Making or Breaking the Silence? British Jews and Anglo-Jewish Relief, 1914-1917.

SamJohnson

BREAKING OR MAKING THE SILENCE?BRITISH JEWS AND EAST EUROPEAN

JEWISH RELIEF, 1914–1917

In 1839, the dynamics of Anglo–Jewish philanthropy shifted fromtheir traditional focus on internal, domestic wants and needs, to anexternal and international concern.1 This was the year that Sir MosesMontefiore, perhaps the single most important Anglo–Jewish figure ofthe nineteenth century, instigated a scheme to promote artisanal andagricultural skills in the Jerusalem Yishuv.2 Henceforward, Anglo-Jewrywas frequently concerned, intellectually or otherwise, with the socialand economic condition of its co-religionists in a worldwide context.In particular, moments of crisis usually inspired an act of communalresponsibility in the form of a relief committee or fund. For example,the Jews of Morocco benefited from such an act in the 1840s.3 Withinmonths of the 1871 Odessa pogrom, the community raised £5000 toaid the victims and, throughout the 1860s and 1870s, various fundswere instigated for oppressed Romanian Jews.4 Inevitably, the victimsof the 1881–1882 Russian pogroms, as well as those of early twentiethcentury, also received financial succor from British sources.5 Institu-tionally, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and, from 1872, theAnglo–Jewish Association (AJA) were the driving forces behind thesephilanthropic gestures.

In late 1914, Anglo-Jewry was confronted with another terriblecrisis in Eastern Europe, wrought by the actions of the Habsburg,German and, most especially, Imperial Russian armies. From early1915, the Anglo–Jewish press regularly published the horrendousdetail of the Great War’s impact on the Jewish communities strandedin the conflict’s Eastern theatre. For Russian, Austrian, and PolishJews, their sufferings were unimaginable, as they endured pogroms,hostage-taking, mass deportation, as well as the uprooting of tens ofthousands of civilians as refugees.6

The manner in which Anglo-Jewry responded to the humanitariancatastrophe in Eastern Europe forms the central focus of this paper.For reasons that will become obvious, it deals only with the three yearsprior to the February 1917 Revolution in Russia. The subsequent relief

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program, which continued into the early 1920s, requires a separatepaper. Hitherto, historians have paid only fleeting attention to thistopic and it has occupied just a few, mostly laudatory paragraphs inimportant studies of the Anglo–Jewish experience in the early twenti-eth century.7 Moreover, where the drawbacks of the relief programhave been assessed, the mechanisms of its failings have been viewedwithin the context of the Jewish–Gentile relationship in Britain. Or,more specifically, the relationship between the Anglo–Jewish establish-ment and the British government. Since Tsarist Russia was Britain’sally, Whitehall discouraged too harsh a portrait of the regime’s war-time Jewish policy. In this regard, it has been implicitly suggested thatAnglo-Jewry battled to break the silence on the fate of East EuropeanJewry.8 This article reassesses the relief program from a different per-spective. In particular, it considers how the internal dynamics ofAnglo–Jewish society impacted on the decision to implement a reliefprogram.

On previous occasions, the Anglo–Jewish establishment andthe wider Jewish community responded swiftly and tirelessly to allmanner of crises. Material relief was always generously supplied bythe Rothschilds, Montefiores, Goldsmids, and Sassoons, and wheremany prominent individuals led, others soon followed. Indeed,relief committees and funds always united, or at least glossed over,Anglo-Jewry’s differences. In contrast, the obligations of the GreatWar appeared to highlight and exacerbate Anglo–Jewish society’sreligious, social, and cultural divisions. In particular, there wererepeated clashes between the Jewish establishment, embodied in vari-ous institutions like the Board of Deputies and the AJA, and the widercommunity. As a consequence, from late 1914 until mid-1915, theAnglo–Jewish response to the crisis was, at best, hesitant and confused.At worst, it appeared indifferent. In other words, perhaps it was actu-ally Anglo-Jews who made, or at the very least, contributed to theBritish silence on Eastern European Jewry’s war-time crisis?

THE GREAT WAR: ‘‘JEWS WILL BE ALL THEY CAN TO ENGLAND’’

Historians have long considered the World War I a troubling time forBritish Jewry.9 Like many of their continental counterparts, fromthe early weeks of the conflict British Jews faced recurrent questionsabout their loyalty to the cause. Allegations of spying and politicalunreliability went hand-in-hand with accusations of cowardice andshirking. German-sounding surnames prompted fantastical imaginings,whilst immigrant Polish and Russian Jews were deemed pacifists.

2 Sam Johnson

The Jewish establishment endeavored to correct this skewed perspec-tive through a discreet propaganda campaign and, from mid-1915,an active and visible recruitment drive in the East End of London.10

A sentence from a leading article published in the Jewish Chronicle inAugust 1914, rapidly became a slogan that was embraced and reiter-ated throughout the war: ‘‘England has been all she could be to Jews,Jews will be all they can to England.’’11 From its earliest stages, theGreat War was perceived as a testbed for Jewish patriotism by Jewsthemselves.

Despite the sniping of the popular press, British Jewry’s commit-ment to military engagement was total. This was a fact best repre-sented by the ‘‘honor lists’’ of Jews serving in the armed forces thatappeared weekly in the Chronicle and its sister newspaper, the JewishWorld, and particularly by those who came under the separate headingof ‘‘killed in action.’’12 Indeed, statistics suggest that as a proportion ofthe British population, Jews actually served and died for their Kingand Country in greater numbers than their Gentile contemporaries.13

This was surely unparalleled evidence, in Jewish eyes, of the greatlydesired rejuvenation in the ‘‘old Maccabean spirit.’’14

Nevertheless, British Jewry nursed reservations about some aspectsof the war. The most telling and troubling concern was the alliancewith Tsarist Russia. Of course, this was far from only being a Jewishworry. Wider society fretted about the relationship with a regimewhose worldview appeared incompatible to British liberal and demo-cratic ideals. But for Jews it was particularly pressing. In the decadesbefore 1914, sections of the Anglo–Jewish establishment waged theirown battles with the Tsarist regime, campaigning frequently on theissue of Jewish rights in the Empire. Anti-Tsarist sentiment wasexpressed in a weekly publication, Darkest Russia, edited by LucienWolf.15 As secretary of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of theBoard of Deputies of British Jews/Anglo–Jewish Association, Wolfplayed an important role in the Jewish establishment’s response tothe war. The urgent pressure to patriotically fall into line led him tocease publication of Darkest Russia in August 1914, a gesture that wasmet with approval throughout the community.16

But this act was, to a degree, merely symbolic. It did not ensure theimmediate resolution of Anglo–Jewish misgivings about Britain’sRussian alliance. How could it? The animosity that British Jewry felttoward the Tsarist regime was based on comprehensible presumptions.For sure, there had been no pogroms in the years immediately preced-ing 1914, horrific events which best represented to British Jews thedepths to which the purported antisemitic policies of the regimecould sink.17 But the anachronistic phenomenon of anti-Jewish vio-lence appeared so inherent within Russian politics and society, who

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was to say that it might not recur again? Such prognostications were, ofcourse, all too readily confirmed as the Great War unfolded in the East.

In the initial months of the war, however, British Jews attemptedto cast new light on the situation in Eastern Europe and, for once,a shade of optimism was discernible. The Chronicle, for instance,expressed the hope that since Russia had been ‘‘drawn into theorbit of enlightened peoples,’’ it would surely return from the war‘‘with the scales of intolerance lifted from its eyes.’’18 Again, this wasa widespread perspective in Britain and many commentators predictedthat the victories of the Triple Entente would not merely be manifestin the military defeat of Germany and Austria–Hungary. Russia wouldreap the reward of a moral victory. Other Jewish commentators triedto explain away Tsarist antisemitism by asserting that ‘‘Jews in Russiaare thought to be akin to Germans.’’ Such suspicions had been‘‘fostered and engendered by the consciousness of the danger of themilitarism of that power.’’19 Thus, like all British newspapers, theChronicle and the World were assiduous in demonizing the image ofImperial Germany.

