Making Sense of Suffering: Insights from Buddhism and Critical Social Science

Flores, Ruben. “Making Sense of Suffering: Insights from Buddhism and Critical Social Science.” In World Suffering and Quality of Life, edited by Ronald E. Anderson, 65–73. Social Indicators Research Series 56. Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-9670-5_5.

Making sense of and healing suffering: Insights from Buddhism and critical social science 1

Ruben Flores

Abstract

In order to enrich our analytical framework for the study and alleviation of suffering, this chapter argues that there are good reasons to encourage a dialogue between Buddhism and critical social science (CSS). Although both traditions hold the reduction of suffering as fundamental, they provide different causal understandings of and recommendations for healing suffering. CSS is good at criticizing social sources of suffering, but arguably requires a constant engagement with a variety of normative discourses in order to regain clarity as to its motivations and purposes. On the other hand, although Buddhism stresses personal liberation and provides tools for addressing existential suffering, it has nevertheless historically neglected social causes of suffering. Thus, there are spaces for mutual enrichment and synthesis, as well as areas of disagreement that could potentially spur further dialogue, critique, self-critique, and reflexivity.

Keywords: ethics, ontology, reflexivity, Buddhism, suffering, synthetic research

———

R. Flores National Research University - Higher School of Economics Email: [email protected]

The author wishes to thank Ron Anderson, Patrick Brown, Katja Bruisch, Ryan Burg, 1

Letta Wren Page, Lili Di Puppo, and Sandy Ross for very useful comments and criticism. All the shortcomings of the text are entirely the author’s responsibility.

Postal address: 20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation.

1 Introduction

Seeking to enrich our framework for studying and alleviating suffering, this chapter reflects upon the points of contact and tension between critical social science (CSS) and Buddhism—two traditions that have been compared at different times to the practice of medicine (Batchelor 1998; Bresnan 1999; Conze 1951; Eagleton 2011; Levine 2007) in that a key aspect of their raison d’etre concerns the alleviation of suffering. Both Buddhism and CSS offer causal understandings of suffering and recommendations for its alleviation. However, diagnoses and remedies differ in substantive ways, as it is to be expected from discourses developed in radically different historical contexts.

Part of my argument is that a dialogue between Buddhism and CSS is both necessary and useful. Necessary because, as Andrew Sayer has argued, CSS is bound to benefit from a constant engagement with different ethical perspectives (Sayer 2009); Buddhism, on the other hand, though strong on ethics, lacks a coherent understanding of societal suffering, which understanding CSS could provide. And useful because such debate could enrich the analytical perspectives of anyone interested in understanding and alleviating suffering.

Both Buddhism and CSS have long histories. I have attempted to avoid oversimplifications, especially regarding Buddhism, a tradition that, with over twenty five centuries of reflection and practice, has given rise to a wide variety of schools and sub-traditions spanning continents, languages, and times (Buswell and Lopez 2014; Bresnan 1999). My approach is best understood as drawing on Weberian “ideal types,” or conceptual constructions that seek to represent a given phenomenon, but that should not be confused with the varieties and nuances of its many manifestations.

2 Critical social science (CSS)

In a sense, all social research is critical. Varieties of CSS like Marxism or feminism can be clearly distinguished from mainstream social research in that they aim to dispel illusions not only in academic discourse, but also “in society itself” (Sayer 2009:769). For example, “Marxism generally incorporates a critique of practices or social structures as contradictory and productive of unintended and destructive consequences (Callinicos 2006),” while feminism has criticized the incongruity of gender notions underpinning sexist/patriarchal practices (Sayer 2009:769-770). Following Marx’s celebrated eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, CSS has historically committed to understanding and criticizing social reality, as well as to transforming it through conscious individual and collective action (Feagin and Vera 2008).

In seeking to transform the world for the better, though, one is bound to benefit from taking a clear ethical standpoint. This is when CSS runs into trouble. Traditionally, CSS has implicitly aligned itself with notions like emancipation, thus effectively tending a bridge between “positive (explanatory/descriptive) social science and normative discourses such as

those of moral and political philosophy” (Sayer 1997:476). CSS has, however, tended to avoid spelling out the normative grounds on which it stands. While this uneasiness did not derail CSS at the time when criticism was fashionable, it has become a serious obstacle to its aspirations during more conservative times. The upshot is that, in the last three or four decades, critical researchers have been unable to go beyond shy demands for heightened reflexivity and “unsettling” discourses. Necessary though these activities may be, they can only amount to a “weak” version of critique (Sayer 2009).

