Malmvig_Ambiguous Endings. Middle East Regional Security

8/11/2019 Malmvig_Ambiguous Endings. Middle East Regional Security

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AMBIGUOUS ENDINGS

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY

IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS

AND THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Helle Malmvig

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DIIS REPORT

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IISR

EPORT

DIIS

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DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


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Copenhagen 2013, the author and DIISDanish Institute or International Studies, DIIS

stbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, DenmarkPh: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00E-mail: [email protected]

Web: www.diis.dk

Cover photo: Poloto / Karam AlhamadLayout: Allan Lind JrgensenPrinted in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS

ISBN 978-87-7605-601-8 (print)ISBN 978-87-7605-602-5 (pd )

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Tis publication is part o DIISs Deence and

Security Studies project which is unded by a grant

fom the Danish Ministry o Deence

Helle Malmvig, Senior Researcher

[email protected]


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Executive summary in Danish

Mellemstens regionale sikkerhedsorden er under hastig orandring. De arabiskeoprr og krigen i Syrien har ikke blot ndret orholdet mellem stat og samund,men ogs nogle a regionens grundlggende normer og historiske skillelinjer. Dennerapport stter okus p de vigtigste orandringer i Mellemsten siden 2011 med vgt

p em ngletemaer:

Relationen mellem stat og samund Forholdet til Vesten og udenrigspolitikken Iran-Syrien-Hizbollah aksen under pres

Sunni-Shia skel og identitetspolitikkens genkomst Saudi-Qatar rivalisering og Det Muslimske Broderskab


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Executive summary

Middle East regional security is changing rapidly. Te Arab Uprisings and the Syriancivil war are changing not only the relationship between state and society, but alsosome o the regions core norms and historical divisions. Tis report analyses keychanges in regional security in the Middle East since 2011 with emphasis on fiveimportant issues:

Te relationship between state and society Relationship with the West and oreign policy posturing Te impact o the IranSyriaHezbollah resistance ront and the radical-mod-

erate divide Te Sunni-Shia rif and the rise o identity politics Te Saudi-Qatar rivalry and the role o the Muslim Brotherhood

Te report concludes that the Middle East regional security situation has not beenas unstable and conflict-ridden since the 1950s and early 1960s, when revolutionaryideologies, interventionism and wars marked the region with equal orce. o the extentthat the Syrian civil war is allowed to carry on, this instability and level o conflict will

continue to damage many o the positive developments originally set in motion by theArab Uprisings, which is why a more robust, unified Western effort may called or.


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1. Introduction, aim and structure

Te Arab Uprisings o 2011 catalysed ar-reaching changes, not only in the way Arabpeople relate to their rulers, but also in the way the state and society in the regionrelate to one another. As one entrenched regime afer another ell a new sense oArab unity and pride seemed to spread across the region, just as new lie was breathedinto decaying regional institutions. Prepared to expel ruthless dictatorships and give

voice to principles o democracy and human rights, the Arab League and the GulCooperation Council (GCC) took on enhanced roles in Libya, Yemen and Syria.At the time, many observers hoped or a brave new Arab world, where realist power

politics would give way to regional cooperation. Peaceul protests in Bahrain and Syria,

however, turned into brutal repression and war, working to shatter such hopes. TeSyrian conflict has now evolved into a tragic civil war o sectarianism and proxy war,drawing in regional powers and spilling over to neighbouring states. Te dynamicson the domestic ront in unisia and Egypt are similarly having serious regionalrepercussions: violence, insecurity and the ever-deepening divide between Islamistand non-Islamist groups are dampening the positive effect that initially led protesters

across the region to emulate what happened in unisia. And, conversely, the intensepolarization o Egyptian and unisian society makes ample room or regional powers

to support competing societal ractions, as clearly evidenced by Saudi Arabia and theUAEs responses to the military overthrow o Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.Te eventual outcome o the Arab Uprisings and the struggles or power and identity

will shape regional politics or years to come. Tis report nevertheless purports thatit is already possible to identiy key changes in the regional security situation thathave taken place with the Arab Uprisings as their backdrop. Tis is the main topico this report.

Tis report accordingly sets out to assess the changes in regional security and the

complex dynamics between the domestic and the regional level in the Middle East.In other words, the report willassess how the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian civil warhave altered the nature of regional politics since 2011.First, a short analysis is presented

o what regional politics looked liked prior to the uprising (2003-2010). Next, theollowing five key issues that have emerged and/or changed as a result o the waveo demonstrations and protests will be discussed: 1) a re-configuration o the rela-tionship between the state and society; 2) a lessening o the importance o the pro

versus anti-Western divide; 3) a weakening o the resistance ront and the moderate

versus radical divide; 4) a renewal o the Sunni-Shia rif; and 5) the emergence o a


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Salafi-Muslim Brotherhood divide. Te reports conclusion points out implicationsor the EU and the US due to the changes occurring in the region, especially in rela-tion to the on-going conflict in Syria. Tese five issues also guide the structure and

chronology o the remainder o the report.1

1 Te report is based on open sources, diplomatic cables and key interviews with political actors, institutions,researchers and diplomats rom the region gathered rom February 2011 to June 2013 in Egypt, Israel, Iran,

Lebanon, urkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria.


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Textbox 1. The Sunni-Shia divide

Te Sunni-Shia divide nominally reers to an unresolved dispute within Islam con-cerning the question o rightul succession to the Prophet Muhammad afer hisdeath in 632, resulting over time in different religious practices, customs and inter-

pretations between the two sects. Sunni-Shia relations, however, have been markedby both cooperation and conflict, and the importance o the issue has ebbed andflowed in the history o the region. Discriminated against in modern times the Shiashave played a weak role in Arab societies. Nonetheless, over the last 35 years, the Shi-as have mobilized and become politically stronger, in part as a result o the IslamicRevolution in Iran in 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeinis more radical interpreta-tions o Shia Islam, but also as a result o the rise o Shia movements in Lebanon in

the 1970s and 1980s, and lately by the overthrow o the Sunni dominated Baathregime in Iraq with al-Malikis Shia-led government, in addition to Shias claimingtheir rights in, or instance, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Te Shia, comprising 10-15

percent o the population in the Arab world, are mainly situated in Lebanon, Syria,Bahrain and Iraq; in the remainder o the Arab countries the Sunni-Shia division hasthereore historically played much less o a role in the identity politics o most Arabcommunities. As a result, it is also important not to reduce the Sunni-Shia divideto a centuries-old religious conflict alone, but also to see the Sunni rif as part oregional identity and power politics, in which local actors may instrumentalize andco-produce specific sectarian narratives to gain support or discredit their opponents.

Ofen the Sunni-Shia divide has been employed at times o uncertainty, upheavaland war in the region, as the present wars and instability in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain andLebanon amply exempliy.

dan to discredit Iran, and not least to de-legitimize Irans popular ally in Lebanon:Hezbollah (see also Valbjrn & Bank, 2012).

It was above all the 2006 Lebanon War that gave Hezbollah its popularity in Arabsocieties, just as this war came to define the regions main patterns o enmity and

amity between pro-Western and anti-Western governments, between the so-calledresistance ront and the more Israel-tolerating governments, and between Arab states

and Arab societies. As Israel attacked Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanonand in Beirut itsel, causing a great number o civilian casualties and material losses, 3

3 According to Human Rights Watch more than 1,100 Lebanese civilians died during the 34-day conflict (Why

they Died Human Rights Watch, New York, 2007).


