MAJOR INCIDENT REVIEW Lake Clifton, Red Hill and ... · PDF fileMAJOR INCIDENT REVIEW Lake Clifton, Red Hill and ... ISG Incident Support Group IMT Incident Management Team LUPWG Land

MAJOR INCIDENT REVIEW Lake Clifton, Red Hill and Roleystone Fires June 2011 Prepared for

Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia by

Leading Emergency Services

FESA MIR 1.3 dated 15 June 2011

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Acronyms / Abbreviations

AFAC

Agency

ACOO

Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council

A firefighting agency, i.e. DEC, FESA or Local Government

Assistant Chief Operations Officer

AIIMS Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System

AWS Automatic Weather Station

BA

BFB

BFSCC

Breathing Apparatus

(Local Government) Bush Fire Brigades

Bush Fire Service Consultative Committee

BoM Bureau of Meteorology

CBFCO Chief Bushfire Control Officer

CFA

CFRS

COMCEN

COO

Country Fire Authority (Victoria)

Career Fire and Rescue Services

FESA Communications Centre

Chief Operations Officer

COAG

CRC

DEC

Council of Australian Governments

Cooperative Research Centre

Department of Environment and Conservation

DM

ESL

FCAD

FDI

District Manager

Emergency Services Levy

FESA Computer Aided Dispatch System

Fire Danger Index

FDR

FESA

GFDI

Fire Danger Rating

Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia

Grass Fire Danger Index

IAP Incident Action Plan

IBMC

IC

Interagency Bushfire Management Committee

Incident Controller

ICC Incident Control Centre

ICP

IBMC

ICV

Incident Control Point

Interagency Bushfire Management Committee

Incident Control Vehicle

ISG Incident Support Group

IMT Incident Management Team

LUPWG Land Use Planning Working Group

MDT

MET

MIMIC

MIR

Mobile Data Terminal

Major Emergency Team

Major Incident Management for Incident Controllers

Major Incident Review

MPA Media and Public Affairs (FESA)

MROC Metropolitan Regional Operations Centre


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OASG Operational Area Support Group

PIA Post Incident Analysis

PPE

RD

ROC

Personal Protective Equipment

Regional Director

Regional Operations Centre (FESA)

ROS

SDC

SDD

SECG

Rate of Spread

State Duty Coordinator

State Duty Director

State Emergency Coordination Group

SEMC State Emergency Management Committee

SES State Emergency Service

SEWS

SLIP

SMEACS

SO

SOC

Standard Emergency Warning Signal

Shared Land Information Platform

Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command, Signal

Station Officer

State Operations Centre (FESA)

SOP Standing Operational Procedure

TFB

UCL

UFU

Total Fire Ban

Unallocated Crown Land

United Firefighters Union of Western Australia

VBRC

VES

VFRS

WALGA

Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

Volunteer Emergency Service

Volunteer Fire and Rescue Services

Western Australian Local Government Association

WAPOL Western Australia Police

WESTPLAN

Western Australia State Emergency Management Plan


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Thanks and Disclaimer I wish to acknowledge the open and frank manner in which members of FESA, DEC, Local Government and other agencies raised issues with me during the inquiry and answered my questions. While I am solely responsible for the report, I received invaluable assistance from Ms M Butler who supported the Inquiry process. This MIR was prepared between February and April 2011. Subsequent consultation regarding the draft was delayed, leading to the report being finalised in June 2011. The report and its content is based on information as it was available in April 2011. This report was prepared by Stuart Ellis. While every effort has been made to present the most accurate information and assessment, Leading Emergency Services expressly disclaim all liability or responsibility to any person, organisation or government using the information or advice. © Leading by Example Pty Ltd This work is copyright and for the sole use of FESA WA. Subsequent use and distribution is at FESA‘s discretion. Unless permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from Leading Emergency Services, a division of Leading by Example Pty Ltd.

Stuart Ellis, AM Principal Leading Emergency Services (A Division of Leading by Example Pty Ltd)


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Contents

Summary .............................................................................................................................. 1

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 2

2. The fires and how they were dealt with ............................................................................. 5

2.1 Fire One: Lake Clifton ................................................................................................ 5

2.2 Fire Two: Red Hill .................................................................................................... 11

2.3 Fire three: Roleystone .............................................................................................. 15

3. Preparedness .................................................................................................................. 21

4. Information Management ................................................................................................ 30

5. Operational Response .................................................................................................... 35

6. Incident Management ...................................................................................................... 38

7. Consequence .................................................................................................................. 47

8. Greater Coordination with DEC ....................................................................................... 50

9. Other Issues.................................................................................................................... 54

10. Previous Reports........................................................................................................... 55