In August and September 1914, the optimistic hope that a newRussia was emerging seemed, to a degree, justified. Intelligencefrom Petrograd in various British newspapers promised the sweepingaway of the Pale of Settlement and other restrictions.20 But it was notlong before the case for such optimism was undermined. Initially,in October 1914, this resulted from the alleged atrocities perpetratedby Austrian and German troops, mirroring, it appeared, similaractions in Belgium. There were reports of hostage-taking, randomviolence, the desecration of synagogues, and the murder of civilians.The term pogrom was even used.21

In the weeks that followed, revelations about the actions of theTsar’s armies appeared alongside accusations against German andAustrian soldiers. An article by a special correspondent of theLondon Evening Standard, reprinted in both the World and theChronicle, detailed the terrible sufferings of Jewish civilians inLithuania (although it was identified as Poland). It was a world thathad been physically ripped apart by bullet and bayonet, where Jewishlivelihoods had been devastated and many thousands reduced to thecondition of miserable beggary.22 Subsequent reports revealed thefurther uprooting and destitution of East European Jews, as manythousands were scattered eastwards and westwards from the conflictsin Galicia and Russian Poland. Bedraggled and sorrowful Jewish refu-gees were observed by British correspondents in Vienna, Lemberg,Warsaw, and Russian towns outside the bounds of the Pale of Settle-ment.23 By the beginning of 1915, the time had surely come for BritishJews to act. But how—and why?

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‘‘WE AS A COMMUNITY HAVE DONE NOTHING’’24

Why British Jews should materially and morally support their EasternEuropean co-religionists was, perhaps surprisingly, not any easy ques-tion to answer in late 1914 and early 1915. This was certainly true ofthe Jewish establishment. The emphasis on being good Englishmen inthe initial stages of the Great War was the uppermost considerationfor the Conjoint Committee, the Board of Deputies and other keyAnglo–Jewish institutions. In August 1914, when shutting downDarkest Russia, which had once proudly been proclaimed a ‘‘ranklingthorn in the side of the [. . .] St. Petersburg government,’’ Lucien Wolfobserved25:

For the moment, Darkest Russia can serve no useful purpose, exceptby the contribution of its silence to the hushing of dissension in thefield in which the first duty of every Englishman now lies.26

The need to prove British Jews loyal subjects was the overridingconsideration in this period. The Conjoint was thus especially anxiousto avoid making any public fuss about the status and conditionof Eastern European Jews. After all, if the trials and hardships ofRussian and Polish Jews were highlighted too readily, accusationsabout Tsarist culpability might soon follow. This, in turn, wouldagain raise the disagreeable specter of disloyalty.

Instead, the Anglo–Jewish establishment preferred to play a wait-ing game, a plan implicit in its actions in this period. For instance,in October 1914, an article about the Jewish crisis in Poland, authoredby the renowned Danish scholar Georg Brandes, appeared in aCopenhagen newspaper, Politiken. By November, it had been trans-lated into English and mailed, via Stockholm, to potentially interestedparties in London, including leading Jewish newspapers, the AJA andthe Board of Deputies.27 Excerpts were included in issues of theChronicle and the World. The Dane did not hold back as he graphicallydetailed the ‘‘calamity that [had] befallen Polish Jewry,’’ manifestin ‘‘a widespread reign of terror culminating in pillage, rape andmurder—even the hanging of adults and children from telegraphpoles.’’28 Most of these crimes were said to have been committed byGerman ‘‘uhlans,’’ but insult was added to injury by the ‘‘apparentindifference of the Russian authorities.’’ The humanitarian instinctsof Poles were also found wanting. They were accused of stirring upRussian and German animosity toward Jews.29

Clearly, the words of a respected individual such as Brandes hadto be taken at face value.30 And, although there had already beenmany reports of anti-Jewish atrocities in Eastern Europe, it is evidentthat this single article impelled Anglo-Jews to sit up and take a closer

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look at what was happening to their Polish and Russian coreligionists.The establishment, however, took a different view. Writing to ClaudeG. Montefiore, AJA President, Wolf observed: ‘‘I have read Brandes’article, but am afraid in view of the resolution we arrived at at theConjoint the other night, we cannot do anything with it officially.’’31

The resolution, though not recorded, was seemingly a decision toavoid embroiling the Conjoint in any public controversy connectedto Russia’s Jewish question. Similar views were expressed a monthlater, again to Montefiore, in reaction to the involvement of RussianJews on British communal platforms, in particular the Zionist NahumSokolow. In a conversation with another Russian visitor, the retiredjudge Jacob Teitel, Wolf took the opportunity:

[. . .] of telling him confidentially of what is going on and I arrangedwith him that we should impress upon Mr [Sokolow] and the otherZionists who are coming here, that they must be very moderate intheir demands, and very mindful of English public opinion if theydesire to act with us.32

Such perspectives continued to preoccupy the Anglo–Jewish establish-ment into 1915. At a meeting of the Board of Deputies in Februaryof that year, its President, David L. Alexander, urged that it wouldbe ‘‘unpatriotic to introduce into the discussion [. . .] any question inrelation to the internal policy of Russia or any other of our Allies.’’33

It is clear at this juncture, from Wolf’s perspective at least, that thedesire to maintain silence extended beyond his editorship of DarkestRussia to his role as Secretary of the Conjoint. He preferred, as he didfor most of the war, to intervene in other ways. He and the Board ofDeputies certainly collected an array of material on the humanitariancatastrophe in Eastern Europe.34 But it was not divulged to any Jewishparty that might have used it for propaganda purposes, such as theChronicle or the World. Indeed, in the twelve months followingOctober 1914 there was just one piece in the JC that connectedWolf and the Conjoint to the issue of Eastern European relief.35

Instead, revelations of Jewish destitution and persecution in Polandwere presented in camera during his regular visits and correspondenceto the Foreign Office.36 This was a diplomatic tactic that had longbeen embraced by the Anglo–Jewish establishment, especially sincethe Kishinev pogrom of 1903.37

It cannot be said that, in late 1914, the community lacked thewherewithal, financially or practically, to instigate a philanthropicprogram for Eastern Europe. On the contrary, it had already shownitself, from October 1914 onwards, more than capable of organizingan efficient relief operation for some 5,000 Jewish refugees fromBelgium.38 The leading scion of the community, Lord ‘‘Natty’’

6 Sam Johnson

Rothschild, donated the huge sum of £10,000 to this cause.39 Hisbrother, Leopold de Rothschild also lent his name to the campaign.Of course, patriotic duty was once again the major consideration. In1914, there was no better justification of Britain’s part in the war than‘‘Brave Little Belgium.’’ This was not merely because it had been indefense of the latter’s neutrality that Britain had entered the fray inthe first place—though that was undoubtedly of great significance.Rather, the manner in which Imperial Germany had allegedly con-ducted its military operation in Belgium confirmed every British fearabout the barbarous Hun—as well as Britain’s claim to the moral highground.40

Such sentiment was apparent in the Jewish response. The Chronicleset up a ‘‘Shilling Fund’’ and recorded weekly lists of contributions.The Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter, an East End communal organiza-tion that had aided Eastern European immigrants since 1885, nowoffered its services to Belgian refugees. In October 1914, the Shelterpurchased a hotel for the cause. In addition, the Chronicle and theWorld published double-page advertisements that urged readers togive more. In one, the imagery employed was reminiscent of thatfound in the wider pro-Belgian campaign in Britain.41

Naturally, the immediate proximity of the war on the WesternFront and the arrival of refugees on the community’s doorstep,provided ample proof to British Jewry of the need to mount a reliefprogram. The terrible tales that accompanied Belgian refugees, bothJewish and non-Jewish, could not be disputed. It was also much sim-pler on a practical level to deal with the wants of five thousand people,as opposed to the potential millions in the East. There can be nodoubt, too, that British Jews instinctively felt a greater sense of com-munality with the majority of their Belgian counterparts.42 Even in1914, the Eastern Jew retained mysterious and sometimes disagreeablequalities for Anglo-Jewry. No doubt their peculiarities were the prod-uct of persecution, as was often asserted, but their lives, culture andeven religious practice seemed a world apart to many highly accultu-rated British Jews. This was especially the case for those figures whoplayed a crucial role in the Anglo–Jewish establishment.