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Hezbollah and its charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, gained enormous popularity

in the Arab street or taking up the fight against Israel. Te Shia movement and itssupporters in the resistance ront Iran, Syria and Hamas were heralded as true

champions o the resistance against Israel and Nasrallah was even compared to thestar o Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Tis was openly contrasted with themore pro-Western regimes in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who were accused onArab satellite channels o merely paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, or eveno secretly condoning Israels war against Hezbollah in an attempt to counter Iransrising power by proxy. Tis accusation was perhaps not so ar-etched given the actthat the leadership in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan initially all warned Hezbollaho adventurism and o dragging the region into an unnecessary war, a rather unprec-edented warning given the traditionally sacrosanct status that conrontation against

Israel has in Arab politics. Faced with Hezbollahs rising popularity and anti-Israelisentiments, the regimes were also soon orced to backpedal on the warning. Tus,although the Iraq War opened the Pandora box o Sunni-Shia sectarianism, Sunni-Arabgovernments also had a vested interest in ampliying the Sunni-Shia divide in orderto counter the sof power o Iran and Hezbollah. Te reverse was o course also true,in the sense that Iran and Hezbollah were keen to downplay their Shia identity andideology in order not to alienate their wider Sunni-dominated Arab audience. Doingthis demanded, or instance, appealing to the Palestinian cause or building close ties

to Hamas in Gaza.

Regional relations, however, were not only marked by divisions. Over the course othe 00s, Arab regional politics also witnessed a new kind o Arab identity politics. Teemergence o a plethora o new Arab satellite channels and internet sites in the late1990s created a new Arab public sphere that challenged the media monopoly o theautocratic Arab state and provided a common Arab reerence point (Lynch, 2006).On the new satellite channels, such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and MBC, ordinaryArabs were allowed or the first time to debate political issues on live broadcast, to

question the policies o their leaders, and even at rare times debate the corrupt andrepressive nature o their current political systems. Indeed, the ever growing gap be-tween the autocratic Arab police states and their discontented societies was perhapsthe most significant dividing line in the region, and one o the main drivers behindHamas and Hezbollahs popularity and successul rallying o Arab societies (seealso Lynch, Valbjrn & Bank, 2012). Tus the two Islamist parties had been electedat air parliamentary elections, in contrast to the incumbent rulers in e.g. unisia,

Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who were in the habit o wrecking election results,

or in the case o the last, o not having parliamentary elections at all, just as Hamas


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and Hezbollah were effectively challenging the West and Israel, thereby exposing theoreign policy hypocrisy o leading Arab rulers.

Te deep divide between state and society had o course also been one o the mainreasons or the Bush administrations strategy o democracy promotion launched inthe wake o 11 September. Te US attempt to bring democracy to the region wasarticulated as a long-term security effort to counter the root causes o radicalismand terrorism in the region, the authoritarian Arab state being pinpointed as astructural cause o Islamist extremism and terrorism. Te US promised to turn its

previous Middle East policy on its head. Rather than seeking stability in the questor democracy, it would now pursue a different policy, a broad hint to the rulers inSaudi Arabia and Egypt to undertake political reorms in earnest.4Although many

European governments did not agree with the US over how to promote democra-cy especially in light o the Iraq War they did recognise the need or pushingthe reorm agenda more actively. Consequently the EU launched its own strategic

partnership or democracy with the region and a new European NeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP) in 2004 offering privileged trade relations and financial bonuses toArab Mediterranean states in return or democratic reorms. Individual Europeangovernments also launched separate bilateral initiatives or democracy promotionin the Arab world, such as the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme and the Dutch

MARA programme (see also Malmvig, 2013, 2004, 2007).

Initially there was some optimism regarding the prospects o democratic reorm. InEgypt, or instance, the Mubarak government promised to abolish emergency lawand widen the arena or political opposition. Egypt held parliamentary elections withthe participation o the Muslim Brotherhood, while the Keaya (Enough) movementopenly reused hereditary rule in response to plans or Gamal Mubarak to take overrom his ather. In Jordan, King Abdullah initiated the so-called National Agenda,

while in Kuwait the parliament pressed the government to electoral reorm, and in

Morocco King Mohammed IV adopted a new progressive amily law (Mudawwana)and began tackling widespread corruption. Already by 2007-2008, however, manyo these political openings were rolled back, never materialized or were simply usedto cement existing authoritarian structures (see also Brumberg, 2003; Heydemann,2007). Upheld by a combination o ear o the ever-ominous security apparatus (the

4 In her (in)amous speech in Cairo Condoleezza Rice argued, For 60 years, my country, the United States,pursued stabi lity at the expense o democracy in this region, here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither.Troughout the Middle East the ear o ree choices can no longer justiy the denial o l iberty(20.06.2005, BBC

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4109902.stm).


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Mukhabarat), rent seeking, divide and rule tactics, and skin-deep liberalization, theincumbent regimes seemed resilient to change. Moreover, the US and the EU seemedless eager to push or democracy in the region. Faced with the successes o the Muslim

Brotherhood and Hamas at the ballot box and with the ailure in Iraq, many Westerngovernments effectively shelved their democracy promotion programmes, ocusinginstead on outreach and cultural dialogue with the Muslim world.

In sum the period rom 2001 to 2011 was marked by three wars the Iraq War, theLebanon War and the Gaza War, all o which involved the so-called resistance ront,i not directly, then by proxy. Te rise o Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas challenged thelargely pro-Western and Sunni Arab regional order, but it also exposed a deepeningdivide between Arab states and Arab societies. Despite rising domestic demands

or reorm, deep-seated discontent and a wide array o external efforts to promotedemocratization, Arab regimes appeared to be as stable and resilient as ever. As pro-tests spread rom one country to another in 2011, however, the resilience o Arabregimes was once more turned on its head, with significant consequences across theregion, as will be described in the next section.


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3. The Arab Uprisings and regional order 2011-

3.1 Changing state-society dynamicsTe Arab Uprisings sweeping the region in 2011 gave rise to much optimism asone entrenched dictatorship ell afer another. However, three years into the ArabUprisings, pessimism now seems to reign and observers have reerred to sombremetaphors o Arab Winter and Arab Fall or some time (Bitar, 2012; Brumberg &Heydemann, 2013; Cordesmann, 2013; Te Economist, 2013; Friedman, 2013).Indeed signs o winter abound, including the militarys ousting o Morsi in Egypt;the assassination o the lef-wing politician Mohammed Brahmi; new protests and

polarization in unisia and Egypt; violence and near state collapse in Libya and in

Syria; and a continuation o aade democratization and political reorm making ine.g. Jordan and Morocco. Yet the Arab Spring-Arab Fall metaphor is problematic onseveral accounts. First the metaphor draws on a European experience related to theshort-lived Prague Spring in 1968 against Soviet repression, shoring up the wrongconnotations since the Arab Uprisings only concerned opposition to domestic rule(rather than oreign oppression) and were arguably very homegrown. Second, on ananalytical level the season metaphor makes it difficult to appreciate the rather mixedand unfinished nature o the Arab Uprisings: We are either supposed to be in spring

or in winter, but not somewhere in between. Tird, the normative aspect o the met-aphor tends to blind the analysis to political changes that cannot be categorized aseither positive or negative. As a result, this section will move beyond the metaphor,zooming in on the changes that have already taken place in the relationship betweenArab states and societies, and argue that we are lef with an extraordinarily mixedand muddy political landscape.