11. Summary of Findings and Recommendations ............................................................... 56

12. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 59

Appendices 1. The Major Incident Review‘s Terms of Reference

2. List of those interviewed

3. Documentation Reviewed

4. Perth Hills Bushfire February 2011 Review‘s Terms of Reference

5. Detailed Timeline Fire One: Lake Clifton

6. Detailed Timeline Fire Two: Red Hill

7. Detailed Timeline Fire Three: Roleystone

8. Details of StateAlert Warnings

9. Pre Fire Season Suppression Works – Banyowla Regional Park 2010/2011

10. ‗Size up‘ – An initial Assessment and Reporting Tool


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Summary The Major Incident Review (MIR) was commissioned by the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA) to identify strengths and weakness in the operational response to three major bushfires in January and February 2011. It is standard that such a high level review be completed by an external party to provide impartiality and objectivity, and this highlights FESA‘s learning and improvement culture. The 2010-11 southern bushfire season was expected to be a difficult one. It had followed very dry conditions in 2010 and early indications heading into the bushfire season were that the environment would support dangerous fire behaviour. The subsequent house loss highlighted the exposure in dangerous but not catastrophic weather conditions. The MIR identifies a range of actions undertaken by FESA and other agencies that reduced risk, saved lives and enhanced operational outcomes. Many are formalised by ‗Findings‘ in the MIR which either state fact or refer to issues outside the terms of reference and are therefore not recommendations. In turn the MIR has made ‗Recommendations‘ that seek changes in FESA procedure and practice. Many also refer to other agencies. If implemented, operational response is likely to improve. Of greatest significance is the preservation of life when three separate communities were exposed to fast moving, high impact bushfires burning over difficult terrain in the urban interface during dangerous weather conditions. Considering the season, terrain, fire weather, fuel and lack of individual preparation, this was a commendable outcome, reflecting the benefits in these circumstances of evacuation. It came at a cost, however, with the loss of homes and other infrastructure at Lake Clifton and Roleystone, and minor damage at Red Hill. One firefighter was seriously injured. With residents not in place to extinguish the initial ember attack that so often develops into a burning house, and fire crews unable to be present at every structure under threat, the outcome is becoming inescapable. The MIR considers FESA was generally well prepared with effective community engagement and public information. Local government, having failed to address declaring ‗bushfire prone areas‘ for many years, will need to re-consider this issue with the Perth Hills Bushfire Inquiry. Local residents need to become more aware of the risk and more actively address individual preparation around their homes. Greater fuel reduction along the Perth Escarpment will reduce the risk of bushfire and is required, but this will remain a very challenging outcome with the existing complexities, risk appetites and limited opportunities because of the weather. Response to the fires was sound. Areas for improvement were identified in relation to incident management, and a range of operational procedures and capabilities that continue to be identified and refined after major events. These are summarised at Chapter 11 of the report. Operational improvement is a journey and the MIR acknowledges the progress made and the way recommendations from the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission were leveraged to advantage through the Interagency Bushfire Management Committee (IBMC). Reviewing these fires offers a significant opportunity for FESA and the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) to further coordinate their fire management, and in doing so, provide an improved emergency management capability to Western Australia (WA).


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1. Introduction How the Major Incident Review was conducted Major Incident Reviews (MIRs) are the third and top tier of review undertaken by the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA WA), since debriefs and a Post Incident Analysis (PIA) will have normally already been completed. In this instance and in order to complete it as quickly as possible, the MIR was conducted concurrently with the debriefs/PIA‘s for the Lake Clifton and Red Hill fires, while the Roleystone internal analysis had not been completed when this report was prepared. The Terms of Reference for the MIR are set out in Appendix 1. There were no hearings or public meetings, and the author did not attend the internal FESA debriefs. Interviews were not transcribed. The MIR interviewed those directly involved in incident control and fire management within FESA, DEC and Local Government, together with representatives from the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) and Western Australia Police (WAPOL). A complete list of those interviewed is at Appendix 2. In addition, a wide range of documentation was reviewed, listed at Appendix 3. This MIR has sought to identify specific strengths and improvements as a result of the operational response to the Lake Clifton, Red Hill and Roleystone fires. While acknowledging the very positive efforts of all involved, this MIR seeks to extract all available learnings from the three fires. It has arranged comment under the framework of the Terms of Reference, and it has adopted a ‗lessons learnt‘, rather than a ‗forensic investigative‘ approach. It is up to the agencies involved to undertake the detailed debriefs at an individual and tactical level. Comment regarding the conduct of these debriefs is at Chapter 9. The MIR has sorted its observations into ‗Findings‘ and ‗Recommendations‘. Those interviewed took a professional approach and although asked to highlight what went well and what requires improvement, their focus was on improvement. Findings in the report are either statements of fact, at times referring to positive observations, or conclusions broader than the terms of reference for this MIR. Recommendations relate directly to the Terms of Reference. All times used in the report reflect the 24hr clock. Relationship to the Perth Hills Bushfire Review While the MIR commenced prior to the announcement of the ‗Perth Hills Bushfire Review‘ on 23 February 2011, the two inquiries progressed concurrently. Where possible, it was agreed that this operational review would be completed before the Perth Hills Bushfire Review considered operational issues in detail. In this way, the MIR would form the basis of any subsequent consideration of operational issues by the Perth Hills Bushfire Review. This coordinated approach would, wherever possible, avoid both inquiries reviewing the same issues at the same time. The Terms of Reference for the Perth Hills Bushfire Review are set out in Appendix 4. Consultant Stuart Ellis of Leading Emergency Services was engaged to conduct the independent MIR. His past experience that benefits this process includes:

An operational background in the Australian Defence Force

Was CEO and Chief Officer of the SA Country Fire Service from 1996-2002

Participated in a performance audit with the Victorian Auditor General of Victoria‘s Fire Services in 2003

Assisted Mr Ron McLeod complete the Operational Review of the Canberra Bushfires in 2003

Chaired and co-authored the COAG National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management in 2004


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Conducted numerous jurisdictional and agency reviews at an operational and strategic level

Was the sole fire service consultant to the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission in 2009-2010 and

Has provided consultancy services to all Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand in relation to fire management.

