-centric
approach'. As summed up by him, the former relies wholly on
technical expertise and engineering solutions, whereas the latter
recognises that 'development, management and conservation cannot
be achieved in a vacuum, and social systems and structures and
people's cultures and lifestyles also need to be addressed'.
Other IssuesThere are also serious concerns in Pakistan about the pollution of
rivers, the degradation of coastal zones, the problems of sewage
disposal in urban areas, and so on, but limitations of space prevent
this paper from going into them.
India(The Indian concerns outlined below may find a resonance in the
other countries of the region.)
Water Crisis? An important and widely shared perception in India is that of an
imminent water crisis. The crucial element here is the demand
projection, and that needs to be looked at carefully. In every kind of
water use, major economies are desirable and possible, though
difficult. If these are achieved, the demand picture will not remain
the same. Turning to the supply side, large-dam projects are not the
only answer; there are other possibilities. Local rainwater harvesting
(‘catching the raindrop as it falls’) and watershed development are
also part of the supply-side answers to the demand. Through a
combination of these two approaches, namely, on the demand side,
the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and
of resource-conservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment
the availability of `usable' water through extensive recourse to local
water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to
avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and
will call for careful management.
Divergence on Big ProjectsThere is a widespread perception that the growth of population, pace
of urbanisation and economic development will accentuate the
pressure of increasing demand on a finite resource, and that the
answer lies in large supply-side projects and long-distance water
transfers. That is the dominant view in India, but there is a strong
body of opinion that challenges that view.
The Narmada, Tehri Movements The most dramatic confrontation between the two views took place
in the case of the Narmada (Sardar Sarovar) and the Tehri Hydro-
Electric Projects. In both cases, the protest movements and their
leaders (Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna) became well-known
nationally and even internationally. In both cases, the battle has been
lost in the Supreme Court, and construction activities -- stalled for a
while -- have been resumed in full force, but the movements cannot
be adjudged to have been failures: they have changed forever the way
people at every level (including the general public, the media, policy-
makers, project-planners and managers) think about such projects.
In that sense, the movements have been enormously influential.
‘Flood Control’ This is a controversial subject, but it is increasingly recognised that
what we must learn to do is not so much to ‘control’ floods as to cope
with them when they occur and minimise damage, partly through
‘flood-plain zoning’ (i.e., regulation of settlement and activity in the
natural flood plains of rivers) and partly through `disaster-
preparedness'. However, the notion of ‘flood control’ continues to
hold some sway over people's minds, and to influence official
thinking.
Inter-State River Water DisputesMost of the major rivers in India flow through more than one
(Indian) state and are therefore ‘inter-state rivers’. The
constitutional/statutory mechanism for the resolution of inter-state
conflicts within India -- over such rivers seemed initially to be
working reasonably well, but it has run into difficulties in recent
years. Two currently outstanding disputes are the Ravi-Beas Dispute
(Punjab and Haryana) and the Cauvery Dispute (Karnataka, Tamil
2726
Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry). An early and satisfactory resolution
does not seem to be within sight in either case. These unresolved
disputes have implications that go far beyond water: they raise
questions about Indian federalism.
The Groundwater CrisisContinuing reckless exploitation of groundwater, leading to the rapid
depletion of aquifers in many places, portends disaster. The
situation, which has been described as ‘colossal anarchy’ (Shah
2004), needs to be quickly brought under control, but there are
enormous legal, political and practical difficulties here. There may be
need for changes in the law relating to ownership rights over
groundwater, enactment of new state-level laws for regulating the
extraction and use of groundwater, establishment of regulatory
bodies, rationalisation of power tariffs, and so on. However, with
regard to the very large number of private tube-wells in the country
(estimated at 21 million) and the fact that most of these are cases of
‘self-supply’, i.e., outside the purview of supply systems, public or
private, there is some scepticism about the feasibility of `regulation'
and the efficacy of changes in policy or law as remedies for the
depletion and contamination of groundwater aquifers. No clear
solutions to this difficult problem are in sight as yet and the debate
needs to be pursued further.
Water Markets Water markets already exist in India mainly in the context of
extraction of groundwater through tube-wells and bore-wells but also
in relation to surface water in some instances. Many more instances
may emerge. There are many who think that this is the route to
follow for the future; there are others who are deeply uneasy at the
idea of water markets and at the underlying perception of water as a
tradable commodity.
The advocates of water markets (who view water as a commodity)
recommend: ‘Define property rights and allow trading’, but the
citizen's right to water (for drinking, cooking and washing) is a part
of the right to life, and the water rights of a farmer for irrigation or
those of an industry for industrial uses are use-rights; treating either
of them as ‘tradable property rights’ has serious implications that
need to be studied carefully. The supply of water by private tankers in urban areas and the
burgeoning bottled-water trade are also instances of (entirely
avoidable) water markets. If the public system provided an adequate,
reliable and safe supply, the demand for tankers or for bottled water
may go down sharply. Apart from that, these supplies (and the soft
drinks business) have necessarily to draw raw water from
somewhere, and that draft may be an unsustainable or inequitable
one. The instance of the bore-wells of the Coca Cola Company
depriving an entire area in Kerala of its water is well-known. The
case went to the High Court and the judgment has invoked the public
trust doctrine, but the story is as yet unfinished, as the case may still
go to the Supreme Court.
PrivatisationThe paucity of financial resources is pushing the governments,
central and state, to think in terms of inviting private sector
participation in dam and reservoir projects, which would earlier have
been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new Indian National
Water Policy, 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for
this. There has been much opposition to the idea of `privatisation of
water', whether in relation to projects or in the context of water
services, on several grounds. There was a public outcry against the
leasing of a 20-km stretch of the Shivalik River in Chattisgarh to a
private corporate entity for water supply, and the state tried to cancel
the lease but encountered legal difficulties. This, like the Coca Cola
case mentioned earlier, is an unfinished story.
Pricing of WaterThe twin propositions that water rates should be regarded as `user
charges' and not as a form of taxation, and that the principle behind
`user charges' should be `full cost recovery', are important elements
in current economic thinking. They may be acceptable in the context
of water as an input into economic activity: irrigation, industrial use,
water for hotels. However, these principles cannot apply without
modification to `water for life' (drinking water). This too cannot be
free, but must be priced reasonably, with full economic pricing to the
affluent, penal pricing beyond a certain level of use, some degree of
subsidisation to the less affluent, and perhaps some free supplies to
the very poor. It cannot be said that these issues have been thought
through to clarity and finality in India.
2928
Other IssuesThere are many other issues such as the third tier of local self-
government at the level of villages (panchayats) and cities
(nagarpalikas) introduced by the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the
Constitution. Among the subjects to be devolved to these bodies
(known as panchayati raj institutions or PRIs) is water management
at the local level. The future role of PRIs in relation to water is a
matter of considerable importance.
Another matter which demands urgent attention is the problem of
the pollution and contamination of water sources and systems that
steadily diminishes the quantum available for use.
NepalA large number of rivers and streams flow through Nepal and into
India. The nature of the terrain immediately brings to mind the
possibility of generation of hydro-electric power, and a number of
sites for large projects have been identified. Only a small part of the
power so generated can be used in Nepal; the rest would have to be
exported, primarily to India. India can also use all the waters that
flow from Nepal for irrigation, and would further like to minimise
the damage caused by the floods coming down those rivers from time
to time. These possibilities give rise to the idea of large projects for
building dams and reservoirs in Nepal. (Bangladesh, for its part, has
for long been arguing for seven large projects in Nepal for
augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, where
the waters are shared between India and Bangladesh.) Against this
background, there is a growing sentiment in Nepal that the country's
water resources represent the route through which its visions of
prosperity can best be realised; that water is to Nepal what oil has
been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and
wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the
export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries, mainly
India.
Several multi-purpose projects (Karnali, Pancheswar, Saptkosi, etc)
have been under discussion between Nepal and India for over three
decades, but little progress has been made on any of them, for
several reasons: the long history of mistrust and suspicion
characterising India-Nepal relations; the growing salience of
environmental concerns, concerns about the displacement of people,
and misgivin about large projects in the seismically active Himalayan
region; and a degree of dissent, even within Nepal, from the view
that the route to prosperity lies in large-scale centralised generation
of hydro-electric power for export.
There is an `alternative' view in Nepal that advocates decentralised,
relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for
irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own
needs rather than for meeting the needs of other countries. Export of
electricity is not ruled out, but large generation primarily for export
to a single large buyer (India) under inter-governmental
arrangements is not considered desirable. It is difficult to say how
widespread the `alternative' view is, but that it commands a degree
of influence cannot be denied. Opposition to the Arun III Hydro-
Electric Project did eventually result in the World Bank withdrawing
from the project; this is regarded as a great loss by the water
establishment and other proponents of the mainstream position, but
celebrated as an achievement by critics who argue that the
abandonment of this unviable project made created a number of
smaller, cheaper and quicker alternatives. (For a short while a
leading proponent of this view became a government minister, and
for a brief period the `alternative' view became `mainstream', but
that is no longer the case.)
Turning to another aspect, Nepal -- as a land-locked country --
attaches a great deal of importance to a navigational outlet to the sea
(to a port in India or Bangladesh). At the moment this is not
physically feasible, but creating such a possibility as a part of one of
the projects that are being talked about remains an important
objective of Nepal.
BhutanBhutan, close to Nepal and like it a mountainous country lying on the
southern slopes of the Himalaya between China and India, is flanked
on the western and eastern sides by the Indian states of Sikkim and
Arunachal Pradesh, with Assam as the immediate southern
neighbour. The country is heavily forested and richly endowed with
water resources. The annual availability of water per capita is put at
75000 m3 in the Bhutan Water Policy document, but the
environmental information portal of the World Resources Institute
gives a per capita Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR)
3130
figure of 43214 m.3 for the year 2001. It is not clear how those two
figures are related to each other, but it is clear enough from either
figure that the country is exceptionally well-endowed with water,
though even that abundance is expected to come under pressure in
the future because of the growth of population and the processes of
economic development.
The most important point to bear in mind about Bhutan is its deep
attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination
to preserve them. It has adopted what has been described as `the
middle path' to sustainable development. At the same time, the
country is (understandably) not exempt from the aspirations that
other countries entertain for economic development and prosperity.
The contrary pulls of these two strands in Bhutanese thinking are
evident in the Water Policy document. For instance, there are fine
statements of the holistic ecological point of view and indications of
social and human sensitivity; at the same time, the language of
economics, management and the market-place is also found in many
places. It is hoped that the floodtide of `economic development' and
`modernity' will not overwhelm Bhutan and make it
indistinguishable from the rest of the world and subject to the same
ills.
In pursuance of the objective of earning revenues from the country's
hydro-power potential, Bhutan has undertaken certain projects with
Indian assistance. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into
the details of the projects that are in operation; under construction;
and in the visualisation/formulation/planning stages (Chuka, Chuka
II, Tala, Kurichu, Sunkosh, Manas, etc). What needs to be noted is
that Chuka is widely regarded as an example of successful inter-
country cooperation for mutual benefit; and that the inflow of
revenues from the sale of electricity to India has been very large in
relation to the country's GDP and has made the country prosperous
in economic terms, with a per capita income much higher than that
of its neighbours. However, the question whether the transformation
in the economy has been accompanied by ecological and social
changes and whether these warrant any concern, has not been
adequately debated. If further expansions of, and additions to,
hydro-electric capacity take place as planned, would it be possible for
Bhutan to continue to adhere to the middle path? That question is of
course one for the Bhutanese to reflect on.
BangladeshCrisscrossed by rivers and streams, Bangladesh is a water-abundant
country with a per capita water-availability of 8444 m3 in 2002
(World Resources Institute). (Another study Ahmad et al 2001 - puts
the annual per capita water availability at 12162 m3 in 1991, 10305
m3 in 2000, and 7670 m3 in 2025.) As the country acts as a narrow
funnel through which three large river systems (the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and the Meghna) drain into the sea, its major national
problem is the periodical occurrence of disastrous flooding. There
was catastrophic flooding in 1988 and again in 1998. However,
though floods dominate the thinking of Bangladesh, there is also a
perception of a critical shortage of water in the lean season in some
parts of the country.
Most Bangladeshi writings on water tend to make the point that 94%
of the water resources of the country originate beyond its borders,
and that 54 rivers and streams flow into Bangladesh from India. This
consciousness, combined with that of India's size, colours
Bangladeshi thinking and gives it a sense of vulnerability. The water
establishment of Bangladesh is acutely aware that, for water security
as well as for flood-management, the country needs Indian
cooperation.
Against this background, there are four prominent concerns in the
national thinking about water: flood-management; water-sharing
with the upper riparian; internal water-resource management; and
the protection and preservation of the natural environment.
The massive floods of 1988 brought international attention to this
problem, resulting in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) financed by a large
number of donor countries. The FAP was a very large programme
consisting of numerous studies and some pilot projects. However, it
was subjected to severe criticism right from the beginning, and soon
fell into disrepute, largely because it was perceived as a top-down,
non-participative and essentially donor-driven plan.
On water-sharing with upper riparians, treaties or understandings
with India on several rivers are favoured. A Treaty with India on
water-sharing in the Ganges was signed on 12 December, 1996.
3332
Similar understandings are felt to be necessary on at least eight or
nine of the 54 rivers and streams that cross the India-Bangladesh
border. Currently, talks are in progress on water-sharing on the
Teesta. (Another strong Bangladeshi perception is that of the need
for the augmentation of the lean season flows of the Ganges, and the
Government of India is in agreement with that view, but there is a
divergence between the two countries on how the augmentation is to
be brought about).
Turning to internal water-resource management, the work done
under the aegis of the FAP (though there was disenchantment with
that programme) provided useful inputs when, eventually, the
preparation of a new National Water Management Plan and a
National Water Policy was undertaken. (The National Water Policy
was published in 1999, but it still remains largely a declaration of
intent lacking in formal backing and not translated into operational
plans.) In these new initiatives, the old top-down engineering and
structural approaches were moderated by a greater awareness of
non-structural measures; the importance of people's participation in
planning; environmental concerns; and institutional change. At the
same time, the influence of the new processes of `economic reform'
is seen in the references to water as an economic good, the
importance of pricing as an instrument of water management,
private sector participation, and so on. The balancing of these
divergent perceptions seems somewhat uneasy and precarious.
Environmental concerns are now part of the climate of opinion and
have acquired a degree of importance even in the water resources
establishment that was earlier primarily driven by engineering
considerations. The concern is largely focussed on the control of the
incursion of salinity from the sea and on the protection of the
wetlands (the Sunderbans).
In recent years, the presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a
major concern. This problem has been experienced in parts of India
as well, though perhaps not in as acute a form as in Bangladesh.
Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon; expert
opinions seem to vary on this (and therefore on the appropriate
responses), and finality does not seem to have been reached. As
groundwater `development' has been extensive in Bangladesh, this is
a serious national problem.
Another emerging concern relates to the implications for Bangladesh
of the predictions of climate change. This is a subject that is currently
under study in both official and academic circles. As yet, there is
much uncertainty as to what the future holds for the country. As the
studies progress, this is bound to become a central concern.
Convergences and Divergences ConvergencesConcerns about food security and apprehensions of future water-
scarcity are common to all the countries. The response to these
concerns at the administrative, technical and planning levels in
governments is generally characterised by a predilection in favour of
big supply-side interventions, with some variations in the strength of
this way of thinking from country to country. There is also some
advocacy of `alternatives' in all the countries, again with variations
from country to country. The philosophy of `middle path' is
strongest in Bhutan. The `alternative voices' are moderately strong
in Nepal, with a degree of influence on official thinking, but the
mainstream view continues to regard water as Nepal's oil, i.e., as a
potential source of revenue and wealth. In Pakistan and India there
is a strong polarisation between the believers in big, centralised,
technology-driven, supply-side projects as the only answers to future
needs, and those who oppose the approach as unsustainable,
destructive and inequitable, and advocate local, small, community-
led alternatives that are (in their view) environmentally benign and
socially just. The polarisation is particularly marked in India, with an
inadequacy or even absence of constructive civil discourse between
the `dam-builders' and the `environmentalists', either side
describing the other as a `lobby'. In Bangladesh, there are not many
possibilities of big projects, but the official water establishment, as in
India, continues to be dominated by the engineering point of view.
Apart from the already completed Teesta Barrage, the proposed
Ganges Barrage is perhaps the one big project in view, and it is
regarded as very important. Essentially, however, the `big project'
point of view is reflected in the advocacy of several large dams in
Nepal as a means of augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges.
There is also general agreement at the official levels and among the
intelligentsia (especially the economists) on the `potential' of hydro-
electric power that exists in the river systems of the countries, and, in
particular, in the Himalayan rivers, and the need to exploit as much
3534
of that potential as possible. The critics question such projects on
environmental and other grounds, and contend that the need for
large centralised power-generation can be minimised by a
combination of demand-management, efficiency in energy use,
getting more energy out of capacities already created, extensive local
decentralised generation, and so on. They also have strong doubts
about the wisdom of building large reservoirs in the seismically
active Himalayan region.
Environmental concerns are widely shared, but are not equally
strong or influential in all countries. This is of course a central
concern in Bhutan. There are powerful movements in Pakistan, India
and Nepal, but they are not often very effective, and despite the
existence of Ministries for Environment, the concern cannot be said
to be `mainstream'. At the official level, and among the neo-liberal
economists who are influential in the `economic reform' process,
there is a tendency to juxtapose `development' and `environment'
and to argue that the latter should not be over-emphasised to the
detriment of the former. That (questionable) point of view finds
much implicit (and sometimes explicit) support from the officials of
the World Bank and the ADB.
Floods loom large in the thinking of both India and Bangladesh.
Despite the disenchantment with the FAP, mainstream opinion in
Bangladesh is not wholly negative about embankments. Similarly,
despite the recognition of the weaknesses and failures of
embankments official thinking in India still considers them
necessary. An offshoot of the concern about floods is the Indian
river-linking project.
The use of groundwater is massive in India and quite substantial in
Bangladesh. The mining of groundwater and the rapid depletion of
aquifers in some parts of the country is a major problem in India,
and one which has not been attended to in any significant measure.
In Bangladesh, the main problem is the extensive presence of
arsenic, which is also experienced, though perhaps not to the same
extent, in West Bengal and Bihar in India.
Another emerging concern in all the countries is the problem of
pollution and contamination of water sources and systems.
Potentially, this could be a major source of intra-country and inter-
country friction. However, it cannot be said that there is adequate
awareness of this problem in any of the countries. It follows that
serious action to deal with this threat to resource-availability has not
begun, or even been thought of.
DivergencesDivergences have occurred essentially in relation to water-sharing in
(or projects on) rivers that cross (or flow along) national boundaries.
Some of these have been resolved through treaties. However, some
divergences continue.
The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan has
acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of
conflict-resolution, but currently there are a few unresolved disputes
under the ambit of the Treaty. In particular, talks about the Baglihar
hydro-electric project have failed, and Pakistan has moved for
arbitration, invoking the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first
time in its history.
The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh
(1996), after a shaky start due to low flows in 1997, has been working
reasonably well, and neither country has asked for a review. Whether
it will continue to work well will depend on the state of the political
relationship between the two countries. In other words, here, as in
the case of the Indus Treaty, it is politics and not water that will
determine the future of the Treaty.
Apart from the Ganga (Ganges), there are many other rivers that
cross the India-Bangladesh border, and agreements may be needed
on some of them. However, the current state of India-Bangladesh
relations is perhaps not conducive to the conclusion of further
treaties.
Meanwhile the Government of India's announcement of a major
river-linking project (including possible diversions from the Ganga
and the Brahmaputra) has caused much concern in Bangladesh.
However, with a change of Government in India, that project is
under review.
As far as India-Nepal relations are concerned, a new chapter seemed
to open with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996, but action under
3736
the Treaty has remained stalled because of certain differences
between the two countries. We need not go into those differences in
detail, but the point is that much time has already been lost without a
resolution of these differences, and nearly nine years after the
signing of the Treaty there is still little progress on its
implementation. It must also be noted that despite the ratification of
the Treaty by the Parliament of Nepal, there is a significant body of
opinion against the Treaty in the country. Further progress on these
matters will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in Nepal.
Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the
Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India. A Policy Management Approach to
Pakistan's Water ResourcesDr. Zaigham Habib
he international mapping of water resources by the UN and
other leading international research organizations has placed
Pakistan among the world's water-scarce countries (FAO, TIWMI 2004). The existing per capita water availability of 1,100
m3/person fell as low as 900 m3/person during a drought year,
2000-2001. The country's supply of water is consistently decreasing
because of reduced river inflows, groundwater depletion and erratic
rainfall. On the demand and management sides, population growth,
urbanization, increased water losses, and declining water quality has
had a major impact on per capita water availability. Emerging
domestic and industrial requirements are key factors competing for
the use of water, while ecological imbalances, salinization, and
aquifer depletion are typical consequences of the overuse of water
resources. New water quantities and allocations are required for
domestic and industrial uses, and for use in planned agriculture, as
well as to conserve groundwater aquifers, rivers, and lakes, protect
aquatic life in these water bodies, and maintain water quality. Small
users are most gravely affected by canal water scarcity, aquifer
depletion, and land quality deterioration.
New water resource development is critical if we are to increase
availability during water stress periods while minimizing the impact
of water withdrawal from natural streams. The management of water
resources in Pakistan faces challenges in the context of development,
new allocations, environment, and conservation.
3938
Currently, Pakistan utilizes more than 75 percent of its surface water,
100 percent of useable groundwater, and the major part of rainfall in
the plains. River water is central to the rural setup of Pakistan's
economy, employment and social structure. With more than 90
percent of developed resources being utilized, agriculture is
considered a low-performing sector. Extensively developed
agricultural areas are additionally over-drafting groundwater and
face increasing competition from other uses. The actual demand for
water and hydropower has compelled the Government of Pakistan
and water managers to increase the water supply and fully regulate
all water resources. Already, cities are reaching out to more distant
sources of water supply and relocating industries closer to water
sources. It is clear that the future will be heavily concerned with
managing a dwindling resource and mitigating the adverse impacts
of a profligate past.
With the start of the 21st century, there is growing realization of
gross water scarcity, and the need for high water use efficiency.
Water, which was traditionally a technical and administrative
subject, has become an issue of public concern and media coverage.
The current polarization of political and administrative institutions
on matters of water resource development, sharing, and distribution,
has peaked. While there is a clear difference of opinion on
development options, the management vision has become obscured
after ineffective experimentation with participatory and
decentralized management models. Non-agreement on basic water
information is more than a provincial interest, there is a serious lack
of accounting for water availability and demand. Efforts towards “a
management shift” can be seen in new water strategy, policy and
committed priorities, especially at the policymaker and donor levels.
A national water strategy was formulated recently, and the national
water policy is still under discussion. However, the country still has
to screen and select achievable objectives, define an implementation
framework, and set rules and criteria to regulate competing
allocations while conserving the basic resource base.
This paper reviews Pakistan's water scenario by briefly commenting
on the proposed policy and strategy documents in the first section
and presenting an account of water resources, agriculture
assessment, different water demands, and sustainability constraints
in the second section.
Water Policy, Strategy, and InstitutionsThe last two decades have been a globally active period for water
policy and strategy formulations. The issues and conflicts related to
technical and legal management of shared water resources, water
security against increasing depletion and quality deterioration, and
urban versus rural water demands have forced countries and water
managers to take action. Supporting national water policies are
meant to change some of the existing priorities and strategies. In
developing countries, the insistence of donors (especially the World
Bank and Asian Development Bank) has been a major factor pushing
countries towards “new water policy documents”. Experiments so far
have shown that the private sector is not capable of investing in
small, extensively scattered, and low-producing agricultural
economies.
Over the last few years, the Government of Pakistan has developed
and approved a National Water Strategy (2004) and launched a draft
policy document. This policy draft is not very different from other
South Asian countries implementing donor-supported reforms
towards privatization and infrastructure development to increase
water availability, drinking, and domestic supplies. The wording of
the general declaration is global: “that water is essential for life, a
finite resource which must be managed by all stakeholders, valuation
important and agriculture efficiency must increase”.
The water policy of Pakistan (Engineering Council 2005) has
following objectives: (i) provision of drinking supply to all, (ii) food
security, (iii) sanitation, (iv) reuse of water, (v) conserving
environment and ecology, (vi) flood management, (vii) infrastructure
security, and (viii) optimization of water use efficiency. It claims five
guiding principles: (i) equity, (ii) efficiency, (iii) participatory
decision-making, (iv) accountability, and (v) sustainability. Key
water issues and a need for integrated planning are mentioned in the
document. However, the objectives and strategy do not indicate a
focus, envisioned change from the present setup or methods to
achieve these changes.
The water strategy document (National Water Strategy 2004) is
grossly lacking in its presentation of the nature of existing problems
and the pros and cons of different options to solve them. The
conflicts and required compromises at different levels, from
4140
allocation to infrastructure development, remain ambiguous in terms
of their presentation and proposed actions. For example, the total
water requirement of different water use sectors exceeds the total
water available. The strategy is silent on how the sectors will share
the water shortage. What types of rules and implementation
procedures are required to ensure allocations to different sectors?
Another example is environment, which is described as a priority
area. However, discussion on the water needs of environmental
concerns (within and outside rivers, lakes, and aquifers) and any
mechanism to allocate this water is neither envisioned nor proposed.
The importance of water recycling and declining drainage in the
Indus River valleys is ignored. Despite the high percentage of
international consultants in the sector, it lags behind in the
implementation of contemporary sciences.
If the current policy and strategy documents are not to be considered
a “final product”, but part of the transitory process, and if the correct
procedures and directions are selected to plan, test, and refine an
implementation framework, it is possible that a practical water
framework might evolve in a decade or so. The process followed by
the European Union is a good example to understand the complexity
of reaching a clear water vision, priorities, and firm actions. The EU
started evolving its water policy in 1970; it took 18 years for most
countries to reach the required water quality standards (1970-88)
and a further 14 years to compile a comprehensive EU framework
(2002). The framework targets to achieve ecological safety by 2015.
Institutional ApproachesWater Sector OrganizationsSince 1947, there has been a debate on the water sector's
organizational limitations, governance issues, users' interface, and
management gaps. The original water management model is
administrative and colonial. The Public Works Department of India,
responsible for development and operation of water resources, roads,
and railways, was organized as top-bottom hierarchy like all other
departments of the time. The model was close to the British
administrative model in structure, but predominantly colonial in
management and operation (Ali 1995) of the system. The irrigation
network was operated by powerful provincial irrigation departments
having their own legislative, judicial, and administrative powers.
Development decisions were made with the help of special missions
and commissions, which also functioned as arbitrators among the
provinces, in case of disputes. The need for a central planning and management institution arose in
the 1950s. Trans-boundary water sharing, reservoir operations, and
hydropower generation were issues beyond the provincial irrigation
boundaries. The World Bank, a major donor to the Indus works,
proposed a semi-autonomous organization at the central level.
WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) was made
custodian of all resources and emerged as the main operator of the
power sector and major developer of large-scale infrastructure for
irrigation and drainage. Meanwhile, need for a basin level planning
on one hand and local decentralized management on the other
continued to be mentioned by the donors. Pakistan, like other South Asian countries, has experimented with
management changes in the water sector since 1980, but without
much success (Bandaragoda 2003, World Bank 2005). A new and
conceptually different institutional approach was introduced about
ten years ago through participatory irrigation management (PIM).
The Government of Pakistan has now adopted the PIM approach as a
condition laid down by its donors. A seminar on “Participatory
Irrigation Management” was sponsored by the Ministry of Water and
Power and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI)
in October 1994. This was the first introduction to the concept. The
EDI sponsored another workshop in October 1995, during which
representatives from four provinces agreed on a tentative action
plans for institutional change. The diverse opinions and lukewarm
welcome by water managers led to some pilot projects in selected
locations. After pilot experiments at the district level by the
international research organization, IWMI, in Punjab and Sindh, the
authorities themselves selected larger pilot areas comprising whole
canal commands. The Provincial Irrigation and Power Departments
(PID) have been renamed the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage
Authorities (PIDA Act 1997), but new management pattern is still not
emerged.
The latest priority of the water sector is provision of drinking water
and sanitation to rural and urban population. In the rural areas,
district governments headed by the nazims are responsible for
planning, investment, and control of municipal services, including
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water supply, sanitation and solid waste disposal. Principally, the
PHED (Public Health and Engineering Department), which had been
responsible for the development and management of rural water
supply, has been decentralized and placed under the respective
District Coordination Officers. The communities wishing to build a
scheme will form Community Based Organisations (CBO) and
contribute a part of the capital. In the urban areas, Water and
Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) and municipal bodies remain
responsible for the management of water supply and sanitation
services. While many of these are run relatively well, most of them
suffer from inadequate funds due to the way they are financed.
Where unable to raise their own money, WASAs must rely on ad hoc
inputs of money from central government reserves which are
infrequent and inadequate. Hence, most urban water systems are in
a poor state of repair and without any real ability to improve the
situation.
Key Legislation Defining Water Rules and InstitutionsThe Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 is a key piece of legislation
providing rules for irrigation water distribution and conflict
resolution at the user level. The act has been supplemented after
1950 in the areas of drainage, groundwater, agriculture research,
ownership of river water resources, and new institutions. The Punjab
Soil Reclamation Act of 1952 governed the preparation of drainage
schemes and other drainage-related works. The Act was later
extended to cover the whole country.
In 1982, Water User Ordinances were promulgated to enable the
formation of Water User Associations (WUAs) to participate in water
management at the watercourse level. The WUAs made a good start
by participating in the improvement of more than 10,000
watercourses. In several cases, WUAs contributed up to 55 percent of
the cost of civil works for improvement of watercourses both in cash,
kind, and in the form of labour, but these generally became dormant
once the improvement works were completed. In order to introduce
institutional reforms in the irrigation and drainage sector, the
provinces enacted new Acts in 1997. These Acts provide the legal
framework for establishment of Provincial Irrigation and Drainage
Authorities (PIDAs), Area Water Boards (AWBs), and Farmers'
Organizations (FOs).A complete and locally accepted water management model is still far
away (Habib 2005), which is evident from the current efforts of the
Government and difficulties faced in the development, management,
and regulation of water resources. The diversity of provincial water
visions is clear from the ongoing processes. The institutional
hesitation in accepting the current draft water policy and “new
modified assertions” in the World Bank's report of 2005 indicate that
substantial adjustments are expected in water resources
management.
Water Resources of PakistanPakistan has achieved extensive development of its water resources,
supported by highly inter-linked rivers, a widespread canal network,
and extraction of groundwater by the majority of individual farmers.
Reasonably reliable river inflow data are available from 1940. The
estimation of useable, recycle-able groundwater resource remains
tricky. A range of values exists, based on assumed seepage losses,
aquifer changes, or well density. A good water balance within a
spatial boundary needs good information on inflow and outflow
across the boundary, infiltration coefficients, and aquifer changes.
Rainfall in the basin is well monitored for the major areas; however,
volumetric estimates of effective rainfall remain controversial. High
variability of rainfall is one of factors causing uncertainty.
RainfallRainfall data since 1960 are available for 35 MET offices, and even
earlier data for a few big cities. The actual rainfall in the basin varies
widely, both spatially and temporally. The average rainfall varies
from 1,400 mm in the north to less than 100 mm in the south.
However, the measuring consistency of these data are difficult to
ensure. Eighty-five percent of the rainfall collected through PAN is
considered effective by WAPDA consultants (WSIP 1990). The
average, minimum, and maximum amounts of rainfall in the basin
after 1960 are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. Following the
monsoon pattern, rainfall quantities can vary in the range of 30 maf
to 110 maf.
Table 1: Annual average rainfall in different Provinces in mm Data 1960-2002
Period Punjab NWFP Sindh Balochistan Pakistan April-September 254 308 131 72 158 October-March 79 228 16 63 80 July-September 202 279 109 50 118 Average Annual 333 536 147 135 238
4544
Normally, there is no disagreement on the rainfall measured at a
particular location in millimeters. While, computed volumetric
quantities and effective rainfall from the provincial and basin
boundaries vary widely. A detailed discussion on rainfall estimates
and utilization under different hydrological conditions is beyond the
scope of this paper, but references can be made to detailed studies
carried out at different levels (Waijjne 1996, Kijne.J.W. 96, Habib
2004, Chandio 2003, Bhutta 2004).
Based on different analyses, rainfall's quantitative contribution is
summarized as follows. The agricultural land of 18 million ha in the
Indus Basin uses 8 maf to 22 maf rainfall, which is 40 to 20 percent
of the total rainfall in the basin. The groundwater recharge from the
rainfall is estimated in the range of 15 percent (Habib 2004, Chandio
2004), and 5 maf to 14 maf from dry to wet years. The drainage
component of rainfall in the plains is estimated at 6 maf under
average conditions (WAPDA 1989). A range of 4 maf (dry conditions)
to 18 maf (wet conditions) is calculated by a recent study (Study III
2005, Environmental concerns of all provinces). Estimates also show
that more than 65 percent of the rainfall could be utilized in the
basin for vegetation, groundwater recharge and drainage outflow.
The rest goes to unaccounted water bodies recharge (indirectly used)
and non-beneficial evapotranspiration. The beneficial components of
rainfall reduce with the development of urban centers, infrastructure
and reduction in the size of water bodies. The contribution of rainfall
to groundwater aquifers can substantially increase during a wet spell
followed by a dry period and in areas with declining groundwater.
Surface Water ResourcesThe river inflows of the major rivers of the Indus Basin have been
monitored since 1922 (Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab), 1937 (Jhelum), and
1960 (Indus). The measurements after 1978 represent the existing
system with two big reservoirs. The historical trends indicate the
influence of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 and physical changes
carried out during 1960-80. There is a declining trend of river
inflows however, the maximum inflows can be double of the
Table 2: Effective Rainfall in the Indus Basin below RIM stations
Average 1960-90
Average 1965-2004
2001-02
1994-95
Rainfall in millimeters (mm)
304
238
153
553
Rainfall million acre feet (MAF)
61.4
49.5
30
110 Source: Pakistan Metereological (MET) Directorate for the
rainfall measured at 26 satations
minimum (Table 3).
Apart from the Indus Basin, there are two smaller river basins in
Balochistan. The Makran Coastal Basin includes the Dasht, Hingol,
and Porali rivers. These rivers flow southwesterly and discharge into
the Arabian Sea. The closed Kharan Basin comprises the Kharan
Desert and Pishin Basin and includes the Pishin, Mashkhel, and
Baddo rivers which discharge into shallow lakes and ponds that dry
out completely in the hot season. The total inflow of the two basins is
less than 4 MAF (5 BCM) annually. These are flash streams and do
not have a perennial supply. About 25 percent of the inflow is used
for flood irrigation.
Surface Water Allocated and Diverted to CanalsThe monitoring and recording of river diversions to canals is carried
out at all head works from the date they commence operation. The
discharge data recorded in the morning is used by the Irrigation
Departments, IRSA (Indus River System Authority) and WAPDA for
official purposes. Generally, diversion data are accepted as accurate,
but the discharge table is rarely updated and the erratic pattern of
water losses in river reaches has raised doubts about the accuracy of
monitoring data. Recently, a telemetric system was installed to
measure river-flows passing through all river structures, but the
calibration and full operation of this system has yet to be established. Out of a 145 maf average inflow for all rivers after 1978 at the RIM
stations, 114.4 maf is allocated for the expected annual canal
diversions to the four provinces (Water Allocation Accord 1991).
Based on the actual data for 1978-82, a 10-daily flow pattern is
suggested for individual or groups of canals. Only 25 percent of the
time, actual diversions follow proposed pattern of the WAA. These
diversions are constrained by river inflows and reservoir storages,
while the capacity of the canals is much greater. Average diversions
from 1978-2004 were 101.6 maf. The peak diversions of 111 maf
Table 3: Rivers Inflow Pattern after 1940 in MAF
Period for Averages Western Rivers Eastern Rivers Indus Rivers
1940 – 1978 139.38 22.54 161.92 1978 – 2004 137.74 7.39 145.1 1999 – 2004 115.39 1.42 116.8
Max year inflow 186.79 32.78 209.5 Min year inflow 99.99 0.90 101.1
4746
occurred in 1996 with a supportive inflow pattern and maximum
storage. After the completion of three on-going canal projects, 3 maf
additional canal supplies are expected.
The average outflow at the last barrage on the Indus, Kotri, is 33.8
maf (1978-2004). Natural uses of this water along the rivers are not
formally accounted for, including diversions to lakes, aquatic and
ecological systems, depending upon river flow and vegetation directly
supported by the rivers. A conservative estimate of these uses is
between 5 to 10 maf (Study III Volume 1). The groundwater excess
pumpage can be up to 15 maf during a dry year (2000-01), which is
not easy to replenish in a wet year (1994-95).
Groundwater Resources The groundwater aquifer in the sweet zone of the Indus Basin is a
reliable and rechargeable secondary source. It has played a major
role in providing extended water access outside the canal irrigated
areas. Fresh shallow groundwater has been used for centuries for
domestic and animal consumption, but the last two decades have
seen the extensive development of shallow tubewells operated by
Table 4: Provincial canal allocation 1991 and average post Tarbela Diversions Allocation WAA Diversions Average 1976-2004 (MAF) Kharif Rabi Annual Kharif Rabi Annual
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.95 33.49 19.04 52.54 Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76 28.94 14.22 43.15 NWFP 3.48 2.30 5.78 2.36 1.52 3.87
Balochistan 2.85 1.07 3.92 1.22 0.82 2.02 Sum 77.34 37.06 114.41 66.01
35.6
101.58
Table 5: The maximum and minimum canal diversions between 1978 to 2005 - MAF
Diversions Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Gross diversions
Maximum 58.20 50.01 6.11 3.17 111.11
Minimum 37.06 31.57 2.91 1.32 77.26
Table 6: Water Balance Summary of the Indus Basin – MAF
Category Average year
1993-94 Wet year 1994-95
Dry Year 2000-01
Total recharge of groundwater aquifer 65.99 72.25 55.1
Total groundwater extraction 67.4 71.13 69.91 Groundwater Balance -1.4 1.1 -14.8
electric, diesel, or mechanical power. The use of groundwater has
become a critical factor in all water use sectors. Shallow aquifers are
tempered in moderate-quality water zones also. Four major
waterlogged areas where deep wells were installed under the Salinity
Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP) in 1965 are now facing
new threats of irreversible water table depletion.
More than 0.6 million tubewells (NESPAK, World Bank) are
operating in the Indus Basin. The design capacity of deep electric
wells (about 4 percent of the total wells) is 2 to 4 cubic feet per
second (cusec), mostly functioning for city water supply and
industry. Private shallow wells have an average capacity of 1 cusec.
With an average utilization of 8 hours per day and discharge capacity
of 1 cubic feet per second, these wells can pump more than 70 MAF
water. Groundwater pumpage is the most beneficial in non-perennial
canal-irrigated agricultural areas. The areas have higher per hectare
canal supplies in summer, compensating for the winter when
groundwater becomes a primary resource. This water is economically
most beneficial for the farmers and Government because of multi-
cropping and high-value crops.
Groundwater quality has a high dependence on soil type, surface flow
patterns, topography, and irrigation practices. Currently,
groundwater contributes 35 percent of the total water available to
users. The water quality of about 45 percent of the area is marginal to
brackish (World Bank 1997). In the permanent brackish region,
seepage from rivers and canals forms a shallow fresh water layer.
Over-extraction of groundwater and change in water levels can cause
the depletion and rupture of the shallow sweet layer.
Water Demand and Supply GapsIt is normal for projected water demand to be higher than the actual
water supply; the situation becomes serious when supply is less than
the committed allocations and actual demand. Officially, water
shortage is computed against official commitments, while the actual
shortage (from the user's perspective) is the quantity required to
meet existing water needs. With the increase in demand from
different sectors, the targets of the system may become redundant.
Agriculture is the primary water use sector in Pakistan where
demand and use have gone beyond the original planning. Farmers
extract water from aquifers, lakes and ponds, and sometimes directly
4948
from rivers. For water managers, one of the consequences of this
situation can be the gradual irrelevance of monitoring and evaluation
processes. The following sections briefly discuss the current demand-
supply gap with reference to different perspectives.
System Shortages with Respect to CommitmentsTargets set by the Water Allocation Accord of 1991At the basin and provincial levels, WAPDA, IRSA, and the Irrigation
Departments operate to deliver quantitative seasonal allocations
(agreed in the 1991 WAA) to the provinces and operate reservoirs
and link canals to provide the main canals' discharge according to
the 10 daily allocations of the WAA. Below the RIM (rivers inflow
monitoring) stations, average canal diversions are short of about 8
maf annually against an allocation of 111.35 maf. The actual annual
diversions vary from 94 maf to 111 maf with an average of 103.4 maf
(1978-2005). Hence, in a good year, the allocation target is achieved,
while in a worse situation, the target remains short by 22 maf (only
89 maf diversions in 2001). Three non-perennial canal systems
(Katch, Rani and Thal) are under construction, with an allocation of
4 maf. With the completion of these canals, average diversions will
increase, and only during exceptionally low summer flows will these
targets not be achieved. However, average diversions will still remain
within the approved target of 1991.
Targets set at the Design Stage of Canals“Scarcity by design” was the approach adopted in Punjab and
northern India for the development of irrigation. It developed into a
widespread network, low proposed cropping intensities and low
water allowance. The design capacity of the irrigation network was
based on design allocation for summer plus 10 percent to 30 percent
capacity margins. Canal command areas with less reliable flows were
provided with high capacity margins. Because of river flow shortage,
35 percent of the agriculture areas were not entitled to river supplies
in winter, while surplus water could be supplied to these canals on
low priority. The systems in the lower Indus were designed after
1947. Water allowances and canal capacities were kept two to three
times higher than the earlier systems of the Upper Basin.