New networks, political parties and intense political debate have emerged in the Arab

states undergoing transition. Te joy and enthusiasm protesters shared in 2011 have

arguably diminished, but public protest itsel has survived. A new political cultureis emerging in which the opposition takes to the streets when it disagrees with the

policies o its political leaders; in which politics are fiercely debated in new networks,associations and political parties; and in which new ways to hold governments account-able are being introduced. Tis is most evident in Egypt and unisia, where powerholders are exposed to fierce criticism, debate and ridicule rom their opponents atstreet level, or example in the orm o demonstrations, strikes and street art, not tomention in social media, where blogs, witter and web-based watch-dog groups are

flourishing. Arguably these new orms o street politics and debate can also turn violent


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and lead to increased polarization, as is the case in Egypt. Tey have also been used,however, to hold Arab leaders accountable in new ways. For instance, in unisia, AlBawsala a new watchdog NGO has monitored the slow progress o the unisian

Constituent Assembly, providing documentation on the nature o their work and thewidespread non-attendance in the Assembly, thus causing a public outcry in unisia.In Egypt the so-called Morsi Meter website kept track o President Morsis election

promises, comparing promises with his first 100 days in office. Holding governmentaccountable in this manner would obviously have been unthinkable during the reigno Ben Ali and Mubarak, but they also show how Arab leaders are on the verge o, andin some cases already have lost, their traditional inviolable status in Arab societies.Tis applies not only to unisia, Libya and Egypt, but also to Syria, where Basharal-Assad and his inner circle became objects o intense political satire rom early on

in the protests and demonstrations, being dethroned in cartoons, posters, graffitiand the much-acclaimed op Goon series,5a trend that would have been unheardo in a Syrian (and an Arab) context prior to the 2011 uprisings.

Although we should be careul not to overstate the drive or, or inevitability o,democracy in the region, one might argue that democracy has emerged as a locallyowned discursive ramework that all main political actors relate to and speak in termso, comparable to the way that Arab leaders had to speak in terms o Arab unity and

nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s.6

A recent study by the Al-Ahram Center inEgypt and the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute show that 80 percent o unisiansand 90 percent o Eg yptians agree that democracy is the best orm o government,regardless o whom they voted or. Islamists and secularists might disagree aboutthe role o religion, but they both believe that the state should unction accordingto democratic principles (Lust, Wichmann & Soltan, 2012). In other words, whensecularist and Islamist parties collide in unisia and Egypt, it is not over whetherthere isto be democracy or not, but over who is democratic and who is not, eachside accusing the other o being non-democratic. Tis can also be seen at a regional

level. wo recent significant events in the region the military intervention in Libyaand the expulsion o Syria rom the Arab League have both been carried out withreerence to principles o reedom, dignity and democracy. Similarly, when Morsi wentto ehran or the first time in over 30 years to mend relations with Iran, he simulta-

5 op Goon: Diaries o a Little Dictator a finger puppet show produced and filmed by a proessional group oSyrian actors, as well as a Syrian director and musicians, satirised Assad, his amily and his inner political circle. Deliberately crossing the line by ridiculing Assad, the show quickly became immensely popular on Youube.See e.g.: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2012/08/2012820111648774405.html6

However, democracy is arguably not as strong or sedimented as Arab nationalism and unity once were.


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neously urged all countries to support the Syrian people in their fight against theiroppressors ... and help the people build a democratic system o rule that reflects thedemands o the Syrian people or reedom, much to the dismay o his Iranian host

(Morsi, 30.08.2012). Tese verbal endorsements in the regional and domestic arenasobviously give no guarantee that democracy will materialize in the end, just as it isclear that the different political actors have highly different understandings o whatdemocracy means. But the very act that democracy has emerged as a locally owneddiscourse marks a clear difference rom the situation that reigned in the region only aew years back, where democracy ofen was seen as an imposed Western agenda, and

where the autocratic incumbents preerred to speak in terms o piecemeal politicalreorms rather than democracy.

While the new local ownership o democracy is indeed a positive development, recentevents in Egypt and Syria in particular point in a less positive direction. In the caseo Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, early on, backtracked on its original promisesconcerning power sharing, rushed through the Constitution and re-introduced anumber o autocratic measures that curbed the reedom o NGOs and reedom oexpression. With the ousting o Morsi and fierce persecution o Muslim Brotherhoodmembers, however, the situation has turned rom bad into worse. Liberal secular groupsare now cooperating with remnants o the old regime and the military, adopting a

strong nationalistic security discourse, where democracy and basic rights only seemto play a secondary role (see also Chayes, 2013). In unisia, Islamist extremism ledto the 2012 tragic assassination o opposition leader Chokri Belaid and later to theassassination o Mohammed Brahmi in 2013. Te relationship between the secularopposition and the roika government has been marked ever since by tension andconrontation, with the secular opposition calling or the resignation o the govern-ment and the Constituent Assembly. In both unisia and Egypt a deepening divideis visible between secularists and Islamists, uelled by stereotyping and ear monger-ing on both sides, precluding inclusion and dialogue, both o which constitute vital

elements or building up a democratic political culture.

On a regional level, the evolving civil war in Syria has, above all, halted the positivedemonstration effectthat initially inspired protesters in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syriato emulate what happened in unisia. Te ollowing three observations indicate thatthe demonstration effect may in act be negative:

Te brutal crackdown in Bahrain and Syria has caused pro-democracy groups

elsewhere in the region to hesitate beore embarking on protests and demonstra-


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tions, especially in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which were the most likely candi-dates or another Arab Uprising.

Incumbent authoritarian regimes can now slow down the pace o political

change, or put reorms on the back burner all together by pointing to the neg-ative consequences o revolutionary change or stability and the economy inEgypt, unisia and Syria, once more arguing or the need o incremental andgradual reorms rom above (see also Heydemann & Reinoud, 2011).

As the Syrian War has evolved, many o these regimes ace an influx o reugees,sectarian grievances, jihadist terrorist groups and rivalries with neighbours,

which means immediate security concerns can be posed as more expedient thanpolitical reorms, playing into the old dilemma between stability and democ-racy. Tis is especially true or Jordan and Lebanon, which are experiencing a

orm o dont rock the boat attitude (see also Hall, 2013; Pelham, 2013), butalso or the Arab Gul states, who are resorting to hyperactivity in the oreign

policy arena and are deeply involved in proxy warare in Syria.

In sum the Syrian War, but also recent events in Egypt and unisia, have dampenedthe positive demonstration effect and enabled the incumbent regimes in neighbouringstates to ocus on immediate security considerations rather than political reorms. Ona state-society level we also see the new governments in power returning to autocratic

measures and societies being increasingly polarized between Islamism and secularism.Yet compared to the period prior to the Arab Uprisings, the domestic sphere can nowencompass political contestation and debate, governments and political leaders areheld accountable in various ways and the barrier o ear has been broken.