Fire Agencies in Western Australia Authority for fighting bushfires in WA is dispersed across 124 authorities: 122 Local Governments, FESA and DEC. This arrangement has been in place for many years, although all other Australian jurisdictions have removed the control and coordination of operational response to bushfires from local government. In 2004, the Auditor General was critical of this arrangement,1 and subsequently the Bush Fires Act 1954 and the Emergency Management Regulations 2006 were amended to provide FESA with legislative authority to take control of fire on local government or DEC managed lands in specific circumstances detailed later in the report, and referred to as a ‗Section 13 declaration‘. While this arrangement potentially addresses the control of major fires when they occur, it does little to assist in the vital preparation and planning prior to emergencies. Noting the vast size of Western Australia, it is understandable how these arrangements came about and why they remain attractive to some. With so many authorities involved, these arrangements do raise reservations about efficiencies, competencies, standards and coordination. The MIR received reports of the existing arrangements working satisfactorily and this was evidenced in the fires examined by the MIR. There are opportunities, however, to improve operational response to bushfires via further coordination through fewer fire authorities. Operational Resources Within WA there are a number of services providing operational support. These are:

Career Fire and Rescue Services (CFRS)

Volunteer Fire and Rescue Services (VFRS)

Volunteer Fire Service (VFS) brigades

Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) Fire Management Resources

Local Government Bush Fire Brigades (BFB) who are members of the Bush Fire Service (BFS)

Volunteer Emergency Service (VES) and

VES and State Emergency Service (SES) (for the provision of logistics and communications support at major fire events).

Bushfire Mitigation and Management within FESA The provisions of the Bush Fires Act 1954 are used for the prevention, preparedness and response phases for bushfires. In accordance with the Fire Brigades Act 1942, FESA has responsibility for fire suppression within gazetted Fire Districts. Outside these districts, FESA provides support to land owners and Local Government (through their Bush Fire Brigades) in regard to bushfire preparedness and prevention strategies in pastoral/rural areas, and in regard to fire suppression on all non-DEC land. DEC has responsibility for all aspects of fire management within DEC estate, and for bushfire preparedness and prevention for all unallocated Crown land (UCL) and unmanaged reserves (UMR) outside the metropolitan area, regional centres and town sites.

1 Auditor General for Western Australia, ‗Responding to Major Bushfires‘ Report No 7, October 2004,

p 5


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Recent amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 now enable FESA to appoint a person to take overall responsibility for bushfire suppression regardless of their original jurisdiction or the land tenure of the fire. Amendments also allow for the control of bushfires to be handed over between Local Government and DEC when this is agreed and expedient. It should be noted that FESA always retains control of bushfires within gazetted Fire Districts. Weather conditions over the last 12 months and during the fires 2010 was one of the driest years on record across the Perth metropolitan area. Records for the lowest annual rainfall were broken at a number of sites due to the combination of a record dry summer in 2009-10, a dry winter in 2010, and below average spring 2010 rainfall. Annual rainfall readings were 40-60% lower than normal in the Roleystone/Kelmscott area.2 A single rainfall event on 5-6 January 2011 reduced two key drought indices, (the Keetch-Byram Drought Index and the Soil Dryness Index), which from September were both the driest in the last 5 years. The significance of these indices is that they are useful indicators of drought stressing of vegetation and subsequent fire behaviour.3 The serious nature of the prevailing drought conditions was conveyed through briefings by staff from the BoM Perth Regional Office in November 2010 to FESA, DEC and Local Government staff. This was subsequently updated at the regular meetings agencies arranged with BoM. In addition, an annual ‗Fire Weather Directive 2010/2011‘ was issued by the BoM Office which detailed the standards of service for operational fire weather data, fire weather warnings and spot forecasts.4 In summary, 2010 had been a dry year and unlike the remainder of Australia, it was apparent that WA was suffering from drought conditions. The annual launch of the ‗Bushfire Action Week‘ in October 2010 conveyed like messages. In a letter that the Minister for Police, Emergency Services and Road Safety sent in mid-November 2010 to his fellow parliamentarians, The Hon Rob Johnson MLA states:

―The season outlook is clear – despite the recent rains, WA is facing one of its worst bushfire seasons in history after the State recorded one of its driest winters. FESA has advised me that the seasonal conditions are worse than last year and the bushfire season is already ahead by six weeks. …A national report by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre warns that large areas of WA face an above normal fire risk because of increased fuel loads from dry bush and grasslands. This means early season bushfires are fast moving and extremely challenging for our firefighters to control.‖5

Predictions and subsequent assessments of fire danger were calculated using a Fire Danger Rating (FDR) system which is used across Australia, but has been modified for WA conditions. WA uses the Grass Fire Danger Index (GFDI) rather than the Forest Fire Danger Index (where applicable), which is the other available option. The MIR was advised that FESA and DEC have used the GFDI exclusively for many years and the BoM had endorsed the use of the GFDI as the generic measure of FDR predictions. On the fireground, crews are expected to re-assess local conditions and actual fire rate of spread (ROS) based on local real time conditions, not relying on the FDR prediction.

2 Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone

Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 4 3 Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone

Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 4 4 Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Fire Weather Directive 2010/2011‘, 2010

5 R. Johnson, Reference 31-10980, undated but confirmed sent 17 November 2010


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Legislation Legislation referred to in this MIR is:

Bush Fires Act 1954

Emergency Management Act 2005

Fire Brigades Act 1942

Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia Act 1998

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 and

State Records Act 2000.

The following chapter discusses the facts of the three fires and subsequent chapters provide analysis and commentary.

2. The fires and how they were dealt with The three fires reviewed by this MIR occurred around Perth; one to the south (Lake Clifton) in January 2011 and two to the east (Red Hill and Roleystone) in February 2011. None of these fires occurred in isolation and in addition to the Red Hill and Roleystone fires burning over the same weekend, FESA, DEC and Local Government brigades were responding to other incidents across the State. Some of these incidents were not related to fire, but still demanded responding units and management resources. On the weekend of 5-6 February 2011, there were other significant fires at Ferndale (FESA), Upper Chittering (FESA), Lesueur National Park (DEC) and Jarrahdale (DEC) that all demanded management and fireground resources concurrently with the Red Hill and Roleystone fires reviewed by this MIR.6

2.1 Fire One: Lake Clifton Background Lake Clifton is 109 kms by road from Perth CBD and 68kms from Bunbury. The fire burnt between the Forrest Highway (Highway 2) and the Old Coast Road (Highway 1) in the vicinity of Lake Clifton (see map below). More than 40 houses were saved but 10 houses were lost together with a number of other structures in the rural subdivision development known as Armstrong Hills at Lake Clifton. The fire caused much of the damage during the initial six hours, and after that time it was more a matter of containing the fire and extinguishing where it was burning than defending further property and homes. Although the fire never reached the area, residents of neighbouring Tuart Grove were evacuated. A detailed timeline of the Lake Clifton fire is contained at Appendix 5.