The apparent intransigence of Jewish representative institutionsin dealing with Eastern European relief, and other pressing issues,did not pass unnoticed. The wider community expressed particularmisgivings about the structure and policy of the Conjoint.43 Indeed,it would seem that far from uniting British Jewry, the complicationsof the war heightened existing tensions and created new ones. Oneletter sent to the Chronicle revealed a multitude of concerns, not leastthe urgency of the situation in the East: ‘‘All of us, from the highestto the lowest, agree that it is necessary for us to do everything

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 7

in our power to alleviate the sufferings of our unfortunate brethrenin Russia.’’ But it was clear to Isaiah Wassilevsky, a Hebrew teacherin Manchester, that in this and other present Jewish concerns, theConjoint ‘‘thought more of what the ‘Goyim’ say than of whatJudaism demands.’’44

Such correspondence was representative of a controversy thatrumbled in the columns of the Chronicle and the World from late1914. The JC, for instance, noted with evident disgust that in itsannual report the AJA had unusually failed to make a single referenceto conditions faced by Jews in Russia and Poland.45 Whilst it was theWorld that admitted with obvious shame that ‘‘we as a community havedone nothing.’’ By late December 1914, many elements within BritishJewry were determined to alter the course of this dishonorable andself-interested record.

‘‘BROTHERS IN FAITH—AND ARMS’’46

Whilst the Wolfs, Montefiores, Alexanders, and Rothschilds seeminglywrung their hands at the abject circumstances of Russian and PolishJewry, the East End of London sprung into action. Several meetingswere instigated by Hermann Landau, who, as founder and head of thePoor Jews’ Temporary Shelter, had already shown himself capable oforganizing and dispensing relief. Born in Russian Poland, Landau wasevidently able to relate to the situation in the East, not least becausehe had provided much succor to hundreds of Polish, Romanian,Russian, and Galician Jews during the two decades before the war.47

In addition, he retained relatives in Russian Poland, who had commu-nicated their perilous situation to him.48 On December 31, 1914,Landau convened a public meeting at Mile End’s Pavilion Theatre,in the East End. Hundreds attended, many of them immigrant Jewsfrom Poland and Russia and part of the proceedings were undertakenin Yiddish.49

In these early stages, the convening of a relief program waslocated solely at a local, metropolitan level. The first time it was men-tioned in the JC, it was referred to as ‘‘a London Relief Fund.’’50

Although Lord Rothschild granted £1,000 to it in January 1915, itwas the Jews of the East End to whom the fund mainly and deliber-ately appealed. In the wake of the meeting on December 31, for in-stance, the Chronicle noted that ‘‘the Jews of East London haveimposed upon themselves the self-denying ordinance of givingweek-by-week, of their meager earnings, to the relief fund.’’51 In sub-sequent meetings, the audience was required fill in a card, which was

8 Sam Johnson

then used as a record of weekly donations.52 Clearly, such an arrange-ment drew inspiration from long-standing Jewish charitable practices.

The sacrifices of East End Jews were much lauded in the Chronicleand World. But they also urged the same from the ‘‘better-to-do Jewsof the country.’’53 The presence of Lord Rothschild’s name amongstearly subscribers was of considerable importance to the organizers,though it might be noted how much smaller his donation was com-pared to that he had granted to Belgian relief (£9,000 less, in fact). Hisbrother, Leopold, also sent a supportive message to the first meetingin the East End.54 But most of the key members of the Anglo–Jewishestablishment involved in the publicity in these early weeks of thefund’s development were drawn from religious quarters. MosesGaster, Haham of Britain’s Sephardic community, presided over ameeting in the Tottenham Court Road, Central London, in lateJanuary 1915.55 Three weeks later, Gaster accompanied the ChiefRabbi, Joseph Hertz, to another gathering in the East End.56

Religious obligations were evidently stressed in these oral appeals toordinary members of London’s Jewish community, though Gaster alsomade great play of the historical bonds between Jews and Poland.57

For the time being, the fund’s connections to the Anglo–Jewishestablishment were only through the Rothschilds, Gaster, and Hertz.Notwithstanding the presence of the Rothschilds, this might have beenpresumed a disadvantage since there were no links to the Board ofDeputies, AJA, or the Conjoint. But this appears not to have been thecase and the fund’s progress was not hindered. Rather, advantage wastaken from London’s connections with distant and like-minded phil-anthropists from Imperial Russia itself. For instance, representativesof the Jewish Colonization Association [ICA] in Petrograd cabledtheir approval in January 1915.58 A few weeks later, after the firstlist of donations had been published in the newspapers, a letter tothe fund from the leading figure of the Petrograd Jewish community,Baron Aleksandr Gintsburg, was widely publicized.59 It advised thatthe first tranche of money from Landau’s fund had already beenexhausted and ‘‘further contributions [were] urgently needed.’’60

Gintsburg represented the Central Jewish Committee for the Reliefof Victims of the War [Evreiskii komitet pomoshchi zhertvam voiny—EKOPO], which administered the disbursal of Jewish relief throughoutthe Empire.61 There was also a personal connection here, since N.M.Rothschild & Sons transferred funds from London to Petrograd viathe Gintsburg family. It is not clear from existing documentation,however, as to how the mechanics of this worked in practice andthere is no mention of any specific bank. It is apparent, however,that the London Rothschilds and Gintsburgs had links stretchingback many years.62

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Ties with other Jewish individuals and organizations in TsaristRussia were important for other reasons besides the practical.Indeed, it was often through these links that most incisive and persua-sive light was shone upon the plight of East European Jews. InFebruary 1915, for instance, an appeal by the socialist Bund was pub-lished in the Chronicle. It detailed the full array of persecutionpresently being experienced by Polish and Russian Jews, includingpogroms perpetrated by the army, expulsions, and hostage taking.63

Nahum Sokolow, representing a different political strand ofJewish life in the Russian Empire, similarly transmitted first-handinformation to British audiences. After his arrival in London, he wasinterviewed by the JC in mid-August 1915. In particular, he focusedon Warsaw’s fall into German hands (August 4, 1915) and the ramifi-cations for Polish Jews.64 A few weeks later, Sokolow accompaniedLandau on the fund’s efforts to raise money in the provinces. In aspeech in Manchester, the Russian Zionist observed that donationshad recently tailed off. The only explanation for this, he asserted,was that the working classes had ‘‘forgotten their obligations,’’ whilstthe ‘‘wealthy were aloof!’’65 Sokolow was unmindful of the Conjoint’sadvice to tone down his pronouncements on the Tsarist regime.Instead, he described events in the East as akin to the ‘‘churbanYerushalayim.’’66 His personal and dramatic testimony undoubtedlypricked consciences in Manchester, since the meeting raised £1400.67

By the same token, the Tsarist regime itself contributed to thecontinuing awareness of the Jewish situation in the East. An interviewin the Sunday Times with Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, revealedthat he believed Jews could fulfill no useful purpose by serving in theImperial Army, thereby implying that they were inherently disloyal.The World was understandably incredulous at this, especially as ithad often commented on the gallantry and bravery of the 200,000or so Jews fighting under the Tsar’s colors.68 At the same time,Sazonov’s words represented a deep-seated perspective, that Jewswere unsuited to soldiering—physically and morally—that someTsarist officials had peddled for many decades. Jewish ears inBritain were not, by any means, unaccustomed to hearing suchaccusations.