3.2 Neither ally nor enemy: the weakening of foreign policy

posturing and the pro- anti-Western divide

One o the core issues o Middle East regional politics has traditionally been how to

relate to the West (see Barnett, 1995) and many observers have indeed argued thatthe Uprisings would change Arab oreign policies, making these more radicalizedand anti-Western. Te new governments in power have to take public opinion intoaccount in a whole new way, thus paving the way or more populist positions one.g. relations with the West and Israel (Abdo, 2013; Singh, 2013). Nevertheless, wealso see indications o a reverse trend, resulting in less oreign policy posturing anda weakening o the pro- versus anti-Western divide. In act, until now, the newlyelected governments in unisia, Libya and Egypt under Morsi appear to be less

pre-occupied withoreign policyposturing (and the West) and more with domestic


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politics. Tis is in part a consequence o the act that an overcrowded domesticagenda overrides regional and oreign policy issues; the new governments are ocusedon the many pressing tasks related to political transition e.g. constitution-making,

elections, turning over the remnant o the old regime and tackling their ailingeconomies. But it is also a reflection o the act that the domestic political debatehas become democratized and re-politicised in a whole new way as a result o theArab Uprisings (see also Brown, Ottaway & Salem, 2012; Valbjrn & Boserup,2012). Prior to the uprisings, Arab governments ofen used oreign policy as astage or high rhetoric to divert attention away rom domestic politics and societalgrievances. With limited domestic debate under authoritarian rule, oreign policy

posturing could be used to eign real political debate, or discontented citizens coulduse oreign policy issues as a less dangerous way o criticising their regimes (see also

Salem, 2011; Valbjrn & Bank, 2012). Yet, now that the lid has been taken off thedomestic political debate in unisia, Egypt and Libya, it can be argued that oreign

policy posturing has become less important. In these states, issues such as Palestine,

Israel and relations with the West have consequently played a rather marginal rolein the domestic political debate compared with the pre-uprising period. Certainlythe new Islamist governments are cautious about being seen as more independentin their oreign policies than the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes this having beenless the case or Libya given Gaddafis anti-Western positions but until now they

have pursued exceedingly pragmatic oreign policies and are eager to retain rela-tions with the EU and the US (Kauch, 2012; Malmvig & Markus Lassen, 2013).In contrast to initial Israeli ears, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have orinstance promised to abide by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace reaty, just as the Morsi

presidency tactically cooperated with Israel in the crackdown on jihadi militantsin Sinai. Morsi even brokered the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israelin November 20127and flooded a number o tunnels between Gaza and Egypt tothe public dismay o Hamas. Similarly, under Morsi, Egypt sought to play the roleo regional broker and mediator in Syria, and in unity talks between Hamas and

Fatah. Also the coalition government in unisia, led by the Islamist party Ennahda,is ar rom pursuing an anti-Western oreign policy, instead displaying pragmatismand an eagerness to keep relations with the EU and France intact. unisia thus

hosted the first Friends o Syria meeting in February 2012 and was quick to mend

7 Te Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi are, however, ar rom having normal relations with Israel . Morsi reusedto talk to Israel directly, or even to reer to Israel as such in public speeches. But the Muslim Brotherhood andeven the Egyptian Salafi leader Emad Abdel Ghaour seem to tolerate Israel in a way that differs greatly romtheir views in the past. At the recent World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan, Ghaour, leader o the Al-WatanParty (and ounder o the Al-Nour Party), said that We have no problem with the peace with Israel (Te imes

o Israel, 26.05.2013).


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relations with France despite the unortunate role the French played during theunisian Revolution.

One may in act argue that the new Islamist parties in power no longer constitutethe vanguards o anti-Westernism in the region that role has, as Lynch contends,ironically allen to lefist and liberal opposition movements who voice the loudestcritique o the West when it does not intervene in the region (in Syria and Bahrain)and when it does intervene (in Libya and Mali). Many o the liberal and secular ac-tions in unisia, Egypt and Syria eel betrayed by the West, in particular by the US,

who they perceive as supporting the Islamists only or the sake o stability, once moresacrificing the values o democracy on the altar o security and stability (Lynch, 2013).

During John Kerrys first visit to Cairo in March 2013, it was thus the liberal leaders

rom the National Salvation Front who reused to meet the Secretary o State and itwas a non-Islamist protester who set fire to pictures o Kerry outside the Ministry oForeign Affairs, reminiscent o Islamist demonstrators in the past. In the wake o themilitarys ousting o Morsi and the perceived US support o the Muslim Brotherhood,Egypt is experiencing a new wave o anti-Americanism in which protesters are accusingthe Obama administration o supporting terrorists and comparing Obama to BinLaden on posters and on social media, just as General Al-Sisi in his first interview

with the Washington Postdeclared that the US lef the Egyptians. You turned your

back on the Egyptians, and they wont orget that (Washington Post, 03.08.2013;see also Lynch, 2013c; Malmvig, 2013b).

Moreover, although the new Islamist parties are less outspoken in their criticismo the West and even o Israel than many had anticipated, this does not imply thatthe new Islamist governments are necessarily pro-Western. As US President Obama

put it in the wake o the storm against the American Embassy in Cairo in 2012, theMuslim Brotherhood is neither an ally nor an enemy (ABC News). In other wordsit is neither pro-Western nor anti-Western. What we may see the emerging contours

o is rather a kind o third position that resembles, or instance, the oreign policystance o the AKP Party in urkey or that o Algeria and Qatar (prior to the civiluprising in Syria). It is also clear that those states that have not yet undergone signi-icant political change still are divided along the pro- versus anti-Western axis, justas oreign policy posturing still prevails, especially in the Gul states, who continueto use oreign policy activism to divert domestic discontent. Te regimes in Jordan,Morocco and some Gul states thus remain closely aligned with the West, just asIran and Syria retain, or have even accentuated, their anti-Western stance. However,

as o yet, the Arab Uprisings do not seem to have given way to more radical oreign


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policy positions, just as the very ault line between pro- and anti-Western states seems

to lose its importance, not least in the light o increased sectarian tensions and theSyrian conflict.

3.3 The weakening of the resistance front and the

conservative-radical divide

Since 2003, the so-called resistance ront has been a dominant orce in the region.But with the Arab Uprisings, and not least the Syrian conflict, the sof power and

popularity o Iran and Hezbollah are seriously challenged. Tis is in part because

Iran and Hezbollah are less able to exploit the legitimacy gap between state andsociety and less able to rally the Arab public on oreign policy issues, as discussed

above. But it is first and oremost because Iran and Hezbollah have lost popularityand legitimacy as a result o their deep involvement with the Bashar al-Assad regimes

violent repression in Syria.