The water allocations of 1991 acknowledge the fact that available
surface water in summer is less than existing full capacity. About 10
percent more water can be diverted in summer if canals are operated
at the authorized supply. At least another 10 percent can be diverted
by utilizing full canal capacity. The situation in winter is improved, as
25 percent extra water is provided through reservoirs. This situation
clearly shows that temporal water distribution has been improved,
especially in winter, while canals can draw 20 percent more surface
water in summer.
Water Shortage against Actual Agriculture DemandsAll estimates, official and unofficial, indicate shortage and stress with
respect to actual demand. The estimated quantities of present and
future demand vary widely because of different assumptions on
efficiency, recharge, and limitation in accounting for uses. The water
balances carried out in the basin also vary in estimates of rainfall and
groundwater. The National Water Strategy computes existing and future water
requirements to address crop demand while considering population
growth and required agriculture production. For the base scenario of
the year 2000, the estimated 'shortfall' is 12.6 MAF. For the low-
growth scenario, 32 MAF more water will be required in 2010 and 31
MAF in 2025. The Strategy suggests that the canal head
requirements will increase by over 19 MAF by 2010 and remain
around 18 MAF by 2025. This increase will be in the range of
additional requirements. The approach suggests that water equal to
existing shortage should be saved by improving efficiency.
The Framework for Action (FFA) prepared by the Pakistan Water
Partnership (PWP) indicates very high water shortages: 40 MAF in
2010 and 107 MAF in 2015 (Framework for Action 2001). High
estimates are because of 30 percent assumed gross efficiency, low
groundwater potential (15 maf as compared to 45 maf by the national
strategy). The message of this scenario is the extreme possible
situation, if other things remain at their usual level. The water
balances in recent years provide more detailed information. Some
important findings are:
i. At the basin scale, current irrigation shortages are mainly
Table 7: Irrigation Water Shortages in MAF in million acre feet (MAF)
2000/01 2010/11 2024/25
High Demand scenario 12.59 66.64 51.2
Lower demand scenario 12.61 31.93 30.26
5150
outside the canal irrigated areas in summer. Water shortage in
the non-perennial areas during winter is mostly compensated by
groundwater extraction. The saline areas have a high
dependence on river supplies, limited uses of groundwater, and
low final efficiencies.
ii. The areas cropped and partially irrigated outside canals
commands are about 30 percent. The traditional Sailaba
(riverine belt) and Barrani (rain fed) areas are shifting to well
irrigation. Agriculture here depends partly on unauthorized
supplies from water bodies, including rivers. The water needs of
these areas are shown by different studies, especially indicating
provincial water needs; however, they have not been considered
in planning.iii. The existing net water shortage in agriculture is about 10 MAF in
a wet year to 25 MAF in dry year. A wet year may have a gross
excess recharge in the range of 5 MAF and replenish water
bodies. Above-normal summer rains and high river flows are
critical in maintaining sustainable water resources availability. iv. Agriculture water demand is not increasing linearly or as a
function of area because new cropped areas have a bigger share
of the non-irrigated or well-irrigated areas, having a smaller
impact on demand and higher water use efficiency.v. Actual water uses in agriculture will decrease if the present
scenario continues. The surface water availability is already
showing a decreasing trend as the residual flows from the
eastern rivers and existing storage decreases. The shallow
aquifer may drop below the existing pumpage level. Domestic and Industrial SectorsAccording to the National Water Strategy, access to water for
domestic purposes in the urban areas is limited to about 83 percent
Table 8: Estimation of the Crop Water Requirements
of the population. About 57 percent of the people have piped supply
to their homes whereas in other mainly poor areas, people get water
either from community taps, hand pumps, wells or pay a heavy price
to water vendors. The present water use for municipal and industrial
supplies in the urban sector is 4.3 MAF. Most urban water is
supplied through groundwater except for the cities of Karachi and
Hyderabad and part of the supply to Islamabad. Demand is expected
to increase to about 12.1 MAF by the year 2025. The present
domestic water use in rural areas is estimated at 1 MAF. Most rural
water is supplied from groundwater except in saline groundwater
areas where irrigation canals are the main source of domestic water.
Only about 53 percent of the rural population has access to drinking
water from public water supply sources. The remaining population
gets their drinking water supply from streams, canals, ponds or
springs etc. Water consumed by major industries is about 1.2 MAF
(1.45 BCM) per year. Most of the industrial establishments use
groundwater and abstract it at their own expense. It is estimated that
about 0.023 MAF of water is provided to industries through
municipal water supplies.
Environmental NeedsAll Indus Basin rivers are threatened by dryness in their lower
reaches as a result of increased upstream diversions. The gradual
shrinking of rivers reduces the natural recycling process of the flood
plains and water bodies. The rangelands become artificially irrigated,
utilized by the infrastructure, or deserted. The lakes are partially
provided with river supplies through canals. Mostly, these supplies
are at lower priority than irrigation. A serious situation may arise
with the further allocation of river resources without considering
environmental and ecological conditions. As shown in the previous
sections, unallocated uses are also seriously affecting water
availability at spatio-temporal scales. It is further complicated if
international water sharing is involved in ensuring environmental
and drinking water needs. Other than Indus delta, little information is available about river eco-
systems and the impacts of reduced water availability on aquatic life,
water bodies, and morphological changes in the rivers. Recently, a
baseline survey carried out by the Forest Department in Sindh
(Baseline Survey Forest Department 2004) showed more than
41,000 tubewells in the riverine areas. This field situation defies the
5352
forecast as well as riverine area development planning (Vision 2002).
The report also shows an increase in riverine area from 1.1 to 2.04
million ha from 1978 to 2004. The existing water uses of the riverine
area are estimated at more than 2 maf. A recent study by the Federal
Flood Commission Pakistan has suggested flow volume downstream
Kotri as two logical sets, a minimum constant flow of 0.3 MAF each
month and three month average flood of 5 MAF to be achieved over
five years period. This procedure to protect the aquatic life and sea
intrusion is based on assumptions that the lower system will remain
prone to occasional floods.
The dry reaches phenomenon has extended over time span and
across river stretches in the Indus and eastern tributary rivers, Ravi
and Sutlej. The daily river data for a dry year shows nil flows in the
whole year in the tail reaches of the Ravi and Sutlej, and more than
ten months in the tail reach of the Indus. The reduced and nil flows
in the river reaches directly influences aquatic life and natural
vegetation in the riverine (sailaba or kacha) areas. An indirect impact
of these reduced flows is the decrease in groundwater recharge. The
first ever minimum water requirements of the Indus rivers have been
roughly estimated by a preliminary study by the Ministry of Water
and Power (Study III 2005). The study recommends 4 MAF annual
volume as the minimum reach flows; 30 percent of this flow is
expected to be used within river reaches while the rest is conveyed
downstream.
Water Use PerformanceManaging Salinity and Drainage Effluent from Different
Water UsesSalinity and drainage effluent management problems exist side by
side in the saline areas of Pakistan. The constrained drainage intake
potential of rivers and water bodies and high effluent generation
from irrigation in the saline lower Indus are the processes that need
to be managed. The irrigation schemes in the Indus basin were not
supported by a drainage infrastructure and low lying rivers were
supposed to collect all excessive runoff. A part of the summer floods
were stored in flood plains that had a low level of human activity, and
recollected in the rivers when ground water levels dropped,
supporting sub-surface water movement. This process is greatly
disturbed by extensive activity along the rivers, by agriculture,
industry and infrastructure. During early periods, irrigation sector
also practiced control by reducing supplies to the waterlogged areas.
The practice is not expected to be revised because of increased
intensities of high water use crops in saline areas. However, the
drainage situation is different in the sweet and moderately useable
aquifer zones, because of extensive use of groundwater. The SCARP
(Salinity Control and Reclamation Project) schemes implemented
between 1965 and 2004 have been windup in these areas.
The drainage problem in saline zones has yet to be solved. These
areas are now permanently waterlogged because of their flat natural
slopes and very high water tables. An annual drainage effluent
surplus of about 18 MAF is generated in the saline zone (Habib
2004), of which, only a fraction enters the rivers and two outfall
drains, while the rest remains in the high aquifer and evaporates
from the soil surface because of high temperatures and nominal
groundwater contribution. Two big surface drainage projects on the
left bank outfall drain and right bank outfall drains were started as a
part of a major interlinked drainage system, but could not be
finalized as envisaged. According to the National Drainage Program
(NDP); “major issues to be addressed are reducing the drainable
surplus dramatically and permanently at source, and providing the
Indus Basin Irrigation System with a permanent outlet to the sea to
dispose off the drainable surplus”.
The permanently saline areas of Pakistan lie mostly in Sindh and
Balochistan. A detailed salinity survey was carried out by WAPDA
during 1977-79, covering a 16.5 mha gross canal command area in
the Indus Basin (Table 9). The water samples were taken from a
depth of 4 to 5 m. Based on the salinity analysis (Table 9), about 14
percent of the area (2.4 mha) was declared as moderately saline but
useable for agriculture, and 39 percent identified as severely saline
with groundwater not usable for agriculture. In the saline area, 11
percent of the soil profile was saline and 27 percent were saline-sodic
and sodic. The Soil Survey of Pakistan also conducted a detailed
survey of about 6 mha salt-affected soils. The saline and saline-sodic
soils were 11 and 86 percent, respectively. Both these surveys
indicated that saline-sodic soils shared the major proportion of salt-
affected soils. The saline zone was grossly waterlogged.
Irrigation and Agriculture PerformanceThe poor performance of the irrigation network and irrigated
5554
agriculture is widely discussed and criticized. The country has
invested heavily in projects to improve efficiency at the farm and
main network levels through on-farm water management and lining
projects. An analysis of the actual impact of these schemes is out of
scope here, but remains an issue of the national concern. This section
discusses some recent performance estimates to highlight the nature
of performance issues.
Field Efficiency The conveyance efficiency of irrigation systems in Pakistan is
reported to have decreased between 1970 and 1995, as there was an
increase in seepage losses. Basin-level projects, the Revised Action
Plan of 1978, and the Water Sector Investment Planning Study of
1991 reported a 100 percent increase in losses from the irrigation
network as compared to the design estimates. Limited field
measurements based on the monitoring of low-performing system
during the 1980s and 1990s imparted a bias to these “efficiency
projections” (Habib 2004). Lieftlick (1965) and earlier studies measured 20 percent water loss in
the main and secondary canals and another 20 percent loss in the
watercourses of Punjab. The measured losses were even low in Sindh
(LIP 1967) due to high groundwater levels. The accumulated losses
from the main canal to field level were estimated at 36 percent in the
sweet zone and 25 percent in the saline zone, field efficiency was
taken at 70 percent. With these assumptions, 45 to 52 percent of
surface delivery was supposed to reach crops. In 1978, measured
watercourse and main canal losses varied across a huge range. The
average conveyance efficiency from the main canal to the
watercourse tail was estimated at 37 percent, and 40 percent for
sweet and saline areas. This means that, at 70 percent field
efficiency, only 25 to 28 percent of the water diverted to a canal could
Table 9: Irrigated Area Within Different Ranges of Groundwater Salinity in Mha
Fresh Zone
Moderate quality zone
Saline ZoneCanal
Commands
Gross Area
<1500 ppm
1500-3000 ppm
>3000 ppm
Percentage
Punjab
9.84
6.83
1.33
1.67
17 percent
NWFP
0.40
0.35
0.50
-
Sindh
6.24
0.94
0.55
4.74
76 percent
Balochistan
Total
16.5
8.1
2.4
6.4
39 percentSource: Water Sector Investment Planning Study WAPDA (1990)
be used for crops. This low average efficiency is continued to be
reported in development projects and in recent debate on reservoirs.
It is important to mention that primary data collected by research
organizations have shown much lower water losses at the primary
and tertiary levels (IIMI 1993, ISRIP 1994, IWASRI 1994, Wijjen
1995, Wolter 1998, Kuper 1998, Habib 1998). Based on an extensive
review of water loss measurements, Habib 2004 compiled much
higher conveyance efficiencies, showing that more than 40 percent of
the diversions could be used by crops and field vegetation.
Impact of Groundwater Pumpage on Net Water Use
EfficienciesGroundwater pumpage has become an essential practice in areas
with good and moderate quality water. It is increasingly pumped in
the riverine areas of the saline belt. The useable water quality
standards set in 1970 for electrical conductivity (EC), and sodium
absorption ratio (SAR) were revised in 1991 by WAPDA to
accommodate well growth in the areas earlier considered unusable.
The recent drought of 2000-03 has shown groundwater use
surpassing new standards. Poor-quality groundwater is mixed with
canal flows wherever possible and used without mixing when canal
water is not available. High and continuous groundwater extraction has generated a cyclical
recharge-discharge process and enhanced final water use efficiencies.
The impact of groundwater can be understood from its contribution
to actual uses, from irrigation to the domestic sector. About 20
percent of irrigated areas depend solely on groundwater in winter.
About 6 million ha or 60 percent of the canal-irrigated areas in
Punjab receive 50 percent of the supplies at the farm level from
groundwater. One-fourth of canal areas (2 to 3 million ha) use
groundwater during the kharif season up to 40 percent. A recent
analysis based on a complete water balance computes fairly high net
water use efficiency at the secondary and main canal levels. A
comparative study (Molden 2001) from three South Asian districts in
Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka showed the efficiency of using water
beneficially is 90 percent in the Chishtian district of Pakistan as
compared to 85 percent in Hakra, India, and 60 percent in Sri Lanka. The water use quantities created through a groundwater recycling
process introduce a secondary efficiency factor in the system. If 60 to
5756
70 percent of the system losses enter the ground and are pumped
back, the net water use efficiency increases to almost equal that of
primary efficiency. The strongest quality of groundwater for farmers
is its reliable access (Habib 2004): lCash crop areas with low or non-perennial canal supplies have a
high dependence on groundwater to support high cropping
intensities. Extensive perennial cropping and groundwater
mining in the cotton-wheat zone of southern Punjab and the
mixed crop zone of northern Punjab has resulted in a negative
recharge-discharge relationship and gradual depletion of
groundwater. lAreas with high rainfall are becoming intensively well-irrigated.
Recharge from rainfall has apparently enhanced with higher
extraction of groundwater aquifers. A consequence is decreased
drainage contribution from the catchment and decrease in river
gains. lVery high well density in the sweet zone (more than half a
million tubewells) is also linked to the small farm sizes. An
individual ownership of tubewells provides reliable water access. Yield of Major Crops The average yield of all major crops in Pakistan is lower than their
claimed potential (RAP 1978, WSIPS 1991). The national average
yield of the major crops does not indicate a progressive tend. Only
the cotton yield reached the internationally competitive level in 1991,
but the next year, declined to the level it had been in 1985 and
remains there with small fluctuations. Rice yield is generally low in
Pakistan. Wheat and sugarcane have shown an increase, however are
still lower than the potential level. The figure and table show the
yield of major crops in Pakistan after 1970. Agricultural production analyses by different studies identify a
number of yield constraints. Reliable water access has remained an
Pakistan Average Yield Max. Farm level
Crop Avg. 1994-04 Max annual Yield / ha
Kg/ha Kg/ha year Kg/ha
Cotton 576 769 1991
Wheat 2240 2491 2001 7000
Sugarcane 47166 50281 1997
Rice 1901 2050 1999
important factor in agricultural output. The availability of
groundwater has a clear impact on all crops. The gross water use and
crop yields are directly proportional, tubewell owners having a
higher yield, especially in wheat producing areas (Habib 2004,
Zubair, Habib 2001). Tail-end farmers and saline areas have lower
yields (WB 2006), because of the fresh-water shortage.
The relationship between landholding size and the average yield has
shifted with time. During the 1970s, small farms were producing
high gross values (RAP 1978), but during the 1990s (Zubair, Habib
2001) medium farmers were performing best due to the following
factors.
lThese farms can mobilize resources and better invest in
agriculture. lMid-level owners depend on the farm economy and are better
aware of technology improvements. To maximize their income,
these farms try to increase cropping intensities and link it with
the local market.lA high percentage of medium-level farms are managed by the
owners themselves or partly with share croppers. Owner-
cultivated farms have the maximum gross value returns
(Strosser 1997).
With mechanization, large farm can fully utilize their resources,
while, very large farms tend to crop only a part of the land. These
farms have dozens of share croppers and limited investments by
them. A cumulative impact of farm level variations of different inputs
and constraints can influence production to vary in a wide range. The
average production of low quartile is only 10 percent to the 30
Average National Yield of Major Crops
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1971
-72
1973
-74
1975
-76
1977
-78
1979
-80
1981
-82
1983
-84
1985
-86
1987
-88
1989
-90
1991
-92
1993
-94
1995
-96
1997
-98
1999
-00
2001
-02
2003
-04
wh
eat,
rice
,co
tto
n(l
int)
kg/h
a
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
Su
gar
can
ein
kg/h
a
Wheat Rice Cotton Sugarcane
Table 10: Average yield of Major Crops
5958
percent of the top quartile for the major crops. The lower investment
potential and cost benefit ratio of Pakistan's agriculture is also linked
with a sharp decrease in subsidies from the Government. The latest
World Bank report (WB 2005) appreciates the agriculture sector of
Pakistan for being able to avoid the “subsidies trap” as a hopeful
factor. However, due to high cost of groundwater pumpage,
pesticides, seeds and fertilizers, inputs are expensive and farmers
tend to use lower quantities of inputs. The low investment potential
is a major factor prohibiting farmers to shift to high quality inputs
and divert from the traditional agriculture.
During the last ten years, wheat, rice and cotton have experienced a
“high production crises”. Apparently farmers cannot increase
national wheat yield to the level of 2.5 tons/ha without a decline of
prices and risk of delayed selling. Not only that, Government is either
failing to manage a good crop or the risk of grain shortage. Pakistan's
access to the wheat market is limited for imports. The local storage of
wheat is also limited, this year local official purchase of wheat was
delayed because storage was already utilized by the imported wheat.
The same happens with cotton. Hence, a good crop can not
guarantee good returns for farmers. The local and international
markets dynamics are mostly not in favor of farmers.
Trans-boundary PerspectivesAt Independence in 1947, the international boundary between India
and West Pakistan cut the irrigation system of the Bari Doab and
Sutlej Valley Project, originally designed as one scheme, into two
parts. The headwork fell to India while the rivers and canals ran
through Pakistan. In 1948, India stopped water supply to the canals
supported by the Ravi River. India's argument was proprietary
ownership of the land and water within its territorial boundaries. A
temporary agreement was reached between the two nations - the
Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to
release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in
return for annual payments from the Government of Pakistan.
Pakistan claims historical water rights to all rivers, but supplies from
the eastern rivers, Ravi and Sutlej, can be stopped at any time. The
agricultural areas fed by these two rivers were the most fertile in
West Punjab, comprising one-third of the total irrigated land. In
1951, the World Bank mediated and proposed joint operation of the
basin, which was rejected by both countries.
The negotiations continued for nine years. Finally, the Indus Waters
Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India in 1960. According to
this agreement, the flows of the three western rivers of the Indus
Basin - the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab (except a small quantity used
in Kashmir) - were assigned to Pakistan, whereas the entire flow of
the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were exclusively given
to India. India was also allowed to use the western rivers for
hydropower generation, on the condition that the use remained non-
consumptive and flow quantities entering into Pakistan were not
reduced. The Indus River Commissions were formed in both
countries to supervise and implement the treaty. Pakistan can object
to a project on the western rivers and can request the World Bank to
appoint an independent inquiry commission. Both countries started
developing infrastructure and reservoirs, Pakistan to divert western
river flow to the eastern rivers command area and India to store the
full flows of the Ravi and Sutlej. The reservoirs and link canals built
in Pakistan provided a boost to agriculture by increasing water
reliability and winter supplies to the irrigated areas.
India has built reservoirs, power plants, and infrastructure for new
irrigation and power supply to Rajhastan, Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. The development on the eastern front
has required the full exploitation of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers.
India is now building supply schemes and power stations on the
Chenab, Jhelum and Indus tributaries. Both countries have operated
within the framework of the Treaty for over four decades. However,
India's extensive planning on the upstream catchments of the
western rivers and Pakistan's increasing water stress are likely to
pose serious challenges to the IWT. The Salal and Baglihar Hydro
Electric Project, and Kishan Ganga project have either been
completed or are in progress. Pakistan has raised objections to each
major project. In 1960, the Treaty did not consider and plan beyond
the agriculture water needs of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej
and Beas) basins. For irrigation canals, water is transferred from the
Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) through link canals.
While, no commitments are made for the environmental water
needs, rivers ecology, wetlands and local uses along the rivers. Water
stress on both sides of the border set the perspectives of future
disagreements:
lThe hydropower potential available in the upper catchments of
6160
the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) on the Indian
side and domestic as well as industrial needs may impel India to
use water of these rivers. The technical issue of “changes in river
regime” can emerge in a more complex way, requiring further
arbitration by the World Bank.lThe impact of gradual death of the eastern rivers was apparently
unforeseen. In addition, post-treaty Indus works compensated
for the irrigation diversions from the eastern rivers by
transferring water from the western rivers, but, totally ignoring
the drinking and other needs of the centuries-old populated
catchments, where the groundwater is brackish in huge areas
and rainfall very low. Riparian non-agriculture water needs and
a gross scarcity of fresh water in the southern areas will put high
stress on water management in Pakistan, questioning the logic
of an “administrative treaty”.
Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues;
her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system.
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in Sustainable Irrigated Agriculture: An interpretive precis of the case of
Pakistan. International Irrigation Management Institute, Colombo, Sri
Lanka.lBandaragoda, D. J. (1999). Institutional Change and Shared Management of
Water Resources in Large Canal Systems:lChandio, B. A. 2002, Water a vehicle for food security and development of
Pakistan, world water vision, water for food and rural development PCRWR
contribution to PWP Islamabad. 12 Pages.lFAO, 1998. Crop Evapotranspiration, Guidelines for Computing Crop Water
Requirements. Paper no. 56. FAO Rome.lFAO, 2004, Irrigation in Asia in Figures, Water Report 18, FAO, Rome Italy.lHabib Z., 2004, Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin,
22nd September 2004, ENGREF Montpellier FrancelHunting Technical Services Ltd and Sir M. MacDonald & Partners
(HTS/MMP). 1965. Lower Indus Report, Physical Resources-Groundwater,
Volume 6, Supplement 6.1.3, 4 & 5. West Pakistan Water and Power
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Prime Minister of India andlMichel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition,
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594.lNational Water Strategy. 2003. Pakistan Water Gateway.
http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/lPNC The Pakistan National Conservation Strategy 1998. Where we are,
where we should be and how to get there. Environment and Urban Affairs
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regulation in Punjab. Technical report No. 38. Punjab Private sector
Groundwater Development Project Consultants. Lahore. PakistanlPunjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority. 1999. Pilot Farmers
Organizations Rules. Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.lPWP - Pakistan Water Partnership. 2001.The framework for action (FFA) for
achieving the Pakistan water vision 2025, civil society response to FFA.
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Pakistan.lShams ul Mulk, 1993. Water resources management, Pakistan experience.
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second international network meeting on information techniques for
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organisation and functioning of Area Water Boards, Farmers Organisations
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Ltd, 1984, Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Project Preparation, Groundwater
and Tubewell Drainage, Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan.lThe Canal and Drainage Act 1873 with Additions of Punjab Minor Act 1905,
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(Second Revision)-Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Umbrella Project
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hydropower development Vision 2025. WAPDA House Lahore. 31 p.lWAPDA. 1979. Soil Salinity and Waterlogged Soils. Atlas Master Planning
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(19902000). Federal Planning Cell, Lahore, Pakistan.lWorld Bank (1994). Pakistan's Irrigation And Drainage: Issues and Options.
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Region
6362
Nepal's National Water Plan and
Regional IssuesDr. Bishnu Hari Nepal
emmed between the two largest populations of the world
China and India, Nepal is a tiny country. But it is a world
water power. Nepal has four major river systems, namely: HMahakali, Karnali, Narayani (Gandaki) and Saptakoshi, which
originate from the high Himalayas and cut through the mountain
ranges to form deep river valleys.
Medium-sized rivers like Kankai, Kamala, Bagmati, West Rapti and
Babai originate from the Mahabharata Range. Rivers originating
from Shivalik Range and flowing to the country's south, contain less
water during the dry season, but can create havoc due to floods
during the monsoon. Undoubtedly, the source of the medium- and
small-sized rivers too is the Himalayas but indirect.
Rivers thus form an average annual runoff water of about 225 BCM
(Billion Cubic Meters). This is considerably a large volume of water
flowing every year from the four river systems of Nepal to the Ganges
of India and then to the Bay of Bengal.
Nepal's hydropower generation capacity is 83,000 MW, largest after
Brazil. Out of this huge capacity, it is estimated that some 42,000
MW to 50,000 MW is financially and technically viable. The
Himalayas is the greatest boon to South Asia, in general, and for
Nepal, in particular. Out of 2500km long and 300km wide
Himalayan Range, 800km long area is covered by Nepal. Nepal thus
deserves to be a “water power” of the world because it occupies
nearly one-third length of the total Himalayas. The Himalayas is the
world's fifth largest fresh water treasure with nearly 5000 cubic KMs
ice and snow after Antarctica, the Arctic islands, Greenland and
Alaska.
Out of 194,471 sq. km drainage area, 76 per cent falls in Nepal.
(Nepal: 2004). The Karnali, Sapta Gandaki and Sapta Koshi, all
trans-Himalayan rivers flowing through Nepal, contribute 71 per cent
of the dry season flows and 41 per cent of the annual flows of the
Ganges. So, there are great repercussions of the Nepalese Water
Management Plans and Actions for the Indian River Linking Project,
officially introduced in 2002 by India, and Bangladesh sub-
regionally and matters relating to the integrated statutes for
Pakistan, Bhutan and China as riparian countries in the region as a
whole.
Nepal's Surface Water Resources Capacity KOSHI RIVER BASIN: Nepal's largest river basin is the Koshi River
Basin covering catchment-area of 60,400 sq. km., out of which 46
per cent i.e. 27, 863 sq. km. lies in Nepal. The rest is occupied by
Tibet, China. In Nepal, out of seven; Sunkoshi, Tamakoshi, Arun and
Tamur are the major tributaries of the Saptakoshi River Basin. The
average annual runoff (discharge) of Saptakoshi at Chatara is around
1,409 CM/S (Cubic Meters per Second) i.e. 45 BCM per annum.
NARAYANI RIVER BASIN: The total catchment-area of the Narayai
River Basin is 34,960 sq. km. and nearly 90 per cent of the total
catchment-area falls in the Nepalese territory. Trishuli, Budhi
Gandaki, Marsyangdi, Seti and Kaligandaki are the major tributaries
of the Narayani River Basin. Some 1600 CM/S i.e. nearly 50 BCM
per annum is regarded as the runoff rate of the Narayani River Basin
at Narayanghat, Chitwan.
KARNALI RIVER BASIN: The origin of Karnali River is the south of
Mansarovar and Rokas lakes of Tibet, China. The total catchment-
area of Karnali River at Chisapani is 43,679 sq. km. and 94 per cent
of the total catchment-area falls in Nepal. The major tributaries of
Karnali River Basin are: West Seti, Bheri, Humla Karnali, Mugu
Karnali, Singa Tila, Lohare and Thuli Gad. The average rate of
annual runoff of the Karnali River Basin is 1,397 CM/S i.e. 44 BCM
per annum.
6564
MAHAKALI RIVER BASIN: Earlier, there was a reading that
Mahakali River, on the western border with India, belonged to Nepal
alone. During post-1990 interim government, KP Bhattarai, as an
interim prime minister of Nepal announced that Mahakali was the
common river of Nepal and India. But two Nepalese villages named
Chandani and Dodhara are located across the Mahakali River.
Neglecting this truth, with an understanding for managing the
precious water of the Mahakali River, Nepal and India signed the
popular Mahakali Treaty in 1996.
Due to major differences, the Detailed Project Report (DPR) has not
been finalized yet though it was to be prepared within six months of
the agreement. There are differences over the source of the Mahakali
River and the installations of the Indian army at Kalapani since 1960
when the late King Mahendra sacked the first elected government led
by late B.P. Koirala and dissolved the first democratically elected
parliament of Nepal. Instead, the father of the present king
introduced non-party Panchayat system. Two years later, in 1962, a
major war between India and China broke out. So Mahakali River
Basin serves India's water and security interests.
Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive
zone between Nepal and India. The Tanakpur Agreement of 1991
done by Girija Prasad Koirala, the first and longest ruling Prime
Minister of Nepal during post-1990 governments created great havoc
in the country. Later in 1996, it had to be amended by the popular
Mahakali Treaty.
This Treaty also could not remain exceptional. There is a saying in
Nepali that it also could not remain- paani maathiko obhaano
meaning remaining dry while lying on water! Because of the
Mahakali Treaty of 1996, then largest party in the Parliament- the
CPN-UML was broken. The result was that the best opportunity for
the CPN-UML to form government with absolute majority was lost.
Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive
area not only due to potential water sharing but also because of
politics.
The Government of Nepal says that Api Himal is the origin of the
Mahakali River. The total catchment area of the Mahakali River
Basin is 15,260 sq. km. and 34 per cent of the total catchment area
falls under the Nepalese territory.
MEDIUM RIVER BASINS: Some rivers originate from the
Mahabharat Range of the mountains. They are Kankai, Kamala,
Bagmati, West Rapti and Babai. They are not very forceful during the
dry season. These rivers are also perennial, with groundwater and
springs sustaining the river-flow during the dry period. They are but
mostly primary and rain-fed. The total catchment area of these rivers
is around 17,00 sq. km. and the average combined runoff at various
gauging stations is 461 CM/S i.e. 14.5 BCM per annum.
SOUTHERN OR SHIVALIK RIVER BASINS: The origin of this class
of the rivers is the Shivalik mountain ranges mostly in the southern
part after the Mahabharat Range in Nepal. The rivers during the dry
season are mostly dry but in the monsoon these rivers also swell to a
considerable level and are able to do harm in the riparian belts. The
government of Nepal has numbered them to be 73 in major
categories and they have been divided into 8 groups, each between a
basin covered by large and medium rivers. The total catchment area
is supposed to be 23,150 sq. km. and the combined runoff capacity is
1,682 CM/S, i.e., 53.0 BCM per annum. These rivers are used for
supplementary seasonal irrigation by the small-scale-farmers
extensively under the Small Scale Farmers-Managed Irrigation
Schemes (FMIS).
Groundwater Resources CapacityNepal's southern belt Terai's hydro-geological mapping indicates that
this sector has a tremendous potential of groundwater resources. The
thick sequence of saturated sediments of alluvial and colluvial origin
represents as one of the most productive aquifers in the
subcontinent. It is regarded that the erosion of the Shivalik Hills and
the outwash fans of rivers form the northern-most Bhabar Zone. The
government says the aquifers are unconfined and sediments being of
coarse materials have very high permeability in the range of 100-150
meters per day and thus the Bhabar Zone is considered to be the
main source of recharge for the Terai Groundwater (NWP: 2005).
The NWP further states that the groundwater re-charge at specific
areas is estimated to be as high as 600mm per annum. However, it is
assumed that overall 450mm is recoverable re-charge figure for all of
the Terai region and inner Terai areas such as Chitwan, Dang and
6766
Surkhet are also estimated to hold good groundwater potential. The
government assessment of rechargeable groundwater in the Terai
region is between 5.8 BCM and 11.5 BCM per annum.
Annual withdrawal of groundwater for different purposes in the
Terai region is 1.04 BCM, which is nearly 20 per cent of the
minimum possible re-charge estimate of 5.80 BCM. Contrary to it,
the Kathmandu Valley is already in an alarming situation, because
present estimation of annual abstraction is 23.4 MCM (Million Cubic
Meters), much greater than the maximum recharge estimate of 14.6
MCM (Nepal: 2005). Anyhow, the conclusion of the research based
on the justifications shows that Nepal is a country of waterpower in
the region if managed properly.
Achievements Out of 225 BCM annual availability of its water flow, Nepal is using
only a minimal amount; nearly 15 BCM annually. The rest is wasted.
The world normally cites Nepal as a country of “white gold”, “white
gem”, and “hydro-dollar” out of its 83,000 MW capacity, Nepal is
producing 606 MW hydroelectricity only, nearly 1.6 per cent of the
capacity that too only after the completion of Kali Gandaki-A last
year with the production of 144 MW by the support of the
government of Japan and Asian Development Bank. This is Nepal's
largest single project so far not only in the history of hydropower
projects after failed Arun-3 but also in terms of any development
projects of Nepal.
ON DRINKING WATER: Nepal government claims it is providing
potable pure drinking water to some 71-72 per cent of the people. But
many water experts have reservations. Nepal's southern Terai belt is
inhabited by more than half of the country's population. More than
95 per cent of the people there use groundwater through tube-wells
pumping from 20-100 feet deep. Nearly 800,000 tube-wells are in
the Terai region, out of which only 30,000 tube-wells have been
tested for arsenic. In some 2000 tube-wells arsenic content was
discovered.
The WHO standard for drinkable water is up to 10 micro-gm of
arsenic content per liter. But India and Bangladesh have also
accepted 50 as the upward margin. In Nepal's districts like Nawal
Parasi, Siraha, Kailali and Rautahat nearly 30, 18, 15 and 8 per cent
tube-wells respectively contain arsenic above Nepalese standard of
50 micro gm per liter. (see Nepal: 2005).
Nepal's capital Kathmandu is not an exception in problems regarding
supplying safe and sufficient drinking water to its city dwellers. Out
of Kathmandu's demand of estimated 31-cr-liter per day, so far the
Drinking Water Corporation of Nepal is able to supply estimated 11-
cr-liter only. Hence, Kathmandu badly needs sustainable water
supply plan and projects. There are three major projects where Nepal
has completed certain degree of feasibility studies. They are: Kodku
Khola Drinking Project, Roshi Khola Drinking Water Project and
Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Among the three, the last one is
the biggest.
In 1995, the CPN-UML government, considering the Melamchi
Project very large and difficult to accumulate huge budget
immediately, had given a priority to Kodku Khola Drinking Water
Project, which needed to construct a dam for the storage of water in
two years. As an Ambassador of Nepal to Japan I was involved in
convincing the government of Japan for ODA to implement the
project. The agreement was almost finalized, but the CPN-UML
government collapsed and the new Nepali Congress-RPP
government gave a priority to Melamchi Drinking Water Project
under the multi-national cooperation including Japan. So the
proposed Kodku Khola project remained pending.
Water has always played a crucial role in Nepal's politics. The work
on the Melamchi Drinking Water Project had started when on
February 1, 2005 the king sacked prime minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba government.
Now Deuba and his local development minister Prakash Man Singh
face jail on the charge of malpractices in honoring the construction of
the Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Thus the urban water supply
system is disturbed and is not satisfactory. The latest National Water
Plan states that in the rural areas, the government policy has been to
hand over management of the Department of Water Supply and
Sewerage (DWSS)-built systems to the communities and planning to
rehabilitate and upgrade more than 500 such schemes and hand
them over to the communities for operation and maintenance (O &
M) (NWP: 2005, p.4).
6968
ON IRRIGATION: According to the latest statistics, Nepal has 2.64
million ha of cultivable land and 66 per cent of this land, i.e., 1.76
million ha, is irrigable and around 60 per cent of the irrigable land
has some kind of irrigation facility, and less than one-third has
round-the-year irrigation. Agricultural production in 2003 was 7.2
million tons, just meeting the minimum requirement of the nation's
edible grains. Out of this, only 3.3 million tons were from the
irrigated agriculture (Ibid, p.5).
In 2000 the government stopped giving subsidy on shallow tube-
wells and continued subsidy on deeper tube-wells. The deep tube-
wells irrigating 30-40 hectares of land are found quite useful in
Nepal. Experts joke in Nepal that on the one hand Nepal is striving
hard to provide irrigation facilities to its farmers through traditional
methods but on the other hand India irrigates nearly 1.7 million ha
land from the Sharada Barrage (constructed after Agreement with
Nepal in late 1920s) alone!
Nepal gives a top priority to Pancheswar Multi-purpose Project,
Shikta (Banke), Babai (Bardiya), Kankai Multi-purpose Project,
Bagmati and Kamala irrigation projects. They all serve five sub-
basins of India.
More than 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area falls under
Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMISs) and in the remaining
areas, some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users
Association (WUA). Some of them are jointly managed by the
government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the
community-managed systems are better than the government-
managed projects.
HMG/Nepal seems interested in starting Shikta Irrigation Project in
phases after nearly 25 years. Due to India's direct intervention, Nepal
could not enhance this project. On India's opposition the Asian
Development Bank stopped financing the project. The same
happened to Saudi Fund (NRS 26 cr.) and the European Union (NRs
8.00 billion). But now Nepal may do it alone. The major canal would
be 9km long and 33 km feeder canals would irrigate 34, 270 ha of dry
land in 39 VDCs east of Banke District via Nepalgunj Municipality.
The inflow capacity is estimated to be 24 cubic metre per second and
the dam is expected to be 372 metre over Rapti River with a concrete
bridge over it. The project is estimated to cost nearly NRs 8.00
billion.
ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERN: Nearly 40 per cent of the
households use electricity generated from different systems including
hydropower. But the energy needs met from fuel-wood, agricultural
waste and animal-dung are 88.64 per cent, from hydro-electricity
1.66 per cent, from renewable energy resources 0.52 percent and
from fossil fuel (petroleum and coal) 11.18 per cent of the energy
consumption.
ON HYDROPWER: Due to lack of funds and firm policy, Nepal has
not been able to benefit from the vast power generation capacity
properly. India, the largest buyer for Nepal, too, should sincerely
realize its need of electricity for rural electrification. One estimate
shows that Indian State of Uttar Pradesh alone needs 20,000 MW of
electricity in the coming decade. Therefore, these two countries need
to assess production, demand and supply properly. Nepal's
production so far is minimal and the country needs more than
$80.00 billion to increase it.
Nepal's private sector or community supply share to the national
hydroelectricity capacity is 17per cent. To attract micro
hydroelectricity production the government has exempted the
production of up to one MW from tax and license. Simply the
producer needs to register the scheme with the district
administration office. This has been very attractive scheme in the
mountainous and rural areas improving the living standard of the
people.
The Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) manages medium-scale
production and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) with a capacity
between 606 MW and 619 MW makes power purchase agreements
with the producers. Small-scale private sector will produce nearly 50
MW. It has been proved that domestically planned, managed and
implemented projects are more cost effective than the internationally
developed schemes.
It is estimated that some 20 MW electricity will be produced per
annum by the local Nepalese resources but the demand has already
reached 60-66 MW.
7170
Nepal needs nearly NRs.4.00 billion extra money to maintain the
production of electricity in normal conditions which is difficult to
foot due to the security costs of the armed conflict. Many potential
donors except Japan and a few more have taken their hands off
seeing the king's hunger for absolute power. If the situation persists,
many experts speculate that 'load-shedding' in Nepal would be worse
though the government is planning to allocate 42 percent of its
budget for the electricity (Thapa: 2006).
Private Sector InitiativeIn January 2006, Nepal's first Hydropower Investment Mart (HIM)
was held in Kathmandu at the initiative of private sector involving
Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI), Small Hydropower
Promotion Project. (SHPP), German Cooperation Agency-GTZ and
Winrock International. Organizers said the HIM was aimed to bridge
the gap between the prospective private investors and private parties
holding licenses and PPAs for feasible hydropower projects. The
HIM not only encouraged the private sector in Nepal but also from
across South Asia.
The hydropower sector was open to the private sector in Nepal
significantly since 1994. Out of the total hydropower national grid of
Nepal, 148 MW is produced by the private sector. Out of which also,
the exclusive Nepali private sector contribution from their plants is
15 MW only. Some license holders in the country have signed PPAs
worth about 200 MW with NEA. However, their projects have not
gone ahead due to lack of funding. They cite NRs 300.00 billion
liquidity in the country. But if only five per cent of that could be
channeled to hydropower generation, they could produce 30 MW
every year. Investment, technology and bureaucratic hurdles are not
so complicated particularly after 1995 for micro and mini-level
hydropower generation. In the small scale also, for instance, the
Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Generation Project is one of the most
cost effective projects in Nepal but the 'Dolakha's White Gem' (as it is
popularly known: see Nepal: 2004) waits for its potential investors
impatiently.
After 2001, the NEA is supposed to be in loss by NRs4.00 billion,
whereas, earlier this authority used to earn nearly NRs1.00 billion as
profit per annum. In 2005 alone, the NEA had to bear a loss of nearly
NRs 2.00 billion. It is likely to join two bankrupt but important
corporations namely Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC) and
Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC). As per agreement, the NEA needs to
pay the foreign investors some 36.7 per cent of the profit.
The payment to the Khimti, Bhote Koshi and Indrawati Hydropower
generation projects alone was nearly NRs6. 56 billion out of the total
income of NRs12.82 billion. On the other hand, the NEA also pays
interest to the government nearly by 10.5 per cent (Thapa: 2005).
Thus, private sectors are a great hope and challenge to the NEA
concern.
First Positive Understanding with IndiaOn 14 January 2006, in India's capital New Delhi, 'a very positive
understanding' on hydropower trade has been made between Nepal
and India. The talks were held between the officials of NEA and
Ministry of Water Resources and India's the Power Trade
Corporation (PTC) officials. The details of the understanding are very
much welcome!