As 1915 progressed and Landau’s relief committee continued itsactivities, the tales of persecution emanating from Eastern Europeworsened. Little hope for the future of Jewry in the Tsarist Empirewas to be gleaned from the allegations of treason that appearedin Russian newspapers or that the work of the Petrograd ReliefCommittee was hampered by residence restrictions.69 In June 1916,British attitudes came to a head in the form of a blistering article inthe Chronicle. Penned by ‘‘Mentor,’’ it may have resulted from a huge

10 Sam Johnson

dossier of information that arrived from Russia and which eventuallyended up in the archives of the Board of Deputies.70 The dossiercontained evidence of military orders that deported Jews from thewar zone in their thousands, further allegations of disloyalty and allmanner of indignities and injustices. It was time, according to Mentor,to speak out.

Mentor was fully aware that his article would create ripples ofconsternation in Anglo–Jewish society and there is no doubt that hedeliberately intended to break the establishment’s silence on the situ-ation in the East. He recognized, for instance, that he might be‘‘denounced as unpatriotic,’’ but now was the time to speak out:

[. . .] the inclination has naturally been to give to the RussianGovernment as an ally of this country the benefit of the doubt.[. . .] But there are limits. And the limit is reached when silence in-volves traitorousness to Truth. [The military Order of the Day ofMarch 1915] decreed nothing less than the expulsion of all Jewsfrom the military zones in Galicia, Bukovina and Poland. Theexcuse for this terrible determination was an easy one to findready to hand. It was the alleged disloyalty of the Jewish population.[It] was directed not at any locality, or at any general section of thepopulation. It was a decree against Jews as Jews.

These Russian actions, which had resulted in the expelling of 200,000Jews, were so terrible, that it would ‘‘require the pen of a Dante toadequately narrate.’’ What was more, Russia had wholly betrayedthe principles which underpinned the alliance with Britain.71

Hitherto, it had been implicit in the activities of Landau’s CentralCommittee for the Relief of Russian Jews that the circumstances requir-ing philanthropic action in the East were connected to the politicalsituation inherent within the Tsarist system. It was clear that Jewishmisery was not merely the result of the routine privations of war.However, up until this point, the relief program had understandablyemphasized philanthropy over anti-Tsarist action. Similarly, Landau’scommittee had not viewed its actions as contrary to the supposedspirit of Britain’s alliance with Russia. For this reason, Russian andPolish Jews were regarded as ‘‘brothers in faith—and arms.’’72 In viewof Mentor’s article, and the response to it in the pages of the Jewishpress, such a stance could no longer be maintained. Too much was atstake, not least the moral integrity of British Jewry.

PHILANTHROPY AND DIPLOMACY

What was the Anglo–Jewish establishment’s response to this height-ening of anti-Tsarist animosity in wider Jewish society? There is no

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doubt that Wolf’s Conjoint Committee was in receipt of the samekind of dramatic testimony that Mentor described in the JC in July1915. Indeed, a month before this article appeared, the Board ofDeputies and AJA sent a memorandum to the Foreign Office thatdetailed the pogroms, deportations, and the ‘‘summary executionsof alleged Jewish spies’’ in Russian Poland and Galicia. An alterationin tone and intent was discernible in this memorandum, sufficientto render it comparable to Mentor’s pronouncements six weekslater:

[. . .] we recognize that there must be great difficulty in interferingwith the discretion of the Russian military authorities under presentcircumstances, but the situation is so terrible and serious that weventure to think it warrants exceptional action.73

Yet the establishment did not immediately move away from itsexisting policy and attempt to mobilize sentiment on these mattersamongst the wider community. Instead, it continued to hope thatofficial and discreet channels were the best means of exertinginfluence.

However, by late August 1915, such was the increasing urgency ofthe situation in Eastern Europe, the Anglo–Jewish establishment finallydecided to act. In a letter to Jacques Bigart, secretary of the AllianceIsraelite Universelle in Paris, Wolf revealed that the Conjoint pos-sessed reliable information about half a million ‘‘starving and shelter-less’’ refugees in Poland and Russia.74 The formation of an officialrelief committee was imminent. But the delicate condition of Anglo–Russian relations remained a major consideration. There was to be noquestion of politicizing this new committee in any way. In September1915, Wolf wrote to Cyrus Adler, co-founder of the American JewishCommittee, indicating the ‘‘essentially philanthropic’’ character of theAnglo–Jewish relief organization. And, although the task was ‘‘heavy,’’it was ‘‘not one of great complexity.’’75 The distress of those to beaided was in their material dispossession, rather than their politicaldisabilities.

The Conjoint intended to keep the issue of relief quite separatefrom the long-standing Jewish question in Russia. This was apparent inlate September 1915, when the Tsarist Minister of Finance, P.L. Bark,visited London. Although meetings were arranged between theMinister, Claude Montefiore, Leopold de Rothschild, and DavidAlexander, there was a careful effort not to be overly critical ofTsarist policy. Indeed, they actually lauded some of the recent conces-sions the regime had granted, including the revoking of the Paleof Settlement.76 Thus, the humanitarian crisis in the Empire, forwhich the regime bore undoubted responsibility, was not referred

12 Sam Johnson

to substantively. Indeed, the delegates reminded Bark that Anglo-Jewry had:

Abstained since the beginning of the war from all agitation, or evenactivity, on the main question of Jewish emancipation in Russia, andthey proposed to maintain this attitude of reserve until the war wasover.

Nevertheless, they cautioned that the same respectful perspectivecould not be promised of Jewish communities in neutral countries,such as the United States. In fact, in order to appease AmericanJewish opinion, there were a minimum number of concessions thatthe regime might like to consider:

(1) Unrestricted right of domicile.(2) Abolition of all restrictions on education.(3) Abandonment of religious discrimination in the matter of visas

for foreign passports.(4) These reforms to be embodied in laws of the Empire, and not

enacted by administrative decree.77

Of course, in presenting these desiderata, the Anglo–Jewish establish-ment was attempting a subtle indication of its own wishes and desiresfor the emancipation of Russian Jewry. No doubt this was understoodby Bark.

Initially, the arrival of the Tsarist Minister of Finance in Londonwas greeted with some suspicion and scorn in the Anglo–Jewish press.But, then again, it was an opportunity to challenge in person a repre-sentative of the Tsarist regime. Subsequently, an interview of Bark byW.A. Appleton, President of the Workers’ League for Jewish Emanci-pation, appeared in the Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian.78

Representations were, therefore, possible. Why, then, asked theJewish World, had the Conjoint or the Board of Deputies apparentlyfailed to meet with Bark? Once again, a conflict of interest and policyarose between the Jewish establishment and the wider community.In early October 1915, the World accused the Conjoint of being‘‘stultified.’’79 Similar perspectives had already been expressed in theJC at the end of September:

[Since the beginning the war, an] inexpressibly foolish policy[has been] pursued by the Conjoint Committee in proclaimingitself the sole arbiter of Jewish destiny, deciding to accept represen-tations of other bodies, and leaving everyone in entire ignoranceas to what it is doing, or indeed if it is doing anything at all.This has given rise to a natural feeling that the Jewish cause maybe shipwrecked by this body, which is largely out of touch withthe general community and which aspires to an authority it cannotclaim.80

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This was pretty damning stuff and, for the first time, it appears to haveworried the Conjoint. As a consequence, for once Wolf revealed thedetails of a Foreign Office meeting to Leopold Greenberg, editor ofthe JC.81 The policy of secret diplomacy was sometimes counterpro-ductive, but on this occasion the Conjoint’s activities were applauded.And perhaps a modus vivendi had finally been achieved? Alas, the com-munal ceasefire barely lasted longer than the Christmas Day Truce onthe Western Front in 1914.