Initially Iran and Hezbollah welcomed the Arab Uprisings, with Iran articulatingthe demonstrations as a continuation o its own revolution in 1979 and Hezbollah

plying protest as part o a wider resistance against Western imperialism. Yet, as theSyrian conflict evolves, Hezbollah and Iran have had to change their official rhetoric

on the Arab Uprisings and by the summer o 2013 Hezbollah openly declared that itis fighting in Syria and that Syrias battle is our battle(Nasrallah, 25.05.2013). Andalthough Iran officially continues to deny having al-Quds orces on the ground andarming the regime, it does not hide that it provides logistical support and training,

just as several sources point to the presence o Iran-led Alawite militias inside Syriafighting alongside the regime and Hezbollah (see e.g. Washington Post, 13.02.2013;

New York imes, 01.06.2013). Te steadast support o al-Assad has had dire reper-cussions or Iran and especially or Hezbollah. Tey can no longer claim to be on theside o the Arab people against dictatorial Arab regimes, just as the economic and

political ties to the popular Palestinian cause have nearly been broken.8Already inJanuary 2012 Hamas and its leader Khaled Meshaal abandoned its headquarters inDamascus, citing the regimes brutal crackdown on its people, and thereby effectively

dismembering Hamas rom its alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. Presently ithas been reported that Iran has stopped providing USD 30-40 million in monthly

8 Initially when the Arab Uprisings broke out Khamenei declared his strong support or the uprisings, arguingthat We do not distinguish among Gaza, Palestine, unisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. We have supportedPalestine or thirty-two years, and they are not Shi a. It is not an issue o Shi a or Sunni. It is the protest o a nation

against oppression (Khamenei,, 20.03.2011, quoted rom Abdo, 2013:1).


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aid to Hamas (Gul News, 01.06.2013) and several sources point to the presence oHamas fighters on the side o the Syrian rebels (see e.g. Hashem, 2013). What wouldhave been unthinkable only a ew years ago is now a reality; Hezbollah and Hamas

are now effectively opposing each other on the Syrian battlefield.9

Te loss o Hamas and the direct involvement o Hezbollah orces in fights againstSunni rebels and Sunni jihadi groups have also amplified the sectarian nature o theIran-Hezbollah- al-Assad alliance. Te ormer axis o resistance has effectively turned

into a Shia axis, making it more difficult to appeal to a wider Sunni Arab audience,just as Sunni religious leaders elsewhere in the region have started to reer to themovement as the Party o Satan as opposed to the Party o God (see e.g. Gursel,

2013). In Lebanon, Hezbollah is also losing ground due to its open warare in Syria.

Hezbollahs battle in Syria is threatening to draw Lebanon into the war, jeopardizingthe ragile political security situation in the country. Syrian rebel groups have declaredthat Hezbollah fighters will have no sae haven in Lebanon and have threatenedto attack Hezbollah, and even the Lebanese Army, i Hezbollah does not pull outo Syria. Already in May 2013 two rockets were launched on the Shiite-majorityChiyah neighbourhood in west Beirut and rockets are fired on a daily basis on theLebanese-Syrian borders. And while Lebanese politicians have hesitated until recentlyto conront Hezbollah, they are now openly criticising the powerul movement or

destabilizing the country. Te Lebanese President Suleiman even went as ar as in-directly comparing Hezbollahs war with the Bush administrations pre-emptive warin Iraq (New York imes, 20.05.2013) and many Lebanese see Hezbollahs fight inSyria as a confirmation o Hezbollah being no more than an Iranian client (Khoury,22.05.2013), an allegation which only a ew years back mostly was put orward byneo-conservative think tanks in Washington (see e.g. Phillips, 2006).

Given these high stakes, one might ask why Hezbollah has chosen to stand by theal-Assad regime and Iran instead o ollowing the path o Hamas, thereby jeopardizing

its standing in the Arab world and not least in Lebanon itsel. Some analysts point toa sense o duty and gratitude to the al-Assad regime, which helped Hezbollah duringthe 2006 war with Israel, sending weapons and aid (Hasham, 2013); others pointto a sense o regional mission (conronting Israel and the pro-Western Sunni states)and allegiance to Iran (Khoury, 2013). Clearly the Hezbollah leadership although

9 Beore the Syrian Revolution broke out, Hamas intellectua ls were engaged in numerous attempts to ideological lybridge the Sunni-Shia divide, or instance by reconciling the ideas o Hassan a l-Banna with those o Ayatollah

Khomeini (see e.g. Schenker, 2013).


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there might be some internal divergence in the movement eel that they are en-gaged in a larger battle over the survival o the resistance ront and are accordinglyless concerned about Arab public opinion. When I talked to Hezbollah in 2012 and

asked about the risk o losing popularity in the Arab street over Syria, the Hezbollahofficial appeared rather puzzled by the question, answering that Hezbollah was notengaged in a popularity contest (Interview February, 2012). Evidently i the regime

o al-Assad alls, this will not only reduce the resistance ront to two players (Iranand Hezbollah), but Hezbollah will also lose its vital weapons supply line rom Syria,

while Iran will see its bridgehead on Israels northern border severely weakened as aresult, thereby lessening its deterrence on Israel. Iran and Hezbollah thereore seemset on the survival o the al-Assad regime and i that cannot be achieved, then withthe presence o a strong Alawite militia and/or Alawite enclave inside Syria backed

by Iran and acting in much o the same way as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Te geo-political implications o the all o the al-Assad regime is arguably alsoone o the main reasons why rivalling Gul states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabiahave become so heavily involved in the Syrian quagmire. Given their traditionalrivalry with Iran, the demise o Irans only Arab ally will constitute a major strate-gic advantage to the conservative Gul states. Te Arab public is obviously awareo these geo-political motivations and thus although Iran and Hezbollah have lost

much credibility in the region, the double standards o Qatar and Saudi Arabia areindeed ofen pointed out as well especially by more liberal and secular groups,who point to the suppression o the uprising in Bahrain and the restrictions onbasic civil liberties in Saudi Arabia and the two states are ar rom being seen as

pro-democracy orces in the region (see also Malmvig, 2012).10Te Qatar undedAl Jazeera news station has also lost credibility in the region, given its perceivedone-sided coverage o the Syrian crisis and its indirect support o Qatars oreign

policy in Syria (Lynch, 2013). Tus it might be argued that both the resistance rontand the conservative monarchies in the Gul and in Jordan and Morocco all are

pressured by the popular demands or reedom and dignity unleashed by the ArabUprisings, thus making it increasingly difficult or both sides to speak on behal othe oppressed Arab people, be that in Syria or elsewhere. In this sense both sideshave become status quo powers. Moreover, this also renders the moderate-radicaldivide a less meaningul device through which to understand the unolding rivalrybetween the two sides. With the Syrian crisis and Hamas shif in alliance, the rivalry

10 A 2012 poll by EIMed in Barcelona on Arab opinion and policy makers ranks Iran as the least supportive o

the Arab Uprisings, but Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not are much better and also received low rankings.


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between the two ronts takes on a much stronger sectarian dimension, putting theSunni-Shia rif (rather than positions on the West, Israel or political systems) to theoreront o the battle between the regional powers.