Nepal lacks nearly 90MW electricity in winter up to 2012 with the
present mechanism. It is estimated that till 2010, India's state of
Uttar Pradesh alone needs nearly 20,000MW electricity for rural
electrification. During winter, Nepal goes for 'load-shedding' due to
shortage of electricity. So, the two countries have come to an
understanding that during winter India sells electricity to Nepal and
during summer, when Nepal has over-supply due to less
consumption, it will sell electricity to India. The signatories have not
fixed the rate of electricity. Electricity is cheaper in India than in
Nepal.
Three complications are seen in this understanding:On the 'rate of the electricity' Nepalese fear being cheated by India. Both India and Nepal need to have a pact that favours both the
countries and so, politics should not hinder it.
India says it will supply Nepal the electricity after the transmission
lines are improved. Let the technology be improved in time in India.
The hope in Nepal is so strong that they believe India would sell
electricity to them even by reducing the supply to Farbesgunj in
India.
7372
Nepal is getting 50MW electricity for its eastern zone from India.
India will supply 50 MW more next year after the improvement of
the infrastructure. Before that in 2006, India can supply 20 MW
more making it 70 MW in total. The understanding shows that up to
150 MW of electricity can be exchanged at the present capacity and
after the improvement of infrastructure. The agreed rate of electricity
is NRs5.57 per unit (Kantipur: 16. 01. 2006, p.1).
Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and Water PlanHaving initiated in 1995, Nepal brought out its 'Water Resources
Strategy' in 2002. The plan envisages integrating and improving
water laws and regulations and policies like 'Water Supply Sector
Policy 2055', 'Kathmandu Valley Strategy on Water Supply and
Sanitation 2057', 'Irrigation Policy 2053' and Hydropower
Development Policy 2058' etc. Now the water sector aims to help
reduce incidence of poverty, unemployment and underemployment;
to provide people access to safe and adequate drinking water and
sanitation for ensuring health security; to increase agricultural
production and productivity ensuring food security of the nation; to
generate hydropower to satisfy national energy requirements and to
allow for the export of surplus energy; to supply the needs of
industry and other sectors of the economy; to facilitate water
transport, particularly connection to a sea port; to protect the
environment and conserve the bio-diversity of natural habitat and to
prevent and mitigate water-induced disasters (WRS-N: 2002, p. 47.).
Nepal Water Resources Strategy started in 2002 but it took four
years for Nepal to bring out the National Water Plan. The Plan was
brought out in January 2006.
The National Water Plan has been integrated with the National Five
Year Plan System of Nepal. Starting from the 10th Plan as its 'Short
Term Strategy' i.e. from 2002 onwards- it declares 11th & 12th Five
Year Plans as its 'Short Term Plan' and the 13th & 14th Five Year
Plans are supposed to fall under 'Long Term Plan', clearly defining
Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan to
be of 25 years starting from 2002 and ending in 2027.
The following table shows breakup of the Projected Capital Cost
Proposed in NWP:
The table shows that Nepal gives a priority to hydropower. Out of its
total investment in water resources, 48.6 per cent is in this sector
followed by drinking water and sanitation with 19.3 per cent and
irrigation with 17.0 per cent of the investment planned for the 25
years starting from 2002-2027. The NWP has come out with
significant changes in the 14th Plan for instance on Water
Transportation. The WRS-Nepal: 2002 set down a strategy to invest
16 per cent in water transportation (Summary of WRS-N: 2002,
chart at p. xx) but NWP-Nepal: 2005 is not specific to this sector.
Similarly, while the former indicates 53 per cent, the latter shows
48.6 per cent investment in hydropower.
Nepal's hydropower production targets are not very ambitious but
the national budget allocation is. The targets are: by 2007 up to 700
MW, by 2017, up to 2035 MW and by 2027 up to 4000 MW -- both
by the government and the private initiatives, which meet the
projected domestic demand (NWP-N: p.42). Thus the figures in
NWP also vary because on page 77, the target of 2027 hydropower
production is 3345 MW as not 4000MW. The domestic demand at
that time is estimated to be 2661.4 MW and Nepal through this
scheme will be able to export 683.6 MW electricity.
But the greatest difficulty for Nepal is managing the fund. The table
indicates the capital cost details but actual costs including the O&M
and others are NRs1218.938 billion. By 2027 Nepal needs NRs 511
billion (42 percent) for hydropower generation, NRs267 billion (22
percent) for irrigation and NRs231 billion (19 percent), etc. Nepal's
Table: Summary of Projected Capital Cost Proposed in NWP by Plan Period (NRs in million a 2001 price level)
S.N. Short
Term
Medium Term Long Term
Projects/Programmes
10th
Plan
11 th Plan
12th
Plan
13th
Plan
14th
Plan
NWPTotal
%Share
1.
Drinking Water
and Sanitation
25400
35615
39125
40790
42727 183658 19.3
2.
Irrigation
17623
37441
27075
33469
45504 161111 17.0
3.
Hydropower
28416
87361
101387
114738
130150 462051 48.6
4.
Rural Electrification
11305
10841
10841
18716
18716 70418 7.4
5.
Elec.System.Reinforcement
4253
7763
8100
8438
8775 37328 3.9
6.
Disaster Management
3842
4963
7333
4840
4596 25575 2.7
7.
Environment
467
324
310
302
300 1704 0.2
8.
Fishery & Others
191
375
375
365
365 1670 0.2
9. River Basin Plan. 37 18 18 1 1 76 0.0
10. Institutional 1242 1576 1490 1205 825 6337 0.7
Total Cap. Exp. 92775 186276 196054 222864 251960 949928 100
Cap Exp % of Total 86.8 86.0 81.8 80.5 80.4 82.4 Source: NWP-Nepal, HMG/N, WECS, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, p. Annex-11, K-1.
7574
current GDP is around US$3.0 billion i.e. nearly NRs210.00 billion.
The conflict has distorted the production process very badly. For
example, so far, Nepal's thought-to-be cheapest, the 'Upper
Tamakoshi Hydropower Project', estimated to produce 309 MW is
disturbed by the Maoists (Kantipur: 19.01.2006). The NEA had
started constructing the link-road, but the Maoists stopped the
construction work. If Nepal could run this project alone and start
producing electricity, it would have been able to end the load-
shedding.
Indo-Nepal Water ConflictsThere are so many examples that in water resources management the
two friendly countries could not satisfy the Nepalese people. Some
typical instances are touched upon below:
Nepal feels badly deceived in the 1927 agreement between the British
India government and the Rana regime in Nepal in exchange for
some saal-trees and 50,000.00 Indian rupees on Sharada Barrage.
The barrage irrigates some 1.7 million ha of land in India now.
Another bitter experience for Nepal was Koshi Agreement of April
25, 1954 which was revised on December 19, 1966. It bears the
technical constraints of the 'sluice gates', silt in the Chatara canal and
change of course of the river etc. leaving little water for Nepal during
the dry season and causing 'inundation' during the lean season. AM
Shrestha writes that the agreement mentions the potential irrigation
benefits for Nepal but keeps the nature and magnitude of similar
gains to India secret. In reality, Nepal irrigates 87,000 ha of its land
but India waters nearly 2.00 million ha i.e. 23 times more than Nepal
(see Shrestha: 1999, p.158). Coincidentally, India is nearly 23 times
bigger than Nepal! The Koshi barrage saves thousands of lives and
property worth hundreds of billion rupees in India by flood control,
says Shrestha.
Another important agreement done by Nepal with India was 'Gandak
Agreement' of December 4, 1959. With a similar technology as of
Koshi Barrage, the dam was constructed in Bhainsalotan providing
for the Narayani to flow to India first and through the dam
constructed half on the border, it could be controlled by India to flow
to the West and East Canals in Nepal. Under the agreement, Nepal
could irrigate nearly 60,000 ha by getting water for the west for
about 16,000 ha and for 44,000 ha of land. But this too could not be
done properly because of Bihar's 94 KM long Don Branch canal.
Shrestha says that in today's calculation, India irrigates some 2.00
million ha of Indian soil, some 33 times more than that of Nepal
benefiting from the project (Ibid, pp.168-169).
With this feeling of being cheated, Nepal waited for nearly three
decades to sign any major agreement with India. It was in 1991 that
Prime Minister of Nepal G.P Koirala signed Tanakpur Agreement.
Shrestha says the agreement was an endorsement of India's
subsequent plan for constructing Tanakpur Dam to supply the
Mahakali river water to a powerhouse through a 566 meter long
canal and then to irrigate half a million ha of land in India. Nepal
also allowed use of 2.9 ha of its territory for the Tanakpur barrage for
7 MW electricity and 4.25CM/S water to irrigate 2,500 ha of
Nepalese land whereas the total hydropower generation was 120 MW
(Ibid, pp.175-176).
But it faced a vehement criticism in Nepal. The Supreme Court ruled
that the agreement required two-third majority of the parliament as
per Article 126 of the Nepalese constitution. B. G. Verghese writes
that the central government of India had to intervene when a hydel-
cum-irrigation project was planned near Tanakpur in Kumaon which
would have diminished flows in the Mahakali for Nepalese uses and
the project was recast to ensure that Nepalese interests were
protected (Verghese: 1999, p.342).
Indian River Linking Project and Detrimental Effects: Nepal faces inundation in its southern belt due to the construction
work by India at the Indo-Nepal border related to its River Linking
Project. India officially declared the project in 2002, though the
country had been working on it by other titles for a long time.According to SB Regmi, the Executive Secretary in the Water and
Energy Commission Sector (WECS), from west to east, Nepal is
flooded at some 19 places endangering world heritage site of Lunbini,
the birthplace of Lord Buddha and the birthplace of mythological
symbol Devi Sita in Janakpur. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal government
has not spoken a single word against the river linking project.
On the IRLP, the government of Nepal writes, “The high dam
projects identified, which store large volumes of monsoon flood and
7776
generate huge hydroelectric power, will essentially have regional
ramifications. The bone of contention in these projects seems to be
the Indian viewpoint that sees such projects as strictly bilateral
issues and undermines the issue of downstream benefits in terms of
irrigation as well as flood. It is yet to be seen how India intends to
address the issue of cost sharing regarding the proposed 'river-
linking-project', which eventually will involve building storage dams
in Nepal' (NWP: 2005, p.6).
Post-February 1, 2005 move of King Gyanendra, no Indo-Nepal
water talks have been held officially except the preliminary talks on
buying and selling of electricity in the first week of January 2006 in
New Delhi. Third high level technical committee meeting (HLTC) of
27-29 September 2004 the 13th meeting of the bilateral Standing
Committee on Inundation Problem (SCIP) on 30 September 2004 in
Kathmandu and at the secretary level in October in New Delhi had
failed.
The Babai and Shikta Irrigation projects, out of Nepal's six major
irrigation projects, are the vivid examples of Indian interference in
Nepal's internal affairs. Due to India's opposition, as a lower riparian
country, Nepal could not construct these projects by the help of the
foreign support (Nepal: 2004:SAJ-8, p.47). On the similar grounds
of being a lower riparian, India is ignoring the Bangladeshi and
Pakistani demands guided by Farakka Agreement of 1996 and Indus
River Treaty of 1960 respectively. So, regional statutes to regulate
their waters resolving the water conflicts among the countries of the
region are badly and immediately needed.
Sour Experiences of the Immediate PastMahakali Agreement of 1996 is a failed agreement. It failed the
possibility of CPN-UML majority government in Nepal. It failed the
Tanakpur Agreement. It also failed the Arun-3 hydel project directly
or indirectly. Finally, it failed because the Detailed Project Report
could not be prepared in 10 years though it was supposed to be ready
in six months. No better is the Karnali (Chisapani) Multi-purpose
Project supposed to yield 10,800MW with 16.2BCM live storage
capacity planned for export. Due to India's hesitation, Enron was
fully disturbed to work in Chisapani.
India likes to engage every important river basins of Nepal to keep
the resources in its grip to irrigate millions of hectares of its dry
lands and light thousands of villages. India needs a huge amount of
well-managed water and energy but its water policy so far seems not
in its own favour. B. G. Verghese accepts that until the mid-eighties
Indian Planning Commission had never looked at the Himalayan
potential in Nepal and Bhutan in terms of long-tem energy planning
(Verghese: 1999, p.343).
India needs to change its water policy, strategy and plans. It needs to
give its top priority for investment to this sector before it is too late
for the country and the region.
Hope at HandThe rays of hope are not dim. On January 14, 2006 in New Delhi,
Nepal and India for the first time agreed that electricity could be sold
or exchanged in need. Three major case-studies are discussed below:
NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-purpose Project
and the Need for its Joint Pre-feasibility StudyNIBB-C stands for Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China.
These countries benefit from the Eastern Himalayan Waters directly.
These are the waters of hope for South Asia - particularly for the Bay
of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation BIMSTEC region in South Asian perspectives. The
region's leadership has not scarcely exploited the resources. The
superficially perceived national interests of the riparian countries
hinder management and proper utilization of the vast treasure of
nature in the sub-region.
The Ganges, Meghana and Brahmaputra (GMB) region consists of
more than 400 million people, the largest concentration of the poor
in the world. Nearly 45 percent of the population falls below the
poverty line, i.e. earning less than USD1.00 per head per day. South
Asia's global share in business is just 1.3 percent but it is home to
nearly 1/5th of the world's population (Nepal: 2005). The efforts by
the planners, implementers and decision makers of the region to
uplift the living standards of the people have remained remarkable
but not satiable.
NIBB-C Water WaysThe 'NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-Purpose Project'
7978
envisions exploring the possibility of shipping from the Bay of Bengal
to the cities of the riparian countries; e.g., Kosh i-Tappu and upper
parts of Nepal, to the cities like Varanasi, Lucknow and many more
and in the Assam highlands of India and still higher to the Tibetan
highlands of China via Brahmaputra and adjoining cities of
Bangladesh in the Meghana region and similarly to Bhutan. It makes
Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet no more landlocked parts of the globe
geographically. This multifarious economic activity could change the
fate of the region dramatically.
Many multinational companies and shipping corporations are ready
for investment in this ambitious proposal of 21st century. The
governments of riparian countries need to be deeply convinced and
be sincerely ready to adopt it.
Koshi High Dam a 'Litmus Test' for the RegionThis author worked for Arun-3 until it was cancelled. It was very
much a necessary project for Nepal, India and Bangladesh and the
SAARC sub-region. But the water-mafias were able to get it cancelled
after Nepal had spent nearly NRs1.00 billion and one decade of time
on it. The same is going to happen with the Koshi High Dam
construction also. The opposition in Nepal and India to Koshi High Dam construction
has already taken shape. One is genuine in saying that India has
never benefited Nepal in any agreement except for the Mahakali, so
it won't in the Koshi. But in politics, there is no permanent friend or
enemy. So before snapping ties, careful study and negotiation is
necessary. But India has already allocated IRs300.00 million and a
feasibility study has already started. So, politics should not be
allowed to hamper the Koshi High Dam.
The dam opponents say that since the Himalayas falls under seismic-
zone, high dams are not favourable here. But needed is the
application of appropriate technology to combat natural hazards.
This high dam technology should store water even considering the
probability of the NIBB-C WW. If the water storage is not arranged
from the start, flood and silt control and regulated water supply
downstream will not be possible. So, before building the Koshi High
Dam, technical experts, not only from India and Nepal but also even
from Bangladesh and other countries, should be consulted to apply
the latest technology.
Koshi River Basin is the largest River Basin in Nepal and has direct
consequences downstream. Many Nepalese claim even today that
they are yet to be compensated and resettleed for the land acquired
for Koshi and Gandak projects. So Koshi High Dam is a 'Litmus Test'
project.
SA-RRR-S Model: Demand of Time for South AsiaIndia is beset with intra-state water conflicts. Scientists forecast that
India will suffer water crisis more in the coming decades, because of
its population, politics and the geography. Since India is the largest
country in the region after China, such a prediction concerns all the
countries of South Asia having water links with it, through sea with
Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh and through river
with, Nepal, China, Bhutan and again with Pakistan and Bangladesh.
So, it is very important that Indian planners consider this sector very
sensitive and useful for themselves and for the region as a whole. The
situation demands a far-sighted approach from all its neighbors in
water management. Water is not a matter of bilateral concern. Rivers
cross the national boundaries.
The 21st century will not be guided only by politics but by political
economy also. Therefore, South Asia should drive ahead towards
uplifting the living standards of its people reducing cultural and
economic conflicts. It is time for South Asian countries to bind themselves by the
statutes on their water conflicts.
Like the European Union and other institutions in Europe, South
East Asia and other regions, South Asia too can frame a regulatory
mechanism so that the common problems can be resolved. With this
objective, the author during the SAFMA Regional Conference on
Inter-state Conflicts in South Asia in New Delhi, October 9-10, 2004
presented a vision named SA-RRR-S Model for South Asia. It meant
'South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes'.
Under this vision, the countries of South Asia make their regulating
laws on their own. The SA-RRR-S Model proposes that the countries
8180
of South Asia take a distance of 8 KM as a distance of mutual
agreement downstream and upstream right of acceptance for any
kind of water and disturbing development activity within the
country's territory. This would reduce the tension of the selection of
the water management sites between and among countries. This
would reduce the problem of the blockade/release of the flow of
water causing scarcity of water, floods during monsoon and
inundation while blocking the 'sluice gates' as per weather and by
making the canals or dams close to the border lines or so.
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Water Resources Management in
BangladeshGiasuddin Ahmed Choudhury
ater resources management is of prime concern in
sustaining life and livelihood in Bangladesh. The river Wsystems and waterbodies (like hoars, baors and beels)
have shaped the country as well as its culture. Bangladesh has too
much water in the wet season and too little in the dry season. The
seasonal variation of availability of water and the competing
demands for water supply and sanitation, agriculture, industry,
fisheries and wildlife, navigation, hydropower and recreation as well
as environment and the preservation of the waterbodies have made
water management and planning a very challenging task. Moreover,
the recent discovery of arsenic contamination in the shallow aquifer
has set back past successes in bringing safe water supply to the rural
population. Pressures remain on agriculture to intensify production
and maintain self-sufficiency in food grains. Aquatic resources and
natural environment are under severe threat from changes in flood
plain management over the last three decades and, more recently,
from an alarming rise in pollution due mainly to industrial growth
and poor sanitation. The problems compound when the present
population of 135 million is expected to rise to 181 million by 2025
and to 224 million by 2050. Rapid urbanization is expected with 40
percent of people living in towns and major cities by 2025, and 60
percent by 2050. Adequate water supply and sanitation for the
increasing population is a huge task. Policies and Plan for Water Management Bangladesh adopted the National Water Policy in 1999, which
provides a framework for water management. The policy provides
directions on basinwide planning, water rights and allocation, public
and private involvement, public investment, water supply and
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sanitation, fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and
environment. The document is intended to guide public and private
actions to ensure optimal development and management of water
that benefits people.
Other related policies are (i) National Environmental Policy (1992),
(ii) National Forest Policy (1994), (iii) National Energy Policy (1996),
(iv) National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
(1998), (v) National Fisheries Policy (1998), (vi) National
Agricultural Policy (1999) and Industrial Policy (1999). Though there
are no major contradictions between them, there are, however, some
gaps in water planning.
Main policy gap is in the land use planning. A principle needs to be
established for guiding the management of the massive urban
expansion expected over the next 25 years. There are also issues of
land tenure reform. Usufruct rights are linked with the willingness
and ability to invest, and the protection of the rights of the landless
and other disadvantaged groups is of paramount importance.
Displacement and resettlement, as a result of natural disasters or
land acquisition, need to be addressed for they affect planning of
water resources.
Based on the policy directions provided by these policy documents,
the National Water Management Plan (NWMP), a framework plan,
was prepared in 2001 and approved by the National Water Resources
Council on March 31, 2004. The plan is presented in three phases: a
short-term (2000-05) firm-plan of on-going and new activities, a
mid-term (2006-10) plan, and a long-term (2011-25) perspective
plan. The plan has 84 different programmes grouped into eight
clusters: Institutional Development (10), Enabling Environment (13),
Main Rivers (12), Towns and Rural Areas, Major Cities (17), Disaster
Management (6), Agriculture and Water Management (8) and
Environment and Aquatic Resources (10).
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2005) has stressed the
need for implementing the programmes proposed by NWMP to
reduce poverty.
Water Management IssuesFloods and Drainage Problems: Floods are an annual phenomenon
in Bangladesh. The high flows of transboundary rivers, high internal
rainfall, general low-level of the country and inadequate drainage
result in widespread inundation each year. In 1954, 1955, 1974, 1987,
1988, 1998 and 2004, the peak flows of major rivers, spring tides in
the Bay of Bengal, and cyclonic surges transformed the annual
inundations into devastating floods. These floods result in major
damage to life and livelihoods and property, particularly in the
coastal regions. Equally, however, the northeast and northern
transboundary rivers are susceptible to flash flooding from the
adjacent hills in India. In 2004, the flood in the northeast was very
devastating. The southwestern region experienced a devastating
flood in 2000 due to heavy rainfall in the Damodar Valley and
consequent heavy releases from the reservoirs.
Drainage problems themselves arise from drainage impediments and
drainage congestion. Drainage impediments are caused by
insufficient drainage capacity through road embankments, blocked
drainage channels due to siltation, cross-dams or fishing activities
and inadequately sized drainage sluices. Drainage congestion, on the
other hand, occurs due to high outfall water levels that prevent the
drainage flows, irrespective of any other impediments. Both
circumstances are inter-linked, as one can affect the other, and both
are common in Bangladesh.
Annual inundation has both negative and positive impacts. Positive
impacts of floods are increase in soil fertility, enhancements of
capture fisheries and navigation, increased groundwater recharge
and flushing of pollutants. Negative impacts include damage and loss
to property, infrastructure and crops, and sometimes loss of life.
Furthermore, the inundation of hand pumps and latrines increases
the incidences of diseases, while disruption to transport,
communications and economic activities leads to the loss of
employment opportunities. Coastal flooding mainly affects modern
agricultural system because of the salinity of floodwater. Women,
children and the extreme poor are especially vulnerable.
The Bangladesh Water Development Board has provided flood
protection to 66 percent (5.45 million ha) of 8.24 million ha of
cultivable lands in the last half a century. The remaining areas,
especially the urban areas, need to be brought under flood
protection. The drainage congestion in the coastal areas needs to be
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addressed immediately. In this connection rationalization of existing
flood control and drainage projects as proposed by NWMP needs to
be taken up.
Drought: Prolonged droughts are not common in Bangladesh.
However, the country experiences dry spells or “crop droughts”.
Much of the western part of the country can be affected by droughts,
with the northwest being most commonly affected. The country has
experienced droughts of major magnitude in 1973, 1978, 1979, 1981,
1982, 1989, 1992, 1994, and 1995. Droughts afflict the country, at
least, as frequently as do major floods and cyclones, averaging about
once in 2.5 years. Although droughts are not always continuous in
any area, consecutive droughts occurred in 1978 and 1979, 1981 and
1982, and 1994 and 1995.
The northwestern region of the country experienced one of the most
severe droughts of the century, which started in October 1994 and
was broken in July 1995 with the onset of monsoon rain. The
continued drought in the northwestern districts of Bangladesh led to
a shortfall of rice production of 3.5 million tons. These districts are
considered to be the granary of Bangladesh and produce surplus rice
- the main staple of the country.
Most of the public irrigation systems were planned for
supplementary irrigation during the monsoon. Droughts connote
enormous suffering for those depending on rainfed-subsisting
farming. To mitigate drought, the drought affected areas need to be
brought under supplementary irrigation systems. Barrages over the
Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers need to be constructed
immediately. In the meantime, the drought assessment model
developed locally (by CEGIS) need to be implemented for optimum
use of scarce water resources.
Dry Season Reduction of River Flows: Bangladesh is the
traditional water user of the transboundary rivers i.e. the Ganges, the
Brahmaputra, the Meghna Rivers etc, but because of the continuous
upstream withdrawals beyond its territory, the country is facing
water scarcity in the dry season. The country has 7 million ha of
irrigable lands, out of which 4.68 ha are irrigated. There is a need for
development of water resources in order to bring the remaining areas
under the irrigation network and supplement the groundwater water
supply, where ground water levels are receding. At present, the dry
season crop production has exceeded wet season aman production.
Erosion: Riverbank erosion in Bangladesh is a chronic problem
forcing involuntary resettlement of as many as 50,000 people a year.
The studies show that about 3,575 square kilometer area along the
Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Padma, the Lower Meghna and their
estuaries will be lost due to erosion by the year 2025. On the other
hand, 3,665 square kilometer of land will be gained due to accretion
in the same period. Perusing these data, it may appear that the loss
of land is not very significant. But this has major social, economic
and environmental implications. Riverbank erosion poses a severe
threat to the livelihoods of the people living along the banks of the
major rivers and particularly the poor are the most vulnerable.
Moreover, the people living on the chars are vulnerable and are
forced to move frequently due to river erosion. Though very
expensive, the major cities, towns and important rural areas in more
than 400 places are being protected with bank protection
interventions in different forms. A riverbank erosion-forecasting
tool, developed by CEGIS, enables the country to maximize the
scarce resources to combat river erosion.
Cyclone and Storm Surges: Cyclones affect the coastal districts
of Bangladesh and cause tremendous damages to housing,
agricultural crops, livestock and poultry, food stocks and sources of
drinking water. The coastal areas have experienced more than 70
major cyclones in the last 200 years. The cyclones are accompanied
with storm surges of 3 meter heights above normal times and in
some places it may go up to 6 to 7 meters. Since 1960s, about 123
polders having 5107 kilometer of coastal embankments were
constructed to protect an area of 1.5 million ha of lands from saline
inundation as well as from storm surges.
Arsenic contamination: The latest data indicates that 59 out of
64 districts have tube-wells with arsenic levels above the safe limit,
exposing about 75 million people to this toxic substance daily. The
deteriorating health of arsenicosis patients puts a heavy burden on
their families contributing to economic hardship, social expulsion
and food security. Various agencies are working all over Bangladesh
in testing tube-well water for arsenic. However, the testing methods
have not yet been standardized, field activities are not coordinated,
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and valuable information from field investigations is not properly
archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop an
arsenic database, which should include information on the tube-
wells being affected, the population under threat, the mitigation
measures being undertaken, the method used for testing, the
agencies involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely to
planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country.
Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the
mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain.
Salinity: The main groundwater salinity problems lie in the coastal
areas of the country and constitute a constraint to its use, although
there is some localized fresh water lenses close to the coast.
Abstractions of groundwater reduce the ability of freshwater to hold
back saline intrusion and this is reportedly a major concern in the
Khulna area and other parts of the southern half of the southwest
region. Fresh groundwater in most coastal areas has to be abstracted
from a depth of over 150 meter and up to 450 meter. Whilst this can
be relatively costly to develop and operate when compared to shallow
aquifers, it has the benefit of being free of arsenic, but it does restrict
the use of this aquifer for irrigation.
The upstream withdrawal of the Ganges waters at Farakka in the dry
season causes the saline water to intrude further inland in the
southwest region, causing industries to close down, reducing crop
yield, degrading the environment and damaging the bio-diversity of
the Sundarbans, which is a World Heritage site.
Declining Seasonal Groundwater Levels: Due to
extraction/exploitation of groundwater through irrigation tube-wells,
seasonal groundwater levels have been declining day by day,
rendering many drinking water hand pump tube-wells inoperable
during the dry season.
Urban Water Supply and Sanitation: The urban population will
increase 2.7 times by 2025. The gross daily water demand in the
major metropolitan cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi)
will rise from the present 2,460 to 7,970 million liters per day by
2025. There is already a major shortage of required supply of safe
water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge areas, the
groundwater table under-lying Dhaka city has declined at an
alarming rate over the last couple of decades. Dhaka has the largest
piped sewerage system in Bangladesh; however, the existing system
serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of this only 3 per cent reaches the
sewage treatment plant at Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface
water system, which cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent
households in Dhaka have septic tanks with soak wells. In the future,
with the increase in population density, the quantities will not only
exceed soak well capacity, high land values will discourage the setting
aside of land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to
collect and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are
necessary.
Water Quality: Water quality in and around the urban areas is fast
deteriorating. Human excretes and industrial wastes are the main
reasons for the deterioration of water quality in the river systems.
The Buriganga in Dhaka, the Karnafuli in Chittagong and the
Bhairab in Khulna are the worst affected. Other rivers are also
showing gradual decline in water quality. The water quality of the
Buriganga River has deteriorated so much that no aquatic life could
survive in it.
Participatory Water Management: The level of participation of
stakeholders in the water management systems is not adequate.
Participatory water management following the “Guidelines for
Participatory Water Management” needs to be institutionalized.
Water Resources Available for Use Bangladesh has abundant water in the monsoon season from June to
October, but there is a shortage of water in the dry season. However,
in the early part of the season and also during the monsoon, the
rainfall can be variable which has necessitated the supplementary
irrigation. Rainfall: Bangladesh has a tropical monsoon climate with four
main seasons: pre-monsoon (March-May); monsoon (June-
September); post-monsoon (October-November); and winter
(December-February). The mean annual rainfall varies from 1400
mm in the extreme northwest to 5,500 mm in the northeastern part
of the country and the mean annual rainfall is 2,400 mm. Some 85 to
90 percent of total annual rainfall occurs between April and
September, with regional variations.
9392
Surface Water: The river systems of Bangladesh are intricate,
crisscrossing the whole country like a web and covering 8 percent of
the country. They are the sources of danger from both flooding and
from erosion, and of sustenance to agriculture, as they contain
sediments. They provide an arterial transportation network for
people, goods and fish migration, and keep salinity intrusion at bay
in the coastal areas. In-country run-off during the dry season is minimal and the main
source of surface water is the transboundary inflows from the
Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna. They drain an area of
1,750,000 km2, out of which only 8 percent lie within Bangladesh. The river flows have huge seasonal variation, with the combined
flows of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra typically increasing from
less than 10,000 m³/s early in the year to a peak of 80,000 to
140,000 m³/s in late August or early September. During the
monsoon season, 20 percent of the country is inundated each year,
with over 60 percent in a peak flood. These peak floods generally
occur every 10 years that bring severe hardships to those affected. By contrast, the dry season from November to May brings water
shortage. Dry season water deficits occur in different localities and
are marked in the southwest and extreme west where rainfall is the
lowest, and in the eastern hill regions. Surface water is an important
strategic resource for Bangladesh in the dry season. It is the only
resources for some 44 percent of the country (barring some small
pockets of groundwater used for domestic and municipal supplies),
and can be used to augment all areas where deficits arise. Groundwater: Groundwater in appreciable quantities underlies
only in some areas, mostly in the northwest region of the country. In
other areas, small quantities of available groundwater exist,
sufficient only to support a limited amount of domestic and
municipal uses, but are easily overexploited (especially levels are
falling under Dhaka city due to heavy abstractions there). In other
parts of the country, mainly the northeast, southeast, eastern hills
and southern parts of the southwest and south central regions, the
availability of good quality groundwater is very limited.
Projected Future Water Needs Land Use: Future water demands depend on the land use pattern. Bangladesh
has an area of 147,570 km² comprising hills (12 percent), terraces (8
percent) and floodplains (80 percent). Floodplains are categorized
into four types: active river floodplain, meander floodplain,
piedmont, and estuary and tidal floodplains.
Over the next 25 years, the area of rivers is expected to remain
almost constant at 8 percent and water bodies are forecast to rise
from 5 percent to 7 percent of the total area as ponds are increased to
satisfy demand for fish. Forest and mangrove will increase slightly
from 17 to 21 percent, while urban and rural settlements together will
increase from 11 percent to 13 percent. The biggest change affects
agriculture, which is expected to reduce from 56 percent to 48
percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha,
or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable
concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is
expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level. However, over the past
25 years the total crop area has been steady at 13 14 million ha per
annum, land loss being compensated for by increasing cropping
intensities. An increase of 0.33 percent per annum would be needed
to keep up with the overall loss of agricultural land, and up to 2
percent per annum would be needed to sustain per capita production
levels. Monsoon Season Water Demands: In general, water shortages
do not occur during the monsoon season from June to October. In
the early part of this season, rainfall can be variable, which is
significant to those farmers who plant aman at this time of the year.
Some farmers practice supplementary irrigation, although there is
potential to expand this. Many of the public sector's surface water
irrigation schemes were originally designed for both early and late
monsoon crops, rather than the now popular dry season boro crop. Dry Season Water Demands: The dry season from November to
May brings water shortages. NWMP puts the projected water
demands in 2025 at 0,000 million cubic meters. The consumptive
demands for water include evaporation from forests, water bodies,
charlands, urban and rural environments, rain fed and irrigated
agriculture, as well as the needs of water supply and sanitation. In-
9594
stream demands include the overlapping requirements for salinity
and pollution control, navigation and fisheries. The consumptive
demands are estimated to be 44 percent of the total water demand
and in-stream demands to be the balance 56 percent.
Agriculture: Agriculture has the highest overall consumptive
demand in the country. The country is still deficient in food grain
production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. More than 80 percent of
irrigation water is used for rice and the rest for the other crops. Over
the last three decades, much effort has been put into intensification
of agriculture by promotion of dry season cropping through
irrigation. In 2025, the approximate irrigation area will be 8 million
ha, and the dry season water demand will be 50,300 million cubic
meters.
Domestic, Commercial and Industrial Needs: NWMP
estimated the gross domestic, commercial and industrial demands as
998.62 millions of cubic meters per month and the overall net
demand as 430.57 millions of cubic meters per month. Water for
domestic, commercial and industrial needs has been expressed in
terms of both gross and net requirements.
Forest: NWMP estimates that the forest and mangrove will increase
slightly from 19 percent at present to 22 percent covering an area of 2
million ha in 2025. The estimated water requirements for the forests
will be 8,200 million cubic meters. The area excludes the
Sundarbans, for which the water requirement is included under the
salinity control flow.
Fisheries: The area of rivers over the next 50 years is expected to
remain almost constant and water bodies are forecast to rise from 5
percent to 9 percent of total area as ponds are increased to satisfy
demand for fish. Water for fisheries falls into two categories:
demands for flowing water fisheries; and demands for fisheries in
water bodies and ponds. The minimum dry season water
requirements for fisheries in rivers are in the form of pools of water.
An approximation to the gross water demand for fisheries can be
based upon the area of rivers and water bodies, which is 16, 050
million cubic metre.
Navigation: River transport is an important mode of
communication and shipment in Bangladesh, and a network of
routes has been developed by BITWA with specified depths
according to the class of route. Many of these routes are in tidal
areas, and little affected by the freshwater flow in the rivers. The total
flow required for regulating the navigation routes is 340 m3/s. These
minimum flows are needed for operation of locks and fish passes.
Salinity Control: In the southwest region, the reduction of dry
season flows upstream of the Farakka barrage led to an increase in
intrusion of the saline front in the dry season. The flow required in
the Lower Meghna to ensure that the saline front did not penetrate
upstream of Ilshaghat for more than 5 consecutive days has been
estimated as 3,000m³/s. The total minimum water requirements for
salinity control are, therefore, estimated to be 3000m³/s in the
Lower Meghna, of which about 1000m³/s is estimated to pass
through the south central region, 250m³/s through the Gorai for the
southwest, 100m³/s for other outflows in the southwest region and
60m³/s for the south-eastern region
Environment: Some flows are essentially required to ensure the
minimum flows in the river systems. These are needed to provide
dilution of effluents from sewage treatment works, untreated
effluents and for the maintenance of aquatic life. NWMP assessment
has identified 10 pollution “hot-spots” for which it is estimated that a
flow of 200m³/s would be required for all hot spots to help improve
water quality. In addition, the treatment, recycling and inland
disposal need to be geared up for managing non-agricultural
pollutants, as these are the appropriate long-term mechanisms for
protecting the environment.
In-stream needs: NWMP estimates the minimum in-stream needs
to be 30,984 million cubic meters per month, taking into account the
percolation losses, dilution flows and the higher of the computed
navigation flows.
Scenarios of Shortfalls and CrisisWater Balances in 2025: The consumptive demands, at present,
are being met ignoring additional in-stream needs for fisheries and
navigation, except in the Southwest region where, as is commonly
known, shortages exist to meet both the agricultural and salinity
control demands. By 2025, considering the future in-stream needs
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and ultimate agricultural demands, meeting full in-stream needs
(i.e., provision of base flows for fisheries and navigation in most
rivers and streams, as well as provision for salinity control and
dilution of flows at particular environmental hotspots) will not be
possible except in some areas in the south central region in the face
of increased agricultural demands. Under this scenario, there would
be an overall national shortfall for three months (the maximum
monthly shortfall is 3,570 million cubic meter in March, equivalent
to 1,377 m³/s, or about the same as the entire flow of the Ganges in
that month).
No amount of inter-regional transfer would be able to overcome this
situation without a major augmentation of flows entering
Bangladesh. Beyond 2025, as agricultural demand continues to
expand, shortfalls would worsen both in quantity and duration, with
an ultimate maximum monthly shortfall of nearly double the 2025
situation. With more modest fulfilment of in-stream needs by 2025
associated with maintaining year round flows only in the main
navigation and fish migration routes through augmentation or
regulation, the situation appears more manageable as there would be
an overall positive national balance throughout the dry season. With
an overall positive national balance, inter-regional transfers would
enable these lower in-stream needs to be met. Possible impact of arsenic contamination of groundwater on water
balances: The full implications of arsenic contamination of the
groundwater are yet to be determined; one possible scenario is that
the groundwater could be considered to be unsafe for water supplies
and irrigation, the latter if arsenic were shown to be entering the
food chain. The possible extent of the contamination across the
country is still being quantified, but appears to be becoming greater
as the testing continues. Assuming an arbitrary estimate of 75
percent reduction in the groundwater availability as a result of
contamination, even with the lowest estimate of in-stream needs and
ensuring full re-use of percolation losses from irrigation, extensive
shortages can be expected to arise. These would create an overall
national deficit in March of about 2,134 m³/s.
Projected Changes in Climate: The probable effects of global
climate change have been examined in general by the
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and are
regularly reviewed. The most recent projections set out the changes
anticipated in Bangladesh, which are:
i) A rise in sea level in the order of 300 mm by the year 2030 and
700 mm by 2075. This suggests a rise of 250 mm by 2025, at the
rate of 10 mm/year.ii) A rise in monsoon season temperature of 0.7°C by 2030 and
1.1°C by 2050. Dry season temperatures would rise by 1.3°C by
2030 and 1.8°C by 2050.iii) An increase in monsoon rainfall of about 10 percent by the year
2030 and 25 percent by 2050. Dry season rainfall is projected to
reduce in the long term.
Climate change will also affect flows in the transboundary rivers.
Temperature changes would affect the timing and rate of snow melt
in the upper Himalayan reaches, which would alter the flow regime
in the rivers, which rise in the Himalayas. Lower dry season rainfall
and increased water demands due to higher temperatures would
increase abstractions from rivers upstream and reduce the flow
reaching Bangladesh.
Restraining Growth of Demand and Possible Measures:
Unquestionably, it is necessary to make adjustment from water
supply management to demand management for the sake of realizing
sustainable water utilization under the pressures of heavy
population, rapid economic development, sharp contradiction
between water supply and demand, serious water pollution and low
efficiency in water utilization etc. The development trend of water
demand management on the dependence of analyzing its current
situation and existing problems is: lStrengthening water resources legislation; lReinforcing water resources management system;lStrengthening water saving;lReinforcing water resources protection;lTaking the water resources appraisal of constructing projects
into effect;lRationalizing water pricing system from the marketing principle;
and studying the assets management on water resources.
Perceived Sector Problems and ChallengesPoverty Reduction: Poverty is endemic in Bangladesh. The trends
in income poverty in Bangladesh show a modest poverty reduction
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rate of around one percentage point a year since the early 1990s from
59 percent to 49.8 percent in 2000. Human-poverty trends have
shown faster improvement than the income poverty trends. The
human poverty index (based on deprivation in health, education and
nutrition) stood at 61 percent in the early 1980s, but declined to 47
percent in the early 1990s and dropped further to 35 percent in the
late nineties (1998/2000). The index of human poverty declined by
2.54 percent per year compared with 1.45 percent in the national
head count ratio for incomepoverty over the last two decades.
Bangladesh formulated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
in October 2005. PRSP recognizes the role of the development of
water resources including irrigation development, flood control, and
drainage improvement in increasing agricultural production and
food security. Following the vision of the National Water
Management Plan (NWMP), PRSP sets the following policy
directions:
i) promote rational management and optimal use of the country's
water resources;ii) improve the people's quality of life by ensuring equitable, safe
and reliable access to water for production, health and hygiene;
and ensure availability of clean water in sufficient quantities for
multipurpose use and reservation of the aquatic and water
dependent eco-systems.
Along with facilitating the cultivation of HYV rice and other crops
and increasing the yield levels of boro and aman crops, PRSP
advocates the structural interventions in order to save properties and
lives by controlling river erosion, monsoon flooding and saline water
intrusion; and improving irrigation and drainage congestion and
mitigating drought through re-excavation of khals [watercourses]
and canals. Measures would also be taken to enhance the social
impacts of flood control drainage and irrigation (FCDI) projects
through rationalization of existing projects, and promoting
stakeholder participation and multi-purpose use of flood
embankments. The National Water Policy and the National Water
Management Plan will be periodically reviewed and revised to guide
the management of the country's water resources.
Increasing Agricultural Production: Bangladesh has made an
impressive progress in food production over the last three decades.