‘‘CASTING BREAD UPON THE WATERS’’82

By the end of October 1915, the Anglo–Jewish establishment hadmade relief in Eastern Europe its priority. It issued an urgent appealfor its newly formed Fund for the Relief of Jewish Victims of theWar in Russia (its title mirrored its Russian partner). Leopoldde Rothschild and Lord Swaythling (formerly Louis Montagu) wererespectively named president and treasurer. A host of Rothschilds,Sassoons, and Jewish Members of Parliament appeared on the generalcommittee, along with Israel Zangwill, the Chief Rabbi, Haham Gaster,and Lucien Wolf. It proclaimed, also, its connections with Landau’sCommittee, and its Petrograd equivalent. Dr. Reuben Blank, withwhom Wolf had regularly corresponded and met in 1915, was thecommittee’s Russian link. The appeal itself was uncompromising andit noted that ‘‘the calamity which had befallen the Russian and PolishJewish communities [was] of the most appalling character, [with] noprecedent in the tragic vicissitudes of the Jewish people.’’ From end toend, the Pale of Settlement had been ‘‘ravaged with a completenessunparalleled in the other vast battlefields of the war.’’ There was nomention, however, of pogroms, hostage taking, the summary execu-tion of ‘‘spies,’’ or deportations.

A further gesture of intent was visible in the donations that thefund had already been received. On this occasion, N.M. Rothschild’sgranted £5,000. A further £3,000 came from Landau’s committee,£500 each from Sir Alfred Mond (M.P. and financier), Claude G.Montefiore, and Sir Marcus Samuel (entrepreneur, founder of ShellOil). In addition, the relief fund aspired to a wider constituency thanits predecessor, since it was addressed to the Jews of the BritishEmpire. A sum of £50 had already been received from the communityin Durban, South Africa. All monies received were to be paid viaBaron Gintsburg to EKOPO, which presided over provincial reliefstations in Russia.83

This was a good start and the Chronicle noted that this ‘‘influen-tial committee’’ had been formed ‘‘not a moment too soon.’’84

14 Sam Johnson

The presence of so many significant Anglo–Jewish names was a clearstatement of intent and the seriousness with which the question ofrelief was now being taken by the establishment. Shortly thereafter itwas announced that Landau’s committee was to merge with the neworganization, reaffirming the elevation from local to international.85

In early November 1915, a meeting was convened in London at whichit was claimed that £60,000 had already been raised. At last, the com-munity could be proud of its achievements. ‘‘It is nothing to wonder,’’wrote the JC, ‘‘at the conscience of British Jewry that has been stir-red.’’ ‘‘The East End had been taxing itself for the relief program forsome time,’’ but now, at last, ‘‘the wealthier members of the commu-nity will desire to fall behind this noble and inspiring standard.’’86

A sense of unity had seemingly healed the divisions between theAnglo–Jewish establishment and the wider community, alongside itsvociferous representatives in the form of the Jewish press. The realmatter at hand, relief for Eastern Europe’s coreligionists, could nowreceive the attention it truly merited. But the distractions and diver-sions were soon to return. A cleavage in the consensus occurred inNovember 1915, as a result of an incident which can only be describedas curious at best, or, at worst, incompetent.

At the same time as Anglo-Jewry was organizing its relief fund,similar activity was occurring in Edinburgh, the Scottish capital. It wasorganized by Leon Levison, a Levantine Jew who had arrived inScotland at the turn of the century.87 Levison was a convert toChristianity and, thus, his fund was Christian in outlook.88 A glanceat the publicity material of the Russian Jews’ Relief Fund reveals thatall the members of its committee were ministers of various Scottishchurches.89 It included figures such as the moderators of the Churchof Scotland and the United Free church. At face value, however, thismight not necessarily have presented an obstacle to the Jewish fundin London. In fact, in the early meetings of Landau’s relief fund,a resolution had been passed on the needs of Christian supplicantsin Russia and Poland. Since there was evidence that Christian organ-izations in Poland had denied assistance to Jews, Landau and his col-leagues were determined that their fund would not be hampered bycomparable prejudices.90 And, in late 1915, there is proof thatChristians and Jews stood on the same philanthropic platforms inthe U.K.91

Perhaps this was the reason that in mid-November 1915, a meetingwas held at New Court (N.M. Rothschild’s) at which the conjoining ofthe two organizations was suddenly decided upon. Levison and hiscolleague the Reverend H. Wilkinson were present, as were Leopoldde Rothschild and Claude Montefiore.92 Interestingly, the Chief Rabbirefused to attend.93 Shortly thereafter, the Rothschild and Montefiore

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 15

names were found on Levison’s publicity material.94 No doubt this wasa coup for the Edinburgh fund. What better way of legitimizing theircampaign, as well as presenting a wonderful propaganda coup, thanthe presence on their committee of two of the most illustrious Anglo–Jewish names?

The response of the Anglo–Jewish community was, to put itmildly, less than enthusiastic, notwithstanding the broader constitu-ency to which the cause of Eastern European relief might nowappeal. Indeed, incredulous and outraged would be a better way tocharacterize the manner in which the Jewish press reacted to the news.This was not a simple matter of religious difference, but rather the factthat Levison’s background, vocation, and relief committee was evan-gelist. The Anglo–Jewish establishment could hardly have made aworse decision than to unite its relief committee, which had takenso long to organize in the first place, with a group of Christian mis-sionaries. The howls of derision in the Chronicle and World can bealmost be heard to this day.

In the first place, both newspapers were startled by the naivety ofthe community’s distinguished representatives. Levison was a well-known ‘‘conversionist,’’ maintained the JC, and in the Scottish presshe was indeed regularly described as a ‘‘missionary.’’95 Moreover, saidthe Chronicle, the nature of his work was surely obvious in the allusion‘‘casting bread upon the waters’’ found in the fund’s publicity mater-ial.96 Much was therefore made of the Chief Rabbi’s absence at theNew Court meeting. He had surely realized Levison’s intent, thoughthere is no documentary evidence to support this thesis. But the criti-cism moved beyond the focus on Levison to the Anglo–Jewish estab-lishment. The JC believed the executive of the Jewish relief fund had‘‘overstepped the limits of [its] functions.’’97 Finally, this witting orunwitting communion with ‘‘perversionists,’’ as the World deemedthe Edinburgh fund, reflected badly on British Jewry in general98:

[. . .] the Committee, in our view, and that of the community gener-ally, has lowered the dignity of the Jews of this country and compro-mised their position in the fight with our most deadly menace andour most unscrupulous enemy. [. . .] Compare the remarkableresponse given by a New York meeting [. . .] for this very object ofrelief to our stricken brethren in Russia – a response to an appeal forthe heart of the Jew to the heart of the Jew – with the comparativelypaltry few pounds gained by the miserable philandering with amissionary-tainted association; and then ask, from the practicalpoint of view, was it worth while?99

The harmonious relations between the Jewish establishmentand the wider community were clearly broken.100 Once again,the Anglo–Jewish leadership, the Conjoint, the Board of Deputies,

16 Sam Johnson

and the AJA appeared to be utterly out-of-step with general Jewishfeeling in Britain. Although the press declined to publish any corres-pondence on this issue, it is evident that this controversy createdmuch ill-feeling and resentment.101 More crucially, the main crisis athand, Jewish relief in Poland and Russia, had once again been over-shadowed by internal division and dissension.

WHAT NEXT?

Within a matter of weeks, Montefiore and Rothschild’s namesdisappeared from the Edinburgh fund’s committee. It was, evidently,the only action that could be taken, given the communal opposition toLevison and his fellow Christians. It produced the desired conse-quences and one can detect a calming of the storm in the pages ofthe Jewish press. By February 1916, any animosity had been cast asideand the relief fund was fully operational. Saving the lives of EastEuropean Jews was now the priority.