6 FESA MPA, ‗Recent Bushfire Response Evaluation Report‘, dated March 2011, p 6


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Figure 1: Area burnt – Lake Clifton fire Weather The Fire Danger Rating on that day was forecast as ‗Very High‘ for the SW coastal area. A Spot Weather forecast issued at 17:33 on 10 January 2011 forecast that at 18:00, the temperature would be 32 C, RH 21%, wind east-south-east at 20km/h. These conditions were likely to have been more severe earlier in the day. The State Operations Centre (SOC) recalls in its debrief that there was no significant predicted fire weather and the State was at ‗Medium‘ alert.7 The Minutes of the SOC weekly teleconference held on 6 January 2011, however, note that ―Fire weather quiet, Monday - Tuesday possible severe fire weather conditions for central west‖.8 The FESA Operational Debrief Incident No 171042 recorded that ―The day of the bushfire was expected to be hot, dry and windy, with a forecast classification of Very High. The conditions forecast for the day were High with an FDI 23 (Mandurah). There were no TFBs declared across the State on that day…‖9 The two nearest BoM automatic weather stations are at Harvey and Mandurah. Harvey was recording peak readings of 35.2 C, 26% RH, winds east-south-east at 41km/h and Mandurah was recording peak readings of 37.2 C, 15% RH, winds east, east-south-east at 20km/h.10 Fire Cause FESA‘s fire investigation has not yet been concluded. Initially, the cause of the fire was considered suspicious due to the series of fire ignitions along the western side of the Forrest Highway and a green vehicle that was observed in the vicinity of some of the ignition points.

7 Lake Clifton SOC Debrief, dated 4 March 2011

8 Minutes of SOC weekly teleconference, dated 06 January 2011

9 FESA Lake Clifton Operational Debrief Incident No: 171042, dated 4 April 2011, p 5

10 FESA Lake Clifton Operational Debrief Incident No: 171042, dated 4 April 2011, p 6


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Subsequent investigation by WAPOL and FESA indicated the fire cause simply as ‗undetermined‘. A possible explanation following forensic analysis is that a truck with a blown tyre may have travelled on the road emitting sparks parallel to the ignition points. Operational response On Monday, 10 January 2011 at 11:47, a series of fires were reported by DEC‘s Wellington District fire tower at Mt William which was confirmed by an opportune report made by a DEC staff member driving past the site at the time. FESA received a 000 call at 11:52, and at 11:54 and 12:03 FESA COMCEN spoke to the Chief Bushfire Control Officer (CBFCO) and informed him of multiple 000 calls. He requested adjacent shires be notified to response additional resources. The Waroona CBFCO, Mr J Twaddle, was advised at 11:54 and set about deploying the two tankers and two light units of the Waroona Brigade. WAPOL was informed of the incident by FESA COMCEN at 12:00 and 12:13. Several Local Government and VFRS units were contacted and dispatched between 12:03 and 12:13. These reports together with local DEC observations led to DEC firefighting vehicles being dispatched from Wellington at 12:10 and DEC aerial bombers being dispatched from Bunbury at 12:20. FESA Air Desk was notified at 12:17 to mobilise air bombers. At 12:28 FESA Air Desk reports Perth and Bunbury water bombers and Busselton Type 1 were dispatched. Additional DEC ground resources were dispatched at 12:24. At 12:26 the DEC Regional Duty Officer contacted the FESA South West Regional Duty Coordinator in Bunbury. FESA mobilised a Level 3 Incident Controller (IC) to the incident at 12:28 from the Bunbury Office. Given the locality, Mr Twaddle assumed the responsibilities of IC. He advised the MIR that he had arrived on scene at a siding on the Forrest Highway in 17 minutes after leaving the Waroona Fire Station. En route he requested the call out of the Preston Beach and Lake Clifton Brigades. By the time he arrived on scene, the initial DEC aerial support was operating overhead – reported by DEC Air Attack at 13:05 with the first DEC bomber drop recorded as 12:55. Through the COMCEN, the IC also sought further brigade support from the adjacent Harvey and Murray Shires. The IC identified two fires which he referred to as ‗Fire One‘ and ‗Fire Two‘. He initially responded resources to ‗Fire One‘, which he considered more accessible by vehicle. ‗Fire Two‘ was burning with a 500m wide head fire – due to the multiple ignitions – in inaccessible sandy terrain, placing vehicles at risk of becoming easily bogged. Subsequently he allocated resources from the Shire of Murray to ‗Fire Two‘ to fight the fire on its northern flank. It is unclear to the MIR when the first Incident Action Plan (IAP) was developed, but an IAP developed for Shift 3 on 11 January 2011 recorded fire spread at 2-3 km/h during the most severe period of the day on 10 January 2011. Fire management is discussed further under Chapter 5. The FESA Regional Office received the initial field sketch of the fire on a map at 14:12 on 10 January 2011. It reflected two fires, both on the western side of the road. The southern ‗Fire One‘ had ‗1400 OK‘, written over it, possibly indicating that at the time of sending (14.12), it was under control, or not a threat. It also indicated a 14.00 line around the larger ‗Fire Two‘, which was approaching the urban interface area of Armstrong Hills. Two Divisions were initially established on the ground, one to the East and North and the other to the South and West. Subsequent DEC mapping indicates three Divisions were in place by 21:56 on 10 January 2011: Division West, Division South and Division East, with east and west being either side of Harvey Estuary. Within these Divisions there were five sectors. In addition, there were aviation resources that may be referred to as a further Division. ‗Fire One‘ was relatively quickly controlled and burnt a total of about 50-60 ha. ‗Fire Two' was a broad fire, appearing to have been started in six or seven places along the Forrest