3.4 Into the fray: the Sunni-Shia rift

A ew years prior to the Arab Uprisings, the Sunni-Shia rif seemed to have somewhatlessened in importance and Sunnis and Shiites appeared to have ound a new balance

o power in both Lebanon and Iraq. Yet with the new political influence o Islamistparties, the proxy war in Syria and the rapid spillover o sectarian tensions to Syriasneighbours, the Sunni-Shia schism has again come to the ore.Te Sunni-Shia splitnow threatens to become the most important dividing line in the region. As Abdo

argues, it may even supplant the traditionally strong ault line between the Westand the Muslim world and potentially mobilize Arab societies even more than thePalestinian issue (2013:2). Various local actors are thus propping up the Sunni-Shiarif. From the beginning o the protests, the al-Assad regime has used the sectariannarrative to buttress support or itsel and to create ear o the alternative amongSyrian minorities, just as Salafi groups in Egypt have used the Sunni-Shia rif todiscredit the Muslim Brotherhood and its diplomatic openings to Iran. Tis has, orinstance, led to mob attacks against Shiites and xenophobic rhetoric on social media,

a phenomenon previously unseen in Egypt. Moreover, in contrast to the period rom2003-2009, where the Sunni-Shia narrative mainly was used by Sunni Arab govern-ments to discredit Iran and Hezbollah, today it appears that sectarian ear mongering

has gained a more popular base. Sectarianism is used not only by Sunni states, butalso by leading non-state actors and religious leaders. Leading Sunni religious leadersare now calling or jihad against the Shiites in Syria. Te powerul Egyptian clerical-Qaradawi who in the past has been supportive o Hezbollah and tried to mendrelations between Sunnis and Shiites is calling on young men to go to Syria andfight.11Shiite leaders in turn regularly speak o the Sunnis as the akfiris,12and in his

May speech Nasrallah declared that the Syrian opposition is composed o akfiris,who will give up Syria to the US and Israel, thus bringing the resistance under siege(Nasrallah, 25.05.2013). In Syria the sectarian narrative is gaining ground with new

11 Al-Qaradawi thus argued, We must all go to purge Syria o this infidel regime, with its Shiites who came romIran, Southern Lebanon and Iraq; Qaradawi even conessed that, I deended the so-called Nasrallah and hisparty, the party o tyranny ... in ront o clerics in Saudi Arabia it seems that the clerics in Saudi Arabia weremore mature than me (Al Arabiya, 02 .06.2013).12 akfiri means declaring a ellow Muslim an apostate or impure. But takfiris has commonly been used as adenominator or violent Salafi groups and is now being used by the Syrian government and Hezbollah to de-

legitimizing the Sunni rebels, effectively describing them as Wahabi extremists with undertones o being apostates.


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massacres against Sunni civilians in Bayda and Baniyas,13with attacks on Shiite vil-lages close to the Lebanese border by rebel orces (O Bagy, 2013; Syrian Observer,12.06.2013) and with Hezbollahs open involvement in the battle or Qasair.

However it should be stressed that the uprising in Syria did not start out as a sectarianSunni revolt against an Alawite-based regime; the protest was not about sectariandivisions. Rather sectarianism has been amplified by the al-Assad regime and byregional powers who have distributed aid and arms along sectarian lines. From thebeginning, the al-Assad regime has thus skilully instrumentalized a sectarian narra-tive, helping to turn sectarian conflict into a sel-ulfilling prophecy, just as regional

powers have pursued their own strategic interest by enhancing sectarian supportstructures (see e.g. Crisis Group, 2012; Heydemann, 2013; Malmvig & Janus, 2013).

Te initial peaceul Syrian protests demanding democratic reorms have morphed intoan increasingly violent and Sunni-extremist rebellion that includes oreign fightersand al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Nusra and al-Sham Brigade, who in turn fightagainst Alawite and Shia militias backed by Iran and Hezbollah.

Textbox 2. The power-base of the al-Assad regime

Te Shia element o the al-Assad rule (and the Sunni-Shia dimension o the Syrianconflict) is ofen exaggerated in popular accounts. Although the regimes inner cir-cle is mostly Alawite (which is an offshoot o Shia Islam), the regime is not basedon an Islamist or Shia ideology (as Iran is). Rather it is a semi-secular regime thatdraws on ideas rom Pan-Arab and socialist Baathism, combined with reerencesto Islam, and since the early 00s with some neo-liberal notions. Above all al-As-sads power base has traditionally relied on the repressive and prolierous securityapparatus and the personal cult surrounding the al-Assad amily (see e.g. Wen-den, 1999). Since the Alawites only constitute about 10-15 percent o the Syrian

population, the regime has always included and co-opted other religious groups

and classes into its power base, notably the Sunni business classes rom Damascusand Aleppo, in addition to Christians, Druze and, to a lesser extent, the Kurds.At present, the regime still seems to draw support rom some influential Sunnigroups, just as there are Alawites and Christians in the opposition, mitigating theSunni-Shia narrative.

13 Reports by opposition groups inside Syria estimate that over 200 civilians were killed in Bayda and Baniyas;these reports cannot however be independently verified (see BBC, 28.05. 2013, Syrian activists document al-Bayda

and Baniyas massacre).


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While neighbouring regional powers have amplified the Sunni-Shia dimension o theSyrian conflict, it is equally the case that Syrias neighbours are increasingly affectedby the sectarian spillover rom Syria. In Lebanon the political leaders o the various

religious groups have until recently strived not to bring the war to Lebanon and thegovernment has officially taken a neutral stand on Syria, or instance by not voting onArab League resolutions and by not being a member o the Friends o Syria group. Te

Lebanese Sunni Future Movement has aided the rebels in Syria, while Hezbollah hassupported the Syrian regime. Also, minor Sunni-Shia clashes have occurred notably in

ripoli and Sidon. But with the direct implication o Hezbollah in the war, the Leba-nese ear that war may erupt inside Lebanon, dragging in external powers, or that state

institutions may be locked into long-term paralysis (see e.g. Bitar, 2013; Hitti, 2013).

Iraq is also increasingly eeling the effects o the Syrian War. Te presence o SunniIraqi fighters in Syria has been reported or some time, but now the fight has beenmoved to Iraqi ground and a resurgent al-Qaeda is once again striking Shiites symbolsand the al-Maliki government (Bitar, 2013). Renewed sectarian killings in Iraq havebrought the highest death toll to the country in five years14and mainstream Sunnigroups still seem eager to contest the Shiite post-Saddam order, hoping that the allo al-Assad might lead to a similar weakening o their own Shiite government. Sunnimilitias continue to target the Iraqi Army and security orces and there are now also

reports that Sunni mosques and neighbourhoods are targeted by Shiite militias (NewYork imes, 01.06.2013).

In the rest o the Gul, the Sunni-Shia split is especially elt in Bahrain and SaudiArabia. In Bahrain, Sunnis, wearing badges with slogans saying No Sunni, No Shia,

Just Bahraini, initially joined the Shia protesters in Manamas Pearl Roundabout anddemanded political reorms and a constitutional monarchy. Yet, as in Syria, the alKhalia government has skilully activated a sectarian narrative, which means anti-Shia

and anti-Iranian rhetoric now thrive, nurtured by Saudi Arabias vested interest in

suppressing the uprising and Irans strong rhetorical support o protesters (see Abdo,2013:15-18). Also within Saudi Arabia, Shiites continue to be discriminated againstand, presently, Shiite clerics in the Eastern province are being jailed on charges ospying or Iran (Schenker, 2013).