Over the following year, a monthly list of subscriptions was pub-lished in the Chronicle and the World. Notable contributions werereceived from many different quarters. The quite enormous sum of£20,000 was donated by Leopold de Rothschild, by now regarded as a‘‘veritable Prince in Israel.’’102 In addition, Jewish communities inCanada, South Africa, and Australia gave substantially to the cause.In Britain, various fundraising activities were instigated, ranging fromconcerts and theatrical events to more politicized gatherings.103

A number of Russians resident in the United Kingdom, not all ofthem Jews, participated in these events, including the RussianAmbassador, Count Aleksandr Benckendorff.104

By the end of 1916 and early 1917, the British relief fundfor Eastern European Jews was operating quite efficiently. It is impos-sible to estimate how much money was raised in this time, but itwas undoubtedly of some import. One historian has adjudgedthe total at around £100,000 by the end of 1916.105 How thispanned out on a practical level is, of course, difficult to discern with-out examining Russian archival material. Moreover, it was considerablyless than the amount provided by the American Joint DistributionCommittee.106

Did the issue of relief ultimately unite British Jewry? This, too, isdifficult to discern, though perhaps by the turn of 1916 some severelessons had been learned. Certainly, there is less evidence of rancor-ous disagreement on the matter between the establishment and thewider community in 1916, as compared with the previous year.

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 17

By August of that year, Britain had been at war for two long anddifficult years. The reality and proximity of the war, which hadturned into an oppressive stalemate by this point, surely had its ownimpact on Anglo–Jewish perspectives. As to Russia, there was alwayshope and the establishment continued to make plans for a futurepeace settlement, in which it was determined that Jews would havetheir own say.107

In February 1917, a flush of optimism overcame British Jewry inall quarters. Here was the true moment that every single British Jew,whether a naturalized citizen or not, was united in a common cause.The downfall of the Tsarist regime was celebrated far and wide andthe hope for a new Russia, in which Jews would share an equal place,was tangible. But even this moment was to be relatively short-livedand by the end of 1917, in the wake of the Bolshevik take-over,Anglo-Jewry’s divisions reasserted themselves once more.108 In thematter of relief, however, consolidation and some efficiency hadbeen achieved. Yet, the Anglo–Jewish conscience was far from clear.In April 1922, Lucien Wolf wrote to Leopold Greenberg on theachievements of the relief program since its foundation. He notedthat since 1915, around £200,000 to £300,000 had been expended.For sure, this was in itself a considerable sum, but he compared itunfavorably with the £12,000,000 apparently raised by American Jews.In addition, the political dynamics of the situation confronting EastEuropean Jews created further internal difficulties for Anglo–Jewishsociety. Wolf noted that ‘‘millions of Jews [have been] reduced tovagabondage’’ and it was in these dangerous conditions that‘‘Bolshevism flourished.’’ He warned: ‘‘if the Jews of England do notwant all their Eastern co-religionists to go over to Bolshevism then letthem give to the War Victims Fund with something more than meregenerosity.’’109

Of course, it would not be true to say that outside of the Anglo–Jewish establishment the Bolshevik party inspired universal support.Far from it, though undoubtedly there were few converts to thenon-socialist alternatives, especially following the pogroms of theCivil War period. But, Wolf and his colleagues once more found them-selves in consensus with the British establishment. Furthermore,although Jewish misery in the East was far from being the sole conse-quence of Bolshevik actions, it was a convenient hook upon which tohang the demands of relief. Undoubtedly, it found some resonancewithin wider Anglo–Jewish society and, by the early 1920s, silence wasno longer the enemy.

MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

18 Sam Johnson

NOTES

Thanks are due to the Manchester European Research Institute atManchester Metropolitan University for financial support. Thanks alsoto Professor Gennady Estraikh who organized the conference at NewYork University at which this paper was first given.

1. For a useful overview of the mechanisms of European Jewish chari-table practice and philanthropy, from the early modern period onwards,see: Derek J. Penslar, Shylock’s Children. Economics and Jewish Identity inModern Europe (London, 2001), pp. 90–123.

2. For an excellent analysis of Montefiore’s significance, in a Jewishand non-Jewish context, see: Abigail Green, ‘‘Rethinking Sir MosesMontefiore: Religion, Nationhood and International Philanthropy in theNineteenth Century,’’ American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 3 (2005),pp. 631–58.

3. In 1845, £2500 was raised for the Jews of Morocco, which wascollected through Montefiore’s inspiration, see: ‘‘Sufferers at Mogador,’’Jewish Chronicle [JC], January 10, 1845, p. 72.

4. ‘‘Odessa Relief Fund,’’ JC, July 14, 1871, p. 16; ‘‘RomanianCommittee,’’ JC, May 3, 1872, p. 16.

5. The Russian pogroms prompted the creation of the Russo–JewishCommittee in late 1881, and in early 1882, the Mansion House Fund. In1903, a relief fund was created on behalf of the victims of the Kishinevpogrom. For a brief discussion of the Russian schemes, see DavidFeldman, Englishmen and Jews. Social Relations and Political Culture,1840–1914 (New Haven, 1994).

6. For details of the Jewish realities of the war in Eastern Europe,see: Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign AgainstEnemy Aliens in World War I, (London, 2003); Victor Alexander Prusin,Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity and Anti-Jewish Violence inEast Galicia, 1914–1920 (Tuscaloosa, 2005); and Peter Gatrell, A WholeEmpire Walking. Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington,2005).

7. Eugene C. Black, The Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1880–1920(Oxford, 1988), pp. 326–28.

8. Mark Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe. The Diplomacy of LucienWolf (Oxford, 1992), especially chapters 2 and 3.

9. See, for instance, Shmuel Almog, ‘‘Antisemitism as a dynamicphenomenon: the ‘Jewish Question’ in England at the end of the FirstWorld War,’’ Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1987), pp. 3–18;C.C. Aronsfield, ‘‘Jewish Enemy Aliens in England during the FirstWorld War,’’ Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 181 (1956), pp. 275–83; DavidCesarani, ‘‘An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain During the FirstWorld War,’’ Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 8 (1989), pp.61–81; ColinHolmes, Antisemitism in British Society (London, 1979): part 2; for thedilemmas of the later period of the war in the wake of the Russian

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 19

Revolution, see: Harold Shukman, War or Revolution: Russian Jews andConscription in Britain, 1917 (London, 2005).

10. Herbert Samuel, Home Secretary in 1916, was instrumental inthis campaign; see Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel. A Political Life(Oxford, 1992).

11. ‘‘The War,’’ JC, August 7, 1914, p. 5. A large banner with thisslogan hung outside the offices of the JC in Furnival Street, centralLondon.

12. These appeared regularly, weekly for a time, from September1914. In the Jewish World [JW], which was illustrated, there often appearedphotographs of those serving, wounded and killed in action.

13. Michael Berkowitz, Western Jewry and the Zionist Project, 1914–1933(Cambridge, 1996), p. 7.

14. ‘‘The War,’’ JC, September 11, 1914, p. 10. The phrase belongedto the Chief Rabbi, Joseph Hertz.

15. For a discussion of Darkest Russia, see: Sam Johnson, ‘‘Confront-ing the East. Darkest Russia, British Opinion and Tsarist Russia’s ‘JewishQuestion’, 1890–1914,’’ East European Jewish Affairs (December, 2006),pp. 199–211.

16. ‘‘ ‘Darkest Russia’ Suspends Publication,’’ JC, August 7, 1914,p. 6.

17. The notion that the Tsarist regime deliberately organized andprovoked pogroms was unquestioningly accepted in all Jewish (and mostnon-Jewish) quarters in Britain; it had been since 1881–1882.

18. ‘‘Jewish Sentiment and the War,’’ JC, September 4, 1914, p. 5.19. Mentor, ‘‘In the Communal Armchair,’’ JC, October 16, 1914,

p. 8. Mentor was the pen-name of Simon Gilbert, an East End Jew, whohad Eastern European antecedents. He became assistant editor of the JCin the 1920s. See David Cesarani, the ‘‘Jewish Chronicle’’ and Anglo-Jewry,1841–1991 (Cambridge, 1994).