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Highway. Little active firefighting occurred between the highway and the Harvey River to the west, both because of access issues as well as an assessment by the IC that the fire would not be stopped east of the river. Once it was west of the river, it burnt through DEC-managed nature reserve to the south and west and private property towards the subdivisions of Armstrong Hills and Tuart Grove. Armstrong Hills is, as the name suggests, on a hill, and a defined slope leads up from the flatter country to the east and north. As the fire reached these slopes it burnt faster11 towards existing houses. To the east of Armstrong Hills was vegetation which was recorded on a DEC map as being 7 or more years old.12 The IC considered much of the fuel burnt on the first afternoon of the fire had not been burnt for many years. Subsequent aerial mapping indicates that at 14:29 the fire size was 732 ha and at 15:19 identified the fire burning into Armstrong Hills with a total fire size of 803 ha. The assessment by the IC (with extensive local knowledge) was that many of the houses at Armstrong Hills were undefendable due to the proximity of vegetation, the nature of their construction and the lack of ‗defendable space‘.13 Although there was some direct asset protection from the ground, the MIR was told that more was done from the air and the IC did not direct fire appliances to houses he considered were undefendable. (This is regarded by the MIR as consistent with interstate practice, so as to not place ground crews in an untenable position.) An over-flight by the MIR of the site and examination of pre-fire Google imagery identified that houses in the area were built within surrounding vegetation, some with very little separation from bushland. On a FESA Map dated 11 January 2011, nine buildings were recorded as having suffered serious damage, one was recorded as partially damaged and a further six were recorded with unconfirmed damage. Seven of the nine seriously damaged buildings were on Thompson Drive, in the estate known as Armstrong Hills at Lake Clifton. It was subsequently confirmed that 10 houses and numerous outbuildings were destroyed, all during the initial run of the fire.14 House losses were reported around 17:00-18:00 from aircraft surveillance, although it was assessed the losses had occurred earlier. FESA and the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) are conducting detailed research into these and other house losses. The findings were not available at the time the MIR was completed. At approximately 14:00 the Chief Operations Officer (COO) sought legal advice within FESA regarding implementing a Section 13 declaration. At about 16:00, on the recommendation of the COO, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of FESA made a Section 13 declaration under the Bush Fires Act 1954. The MIR was advised that the initial reason for the declaration was related to the powers to direct and prohibit movement and subsequently, the imminent impact to properties. Once the declaration was made, giving FESA legislative authority to control fire operations, a teleconference was called to inform the Regional Director, South West. He was asked to nominate an IC and the Local Government CBFCO was identified, even though he was not a Level 3 IC, and the Region had despatched a Level 3 accredited staff member to the fire scene, who subsequently provided advice to the CBFCO. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.

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The spread of fire doubles in speed for every 10 degrees of uphill slope as super-heated gasses dry and heat fuel ahead of the fire. 12

DEC File 13

Defendable space is cleared distance around a house. The FESA Pamphlet ‗Prepare. Act. Survive.‘ V2, October 2010, p 24 advises a 20m ‗circle of safety‘ as a minimum around homes and buildings. This was not evident in many of the Armstrong Hills properties. 14

Interview with Mr J Tillman


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The fire was then managed by a multi-agency Incident Management Team (IMT) made up of DEC, FESA and Local Government representatives. The MIR was advised that FESA requested DEC to mobilise its portable Incident Control Centre (ICC) to be dispatched to replace the FESA Incident Control Vehicle (ICV), which had now exceeded its capacity to operate as an Incident Control Point (ICP). This occurred efficiently overnight and became a sophisticated facility for incident management over the next three days.

Figure 2: Deployable ICC managed by DEC15 Once control lines were established on the night of 10 January 2011, the fire never broke the containment line and was declared contained at 03:00 on 11 January 2011. Mr Twaddle handed over to Mr C Widmer as IC for Shift 2 from 19:00 on 10 January to 08:45 on 11 January 2011, who in turn handed over to Mr J Tillman. A total of five 12 hour shifts were completed before the control of the fire was returned to Local Government at 19:00 on 12 January 2011. Interagency cooperation was considered good within the IMT, being sourced from FESA, DEC and Local Government, and this appeared enhanced by the functionality of the mobile ICC which was deployed. Also acknowledged as effective was the Incident Support Group,16 community briefings involving the local Shire President and the initial road closures by WAPOL. No lives were lost and there were no serious injuries reported. Apart from those who were directly impacted by losses, the community was affected for a number of days after the fire, as utilities were not serviceable, there were road closures with power lines down, and dangerous trees. A total of 1,430 ha was recorded as burnt in the main ‗Fire Two‘ and a further 55 ha in the initial ‗Fire One‘. Incident Control The initial IC who was the CBFCO managed the fire with support from FESA staff from the Bunbury Regional Office through to early evening. The MIR was advised that FESA staff assisted with planning and decision making, working alongside the IC to establish a control structure, provide intelligence to FESA, provide and manage media and alerts to the affected community, and liaise with other agencies. Although the IC had extensive local knowledge

15

Photo provided by DEC 16

An Incident Support Group consists of Police, other emergency services, utilities and local government.