While the Sunni-Shia rif obviously is elt mostly in states with significant portionso both communities (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), it is clear that

14

New York imes, 01.06.2013, As Syrians Fight, Sectarian Strie Inects the Mideast.


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Sunni-Shia divisions also have become more salient on a regional level, dragging inpowers who traditionally have not acted as vanguards o Sunni Islam, such as urkey,Jordan and Egypt, the last having recently experienced a number o mob attacks

against Shiites, although these do not make up more than two to three percent othe population. Te act that the Sunni-Shia axis runs alongside the Arab-Iranianrivalry and that the pro-Western versus anti-Western resistance ront obviously servesto exacerbate sectarianism makes ample room or the political instrumentalization osectarian divides. Indeed as we will see below, allegiances that run across these divides

are now hard to come by in the region, just as attempts at pursuing more pragmaticzero-problem oreign policies seem to have become almost impossible. Tere are,however, also new divisions and rivalries within the Sunni camp, particularly be-tween the Muslim Brotherhood/Qatar and Salafi groups/Saudi Arabia, as will be

spelled out below.

3.5 The end of pragmatist foreign policy and the emergence of a

Salafi-Muslim Brotherhood divide

Prior to the Arab Uprisings both urkey and Qatar were to a large extent pursuing the

same kind o pragmatic oreign policies that cut across the regions main allegiancesand divisions. Both countries had extensive economic ties to Iran and with the West,

and to some extent with Israel. Both were increasingly involved in the Palestinianissue, just as Qatar was heavily engaged in Lebanon and the reconstruction o Shiiteneighbourhoods in the afermath o the 2006 war with Israel. Qatar and urkeysoreign policy pragmatism and attempts to beriend all regional players were rarelycondoned in the West, but both countries were rather popular in the region andallowed sufficient room to manoeuvre by other regional powers.

In the wake o the Arab Uprisings, however, both countries have thrown their po-litical and economic weight unequivocally behind the uprisings, thereby breaking

with their previous oreign policy strategy. Tis shif in strategy has been elt mostclearly in ehran, where Iranian diplomats eel a sense o betrayal and are openly

puzzled by Ankara and Dohas early and strong support or the Syrian rebels.15Andas the competing ronts in Syria have become more entrenched, it seems that no ma-

jor regional power is allowed to pursue the kind o zero-problem policy that Qatarand urkey once did. Tis is most evident in the case o Egypt, where since 2012Morsi in act sought to pursue a more autonomous, less aligned oreign policy. Morsi

15

Based on discussions with diplomats, researchers and think tanks in ehran in November 2012.


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reached out to Iran, opening up or economic and diplomatic relations which weresevered in the afermath o the 1979 Iranian Revolution thereby departing romits traditionally close policy coordination with Saudi Arabia and Jordan and cutting

across the Arab-Iranian rivalry and the Sunni-Shia rif. On Syria, Egypt, under Morsi,similarly attempted to find a middle position. On one hand Egypt is housing theSyrian opposition in Cairo and has, similar to other key Arab states, demanded thatal-Assad step down. On the other hand, Egypt has rom the beginning avoured anon-military negotiated solution to Syria, kept diplomatic relation with al-AssadsSyria and tried to include Iran in a quartet on Syria together with Saudi Arabia andurkey.16Given Egypts size and historical role in the Arab world, these attempts toact as a third orce could potentially have mitigated some o the regions stark divi-sions and rivalries. Yet as the regional ault lines in the Syrian civil war have grown

stronger, and as the Egyptian leadership has become increasingly consumed by its owndomestic agenda and the countrys dire economic situation, Morsi was swinging backto the countrys old Sunni alliance with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In mid-June2013, Morsi thus broke off all diplomatic relations with Damascus, urged Western

powers to enorce a no-fly zone and condemned Hezbollahs aggression against theSyrian people (Morsi, Te Guardian, 15.06.2013).

Morsis inability to uphold a more autonomous oreign policy seems to confirm two

acts in current regional politics: first, that the regional security environment is lockedinto several reinorcing zero-sum conflicts, thus leaving little room or pragmaticmiddle positions and diplomacy; second, that the Gul states o Qatar and Saudi

Arabia continue to constitute the regions main powers and that Egypt has not yet re-gained its ormer regional might. Saudi Arabias regional influence, ounded

on skyrocketing oil prices in the 1970s, is o course nothing new, but Qatars rise toprominence is more recent. With the help o vast natural gas reserves and Al Jazeera,Qatar has in many ways filled a power vacuum in the region and skilully used oppor-tunities to brand itsel regionally and internationally as a hub or education, research

and media, just as Qatar has used its economic muscle to broker political agreementsor influence key regional actors. In act under Morsi, Qatar became Egypts largestdonor by ar exceeding other external donors such as the International MonetaryFund and the US, providing over USD 5 billion, allegedly without imposing thekind o conditionalities that the IMF and the EU do (Singh, 2013). 17

16 Yet Saudi Arabia was opposed to the inclusion o Iran and never turned up or the meeting.17 However, one might speculate i not the Qatari Emir has let the Egyptian President know that Qatar would

welcome a policy-shif on Iran and Syria.


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Yet Qatars colossal support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, unisia and Syriahas given rise to increasing concern and some ear mongering among other states inthe region. Saudi Arabia is especially seeking to balance Qatars political influence in

the states o the Arab Uprisings, generally supporting the Salafi groups while Qatarsupports the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, the two Gul states are thus engaged ina fierce rivalry and provide different rebels groups with aid, military equipment andtraining. Saudi Arabia is allegedly supporting the Salafi-leaning rebel groups andQatar in collaboration with urkish support or Free Syrian Army brigades closeto the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the Farouq Brigades in Homs and the Liwaal-awhid in Aleppo.18Te Saudi-Qatari competition is also played out at the levelo the Syrian political opposition, where Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood havedominated the Syrian National Coalition and the transitional government with Hit-

to as prime minister. Saudi Arabia is now gaining more influence within the newlyexpanded Syrian National Coalition, according to some Arab observers in an effortto undermine the dominance o the Brotherhood (Hassan, 2013; Yousse, 2013).

However, the Saudi wariness over the rise o the Muslim Brotherhood cannot bereduced to a rivalry over regional power between Qatar and Saudi Arabia alone.Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood must also be seen in light o the Gulstates own internal security situation and their preoccupation with regime stability

and sel-preservation. Saudi Arabia has thus traditionally projected its precariousdomestic political balance onto the region by sponsoring Wahhabi interpretationso Islam abroad. Moreover, the support or Salafi groups in Egypt, unisia and Syriacan largely be seen as a continuation o that policy. Yet it is also clear that many Gulstates see the coming to power o the Muslim Brotherhood in several states in theregion as a new challenge to domestic order. Te recent arrest in United Arab Emirateso over 100 local Muslim Brotherhood members (al-Islah), including 14 Egyptiancitizens affiliated with the Brotherhood, reflects the nature o this regional-domesticdynamic. Al-Islah is banned in the UAE, yet it remains the most well-organized actor

in the opposition and has recently called or broader elections and political reormsin the UAE. Now it is being charged with subversion and spying or Egypt. In SaudiArabia the Brotherhood has also voiced some criticism o the Palace and has at timescalled or political change. Yet the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood has been careul notto overstep any boundaries in order not to jeopardize its uture survival in the Saudi

18 Yet these support structures are arguably di fficult to trace, not least because the different brigades and theircommanders do not declare themselves as belonging to the Brotherhood (or not), Moreover, it is estimated thatthere are presently over 100 different smaller rebel groups inside Syria and many o these are known to shif sides,

allegiance or financier depending on where the money and ammunition are (see Lund, 2013:10).