Against this background, Sayer (2011) suggests CSS would be well advised to embark on a serious effort to make explicit and develop its normative dimension. This means defining what is taken to be human “good”—a task more difficult than it may at first appear. As Sayer argues, the categories of suffering and flourishing could offer a useful starting point. After all, an aspiration to combat social suffering has always been a powerful impetus not only for CSS but also for sociology more generally (Wilkinson 2005). CSS would be rendered intelligible if we were unable to understand that social practices that are typically the object of CSS’s critique (capitalism, patriarchy, environmental destruction, compulsory heterosexuality, racism, or imperialism) bring about suffering and impede flourishing (Sayer 2009). CSS practitioners would be able to generate stronger versions of critique were they to recognize that one of their tasks concerns not only dispelling illusions about social life, but also unveiling the mechanisms through which human practices and structures bring about suffering. CSS could also free itself to explicitly search for social conditions that lead to individual and societal flourishing (Sayer 2009; Dussel 1998).

What we take to constitute suffering and well being is, of course, a function of our ethical framework. It is thus imperative for critical social scientists to engage in a permanent dialogue with ethical discourses, regardless of their provenance. The possibilities are as vast as the scope of humanity’s ethical and political traditions, which include the religious and spiritual systems that have provided humanity with ethical guidance for thousands of years (Queen 2000).

3. Buddhism: Individual suffering and compassion for all beings

Born around 500 BCE in the Indian sub-continent during what Karl Jaspers called the Axial Age (Bellah and Joas 2012), Buddhism remains one of the world’s major spiritual traditions, as well as a visible “cultural institution” and “system of healing” (Safran 2003). As other such traditions, Buddhism provides an answer to the age-old question: “How do we find meaning in the midst of the pain, suffering and loss that are inevitably part of life?” (Safran 2003).

Buddhism is notoriously difficult to classify, with some interpretations highlighting its philosophical facet and others its more ritualistic and religious sides (Revel and Ricard 1998). In Western circles, Buddhism has been characterized as a “religion of no religion” (Watts 1996) and as a “religion without beliefs” (Batchelor 1998; cit. Safran 2003). In this account, “the goal in Buddhism thus becomes not one of transcending worldly experience [and

suffering] but rather one of finding a wiser way of living within it” (Safran 2003:461-462). Buddhism here is characterized as an agnostic, non-theistic and pragmatic way of life intent on addressing mental suffering through the letting go of attachments to ego, and the simultaneous cultivation of virtues like compassion, which in the Buddhist tradition is understood as “the wish that we may be free from suffering and the causes of suffering” (Wallace 2011:137).

While there is truth in these descriptions, the history and practice of Buddhism is more complicated and not without numerous tensions. For one, like Christianity, many strands of Buddhism have sought to abolish the very realm where suffering and flourishing take place (Taylor 2013); for another, magic has historically played a very important role in Buddhist practice, early Buddhism’s rejection of metaphysical and theological debates notwithstanding (Conze 1951). Buddhism thus inhabits a tension field that, far from undermining its credibility, has conferred it with vitality and dynamism throughout the centuries. Buddhist practitioners and schools have historically had to navigate their way between “the poles of agnosticism (or atheism) and faith (or commitment)” and “individualistic and communal orientations” (Safran 2003:3). One of the reasons behind this diversity lies in Buddhism's remarkable ability to adapt to the different cultural contexts it has encountered (Conze 1951). It blended with Shamanic practices in Tibet, with the cult of the ancestors in Japan, and today is in dialogue with naturalistic discourses in the West (Flanagan 2011; Wallace 2006).

Common across the different schools of Buddhism is an understanding of suffering as stemming from the (wrong) view of self as a fixed, impermanent entity (as opposed to an ever changing construct) (Safran 2003), as well as an ethics system that stresses compassion, loving-kindness, equanimity, and sympathetic joy for all beings (Conze 1951; Flanagan 2011; Revel and Ricard 1998). These two features can be seen as standing in a productive tension with one another. On the one hand, the view of the self as non-substantial “leads to boundless contraction of the self— because everything is emptied out of it” (Conze 1951:129). On the other hand, we are invited to identify with the suffering of ever wider circles of sentient beings and to strive for their liberation, a task leading to “a boundless expansion of the self— because one identifies oneself with more and more living beings. (...) The true task of the Buddhist is to carry on with both contradictory methods at the same time.” (Conze 1951:129; see also Wallace:133).