20. ‘‘Equality for Jews in Russia,’’ The Times, August 18, 1914, p. 6:this article claimed that Tsar Nicholas II was about to sign ‘‘a proclama-tion giving to the Jews in his dominions equal civil and political rights.’’See the optimistic response to this in a letter from Israel Zangwill,The Times, August 19, 1914, p. 7. Such sentiments were also found inthe Jewish press: ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, September 9, 1914, p. 3;‘‘Freedom for the Russian Jew,’’ JC, September 4, 1914, p. 13.

21. For example, ‘‘German and Austrian Atrocities in Russia,’’ JC,October 20, 1914, p. 11: ‘‘The Germans are acting towards great crueltytowards Jews who are dressed in long eastern coats. They beat themmercilessly whilst forcing them to dig trenches.’’

22. ‘‘The Jews in Poland,’’ JW, October 28, 1914, pp. 18–19.23. For example: ‘‘Life in Austria,’’ The Times, November 26, 1914,

p. 5; Stephen Graham, ‘‘Suffering Poland,’’ The Times, November 21,1914, p. 7; and ‘‘Russia’s Notable Record,’’ Observer, November 1, 1914,p. 5; ‘‘Russia’s New Jews,’’ JC, October 23, 1914, p. 7.

24. ‘‘A Real Conjoint Committee,’’ JW, November 25, 1914, p. 6.

20 Sam Johnson

25. Lucien Wolf to Joseph Jacobs, December 3, 1913, Darkest RussiaFile, Lucien Wolf Papers, Special Collections, School of Slavonic and EastEuropean Studies, University College London.

26. Cited in ‘‘ ‘Darkest Russia’ Suspends Publication,’’ JC, August 7,1914, p. 6.

27. See letter, enclosing Brandes’ article, from Louis Troukel[?] to JC,AJA, Herbert Bentwich, Board of Deputies, November 4, 1914, Archivesof the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London Metropolitan Archives[Hereafter, BOD], file ACC3121/C11/2/5.

28. ‘‘Conditions in Ruined Poland,’’ JC, November 20, 1914, p. 6;‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, November 25, 1914, p. 5.

29. ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, November 25, 1914, p. 5.30. The article also appeared, several months later, in American news-

papers: ‘‘Jews Persecuted in Russian Poland,’’ New York Times, March 19,1915, p. 9.

31. Lucien Wolf to Claude G. Montefiore, November 16, 1914, BOD,file ACC3121/C11/2/5.

32. Lucien Wolf to Claude G. Montefiore, December 31, 1914, BOD,file ACC3121/C11/2/5.

33. ‘‘Board of Deputies,’’ JC, February 26, 1915, p. 6.34. Some of this material was collected via the assistance of the

Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris and, later on in 1915, with helpfrom Dr Reuben Blank of EKOPO, discussed below.

35. Letter from the Chief Rabbi, Gilbert Murray and Lucien Wolf,JC, October 16, 1914, p. 5; ‘‘Board of Deputies,’’ JC, October 22,1915, p.9.

36. Much of this is discussed in Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe,especially chapters 1 and 2.

37. Black, The Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1988), pp. 303–4.38. A figure that represented approximately a third of the total Jewish

population of Belgium: Israel Cohen, Jewish Life in Modern Times (NewYork, 1914), p. 346

39. ‘‘Jewish Belgian Relief Fund,’’ JW, November 18, 1914, p. 4.40. The German invasion of Belgium remains controversial, see John

Horne and Alan Kramer, The German Atrocities of 1914: A History of Denial(New Haven, 2001).

41. Advertisement for Belgian refugees in JC, November 6, 1914,pp. 16–17. The single image employed here showed a helpless mother,clutching her orphaned child to her breast. For discussion of suchimagery, albeit in a French context, see Ruth Harris, ‘‘The ‘Child of theBarbarian’: Rape, Race and Nationalism in France during the First WorldWar,’’ Past and Present, No. 141 (November 1993), pp. 170–206.

42. Nowhere was this better symbolized than the appeal to supplyteddy bears and toys to destitute Jewish children from Belgium, ‘‘AnySpare Teddy Bears?,’’ JW, November 4, 1914, p. 4. I have not encountereda comparable appeal on behalf of Eastern European Jews.

43. See, ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, January 27, 1915, p. 7:

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 21

44. Letter from Isaiah Wassilevsky, JC, January 1, 1915, p. 18.45. ‘‘The Anglo–Jewish Report,’’ JC, December 11, 1914, p. 7.46. ‘‘The Agony of Russo-Jewry,’’ JC, November 5, 1915, p. 11.47. A searchable database of those who passed through the doors of

the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter between 1885–1914, can be found at:http://chrysalis.its.uct.ac.za/shelter/shelter.htm

48. Letter from Hermann Landau to JW, February 10, 1915, p. 23.49. ‘‘Appalling Situation in Poland,’’ JC, January 6, 1915, p. 12.50. ‘‘A London Relief Fund,’’ JC, December 25, 1914, p. 11.51. ‘‘Stricken Poland,’’ JC, January 8, 1915, p. 8.52. ‘‘Distress of Polish and Palestine Jews,’’ JC, February 19, 1915,

p. 14; ‘‘Distressed Polish and Palestine Jews,’’ JW, February 17, 1915, p.15.53. ‘‘Stricken Poland,’’ JC, January 8, 1915, p. 8.54. ‘‘The War and Poland,’’ JC, January 8, 1915, p. 14.55. Advertisement for ‘‘A Public Meeting on Behalf of Polish Jewish

Fund,’’ JC, January 22, 1915, p. 11.56. ‘‘East End Mass Meeting,’’ JW, February 17, 1915, p. 15.57. ‘‘Distress of Polish and Palestine Jews,’’ JC, February 19, 1915,

p. 14.58. ‘‘The War and Poland,’’ JC, January 8, 1915, p. 14.59. ‘‘Central Committee for the Relief of Polish Jews,’’ JC, March 13,

1915, pp. 3–5; this was the first list of donations. The largest was the£1000 from Lord Rothschild, followed by £300 from an anonymousdonor, then £100 from Herman Landau. The remainder was made upof smaller amounts, ranging from a couple of guineas to a few shillings.Most of the donations were from London, with some provincial organiza-tions represented, such as Manchester, Leeds, and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

60. ‘‘The Distress in Poland and Palestine,’’ JC, March 12, 1915;JW, March 17, 1915, p. 18.

61. For discussion of EKOPO’s activities, see Steven J. Zipperstein,‘‘The Politics of Relief: The Transformation of Russian Jewish CommunalLife during the First World War,’’ in The Jews and the European Crisis,1914–1921. Studies in Contemporary Jewry IV, (ed.) Jonathan Frankel(Oxford, 1988), pp. 22–40.

62. As yet, I have not been able to locate material related to the FirstWorld War period in the Rothschild Archives in London. Indeed, theArchive has no knowledge of any administrative/official connection withSt. Petersburg/Petrograd. I have, however, traced evidence of a Gintsburglink in the decade prior to 1914; see letter from Lord NathanielRothschild to Baron Edmund de Rothschild (cousin in Paris), January 1,1906, Rothschild Archives, New Court, London, file XI/130A/0/1906010.

63. ‘‘How Russia is Treating the Jews,’’ JC, February 5, 1915,pp. 12–13.

64. ‘‘The Fall of Warsaw,’’ JC, August 13, 1915, p.12.65. ‘‘In the Provinces: Manchester,’’ JC, August 27, 1915, p. 22.66. ‘‘A Second Churban Yerushalayim,’’ JC, August 13, 1915, p. 5.67. ‘‘In the Provinces: Manchester,’’ JC, August 27, 1915, p. 22.

22 Sam Johnson

68. ‘‘Mr. Sazonov and Russo-Jews,’’ JW, January 20, 1915, p. 8.Whether this is what Sazonov actually said is questionable, since the inter-viewer, Stephen Graham, was widely known for his unsympathetic viewson the Jewish question in Russia and was recurrently challenged in theWorld.

69. ‘‘Russian Accusation Against the Jews,’’ JC, April 16, 1915, p. 20;‘‘The Jews in the Polish War Zone,’’ JC, April 2, 1915, p. 13.