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Arabia (Boghardt, 2013). Qatar, in contrast, has housed Muslim Brotherhood mem-bers in exile, such as the Egyptian sheikh al-Qaradawi and leading Islamist journalists

working or Al Jazeera, this being a constant source o tension or the neighbouring

Gul countries well beore the Arab Uprisings. Some Saudi analysts argue that theysee the growing regional influence o the Muslim Brotherhood as a greater challengeto their regimes than the liberal-democratic quest originally inorming the Arab Up-risings the term Muslim Brotherhood Crescent quietly circulating.19Te wordingis o course not accidental; by invoking the (in)amous Shia Crescent, the MuslimBrotherhood is indirectly inscribed as a threat on a par with Iran/Shiites, yet withoutreerring directly to a threat or speciying the reerent o that threat.

With the change o leadership in Qatar and the ousting o Morsi in Egypt in July,

Saudi security concerns may, however, have lessened somewhat. Te new leadershipin Qatar has already announced that it will sofen its support or the Arab Uprisingsand or the Muslim Brotherhood around the region. Rumours are also floating thatQatar intends to expel the Egyptian religious leader al-Qaradawi. At the same time,the military ouster o Morsi has paved the way or Saudi Arabia and UAE to enterEgyptian politics once again, and Saudi Arabia has already pledged USD 8 billion tothe new military leadership in Eg ypt, in addition to ree shipments o petrol. Teserecent events have arguably shifed the balance o power between Saudi Arabia and

Qatar, the latter likely to pursue a quieter oreign policy in the short term.

However, concerns with the rise (and all) o the Muslim Brotherhood across theregion also point to the continued salience o state-society dynamics or the MiddleEast security situation and the continued permeability o the Arab state. Tus theQatar-Saudi/Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi rivalry cannot be understood without takinginto account the domestic politics and vulnerability o many o the Gul regimes,and conversely the rivalries between Salafi parties and the Muslim Brotherhood in,or instance, Egypt must also be seen on the backdrop o Qatar and Saudi Arabias

patronage. Given the ragile political basis o many regimes in the region, identitypolitics is likely to shape regional politics in the years to come as well.

19

Anonymous background interview.


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4. Conclusion: fragmentation and war

in the Middle East

Middle East regional security is changing rapidly. Te Arab Uprisings and the Syriancivil war are changing not only the relationship between state and society, but alsosome o the regions core norms and historical divisions. Tus this report has arguedthat the regions main conflict line between pro-Western and anti-Western states hasbecome less salient, just as traditional popular issues heralded by the resistance ronthave lessened in importance. Tis is in part a result o the Arab Uprisings and theall o autocratic regimes around the region, making it more difficult or Iran andHezbollah to mobilize Arab societies and exploit the legitimacy gap between state

and society. Yet, above all, the Syrian civil war and the rise o sectarianism have putIran and Hezbollah under pressure. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are actively pushing theSunni-Shia rif, and with the loss o Hamas and the direct involvement o Hezbollahon the side o the al-Assad regime, the resistance ront is increasingly being viewedas Shia club across the region. At the same time the Israeli attacks against Syria andHezbollah-Irans sable rattling on the Israeli-Lebanese border now carry the risk oturning the Syrian proxy war into a ull-blown regional war.

Combined with the intense polarization o Egyptian society and the recent militarytakeover, these developments make the region extremely unstable and conflict-riddenin ways not seen since the 1960s. o the extent that Egypt slides into a sustainedmilitary dictatorship and the Syrian civil war is allowed to carry on, this instabilityand level o conflict will jeopardize the positive developments originally set in motionby the Arab Uprisings. We need only to compare the present situation with eventsa year ago to get a sense o how regional security has deteriorated. In 2011 and early2012 there was still widespread belie in the potential or more regional integrationand cooperative security mechanisms, especially with regard to the role that the Arab

League and sub-regional orums such as the Union o the Maghreb or GCC couldplay. Tere were equally high hopes or new regional norms evolving on how statescould treat their own citizens given the intervention in Libya and in Yemen, and abelie in the spread o protest and calls or democracy to other parts o the region,Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan being potential candidates or democratic upris-ings. However, these hopes are being effectively undermined.

Te implications or the Europe and the US o these regional developments are

significant. With over 90,000 deaths the civil war in Syria alone constitutes a moral


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and humanitarian problem, but the Syrian civil war goes well beyond its own bor-ders, affecting key US allies and the political, economic and security conditions othe whole region. Similarly, in the case o Egypt, violent conrontations between

pro and anti-Morsi orces also affect the conflict between secularists and Islamistsin unisia, and the situation in Gaza and among the Palestinians. While the currentUS administration has sought to correct the overemphasis on the Middle East by

previous administrations though or good reasons it is clear that leading rombehind is becoming increasingly difficult or the US. In the absence o US leadership,

regional politics has not been lef to homegrown democratic or pragmatic Islamistvoices in unisia, Egypt and Libya that originally spearheaded the Arab Uprisings,but to authoritarian regimes in the Gul and elsewhere, which are now shaping andradicalizing the region.

For Europe isolation is even less o an option. Europes geographical proximity andstrong historical and cultural ties with the region make containment difficult and inact out o line with the EUs strategic goals or the region as laid out in the ENP. Yetalthough European governments agree on notions o indivisible security and sharedstability, prosperity and security based on democratic values as an abstract ormula or

dealing with the region, how to enact this strategy aced with the many dilemmas othe Arab Uprisings and the Syrian quagmire has until now proven notoriously difficult.

Tere is a high price to pay, however, or non-decision and hal-backed solutions:entrenched authoritarianism, jihadi resurgence, and prolonged sectarianism and

violence. Te road to Damascus may thereore very well have to go through deter-mined action in Brussels.


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DIIS REPORT 2013:23

Defence and Security Studies at DIIS

Tis publication is part o Deence and Security Studies o the Danish Institute orInternational Studies (DIIS).

Te Deence and Security Studies unit ocuses on six areas: Global security and theUN, the transatlantic relationship and NAO, European security and the EU, Danishdeence and security policy, Crisis management and the use o orce and New threats,

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Research subjects are ormulated in consultation with the Danish Ministry o De-

ence. Te design and the conclusions o the research are entirely independent, anddo in no way automatically reflect the views o the ministries involved or any othergovernment agency, nor do they constitute any official DIIS position.

Te output o the Deence and Security Studies takes many orms rom researchbries to articles in international journals in order to live up to our mutually con-stitutive aims o conducting high quality research and communicating its findingsto the Danish public.

Te main publications o the Deence and Security Studies published by DIIS aresubject to peer review by one or more members o the review panel. Studies publishedelsewhere are reviewed according to the rules o the journal or publishing house inquestion.

Malmvig_Ambiguous Endings. Middle East Regional Security

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