In a very important sense, the interpretations outlined above hardly matter. For Buddhism, doctrine and theory are secondary to the question whether teachings/practices can be useful in overcoming suffering. Likewise, intellectual understanding of Buddhist teachings amounts to little, if anything, in the absence of the practice of virtues like compassion and loving-kindness for all beings and (in some sub-traditions) an utter detachment from the world, including our own bodies (Conze 1951). A multiplicity of methods is available to those aspiring to follow the Buddhist path, from lay rituals to the meditative practices traditionally associated with monastic life. Buddhist practitioners aim at cultivating a sense of serenity and inner peace that are independent of external conditions and the unavoidable ups and downs of life (Ricard 2003:16-22).

Yet one can think of the basic condition of sitting in meditation as not adding much to the alleviation of the world’s suffering or be as broad as helping to release all living beings from suffering. A key point to bear in mind is that scholars and practitioners of the Buddhist tradition have been much more interested in working with our minds in order to alleviate suffering via “world-denying love” (Bellah 2006a) than in changing our social and natural environment (Wallace 2011). In other words, Buddhism has developed an avenue for overcoming suffering in which the stress is on changing our relationship to the world, rather than on changing the world. This has led a number of scholars to claim that drawing only on Buddhist teachings in order to understand and alleviate suffering under conditions of modernity leads to an aporia or irresolvable internal contradiction (Bellah 2006a).

Buddhism’s seeming inability to address modern social sources of suffering stems from its lacking a coherent understanding of political, economic, and social life (Smithers 2012; Van Arnam 2013; Flanagan 2011). As philosopher Owen Flanagan puts it: “Buddhism is a comprehensive philosophy that is very weak in the political philosophy department, overrating compassion and underrating the need for institutions that enact justice as fairness.” (2011:xii). This shortcoming complicates the Buddhist response to the socially conditioned forms of suffering resulting from the dynamic of economic and political systems such as capitalism or authoritarianism. (See, however, Loy 2002). In fact, at some points during Buddhism’s long history, rulers have found in Buddhist calls for compassion and non-violence an effective tool for pacification, conformism, and legitimation (Conze 1951). This is not to say that Buddhism is inherently “conservative”; there have been moments where social/resistance movements have adopted a Buddhist language in order to make sense of their struggles, the Chinese Boxer rebellion being a case in point (Conze 1951).

4. Healing suffering

Though their approaches differ, some parallels are apparent between CSS and Buddhism. Both traditions share the conviction that we can avoid and overcome suffering, provided we are able to dispel delusions about its causes through an appreciation of the nature of reality (Ricard 2003:22-24, 27; Wallace 2011). However, those aspects of reality to which they draw our attention differ: CSS bids us to pay heed to historical social processes while Buddhism advises refraining from giving undue attention to impermanent phenomena.

In spite of the aforementioned differences, or perhaps because of them, Buddhism and CSS are well placed for the tasks of dialogue, critique, and self-critique. Neither tradition exists, after all, for the sake of winning arguments; rather, just like medicine, each is intended to help us cope with the challenges of human existence and liberate humanity from suffering (see, however, Eagleton 2011, for a different take on Buddhism). The desirability of a dialogue has not been lost upon representatives of either “cultural institution”, to use Safran’s term (Safran 2003). Sayer has criticized CSS for its recent shyness and has encouraged a more active engagement with ethical traditions. And numerous Buddhist communities have come to the realization that addressing suffering in the contemporary world involves facing social problems (Malkin 2003; Van Arnam 2013; Queen 2000). Socially engaged Buddhism has emerged “in the context of a global conversation on human rights, distributive justice,

and social progress” (Queen 2000). The same could be said about the 14th Dalai Lama’s repeated statements on Marxism, which acknowledge the need to enrich Buddhism with other traditions in order to make sense of the socio-economic inequalities and political oppression found across the world, e.g., “I think of myself as half-Marxist, half-Buddhist” (Dalai Lama 1996:110; see also Dalai Lama 1999) and “as far as sociopolitical beliefs are concerned, I consider myself a Marxist” (Dalai Lama as quoted by Namgyal 2011; see also Smithers 2012).

We could imagine the outcomes of the potential integration between the two traditions in concrete settings. Buddhism-inspired mindfulness interventions are already used to alleviate pain related to some medical conditions, like depression (Feldman and Kuyken 2011; Fraser 2013), as well as to combat compassion fatigue and stress among healthcare professionals (McClure 2013; Shapiro, Schwartz and Bonner 1998; Shapiro et al. 2005; Fraser 2013). In spite of their value, however, such interventions can do little to address the social inequalities that make such a big difference in the life expectancy and quality of life of people around the world. In order to challenge those inequalities, CSS speaks with a clearer voice than Buddhism.