70. BOD, file ACC3121/C11/12/119(1–4): this typewritten materialof about 300 pages is dated 1915 and details a whole host of militaryorders, articles taken from newspapers and personal testimony. I cannotbe certain that this is the dossier to which Mentor referred, but it certainlyties in with his comments about deportations and the like. There is noRussian name associated with this material.

71. Mentor, ‘‘In the Communal Armchair,’’ JC, July 23, 1915, pp. 7–8.It was also published in the United States: Mentor, ‘‘Russia’s Expulsion ofJews,’’ New York Times Magazine, August 15, 1915, p. 15. Unsurprisingly,the Chronicle’s editor, Leopold Greenberg, had problems with the Russiancensor over this issue (there were subscribers in Petrograd): see LucienWolf to Leopold de Rothschild, August 13, 1915, BOD, file ACC3121/C11/3/1/1.

72. ‘‘The Agony of Russo-Jewry,’’ JC, November 5, 1915, p. 11.73. Claude G. Montefiore, D. L. Alexander to Foreign Office [FO],

June 3, 1915, BOD, file ACC3121/C11/3/1/3. I can only speculate on thedestination of this memorandum, but it is similar to those which I knowwere sent to the FO—and always written by Wolf.

74. Lucien Wolf to Jacques Bigart, August 20, 1915, BOD, fileACC3121/C11/3/1/1.

75. Lucien Wolf to Cyrus Adler, September 16, 1915, BOD, fileACC3121/C11/3/1/1.

76. Various concessions were granted in August 1915, which effec-tively abolished the Pale. The included permission for Jews to reside inareas that from which they had previously been prohibited. For the effectsof this, see: Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, pp. 145–47.

77. Note by Lucien Wolf to Foreign Office, October 14, 1915, BOD,file ACC3121/C11/2/6. Although Wolf did not attend the meeting(s) atthe FO, he was surely the author of this memorandum; see Lucien Wolfto Leopold de Rothschild, September 20, 1915, BOD, file ACC3121/C11/3/1/1.

78. ‘‘M. Bark and Russian Jews,’’ JC, October 8, 1915, p. 7; ‘‘Russiaand the Jews,’’ Manchester Guardian, October 5, 1915, p. 12.

79. ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, October 6, 1915, p. 7.80. ‘‘A Deplorable Incident,’’ JC, September 24, 1915, p. 5. It is not

clear to which incident the Chronicle is referring, since it declinedto mention it in this very editorial. It is possibly connected to Bark,or to the issue of Jewish relief. But whatever the incident, such viewswere representative of the poor opinion the Conjoint inspired in thisperiod.

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 23

81. See Leopold Greenberg to Lucien Wolf, October 7, 1915, BOD,file ACC3121/C11/2/6; ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, October 13, 1915, p. 7.

82. ‘‘Russian War Victims Fund,’’ JC, December 10, 1915, p. 14.83. Advertisement for the Fund for the Relief of Jewish Victims of the

War in Russia, JC, October 8, 1915, p. 2; Ibid, JW, October 6, 1915, p. 19.Wolf also mentioned appealing to the Jews of the British Empire, whonumbered between 500,000 to 750,000, in a letter to Cyrus Adler,September 16, 1915, BOD, file ACC3121/C11/3/1/1.

84. ‘‘For Our Polish Brethren,’’ JC, October 1, 1915, p. 5.85. ‘‘Relief for Russian Jews,’’ JC, October 8, 1915, p. 7.86. The Chief Rabbi, Gaster, Leopold de Rothschild, and Herman

Landau led this meeting, see: ‘‘The Agony of Russo-Jewry,’’ JC,November 5, 1915, p. 11; ‘‘The Russo–Polish Agony,’’ JC, November 5,1915, pp. 16–18; ‘‘The Polish Agony,’’ JW, November 3, 1915, p. 18;‘‘Jewish Life: The Great Agony of the Polish People,’’ ManchesterGuardian, November 7, 1915, p. 19.

87. For information about Levison, see the biography by his son:Frederick Levison, Christian and Jew. The Life of Leon Levison, 1881–1936(Edinburgh, 1989).

88. See: Leon Levison, The Tragedy of the Jews in the European WarZone, Edinburgh: Russian Jews’ Relief Fund, 1915; Ibid., The Jewish Problemand the World War (London, 1916). A curious figure, Levison stood on thesame platform as Roman Dmowski in 1916, who was in Edinburgh topublicize the case for Polish independence. See, Charles Sarolea, Letterson Polish Affairs (Edinburgh, 1922), p. 95. The controversy generated overhis fund was reignited in the post-war period, when Levison received aknighthood for his services to Russian Jewish relief. A number of news-papers ran with the story, including the Morning Post, Truth, and, ofcourse, the JC and JW. See, for example, a leading article denigratingthe decision to knight Levison: ‘‘The Levison Knighthood,’’ JC, August22, 1919, p. 16. Leopold Greenberg, editor of the JC, engaged in personalexchange of letters with Levison in The Scotsman. The accusationhere was related to financial impropriety, see, for instance; L.J.Greenberg to The Scotsman, March 29, 1919, p. 10; Leon Levison to TheScotsman, March 31, 1919, p. 7; L.J. Greenberg to The Scotsman, April 14,1919, p. 6.

89. ‘‘Russian Jews Relief Fund,’’ The Scotsman, July 29, 1915, p. 1:‘‘Russian Jews’ Relief Fund,’’ The Times, September 14, 1915, 3.

90. ‘‘Stricken Poland,’’ JC, January 8, 1915, p.14.91. ‘‘In the Provinces,’’ JC, October 29, 1915, p. 6; ‘‘The Flight from

Poland,’’ Manchester Guardian, October 20, 1915, p. 3.92. ‘‘Relief of Distress in Poland,’’ JC, November 19, 1915, p. 13.93. ‘‘Russian War Victims’ Fund,’’ JC, December 10, 1915, p. 14.94. ‘‘Russian Jews’ Relief Fund,’’ The Scotsman, December 4, 1915,

p. 1.95. ‘‘Jews Fighting for the Allies,’’ The Scotsman, November 13, 1914,

p. 6.

24 Sam Johnson

96. ‘‘The Russian Victims’ Fund,’’ JC, December 10, 1915, p. 9, 14.97. ‘‘The Russian Victims’ Fund,’’ JC, December 24, 1915, p. 7.98. ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, December 8, 1915, pp. 8–9.99. ‘‘The Russian Victims’ Fund,’’ JC, December 24, 1915, p. 7.

The reference to American Jews, always a model to which British Jewrylooked, was to a New York meeting that raised £250,000, see: ‘‘The War,’’JC, December 24, 1915, pp. 14–15.

100. For an extensive discussion of the matter, see ‘‘Around theWorld,’’ JW, December 29, 1915, pp.7–9.

101. ‘‘The Russian War Victims Fund,’’ JC, December 31, 1915, p. 7.102. ‘‘Around the World,’’ JW, February 2, 1916, p. 9.103. Advertisement for ‘‘A Grand Russian Concert,’’ JW, March 15,

1916, p. 24.104. ‘‘Jewish War Victims’ Fund,’’ JW, March 29, 1916, p. 16.105. Black, The Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry, p. 328.106. Even by the end of 1914, the American Joint Distribution

Committee [JDC] had supplied some $185,000 to its relief program inEurope; see ‘‘Chronological List of Events,’’ JDC Archives, New YorkCity, USA, file AR14#2.

107. Levene, War, Jews and the New Europe, chapter 5.108. For British Jewry’s response to Bolshevism, the Civil War, etc.,

see: Sharman Kadish, Bolsheviks and British Jews. The Anglo–JewishCommunity, Britain and the Russian Revolution (London, 1992).

109. Lucien Wolf to Leopold Greenberg, 5 April 1922, BOD fileC11/2/17.

British Jews and East European Jewish Relief 25