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and experience of rural fire, this fire quickly became an urban interface fire, requiring a Level 3 IC early in the afternoon due to the range of ground and air resources, multi-agency involvement, the challenging terrain (difficult to traverse), and the assets being threatened. This did not appear to be recognised by the FESA Regional Operations Centre (ROC) in Bunbury at the time, perhaps due to a lack of timely and accurate information being received from the fireground. The SOC was being informed by the Region, and was not well placed to know better, although it did receive advice from air observers that the fire was not contained, was travelling quickly and moving towards houses. Media reported house losses. It is not clear how these air observations were being conveyed to the IC or the ROC. This led to an inconsistent ‗Common Operating Picture‘, which is a poor foundation for decision making at the IMT, ROC and SOC. Apart from reports from air observers, the SOC did not consider itself well informed on events during the afternoon of 10 January 2011. The distance between Perth and Bunbury, the limited local resources and the delays in out-of-area support arriving would have all contributed to challenging incident management conditions during the afternoon of 10 January. It appears incident management on the afternoon was also constrained by capacity and facilities. When the fire was in its main run, and the situation was dynamic and threatening, incident control was undertaken by the local CBFCO at a road siding, while he steadily established an IMT as individuals became available. This in turn led to delays in identifying and communicating the spread of the fire. Not having a confirmed location of the fire, and/or receiving inconsistent reports from ground and air observers, is not an ideal situation for fire managers. The MIR considers that when a fire is reported as uncontrolled, its location is not confirmed and there is potential for it to impact into urban areas, those in the chain of command are obliged to take a ‗worse case‘ approach (until they know better) and make decisions accordingly. In such a situation, particularly once a Section 13 declaration has been made, FESA should not hesitate to appoint a Level 3 accredited IC, supported by an appropriately staffed IMT. During the afternoon of 10 January 2011, however, there was poor situational awareness at all levels, an IC not accredited to Level 3, and an out of control fire impacting houses. The deployment of a Level 3 accredited staff member from the Regional Office was appropriate, but for him not to be appointed IC placed the local CBFCO in an invidious position and exposed FESA. The experience of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) and the Wangary Coronial Inquiry in South Australia was that the IC was held responsible for fire management, regardless of whether a volunteer or career member and what support may have been in place. This needs to be remembered when appointing Level 3 IC‘s in the future.

Finding 1 FESA was exposed on the afternoon of 10 January 2011 as it lacked situational awareness and appointed a non-accredited IC to a Level 3 fire at a time when Armstrong Hills was under threat.

Public advice The initial IC was recorded as arriving on scene at 12:58, with the first media advice being posted on the FESA website at 13:10. This was timely advice to the public and is discussed further together with delays in issuing StateAlert messages in Chapter 4. A total of 3 StateAlert messages were sent between 16:00 and 23:46 on 10 January 2011. Evacuation did not appear to be directed by the first shift IC, but was ordered for Tuart Grove on the night of 10 January 2011 by the second shift IC. Community briefings occurred at Waroona, which were considered effective, but those to the west of the fire, could not attend. In the absence of an alternative, DEC‘s Information Services Unit, working within the


11

FESA IMT and reporting to the FESA IC, prepared a template for Community Information Updates , including maps and broader information, that were approved by the IC prior to being distributed at community meetings and road closure points. Displaying this joint information on agency websites is discussed further in Chapter 8. In total 30 alerts were issued for the Lake Clifton bushfire including: 17

16 Emergency Warnings with Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS)

3 Watch and Acts

10 Advices and

final All Clear. Road closures These were in place and continued for the next two days. The consequence of these road closures (i.e. those inside the road closure could leave but not return and those outside who had already left, could not return) caused frustration among local residents. The CBFCO said that it is Western Power preference for all residents to be removed while they undertake initial checks of electrical supply, where necessary, to ensure safety and establish re-connections. The total absence of residents speeds the infrastructure recovery process, since there is not the requirement for the same level of signage and local road restrictions while repair work is completed. This issue is pursued later in Chapter 6. Bushfire Prone Area The area burnt by the fire was not declared as bushfire prone18 by the Shire of Waroona. In WA the declaration of bushfire prone is currently at the discretion of Local Government under one of two options: through the review and update of regional or town planning schemes or via the Local Government (Misc Provisions) Act 1960. It was evident to the MIR that the area of the fire was bushfire prone and should be so declared. The MIR did not visit or assess any other areas beyond Lake Clifton in the Shire of Waroona.

Finding 2A The area of Lake Clifton should be declared bushfire prone either through review and update of regional or town planning schemes or via the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960.

2.2 Fire Two: Red Hill Background Within the Local Government City of Swan, the locality of Red Hill is situated on the Darling Escarpment almost 30 km from the Perth central business district. Zoned as Emergency Services Levy (ESL) Category 3, the community is supported by a Volunteer Fire and Rescue Service (VFRS) and Bush Fire Brigade (BFB), with the availability of CFRS stations and SES units. The City of Swan also has a Community Emergency Services Manager, a joint initiative of FESA and Local Government. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. A detailed timeline of the Red Hill fire is set out at Appendix 6.

17

Michelle Harris, Manager Media and Public Affairs, ‗Recent Bushfires Response Evaluation Report‘ dated March 2011, p 14 18

A bushfire prone area is an area of land that can support a bush fire or is likely to be subject to bushfire attack. Interstate (in NSW, VIC and SA), these areas are identified by the fire service, and local government applies planning standards consistent with Australian Standards for ‗Bushfire Prone Areas‘ - AS 3959—2009.


12

Figure 2: Area burnt – Red Hill fire Weather The minutes of the weekly weather brief to the SOC at 09:00 on 3 February 2011 recorded that:

o A broad surface trough will impact the State over the next few days o Over the weekend fresh gusty east winds will impact in the morning and o Possible Very High fire danger in some areas due to strong winds.