Food production has increased from 9 million tons in 1971-72 to
about more than 25 million tons in 2004-05, which is up by 178
percent or about a three-fold increase. However, the country is still
deficient in food grain production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. Increase in agricultural production could be achieved due to rapid
expansion of irrigation, flood control and drainage systems as well as
the adoption of improved seed and fertilizer technology. 60 percent
of the country is now flood protected. During the period 2003-04, it
is estimated that an area of 4.84 million ha was irrigated, out of
which 3.4 million ha was irrigated by groundwater and 1.44 million
ha by surface water. The annual compound growth has been 4.5
percent over the period of three decades. Surface water irrigation has
not, however, grown as fast as ground water and in fact has flattened. In order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals' top agenda of
eradication of poverty and hunger, the shrinking agricultural
resource base needs to be matched with the greater demand for food.
In recent years, both the land and water, particularly surface water,
are continuously shrinking. NWMP has projected that the lands
under agriculture is expected to reduce from 59 percent to 48
percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha,
or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable
concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is
expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level.
The areas irrigated by canal and low-lift pumps have been vastly
outnumbered by use of groundwater using shallow, deep and deep-
set tubewells. There is a limit to which groundwater extraction can
stretch itself without compromising environmental degradation. It is
in this context that the issue of sustainable agricultural development
acquires an added relevance in the light of the MDG. This calls for
greater use of surface water to meet the requirement of increased
food production. Arresting the alarming downward trend in the availability of land
and water resources remains perhaps the most daunting challenge to
achieve the MDG. The irrigation demands are expected to increase
potentially by at least a quarter over the next 25 years, depending
upon the extent to which future agriculture production requirements
are met through yield improvements as opposed to intensification.
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Environmental Degradation: As over one-fifth of Bangladesh is
flooded in the average monsoon and waterbodies cover 9 percent of
its area, the natural environment of the country is dominated by
water. It is, therefore, of great concern to ensure healthy and
sustainable habitats for the many species of flora and fauna, both
aquatic and terrestrial.
Problems of urban and rural water supply and sanitation: Considerable progress has been made in the provision of potable
water supplies in towns and rural areas in the 1990s. However,
arsenic contamination of groundwater has become a serious health
hazard needing the highest priority. Two of the MDGs are directly
related to sanitation. Bangladesh has given priority to sanitation in
order to reduce child mortality, combat diseases, and ensure
environmental sustainability. Also the target of decreasing poverty is
directly related with sanitation. Considering the importance,
Bangladesh has set the target to achieve total sanitation by 2010.
The percentage of hygienic latrines increased from 33 percent in
2003 to 59 percent in 2005. At the same time, the percentage of
unhygienic latrines reduced from 25 percent in 2003 to 21 percent in
2005 and sanitation without latrines from 42 percent in 2003 to 20
percent in 2005. From this scenario, it appears that Bangladesh has
several immediate challenges; such as :lTo develop sanitation and health which needs strong leadership,
political commitment to formulate aerial rules, regulations, laws
and principleslTo convert the sanitation program into a social movement and to
relate it with other cultural and social activities and create social
mobilization for the use of sanitary latrines The current water supply production capacity in Dhaka city is about
900 million litres a day. Low pressure in the distribution system is a
problem in many parts of the city and creates a potential health
hazard resulting from the ingress of groundwater into the mains at
times of zero pressure. Low pressure is often a result of the increased
demands resulting from a vertical expansion of the increasing
population densities. Abstraction exceeds recharge by about 240
million l/day and the groundwater level under Dhaka is dropping by
about 2.6m/year.
Dhaka has the only piped sewerage system in Bangladesh. It serves
about 1.1 million people living in about 20 percent of the city's area.
The sewage treatment plant has a capacity of 120 million l/day, but
in many areas the sewers, which were built to serve much lower
population densities, are overloaded and leaks occur. Many sewers
are totally or partially blocked with sediment and some of the sewage
pumping stations are totally or partially inoperative resulting in a
very small proportion of the water supplied ever reaching the
treatment works. A further 40 percent of households have septic
tanks with soak pits and about 20 percent have pit latrines.
Sanitation in slum areas is practically non-existent. lImplications of Global Climatic Change: Due to Global Climate
Change (GCC) the effects anticipated in Bangladesh are: lA rise in mean sea level in the order of about 250mm by 2025. lAn increase in monsoon rainfall of 10 percent to 15 percent by
the year 2030. lThese two factors will combine to increase flooding, which will
be further worsened if the increased rainfall also occurs in the
catchments of the transboundary rivers.
Water PricingWater pricing is an issue well debated in Bangladesh. Water pricing
ensures the optimum water use. The National Water Policy (1999)
states “Water will be considered an economic resource and priced to
convey its scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its
conservation. A system of cost recovery, pricing, and economic
incentives/disincentives is necessary to balance demand and supply
of water.” In the case of electrically driven pumps for extraction of
groundwater, the farmers pay their electricity bills at a subsidized
rate. The farmers also bear the cost of fuel for abstracting surface
water by low-lift pumps. In some publicly managed surface water
irrigation projects, the service charges are realized from the
beneficiaries. All the public irrigation projects are yet to come under
the service charge net. This needs strong institutional and political
support. Accepting that water will naturally acquire scarcity value, the
underlying problem is how to ensure equity of access and particularly
that the poor will not bear the burden of increased water costs. It is
relatively easy to make safeguards for domestic water, but ensuring
103102
equity in the competition for water for agriculture while also
increasing the cost of water will be difficult. Industry will also be able
to out-bid agriculture for water provided that its profit per unit of
water used is higher.
Increasing the cost of energy (diesel fuel or electricity) is therefore
the most attractive way of raising the value of water through
increasing the cost of its use. This will affect rich and poor alike
without taking measures to restrict access and usage. There is
considerable potential to increase the energy use efficiency of
existing pumping equipment, which could offset the higher energy
costs and it may be appropriate to specifically target poorer farmers
in the introduction of improved technology since they are the people
least able to afford investments in new equipment.
Water Related Social ConflictsFlood Control Projects: The construction of flood control
embankments in a complex flood plain ecosystem is a source of
conflicts between the different users. Prior to the construction of
flood control projects, the fishermen used to extensively rely on
capture fisheries. In addition to over fishing, the embankments have
caused a marked decline in capture fisheries within the flood control
projects, causing disruption in the fishermen's livelihoods. The
traditional cropping patterns have changed due to the advent of
embankments as the water levels within the FCD projects are
regulated by sluice gates/regulators. This has caused conflicts
between the farmers and fishermen. The farmers want to regulate
the water level as per the crop's requirement, which sometimes goes
against the fishermen's interest.
Land use conflict: The commercial uses of land, especially
government land under lease are the cause of significant conflicts.
With khals once excavated using public or project funds, conflicts
revolve around the use of khal water for irrigating dry season boro
rice or fish culture. These are regarded as income-generating
activities for private gain as opposed to shared benefits for the
community as a whole. Within beels or perennially flooded lands,
conflicts often occur between high and low landholders as to the
optimum level of water to be maintained.
Because of the lucrative possibilities afforded by fish culture within
Bangladesh, cooperative ventures involving the leasing of beels and
haors to traditional fishermen have been launched with donor
support. These are largely successful. When beels are leased out to
local influential people, however, conflicts are more likely to ensue.
These men often re-lease the area to fishing co-operatives who then
must pay a proportion of the catch to the leaseholder, an
arrangement again in which local fishermen suffer.
Furthermore, according to the law, khals remain common property
resources. No one is entitled to construct cross dams or block the
flow of water downstream. Nevertheless, such projects including the
innovative rubber dam schemes are being built. While relatively
successful for the farmers who need water for irrigation, downstream
users are deprived of sweet water flow in the dry season. In areas
prone to salinity, this can be disastrous.
In general, upstream/ downstream conflicts are created when
decisions are taken to obstruct or divert flows on khals for private
purposes. By the same token, where the channel is excavated as part
of a project to open out and sustain the seasonal flow of water as well
as to improve drainage, there are fewer social conflicts since the
benefits of water can be more easily and equitably shared. Transboundary Issues Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which
fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream
withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have
deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows,
especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods
of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious
environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh. The increase
in salinity in river waters and groundwater has caused thousands of
industries to close down in the southwestern region. Farmers are
forced to abandon agricultural lands due to the increase in soil
salinity and lack of freshwater for irrigation. A large area in the
southwest region is suffering from drinking water crisis. As a result,
the people are migrating to other parts of the country in search of
jobs and better living conditions.
Moreover, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project, as envisaged,
poses a great threat to the lives and livelihoods of the people of
105104
Bangladesh. The impact of IRL on Bangladesh would be much more
severe than that being witnessed in the Ganges dependent areas due
to the withdrawals of water upstream of Farakka. Some preliminary
studies indicate that the salinity intrusion might reach as far as 100
km inside the country even in the month of September. Drainage
from waterbodies will be quicker. Due to the reduction in water
availability during the monsoon (especially at the later part), the
advent of dry season would be earlier. The mouths of the major river
distributaries would be silted up causing cut-off of fresh water flow to
different corners of the country. The lowering of water levels in rivers
would cause depletion of aquifers and recharge ground.
Undoubtedly, it goes without saying that the Indian River Link
project would cause major changes to the environment of the entire
country triggering off one of the major socio-economic and
environmental disasters of modem times.
Bangladesh has now an arrangement for sharing the dry season flow
in the Ganges, as set out in the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty (GWT)
between Bangladesh and India. The treaty provides for the sharing of
flows for each 10-day period between 1st January and 31st May:
There are fifty-three other rivers that flow into Bangladesh from
India for which agreements are yet to be reached. After the signing of
the Ganges treaty, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission set
up a Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to formulate long-
term/permanent sharing of water sharing of other common rivers in
phases. It was agreed to take up the cases of seven rivers i.e Teesta,
Manu, Khowai, Gumti, Muhuri, Dharla and Dudhkumar in the first
phase with the top priority to the Teesta. An agreement for sharing of
the waters of these and other common rivers need to be worked out
in order to maximize the water utilization of both the countries.
Regional PerspectiveAs a lower riparian state, Bangladesh needs to work with its
neighbours towards an overall basin management, with an early
focus on the different hydrological regions and promoting
information exchange. In the longer-term, there will be increased
competition for water and greater environmental risks. A continuing
dialogue amongst the co-riparian countries and further extensive
studies are needed to develop appropriate long-term strategies in
response to the increasing demands on the overall system.
Since the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna River basins are
spread over five countries, there is a great potential for regional
cooperation for optimal harnessing of the regional water resources.
Cooperation should form part of a long-term water vision for
Bangladesh. Potentials for such cooperation exist in respect of supply
augmentation, sharing of common or transboundary rivers, and
flood forecasting.
Since the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is in place, Bangladesh
needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation towards realizing
the potential of augmenting lean-season flows of the Ganges and
other rivers for the benefit of all the co-riparian. The scope for
augmenting the Ganges flows at Farakka through the construction of
a reservoir on the Sunkosh River in Bhutan is known to be high and
may be examined. Similarly, the proposed Sapta Kosi High Dam on
the Kosi River, a tributary of the Ganges in Nepal, could bring
significant benefits to Bangladesh (as the lower riparian) in terms of
flow augmentation. Bangladesh can collaborate with Nepal and India
in the construction of this dam for mutual benefits.
ConclusionBangladesh has made tremendous achievement in the management
of its water resources spanning a period of half a century. In the past,
the focus was on increasing food production through the
implementation of flood protection, drainage and irrigation projects.
Though the primary objectives of these projects were achieved, other
sectors like fisheries, forestry, navigation and environment were not
paid due attention in this process. This realization led to a holistic
approach in the management of water resources encompassing all
these sectors. NWMP could be cited as an example of integrated
water resources management as a planning document. Another
realization came into focus: the participatory water management
involving stakeholders and local government institutions for the
sustainability of water management systems through proper
operation and maintenance. The extensive and uncontrolled
abstraction of groundwater led to the realization that abstraction of
groundwater needs to be regulated in order to protect the
environment. Another factor is the institutional development of
water sector agencies to make them more service oriented. NWMP
has taken all these concerns during the formulation of the plan.
However, all these achievements will be frustrated if Bangladesh fails
107106
to secure its rightful share from the transboundary rivers. Moreover,
all year round data sharing is needed among the co-riparian
countries for optimization of uses of regional water resources.
ReferenceslNational Water Policy, 1999 GOB, Government of the People's Republic
of Bangladesh lNational Water Management Plan, Volume 1,2,3,4,5; Water Resources
Planning Organization, December 2001lUnlocking the Potential- National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty
Reduction, October 2005, General Economics Division, Planning
Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
Bangladesh's Water IssuesEmaduddin Ahmad
n the last few decades, water management practices in
Bangladesh were mainly concerned with finding ways to develop
water resources in response to an increasing demand in the Iagricultural sector. This practice brought the country close to food
self-sufficiency in the 1990s. However, focus on water development
is now missing in the country's policies. Many areas in Bangladesh
are now confronted with deteriorating quantity and quality of
existing water resources and economic development is leading to a
negative impact on the life supporting ecosystem. It is envisaged that
rapid growth of population, economic activities and climate change
will further complicate the water development issues in the years to
come.
Water Sector Development in BangladeshlTill the 1950s – Flood Management with small dykes under
individual control, irrigation from river water using manual or
semi-mechanical lift.lWater Sector Master Plan of 1964 -- Concepts of major flood
control, drainage and irrigation projects. This implementation
continued until 1971. The objective was safe paddy cultivation.lIBRD Review 1972 -- Concept of small scale project with
emphasis on irrigation using ground water. Large coverage
could be achieved by private sector initiative. Food grain self
sufficiency was achieved but with adverse impacts such as
lowering of ground water and arsenic pollution.l1983-1989 and 1990-1995 -- Master Plan Organisation (MPO)
and Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme (SWSMP).
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Flood Action Plan (FAP) considered 26 components after the
floods of 1987 and 1988, initially on the flood, and finally on
round-the-year water management. Regional study on
environmental impacts was introduced. However, due to a lack
of quality control in managing the studies at one times and
results of pilot studies not in, the FAP could not provide definite
and useful output. Simultaneously Flood Forecasting was
introduced using mathematical model to support flood
management. Major and important secondary rivers were
covered. Due to limited upstream information, lead time was
inadequate.lA new National Water Management Plan has been initiated in
2004. The plan is guided by the National Water Policy
introduce in early 1999.l2004 -- The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was
approved by the Government of Bangladesh.
Achievements and ImpactsSo far 60 per cent of Bangladesh has been brought under flood
control and drainage. Many of the projects are not well maintained
due to lack of funds. No tax rule exists to recover the cost. Adverse
impact of water logging, disallowing available necessary flooding,
closing navigational routes and an overall shortage of fresh water fish
are seen. While the stakeholders are theoretically in favour of flood
management, their participation is still not ensured. Operation of
the structures, maintenance of drainage canal and participation of
decision makers has been missing.
River monitoring is a necessity which requires large sums for hard
material and was neglected until recently. While river monitoring on
a regular basis can reduce the severity of erosion and, thereby, the
costs of initial construction and maintenance, there is no systematic
measure being taken for this.
Policy and Reforms Management actions taken at one location can influence the
geomorphology, water quality and ecosystem of other areas, even far
beyond the project area. Recent approaches to river management are
multi-objective, balancing beneficial uses for agriculture, fisheries,
water supply, navigation with the protection and enhancement of the
riverine and flood plain habitat and water quality. These emerging
concepts make room for the physical processes to drive the ecological
restoration by natural progression, rather than engineering. There is a gradual shift of the government policies of the early 1990s
towards a more comprehensive and holistic approach in water
management from expensive structural measures for flood control
and drainage. There is a new consensus among stakeholders,
professionals and the policy makers on the need for integrated water
resources management, reflected in the Bangladesh Water and Flood
Management Strategy (FPCO, 1996).
The Flood Action Plan culminated in the publication of the
Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in
1996. This recognised the limitations of earlier plans, which had
focused too heavily on agricultural development without adequate
consideration of the needs of other sectors. The BWFMS
recommended that the government should formulate a National
Water Policy together with a comprehensive National Water
Management Plan (NWMP).
The government acted promptly to implement these
recommendations. The National Water Policy (NWPo) was prepared
and published in January 1999 following endorsement of the
National Water Resources Council (NWRC). A new National Water
Management Plan (NWMP) was formulated and approved in 2004.
The National Water PolicyThe NWPO provides an overall framework for future management of
the water sector. Directions are provided on such issues as overall
basin-wide planning, water rights and allocation, public and private
involvement, public investment, water supply and sanitation,
fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and environment. The
document is intended to guide both public and private actions to
ensure optimal development and management of water that benefits
both individuals and society at large. Other Related PoliciesIn 1998, the National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation (NPSWSS) was published. The main objective of this
policy is to improve public health and produce a safer environment
by reducing water borne disease and contamination of surface and
groundwater. In this policy the government recognised the
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importance of increasing participation of users including active
support and involvement of other partners, such as NGOs, market-
oriented business organisations and similar private organisations in
water and sanitation development.
The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) was issued in 1999. The
main goal of this policy is to maintain self-sufficiency in food. It also
aims to ensure that agriculture is profitable to farmers by improved
input supply and credit. One important aspect of this policy is that it
sets out clear agenda to promote and develop socially and
environmentally-friendly agriculture.
As early as 1994, the National Forest Policy (NFoP) proposed
approximately 20 per cent afforestation by the year 2015. For the
first time multiple uses of the Sunderbans were recognised including
water, forest and fish. Issues such as global warming, desertification
and control of trade of wild birds and animals were also addressed.
The National Fisheries Policy (NFiP) of 1998 aims to enhance
fisheries production and improve socio-economic conditions for
households where capture fishing is the main activity; to meet the
demand for animal protein; to boost economic growth by export of
fish and fisheries product; and to maintain ecological balance. The
policy highlights the need to conserve fish habitats, to prevent
further drainage of standing water bodies for agricultural
development.
The National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 1992 is broadly similar
to the National Fisheries Policy. This policy also highlights the need
to maintain ecological balance and overall development through
protection and improvement of the environment. It seeks to identify
and regulate activities that pollute and degrade the environment to
ensure environmentally sound development in all sectors. One
important aspect of this policy is proposing to audit existing flood
control and drainage projects on an emergency basis along with steps
to modify these projects as necessary.
Assessment of PoliciesThere are no major contradictions between national policies for
different sectors with respect to water resources development in the
country. However, there are no clear guidelines in the country as to
how the actions required by different policies should be coordinated.
Contradiction also arises due to gaps and interpretation of policy
issues.
A major gap in the NPSWSS is its obscurity in stating the need for
regulating private sector activities to ensure water quality. Neither
the treatment levels nor the industrial effluents are discussed in the
policy. No reference has been made to the interaction of wells for
drinking water and irrigation. The NPSWSS also does not clearly
address the coordination of activities of different agencies in other
sub-sectors. The NAP objective to maintain food self-sufficiency
along with issues related to water requirement and land use to meet
the policy objective need to be adequately addressed.
The NFiP policy aims at expanding the capture fisheries resources
with a target to export surplus. However, this may trigger conflict
with the agricultural sector in the management of water bodies.
Another area of conflict is advocating banning of discharge of
industrial wastes, agro-chemicals and fish-farm chemicals into water
bodies. This may again give rise to conflict with the target of NAP to
maintain food self-sufficiency by expanding HYV crops. There are no
major conflicts between NEP and other policies except for auditing
the FCD projects. The NWPO does not provide any guidelines or
direction in this regards.
Water Development Issues: Today and 2025The population projection for 2025 for medium fertility decline is 181
million, taking 1995 as the base year, according to National Water
Management Plan (NWMP). NWMP also predicts that the urban
population will grow at a rate of 8 per cent per annum, which means
73 million inhabitants in urban areas in 2025 compared to 27 million
in 2000; an increase of 2.7. According to the draft Development
Strategy formulated by the National Water Management Plan Project
(NWMPP), under the medium economic growth scenario the GDP
will rise from 2021 billion in 1999-00 to 7965 billion in 2024-25.
Considering medium economic growth and medium fertility decline,
it has been estimated by the NWMP that an additional demand of 9.5
million tons of food grains will be created in 2025 compared to
2000. Annual fish consumption will increase from 1.68 Mt/a to 4.43
Mt/a in 2025.
113112
Increase in population and economic activities will be the main
driving force in determining the water demand in the coming years.
Some indication of the development scenario could be obtained from
the estimated land distribution in 2025.
Changes in the area of river, forest, urban and rural settlements will
not be appreciable. However, the major concern is the absolute
decline of approximately 1.4 Mha of agricultural land. This is largely
due to the expansion of fish production on agricultural lands. In that
case, the rate of increase of yield should be 2 per cent per annum to
maintain food self-sufficiency. In order to increase production, most
of the irrigable areas will need to be brought under irrigation. A
1997-98 estimate by NMIDP shows that only 2.83 Mha out of a
potential 7.89 Mha is irrigated in the Rabi (winter) season. However,
it must be recognised that getting water to all irrigable lands at an
affordable price will be difficult. The above estimates do not consider
the effect of global warming. It is envisaged that global warming will
have a major impact on crop production due to prolonged dry
season.
Flood Mitigation and ManagementFloodplains of the major rivers and their tributaries and
distributaries cover around 80 per cent of Bangladesh. As a result of
very flat topography 20 per cent of the lands are inundated due to
spilling of the rivers each year during the monsoon period (June-
September). Rainfall of high intensity and long duration in the river
catchments causes drainage congestion within the country due to
inadequate conveyance capacity of the rivers. The situation becomes
severe when peak flow in the rivers synchronises with high rainfall.
The nation experiences around 37 per cent inundation due to floods
every 10 years. In 1988 and 1998 more than 60 per cent land was
inundated.
Classification River Mang rove Forest Urban Rural Other Water Agriculture
1995 (Mha) 4626 4957 21058 8697 6734 3373 7584 82784
2025 (Mha) 4520 5623 24693 12956 8167 4383 10891 68661
During the last 50 years, hundreds of kilometres of embankments
have been constructed by Bangladesh Water Development Board
(BWDB), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and
local authorities (zilla parishad/union parishads/pourashavas). As
time progresses and more projects are completed, interdependency
of these kinds of flood mitigation measures with the surrounding
water environment has resulted in a number of adverse impacts.
Some of the adverse impacts include increase in the depth, duration
and extent of inundation in the unprotected areas, increase in
sedimentation rate in the drainage channels, increase in flood levels,
drainage congestion in the protected areas, loss of fish habitats and
breeding grounds. Due to inadequate maintenance of flood
embankment, embankment breaches are common phenomenon.
These embankment breaches are the cause of major flood disaster
particularly in the areas on the right bank of Jamuna River.
Therefore, mitigation measure for one hazard can cause a wide range
of hazards in other areas.
Human Intervention and Associated ImpactsHuman intervention in the flood plains and in the water bodies has
introduced large scale environmental, social and economic impacts.
Conventional methods of engineering practices of analysis and
design had to use simplified approaches without considering
interactive responses from system interventions, which is inevitable
in the complex river and flood plain system in Bangladesh. The
designers had to opt for conservative design parameters to remain on
the safe side, or to omit some very important issues which later
proved to be the main reasons behind unacceptable hazards that
took place within and around project area.
Freshwater Withdrawal and Salinity Intrusion Salinity in the coastal areas, particularly in the south-west region is a
major concern. Salinity intrusion in the south-west has increased due
to low fresh water flow through Gorai during dry season. The main
reason is the withdrawal of water in the upstream resulting in
degradation of the Gorai offtake. This has resulted in major adverse
impacts on the environment and socio-economic condition in the
area. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWT) with India
signed in 1996 makes a certain quantum of flow available to
Bangladesh during the dry season. The main challenge in the future
will be to best utilise this additional flow to restore the Gorai and
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other rivers; arrest environmental degradation by salinity control;
extend irrigation facilities; control of sedimentation. Diversion,
distribution and management of this additional flow will require
major interventions like a barrage on the Ganges, water control
structures and distribution canal in the Ganges Dependent Areas
(GDA). A detailed study on the feasibility of various intervention
options should immediately be undertaken.
Sedimentation of Rivers, Estuaries and CoastsEach year a huge volume of sediment is being conveyed by the major
rivers to the sea. Although it is difficult to quantify the volume of
sediment accurately, estimates by different studies show that the
quantity of sediment ranges somewhere between 0.5 to 2 billion
tonnes per year. It is, however, reasonable to state that sediment load
could be in excess of 1 billion tonnes per year. This is a potential
resource, which needs to be harnessed in the reclamation of land in
the coastal areas. An NWMPP estimate suggests that if 10 per cent of 2the sediment is deposited on 31,000 km land with flooding deeper
than 0.9m with a consolidation of 1.5t/m, then the thickness of the
deposit would average 10mm per year. This is important for
compensation of land subsidence which is typically 2mm per year.
Erosion of River BanksThe seasonal variation of river flows causes variation in sediment
transport and as a result, erosion of river banks occurs. The possible
after effects are migration of bank lines, resulting in a loss of valuable
lands. Previous studies have estimated that by the year 2025 around 23,575 km area in the erodible river valleys of Brahmaputra, Ganges,
Padma, Lower Meghna and estuary will be lost due to erosion. On 2the other hand, 3,665 km land will be gained due to accretion in the
same period. From these figures it may seem that the loss is not very
significant. But this has major social, economic and environmental
implications. Structural measures like river bank protection,
canalisation etc. for mitigation for erosion in the extremely dynamic
river valleys of Jamuna, Padma, Ganges or Lower Meghna would
require huge investment in implementation and more so in
maintenance. Planning of any such mitigation measure requires
prediction of river erosion and the most suitable measure for
mitigation based on their resulting impact upstream and
downstream of the mitigation work. Remote sensing data can be
used for study of pattern of changes to river plan form and bank
lines. Mathematical models could be useful to predict river erosion,
and study of different mitigation options and their impacts.
Prediction of erosion for early warning can also save life and
property.
Cyclone and Storm SurgeBangladesh has over 700 km of coastline, which is exposed to
recurring cyclones from the Bay of Bengal. The coastal areas have
experienced over 42 major cyclones in the last 125 years. These
cyclones cause immense damage to the coastal social and economic
life and to the environment. In 1991, the coastal areas experienced a
storm with a surge height of 4.0-5.0 m, killing 140,000 of the
population and damaging livestock, crops, property and
infrastructure in the area. Since the 1960s a large number of polders
have been constructed in the tidal plains of the south as mitigation
measures against tidal surges and saline water intrusion. A large
number of cyclone shelters have also been constructed to save life in
the event of a storm surge.
One of the major mitigation measures are land-use policies, which
should guide development activities in disaster prone areas. The
land-use policy should be based on analysis of risk due to hazard.
Deterministic models can be used to simulate any events and GIS
could be very a handy tool for risk mapping based on risk analysis on
the basis of an inventory of the property at risk to the hazard, and
estimates of different intensities of hazard events. Probabilistic
models could be used to take into account of the whole range of likely
events by assigning probabilities to each range of events and
estimating the damage that would be expected to occur as a result.
Water StressAgricultural drought is a common phenomenon in many areas of
Bangladesh in post monsoon and dry season. In major cities, scarcity
of water for drinking and sanitation is a major problem. Main causes
of drought are limited rainfall, high temperature associated with low
humidity and withdrawal of water in the upstream. Over withdrawal
of groundwater is causing lowering of groundwater in many areas; as
a result, many Shallow Tubewells (STW) are becoming inoperable.
Moreover, low flow in rivers in the dry period and lowering of
groundwater table is causing environmental problems like salinity
intrusion in surface and groundwater, increase in the concentration
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of pollution in surface water, sedimentation etc. The problem
becomes multifaceted when there is scarcity of ground water during
the monsoon in most years, especially in the flood-controlled area.
This reveals the significance of annual flood plain's inundation for
ground water recharge.
Urban Water Supply and SanitationPollution from human and industrial sources is the main water
quality problem in the river systems near urban areas. Buriganga in
Dhaka and Karnafuli in Chittagong are the worst affected. Other
rivers are also showing gradual decline in water quality. It has been
estimated that urban population will increase by 2.7 times by 2025.
The gross daily water demand in the major metropolitan cities
(Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi) will rise from the present
2460 Ml/d (million litres per day) to 7970 Ml/d assuming a system
loss of 20 per cent. There is already a major shortage of required
supply of safe water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge
areas, the groundwater table in Dhaka has declined at an alarming
rate over the last couple of decades. A 1997 study by Institute of
Water Modelling (IWM) has shown that the maximum drawdown
due to groundwater abstraction was 25m. However, this drawdown
could have been reduced to 15m by conjunctive use of surface and
groundwater. Based on model study, the IWM recommended the use
of surface water during wet season from the rivers surrounding
Dhaka and use of groundwater during dry period. It may be
mentioned here that cost of treatment of surface water will be lower
in wet season because of lower pollution level. Recharge during wet
season will raise the groundwater table, which will reduce the cost of
groundwater abstraction during dry season. Alternative sources like
River Jamna, which is only 80km away with reliable flow needs to be
investigated. Conjunctive use in other major cities and urban areas
should also be studied. Other options relate to more stringent
regulations implemented on the ground relating to protection of the
quality of water and reduction of wastage and unaccounted-for
water. Community participation in the process is vital. Demand
management by imposing tariffs could be useful to discourage
wastage of water. Private sector management of water supply system
could be more efficient in the management of demand and quality
services.
Dhaka has the largest piped sewerage system in Bangladesh;
however, the existing system serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of
this only 3 per cent reaches the DWASA sewage treatment plant at
Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface water system, which
cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent households in Dhaka have
septic tanks with soak wells. In the future, with the increase in
population density, the quantities will not only exceed soak well
capacity, but high land values will discourage the setting aside of
land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to collect
and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are necessary.
Arsenic Contamination of GroundwaterThe issue of arsenic is now the most important environmental
concern of Bangladesh. In recent times arsenic in tube-well waters
has upset the drinking water supply from groundwater. Arsenic has
turned into a national health issue, groundwater users panicking as a
result. Out of 64 districts, arsenic contamination in groundwater has
been detected in 59 districts. The most common mitigation measure
being taken is identifying the tube-wells with arsenic level crossing
allowable limits for drinking water. Various agencies are working all
over Bangladesh in testing tube-well water for arsenic. The testing
methods have not yet been standardised, field activities are not
coordinated, valuable information from field investigations is not
properly archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop
an arsenic database, which should include information on the tube-
wells being affected, the population under threat, mitigation
measures being undertaken, method used for testing, agencies
involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely into
planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country.
Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the
mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain.
Institutional DevelopmentThe National Water Policy states that “the governance and
management of the national water resources require a great deal of
coordination of existing institutions and, in some cases, reform and
creation of new community-based institutions. Water resources
management extends across many water-using sectors as well as
political jurisdictions and geographically and hydrologically diverse
areas. Properly functioning institutions are essential for effective
implementation and administration of the country's water and
related environmental resource management policies and directives.”
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It further states “firstly, there should be separation of policy,
planning, and regulatory functions from implementation and
operational functions at each level of government. Secondly, each
institution must be held accountable for financial and operational
performance.”
Regarding community participation and involvement of local
government institutions in water resources management, the policy
states that, “the principle that community resources should be
managed by the community concerned, along with local
government institutions unless a greater national interest prevails,
should guide water resource management. It is recognised that
women have a particular stake in water management because they
are the principal providers and carriers of water, main caretaker of
family's health, and participants in many stages of pre- and post
harvest activities.”
The NWPo clearly states the responsibility of public and private
sectors and need coordination of existing institutions. It is important
to note that the policy has emphasised on participation and
mobilisation of community resources and recognises the importance
of the role of women in water resources management.
In NWPo, the government states its intention to transfer a large part
of all water development schemes to the Zila and Upazila parshads
from the line agencies. These local government institutes are
supposed to secure public participation in all aspect. The government
also declares that restructuring or reform of existing institutions will
be required to implement the policy.
Institutional reforms as declared are never easy to achieve. It may
take several years before such reforms are effectively in place.
However, targets to achieve different institutional reforms have to be
developed and acted upon.
Regional Water IssuesSouth Asian regional water issues can be mainly divided into three
broad categories: i) sharing of river waters ii) cooperative development of water resources, and iii) sharing of data and information on common rivers to facilitate
flood forecasting and water quality control. The sharing of the
riparian river water has been a bone of contention between
India and Bangladesh for the last 35 years.
In 1972, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was formed
with the intension to address water related issues concerning the
common river systems between India and Bangladesh. The statute of
the Commission defines its function as follows:
(a) to maintain liaison between the participating countries in order
to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximising the benefits
from common river systems to both the countries, (b) to formulate
flood control works and to recommend implementation of joint
projects, (c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance flood
warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone warnings, (d) to study
flood control and irrigation projects so that the water resources of
the region can be utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual
benefit of the peoples of the two countries, and (e) to formulate
proposals for carrying out coordinated research on problem of
flood control affecting both the countries. (ii) The Commission shall
also perform such other functions as the two Governments may, by
mutual agreement, direct it to do.
The Commission, over the last 30 years, has only involved itself
effectively (with mixed results) in water sharing issues and sharing of
data on common rivers between India and Bangladesh.
The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of
the Ganges water during lean period. India has constructed a Barrage
on the Ganges at Farraka in West Bengal to divert water through the
Bhagirati-Hoogly system to flush mainly the port of Calcutta.
Bangladesh claims that there is not enough flow in the Ganges that
could be diverted through Bhagirathi-Hoogly to flush Calcutta port
and at the same time maintain the agriculture, ecology and economy
of the areas in the downstream, particularly, the southern part of
Bangladesh.
On 12 December, 1996 Bangladesh and India signed the historic
Ganges water sharing treaty. The 30-year Ganges Water Treaty
concluded 35 years of discussions and negotiations between India
and Bangladesh. The Treaty provides Bangladesh the opportunity to
invest in long-term sustainable projects to develop freshwater
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resources in the Ganges. They must be used to nurture the region
that has suffered so much social and environmental damage in the
past due to low freshwater flow during the dry season as a result of
withdrawal of water in the upstream. One big question about the
Treaty is the guarantee of minimum flow for Bangladesh. This is still
one area of great concern for Bangladesh, which needs to be resolved
in the shortest possible time.
Over the last couple of years a new area of major concern for Bangladesh has emerged. This is in connection with the proposed Indian River Link Project. The main objective of the project is to divert a large volume of water from the so-called water surplus areas to the water deficit areas in India. The Ganges and the Brahmaputra River basins have been identified as marginally surplus and surplus areas, respectively, while most of the western and southern areas have been identified as the water deficit areas. The transfer of water would, therefore, primarily occur from the Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins. Bangladesh has voiced its concern to the Indian side formally. Unfortunately, the response from India has been discouraging to initiate a fruitful dialogue on the issue.
The GBM Basins, covering an area of around 1.75 million sq. km in five countries, have immense potential in developing its water resources in areas like flood management, flow augmentation, hydropower, navigation etc. This is vital for uplifting the economy and living condition of 600 million people living within the GBM region.
Lessons lPast strategies focused on flood prevention with a view to
increasing food production. As a result, other water-using sectors were neglected and a holistic and integrated water management strategy and vision could not be developed.
lStake-holder's participation was completely unknown and absent in the past water development activities, which contributed to the lack of sustainable development in this sector.
lThe reason behind failure of many institutions in the water sector was due to poor operation and maintenance mechanism and capability.
lOver exploitation and unregulated use of groundwater have contributed to adverse environmental impacts including lowering of groundwater table.
lLack of coordination among various agencies in planning and implementation of projects prevented in achieving the desired objectives; rather resulted in some adverse impacts.
Recommendations1. The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) being prepared
should be implemented.
2. In order to meet the national policy to maintain self-sufficiency in food, research in crop diversification and high yielding variety of crops should be given top-most priority.
3. Irrigation facility to maximum irrigable lands should be extended in the next 15 years. Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, water retention in river valleys and beels, water conservation, rain water harvesting, flow augmentation and diversion and utilisation of major river flows should be investigated.
4. An integrated land and water management policy for Bangladesh formulated by 2007. The policy should:
i) address to the gaps in different sectoral policies ii) provide guidelines for coordination of activities in
different sectors, iii) provide guidelines of land use and management in
Bangladesh, iv) provide principles determining development of urban,
rural and industrial areas, v) provide policy on the preservation of wetlands and bio-
diversity, vi) provide a policy on the mobilisation of private sector
resources, vii) a policy related to access of water to all elements of society,
including the poor and the under-privileged, taking into account the need of women and children.
5. Nationwide environmental assessment for 2005 and prediction for the next 50 years for different development options is required. Mitigation plans for any adverse impacts should be formulated.
6. Water quality in many of the rivers and wetlands in Bangladesh has deteriorated due to lack of awareness among water users, failure to implement regulatory mechanisms to ensure water quality, indiscriminate use of agro-chemicals and untreated disposal of industrial and domestic waste. Immediate steps have to be taken to implement strict measures for waste treatment, monitor use of agro-chemicals and raise awareness about water
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quality.
7. Coordinated efforts to reduce risk of flood in the affected areas by 50 per cent within the next 10 years and by 75 per cent by 2025.
8. Reassessment and audit of all coastal polders and FCDI projects by 2006. Immediate rehabilitation of the projects to meet the need for overall development completed by 2010.
9. Management of water in the monsoon through controlled flooding and drainage where possible.
10. Dredging of offtakes and river beds can be viable solution for restoration of rivers. Appropriate technology for dredging to minimise cost has be studied.
11. Flood forecasting and warning system need to be integrated with the overall mitigation activities for arriving at optimum benefit from the system. Immediate need for institutional strengthening, human resources management and community participation in flood forecasting and warning for better dissemination and utility of forecast. Existing flood Forecasting Model extended further upstream to increase lead-time of forecast in the next 3 years.
12. Computerised Emergency Response System based on wireless and Internet technology instituted in the country by 2007 linking the stakeholders and the central decision making agency.
13. Ganges barrage and associated interventions completed for maximum utilisation of dry season flow of the Ganges in extending irrigation facilities and control salinity intrusion in the Ganges Dependent Areas in the next 5 years.
14. Models for erosion and storm surge prediction developed and applied by 2005.
15. Structural measures for reclamation of coastal lands initiated by 2006.
16. Phase-wise programmes for expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation completed within the next 20 years.
17. Hygiene education in 80 per cent of schools by 2010
18. Immediate steps for revival of Buriganga River.
19. Augmentation of water supply for Dhaka needs urgent attention
20. Sanitation problems in particular of urban cities like Dhaka needs to addressed on an urgent basis
21. Standardised testing method for arsenic detection in groundwater, national arsenic database, development of low cost mitigation measures by 2006. Research on probable impact of arsenic contamination on food chain is urgently required.
22. Institutional restructuring and reforms initiated for creating enabling environment for:
i) participation of stakeholders in planning, design, implementation and management of water schemes,
ii) mobilisation of private sector resources, iii) transfer of water sector schemes below 5000 ha to local
government institutions, andiv) enhancing the role of women in water management. Social
and cultural aspects should be given importance in development planning and management of water resources.
23. Campaign to raise awareness among the stakeholders about water planning, management, use and conservation in the next 10 years.
24. Mechanisms for mobilising new financial resources identified and under process of implementation by 2006.
25. Government investment in research in water management issues increased by 2006.
26. Regional cooperation for share of information and data, hydropower, flow augmentation, flood management and flood forecasting by 2010. Basin wide approach is needed for development and management of water resources in the GBM basins for fostering effective regional cooperation.
27. Need of political goodwill to ensure an equitable sharing of the water of the international rivers among the co-riparian as well as to maintain ecological balance and environmental quality.
Department of EnvironmentDepartment of FisheriesDepartment of Public Health EngineeringDhaka Water and Sewerage AuthorityExecutive Committee of the National Economic CouncilExecutive Committee of the National Water Resources CouncilEnvironmental Impact AssessmentFlood Action PlanFlood Control and DrainageFlood Control, Drainage and IrrigationFlood Forecasting and Warning CentreFlood Plan Coordination OrganisationGanges-Brahmaputra-MeghnaGanges Dependent Area Gross Domestic ProductGeographical Information SystemGovernment of (the People's Republic of) BangladeshGorai River Restoration ProjectHigh Yield VarietyInternational Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentInternational Union for the Conservation of NatureInstitute of Water ModellingIntegrated Water Resources ManagementJoint Rivers CommissionLocal Government Engineering DepartmentMinistry of AgricultureMinistry of Environment and ForestMinistry of Fisheries and LivestockMinistry of IndustryMinistry of LandMinistry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operativesMinistry of Water ResourcesMaster Plan OrganisationNational Fisheries PolicyNational Forestry PolicyNon-Government OrganisationNational Policy for Safe Water Supply and SanitationNational Water Management PlanNational Water Management Plan ProjectNational Water PlanNational Water PolicyNational Water Resources CouncilNational Water Resources DatabaseOperation and MaintenanceOptions for the Ganges Dependent AreaProject-affected PersonPeople's Participation ProcessRoads and Highways DepartmentSurvey of BangladeshSpace Research and Remote Sensing OrganisationSurface Water Simulation Modelling ProgrammeWater Resources Planning OrganisationWater and Sewerage AuthorityWorld Bank
DoEDoFDPHEDWASAECNECECNWRCEIAFAPFCDFCDIFFWCFPCOGBMGDAGDPGISGoBGRRPHYVIBRDIUCNIWMIWRMJRCLGEDMoAMoEFMoFLMoIMoLMoLGRDCMoWRMPONFiPNFoPNGONPSWSSNWMPNWMPPNWPNWPoNWRCNWRDO&MOGDAPAPPPPRHDSOBSPARRSOSWSMPWARPOWASAWB
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28. To facilitate implementation of co-riparian state's interests and obligations, an apex body comprising representatives of all the co-riparian states needs to be set up to evolve a plan for development, conservation, sharing and utilisation of the international water according to the needs of the member states and the principle's of international law.