Still, the salience of Buddhism in the spiritual landscape of contemporary societies can be interrogated as a possible symptom of the ideological problems of our time, and construed as a central piece in the ideological core of the 21st century capitalist “post-ideological era” (Žižek 2001; see also Smithers 2012). In this account, Buddhism allows people to search for salvation without having to confront the contradictions of capitalism and capitalist societies. Though this critique may be justified, its validity is limited. Reducing “Western Buddhism” to a form of escapism risks throwing out the baby with the bathwater. For the value of Buddhism and other achievements of the Axial Age (Bellah and Joas 2012) arguably go well beyond the historical specificity of the capitalist age.

Dissonances should not be reasons for despair. Clashing notions can be fruitful grounds for the development of new ideas (Turner 2014), as the dialectical tradition teaches (Farr 2008; Jay 1996; Van Arnam 2013). Both sides require, however, the ability to listen attentively to the other (Barenboim 2010), a point worth mentioning because many strands of CSS have not been particularly good at listening. This flaw partly explains the charges of authoritarianism leveled against them in the past (Sayer 2009). How Buddhism fares on this count is an empirical question. We should note that, given its standing “in between” religion and philosophy, Buddhism is particularly well placed for building bridges between different traditions (Dalai Lama, cit. Revel and Ricard 1998:25); that listening constitutes an important part of socially engaged Buddhism (Malkin 2003); and that some strands of Tibetan Buddhism in exile have shown a keen interest in encouraging a dialogue between science and religion (Wallace 2006). And yet, in spite of having anticipated many insights from sociology for thousands of years, in general Buddhism has arguably failed thus far to engage in a serious dialogue with social research (for an exception see Loy 2002).

5. Towards a framework for the study of suffering

A process of active listening and dialogue could open up a “cycle of critique” (Abbott 2004), with both traditions addressing each other’s weaknesses. A dialogue with Buddhist ethics could provide CSS the tools to counter its excessive emphasis on the individual self, which by the way is also common to much current social research (Anderson 2014; and personal communication). There is, of course, nothing wrong with individual emancipation and freedom. However, in taking the “free individual” as an implicit, ultimate goal when criticizing “undesirable social determinations,” CSS has failed to grasp that flourishing requires not only liberation and “freedom from” undesirable social constraints, but also “freedom to” form social commitments (e.g., freedom to join communities and adopt responsibilities) (Sayer 2009).

In this context, Buddhism and traditions like care ethics (Tronto 1993) could help CSS gain clarity about the role of care as a positive social determination, and more generally on the social conditions that facilitate human flourishing for fragile yet resilient beings like us (Sayer 2011; see also Johnston [this volume] and Wilkinson [this volume]. For instance, engaging with Buddhism could help social researchers make sense of instances where suffering can be transformed into compassion (Johnston [this volume]; Flores 2013). On a more applied level, CSS could benefit from Buddhist techniques for cultivating compassion and virtue in order to advance towards more humane forms of struggle against oppression; this is not a minor task given the cruelty committed in the name of the construction of revolutionary projects in the 20th century (on compassion and politics, see Paz 1990). The ideals and actions of Mahatma Gandhi and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. illustrate the potential for bringing together struggles for social emancipation with “world-denying love” (Bellah 2006a).

As far as Buddhism is concerned, a dialogue with CSS could help make sense of suffering brought about by historical social practices and structures. As Conze writes, no major Buddhist school has developed in the last thousand years or so, but the conditions of the modern world may encourage a new creative impetus for Buddhism (Conze 1951:68). Queen (2000) argues, similarly, that socially engaged Buddhism may be part of the formation of a new Buddhist stream—one more attuned to the needs of the modern world and the need to attain collective liberation and flourishing alongside personal liberation from suffering (see also Levine 2007).

But the more general point is this: in seeking to frame, explain, and alleviate suffering, we necessarily draw on the manifold intellectual, religious, and philosophical traditions that constitute humanity’s heritage. Even when attempting to reject past understandings of the nature, causes, and solutions of suffering, human beings never start ex nihilo—they build on the stock of knowledge available to them (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Vera 2013). From these traditions, we have inherited some basic distinctions and intuitions leading to different conclusions as to the best courses of action individuals and whole societies might follow in their ethics, politics, and policies. Taking these traditions on their own terms and in dialogue could open new vistas for those interested in understanding and

alleviating suffering. In seeking to illustrate this point focusing on Buddhism and critical social science, I have argued that both traditions could benefit from listening attentively to what the other has to say. This involves focusing on the harmonies between traditions as well as the points of dissonance. To the extent that these perspectives converge, they can enrich our toolkit to frame and heal suffering; to the extent that they collide, they call for dialogue, critique, self-critique, and reflexivity. This dialogue could also be useful to those who, without subscribing to either tradition, share a common goal to intellectually and practically address the challenges that suffering raises for human existence.

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