A Fire Weather Warning for 5 February issued at 15:30 on 4 February 2011 forecast a Severe Fire Danger.19 The BoM issued a further Fire Weather Forecast at 15:35 on 5 February 2011 valid for the following day (Sunday) with a FDI of 54 for ‗Lower West Coastal‘ Fire Weather Forecast Area and confirmed via Fire Weather Warnings issued at 15:30 on 5 February and 04:25 on 6 February 2011 that a Severe Fire Danger (GFDI 50-74) was forecast for the Perth metropolitan area.20 The Fire Weather Warning states, ―FESA advises that if a fire starts and takes hold it will be unpredictable, move very fast and be difficult for firefighters to bring under control.‖21 This was supported by the fire danger advice disseminated by FESA to warn people of the severity of fires if they were to start. A Total Fire Ban was declared for 5 February 2011 in accordance with Section 22A of the Bush Fires Act 1954.

19

Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 32 20

Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 28-29 21

Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 32-36


13

The two nearest BoM automatic weather stations are at Perth Airport to the south-west and Bickley to the south, south-east, considered more representative of the fireground weather. Overnight at Bickley on 5-6 February 2011, easterly winds were 46km/h at 00:50 on 6 February with gusts to 87km/h later in the day at 21:27. A Spot Weather forecast issued at 21:45 on 5 February 2011 forecast at 21:30 the temperature to be 18 C, RH 42%, and the wind was easterly at 30km/h, gusting to 55km/h. The IC for Shift 2 on Sunday, 6 February 2011 reported easterly winds at 75km/h with gusts to 90km/h, although the MIR understands no local readings were taken. Fire Cause An ‗area of origin‘, rather than a point of origin, has been determined for the Red Hill fire. Investigation by FESA fire investigators concluded the fire cause as ―accidental – no suspicious circumstances‖, with ignition being caused by a tree limb hitting Western Power infrastructure, albeit that the statutory clearances for vegetation had been met. Fire cause has also been investigated by WAPOL and EnergySafety, Department of Commerce. Operational Response At 21:14 a scrub fire in the vicinity of Toodyay Road and Roland Road, Gidgegannup was reported through Triple Zero (000) by a member of the public. The fire quickly burnt into rocky, inaccessible country north of Toodyay Road. Brigades were responded in accordance with FESA mobilising Standing Operational Procedure (SOP) 1 and Zone 2 and 2A operational protocols. Although DEC indicated there was a delay in being advised of the fire, FESA COMCEN recordings do not support this. At 21:20 FESA COMCEN received a report from the incident ground of a fire at the ―base of power pole; size 100m deep and 50m wide; moving very quickly – moving in a westerly direction‖. Further resources were responded. At 21:30 the COMCEN was advised the fire was confirmed as a 3rd Alarm resulting in further resources being mobilised including a request for WAPOL attendance to assist with closure of Toodyay Road. The initial IC, DM M Teraci, upgraded response to a 4th Alarm Bushfire. The ICP was initially established in an open shed at the entrance to the Red Hill Waste Management Facility located at 1094 Toodyay Road Red Hill. The IMT occupied this through the night, although it was windy and noisy and the ICP location was unlikely to have enhanced incident management. The Darling Range and Swan BFB ICVs were in location offering some respite from the conditions, together with a mobile WAPOL control facility. It is unclear why the IC did not request the FRS ICV; however, it appeared he was comfortable with the existing arrangement, and in the morning a building on site was made available. An initial warning was sent out at 21:50 and a second request was made at 21:58 for an emergency warning message for the communities of Brigadoon, Baskerville and Millendon. The Metropolitan Regional Operations Centre (MROC) at FESA House was activated at 21:59 and the SOC was activated at 01:27 on 6 February 2011. A Section 13 declaration under the Bush Fires Act 1954 was made at 01:15 on 6 February 2011, with FESA‘s RD E Brooks appointed as the authorised person to take control of all operations in relation to the Red Hill Fire. The fire was managed as two divisions. Local Government and DEC resources operated the northern Division together with heavy machinery, establishing a mineral earth break along the northern boundary. This activity was ceased during the night of 5/6 February 2011, as local mine sites proved too dangerous for crews operating in the dark. CFRS crews operated on the southern division along the Toodyay Highway, and later on 6 February 2011 resources centred to the west, where the fire was accessible at the base of the foothills. This was also where houses and other infrastructure required protection from the fire.


14

The IMT on the second shift during the day of 6 February 2011 gained entry to offices at the entrance to the Red Hill Waste Management facility and this proved satisfactory as an alternative ICP. The IMT subsequently relocated during the early hours of 7 February 2011 to facilities at the old Swan Shire Offices, although the Operations Section operated separately at nearby Jack Mann Oval. This is discussed later in Chapter 6. The IMT consisted of nine officers and an effective Incident Support Group (ISG) was established. A request for aerial support was made at 05:15 on 6 February 2011. Helitacs 670 and 671 arrived at the fire ground at 06:50 and Helitac 681 at 06:55. Helitacs 668 and 669 were mobilised at 07:54 and arrived at 08:12. Fixed wing bombers were also mobilised and conducted one drop. Due to the high wind shear over the escarpment in the vicinity of the incident, however, it was deemed unsafe for the fixed wing bombers to continue to operate. This situation was monitored and remained the case for the duration of the fire. The air intelligence aircraft arrived at the Red Hill incident at 07:15 on 6 February 2011 where it remained until a request for priority redeployment to the Roleystone incident was made at 14:16. The following air operations data was provided to the MIR in regard to the Red Hill Fire:

o Total hours flown by Helitacs 41.7 hrs o Total drops conducted 354 o Total water delivered 472,440 lt o Total foam concentrate used 967 lt o Total hours flown Air Intelligence 6.1 hrs

Public advice Warnings to the public were considered timely and are further discussed in Chapter 4. In total 58 alerts were issued for the Red Hill Fire including:22

39 Emergency Warnings with SEWS

1 Watch and Act

17 Advices and

final All Clear.