29. Cooperation and coordinated approach is essential to achieve sustainable development in the water resources sector since water is integration of technical, economical, social, political, institutional and policy factors.
Emaduddin Ahmad is executive director of the Institute of Water Modelling in Bangladesh.
ReferenceslQ. K. Ahmad et al, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A
Framework for Sustainable Development, (Dhaka: UPL, 2001).lEmaduddin Ahmad et al, Sustainable Development of Water Resources
Towards 2025, BUP, 2002.lBangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy, MoWR, GOB, 1995.lBangladesh Water Vision 2025, Bangladesh Water Partnership, 2000.lM. C. Chaturvedi, Transboundary River Basin Management and
Sustainable Development-Case Study of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghana Basin, Proceedings of a seminar on Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development, UNESCO, 1993.
lA N H A. Hossain, Peoples Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management, (SAWAF III, Dhaka, 2003).
lHossain, S. M. M. A. Rahman, Integrated Water Resources ndManagement in Bangladesh: Role of SWMC, 2 SWMC Users
Conference, Dhaka, 1999.lMinistry of Water Resources, Govt. of Bangladesh, Overview of Water
Resources Management and Development in Bangladesh, 1997.lNational Water Management Plan, WARPO, 2004.lNational Water Policy, 1998.
Abbreviations
BAMWSPBBSBREBUETBUPBWDBBWFMSDAEDANIDADDSDEMDO
Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply ProjectBangladesh Bureau of StatisticsBrahmaputra Right EmbankmentBangladesh University of Engineering and TechnologyBangladesh Unnayan ParishadBangladesh Water Development BoardBangladesh Water and Flood Management StrategyDepartment of Agricultural ExtensionDanish International Development AgencyDraft Development StrategyDigital Elevation ModelDissolved Oxygen
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Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An OverviewRanaswamy R Iyer
his article focuses on issues and concerns rather than facts
and figures or engineering details regarding the Indus Waters TTreaty and the Baglihar controversy.
The Indus Water Treaty, 1960 is internationally regarded as a
successful instance of conflict resolution between two countries that
have otherwise been locked in conflict. It was also the practice until
recently to express satisfaction at the fact that the arbitration
provisions of the Treaty had not so far been invoked, but that record
seems about to change. On the other hand, there are some who
question the statement that the Treaty is a good example of conflict
resolution; they feel that the surgery that it did on the river-system
was harmful. There is also a body of opinion in both countries that
the division of waters under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness
alleged in one country is the exact opposite of that alleged in the
other country. On the outstanding differences under the Treaty
(relating to the Tulbul/Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga projects)
there are divergent perceptions in the two countries as to the
question of conformity to the Treaty. Where does the truth lie in
relation to all these differences?
Conflict ResolutionIs the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-resolution? The answer has to be `Yes and No'. The water-sharing under the
Treaty was a simple allocation of three rivers to Pakistan and three to
India, and there was nothing much thereafter to `operate'; there is
no continuous water-sharing on the same river as in the case of the
Ganges (between India and Bangladesh). It is much more difficult to
operate the Ganges Treaty than the Indus Treaty, and high praise of
the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution is
perhaps somewhat exaggerated. Having said that, one must give due
credit to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars,
that the Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the
political relationship between the two countries was extremely bad,
and that at the working level the relationship between the officials of
the two countries has been marked by cordiality. At the same time, a
few differences under the Treaty have proved quite intractable, and
that is a poor reflection on the Treaty. On the claims of `successful
conflict-resolution', the picture is, therefore, mixed, with the positive
elements having a slight edge.
Was the `surgery' on the Indus system necessary and good? We must note that the `surgery' on the river-systems (Indus in the
west, GangesBrahmaputraMeghna in the east) was a part of the
surgery on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history.
However, without entering into a discussion of that division, it must
be noted that in deciding whether the subcontinent should be
divided, little (if any) attention was paid to the fact that major river-
systems were going to be cut across. That did not figure as a factor in
the decision-making but was only considered later as a consequence
of a decision taken on other grounds.
Water Sharing Issues and PartitionWas the Treaty a good answer to the water-sharing problem that
surfaced after the Partition of the subcontinent? It has been argued that dividing the river-system into two segments
was not the best thing to do, and that the better course would have
been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire system in an
integrated and holistic manner. However, given the circumstances of
Partition and the difficult relationship between the two newly formed
countries, it would have been naïve to expect that such a joint
integrated cooperative approach would work. (If a constructive,
integrated approach were possible in relation to the river system,
then why not in relation to the totality of perceptions that led to the
partition of the subcontinent? Obviously this speculation is
pointless). An alternative possibility would have been to agree upon a
sharing of waters between the two countries on each of the six rivers
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constituting the system. That might have been technically feasible
but very difficult to operate. Continuous sharing on each river with
joint monitoring arrangements and so on might have proved
cumbersome, difficult and productive of endless disputes. Instead,
the actual division agreed upon was the allocation of the three
western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. If the
ideal solution is unavailable, the choice has to fall on the second-best
solution; agreement of any kind is better than discord.
Was the sharing of waters fair? Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the waters to
Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly
accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that
the territories that went to India under Partition were historically
using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty
was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters.
Both are fallacious arguments. A share of 20 per cent is not ipso facto
low; on the other hand, the level of historic use (10 per cent or
whatever) does not necessarily determine a country's future needs or
entitlements. A multiplicity of factors and criteria has to be applied,
having regard to all the relevant circumstances; not a priori view on
what is fair is possible. However, it is hardly necessary for us to go
into this question. When prolonged inter-country negotiations by
teams acting under governmental briefings led to a Treaty, and the
Treaty was approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be
presumed that it was the best outcome that could be negotiated
under the given circumstances; either side is then precluded from
saying that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree
of dissatisfaction with the Treaty arises in the course of operation of
the Treaty, it would be a matter for inter-state discussions within the
ambit of the Treaty, or a re-negotiation of the Treaty with much
uncertainty as to the outcome. On the whole, it would probably be
best to leave things as they are. The Treaty embodies a negotiated
sharing that doubtless represents what was achievable.
Resolution of DifferencesWhy are certain differences (Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving
intractable? Ignoring the complexities involved in these cases and simplifying the
issues, the Pakistani position is that these projects constitute
violations of the Treaty by India which India denies. The Treaty
precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated
to Pakistan. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the projects
proposed by India involve the creation of storages. That is not as
simple a question as it might seem. The conventional engineering
view is that a diversion barrage or a run-of-the-river hydroelectric
project (unlike a dam and a reservoir) does not create any storage.
However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures, and any
structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a minimal
storage. The question then becomes one of the level and acceptability
of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is possible. It is
the Pakistani view that the Indian projects mentioned above involve
storages and are therefore unacceptable; Pakistan is also
apprehensive of the structures in question giving India a measure of
control over rivers allocated to Pakistan, and enabling India either to
reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters and cause
floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and
partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears
are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding
itself first (such an explanation was earlier accepted by Pakistan in
the case of the Salal Project); that its capacity to reduce flows to
Pakistan is very limited; that the Treaty does give India some
minimal rights on the western rivers, which India has not been able
to use partly because no proposal, drawing, design or other technical
detail submitted by it is ever cleared by Pakistan; and that Pakistan is
deliberately unreasonable in its examination of such proposals, the
aim being the obstruction of all efforts by India to use the limited
rights given to it by the Treaty. It is the Indian perception (privately
stated) that the operation of the Indus Treaty has been hamstrung by
total and persistent Pakistani negativism. It is also the Indian
perception that Pakistan's objections to Wullar (Tulbul), Baglihar,
and Kishenganga are essentially political and not technical.
As mentioned above, one such project, namely Salal Hydroelectric
Project, was (after many years of talks) cleared by Pakistan in the
1970s. Subsequently the relations between the two countries
deteriorated and touched rock bottom in the post-Kargil period. It
was unrealistic at that stage to expect the differences relating to
Baglihar, etc, to be resolved. There was even some uncertainty in
2002 about the future of the Treaty itself, but that trouble blew over
and the Treaty continued to function. However, there was a feeling
131130
that once the political relationship between the two countries
improved, agreement would be reached on these outstanding issues.
That expectation has been belied. While the two countries have
begun to talk to each other, and a`peace process' has been put in
motion, the talks over Baglihar have failed and Pakistan has invoked
the arbitration provisions of the Treaty and asked the World Bank to
nominate a neutral expert. It is a bit puzzling that this negative
development that casts a shadow on the `peace process' has been
allowed to occur.
There are two possible explanations to this unfortunate
development. The first is that there is indeed a genuine and sharp
difference between the two countries on the conformity of the
Baglihar Project to the provisions of the Treaty, and perhaps the talks
broke down on that issue. The other possibility is that Pakistan's
objection continues to be political rather than technical, and that
there has been a hardening of the Pakistani position on the talks with
India. If this understanding is correct, the breakdown of the talks on
Baglihar might be the result of a deliberate decision about political
relations, unconnected with the details of the Baglihar case.
Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret?It seems to this writer that there is no need for unhappiness at the
invocation of the arbitration clause. The Treaty provides for
arbitration. That would also be action under the Treaty. If India is
convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present its
case strongly to the neutral expert, and eventually to the Court of
Arbitration if that contingency arises. However, an agreed settlement
is definitely preferable to arbitration, and India should continue to
try to persuade Pakistan to return to the negotiating table.
Relation with the Kashmir IssueFinally, what is the Jammu & Kashmir dimension of Baglihar,
Wullar, etc? There is a strong sense of grievance in Jammu & Kashmir that the
Treaty has made it very difficult for it (J&K) to derive any benefit by
way of irrigation, hydroelectric power or navigation from the rivers
that flow through it but stand allocated to Pakistan. The Government
of India would like to remove J&K's sense of grievance. However, the
first step here is the communication of the technical details of the
projects concerned to Pakistan. Things get stalled at that stage
because of Pakistan's objections. Speculatively speaking, Pakistan is
perhaps not keen on letting these projects go forward because (a)
they are in what it regards as disputed territory, and (b) the benefits
of the projects would go to J&K under Indian auspices. Hence,
(presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might not have
proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J&K but
elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed
under certain conditions; one had hoped that Baglihar would also be
similarly allowed to proceed. That has not happened. One has to wait
and see what the future holds.
Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the
Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India.
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Pakistan's and Perspective: the Baglihar Project
Shahid Husain
hile the Baglihar Project may have been at a conceptual stage
for a very long time, it emerged on public consciousness in W1992. However, the issue entered the arena of intense public debate
in the year 2000 and has assumed classical proportions of an Indo-
Pak dispute.
Having accepted the scope of bilateral dialogue, the Government of
Pakistan has finally referred the question to the World Bank for the
appointment of a neutral expert. It notified the World Bank on 15
January, 2005 of its intention. The decision to appoint a neutral
expert had been taken earlier but was deferred on the personal
intervention of the Indian Prime Minister with his Pakistani
counterpart. The neutral expert, when appointed in any of the three
manners defined in the Indus Water Treaty, would help both the
parties reach an agreement but if he fails wholly or partly, the
differences remaining unresolved are designated as ‘Disputes’, which
which would then find their way to the Arbitration Court.
Article IX of Indus Water Treaty 1960 provides for the settlement of
differences and disputes for questions arising between the parties
concerning the existence of any fact which if established, might thconstitute a breach of this Treaty. To the Note Verbale dated 7
August 2003 sent by the Government of India to discuss the issue at
the government level, under Article IV of the Treaty, the Government
of Pakistan put forward the following three conditions:
1. All construction work on the project would be suspended
pending amicable and satisfactory resolution of the issues raised
by Pakistan's Commissioner.th2. On-site inspection by 30 September, 2003 would be provided
to Pakistan's Commissioner and3. Agreement to amicably settle all issues pertaining to the Project
by 31 December, 2003.
The previous round of talks between Indian Water Resources
Secretary V. K. Duggal and his Pakistani counterpart Ashfaq
Mehmood, lasted for four days, and yet did not yield any results.
'Collapse of talks' as observed by Kuldeep Kumar was considered a
setback by observers to the CBMs (Confidence Building Measures).
Pakistan's request to the World Bank has been received by India as a
spanner in the works the reconciliation process. According to one
report, 'Pakistan's reference to the World Bank was premature', as
both sides had achieved some degree of convergence on technical
details during the last round of talks. Indian Foreign Secretary said,
'if carried forward the area of convergence would have increased
further.'
After secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, a Joint Press thRelease (JPR) was issued on 24 June, 2004. Like all such
diplomatic minutiae this statement, innocuous in content, failed to
address any issues or reveal anything of substance. The joint press
release must have involved intense efforts on the part of the two
foreign office experts. The brief statement is reproduced below:
'Secretary level talks between Indian and Pakistan on the Baglihar
Hydroelectric Project were held at New Delhi on 22.6.2004. Mr
Ashfaq Mahmood Secretary Water and Power led the Pakistan
delegation and Indian delegation was led by Shri VK Duggal,
Secretary, (Water resources). Prior to the meeting the Pakistan
delegation called on Shri Priyaranjan Dasmunsi, Hon. Minister of stWater Resources on 21 June, 2004.
The talks were held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere and in
the spirit of goodwill and cooperation. The two Secretaries discussed
ways and means to resolve technical concerns relating to the Project
and shared their assessments on this issue. They will now report
back to their respective governments.'(New Delhi June 22, 2004).
139 138
Following a reference to the World Bank, Ministry of External Affairs thof India's (MEA) spokesman, in his statement on 18 January, 2005
said: 'We do not believe that the reference to the World Bank was thjustified.'Irritation was more pronounced, when on 11 January,
2005 the MEA Spokesman said, 'If Pakistan still chooses to go the
World Bank, then we will respond appropriately.'
thOn 16 February, 2005, a month after the reference to the World
Bank by Pakistan, Mr Shyam Saran, the Indian Foreign Secretary,
made the following public statement:
'Our viewpoint is that last round of talks which was held between
India and Pakistan was perhaps the first time that there was a really
very intensive technical discussion. It was our sense, perhaps not
shared by the Pakistani side, that some degree of convergence was
achieved during these discussions. It was our assessment that if these
technical discussions could be carried forward then perhaps the area
of convergence could increase further. Perhaps, it was a sense on the
Pakistani side that we were not going to get anywhere even if there
were further discussions. As you are aware, a reference has been
made by Pakistan to the World Bank. It remains our view that we
should continue bilateral discussions, it remains our view that there
are possibilities for us to be able to find greater convergence to these
discussions.'
The Foreign Secretary seemed to express frustration at the reference
to the World Bank but did not identify the exact areas of
convergence. He acknowledged that this was the first time that
technical discussions had taken place. But water issues cannot be
treated as pure technical matters or divorced from political subtext.
According to Rajeev Sharma, 'Pakistan's objections were not really
technical.' It only wanted to prevent India from doing a major
project in Jammu & Kashmir even if it is permissible under the
Treaty. Pakistan's decision according to him, to bring in neutral
expert, 'will inevitably cast a shadow on the projects in Jammu &
Kashmir.'(The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10, 2005). The same newspaper
in its editorial characterised the dispute as 'essentially technical,
rather than political.'Pakistan's decision will prove to be a potential
headache for the Government of India.
As articulated by Professor Pushpesh Pant, such setbacks are normal
in any peace process and should not dishearten any side. In fact it
will convince Pakistani people that their government was not
buckling under Indian pressure, thus arming it with more credibility.
But credibility, without being put to use in resolving the issue to the
mutual benefit of both the parties, is of no use.
Pakistan however offered whatever it could as a lower riparian to
reach a settlement predicated upon suspension of work followed by a
dialogue. But Indian desire to proceed with exploiting hydropower
potential was too overwhelming.
What precisely are Pakistan's objections? They primarily relate to the
design of the plant without questioning India's right under the Treaty
to construct hydroelectric dams and the fear that the dam will cause
a loss of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equal to a 27 per
cent decrease in the Jhelum River. Other experts say that the
Baghlihar dam will have major security and economic implications
for Pakistan owing to increased Indian control over its share of water
supplies. According to this report the Project will tap around 7000
cusecs of water for irrigation purpose in the short term. This only
confirms Pakistan's apprehensions regarding India's intentions on its rdstorage potential. The electricity would meet 1/3 the total power
requirement of the State.
Due to suspension of supplies for up to 28 consecutive days during
certain months, the project can lead to acute water shortages. Some
apprehensions expressed by Pakistan are:lIndia can use water as a weapon against Pakistan.lThe design of the hydropower project violates the terms of the
1960 Indus Water Treaty.lThe structure will provide India the capability to manipulate the
flow of water to Pakistan's disadvantage.lComplete stoppage for a continuous period of 27/28 days during
December, January and February would adversely affect
agriculture and other requirements at Marala head works.lThe project can also lead to inundation of the area above Marala
head works due to the sudden synchronised releases from Dul-
Hasti, Baghlihar and Salal reservoirs.
India plans to operate the dam at maximum capacity by 2007. (Bilal thHassan, Dawn, 14 February, 2005). It has already constructed the
141140
Wullar and Salal Barrages, on this river and has plans to construct
16/17 dams on river Chenab and 6/7 on River Jhelum. Pakistan has
already, according to the Dawn report, sacrificed 27 MAF to the India
under the Treaty.
The objections officially communicated to India reflecting these
concerns are: i) 'The works themselves appeared to be capable of raising
artificially the water level beyond the full pondage level
specified in the design and would contravene the provisions of
Paragraph 8 (a) of Annex D to the Treaty.ii) 'The pondage in the operating pool being 37.722 million cubic
meter exceeds twice the pondage of water level.iii) 'The site was suitable for an ungated spillway and, therefore, a
gated spillway should not be provided. This was in
contravention of Paragraph 8 (e) of Annex D and iv) 'The intake for the turbine had not been located at the highest
level as required vide Paragraph 8 (f) of Annex D to the
Treaty.’
Reference to the parts of Treaty that Pakistan referred to above find
mention in Annexure D paragraph 8 and the relevant sub paragraphs
8(a), (c), (e) and (f) read as follows:
8. Except as provided in Paragraph 18, the design of any new
Run-of-River Plant (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a
Plant) shall conform to the following criteria; a) 'The works themselves shall not be capable of raising
artificially the water level in the Operating Pool above the Full
Pondage Level specified in the design.b) xxc) 'The maximum Pondage in the Operating Pool shall not exceed
twice the Pondage required for Firm Power.d) xxe) 'If the conditions at the site of a Plant make a gated spillway
necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed
position shall be located at the highest level consistent with
sound and economical design and satisfactory construction
and operation of the works.f) 'The intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest
level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction
and operation of the Plant as a Run-of-River Plant and with
customary and accepted practice of design for the designated
range of the Plant's operation.’
India, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir are deficit in power and
it seems that the Indian Government has taken a policy decision to
increase the generation. 'Even as the Government of Pakistan is
crying wolf over India's Baglihar, Wullar and Kishanganga
Hydroelectric Power Project, the Indian government is reportedly
planning to construct another three projects. J&K is reported to have
about 15,000 MW of power potential. In the past two decades Indian
Rs.40b have been invested in the power sector in the State’. (Daily
Times, January 17, 2005). There is growing resentment amongst the
people of the State over (the) government's failure to harness the
enormous hydroelectric power potential.
This is why a number of other disputes seem to have emerged in
public view, the Kishenganga hydroelectric project on Neelum River,
which is a tributary to Jhelum, being one of them. The other projects
are: Uri II on the Jhelum River in Baramulla District, the Pakul Dul
and the Burser Dams, both on the Marusundar, a tributary of the
Chenab River in Dhoda district. The Pakuldul and Burser dams are
mega projects with a generating capacity of above 1000 MW each.
According to another report, the Prime Minister's Office has not only
approved more hydel projects but has matched the intention with
money. These projects have been forwarded to the Cabinet for
approval. An allocation of Rs.163 billion by the State of Jammu &
Kashmir and Rs. 240 billion from the Prime Minister's construction
plan have been earmarked. Ministry of Power has reserved about Rs.
120 billion for the three projects.
Chenab is one of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under
the Treaty. It is an important water source for the Indus. Both the
countries are planning a dam on the Neelum River, a tributary of
River Jhelum.
Under Indus Water Treaty 1960, Article I the term 'Western Rivers'
means the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together. Article
III provides for unrestricted use by Pakistan of 'all those waters of
the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under
the provisions' of the following paragraph, which lays down that
India shall not permit any interference with these waters except for
143142
the specified uses like Domestic Use, Non consumptive Use,
Agricultural Use and Generation of hydroelectric power as set out in
Annex D.
Article III (4) reads:'Except as provided in Annexure D&E, India shall not store any
water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western
Rivers.'Annexure D & E to the Treaty provide for exceptions to the
use of Western Rivers by Pakistan.
The Treaty allows India generation of hydroelectric power as one of
the uses. Annexure D applies to unrestricted generation of
hydroelectric power. India is planning many more such projects.
Annexure D to Indus Water Treaty, 1960 applies with respect to the
use by India of the waters of western rivers for the generation of
hydroelectric powers under the provisions of Article III (2) (d) of the
Treaty. The design, construction and operation of the plants shall be
governed by provision of Annexure E (ibid). The design shall
conform to the criteria laid down in para 8, part iii to Annex D and
includes the requirement that the works shall not be capable of
raising artificially the water level in the operating pool above the Full
Pondage Level specified in the design. There shall be no outlets
below Dead Storage Level. Under the Treaty India can make only
‘Non-consumptive uses’, which include any control or use of water
for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection
or flood control, fishing or fish culture, and other like beneficial
purposes so that the water undiminished in volume within the
practical range of measurement remains dormant in or is returned to
the same river or its tributaries. Such use does not include
agricultural use or use in the channels of hydroelectric power.
As soon as it found out Indian 'designs', Pakistan did not hesitate to
ask for more information, and then raised objections as early as
August, 1992. This should be enough to allay any suspicion that
Pakistan's government was found not vigilant. The project is divided into two phases and each phase is designed to
produce 450 MW power. The first phase is likely to be completed
within 2005. However, the MoU for construction of 450 MW thBaglihar Project was signed on 11 March, 1999 with Jaiprakash
Industries Ltd., the biggest Indian hydropower construction
company, and two other companies, Siemens and Hydro Vevey Ltd.
Total cost of the project is Indian Rs.38b (less than a billion dollars)
and the Indian government is providing massive assistance to the
state government in completing the project. The state allocated Rs.
16b; the Indian government promised assistance of Rs. 22b.
The Project envisages the construction of a 308 meters high dam on
River Chenab near the place known as Baglihar (see Map) with
storage of 321,000 Acre Feet of which 291,000 acre ft. is dead
storage capacity. Live storage, also termed as Pondage (Operational
Pool), is 30,400 acre ft. This Pondage is required to supplement the
discharge during low flow period. This is what Pakistan is opposing.
The Treaty has an excellent record of full compliance by both the
parties and has held for the last 45 years and yet we may have
entered a phase where water has acquired a new sense of urgency
about shortages. Population explosion continuing apace in both the
countries, water is going to come under intense pressure. The Treaty
lays down an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism, which has not
been necessary to invoke for the past 45 years. No difference between
the two commissioners has, so far, graduated to a dispute, not even
to the point of difference requiring reference to a neutral expert
before this one.
India insists on bilateral discussion under Article VIII whereas
Pakistan seeks recourse to Article IX. The latter provides for dispute
resolution and involves third party involvement, which India
religiously avoids in settling any dispute with any of her neighbours.
Under the Treaty, it is the Commission that shall first examine any
issues arising. The Commissioners from both sides together form the
Commission. This Commission, if it fails to reach an agreement, a
difference will be deemed to have arisen. It may be noted that
'questions' remain questions so long as they are under discussion in
the Commission. When they defy resolution, they become
differences, which are then to be referred to the neutral expert.
Annex F to the Treaty prescribes the procedure to be followed in that
case. If there is any difference, which in the opinion of either
Commissioner falls within the scope of Article IX read with Annex F
to the Treaty, then at the request of either Commissioner (in this case
145144
Pakistan's) a neutral expert will be appointed in accordance with the
provisions mentioned in Annex F. The two governments may make
appointment jointly, and failing which, by such person as may be
agreed upon between the two governments. In the absence of such
agreement the World Bank will appoint the neutral expert.
Annex G deals with the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. A
Court of Arbitration shall consist of 7 Arbitrators including two
appointed by each party, and three called the umpires, one from each
of the following categories:
1. Persons qualified by status of reputation to be Chairman of the
Court of Arbitration who may, but need not be Engineers or
Lawyers.2. Highly qualified engineers and3. Persons well conversant in international law.
It appears that sooner or later, the World Bank will have to fulfil its
obligations under the Treaty. It cannot escape the responsibility by
claiming that it is not a guarantor. That is precisely what its role was
contemplated by the two parties before agreeing to subscribe to the
Treaty. The appointment of a neutral expert is not going to be easy.
Once the World Bank is referred to, and the two governments fail to
jointly appoint one, the Bank, within one month after the date of
request, shall appoint him. This provision is subject to an important
caveat, which stipulates, 'Every appointment shall be made after
consultation with each of the parties.'
According to reports, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. met the
World Bank President. A leading expert of the World Bank has
predicted a prolonged and complicated legal battle. According to a st threport (31 January, 2005), the World Bank responded on 19
January, 2005 and made it clear that it is just a signatory and not a
guarantor. The WB needs the approval of both countries and as such
the process could be time consuming allowing India sufficient time
to complete the project.
There has been no outcome yet. The World Bank is dragging its feet
and has adopted the role of a conduit of messages between the two
protagonists. The two governments may ultimately agree to finalise
the services of one or more mediators. If and when the neutral expert
agreeable to the two parties is found, the process will begin and in
the meanwhile India will be busy changing realities on the ground.
The provisions contained in paragraphs 3,4, and 5 of Article IX
relating to the 'Dispute' shall not apply to any difference while it is
being dealt with by a neutral expert. In case the neutral expert
determines that in his opinion the difference or a part thereof should
be treated as dispute, then the dispute will be deemed to have arisen,
which will be settled in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of
Article IX.
Mr. T.C.A. Raghavan, Deputy High Commissioner of India, whom
the author met recently, recently stated that the Project is not due for
completion anytime soon and might get completed by Dec 2006.
According to him about 60 per cent work on the Project has been
completed. According to a newspaper report, Senator Khurshid
Ahmad, on the other hand claims, that 85 per cent work on Baglihar
has been completed.
thTrevor D'Souza, in Business and Finance Review, 28 February
2005, claims that 'The percentage of progress at stage I so far is 41
per cent for civil works and 63 per cent for hydro-mechanical works.
Design and engineering 94 per cent, infrastructure works 99 per
cent, river diversion works 88 per cent, dam and intake 17 per cent,
waterways 60 per cent, powerhouse complex 90 per cent and
pothead yard 13 per cent.
The completed structure so far comprises eight bridges, 30 km of
roads, 10 km of tunnels, 300 m vertical shafts and 5 huge caverns
plus camps, storehouses and workshops, offices, laboratory, hospital
and complete facilities for production of aggregates and concrete and
placement.’
When asked why India did not suspend work on the Project as
demanded by Pakistan to provide for further bilateral discussions,
Mr Raghavan referred to the Tulbul Project, which was suspended by
India at the instance of Pakistan, and has remained so since then.
Wullar Barrage Storage Project, which India prefers calling Tulbul
Navigation Project, remains suspended since 1987. According to
India Indian Rs.170 million has already been spent on the project.
India does not want to repeat the mistake. Similarly, India does not
want third party involvement because of sad experience with the
147146
Rann of Kutch and points to India's suspicions of the multilateral
process.
Then there is another twist to the dispute. Kashmir is back again
center stage. According to Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani (South Asia Tribune,
24 January, 2005), taking a position on the Baglihar dispute is full of
risks. Gilani is Chair of International Kashmir Alliance and Advocate
of the Supreme Court. He says that since Pakistan has moved to the
World Bank, 'it is in our prime interest that we become a party
without fail”. According to him the dispute is a blessing in disguise
and has landed Pakistan in the soup by exposing its disregard for the
welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has
created an opening for the defence of Kashmir Interests. He holds
that allocation of water under the Treaty was a breach of the
Instrument of Accession of Kashmir with India 1948, which could
not trade off a natural resource without fully assessing 'the
jurisprudence of principality of water, and whether the water being
allocated actually exists or may be taken without detriment to other
users, the water or the environment.’
By concluding the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with India, Pakistan has,
in practice, accepted the sovereignty of India over water resource and
habitat. According to a Kashmiri website (jammu-stkashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31 January, 2005, J&K
rdAssembly passed a Resolution on 3 March 2003 asking New Dehli
to reconsider Indus Water Treaty so as to safeguard the interests of
the State. According to this report, Pakistan's opposition to the
project amounts to playing with aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
It states that average annual flow of water in the Eastern Rivers
allocated to India is around 33 MAF and in the Western Rivers given
to Pakistan 135 MAF.
Pakistan certainly harbours suspicion of India's intentions because of
the design of the Project. The official spokesman for the government
of Pakistan, Mr Masood Khan referred to 'trust deficit'between the
two countries. He went on to say that water is precious and the two
countries need to manage it with prudence.
Even if India does not breach the spirit of the Treaty, there is
obviously no remedy against future intentions of India. A reference
to the World Bank may have satisfied diplomatic ego of Pakistan but
may take long in yielding any returns. In the process it has hurt the
spirit of the reconciliation process. There appears no escape from
confronting each other as well as the thorny issue. One has to
contend with a stream of such project in the pipeline, which India
has suddenly realised offer it the best potential for progress, in
general, and to Indian-administered Kashmir, in particular. The
basic dispute between the two governments arises more out of
mistrust by Pakistan of India's intention, because at some point in
the future, once it acquires the capacity to store water, India can
easily withhold it during shortage and release it during excess, the
precise opposite of what the lower riparian country would want.
India answers to the Pakistani fears by saying that 'the first
installation which would disappear would be the Salal project, which
is down-stream the Baglihar project, and if they were to flood
Pakistan, they would endanger the Salal Project.
The Indian Foreign Secretary, on Pakistani fears that somehow India
would have the 'capability either to flood Pakistan or to deny water to
Pakistan', says: 'The treaty cannot deal with suspicion of this kind; it
cannot deal with intentions of this kind. We are confident that what
we are doing with this project is entirely within the parameters laid
down by the Indus Water Treaty. We respect the Treaty because this
Treaty held for the last forty five years.'He went on to say that: 'We
cannot find a technical fix for suspicion of the kind.'
This issue is an addition to other irritants in the relations between
the two nuclear neighbours. Its early resolution to the satisfaction of
both parties is highly unlikely. The process of appointing a neutral
expert followed by arbitration will be long and tedious.
India seems to be following its decision to proceed apace, and create
a fait accompli like Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other
Palestinian territories. But then India would have to pay a price; it
will undermine the sanctity of an international treaty, which has held
for 45 years. There is nothing to force India to accept the terms of
the Treaty, both in letter and spirit, except the moral force. As the
future unfolds, the waters will be choppy, and the feeling of trust and
good will having been lost, resolution of issues would be less
susceptible to an easy solution.
In the final analysis the dispute will have to be resolved by the two
149148
South Asian nations in the spirit of give and take.
Shahid Husain is a former secretary for water and power with the
Government of Pakistan.
Refernces lIndus Water Treaty, 1960.lOfficial Documents.lJoint Press Release, dated 24.6.2004.lInterviews with Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters (4-Lytton
Road, Lahore) and Mr.lT.C.A. Raghavan Indian Deputy High Commissioner, Islamabad.l‘India Planning three more dams in Jammu and Kashmir’, Daily Times,
(Feb 21 2005). th
lDaily Times, Jan 17 2005.lThe Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10,2005.lBilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th Feb, 2005.lTrevor D'Souza, ‘Baghlihar Dam: Stalemate In Peace Talks’, Business
and Finance Review, 28, Feb 2005. lDr. Syed Nazir Gilani, South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005.lJammu Kashmir website (jammu-kashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31
Janusray, 2005.lDelhi Times, Feb 8, 2005.
thlDaily Times, January 17 2005.
Chronology of Events
20.5.1992 The first time India supplies information and Pakistan got to
know about the proposal.
12 .8.1992 Pakistan raised objections.7.5.93 - 28.9.99 Exchange of arguments on the design of the Plant and request
for the Commission's meeting on the issue.6 -11.1.1996 Site inspection No work at site.
th29 - 30.3.2000 First discussion at the 84 meeting of Permanent Indus
Commission.th29.5. - 1.6.2000 85 Meeting of Commission. India promises data. India also
states that no river works have been taken so far. However,
construction on infrastructure continues.29.5 - 1.6.2001 Permanent Indus Commission agrees to consider the matter
under Article IX (1) of the Treaty.(Dispute Resolution).10.01.2001 Pakistan's asks through a letter about status of work in
progress. 15.10.2001 Pakistan writes a letter asking for work to stop and to have a
meeting to resolve the issue.15.1.2002 Pakistan writes a letter asking the construction to stop pending
resolution.6.3.2002 India replies that it is under no obligation to stop work under
the Treaty.April 2002 Pakistan conveys 'questions' relating to the project to India.
th28.5 - 1.6.2002 87 Meeting of the Commission. India seeks Pakistan's reaction
on particulars of change, which they posted to Pakistan.24.5.2002 Particulars of change conveyed by India.13.7.2002 Pakistan writes a letter and maintains objections on the revise
design.31.7.2002 Pakistan writes a letter for meeting to resolve the issue under
Article IX (1).29.8.2002 India gives interim reply that awaiting comments internally.6.9.2002. Pakistan writes a letter and urges an immediate meeting.
th16.9.2002 India writes a letter and repeats its reply dated 29 2002.17.9.2002 Pakistan urges for a meeting and proposes to proceed to the
next step provided in the Treaty, if no positive response.27.9.2002 India writes a letter that it will revert to the subject in coming
weeks but refuses to suspend work.28.9.2002 Pakistan writes a letter and asks for a meeting in October.18.10.2002 Pakistan writes again and urges a meeting in October and asks
to suspend construction.7.11.2002 India writes a letter and expresses its inability to meet in
October.18.11.2002 Pakistan writes to India proposing suspension of work and also
to hold meeting.11.12.2002 India writes a letter and suggests meeting in January 2003.13.12.2002 Pakistan accepts the proposal. 4-6.02.2003 Permanent Indus Commission meets in Islamabad. India
disagrees with the questions formulated by Pakistan. Pakistan
records failure.8.05.2003 Pakistan's Commissioner gives notice for the appointment of a
Neutral Expert.28-30.05.2003 Annual Meeting of the Commission is held. Fails to prepare
'statement of points of difference’.20.6.2003 Pakistan's Commissioner requests the two Governments for the
appointment of a Neutral Expert.4.7.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale to India regarding modalities of
appointing a Neutral Expert.7.7.2003 GOI issues Note Verbale. Suggests bilateral discussion.18.08.2003 Government of Pakistan sends Note Verbale. Asks for:
1. Suspension of work2. Site Visit and3. Time bound resolution
Oct, 2003 Pakistan Commissioner is allowed a Tour of Inspection to the
site. Work was in progress as per design.Nov, 2003 Pakistan communicates its observations based on the site visit
to India.6.11.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to suspend work and
proceed towards time-bound resolution.18.12.2003 GOI issues a Note Verbale and again asks for a meeting of the
Commission.
151150
27.12.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale. Accepts proposal to have meeting to
discuss & resolve the issue under Article IX (1).13.01.2004 GOI issues Note Verbale. Proposes meeting under Article VIII
(5) and not IX (1).15.01.2004 Pakistan does not accept Article VIII (5), being not relevant
and proposes a meeting under Article IX(1).15.01.2004 Special Meeting of the Commission is held at
Islamabad/Lahore. India refuses discussion under article IX
(1).26-29.05.2004 Annual Meeting of the Commission takes place. India urges
bilateral resolution. Pakistan maintains its demand for
suspension and time-bound resolution.03.06.2004 Pakistan High Commissioner to India raises the issue with
Indian External Affairs Minister. Secretary level talks are
proposed.21-22.06.2004 Secretaries Water (India and Pakistan) meet and agree on
certain modalities including examination by a Technical
Committee.Aug, 2004 Pakistan dispatches data as agreed in the previous meeting.10-9-2004 GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to start process for
time-bound resolution.13.09.2004 India demands Pakistani objections to be substantiated.10.10.2004 Pakistan issues Note Verbale and protests against the Indian
statement that Pakistan had offered to resolve all technical
objections without reference to Article IX of the Treaty.24.11.04.1 The two Prime Ministers meet. Both decide to make another
attempt to resolve the issue bilaterally.st
25.11.2004 Indian Commissioner writes letter and refers to 1 Secretary
level meeting and promises to supply all possible information
by mid December 2004.27.11.2004 GOP issues Note Verbale and proposes to hold the final
thmeeting between Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India on 6
December 2004.01-02.12.2004 GOI issues Note Verbale and suggests a meeting in end
December, 2004 because talks between Secretaries of Water
Resources would be more effective after Pakistan has examined
relevant data provided by India. 11.12.2004 Prime Minister chairs an informal meeting of all relevant
Ministries and issues instructions for holding one last meeting
with India.15.12.2004 GOI supplies requisite data/information through Indian High
Commission, Islamabad. Data is examined by Pakistan.
Objections on the design are maintained after due
substantiation.3-7.1.2005 The Secretaries meet in Delhi but fail to resolve the differences.15.1.2005 Pakistan requests World Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert.24.1.2005 World Bank asks for some documentary evidence.28.1.2005 Pakistan supplies documentary evidence to the World Bank.
Arsenic Poisoning and Water Supply in Bangladesh
Dr M. Abdul Ghani
he river system that flows through Bangladesh is the third
largest source of fresh-water discharge to the world's oceans.
The annual volume of flows passing below the confluence of Tthe Ganges and the Brahmaputra is about 795,000 cubic meters,
which is equivalent to about 5.5 meters of depth over the country. In
addition to that the country receives on an average about 2 meter
rainfall annually. Therefore, hypothetically the country will be under
about 7.5 meter water if there was no flow to the Bay of Bengal. Still
Bangladesh faces shortages of water every year for crop production
and even for home consumption during summer months especially
during February to May. This contrasting situation is mainly due to
regulation of flows of the major rivers outside Bangladesh and
uneven or skewed distribution of rainfall over the year (Table 1)
Table 1: Average Monthly Rainfall Data of Bangladesh for 1986 to 1998 Period (in mm). Year Jan Feb Mar Apri May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Avera
ge
1986
3
1
14
116
146
363 438
315
497
189
131
5
185
1987
1
5
4
148
113
237 779
450
320
93
31
16
183
1988
2
41
58
122
336
551 474
429
236
164
98
2
209
1989
2
13
7
76
203
344
526
134
289
237
0
3
153
1990
0
50
121
133
245
334
586
206
253
238
60
30
1881991
7
19
33
58
274
461
378
341
460
268
3
52
1961992
8
54
4
21
187
264
398
254
274
150
9
3
1361993
22
57
109
124
367
599
464
434
341
148
18
0
2241994
11
27
106
157
183
407
280
309
164
90
8
0
1451995
6
28
23
47
216
416
366
392
238
268
45
0
1701996
10
23
68
118
211
337
583
357
446
27
12
18
1841997
27
19
121
113
223
299
559
3018
277
29
7
22
3931998
28
39
101
150
251
219
697
657
117
161
86
0
209Normal
8
15
42
111
265
506
537
429
304
186
35
9
204
Source: Bangladesh Meteorological Department, 2000.
153152
recent and long term data show similar pattern).
The country depends on intensive withdrawal of groundwater for
irrigation and household purposes during the summer months.
Quality deterioration of groundwater during the recent years due to
arsenic contamination has reduced safe water availability for
drinking and irrigation purposes all over the country. However,
fortunately the quantity of groundwater pumped and used during the
dry months -- November to May -- is fully recharged during the rainy
season -- June to October -- except in Dhaka, where withdrawal rate
is higher than possible recharge rate. Bangladesh receives plenty of
rainwater during the monsoon, which mostly coincides with the
period of the year when it receives huge volume of water from the
catchments outside the country.
Therefore, an unfavourable water environment, due to drought
during February to May and frequent floods during June to October,
is created. During the dry months ground water level goes down at
many places beyond suction limit (>25 feet or about 10 m), arsenic
content in ground water becomes high and crosses safe limit (> 0.05
ppm) for irrigation and domestic consumption and coastal water
(both surface and ground) becomes saline in many places.
Bangladesh, therefore, needs better management of water resources
for crop production and human consumption.
Groundwater is contaminated by natural arsenic in 60 out of 64
districts in Bangladesh. Out of 640 upazillas (sub-districts), 268 are
affected by arsenic contamination (personal communication with a
senior manager of the Department of Public Health Engineering,
DPHE). However, the extent of contamination varied from area to
area and entire area of a district or sub-district is not affected. High
concentration of arsenic is found in water from thousands of wells
across the country and an estimated 30 million out of 130 million
people are at risk (DPHE 2000). However, the extent of
contamination level varies from area to area. The extent of problem
and its impact on health and production are still unknown, but
millions of people are threatened. Information on arsenic
contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential
contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive. However, in
recent years arsenic contamination has become an additional
problem and is becoming a major concern both from human
consumption and irrigation points of views. It is a complex problem
in Bangladesh which needs to be dealt with scientifically. Careful
investigation is also required to find out impact of using arsenic
contaminated water on crop production, its effects in the food chain
as well as arsenic build-up in the soil.
