Managing Risk and Crisis: The Cases of Mayak, Chernobyl, and Kursk Autumnschool, Tartu September 20, 2013 Dr. Julia Gerlach (FU Berlin)
Managing Risk and Crisis: The Cases of Mayak, Chernobyl,
and Kursk
Autumnschool, Tartu September 20, 2013
Dr. Julia Gerlach (FU Berlin)
Our goal is…
… to evaluate risk and crisis management (> nuclear energy)
(1) making sense of risk, risk governance (especially communication), and the nexus of risk and society;
(2) analyzing three cases of crises;
(3) concluding by using the conceptual framework of risk, etc.
Risk
• Multiple conceptions of risk, no widely accepted definition
• Two approaches – Economical/technical: focus on probability and
quantity
– Social/political: focus on the impact on human beings/society and quality
• No “real risk”, no “objective risk”, but multiple
risk perceptions that can be affected by sensational occurrences or dramatic events
Risk
• Risk is the potential or probability of loss resulting from a given action, activity and/or inaction (Slovic 2001)
• Risk is an uncertain (positive or negative) consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that humans value (Renn 2007)
Risk • Risk is dependent on human decisions, unlike
catastrophe (Luhmann 1991)
• The antonym of risk is (the social fiction of) security/safety (Luhmann 1991)
(Political) decision-making and communication
Risk governance
Risk
Decision
Uncertainity Future
Risk Governance
• Identification
• Evaluation
• Appraisal
Assessment
• Monitoring
• Decision-Making
• Implementation
Management
• Internal
• External
Communication
Knowledge Challenge: Complexity
Uncertainty
Ambiguity
Risk Communication
get the numbers right
tell them the numbers
explain the numbers
show them that they accepted similar risks in the past
show them that it‘s a good deal form them
treat them nice
make them partners
(Fischhoff 1995)
Risk Communication
Good risk communication is
• delivering the relevant information (no “paralysis by analysis” (Renn 2007))
• balancing science and politics
• between “promoting and protecting” (Sjöberg 1999)
• transparent
• accountable
• sustainable
Risk and Society (1)
• “Thus the question of how misfortunes are explained and handled contains a significant critical potential – critical not in the sense of an appeal to reject the society that finds itself exposed to such misfortunes, but critical in the sense of a heightened, not self-evident capacity to draw distinctions. We are dealing with the other side of the normal form – and it is only by referring to the other side of the normal form that it can be recognized as a form.” (Luhmann 1991)
Risk and Society (2) “In risk societies, the consequences and successes of
modernization become an issue with the speed and radicalism of processes of modernization. […] Under such conditions, a new moral climate of politics develops in which cultural and hence nationally varying, evaluations play a central role and arguments for and against real or possible consequences of technical and economic decisions are publicly conducted. In this process, the functions of science and technology also change. Over the past two centuries, the judgment of scientists has replaced tradition in Western societies. Paradoxically, however, the more science and technology permeate and transform life on a global scale, the less this expert authority is taken as a given. In discourses concerning risk, in which questions of normative (self-)limitation also arise, the mass media, parliaments, social movements, governments, philosophers, lawyers, writers, etc., are winning the right to make
decisions.” (Beck 2009)
Nuclear Energy and Risk
• Nuclear energy is obviously risky – but it serves a number of strategical goals, such as
– increasing the number of sources of energy
– decreasing energy dependency
– guaranteeing energy supply
– meeting cutting edge in science
– …
Cost? Benefit!
Mayak (Chelyabinsk)
film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MVLYPkMlBA
Mayak (Chelyabinsk)
Assessment
• Dumping ~ 76 million m3 of radioactive water into Techa river (1949-1956)
• Explosion of a poorly maintained storage tank, releasing 50-100 t of high-level radioactive waste (1957)
radiation estimated higher than Chernobyl
number of direct/indirect victims unknown
contamination of the Techa river 250 km + x
contamination of land of 8 x 110 km2 15
Mayak (Chelyabinsk)
• Management (ad hoc)
– Exterminating harvest, slaughtering cattle
– Banning (water from the river, agriculture, cattle)
– Evacuating ~ 10.000 people one week after
• Communication
– No public information at all
– Uncovering in 1976, 1979 (Sh. Medvedev)
– Informing IAEO in 1989
16
Mayak (Chelyabinsk)
Lesson learned?
• Management – Mayak still employs ~ 10.000 people
– ~ 280.000 people still live in the contaminated area • Invalidity pension for some people
• No sufficient health care
• Communication – “Something happens – look at the ongoing
evacuation.“
17
Chernobyl
film: http://video.about.com/history1900s/The-Chernobyl-Disaster.htm
Chernobyl
Assessment
• Explosions and fire in the core of one reactor that disperses radioactive fuel and core materials into the atmosphere (1986)
number of direct/indirect victims unknown
~ 100.000 km² significantly contaminated
Chernobyl
Management (ad hoc)
• Immediate set-up of a state commission for investigating the accident
• Immediate evacuation of ~ 53.000 people of the nearby town of Pripyat and surrounding villages
• Setting an exclusion zone (30 km)
• Shortening May 1 celebrations in Kiev
Liquidation process, sarcophagus, etc. (cost bankrupted USSR virtually)
Chernobyl
Communication
• April 26, 1986, 1:23 A.M.: Explosion
• April 28, 1986: USSR admits that something happened (after initial evidence from Sweden)
• May 6, 1986: Press conference in Moscow > USSR
• May 14, 1986: TV address by Gorbachev
Acceleration of glasnost (~ openness, esp. for the field of press) after its confirmation as party policy in March 1986
Kursk
Assessment
• Sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea during military exercise (2000)
Death of 118 crew members
Amount of radiation unclear
Kursk
Management (ad hoc) – Failing of the initial rescue operation: Despite
international offers for assistance, international rescue teams were involved four days after the accident
– Setting-up two commissions for investigation
Communication
– 2 days after: Statement by the Navy
– 4 days after: Statement by Putin (vacations)
– 11 days after: Meeting Putin/members of the families
Kursk
Lessons learned? • Management
– no Navy reform – no dismissal/withdrawl from office – compensation for families: apartment, 26.000 US$ +
electricity for free, etc.
• Communication – awarding the “Order of Courage” to all of the crew
and the title “Hero of the Russian Federation” to the submarine's captain
– Putin‘s attendance at the memorial/funeral ceremony
Comparison
Mayak Chernobyl Kursk
1957 1986 2000
Assessment Nature as a factory: maintenance (-) sustainability (-)
Maintenance (?) Maintenance (?)
Management Inappropriate and in detail top secret – secrecy valued higher than human life
Political management “up to a point” from Moscow, attempts to deal with Chernobyl technically
Denial of foreign assistance; “politics vs. military”
Communication Crisis alien to the system/ anti-risk and anti-crisis world view: concealing reframing, no communication until 1989
Delayed communication under international pressure, “up to a point”, facing the crisis
Delayed political communication, facing the crisis, then even emotional support