The coastal area of Bangladesh consists of about 2.8 million hectare
(Mha), which is over 20% of the country. Due to suspected salinity
problem, people in this area are forced to use costly tube-wells of
over 300 meter depth for avoiding pumping saline water.
In view of the above situation, Bangladesh should develop strategies
for addressing salinity and arsenic contamination to ensure supply of
clean water for agriculture and household use. Since 25 per cent of
the country is suspected salinity prone and about another 25 per cent
affected by arsenic contamination, Bangladesh cannot afford to leave
almost 50 per cent of the country unattended. The impact of this
situation on human health, production, social and natural
environments needs to be assessed so that professionals can assist in
developing research programmes for mitigating the problems.
Bangladesh has excess water from June to October, which causes
floods carrying debris, dirt and sediments. Therefore, physical
cleanliness is a visible problem in addition to the chemical
contamination of water, which makes it unsuitable for drinking
unless purified. Salinity and arsenic contamination are problems for
coastal and affected areas respectively for agricultural and human
consumption purposes in the dry seasons.
Improvement StrategyWater availability over the year indicates that the country should not
face problem in supplying adequate water for human consumption
and agricultural production. In addition to deep and shallow tube-
wells mainly used for irrigating about 4 million hectares in recent
years, about 8 million hand tube-wells and about 1500 production
wells (deep tube-wells of different capacities used for urban water
supply) are in operation for drinking water supply all over the
country (Personal communication with concerned DPHE high
management 2005).
155154
Water Availability Water for drinking is not scarce in Bangladesh. The document on
national water management plan confirms that the requirements for
domestic and industrial supplies are only to the extent of 0.7 per cent
and is assured while planning agricultural water demand for the
country (MPO 1991). However, its quality is the limiting factor at
places and during a certain period of the year. With possible low cost
treatment/purification, this can be solved specially during the rainy
season (May to October). Water pollution caused by dumping
industrial and other wastes in the low-lying areas, rivers and other
water bodies will improve the situation. Improved management at
local and national level through government and social interventions
can ensure clean water for all. Bangladesh has assessed availability
of groundwater over the Agro-Ecological Regions of the country
(UNDP & FAO 1988). The country can a develop plan for its
sustainable use and quality improvement using this information
(Table 2).
The Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) confirmed
that there are 11 Zonal Laboratories in Bangladesh for monitoring
drinking water quality. DPHE is also setting up a donor-funded
central laboratory.
Arsenic ContaminationGroundwater is contaminated by naturally occurring arsenic in 60
out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Technical options for using
groundwater in the arsenic contaminated area will need to be
developed. This will require analysis of existing water supply
infrastructure and options for alternative supply and treatment of
Table 2: Agro ecological Regime and Surface and Ground Water Availability Situation in Bangladesh Sl.No. Region Water Availability 1.
Old Himalayan Piedmont Plain
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater
2.
Active Tista Floodplain
No dependable surface water
Ample groundwater
3.
Tista Meander Floodplain
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater
4.
Koratoya-Bangali Floodplain
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater except in some locations.
5.
Lower Atrai Basin
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater
6.
Lower Purnabhaba Floodplain
Limited surface water
Uncertain groundwater
7,
Active Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain
Limited surface water
Uncertain groundwater
8.
Young Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain
Ample surface and groundwater
9.
Old Brahmaputra Floodplain
Available surface water (exploited)
Ample groundwater
10.
Active Ganges Floodplain
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater
11.
High Ganges River Floodplain
Limited surface water
Ample groundwater
12.
Low Ganges River Floodplain
Limited surface and groundwater
Groundwater is not available in some places
13.
Ganges Tidal Floodplain
Limited surface water, satisfactory groundwater but with some dead zone
14.
Gopalganj-Khulna Beels
Adequate surface water but saline within 500 meter.
Adequate groundwater but saline near surface and good below 300 meter.
15.
Atrai Beel
Ample surface and groundwater with some limitation of groundwater in certain areas.
16.
Middle Meghani River Floodplain
Ample surface and groundwater
17.
Lower Meghna Floodplain
Ample surface and groundwater
18.
Young Meghana Estuarine Floodplain
Ample surface water but little salinity in dry season.
Groundwater is good below 300 meter.
19.
Old Meghna Estuarine floodplain
Ample surface and groundwater but saline in some
20.
Eastern Surma-Kushiyara Floodplain
Surface and groundwater are available but not enough for the entire area.
21.
Sylhet Basin
Ample surface water
Limited groundwater
22.
Northern and Eastern Piedmont plains
Surface and groundwater are limited
23.
Chittagong Coastal Plain
Limited surface and groundwater
24.
St. Martins Coral Islam
Surface water is saline
No mention about groundwater
25.
Level Barind Tract
Limited surface water
Good groundwater
26.
High Barind Tract
Limited surface water.
Groundwater is poor but need detail investigation
27.
North Eastern Barind Tract
Limited surface water but groundwater is good
28.
Madhupur Tract
Limited surface water but
Ample groundwater
29.
Northern and Eastern Hills
Limited surface water,
Groundwater is also limited, but need detail surveying.
30. Akhaura Terrace Limited surface water
Groundwater is good but need detail survey whether it is enough for the entire area.
Source: Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development.
Report 2, Agro -Ecological Regions of Bangladesh, UNDP & FAO, Rome, 1988.
157156
water.
Low cost mitigation of arsenic contaminated water is available,
which indicates that through community participation, cost effective
methods of supplying arsenic free water can be made available at less
than Taka 0.1 (0.2 cent) per litre (PROSHIKA 2001). Tube-wells
used for irrigation can also be used for household water supply.
(BMDA 2002).
The relationship between pumping depth and arsenic concentration
of groundwater has been studied for three years, and there is no
correlation between the parameters. At the beginning of the dry
season (December/January) arsenic concentration in the tube-wells
was <0.05 ppm. It gradually increased to >0.05 ppm by the end of
dry season (May/June) but dropped again to <0.05 ppm after the
rainy season. If this trend continues over the years, Bangladesh need
not fear the arsenic havoc claimed by professionals and interest
group (Ghani 2004). However, the study needs three to five more
years for reaching a dependable conclusion.
A major constraint to addressing the arsenic problem in Bangladesh
is insufficient information on the extent, causes and remedial
interventions. Although many research organizations of the country,
government agencies and NGOs are now engaged in data gathering,
information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover
all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or
conclusive. The technical options for using groundwater for drinking
in the arsenic areas will need to be developed. This will require
analysis of the water supply infrastructure, options for alternative
supply and treatment of water. Tables 3 and 4 show that preliminary
level of information through limited studies and more detailed
studies are under way. Similar studies should continue in a more
comprehensive way for a longer period for developing data-based
information and mitigation measures.
In the coastal area, where salinity level of the river water becomes a
limiting factor during later part of February to end of May (Table 5 -
cited as an example as many rivers are flowing through the coastal
area), the author and fellow researchers explored the possibility of
storing water in the canals and low lying area when salinity level is
within acceptable level for enhancing ground water recharge,
multiple uses of the stored water including fish farming. Expansion
of the research idea in wider area in the region received enthusiastic
support from the beneficiaries. They agreed to provide 10-15 per cent
of the research cost through cash and kinds, if a pilot study is
undertaken in their area. About six km of canals can be used for
water conservation in a proposed study site and more than 100 ha
area can be irrigated with the stored water during the dry season.
Table 3: Status of Arsenic in Experimental Soil and Water for Different Locations in Bangladesh.
Place No. of Samples Soil As Range (ppm) Water As Range
(ppb) Gopalganj Sadar 132 0.261 to 7.035 150 to 791 Muksudpur 86 0.303 to 8.628 129 to 532 Monirampur
70
0.690 to 4.960
247 to 765
Pirgacha
90
1.200 to 8.100
134 to 667
Rajhat
90
0.200 to 5.500
112 to 490 Chapai Nawabganj
sadar
78
1.980 to 7.480
59 to 796
Charghat
220
0.200 to 40.080
158 to 689 Adopted from Farid A.T.M., et al., 2 002
9
Laksham
0.145
15- 30
10.791 10
Laksham
0.658
15-30
39.107
11
Laksham
0.729
0-15
18,125 12
Laksham
0.037
15-30
16.971
13
Laksham
0.261
O- 15
28.009 14
Laksham
0.261
15-30
42.608
15
Laksham
0.397
15-30
22.763
16
Laksham
0.341
15-30
12.529
17
Chandina
0.380
0-15
19.270
18
Chandina
0.160
0-15
19.270
19
Sonargaon
0.682
15-30
38.930
20
Sonargaon
0.860
0 to 15
22.866
21
Sonargaon
0.860
0 to 15
14.829
22
Sonargaon
0.860
15 to 30
14.000
23
Sonargaon
0.860
15 to 30
13.671
24
Bancharampur
0.092
0 15
17.147
25
Bancharampur
0.115
0 to 15
11.318
26
Netrokona
0.077
0-to 15
81.248
27 Netrokona 0.064 15 to 300 26.559Adopted from Huq, S. M. I., Rahman, A., and Sultana, N., 2002.
Table 4. : Arsenic in water and corresponding As in Soil of Different locations in Bangladesh.
Serial No. Location Water As (mg/kg) Soil depth, cm Soil As (mg/kg)1 Sharsha 0.041 0-15 13.670 2 Sirajdikhan 0.544 15-30 10.655 3 Alamdanga 0.021 0-15 16.647 4 Alamdanga 0.021 15-30 11.820 5
Alamdanga
0.191
0-15
11.918
6
Alamdanga
0.058
0-15
10.675
7
Meherpur
0.163
0 15
33.912
8 Meherpur 0.016 15- 30 28.220
159158
Fish farming in the canal and domestic water supply with water
purification will be additional benefits. The author believes that out
put of the research findings can be expanded in the remaining part of
2.8 million hectare of coastal area in Bangladesh. Similarly,
rainwater conservation and its planned use can minimise the
problem of clean water availability especially during dry months if
properly planned and implemented. This can also be used even for
the coastal and arsenic affected areas.
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) has created facilities
for irrigation, drainage and flood control for over 5 million hectares
(BWDB 2004). BWDB has also created irrigation and drainage
canals and borrow pits for water conservation. Similarly, adequate
water can be stored in the small rivers through water control
structures from end of the monsoon till up to beginning of the
following monsoon. This will provide additional water bodies for
year-round use and help in continued recharge to the groundwater
and improved water environment. Water conservation during the
monsoon in the upper region through active participation of the
neighbours will further assist Bangladesh in solving water availability
problem during the dry months and will also assist in establishing
friendly relations with its neighbours.
Comprehensive studies should be undertaken at upazila or sub-
districts levels involving stakeholders, government and non-
government organisations (NGOs) working with agriculture, soil and
water based development programs. This will assist in developing
and implementing upazila level crop production and drinking water
supply plans. Experiments on on-farm water management will be
complemented with crop demonstration programs over the country
for comprehensive use of water for agricultural development and
drinking water supply. Water saved in one sector can complement
water supply to other sector. Appropriate management and low-cost
water purification and treatment will ensure good quality drinking
water supply for Bangladesh.
ConclusionSafe water for Bangladesh can be ensured through improved
planning and management. However, this will require water
purification, treatment and selection of pumping depth from region
to region. Government policies should ensure regulation of city, town
and industrial waste disposal so that water bodies are not polluted.
Improved management and conjunctive use of water resources are
major needs for Bangladesh. Rain water conservation and its
planned use during less or no rainfall period can minimise the
problem of clean water availability.
Dr M Abdul Ghani is national coordinator of the International Rice
Research Institute in Bangladesh.
References lWeather Data Report, Bangladesh Meteorological Department, (BMD,
Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000) lPersonal Communication, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC), (BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh)lAnnual Report for 2002- 03 and Project Brief of BWDB Projects,
(Bangladesh Water Development Board, BWDB 2004 and 2005). lPersonal Communication, Barind Multipurpose Development Authority
(BMDA), 2002. lCEGIS, Unpublished Data 2002, Bangladesh. lBGS Technical Report, Department of Public Health Engineering,
DPHE (2000). WC/00/19 Volume 1. (Kakrail, Dhaka, Bangladesh).lFarid et. Al., A study of Arsenic Contaminated Irrigation Water and its
carried Over effect on Vegetable. Proceedings of the International
symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh
University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United Nations
University ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003).lM. A. Ghani, Arsenic Research in Bangladesh Agriculture: An
Overview. Proceedings of the workshop on "Arsenic in the Food Chain:
Assessment of Water-Soil-Crop Systems" held in Dhaka on July 22,
2004. Publication number 147 (Bangladesh Rice Research Institute,
Gazipur).lS. M. I. Huq, A. Rahman and N. Sultana, Extent and Severity of
Arsenic Contamination in Soils of Bangladesh. Proceedings of the
Table 5: Salinity Level in dS/m in Kazibacha River, Batiaghata, Khulna.
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec1990 - - - - 12.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.31991
1.0
3.9
13.8
17.3
19.3
1.3
1.2
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.5 2.4
1992
1.7
6.5 11.3
21.3
20.0
13.9
1.2
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.5 2.4
1993
5.5
11.2 14.5
18.0
15.5
2.0
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.3 0.3
1994
0.8
5.7 10.0
15.2
14.7
12.5
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3 0.4
1995
3.2
8.4
14.9
19.9
21.2
2.9
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4 0.4
1996
1.6
8.9
-
15.8
15.2
14.6
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.6 1.01997
2.7
10.5
11.4
13.4
17.4
11.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4 0.91998
1.9
2.3
11.1
12.5
14.3
6.9
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3 0.41999
1.7
2.6
9.4
16.3
13.7
1.1
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3 0.32000
0.7
1.1
1.8
9.7
1.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.4 0.52001 0.7 5.9 11.7 19.6 9.1 0.6 - 0.14 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.5
Adopted from CEGIS, 2002.
161160
International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment.
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and
United Nations University, ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003) lMaster Plan Organization (MPO), National Water Plan Project Phase II.
Ministry of Water Resources, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, 1991).lPROSHIKA Initiatives on Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Progress
Report, PROSHIKA - A Center for Human Resources Development.,
Dhaka 1216, Bangladesh.lUNDP and FAO, Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for
Agricultural Development, Report - 2, Agro-ecological Regions of
Bangladesh, FAO, Rome, 1988.
Decentralizing South Asia's Rural Water Sector
Dr Satyajit Singh
arl Wittfogel is thesis of Oriental Despotism emphasized that
it was the distribution of water which laid the foundation of
society, state and empire (Wittfogel, 1957). The Wittfogelian Kthesis argued for an all powerful, centralized and despotic state that
should control all water resources. In contrast, Clifford Geertz, based
on a historical and sociological study of a subak, or irrigation society,
in the Indonesian island of Bali points out that peasants and
communities played a central role in the control and regulation of
water (Geertz, 1980). As Geertz puts it, 'Theories of hydraulic
despotism to the contrary notwithstanding, water control in Bali is
an overwhelming local and intensely democratic matter'. It is argued
in this paper that an understanding of this debate on a centralized
versus decentralized state for water management is central to the
understanding of water and its related conflicts in South Asia. This
paper will highlight the centralizing versus decentralizing debate in
the context of the rural drinking water sector in South Asia and draw
lessons for the wider water sector.
In South Asia we have had a few large irrigation projects in the forms
of lakes and canals built by empires. The classic examples are the
Lake Sudarshana constructed by Chandragupta Maurya and the
Grand Anicut by the Cholas and numerous canals off rivers that were
supported by the State. At the same time, groundwater irrigation
through the charsa and the araghat or small bunds on rivers and
streams (also supported by the State at least from the time of the
Mauryan empire documented in the Arthsashtra) met the bulk of
irrigation requirement in South Asia. Indeed, this decentralized
production of water led to the consolidation of petty peasant
production in agriculture as medieval historians like Irfan Habib
have pointed out (Habib, 1963). The existing social relations to water
were to change under the British colonial rule. Under the
management of military civil engineers, water was seen as an empire
builder and Lt. Gen Sir Arthur Cotton visualized a web of canals
linking the rivers in India and China. Water was not only an
instrument for empire building but also a revenue generator. The
early returns from water led Cotton to make the statement, “Water in
India is more valuable than gold of Australia.” Post-colonial South
Asia continued with the colonial quest of taming the waters in a
centralizing manner with disastrous social, ecological and economic
implications (Singh, 1997).
Present-day South Asia has seriously begun the quest of
decentralizing and democratizing governance. Institutional designs
for the production, control and regulation of water at the local
government level are being attempted in earnest. This paper points
to some - issues and concerns related to the decentralized
management of drinking water in rural South Asia that has
implications for decentralizing the water sector as a whole. Similar
attempts at decentralization are also being made for watershed
management. While farmers associations are also being established
for the efficient distribution of canal water, reforms in the irrigation
sector as a whole are not yet on the table in South Asia. Here policy
makers, academics and critics are working for spaces within the
centralized structure rather than calling for an overhaul of the
system.
State and Provision of Service DeliveryDrinking water and sanitation services to rural areas have
traditionally been delivered by state agencies funded through fiscal
transfers from the center. It is a public sector model of delivery
where the incentives are so structured that the public agency is
responsive to central bureaucracy rather than beneficiaries. In South
Asia they are structured to disburse capital funds rather than focus
on sustainability, outputs and outcomes of the investment. This is a
supply driven mechanism where technology is chosen on the basis of
incentives to the professional managers rather than the people. The
existing perverse incentives have led to an over-emphasis on the
technological super-structure rather than the economic and social
sub-structure through which people relate to water. In contrast, civil
society initiatives have focused on issues of appropriate technology;
equitable distribution of developmental benefits and prioritized
targeting of the poor; greater gender equality; and sustainable use of
resources. People's participation is seen as key for better
developmental outcomes.
Recent studies have also pointed out that many of these public
investments are also inefficient. In South Asia unaccounted-for water
ranges from 40 to 60 percent. Cost recovery from water is grossly
inadequate. While the proponents of the public sector justify its
existence in the name of the poor, the public distribution system for
drinking water has not reached full coverage. This actually means
that the poorest are actually not provided public water and are left to
depend on water vendors who could charge according to recent
studies anywhere between 20 to 60 times more than the public utility
price. The poor are already paying the cost of public sector
inefficiency. In the name of public goods, while about 10 percent of
the total plan funds since independence have been spent on
irrigation, hydraulic property rights are linked to property rights in
land. Given the skewed distribution of land in South Asia, it is not
wrong to say that public investment in irrigation has benefited the
affluent in the countryside rather than being used for poverty
reduction. It is time to question the outcome of our public sector
investment in the effort to design pro-poor institutions and
safeguards. Democratic and devolutionary decentralization that puts
the responsibility of distribution and development of public goods
and distribution of subsidy at the local level may be the starting point
for addressing pressing concerns of poverty and what water can do to
help alleviate it.
A worldwide emphasis on reforms is a political reaction to the
failures of centralized models of administration and economic
management, whether Leninist or Keynesian. Today the centralized
state is being dismantled because the economic gurus have found a
competitive market to be more efficient and responsive to the
citizens than a monopolist state where accountability is to the centre.
This theory states that the market creates efficiencies due to the
existence of bargaining in economic transactions and the existence of
institutions that define the procedures under which this bargaining
163162
takes place and the mandates of those involved. Under a
monopolistic state, organizations face informational constraints,
there are huge transaction costs, contracts do not provide for all the
contingencies or specifically define the outputs and outcomes of
public investment. In short, institutional weaknesses, graft and rents,
inappropriate incentive systems and lack of enforcement lead of
chronic failures in centralizing states. Economies that are in
transition form socialism or developing economies to a market
economy, face the added problem of working in an institutional
vacuum created over the control of rents in a situation where the
older elite has not yet been replaced with a new governing
configuration. In fact, the nature of the new governing structure is
'under construction' for the market and the state have to define their
'equilibrium' positions in the new order. A recent economic theory
argues that Paroto-optimal allocation through the price mechanism
can be achieved for private goods only. For public goods such as
health and education, market allocation leads to undersupply.
However, before we celebrate the inefficiencies of the market in the
supply of public goods we need to heed carefully to the institutional
paradigm that call for the demise of the monopolistic state and the
need to establish institutional and organizational bargaining for
greater efficiencies. The institutions regulate the exercise of
authority, establish incentive systems and reduce transactional
constraints. Douglas North calls institutions the rules of the game,
according to which individuals and organizations function. They
constrain and facilitate behavior and together with endowments and
technology, define the set of economic opportunities in a society.
Institutions define norms of behavior, provide transparent
information, define commitment mechanisms, and establish an
effective monitoring and evaluation system (North, 1986).
The state thus redefines itself to focus on policy, leaving the process
of implementation or service delivery to a plethora of institutions
characterized as public, private, civil society or partnerships between
these organizations. The issue is not one of state versus market, or
state versus civil society, rather one of institutional design that
separates the functions of policy, implementation and regulation.
Currently, these roles are all combined in one, making the
government the judge, the jury and the executioner. Yet, the state
cannot be wished away as government regulation in some form is
required due to the public good nature of water. The state needs to
ensure sustainability of the water resource over time and provide
standards for water quality. An important function of the state is the
provision of public goods to the poor to help them with asset
creation. The state needs to devise safety nets and instruments of
managing the shocks to the economy that enhance the vulnerability
of the poor (drought, floods, natural calamities, etc), devise
mechanisms for redistribution and also methods that enable voice
and choice in the determination and distribution of public goods.
There is thus a need to evolve models of state ownership and control
without necessarily being part of the delivery process.
Decentralization is one such option.
Decentralization, driven by political, economic and technical factors
has led to the emergence of multi-tiered governments in one form or
another across the world. Of the 75 developing and transition
economies, with a population of over 5 million, 63 are devolving
political, administrative or fiscal authority at the local governments.
In some countries, administrative de-concentration is the path while
in others it is full political and fiscal decentralization. There is a
potential that the attempts to address the rural drinking water
scarcity may require some form of decentralization of powers -
partial or otherwise - in South Asia. In today's world more often than
not, several tiers of government are often involved in the delivery
and financing of public goods. There is a need to clearly define the
institutions, role of different tiers of governments within a country in
the management, financing and delivery of these public goods.
Decentralizing the Rural Water Supply in South AsiaIn the mid-nineties a $80m community driven project, popularly
known as the Swajal project, was designed in Uttar Pradesh in India.
This was a follow-up on the institutional design of the JAKPAS
project in Nepal designed in the early nineties. Under these projects,
for the first time the communities had a say in every aspect of project
design and implementation, including the choice of technology and
community contracting. The earlier NGO, bilateral and multi-lateral
projects encouraged participation for O&M while hardware was
designed and constructed by the state water boards, e.g. World Bank
and DFID Maharashtra, World Bank Karnataka, Danida Karnataka,
Dutch AP, Gujarat and Kerala projects. The JACPAS project in Nepal
and the Swajal project in UP demonstrated to the world that
165164
community-driven development for rural infrastructure could be cost
effective and sustainable. The per capita cost of these projects ranged
between 40 to 60 percent of the UP Jal Nigam rates. Similarly in
Ollavanna panchayat in Kerala, the cost of local government projects
was about 18 percent of the Kerala Water Authority projects.
Community management characterized the institutional design of
this scheme. The management of the project was situated outside the
government, as the Project Management Unit (PMU) was an
autonomous body registered under the Societies Act. The PMU and
the communities in the form of the village water and sanitation
committees (VWSCs) sought the help of NGOs for both hardware
and software support. The VWSC was a stakeholder group, bypassing
the political institution of the Gram Panchayat. This was a very
efficient, executive led, fast delivery vehicle for the supply of rural
water.
However, there are a few issues associated with this institutional
design marked by a flow of funds to community and user groups by-
passing of state as well as local governments. The first relates to
economies of scale. Drinking water technologies that require
economies of scale beyond the boundaries of user groups or village
committees and which are economically efficient and affordable are
not addressed by the project. As a result, most rural communities are
left with small gravity systems or tube wells rather than piped water
systems that may be recommended for areas with water quality
problems. Excessive decentralization can be as problematic as over-
centralization. It is important to draw up a right balance of the roles
and responsibilities of the different tiers of the government as per the
local needs. Second, in order to effectively deal with issues of equity,
sustainability and reducing the vulnerability of the poor due to
uncertainties, a local fiscal base is required. In other words, there is a
need to develop the local government's fiscal foundations rather than
by-pass an underdeveloped local government. Finally, there is the
issue of scaling up the best practices of decentralized management.
The local government structure provides a constitutional and
institutional base to scale up what are identified as local,
decentralized and community initiatives in resource and water
management. The rational option seems to be an alignment with the
local government system in a way that local government and
community interface is strengthened. This has to be along with the
need to develop local capacity and innovative mechanisms to
contract in state level training institutions, NGOs, professionals and
the private sector for support to implement the water and sanitation
services.
Policy Reforms in Rural Water Supply in IndiaThe 73rd Constitutional Amendment is changing the institutional
landscape in rural India. The Government of India is committed to
rural decentralization. The constitutional amendment has mandated
a minimum level of rural decentralization across all states. The States
have modified their Acts to conform to the 73rd Amendment and
have set up State Finance Commissions to recommend resource
allocation to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). Political
decentralization in most states has taken place and has been highly
successful. However, with regard to devolution at the state level there
is a hesitant beginning in spite of the possible positive outcomes.
With the Constitutional Amendment, local governments have been
given functional responsibilities for water supply and sanitation. In
many ways these are natural functions for rural local governments as
these are critical to their everyday needs. The general disillusionment
with the centralized delivery of these services has resulted in growing
expectations for better services from the local governments.
The national and state governments face the challenge of providing
the poor with efficient services and substantially increased access to
sufficient quantity and quality of water and sanitation services. In
spite of significant public investment to the tune of Rs 37,000 crores
(about $ 9 billion) since independence till the Ninth Five Year Plan,
it is estimated that nearly fifty percent of the country's rural
population does not have access to safe and sustainable water supply
and the sanitation coverage for rural India is estimated to be only
about twenty percent. Lack of sufficient safe drinking water and
sanitation facilities significantly worsens the conditions of the rural
poor.
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) sector in India is
undergoing a gradual but dramatic transformation. A centralized
state-run supply-driven organization staffed by hydraulic engineers
has till recently been considered as the most efficient form of
institution to be entrusted with the responsibility of safe and
sustainable supply of drinking water in rural India. It is increasingly
167166
The nature and scale of the reform process is unprecedented and
therefore requires focused intervention to catalyze the capacity fund
to make the reforms more effective. An increase in the access of the
poor to safe and sustainable water and sanitation services would
assist in better health that will positively impact economic gains from
the livelihood of the poor.
The Government of India (GOI) guidelines on sector reforms mark a
shift in the institutions primarily responsible for the delivery of water
supply and sanitation services. The reforms are clearly aimed at
developing alternatives to the water boards or the public health and
engineering departments. However, the GOI has provided a flexible
institutional design for state governments to adopt in line with state
policies. After one year we see three generic models developing
amongst the 26 states that would be discussed later. At the state
level, the GOI guidelines call for the creation of a State Water and
Sanitation Mission (SWSM) or an equivalent institution to facilitate
the reform process, provide policy guidelines salient to the state,
coordinate with other line departments, ensure uniform policies
across pilot districts and ensure proper monitoring and evaluation. Diagram 1: Institutional Reforms in the Water Sector in South Asia Existing Arrangement:
Supply Driven Reform Design: Demand Driven
Under the reform programme, the GOI instead of funding the state
water boards, directly funds a District Water and Sanitation Mission
(DWSM) or an equivalent institution like the District Panchayat for
project preparation, design and implementation. The DWSM is
State
Communities
Water Boards Local Governments
being recognized that this model of service delivery has failed to live
up to its expected outcomes of quality service delivery, financial and
ecological sustainability.
The Government of India has introduced a national policy that
promotes the financing and management of rural drinking water and
sanitation services at a decentralized level through local governments
and communities. The programme advocates for an increased role of
communities in the planning and management of their own facilities.
It envisages a shift in the role of government from provider to
facilitator and promotes participatory management and increased
cost recovery from users (at least 10 percent capital cost and 100
percent operation and maintenance contribution) as being critical in
order to ensure good quality, sustainable services. Under this
programme, the fiscal transfer from the national government is
directly to a dedicated district unit that in turn acts as a facilitator of
this programme with the involvement of local government and
community groups.
These principles were first articulated in the GOI Eighth Five Year
Plan, and are being implemented under the GOI Accelerated Rural
Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in the Ninth Five Year Plan. 20
per cent of the ARWSP funds have been earmarked to implement
sector reforms on the basis of a demand responsive approach across
63 pilot districts in 26 states. Till August 2001, more than Rs 1,820
crores had been sanctioned to implement sector reforms in the 63
districts. Based on the wide success and acceptance of this
programme, the Government of India now wishes to allocate its
entire ARWSP budget on the basis of these demand-driven principles
from April 2006. State governments are being asked to restructure
the PHEDs and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the
central government to move from a supply driven to a demand
driven paradigm. Failure to do so would result in a denial of the
central funds that form the core of the state government's resources
for drinking water.
As institutional change of this magnitude has to be supplemented
with adequate capacity, a significant proportion of the national funds
are earmarked for capacity building of the local government and
communities. This is a unique scheme, perhaps the only one in the
world, to pilot a reform process in rural water supply and sanitation.
169168
Reforming the Rural Water Supply in Bangladesh:
s per the Gram Sarkar Bill of 2003, the local governments
work as agencies of the central government with little or no
autonomy. Their responsibilities are restricted to conducting Asurveys, maintaining birth and death and marriage statistics,
supervise management of primary schools, create awareness for
better health care, maintain law and order, ensure participation in
government development programmes, etc. The local government
structure has helped the administration reach the grassroots and
built mechanisms for participatory decentralized administration.
However, it is still a long way away from the stage of devolution of
the rural local governments. While the draft Upzila/Thana Parishad
and the Zila Parishad bill discusses autonomy by suggesting the
devolution of 26 subjects currently with the central government to
the local governments, there is as yet no firm support for these bills
by the ruling party in the country. A weak administrative structure
and lack of financial and human resource base would inevitably
result in questionable outputs from the local governments. At best,
the Bangladesh model of local governments can be described as a
deconcentrated model that combines in itself democratic
representation. It represents a centralized administrative system
with the Union Parishad having little resources itself and little say in
the manner in which the centre decides to allocate resources. While
the Union Parishad is directly elected, it is dominated by
administrative officials whose accountability lies elsewhere as well as
by members of the parliament. Given the lack of accountability it has
been characterized as a hub of patronage, clientialism and
corruption. The Government of Bangladesh has recently embarked upon major
reforms through its five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply Project.
responsible for managing central funds, communicate the key
features of the programme to the entire district, form Village Water
171170
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Water Politics in PakistanDr Zaigham Habib
he political formulation of water-related socio-economic
interests and the civil society debate on water issues have
remained limited in Pakistan. The political parties have not Tgone much beyond the regional water demands they had promised to
provide to their constituencies. The development of water storage is
a hot issue, but the existing extreme positions are taken superficially,
without any real vision and understanding of future implications.
The media have recently started playing an active role in the
projection of water related issues. For the common public, facts
about water remain controversial and all domestic water issues are
explained in the context of provincial antagonism. Water-related
policies, economically important and socially relevant, are mostly
undertaken by the public sector in Pakistan. However, techno-
political controversies may become complicated requiring intensive
political process to resolve them.
Background of Water PoliticsLarge-scale development and management of water resources of the
subcontinent were introduced under a centralised policy of the
British colonialists. The objective was to exploit maximum
agricultural potential. The regional and local administrations played
a key role in the identification of feasible water projects. The
management of developed water resources was handed over to the
provincial departments. The state, as the owner (usually termed as
custodian), promised water access to everyone. The constitutions of
all South Asian countries have similar clauses ensuring 'public
access' to water. However, in Pakistan, as in South Asia, the state
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175174
mainly develops water resources for agriculture. The physical
integration of the river systems and scattered population in Pakistan,
and North India, made the development of water resources a matter
of competition among various regions. This competition is mostly
reflected by the conflicting demands of the provincial/state
governments.
thThe last two decades of the 20 Century have highlighted the global
and local water scarcity, conservation threats, crisis of water
management and ownership issues. 'New water policies and
paradigms' are debated (Annexure 1) and sometimes changed to suit
competing interests of various stakeholders. However, changes
introduced in the developing countries, with the help of donors and
multilateral funding agencies, have not produced expected results
(WB 2003). The factors behind a need for change in water
management are:
lsteady decrease in per capita water availability; lfinancial inefficiency of agriculture, especially services; lincreasing need and demand for drinking water and sanitation;lcompetitive water-related business (agriculture, industry); and
interest of donors.
With the whole water infrastructure of Pakistan developed with the
help of foreign and international experts (British engineers before
1947, many international consortium after 1950, different
management approaches have been tried as well. The basin level
water resources management (main theme behind Water and Power
Development Authority [WAPDA]), participatory management
(change of the provincial irrigation departments into irrigation
authorities in all provinces 1997) and the National Water Strategy
(2002) are a few examples.
However, not much is changed for the development and
management objectives and procedures. Sp far no proper political
dialogue on water management issues in Pakistan has taken place.
Inability of the present system to move forward indicates the need to
understand what is wrong with it, what the long-term solutions are
and how constructive political choices can be made.
Existing Procedure Generally, three sets are followed to implement and improve water
resources development and utilisation:
1. Technical solutions are formulated and proposed by different
public sector institutions and donors considering multi-
disciplinary factors and constraints; 2. Solutions are formally approved by the administrations and
legislation at the national and/or at the provincial levels on the
basis of priorities and compromises; and 3. Decisions are administratively implemented.
It can be seen that none of the above mentioned processes is
independent, linear and convergent. Political and economic interests
may influence the selection of technical options as well as
institutional priorities. Institutional interests may lead to limited
vision of management and development options; a dominant
institution can over-shadow the less developed and less influential
institutions. In case of political disagreement, the process can be
complicated, formulation of issues exaggerated and political
representation biased towards the vested interests and vocal groups.
The technical aspects of water resource management are generally
not understood by the politicians nor are they communicated to the
common public. In case of diverse opinions, step 2 becomes difficult
and selection of appropriate solutions a major techno-political task.
The dominant mode of thinking prevails and the probability of
making wrong decisions remains high. There could be intensive
negotiations and a deadlock in case of disagreement and unnecessary
uniformity in case of agreement.
Water Issues The provincially disputed issues - debated by the media and
politicians are:
1. provincial river water sharing from the gross pool and during
water shortage periods, 2. development of a new reservoir, 3. protection of the Indus delta, and4. potential for water saving and increased efficiency Emerging
issues at the national scale but less debated are:i) shortage of water required for agriculture;ii) groundwater depletion in intensively cropped areas and
urban centers;iii) drinking water supply and water quality hazards, andiv) pollution of the water bodies: river, lakes and groundwater.
On the first set, technical and institutional opinions are different, not
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only between Punjab and Sindh, but also across the country. There
are different opinions among the media and public groups. No
technical solution seems possible because all given solutions are
controversial and the justifications diverse. The river water transfer
approach adopted in the Indus Basin, estimation of total water
availability and mode of water use are strongly linked with these
issues. The second set of issues is less debated, but more basic and
critical in nature. These are the real challenges faced by the water
shortage and non-optimum performance of the water systems. In
fact, these shortages are to be addressed with a long term planning,
integrated and priority based choices, to avoid adverse future
impacts.
River Water Transfer and ImplicationsThe water transfer from a bigger to a smaller river had been adopted
as early as 1905, to support agriculture on physically suitable and
populated areas of the Basin. The river commands of the Eastern
tributaries benefited the most from this approach. Sindh objected to
each upstream project as the lower riparian of the Indus river,
especially those which would reduce winter flows in the lower Indus.
Historically, regional conflicts of interests were represented by the
institutions, and addressed by the technical and judicial committees
formed by the central governments. The five committees formed
during 1916, 1925, 1932, 1939, 1945 suggested technical solutions.
Principally, all mainstream and local political institutions supported
the development of irrigation schemes while defending their existing
uses and water access. The tedious negotiations between the
Bahawalpur State and the British Government show the conflict of
regional and central interests. With the development of Sukkur
Barrage scheme in 1932, irrigation rights were provided to the vast
area of Lower Indus, to be developed over a long period of time.
In 1947, the water sharing issue acquired a new intensity, with the
division of the basin between the two countries, cutting the upstream
reaches of the tributary rivers of the Indus. The whole country
became lower riparian. Pakistan, being at the neck of the rivers, had
limited choices, especially from the Eastern Rivers. The Radcliff line
dividing the two nations was drawn so hastily that 'there was not
sufficient time to divide the Indus waters or the assets’. After 13
years of negotiations and international mediation the Indus Water
Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on September 19,
1960. The Treaty is an internationally appreciated and well-quoted
example of successful trans-boundary agreements on river water
sharing. However, it was signed after a high-level political agreement
between the two countries, only 'After long, intensive, and difficult
discussions'. The World Bank and the Consortium of donors had to
persuade the president and prime ministers of Pakistan and India.
Kirmani and Rangeley conclude that 'they differed too sharply in
their views to pursue joint planning.' The Treaty brought major changes in river water availability and
sharing.
lA shift from the Basin to the Dominion level water development
planning. lAnnual average of 29 million acre feet (MAF) water from three
Eastern Rivers was allowed to be fully used by the India. A
number of dams, barrages, and link canals have been built to
distribute water from the eastern Indus tributaries to the Indian
Punjab and neighbouring states. lThe construction of replacement works included inter-river link
canals to transfer water from the Western Rivers and a reservoir
(Mangla on Jhelum) to store water for the Rabi (winter crop)
irrigation. Pakistan started another reservoir to transfer water
from the summer flood flows to winter. On an average 10 MAF
water is transferred (from the Indus and Jhelum rivers) to the
Eastern Rivers systems, which is bound to increase as supplies
from India are becoming nil after 1995. lBetween 1947 and 1978, Pakistan extended canal systems to
divert 70 per cent more canal water and irrigate 29 per cent
more area.
Provincial Water Accord With the development of reservoirs, winter water availability
increased and provinces started to count their volumetric share from
the gross storage. Practically a mix of design authorised discharge
and seasonal volume sharing evolved new regulation of the network.
The Water Allocation Accord (1991) was another success in the
regional water sharing. Each province is provided a volumetric share
and 10-daily reference allocation to share the daily flows. However,
the developments of 1960-78 could not continue satisfying the water
demand of the increasing population and agriculture and differences
on the interpretation of WAA increased.
Further storage of summer water was once more rejected by the
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Sindh. The four year drought made the situation worse, strongly
indicating the need for sustainable water supply to highly arid areas.
The current debate on further water development is extremely
important as the water left in the basin is at a minimum level while
agriculture and drinking water shortage is maximum.
Existing Water Scarcity Agricultural sector use has reached 70 per cent of the river inflow,
more than 95 per cent of the developed water and more than 90 per
cent of the groundwater pumped. During a dry year, the percentage
of river water used goes to 90 per cent (PWP 2000). No government
or political institution can deny that the whole riverine belt (called
Saila area in the upper and Kacho area in the lower basin) has
become heavily well irrigated and cropped. Officially five million acre
riverine cultivation is reported in the country (WAPDA 2000). The
water used by riverine agriculture is around 20 MAF (Habib 2004).
Like other developing countries, Pakistan has the land potential to
expand agriculture, while existing agriculture has become highly
groundwater dependent. Every farmer will prefer to have and use
more canal water; this is partly due to irrigation practices and
groundwater quality.
The existing canal system can divert 20-30 per cent more water.
Because of economic pressures and modernisation, the cropping
intensities are increasing with future demand further increasing. The
basic question is: Do we have sustainable water availability to expand
agriculture? A big technical failure of the public sector institutes is to
realise this basic water shortage and communicate it to the users.
The political handling is even worse; all political institutions (within
the government or outside) advocate or promise extension of
agriculture. Notwithstanding the political value of such slogans, it is
a dangerous path of thinking and planning.
The groundwater table is depleting around the urban centers and
intensively irrigated areas, because of higher extraction than
recharge to the aquifer. It is being evaluated since 15 years (a nation
wide NESPAK study was carried out in 1991). The control of
groundwater pumpage is a difficult problem to be addressed, because
it has become a major source of supply for the domestic and
industrial uses, livelihood agriculture and riverine areas.
Unfortunately, technical and institutional failure of the public sector
to protect the regenerative nature of alluvial water supply system is
the least understood issue. Rather, there is continuous advocacy for
the canal lining (projected by the media and politicians as capable of
saving water equivalent to few surface reservoirs). It is not only 40
maf pumpage (WAPDA vision 2001), its leaching character is
ignored. A very basic contribution of the shallow drinkable
groundwater is the dependence of more than 70 per cent population
on it. The physical works are always the choice of the engineering
institutes. A lack of understanding of the environment friendly
regenerative water and land systems of the basin can cause
permanent damage to the system. It will further accelerate
groundwater depletion and quality deterioration. Drainage and effluent management systems are other areas of
technical and administrative failure. The drainage projects proved
short-lived despite maximum investment across the country, (SCARP
Projects, LBOD). Most of the vertical drainage is replaced by the
irrigation tube-wells; surface drains have no effluent and could not
be maintained. About 80 per cent of the total area is waterlogged in
the saline zone. The mega LBOD drain has a major problem of direct
seawater back-flows and has to share fresh river water below Kotri.
Another technical and institutional failure is to control the water loss
to the saline aquifer. The much advocated lining projects are hardly
implemented in the saline Lower Indus (Sindh). It is unfortunate
that the technical organisations cannot put together the failure of
watercourse lining in the high water use saline areas and push it
forward for political reasons. A common explanation is that the
system has deteriorated so much in Sindh that watercourses cannot
be lined.
In reality, a new water use system has evolved in Sindh, canals and
watercourses are governed by new regime, tail-ends of the channels
have gone lower than the ground level and water is pumped for
irrigation. The vested interests of the large land holdings are
understandable, but the bigger political issue is the high vulnerability
of this system. In case of shortage, some areas quickly lose access to
water, a higher probability for the small land holdings, and a general
drinking water shortage for the millions of people relying on the river
water. The low performance of water conveyance and distribution
systems in Sindh is linked to the low performance of the irrigation
department and vested interests of the big land holding.
181180
There should be no doubt about emerging drinking water problems
in Pakistan. All big cities are facing shortage of potable drinkable
water. The drinkable water supply to big cities -- Karachi, Islamabad
and Quetta -- has forced an increasing percentage to shift to bottled
water. The access of millions of rural users to safe drinking water is
considered critical. It has increased the common public's
vulnerability to scarcity of water.
New Surface StoragePakistan has a shortage of water in all areas, with higher
vulnerability in the saline and more arid areas. The agriculture of the
lower Indus mostly depends on the surface storage, which is
depleting. The question arises as to why there is a big resistance to
the new storage in Sindh. To some extent it is mistrust, but there is a
more sound background to this opposition, which needs to be
understood and addressed. The lower Indus has been the major
recipient of Indus waters before the irrigation development and has
always claimed its riparian right on its water. It is now a shareholder
in the developed water used for irrigation, vulnerable to drinking
water shortage, sea intrusion and having a greater percentage of the
unaccounted water uses. Water experts from Sindh have the dual
task of protecting bigger gross share and securing a sustainable water
supply. The water shortage is more dangerous because the majority
of the population uses canal water for domestic purposes as well.
At the national scale river-regulation cannot be allowed to move
backwards, which is happening with the depletion of existing surface
storage. The gross available river inflow is expected to decrease in the
future with water management schemes on Chenab, Jhelum and
Kabul rivers in the upstream countries. The climate change can have
longer dry spells. These challenges have forced the president of
Pakistan to campaign for water storage development. However, due
to shortcomings of the water management institutes and
apprehensions of the provinces, the techno-political process remains
weak. Some of the factors not properly understood/conveyed are:
lThere is a growing need to manage water demands, as the water
available for development is limited. The claims to develop
many reservoirs are misleading.lThe water needs outside agriculture are critical and are bound to
increase because these uses are informal and highly stressed.
There must be an allocation for all uses to secure them.
lThe reservoir site has a critical link with the gross and minimum
availability of water. This point is understood by the technical
institutions (WAPDA) but not conveyed to the politicians and
common people.lAll provinces of Pakistan have adopted a water use system based
on river regulation. Each province is to protect its systems
depending upon natural inflows or flood pattern (highly
unreliable with decreasing probability at the current level) with
the help of an efficient use of regulated flows. Intensive
negotiations at Indus River System Authority (IRSA) are proof
of that.
Institutional and Political Failure The issue of below Kotri is the most serious example of the failure of
technical and management system of the public sector institutions. It
is a much debated and politically controversial issue, but the national
and provincial water management organisations have not addressed
it. With any new development of water infrastructure, the annual
gross quantity passing below Kotri (limited to couple of weeks) has
been decreasing. There is an inevitable increase in water uses
upstream and a part of flows are shared with the drainage system
(LBOD). It is amazing that the basin famous for the engineering
interventions could not move for a solution here. There is also a lack
of discussion on the solutions suggested by the Sindhi engineers
(Panhwar 2002). Political sensitivity of the issue is the obstacle to
technical debate. However, it will be highly unfortunate to postpone
solutions for the below Kotri management and to continue focusing
on the water demand. Some recommendations made in the past
show that the scope of this debate should be widened. Another
barrage below Kotri could ensure and control the supply
downstream, the sea intrusion through the groundwater table is
caused by the depletion of sweet water layer, which is also linked
with the irrigation and drainage practices. Human efforts and
modern science need to be applied to preserve the Indus delta.
Water Policy and PoliticsThe practiced and legally accepted relation between water and its
users is a key factor in shaping the communal and institutional water
interests. A major policy challenge is to protect the future water
security. This can be achieved only by ensuring livelihood-oriented
water availability for future generations and by conserving and
improving existing water resources of the country. As is obvious, it is
183182
a complicated political and institutional task. Since the country is
trying to do business as well, we cannot avoid political influence of
the donors, vested local interests and decay of water management
institutions (WAPDA) in their desired functions. The political
dialogue is still weak and superficial in the country. Politicians and
major political parties continue promising water without prior
thinking. The water issues of Pakistan and selective political
sensitivity show the need to go down to the community and users
levels and make an inventory of the challenges faced by them, then
up-scale their issues to the national level with a futuristic vision. No
correct political process and vision on water policy issues could be
suddenly evolved but more aware techno-political debate is towards
filling the gaps. Three water policy approaches globally discussed are
given in the annexure-1.
The water management institutes have played a strong role in the
national and provincial water politics as well as authoritative control
on water resources development. Both roles have declined with the
evolution of new historical realities. It is important to realise that
water politics cannot be contained within the old boundaries and the
new water policy should go for strategic changes.
Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues;
her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system.
References lZ. Habib, Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin,
ndENGREF Montpellier France, 22 September 2004.lP. H. Gleick, ‘The Changing Water Paradigm – A look at the Twenty-first
Century Water resources Development’, Water International, Vol. 25,
no.1, (International Water Resources Association, 2000). pp. 127-138lWSIPS -- Water Sector Investment Planning Study, Vol. I - IV,
(Islamabad: Federal Planning Cell, WAPDA, 1990).lDavid Aubin and Frédéric Varone (AURAP - UCL) March 29, 2002
European Water Policy. lWAPDA 2001, Water Resources Hydropower Dev Vision 2025. lMichel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers -- A study on the effects of
Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp.
594.lLisa Widawsky, The Integral Role Of International Actors In Solving
Riparian Disputes: A Case Study On The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.lM. H. Panhwar, Water Requirements of Riverine Areas of Sindh, (Sindh
Education Trust Hyderabad, 2002).lThomas, 48. 90 Kirmani and Rangeley, 4.lAyoob, 57. 91 Gulhati, 97.
lHussein A. Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2000), p. 210.
Annexure 1
1. Privatisation approach of the major donors as formulated by
the ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)
lThe dominant water policy promotes and ' imposes' :lLiberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of water services to meet
the loan conditions established by the World Bank and the IMF, which
require that a country liberalise, deregulate and privatise a sector for
which it is seeking loans.lPrioritisation of private investment. The priority has been once again '
consecrated' by the ' Camdessus' report in ' Financing Water for All' ,
that was presented in Kyoto. Based on the final declaration of the
Monterrey Summit on the financing of development in the world, and
the Camdessus report, it is only the private sector that can assure the '
efficacious' financing of the hundreds of billions of dollars of
supplements (an hugely exaggerated amount), which according to the
World Bank would be required to reduce by half the number of people
with access to drinking water and hygiene from now to 2015
2. Towards demand managementAn international paradigm shift towards demand-based management has
been summarised by Gleick (1999, 2000) ' the dynamic process of managing
freshwater resources is changing again. There are many components to this
change: a shift away from sole, or even primary, reliance on finding new
sources of supply to address perceived new demands; a growing emphasis on
incorporating ecological values into water policy; a reemphasis on meeting
basic human needs for water services and a conscious breaking of the ties
between economic growth and water use' .
3. New Socialistic Approach:
freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)
An alternative global and local
water policy '
As a point of departure, we propose the right to life for everyone by 2020.The objective is to guarantee the right of access to water for all the 8 billion
people who will live in the world by 2020, for all living species, and for all
future generations, while equally guaranteeing the sustainability of
ecosystems.
In this spirit, we affirm the ' sacred' value of water at the symbolic level.
Water is the expression of life, human dignity and nature, and of human
cultures and history.
Basic Principles
185184
a) The access to water in necessary quantity (40 liters per day for domestic
use) and quality for an acceptable quality of life, should be
acknowledged as a constitutional, universal and indivisible human and
social right.In this regard, we salute with satisfaction, the ' General comments' of
the United Nations Human and Social Rights Committee, which
considered access to water as a human right.b) Water should be treated as a common good belonging to all human
beings and living species of the plant. The ecosystems should be
considered as a common good.Water is a good only available in limited quantity at local and global
levels. No level of profit justifies the unlimited consumption of this
good. The current excessive waste of water constitutes a crime against
necessities of life. That is why ownership, governance and political
control of water (specifically the management of water services) should
remain in public hands and within public authority.c) It is the task of public authorities to ensure and promote the use of
water resources with regards to human rights, to take into consideration
future generations and to safeguard and value ecosystems in an
integrated fashion.d) The public sector (from communities to the state, from continental
unions to the global community) must assure the necessary financing
and investment to realise the right of access to drinking water and
sustainable use of water resources.e) The most appropriate instrument for this purpose is the establishment
of a progressive fiscal system with a redistributive nature at all levels,
from local to global, based on multiplicity and modularity of public
provision of financial resources for territorial investment needs. For this
purpose, it is imperative that the role and function of multilateral
financing agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, BERD, BEI, IBD,
ABD etc. be revisited without further delay, and that new national or
international cooperative financing institutions based on public-public
partnerships are defined.f) Citizens have to participate in a representative and direct manner in the
definition and realisation of the water policy, from the local level to the
global level.g) Democracy has to be at the center of ' coexistence' , even at the global
level. It's hard to accept that globalisation can really be ' global' , if it
only occurs at the level of trade, finance, production, consumption,
lifestyles and cultural flux, while democracies are still based on nation-
states or continental-state in nature, such as is the case of the United
States, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Indonesia. The concept of '
global governance' put in fashion by policymakers in the ' north' is a
great mystification.h) Democracy necessitates the promotion of a new democratic,
participatory and solidarity-based public sector, and the establishment
of participatory mechanisms which include citizens and local
communities, workers, local institutions and valuing diversity in all its
different forms, which represents the richness of the democratic
experience in different continents and countries.
India's River Linking Plans Syed Shahid Husain
he Indian government got judicial sanction from its Supreme
Court in October, 2002 to be able to implement its scheme on Tlinking major Indian rivers to 'overcome drought and floods'.
The BJP government followed this up with pronouncements
supportive of the scheme. The proposal was not received without
dismay in the neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh,
which organised a series of conferences to highlight the folly inherent
in the scheme. The most recent of these conferences was a three-day
international conference on Regional Cooperation on Trans-
boundary Rivers in Dhaka (December, 2004) with a call to India to
dispel mistrust and concerns over its river linking project and to
follow a 'no harm policy' towards its neighbours. This is a phrase
used in the Treaty between India and Bangladesh on Farakka.
According to reports, the Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh assured
the Bangladeshis that India would undertake a detailed consultative
process with all concerned. She asserted that the project was still at a
conceptual stage. This does not mean that the proposal has been
shelved; hence, the continued concern for Bangladesh. This
conference was a follow up, close on the heels of the August
conference in 2004. Aware of the threat posed by this gigantic
project and the challenges faced by the region on account of
population growth, food scarcity, the Third South Asia Water Forum
(SAWAF-III) was held in Dhaka in July, 2004.
The Bangladesh People's Initiative against River Linking (BPIRL) in
collaboration with the South Asian Solidarity for Rivers and Peoples
(SARP) organised the South Asian consultation on River Linking
Project (21-22 August 2004), so as to focus on the implications of the
proposal on linking the two large rivers in the subcontinent.
Concerned citizens from India, Pakistan and Nepal joined their
Bangladeshi counterparts to voice their concern at the Indian
proposal of changing the geomorphology of the subcontinent.
Brahmaputra and Jamna Basins account for 65 per cent of surface
water in Bangladesh. In all, 80 per cent of the surface water in
Bangladesh comes through these two rivers (Brahmaputra and
Jamna) originating in Himalayas and passing through Nepal, Bhutan
and India. Bangladesh inter alia decided to endorse the principle of
'more crop for each drop' of water as an alternative to this mega
project, so as to increase water efficiency, to decrease non-structural
options, to evolve cost effective technologies including rain water
harvesting as well as re-cycling of effluent and for action to use water
as a source of peace and prosperity rather than a source of discord.
stThe 21 century is marked with a growing need for global
cooperation, in general, and regional cooperation, in particular.
What could be more important for global understanding than on
water, which is getting scarcer by the day and will get more so in the
future? Days of profligacy are long gone and the mounting pressure
of population has forced the issue of this precious commodity to the
fore not only in this region but also in other parts of the world.
The controversy is not confined to Bangladesh and India. The
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin (GMB) represents a far bigger
region comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and some parts
of Tibet. According to a recent report, India has nearly exhausted
underground water reservoirs by pumping water for irrigation to
achieve a mirage of food self-sufficiency. The proposed project is
thought to be the only solution to overcome the problem.
The project consists of thirty river links, 14 on the
Himalayan Rivers and 16 on the peninsular south. The project
involves storage of flood and monsoon water. The important links
India has
proposed to transfer water from the Brahmaputra through a gigantic
324-km long link canal, which will run from Assam across northern
Bangladesh to just above Farraka. The second part of the proposal
envisages three large dams, which are potential hydropower-cum-
flood control sites.
187186
are four, including Brahmaputra with Ganges, Subamarekaha and
Mahanadi with Brahmaputra so as to irrigate Assam, West Bengal,
Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa.
The proposal for interlinking of rivers is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton
first mooted it in the 19th century primarily for promoting inland
navigation. Dr K. L. Rao later revived the idea in 1972. After that the
focus shifted from navigation to the issue of water scarcity in the
south. In 1977 Captain Dastur, a pilot by profession, proposed
construction of two canals named Garland Canal -- because it
envisaged 4,200 km Himalayan Canal and the twice as long Southern
Garland Canal, which were to be connected through pipelines
passing through Patna and Delhi.
Much before the Supreme Court decision in 2002, National Water
Development Agency (NWDA) was established in 1980, to carry out
two separate studies, viz. Himalayan and Peninsula rivers. NWDA
has to survey and investigate possible storage size and
interconnecting links. There are two action plans. Under action
plan-I, the schedule for implementation is 10 years from the start. It
is stipulated that work will start in 2007 and complete in 2016.
Under action plan-II, two committees have been set up to go into the
financial aspects of the project. Both the committees are to work
concurrently. The NWDA has conducted feasibility studies jointly
with the Ministry of Water Resources on six of the thirty possible
river links in the last few decades. It is reported to have completed
water balance studies of 137 basins/sub-basins and prepared pre-
feasibility studies of 30 links.
A task force has also been set up by the Government of India on
December 13, 2002, with Suresh Prabhu as the Chairperson with the
following terms:
1. To provide guidance on norms of up-raising of individual
projects in respect of economic liability, socio-economic impacts,
environmental impacts and preparation of re-settlement plans;2. Devise suitable mechanisms for brining about a speedy
consensus among the stats;3. Privatise different projects' components for preparation of
detailed project reports and implementation;4. Propose suitable organisational structures for implementing the
projects;5. Consider various funding, modalities; and6. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some
components of the project.
A full-fledged cost benefit analysis will follow the feasibility studies
and detailed project reports. It is, however, claimed that phenomenal
economic and socio cultural benefits will accrue, like:
1. Agricultural production will increase by 100 per cent in the next
five years;2. 35 million hectares will be added to the command area to the
current 90 million hectares; 3. Loss of crops worth Rs.250b will be saved by preventing drought
and floods;4. Savings in foreign exchange of Rs.30b per annum will accrue
because of cost effective alternative navigation and reduced
import of oil;5. The country will further be bound together.6. Employment to one million people will be provided in next 10
years; and7. Additional water line defence will be provided along the western
and north-western borders.
There are sceptics who doubt the viability of the scheme or even the
seriousness on the part of India. They suspect that it was an election
stunt and will not go beyond the laying of foundation stone. With the
new government in place one has not heard of it so loudly. 24 years
after the project emerged on the public scene, it is nowhere near
completion. But there are those who are afraid of India's
seriousness. Once the government conducts studies, like it did on the
Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan, without involving the stakeholders in a
discussion, then a vested interest is created in going ahead with its
execution. Narmada is another example of the same approach.
Consequently, the dam is still incomplete.
The question remains whether there is enough water to sustain the
idea. Except for the Brahmaputra basin in the northeast, there is no
surplus water anywhere. The scheme is predicated on the
assumption that there is surplus water in the rivers that could be
diverted to the deficit rivers. Dr Ainun Nishat, Country
representative of IUCN in Bangladesh, in his brilliant exposition at
189188
the August Conference in 2004, brought out -- with the help of data -
- that dry deltas in Bangladesh bring forth (very poignantly) an
affirmation of the claim by the critics of the proposal that not much
water is left to flow into the sea. Those who are building a super-
structure over a pipe dream either do not understand or have a
sinister agenda hidden from public view.
The receding snow lines of the Himalayas are another development
which cannot be overlooked. The glacier mass showed a negative
trend since the middle of the last century, signalling a sharp
reduction in flow into the rivers in the next 30 years. Himalayan
glaciers could disappear by the year 2035 according to some
researchers. There is no scientific database on climate pattern and
discharge pattern in the Himalayas. Pakistan is facing its gravest
crisis with its existing dams almost empty and its present and future
crops in jeopardy. In-depth studies of glacier hydrology is in order.
The claim that water flows into the sea is no longer true. India has
highly uneven water availability. In Pakistan and India diversions on
the mighty Indus and its tributaries have reduced water outflows into
the sea by 80 per cent; destroying deltaic mangroves that once
stretched over 250,000 hectares and were spawning grounds for
coastal fisheries. In Philippines, rights to environment have been
included as fundamental rights.
Engineering a geo-morphologic feature changes both the object and
the process and thus triggers a chain of developments that persist
long after the intervention is over. The system takes its own time to
settle into a new equilibrium. This on a generational time scale is
much longer than the executive decisions. The natural level of all
water on earth being the sea, the river -- unlike a canal -- augments
its flow along its path. Such a project will invite the Law of
Unintended Consequences. Moreover the project will involve
submergence of forestland, habitations and wild life. How good is the
prevailing use of irrigation water? 70 per cent of river water is wasted
before its delivery into the fields. High intensity use for sugar cane
and rice further compounds the problem. The region faces floods and
droughts at the same time.
Obtaining the consent of the states within the Union of India will
prove an almost insurmountable hurdle. The states have full
authority over water and yet the Centre can intervene by taking steps
to interfere with their plans for use of the water. Ironically the states
where the rivers are located are the most undeveloped parts of the
country. East Punjab followed Kerala in opposing the project. Punjab
and Haryana are still fighting over the Sutlej water. The annual
discharge of the system is 1350 billion cubic meters with a total
drainage area of 1.75 million sq. kms Brahmaputara contributes 700
BCM, Ganges 500 and Meghna 150.
Tamil Nadu supports the project completely, whereas Andhra
Pradesh supports it conditionally. Tamil Nadu has already completed
the Mekkara Dam, which is to be used in the proposed link even
though Kerala is opposed to the project. Kerala Legislative Assembly
has passed a unanimous resolution against the link on August 6,
2003. Gujarat has objections because Daman Ganga-Pinjal River
Linking Project, one of the 30 interstate projects, located in Gujarat
will be adversely affected. There are two out of thirty proposals that
fall in Gujarat.
West Bengal is worried. It is demanding adequate funds from the
centre to combat post Farakka problem causing floods and erosion.
Assam is opposed to the project and is of the view that while
remaining within the constitution, the Centre must evolve a
consensus of the states. A board or an ordinary bill in parliament
cannot supersede the constitutional provisions. One opinion suggests
that Bihar should not oppose linking of Brahmaputra because there
is sufficient water to meet the needs of the south. However, Nepal
will have to be excluded from the plans. Bihar, after spending over
Rs.19b on flood control in the flood prone area, is worse off with
floods affecting almost three times the area (from 2.5m hectares to
6.9m). Bihar also fears that India will reap benefits at its cost.
Bringing the countries of the region, particularly Bangladesh, on
board may be far more difficult for India, especially after the India-
Bangladesh Treaty of December 1996 on the sharing of the Ganges
waters. Farakka Barrage, completed in 1975, has been a significant
source of friction between India and Bangladesh, much before the
latter's creation. The Barrage allows India to divert the Ganges water
into Hoogly River through a feeder canal. A decline of 51 per cent
flow of water is claimed to have been experienced by Bangladesh
191190
after Farakka. Under an ad-hoc arrangement reached in 1983,
pending scientific studies, 39 per cent of the dry season flow was to
be allocated to India, 36 per cent to Bangladesh and the remaining to
continue to be unallocated.
The 1996 Treaty protects the flows at Farakka and any storage
upstream of Farakka will be in breach of that Treaty. Ganges and
Brahmapatra are international waters and their historic use cannot
be overlooked. Para 3 of the Preamble of the Treaty requires the two
countries to make optimum utilisation of the water resources of their
region for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries.
Article IX of the Treaty enshrines the principle -- 'Guided by the
principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party both the
Governments agreed to conclude water sharing Treaties/Agreements
with regard to other common rivers'.
According to Bangladesh, its share in Farakka is fixed at 35,000
cusecs, if availability of water is 75,000 cusecs. In case water exceeds,
India will get 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh the balance. The water
sharing arrangement was to be reviewed by the two governments at
five years interval or earlier, but so far no such review has taken
place. Bangladesh took up the issue of the interlinking project at the
Joint River Commission. According to Mr. Hafiz Uddin Ahmad,
Bangladesh Minister for Water Resources, India was reluctant even
to discuss it, calling it outside the scope of the Joint River
Commission (JRC). Bangladesh persisted and the discussion
continued for 13 hours, but at the end of the day it was not even
minuted. The marathon discussion was dismissed in a single line
signifying, nothing. However, there may be some meeting of minds
with the new government in place in New Delhi.
There are alternatives available to the proposed millennium folly
such as decentralised water harvesting, non-conventional energy
sources and conservation strategies. A former Indian Prime Minister,
while addressing state irrigation ministers in 1986, had this to say:
'Since 1951, 246 big surface irrigation project(s) have been initiated.
Only 66 out of these have been completed. 181 are still under
construction. For 16 years, we have poured out money. The people
have got nothing back, no irrigation, no water, no increase in
production, no help in their daily life'. The river linking project is in
fact a river privatisation project. Projects that have already been
planned or executed are being shown as new projects under the
scheme. India seems to be re-making its geography so that water
flows where it previously never did.
There is need for a regional treaty that forces each country to honour
its ecological obligations towards the great oceans. The combined
population of the region is about 600 million. If India thinks that it
can exploit its upper riparian position and its size, China, which has
reportedly drawn its own plans to divert rivers originating in Tibet --
including Brahmaputra, may follow suit. While India plans to
complete the project by the year 2013, China plans to do so by 2009.
An estimated 90 per cent of the Tibetan rivers flow downstream to
India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Both India and Bangladesh
are at the mercy of China which could for its own interest withhold
water for irrigation and power during dry season and release water
during the flood season. Bangladesh experts brought the issue to the
attention of Indian journalists.
All the rivers flow into the Bay of Bengal. All these countries have
abiding interest in the sustainability of the system in order to ensure
livelihood of people, who depend on agriculture as well as to protect
ecology, environment and wild life for present or future collaboration
necessary to evolve common goal of survival. Ganges is reported to
be the most polluted river. The effort is not going to be easy but each
country has to be prepared to make sacrifices and suffer the
perceived loss involved in an agreement. Equity and understanding
of the other's point of view are crucial to any settlement, tentative or
permanent.
Another option is that a public interest petition is filed by any
concerned citizen of India requesting review of Supreme Court order,
which may possibly review its own order suo moto in the region's
interest. There are other hurdles that India must cross before
establishing feasibility such as:
1. External financing in view of huge external debt may not be
forthcoming. The private sector sees a distinct road for itself in
the proposed mega project after having experienced the
privatisation of Sheonath River in Chattisgarh.
193192
2. As per the Constitution, water is a state subject, but no project
can be undertaken without following the planning process,
which means every proposal must go before the central
government.
3. Whether or not there will be a political will to interlink rivers is
an open question. A proposal was made to constitute a
commission on the lines of the Finance Commission to examine
the project.
There is also the role of international law and treaties. United
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, although not ratified, could provide a
basis to proceed. The Convention was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1997. Watercourse has been
defined as a system of surface waters and ground waters forming a
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus. The
Convention was based on the principles and recommendations
adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. It
expressed the conviction that a framework Convention will ensure
the utilisation, development, conservation, management and
protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the
optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future
generations.
Nothing in the Convention shall affect the rights or obligation of the
Watercourse state arising from agreements in force on the date on
which that State became a party to the Convention.
There are 37 Articles to the Convention. The Articles in the
Convention relate to subjects like watercourse agreements, equitable
and reasonable utilisation participation, factors relevant to equitable
and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to cause significant harm,
general obligation to cooperate and settlement of disputes, etc. The thConvention shall enter into force following ratification of 35
Instrument. So far the Convention has attracted perhaps no more
than 16 signatures and 11 ratifications. 103 nations including
Bangladesh had voted in favour. Surprisingly India and Pakistan
were on the same side and were amongst 27 nations that had
abstained from voting.
Times have changed; the demand for water is growing. Dams and
megaprojects are known to disrupt the existing pattern of water use.
Where people depend on fish, flood plains or deltas for their
livelihood, big dams can wreak great havoc. Watershed eco-systems
suffer and fragmentation of aquatic and terrestrial eco systems cause
growing threat to the ecological integrity is one of the many factors
impacting on the change in climate.
The growing rate of extraction of fresh water has put enormous
pressure on aquifers. Sedimentation causes the dams to lose storage
capacity at an estimated rate of 05-1 per cent per annum. In the next
25 to 50 years, 25 per cent of the existing storage will have been lost
mostly in the developing countries. In three Asian countries -- China,
India and Pakistan -- the water table is sinking at the alarming rate
of 1 to 2 metres a year. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Israel are the
most water stressed countries. Pakistan is close to Germany in being
less stressed.
Today most of the countries are focusing their attention on
management of existing water resources including the dams. The
effort involves rehabilitation, renovation and optimisation. Demand
side management and improvement of efficiency of the existing
supply are receiving greater attention.
There are bound to be difficulties for the countries of the region
along the way. However, inaction is not an option. If the waters in
the basin are sufficient to justify an equitable and just sharing of
waters and the social, economic, political and environmental impact
of such structural intervention on common river systems is
manageable, then the project cannot be dismissed as being
unfeasible. It will require cooler heads in the spirit of give and take
for the stakeholders in all the countries of the region to grapple with
hard choices. The outcome may yet produce a win-win situation for
everybody. The growing population of all the countries of the region,
which they have failed to control, imposes an obligation on their
leaders to do something substantial to avert the looming disaster of
famine and poverty.
Forming a common front against India as being the largest country
195194
in the region will be a self-defeating strategy. After all Pakistan did
the unthinkable of bartering away three of its six rivers for the sake
of peace and amity in the largest part of the subcontinent. The
important thing to note is that the intervention of the World Bank
proved crucial to the culmination of the effort in the signing of the
Treaty.
(Syed Shahid Husain has served as Secretary, Water and Power in
the Government of Pakistan and as Chief Secretary, Balochistan.
Mr. Husain may be contacted at [email protected])
ReferenceslIndus Water Treaty 1960.lProfessor Hap Dunning , 'Water Law', in Water Resource Management,
fourth edition. l'Riparian Rights Case Summaries', Environment Probe. lIslam M. Faisal, 'Managing International Rivers in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM)'.lJayanta Bandyopadhyay and Shama Perveen on Doubts over the
scientific validity of the justifications for the proposed inter linking of
rivers in India. lMostafa Kamal Majumdar, 'River Linking and the Environment'.lDr. Sudhirendar Sharma, 'Interlinking Rivers , Whose Concern is it
Anyway?'. lDr. Asif Nazrul, The RLP and International Law lDr. Uma Shankari, Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and
Confrontations, A Report on the electronic debate (riverlink@
yahoogroups.com)
197196
Nepal's Hydel Power for Export Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki
epal is ideal for the development of hydro-power due to its
vast water resources and steep topography. Furthermore, Nthe only significant source of energy in Nepal, apart from
bio-mass (which is a traditional source comprising firewood, animal
dung and agricultural residue), is hydro-power. The present techno-
economically feasible hydro-power potential (given the state of
infrastructure and price of fossil fuel) in the country is estimated to
be around 43,000 MW.
However, to date, the Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) has a
total installed capacity of about 610 MW, of which about 550 MW is
hydro-power based. Of the hydro-power plants, only 92 MW
(cascaded between Kulekhani I of 60 MW and Kulekhani II of 32
MW) is from seasonal storage and the rest is from run-of-river
schemes (some have daily pondage). Thus, so far, less than 2 per
cent of the techno-economically feasible hydro-power plants have
been developed in the country.
The annual electrical energy available for use within the country in
the fiscal year 2003-2004 was 2381 GWh (92% of which was from
hydro sources) -- an increase of about 5.3 per cent compared to the
previous fiscal year. The state-owned utility, Nepal Electricity
Authority (NEA), has estimated the total number of grid connected
consumers to have reached 1,060,700 by the end of 2004. Of these,
the domestic consumers were expected to be around 1,018,000.
Thus, in 2004 among the country's population with access to the
electricity grid (23 per cent), the average national consumption per
connection was 187 kWh/month. In the domestic consumer
category, the consumption per household was about 56 kWh/month.
Assuming average household family size to be between four to five
members, the electricity consumption per capita would be around 11
KWh/month to 14 KWh/month. These figures indicate that on one
hand only limited population has access to grid electricity in Nepal,
and even among those who are grid connected the consumption is
nominal. It should be noted that electricity consumption in
developed countries such as Canada and Sweden had reached 4500
kWh/annum per capita (i.e., 375 KWh/month per capita) in 1998.
Based on a load forecast study undertaken by NEA, the expected
peak load in the Integrated National Power System (INPS) by the
year 2020 is estimated at 1820 MW with the corresponding annual
energy availability at 8300 GWh. Thus, even if Nepal is able to meet
the projected demand for electricity in 2020 (and reach an installed
capacity of 1820 MW), only about 4.2 per cent of the techno-
economically feasible hydro-power potential of the country will have
been developed. These projections clearly indicate that within the
distant future, Nepal's hydro-power potential will far exceed the
growth in demand for electricity within the country. It is against this
backdrop that this paper discusses the possibilities of how Nepal's
hydro-power potential can be used to meet regional energy demand
creating a win-win situation.
The relevance of the regional context is obvious when one looks at
the map entitled: "Earth at night, lights of the world" produced by
the National Geographic Society in November 2004. Darkness
carpeting South Asia and western part of China adequately reflects
the need of a substantive inter-Himalayan regional energy drive to
take this part of the world from darkness to light.
Hydro-power Development PlanThe only significant hydro-power plant currently under construction
is the 70 MW Middle Marsyngdi Project located in Lamjung District,
Western Region of the country. Due to various delays, this hydro-
power project is now expected to be commissioned in 2007. At
present, the Nepali private sector is mainly involved in developing
small hydro-power projects that are limited to 5 MW installed
capacity. This year (2005), the 2.5 MW Sun Koshi and the 500 KW
Rairang hydro-power plant have been commissioned and the 1.5 MW
199198
Chakhu is also expected to come on line within a month. Although,
the Nepalese private sector hydro-power developers have acquired a
number of licenses and have also entered into power purchase
agreements (PPA) with NEA, at present not one has entered the
construction phase.
After having successfully implemented the 60 MW Khimti and 36
MW Bhote Koshi projects in the early 2000, the multi-national
companies too do not seem to have immediate plans to develop more
hydro-power plants in the country. Thus, in the next four-five years
the installed capacity in the INPS is likely to be limited to 700 MW.
Snowy Mountain Engineering Consultancy (SMEC) had acquired the
license to develop the 750 MW West Seti Hydropower Project in the
mid 1990s. SMEC plans to develop this project for export of
hydroelectricity to India. Under the terms of the licence, Nepal will
be entitled to receive 10 per cent of the generation capacity free of
cost from the project. Thus, with the completion of West Seti
(planned for 2012/13), the INPS will have an equivalent 75 MW of
additional installed capacity. SMEC has successfully concluded the
PPA with India.
The tentative list of hydro-power projects that NEA has identified for
development in the near future are presented in Table 1. These
projects were initially planned to be commissioned by 2015.
However, since only the feasibility studies have been completed for
most of these projects and furthermore, none have reached the
construction stage and the 2015 commissioning target now appears
to be over optimistic basically due to large number of power plants
and limitation of funds.
It should be noted that if all of the hydro-power plants listed in Table
1 were to be developed, the installed capacity within the INPS would
reach around 1850 MW which would be sufficient to meet the
predicted system demand till the year 2020.
ChallengesOne of the main challenges in the hydro-power sector in Nepal is the
excessively high consumer end tariff. The present domestic
(household) tariff in Nepal and that of Delhi, India, are compared in
Table 2.
The current exchange rate between Indian Rupee-IRs. and Nepali
Rupee-NRs. is one IRe. is equal to 1.60 NRs. As can be seen from
Table 2 the electricity tariff (on per kWh basis) in Nepal is around
90-250 per cent higher than that of Delhi, India, although the Indian
electricity tariff is subsidised (i.e., cost of supply in Delhi is 20 per
cent higher than the consumer end tariff). However, even when the
subsidy is accounted for, the Indian domestic tariff is still
significantly lower than that of Nepal.
S.N. Hydropower Project Installed Capacity
(MW)
Average Annual Energy (GWh)
Remarks
1. Kabeli A 30 164 Feasibility study completed2. Chameliya
30
196
Feasibility study completed3. Lower Modi
19
123
Feasibility study completed4. Upper Modi-A
42
285
Feasibility study completed5. Rahughat
27
165
Feasibility study completed6. Upper Marsyngdi A
50
340
Feasibility study completed7. Budhi Ganga
20
106
Feasibility study completed8. Hewa Khola
10
67
Feasibility study completed9. Likhu-4
44
270
Feasibility study completed10. Khimti-2
27
157
Pre-feasibility study completed
11. Upper Seti
122
592
Storage type, Feasibility study completed
12. Madi Ishaneswar 86 355 Storage type, Feasibility study completed
13. Upper Tamakoshi 250 1568 Feasibility study- Phase 1 completed
14. Tamur -Mewa
101
489
Feasibility study completed
15. Dudh Koshi -1
300
1702
Feasibility study completed
Table 1: Hydropower projects identified for development in the near future
Source: Nepal Electricity Authority, Corporate Development Plan FY 2003/04 - 2007/08.
Table 2: Domestic electricity tariff in Nepal and Delhi, India Tariff, NRs./kWh (IRs./kWh)
Monthly Energy
Consumption (kWh) Nepal
Delhi, India
Remarks
0-20
4.00 2.10 (1.31)
21-100
7.30
2.10 (1.31)
101 -200
7.30
2.53 (1.58)
201 250
7.30
5.04 (3.15)
251-400 9.90 5.04 (3.15)Over 400 9.90 6.05 (3.78)
Nepal : Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80, 299, 664 and 1394 based on 5A, 15A, 30 A, and 60 A meters installed.
Delhi, India : Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80 to 160 for 1 kW and 2 kW loads and NRs. 96 per additional kW load thereafter.
201200
The main reason for such high tariff in Nepal is because of high per
unit (kW) cost of hydro-power plants that are developed in the
country (i.e., high cost of supply), especially the larger ones with
public funding. This high cost of supply of electricity is mainly due to
the need for importing construction materials (e.g., steel) and
equipment, the inability of the local contractors to take up significant
construction work volume and the inability to mobilise local finances
and thus the reliance on hard currency loans. Furthermore, large
hydro-power plants in Nepal are implemented under bilateral or
multilateral donor aid with the preconditions (tied aid) that the
generating equipment, accessories and the main contractor be from
the donor countries. On the other hand, India is able to produce
most of the required construction materials and equipment for
hydro-power development within the country along with the
capability to mobilise significant local finances.
Another reason for high tariff is due to ‘cost-plus pricing’ approach
used to fix the tariff in the Nepalese hydro-power sector. In this
approach the generator fixes the price of electricity based on its
average cost of generation plus a certain net profit margin. Although
from the developer's point of view, cost-plus pricing is good as it
guarantees a minimum profit, it does not encourage reduction in
generation cost and thus the tariff. Some would even argue that
under the cost-plus pricing mechanism, power generation with high
costs generates higher profit and vice versa, as profit margin is
estimated as a certain percentage of the total costs.
It is also interesting to note that small hydro-power plants developed
by the Nepalese Independent Power Producers (IPP) are within the
range of US$1500/kW installed capacity, whereas the larger projects
developed by the public sector easily exceed US$2500/kW. Based on
the principles of economy of scale one would expect larger project to
be more cost effective on a per unit basis. The reason for small
hydro-power plants being more cost effective is mainly due to use of
local finances and local contractors in larger proportion along with a
higher ability to manage risks internally.
‘If one further transparently analyzes the strategic implications of the
‘high cost’ of hydropower pricing in Nepal, no developer other than
India would have an interest in harnessing Nepal's water for energy
as it is only India which can reap all other geo-political and economic
benefits (flood and drought mitigations, maintenance of ecological
balance, industrial development, and redistribution of benefits in the
poverty-centered and politically - sensitive heart-land of densely-
populated northern states of India, namely, the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar
and West Bengal) out of the ”high cost” hydropower development.’
(U. Gautam and A. Karki, Editors Note, Hydropower Pricing in
Nepal, Developing a Perspective (2004)
The challenge for Nepal remains to produce and market hydro-power
at a reasonably affordable price if hydro-power generation and
utilisation is to be linked to distributive justice, industrial
development, and as a common means of modernising the lives of
the Nepali people.
The ‘pricing’ indicates the inherent institutional attitude of the
official power sector. Recently India and China agreed to continue to
cooperate in exchanging flood-season hydrological data of the trans-
border rivers. Furthermore, in response to concerns expressed by the
Indian side, China agreed to take measures for controlled release of
accumulated water of the landslide dam on the river Parechu, as
soon as conditions permit. Both the sides noted with satisfaction that
an agreement concerning the provision of hydrological data on
Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo was concluded and that the two sides had
also agreed to continue bilateral discussions to finalise at an early
date similar arrangements for the Parlung Zangbo and Lohit/Zayu
Qu Rivers. While encouraging developments have taken place, that
too of an inter-Himalayan regional significance, in the water
resources management, the same was not true when it came to
water-energy security and conservation. The joint India-China
statement as published by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
stated: ‘The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of energy
security and conservation, including, among others, encouraging
relevant departments and units of the two countries to engage in the
survey and exploration of petroleum and natural gas resources in
third countries.’
But the two sides do not specifically offer cooperation in water
energy, a proven resource that is not only renewable, clean, and
environmentally friendly but is integral to water, a natural
endowment in the inter-Himalayan region.
203202
China and India, with higher rates of pollution due to the excessive
use of fossil fuels, require a regime of more environment-friendly
energy under the Kyoto Protocol. As the sustainability of increasing
China-India trade depends on progressive use of environment-
friendly energy in the coming time, Nepal can offer comparative
advantage to both neighbors through regional cooperation and
management of its water resources.
The Way ForwardThe first two priorities for hydro-power in Nepal are: to ensure that
the consumer end tariff is affordable, and to continue to increase
supply of electricity to the general population. These require the
country to come out of the ‘cost plus pricing”’mindset and to develop
a mechanism which rewards efficiency. One option would be to
initiate competitive bidding for electric power (kW) and energy
(kWh) where the authorised agency would request developers to
quote the price they are willing to sell the electricity generated from
their proposed hydro-power plants. The authorised agency will then
have the option of buying electricity on a least cost basis to meet the
growth in demand.
A second option that can be considered to ensure competition in the
electricity sector in the country is to create an environment where
multiple generators and distributors of electricity can operate in a
free market instead of having a monopolistic and dominant player.
Although the private sector has been investing in the generation
sector (24 per cent of the INPS installed capacity is contributed by
the private sector), the distribution sector is still entirely owned by
NEA. Thus, all IPPs need to sign PPA with NEA in order to sell
electricity into the national grid. With multiple generators and
distributors, the prices could be brought down, as the monopolistic
barrier would be broken. With such an arrangement and free
market, Nepal could move closer to establishing a spot market in
electricity similar to the one set up by India recently. His Majesty's
Government of Nepal is currently preparing to divide NEA into
generation, transmission and distribution entities. As a result of this
and providing a greater room to the private sector, one can expect a
competitive electricity market with the end result being affordable
end tariff for the consumer.
Given the high price of electricity from generation cost to consumer
end tariff, the electricity market has been operating on a suppressed
demand. The projections that have been made by NEA of a system
demand of 1820 MW in the country by the year 2020 also reflect
such suppressed demand and not the actual or potential demand. If
the price of electricity is based on its ‘real market value’ and
extensive transmission and distribution networks are established
allowing the general population and industries access to virtually
unlimited electrical energy, the aggregate demand would be much
higher. However, even with such growth that caters to the
development driven demand, it is unlikely for the country to have the
capacity to fully utilise the 43,000 MW of techno-economic potential
hydroelectricity even in the distant future. Priority needs to be given
to domestic consumption of electricity, as this would ensure that the
secondary benefits (industrial output, employment, etc. resulting
form forward and backward linkages in the economy) remain within
the country, due to the sheer hydro-power potential. An enormous
possibility still exists for Nepal to develop this resource base as an
exportable commodity. Apart from being a constant source of
revenue for the country, this can also contribute towards regional
energy security.
There is a growing deficit in the supply of electrical energy in India
and more specifically in its northern states. Against the target of
adding 6,000 MW annually, India has been able to meet it only
halfway and consequently, the demand-supply gap has been
increasing annually. With the growing Indian economy, this deficit is
likely to increase. Nepal can contribute in bridging this gap in the
Indian electricity supply by developing its hydro-power potential
further. With the planned implementation of the 750 MW West Seti,
to a certain extent, export of electricity from Nepal to India is about
to start.
China's annual energy need has been increasing rapidly to meet its
development pace. According to China Daily of 28 January, 2005,
‘…car ownership and fuel consumption are growing inexorably and
today China is the second largest importer of oil in the world’. It is
interesting to note that prior to 1993, China was an exporter of oil.
To curb the use of fossil fuel, China has also launched grain-fed
vehicles programs, i.e., vehicles are driven by gasohol, which
comprises 10 per cent ethanol. Corn, wheat and sugar cane serve as
raw materials for ethanol and it is claimed that with gasohol, vehicle
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carbon monoxide emissions can be reduced by as much as 40 per
cent.
It should be noted that only domestic production and huge imports
of oil and innovations such as the use of gasohol would not be
sufficient to meet China's growing demand for energy. Thus, along
with developing huge hydro-power project such as the 18,200 MW
Three Gorges which when fully commissioned will produce 84,000
GWh/annum (enough to provide 11% of China's soaring electricity
demand), China plans to build nuclear reactors at a rate of nearly two
a year between now and 2020 (International Herald Tribune, 17
January 2005).
Due to high volume of fossil fuel consumed, projections are that
China will be among the leading countries in terms of carbon
emissions. Similarly, India's electricity generation is also
significantly thermal power plant based and coal, which is the
primary fossil fuel used by Indian thermal plants, produces more
carbon than most other fossil fuels. The scientific community is of
the opinion that high carbon emissions (greenhouse gas emissions)
leads to global warming resulting in climate change. In fact, this is
the basis for the Kyoto Protocol, which has been ratified this year
with Russia signing the ‘Protocol’.
The Kyoto Protocol is the outcome of the meeting of more than 160
nations in Kyoto in 1997 when an agreement was reached among the
developed nations to limit their greenhouse gas emissions, relative to
the levels emitted in 1990. Now that the Protocol has entered into
force, the emissions target by the developed countries would have to
be achieved on average over the commitment period (2008 to 2012).
The Kyoto Protocol has established the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which enables Annex I countries (developed
countries and economies in transition) of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meet their
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets at lower cost through
projects in developing countries. Thus, carbon has now become a
tradable commodity with an associated value. One tonne of carbon
dioxide (CO2) reduced through a CDM project, when certified by a
designated operational entity is known as a Certified Emission
Reduction (CER) and can be traded like any other commodity.
Apart from standard climate change implications due to carbon
emissions such as changes in rainfall pattern and frequent
occurrences of extreme hydrological events (droughts and floods)
affecting agricultural sector and livelihood, other common areas of
concern between Nepal, China and India are:
lMelting of the Himalayan snow in Nepal and China resulting in
Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF).lReduction in river discharges in Nepal and India affecting mostly
hydropower generation in Nepal and supply of irrigation water
in India. Studies now indicate that over the past 10 years, the
average discharge in the Mahakali River has been gradually
decreasing.
In the context of climate change, Kyoto Protocol and CDM, there
exists a viable cooperation possibility in water-energy sector among
the three nations, namely Nepal, China and India. By supplying
electricity to its northern and southern neighbors, Nepal can produce
other multi dimensional effects. That are as follows:
lThe trade in energy will help China and India reduce their oil
imports.lThe sharing of CDM benefits the countries along with a
reduction in pollution level, due to the reduction in carbon
emissions in China and India after a decrease in their reliance on
thermal as a result of hydro-electricity supplied by Nepal.lThe market opportunity for both China and India to supply
construction materials and equipment to Nepal for the
development of hydro-power plants. For example, construction
materials such as steel are imported from India and some small
hydro-power plants have recently installed Chinese generating
equipment.
However, for such a win-win situation, it is essential for the three
countries to have the political will at the highest level. First, Nepal
needs to take measures to ensure that it is able to supply electricity at
a competitive market price and treat water-energy from a business
perspective. This may also require allowing multinational
investment, including from China and India, in Nepal's hydro-power
sector. China and India need to diversify sources of energy to ensure
energy security. Furthermore, India needs to duly recognize the
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benefits (mainly irrigation benefits) that will accrue from regulated
flows of water from Nepal if it agrees on a mutually beneficial
sharing mechanism.
Another pre-requisite for such a win-win situation is to encourage
people to people interaction leading to private sector investment
across the borders. Since both China and India have been supplying
construction materials and equipment to hydro-power projects in
Nepal, such an interaction is already happening. Thus, this will not
be an entirely new field for cooperation; only a multilateral
cooperative framework with a vision legitimately based on a mutually
agreed international protocol.
Such cross country energy trade did not take place earlier due to the
constrained political environment because of putting both energy
security and national security under the same framework, and in
some ways, mutually exclusive. With the Kyoto Protocol coming into
force, such constrained perspective will become irrelevant.. Issues
considered political will be driven primarily by market and
environmental/ecological factors.
In the words of Stanley A. Weiss, Chairman of the Washington-based
Business Executives for National Security, ‘India must be more
sensitive to the legitimate water worries of its smaller neighbors.
What's good for New Delhi must also be good for the region,
economically and ecologically. For example, as part of their new
‘strategic partnership’ and plans for joint energy ventures, China and
India should stop treating Nepal and Bhutan as buffer zones and
instead see them as future hydro-based economic zone’.
Equitable Water Energy Order Water energy offers an equitable alternative to the countries of the
inter-Himalayan region as water has an integrated upstream and
downstream spread and connectivity. The spread and connectivity
have received critical significance in the face of on-going climate
change. It is therefore a high imperative to go for an inter-Himalayan
regional commission that works for establishment and promotion of
equitable water energy order on an inter-regional basis. Conflict
cannot be an option in such a cooperative framework. To quote
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘India finds no inconsistency between its
improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a
strategic partnership with China, and China, in its own interest, is
seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons’. In
such a scenario, regional cooperation should become possible and
essential. What the countries of the inter-Himalayan region
including China, India, Nepal and others, need is an enforceable
cooperative framework for an equitable water energy order,
regardless of the internal situation of any country.
Dr Upendra Gautam is an institutional development specialist from
Nepal.Ajoy Karki is editor of the quarterly publication, Biogas, based in
Nepal.
Referencesl 'FY 2002-03 -- A Year in Review', Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA),
August 2004.lUpendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki, Hydropower Pricing in Nepal,
Developing a Perspective, Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha (JVS), Anmanager,
Kathmandu, Nepal, 2004 lA. Karki and B. Shrestha, ‘Micro-hydropower in Nepal: Access to
Electricity for Isolated Rural Population in the Hills and Mountains’,
International Energy Journal, Special Issue, vol. 3, No.2, December
2002.lWebsite: www.worldenergy.org
lWebsite: http://cdm.unfccc.int/
lWebsite: www.ipcc.ch
lWebsite: www.prototypecarbonfund.org
lStanley A. Weiss, ‘The Untapped Might of Himalayas,’ The Kathmandu
Post, May 12, 2005.lThe Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's Republic
of China published after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit to
India, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2005, New Delhi. lUpendra Gautam, ‘China-India accords and Nepal,’ The Kathmandu
Post, April 23, 2005.lIAHR Newsletter, vol. 22, 2005 (Supplement to JHR - Vol. 43 - No. 1)lThomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat, A Brief History of the Twenty-
first Century, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).lHenry A. Kissinger, ‘Conflict is not an option,’ International Herald
Tribune, June 9, 2005.
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SAPANA Conference Declaration
eading experts, academics, and scholars from the member
countries of SAARC, representing different disciplines and
sectors, having met at the South Asian Journal conference L“Envisioning South Asia”, facilitated by SAFMA, on 29-30 April
2006 in Islamabad, Pakistan, have deliberated upon and initiated a
process of evolving a holistic and integrated South Asian vision by
and for South Asians and a strategic understanding on meeting the
challenges of the 21st century and globalisation and ushering in a
new era of fraternal, equitable, and collective partnership:
1. South Asia is at a historic moment of unprecedented potential
for transforming its economic and social conditions and,
together with China, emerging as two large economies in the
next two decades, playing a key role not only in the global
economy, but also in the development of human civilisation in
the 21st century. Yet the world cannot be sustained by economic
growth alone. Human life is threatened with environmental
crises, conflicts, endemic poverty, natural calamities and an
arms race. 2. Our societies have a rich cultural tradition of unity in diversity,
creative growth through human solidarity and harmony with
nature. In bringing these aspects of their culture in facing
contemporary challenges, the people of this region could bring
new consciousness and institutions to the global market
mechanism that can take the world on to a new trajectory of
cooperative, sustainable development and human security.
Global cooperation in environmental protection, poverty
reduction and defusing the flash points of social conflict and an
end to violence, terrorism and repression will become the
essential underpinning of sustainable development and human
security in this century. Thus it is not the military muscle of a
state/region that will be the emblem of status, but its
contribution to meeting the challenge of peace, overcoming
global poverty, protecting the planet from environmental
disaster and contributing to humanizing the world and
advancement of its people.3. The global environment provides a historically unprecedented
scale of capital flows, trade opportunities, information and
technologies, which, if utilized, can dramatically transform the
material and social conditions of life of the peoples of South
Asia. A vision is efficacious to the extent that it can be
concretized. This requires bringing to bear the new
consciousness of South Asian cooperative and equitable
partnership to undertake specific policy actions. Apart from
implementing the decision at the Islamabad SAARC Summit to
establish a South Asian Free Trade Area, SAARC Social Charter,
ISACPA Report on Poverty Alleviation, three broad areas for
deepening economic cooperation can be identified for the
purposes of specific policy action: (1) energy cooperation and
water management and conservation within South Asia; (2)
Increased investment for accelerating economic growth,
especially in physical and social infrastructures; (3)
Restructuring growth for faster poverty eradication and human
resource development. 4. With the most contiguous region of the world, a common history
to share and similarities of cultures, South Asia has less baggage
to shed than Europe or the Far East. It is now booming with the
ideas of regional cooperation that take a wholist approach
towards the collective good of the region as they increasingly
find state-centric and security-centred approaches inconsistent
with the interests of our 1.4 billion people and the imperatives of
our times. 5. India and Pakistan are at a crucial moment in history when
economic cooperation between the two is necessary for
sustaining their respective economic growth rates. a) India will
require rapidly rising imports of oil and gas from the Middle
East and Central Asia to fuel its economic growth. Pakistan is
the natural conduit through which these oil and gas supplies can
be transported into India and the rest of South Asia. b) India's
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growth in the past has been based essentially on the home
market. In the future, sustaining growth will requite export
markets in Pakistan and other South Asian countries. c)
Similarly, the sustainability of Pakistan's GDP growth requires a
large increase in investment, particularly in infrastructure, and
the Indian private sector, along with direct foreign investment,
can fill this gap for Pakistan. d) The oil and gas pipeline from
Iran through Pakistan to India alone can generate over $700
million a year and with similar lines from Central Asia,
Afghanistan through Pakistan another $500 million. This could
add 1.5 percentage points to Pakistan's GDP growth. e) The gains
from trade between India and Pakistan will be greater for
Pakistan than India, and can accelerate GDP growth in both
countries. Thus opening up trade and investment is vital for
growth sustainability in South Asia.6. Energy and Water are two vital resource inputs into economic
growth. South Asia requires integrated gas and electricity grids
for the welfare of each South Asian country. Similarly, South
Asian regional agreements among upper and lower riparian
states on the model of the Indus Basin Treaty need to be made
between Nepal, India, Bangladesh. Similar protocols need to be
developed for upper and lower riparian districts/ provinces
within each country. These are necessary to avid inter and
intrastate tensions in the future.7. Governments in South Asia need to realize that in the next two
decades, South Asia will become the second largest economy in
the world after China. This means that the centre of gravity will
shift for the first time in 300 years, to this part of the world from
the West. This presents a new challenge to South Asian citizens
to develop new paradigms of economic policy, governance and
international relations. a) At the level of economic policy we
need to restructure our GDP growth so as to achieve growth with
equity which requires making the poor not into victims but the
subjects of the growth process, from being marginal to becoming
the mainstream of economic growth. b) At the level of
governance we need to give up the 18th century notion that
economic gains must be translated into increased military
power. In an inter-dependent world the emblem of the status of
a country will be based not on its ability to destruct but its ability
to save the planet from ecological disaster and to build a more
humane world. c) At the level of international relations we need
to replace the competitive and hegemonic model of interstate
relations with a cooperative model. We can start with South
Asian cooperation to demonstrate to the world that the
maximization of national welfare lies not in conflict but
cooperation, not through aggression but through human
solidarity.8. The remarkable concurrence of views expressed by the experts at
South Asian Journal's conference reflect the immense urge of
our peoples to outgrow the past and take a leap into a future that
is free from want and conflict. Certain stages of history can be
skipped, so can various evolutionary stages through which, for
example, the European Union had to pass in the 20th century.
The intrastate conflicts and interstate disputes must move from
management to resolution in a result-oriented process that must
at the same time allow, rather than hinder, regional cooperation
to address the demands of our peoples. The lines of conflicts
must change into the bridges of friendship and the fenced-
borders must gradually soften before the urge of South Asians to
become a fraternal and indivisible community of people with
nation states, while keeping their sovereign equality, joining
hands in submitting before the will of their real sovereigns - the
people. 9. With a step-by-step approach, and simultaneously, all sided
measures can be taken through an integrated and well calibrated
sequencing and realistic stages, towards South Asian Free Trade
Area, South Asian Union, (tourism/environment/water/energy/
communication /information/economic), South Asian Tariffs
and Customs Union, South Asian Monetary Union, South Asian
Bank and Development Fund, South Asian Cooperative Security
and South Asian Parliament. However, to take a leap forward,
there will have to be no hegemony, or ganging up by the small
against the big. A new paradigm of equitable, if not equal,
partnership must evolve to reshape our all-sided relations. 10. Welcoming the current peace process between India and
Pakistan with its two-fold objectives: the exploration of all
options for a final settlement of the J&K question in an
atmosphere free of violence, terrorism and normalization of
bilateral relations while implementing their joint statements of
January 6, 2004, September 24, 2004 and April 18, 2005 in
their letter and spirit. Appreciating the efforts by India and
Pakistan to undertake nuclear and conventional military
213212
confidence-building measures, we urge them to put in place a
comprehensive regime of CBMs that will ensure a nuclear-
tension free subcontinent. We endorse the demands of India and
Pakistan for negotiations with the other nuclear weapons powers
to promote global non-proliferation and effective nuclear
disarmament. Appeal to all countries in the region to put in
place comprehensive sustainable dialogue mechanisms for
resolving all bilateral disputes. While India and Pakistan today
have a composite dialogue in place which needs to be given
further impetus and momentum, similar exercises are needed,
for example between India and Bangladesh.11. Concerned about various intrastate conflicts, such as in Sri
Lanka, Nepal and elsewhere, we call upon the concerned parties
to hold fire, take necessary confidence building measures and
allow peace process to address their relevant genuine concerns
and propose alternative solutions on which the parties could
mutually agree to resolve their disputes. 12. Welcoming the victory of democratic struggle in Nepal, a
broader consensus on convening a Constituent Assembly,
without any conditions, the urge of all segments of civil society
to find an amicable peaceful solution to the causes that gave
birth to the Maoist upsurge and to set a democratic path of free
and fair elections, we hope that the people of Nepal will realize
the dream of a republic and set a laudable example for those
other peoples who are still struggling to achieve their democratic
aspirations against the remnants of authoritarianism and
extremism. 13. Facing the challenges of globalization and taking a collective
stand in the ongoing trade negotiations on WTO, South Asia
should set its own house in order to pursue its collective goal of
creating an even playing filed both within the region and in the
world.
In view of the above, the individual working groups set up under
SAPANA put forward recommendations in the following areas:
South Asian Free Trade Area The agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) requires
effective implementation, expanding the space for trade and, more
importantly, economic collaboration, investment and development.
If South Asia's economies are to be integrated, it presupposes
development of transnational communication networks and physical
infrastructure and monetary cooperation involving greater
coordination among the governments and the central banks. Despite
limited complementarities in trade-able items, due to similar
comparative advantages, expansion of trade warrants vertical and
horizontal integration of industries and investment in joint ventures
by public and private sectors. However, trade and investment will
not move ahead unless tariffs are lowered, the negative list kept to
the minimum, para- and non-tariff barriers removed and standards
harmonized.
Streamlining borders transactions through trade facilitation at sub-
regional junctions, special attention needs to be focused on
promoting border trade. Increase in efficiency within the sub-region
often spills over into trade outside the region as well, because
improving customs or improving efficiency of ports helps both
intraregional trade and international trade.
The Group on Tariff and Macroeconomic Harmonisation
recommends:14. The average rate of tariffs has gone down in all the South Asian
countries, but some of them impose para-tariffs, including
regulatory duties, anti-dumping duties, and specific duties and
non-tariff barriers. Transparency in the tariffs structure needs to
be ensured. While the average duties are not all that high there is
a need to remove tariff peaks. Further reduction in duties should
ensure that the industries where the country has dynamic
comparative advantage are not closed down. The group also
recommends trade facilitation because various procedural
requirements discourages growth of trade;15. Containing fiscal deficit policy should be pursued by making
judicious choices between growth and stability;16. The prudential regulations for the banks should be effectively
implemented and it needs to be ensured that the efficiency gains
result in higher deposit rates and/or lower rates on the
advances. The pursuit of prudential regulations should not be
applied on the small and micro enterprises who cannot meet the
collateral requirements; 17. South Asian countries may continue to have floating exchange
rates and the central banks may only intervene to keep the
currency near the equilibrium value;
215214
18. The South Asian countries may further deregulate the economy
and may continue privatization policies as long as the private
sector monopolies are properly regulated; 19. Whereas South Asian countries are struggling to promote trade
within the region, the ultimate objective should be the economic
union and common currency. Whereas political agreement
would be necessary to make SAFTA effective, formulate the
custom union and economic union, various steps will have to be
taken before economic union is formed. The countries will have
to coordinate the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies;20. The coordination of policies would imply that the countries are
willing to increase interdependencies and the commitment of
the union to help the country suffering from any problem and a
South Asian Fund may be created for this purpose. Various
studies need to be conducted to examine the problems by way of
policy coordination and the lack of economic policy options
when the economic union is formed; and21. The group also feels that the South Asian countries have
achieved growth rates exceeding 8 per cent in recent years and
they expect the growth rate to continue. However, the
investment rates and other prerequisite to the high growth rates
are missing and they must try to overcome the stumbling blocs
to growth.
InvestmentsIntra-regional investment plays an important role in transferring
surplus capital from capital endowed countries of a region to capital
deficit ones and along with it technical, managerial and marketing
skills. It also plays a vital role in industrial restructuring within the
region and helps in moderating trade imbalances among the member
countries.
In view of the crucial role of investments, it is desirable that member
countries of SAARC evolve a common investment policy so that
instead of competing with each other in terms of offering fiscal
incentives, they facilitate freer flow of capital among them that
extend beyond their respective countries. The elements of such an
investment policy include capital flows to mitigate the trade deficit
and capital scarcity, avoidance of double taxation, protection of
investment and conditions governing the management of foreign
exchange, differentiating between the requirement s of least and
non-least developing countries.
The 13th SAARC Summit held in December 2005 adopted three
treaties for promoting investment facilitation. These are related to
customs cooperation, limited double tax agreement and setting up of
an Arbitration Council. The scope of these agreements needs to be
extended so that the goal of a SAARC investment area is realized.
South Asian Customs, Tariffs, and Monetary UnionIntra-regional trade and Investment will, subsequently and
gradually, translate into a South Asian Customs and Tariffs Union
which may lead to a common exchange rate policy that will,
eventually, necessitate the creation of a South Asian Monetary Union
underwritten by macro-economic management and harmonization of
trade, fiscal and monetary policies at the regional level.
No less important is the cooperation in the transport and
communication sectors envisaging an integrated transport
infrastructure that allows uninterrupted travel across and beyond
our region and communication highways, facilitating free movement
of people, goods and unhindered flow of information across the
region and beyond, connecting South Asia with Central, South
Western and South East Asia. Not only do rail and road links
between Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh need to be
rehabilitated, a system of connectivity will have to be constructed
especially for the railways and the truckers will have to be issued
special permits.
Nevertheless, the Indian and Pakistani governments must agree to
transit of trade between Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, India and
Central Asia. For promotion of trade the countries will have to
facilitate cross border movement of people and goods. Visa and
custom facilities will have to be simplified, and for special categories
of people and goods waived, across the board.
The Group on Custom Laws and Issues recommends: 1. Trade is growing in the region the mindset of protectionism is
changing. Trade barriers still exist, with high tariff barriers and a
large number of non tariff barriers. The economies are booming
and clearly need to be integrated.2. Customs laws need simplification and harmonization;3. Dry ports need to be set up and transit rights be given freely;
217216
4. Valuation procedures need to be harmonized;5. Warehousing infrastructure, charges and fees needs
improvement;6. Common formats need to be developed for declaration forms;7. These forms be made available in electronic form, and available
in all major languages in the region;8. Information and data be exchanged freely;9. Countries to do away with secretive sensitive lists;10. A common software be used that would simplify declaration and
valuation;11. Mutual recognition of certification;12. Common standards and testing procedures to be followed;13. Capacity building and technology transfer be speeded up;14. Pakistan to take a lead in trade facilitation efforts, Sri Lanka to
lead the efforts towards breaking down non tariff barriers;15. Allow and encourage trade in services by recognizing University
and college degrees across the region.
Water Sharing and ManagementIncreasingly, the governments and concerned institutions are
realizing the need to address acute shortage of energy and water,
incidence of drought and floods that often bring miseries to the
people and, at times, states into conflict. The distribution and
management of water resources, though quite a divisive issue among
the upper and lower riparian regions across states, needs to be
undertaken amicably without depriving the lower and upper riparian
regions of their due to avoid a conflict over water issues which must
not be politicized.
Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and
Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India
must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali
Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing
reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage
water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower
riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome
their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects
within the framework of the IWT, on the other.
There are other major water related problems that need to be
addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the
member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security.
There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can
be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would
involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all
concerned countries would have to agree.
Recommendations of the Water Group1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by
increasing gap between increasing water demand and
insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing
new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional
conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water
needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new
management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the
socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and
institutional capacity. The following general and specific
recommendations could be made, based on the group
discussion:2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower
riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and
Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development
interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower
(Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and
multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and
the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option.
(proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example)3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of
decentralization and local management. Different models have
been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil
society, political acceptance and local institutional
implementation capacity as the key elements. The national
experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the
proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must
be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture.
The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan
and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector. 5. All infrastructure developments should consider long term
conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies,
including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and
regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom
219218
engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to
political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical
options must be formulated across the appropriate local
hydrological and political boundaries.6. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and
increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the
growing challenges for the planning and development. The
secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable
distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and
regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector
as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines.7. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the
knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.
South Asian Energy GridSimilarly, the energy cooperation should evolve into a South Asian
Energy Grid with integrated electricity and gas systems. As India and
Pakistan now agree, and they must move forward, the gas and oil
pipelines can run from Central Asia, Gulf, Iran and Myanmar
through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh to whole of South
Asia and beyond. In this context of developing energy markets,
power trading in the region calls for establishment of high voltage
interconnections between the national grids of the countries. India,
Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh should cooperate in transportation
of gas and jointly developing, trading and sharing of energy.
The Energy Group recommends: 1. South Asia is home to 22% of the world's population and
occupies only 4% of the world land mass. All the countries in the
region are developing economies and heavily dependent on
energy imports despite being bestowed by nature with large
energy resources including hydro, solar, wind and, to some
extent, natural gas resources. However, they have not been able
to exploit their energy resources to meet the demand. Energy
imports constitute 27% to 87% of their commercial energy
needs. Price fluctuations in the international oil market have
been adversely impacting the economies of the region. Projected
energy consumption to sustain the current economic growth
levels would call for a more than 300% increase in their energy
consumption by 2020. Energy security, therefore, assumes
greater significance for the socio-economic development of
South Asia. The major causes of concern from the regional
energy security perspective are:(i) Short-term supply risks due to threat of war and military action
that may impact Middle East or Iran, the primary source of
commercial energy supply to South Asia;(ii) Difficulty to pay for oil imports, when the prices shoot up
sharply;(iii) Prospect of obtaining to long term gas and oil supply contracts at
affordable prices, which can also ensure greater price stability;(iv) Availability of electricity to all households within a reasonable
time span to enhance the socio-economics development and
improve quality of life.2. The following steps need to be taken urgently to address the
above concern:3. Expedite development of indigenous energy resources including
hydropower while taking into account issues of resettlement and
socio economic crisis. Non-conventional energy resources, such
as, the wind and solar energy resources, such as, the wind and
solar energy to meet the long term energy demand;4. Establishment of a South Asian regional power grid to facilitate
exchanges and trading of power to meet the electricity demand
in the region;5. Development of a South Asia Gas Grid with pipelines from Iran.
Turkmenistan, to facilitate natural gas surplus countries in the
neighborhood of South Asia to facilitate natural gas imports into
the region and its distribution among the countries of South
Asia;6. Establish South Asia Energy Research Programs for
development of new technologies that would facilitate
harnessing the benefits of solar and other energy resources on a
more sustainable basis;7. Establish regional energy cooperation on a long-term basis;8. Undertake evaluation to examine the appropriateness and
impact of power sector reform initiatives undertaken by the
countries in South Asia to identify the need for any course
correction or policy change.
South Asian Development Bank Given a low rate of investment to GDP ratio, South Asia must create
attractive environment for investment in high value-added
manufacturing lines and trans-regional projects. Enhanced
investment flows, both from within and outside the region, would
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culminate in production facilities located across the region through
integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional
companies would be quoted on our stock exchanges as capital moves
without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite
investment in joint ventures and projects in any part of our region
through a South Asian Development Bank.
Addressing LDCs' ConcernsHowever, economic cooperation and trade would not produce
tangible results unless the concerns of Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) are genuinely addressed, the negative-list is minimized,
tariffs are substantially brought down and non-tariff and para-tariff
barriers lifted, the economies are gradually opened up with a
recourse to investment-trade linkage that takes care of trade deficits
between partners through investment flows and capital account,
vertical and horizontal integration of industries that benefits from
relative advantages and economies of scale. The time frame
envisaged in the agreement on SAFTA must be strictly adhered to.
South Asian Cooperative SecurityWe resolve to get out of the straitjacket of enmity, overcome
obsession with over-demanding militaristic security paradigms and
look beyond the traditional notions of security and focus on an
integrated South Asian Cooperative Security that recognizes
interdependence and mutuality of interests. The states ought to act
in their enlightened self-interest to resolve their conflicts and
differences through peaceful means and to the mutual benefit of our
peoples. The choice is often, erroneously, posed between regional
cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all our states to
simultaneously move forward to address long-standing political
disputes through peaceful means. The main obstacle to regional
cooperation and economic integration remains political and
strategic. Therefore, we vow to be courageous, flexible and consistent
to help resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts and dismantle
political barriers to regional economic takeoff.
Countering the widespread threat of terrorism, the SAARC countries
must implement the current protocol for cooperation against
terrorism and bring it in line with the international norms. The
regional efforts against terrorism must also include measures to
combat the spread of small arms and light weapons, narcotics
trafficking, smuggling, organized crimes and criminal mafias. This
will require exchanges and interaction between the national
intelligence and security agencies with their counterparts across the
border and greater interaction between the armed forces and
military establishments in the region.
The conference strongly emphasizes the principle that there can be
no intervention in the internal affairs of any nation in the
subcontinent. Yet, given the implications of internal conflicts for
regional security as a whole, the SAARC must pay greater attention
to the relationship between internal and regional security. It calls on
both parties to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to take immediate
steps towards a revival of the stalled peace process and creation of an
interim administration in the Tamil-dominated regions while
securing integrity of the country and the rights of minorities there.
Without prejudice to the current positions of the SAARC
governments on amending the SAARC charter, the conference calls
upon the SAARC to initiate a study on mechanisms for cooperative
security in the region.
Advancing the SAARC charter, the conference welcomes the
decision, in principle, of the Islamabad SAARC summit to establish
procedures for cooperation with other countries and organizations.
Given the increasing interdependence among regions, cooperation
with neighboring countries, such as China, Afghanistan and
Myanmar and Central Asia, and other regional organizations, it is an
essential future activity for SAARC.
The Group on Nuclear Stabilization recommendsThe existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia remains an issue of
major concern for the peoples and region's security analysts. Given
Indo-Pak history of constant tensions and intermittent crises, we are
concerned about the likelihood of a crisis spiralling out of control
and eventually leading to a nuclear conflict. While we find the South
Asian nuclear regime to be relatively stable in peace time, there is
indeed nuclear instability induced into the nuclear equation in time
of crises. This is borne out of an analysis of the 1999 and 2002 crises
between India and Pakistan. Moreover, since one of the adversaries,
Pakistan, inherently links nuclear escalation to conventional
asymmetry, the growing asymmetry in conventional arms between
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Pakistan and India could also lead to a lowering of the nuclear
thresholds in terms of South Asian crises. Finally, while the mutual
ambiguity of the nuclear regime in South Asia contributes to stability
on some counts, it does not allow the adversaries to make informed
decisions in times of crises and can thus lead to instability.
Given the above, the recommendations of the group
include:1. Recognizing that much of the tensions are a result of outstanding
disputes, we recommend that Pakistan and India must continue
dialogue on these issues and continue on the overall drive
towards CBMs through the existing normalization process. With
regard to nuclear weapons, Pakistan and India should mutually
initiate a global drive towards disarmament. The starting point
should be a declaration that transforms South Asia into a nuclear
weapons free zone. More specifically, the two sides could focus
on the following:2. Declaring a bilateral ban on nuclear testing through an
agreement;3. Ceasing the production of all fissile material (agreement);4. Signing a non-deployment agreement, agreeing that weapon
systems will not be mated or deployed (agreement);5. Signing an agreement no to pre-empt nuclear installations of the
adversary;6. Establishing of NRRCs but with a legally binding agreement that
such channels will remain open during crises;7. Enhancing command and control structures to eliminate the
likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear conflict.
The Group on Conflict Resolution Mechanism Proposes: Conflicts in South Asia are passing through a critical phase of
transformation which requires a proper understanding,
interpretation and information about issues which cause conflicts.
For a long period of time, South Asia has perceived conflicts through
a zero-sum perspective but the process of gradual conflict
transformation is taking place in the region which may help the
formulation of conflict resolution mechanism.
Recommendations:1. Need for proper conceptualization and understanding of
conflicts and their interpretations in a rational manner.
Therefore, it is recommended to establish conflict resolution
centers and institutes at the governmental and non-
governmental levels so as to unleash the process of meaningful
research in the field of conflict resolution. It is also
recommended to design academic curricula on conflict
resolution so as to create a better awareness among the people of
South Asia about the need for a conflict resolution process. Both
print and electronic media of South Asia can play a plausible role
for creating proper conditions for conflict resolution process; 2. Involvement of stake holders and allow them the space to craft
out alternative conflict resolution mechanism. Stakeholders
must have political will for conflict resolution and women should
be made an integral part of this mechanism. The composite
dialogue going on between India and Pakistan should also focus
on the practicable conflict resolution strategy as far as
contentious issues are concerned;3. State structures and their proponents should also be influenced
because states are often the creators, promoters and sustainers
of conflict;4. There should be SAARC conventions on minority and water
rights' charters and the existing human rights' charter of SAARC
needs to be strengthened and properly implemented.
South Asian Human Security Beyond cooperative security, South Asian nations must ultimately
move towards South Asian Human Security by placing people -- their
wellbeing and rights to peaceful life and development -- at the centre
of security concerns, rather than intensifying the arms race. To
include the excluded, governments of South Asia should take
concrete steps to implement the SAARC Social Charter and give
priority to poverty eradication by implementing ISACPA Report on
Poverty Alleviation and meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
This can be done by increased investment, enhanced economic
growth and development, which do not necessarily translate into
poverty alleviation unless structured to address the root-causes of
poverty and give priority to human resource development,
employment generation and empowerment of the dispossessed,
women and the poor, in particular.
South Asian Parliament The South Asian region emerged out of decolonization as a result of
the drawing of political boundaries with sovereignty attributes
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forming new states. The political boundaries have further been
reinforced through divergent strategies of state and nation building,
reinterpretations of history and religion, and due to the Cold-War
strategic divides. In the context of these reinforced boundaries and
divisions, it may sound imprudent and even unrealistic to talk of
political integration in the region. However, over the past decades,
the imperatives of globalization, end of the cold war and rising
popular aspirations in each of the South Asian states have brought
about qualitative changes in the regional perceptions. Processes like
SAARC have created institutions and generated impulses under
which people are visualizing the prospects of establishing a South
Asian community. Regional integration should and will take place
within the framework of community building, not by conceiving or
attempting erosion of state sovereignties or identities. The examples
of SAFMA's initiative towards South Asian parliament and the
collective and individual attempts in India and Pakistan to re-write
history text books are indicative of growing popular pressure in
favour of community building.
The SAPANA Group decided to mobilise country-based but
comparative studies, that address the question of state building
strategies, nationalism, status of minorities within and otherwise in
the context of human rights and democratic polices. Studies will also
take note of the professional engagements like that of Chamber of
Commerce and industries, media, lawyers, academics, doctors and
human rights activists across the board initiated and
institutionalised within or outside the SAARC framework. The basic
strategy to be adopted towards community building through
integration will be to encourage institution building and
engagements. Patterns of sub-regional cooperation amongst the
parts of the states and societies in South Asian, linkages among
parliamentarian, political parties, scholars and analysts, as well as
transport and communication networks across the borders driven by
popular pressures present concrete examples of such strategy. The
conclusions of the studies will then be put in a perspective to map
out the properties of community building through integration. The Group on South Asian Political Integration
recommends:The participants overwhelmingly endorsed the view to initiate a
process of moving towards the creation of an institutional interactive
mechanism for parliamentarians of South Asia keeping in mind the
concept of a South Asian Parliament. A full fledged SAP may take a
decade or two, but it is time to initiate moves in that direction. To
begin with, the conference proposes: a) Creation of an Intra-
Parliamentary Union in South Asia; b) SAARC may in principle agree
to create a South Asian Parliament and appoint a group of experts,
responsible before the SAARC Speakers Forum, to prepare a
comprehensive report and a timeframe to establish it in stages and
through an evolutionary process; c) The SAARC Speakers Forum
should be activated and; d) To begin with, SAP may be set up as a
deliberative and consultative body, not as a legislative body, so as to
create regional opinion on and build regional pressures on the issues
pending for implementation at the SAARC level. This deliberative
body may work within the SAARC agenda. By ultimately creating a
South Asian Parliament, the evolution of a regional South Asian
identity, without in any sense compromising on or conflicting with
respective national identities and sovereignty of nation-states of the
region.
The Group on Rewriting History recommends: There is very little shared knowledge of how history is researched,
written and taught in each of the countries of South Asia.
Furthermore, there is inadequate recognition or appreciation of the
shared past of this region. Despite this lack of knowledge about the
past, references to and the use of history as a resource in a variety of
political debates has only increased, particularly for the promotion of
communalism, fundamentalism, casteism, regional and linguistic
chauvinism. This makes it more difficult to produce trans-national
historical perspectives.The close link between the state and historical research and textbook
production has had ambiguous and conflicting consequences for
developing a sense of the past. Historical research and analysis is still
dependent on Western categories and tools of analysis. There is need
to develop more indigenous categories.
Recommendations:1. The efforts at working out a common history of South Asia are
viable. Even though there may be fundamental differences in
perspective, it is possible to identify and work on common
themes. Rather than focusing on national histories, themes that
are shared by all the countries of South Asian countries should
be identified and worked upon.
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2. Furthermore, a perspective on history that emphasizes the
people, and neither fights shy of acknowledging historical
injustices of caste, region, religion, gender, (to take some
examples) nor glorifies them is an urgent imperative. 3. We believe that such histories can help evolve a broader
framework through stronger institutional linkages between
groups of professional historians in South Asia. Such an
engagement with the past will make a richer, fuller sense of the
past possible, and have a great impact on society and the polity
today and in the future.
The Group on Religious Extremism and Minorities
recommends:Both minority persecution and ghettoisation have to be countered.
There is still a major deficit in terms of information and
understanding about events across the region even among those
actively engaged with various human rights causes.
Recommendations: 1. A standing body charged with responsibility to study and
compose the institutional frameworks that seek to empower
minorities across the region. Where institutional support is
absent it should be highlighted.2. The political position, strategies and rhetoric employed by the
participants in the political process be monitored in order to
identify issues that may impact minorities. 3. Intellectual tendencies and debates within discourses generated
by the minorities about their situation those that promote
minority empowerment be highlighted.
South Asian Human Rights CodeIt is imperative for the South Asian countries to agree to and set up
institutions under the Paris Principles and purposefully set about
creating the required mechanisms to implement all internationally
recognized fundamental human, civil and democratic rights. The
Proposed Draft on Human Rights Code for South Asia presented
before the South Asian Parliament's Conference, convened by
SAFMA, will be circulated among the human rights bodies of the
region and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other human
rights bodies in the region will be requested to develop broader
understanding among the major stakeholders to develop a regional
framework at the level of SAARC and its member countries.
People to People ContactThe prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither
commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of
interstate, as well as domestic, politics. There is an urgent need to
allow greater interaction among the policy-makers,
parliamentarians, businessmen, media practitioners, professionals,
youth and the leaders of civil society. To enable it to happen, it is
necessary that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have the most
restrictive visa regimes, drastically revise their visa policy and
remove impediments to free movement of people. All-country visas
may be granted at separate South Asian counters on arrival at the
airports and on all border-crossings.
South Asian Information Society To overcome information deficit in the region, it is essential that all
restrictions on access to and free flow of information are removed
forthwith and media persons and products are allowed free
movement across frontiers. In this regard, SAFMA's Protocols on
'Free Movement of Media Persons and Media Products' and
'Freedom of Information' must be adopted by the national
legislatures/governments and the SAARC. To ensure the citizens'
right to know, we support SAFMA's Protocol on Freedom of
Information. The media, on their part, should rise above national
divides, avoid demonization and give special attention to the
coverage of the countries of South Asia that remain under-reported.
Given the rising numbers of South Asian Cyber citizenry, there is an
urgent need to upgrade, integrate and facilitate cyber connectivity
and accessibility.
Culture and TourismThe scope of collaboration in the sphere of culture, tourism, sports,
education, health, research, human resource development and
environment is infinite. At the level of SAARC, measures should be
taken to promote cultural exchanges, tourism, health and education
services and research in all fields.
Promotion of HumanitiesPrivate initiatives and those of universities should be encouraged by
the authorities to introduce country studies, invite faculties from the
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neighbourhood, exchange students, promote humanities and
physical sciences through South Asian congresses and undertake a
non-discriminatory portrayal of history. Visa restrictions and tedious
process for academics, experts and scholars must be dispensed with.
Women's ConcernsAcknowledging the inadequate attention to and focus on redressing
the marginalization and invisibility of women at all levels of national
and regional policy-making; and the disproportionately high burden
of poverty that women face in South Asia; SAPANA resolves to work
towards gender equality and gender justice in all aspects of our work
in the process as well as the substance; and exhort all the South
Asian governments to acknowledge and rectify the glaring gender
inequalities especially the feminization of poverty.
South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) NetworkThe participants of South Asian Journal conference have agreed to
form South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network that will
pursue virtual research and develop networking among various
independent research groups and scholars across the region to
promote free and pro-people thinking and a course of development
that addresses the concerns of the people, in a wholist and
sustainable framework.
The objective and purpose of SAPANA will be to redress the
shortcomings found in existing Think Tanks and research
organisations. Firstly, it is proposed that the main purpose and
objective of SAPANA will be to liaise with policy makers and with
governments in separate countries and in South Asia as a whole. The
research undertaken by SAPANA, while following all the principles of
objectivity and rigour, will serve as a platform for policy dialogue and
intervention.
SAPANA has a great advantage over all existing think tanks and
similar institutions, in that it is part of the Free Media Foundation
and will work closely with the South Asian Free Media Association
(SAFMA). This proximity will allow SAPANA's research output to be
available in the public arena through the media. This ability to
disseminate extensively will be one of the major advantages SAPANA
will have over other institutions.
SAPANA will focus on multidimensional and multi-thematic
interventions rather than specialise in one particular area. Because of
the already existing network of the Free Media Foundation and
SAFMA, SAPANA is being perceived as a sort of a 'virtual' institution.
Unlike most research organisations and think tanks, for the first few
years, it will not employ scholars and academics, but will out-source
research. Because of its 'virtual' nature, not constrained by the
abilities of an in-house research staff, SAPANA will have access to
the best scholars working on South Asia who will be hired on short
term contracts for specific purposes. Moreover, SAPANA will also be
able to design research themes of a more topical and immediate
nature requesting scholars to respond quickly. Its flexibility will be
one of its strengths. The participants appreciated South Asian
Journal and SAFMA for taking this timely initiative. The participants
of the First SAPANA Conference agreed to meet again within two
years to pursue their objectives and shared goals.
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