StateAlert was activated with a total of six messages being sent between 02:14 and 03:54 on 6 February 2011. These are detailed at Appendix 8. Bushfire Prone Area

The area burnt by the fire was not declared as bushfire prone by the City of Swan. It was evident to the MIR that the area of the fire was bushfire prone and should be so declared. The MIR did not visit or assess any other areas beyond Red Hill in the City of Swan.

Finding 2B The area of Red Hill should be declared bushfire prone either through review and update of regional or town planning schemes, or via the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960.

The fire is recorded as burning a total of 1020 ha, with one shed destroyed but no other substantive losses. No lives were lost and there were no serious injuries reported. Apart from those who were directly impacted by losses, the community was affected for a number of days after the fire as utilities were not serviceable, there were road closures with power lines down, and dangerous trees.

22

Michelle Harris, Manager Media and Public Affairs, ‗Recent Bushfires Response Evaluation Report‘ dated March 2011, p 9


15

2.3 Fire three: Roleystone Background Roleystone is 38 kms by road south east of the Perth CBD in the City of Armadale. The area is categorised as ESL Category 323 which attracts operating arrangements that are supported by a VFRS and a BFB, a network of CFRS and SES. It is also in the Zone 2 and 2A Special Response Area, which due to the identified risk attracts additional response resources including multiple crew, DEC and aerial response. A detailed timeline of the Roleystone fire is set out at Appendix 7. On 6 February 2011 there had been a significant Level 3 incident which had developed the previous night about 30 kms north at Red Hill. This had attracted significant incident management and firefighting resources with the fire travelling towards property and houses at the foothills of the Darling Escarpment during the day of 6 February 2011.

Figure 4: Area burnt Roleystone fire Weather The minutes of the weekly weather brief to the SOC at 09:00 on 3 February 2011 recorded that:

o A broad surface trough would impact the State over the next few days o Over the weekend fresh gusty east winds would impact in the morning and o Possible Very High fire danger in some areas due to strong winds.

The BoM issued a Fire Weather Forecast at 15:35 on 5 February 2011 valid for the following day (Sunday) with a FDI of 54 for ‗Lower West Coastal‘ Fire Weather Forecast Area, and confirmed via Fire Weather Warnings issued at 15:30 on 5 February 2011 and 04:25 on 6

23

ESL – Manual of Operating Procedures, 2010-11 Version, p 5


16

February 2011 that a Severe Fire Danger (GFDI 50-74) was forecast for the Perth metropolitan area.24 The Fire Weather Warning states, ―FESA advises that if a fire starts and takes hold it will be unpredictable, move very fast and be difficult for firefighters to bring under control.‖25 This was supported by the fire danger advice disseminated by FESA. A Total Fire Ban was declared for 6 February 2011 in accordance with Section 22A of the Bush Fires Act 1954. The two nearest BoM automatic weather stations are at Champion Lakes (west of the fire ground) and Bickley (north-east of the fireground). On 6 February 2011, the Grass Fire Danger Index peaked at Champion Lakes at 28 (High Fire Danger Rating) and at Bickley at 36 (Very High Fire Danger Rating). The BoM indicates the Fire Danger Rating at the fire ground ―is likely to have been Very High.‖26 A subsequent Spot Weather forecast issued at 14:19 on 6 February 2011 forecast at 14:00 the temperature to be 29 C, RH 28% and the wind ESE 31 gusting 50 km/h. These confirmed a Very High Fire Danger Rating. Fire Cause During the late morning of 6 February 2011 a fire was ignited in the front yard of 405 Brookton Highway, Roleystone, allegedly by a person operating an angle grinder while undertaking metalwork at his home. The formal cause of the fire was investigated by FESA and determined as ‗accidental‘. The sparks from an angle grinder ignited nearby vegetation. Fire Investigation reports have been prepared by both FESA and WAPOL. A member of the local community has been formally charged under Section 22B(2)(b) of the Bush Fires Act 1954 which states that ―a person must not carry out an activity in the open air that causes, or is likely to cause, a fire‖. Operational response Initial response was at 11:45 by the Armadale CFRS, Roleystone VFRS, Roleystone BFS and Bedfordale BFS in accordance with FESA Mobilising SOP1 and the Zone 2 and 2A operational protocols, which also requires aerial support and DEC resources to be mobilised. DEC was advised by phone (they are not alerted by pager) and resolutely indicated to the MIR that initial advice from the COMCEN was that ‗no assistance was required‘. The DEC Perth Hills Duty Officer initiated a spotter aircraft and subsequently initiated ground response. The MIR reviewed the recorded initial advice to DEC from the FESA COMCEN that makes no reference to ‗no assistance being required‘. What subsequent exchanges may have occurred between FESA and DEC are unclear to the MIR and it did not to dwell on this issue. It did conclude that in future when responding DEC resources, paging rather than calling the Duty Officer, is likely to eliminate some confusion with response requirements. In addition, Zone 2 and 2A response protocols need to be clarified and consistently applied. Initial fire crews arrived at the incident scene in 11 minutes and after a further seven minutes reported the fire as ―contained‖ at 12:03, with advice to the COMCEN to ―stand down‖ the aerial support. Fuel load in the vicinity of this location was noted as being ―thin leaf litter, light dry grass and waist high foliage plants‖. Wind conditions were noted as ―gusting at times

24



Bureau of Meteorology WA Regional Office, ‗Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone Fire‘, 6 February 2011, p 15


17

and coming from an easterly direction‖27 with ―speed of 50 – 60km/h and gusts of up to 90 km/h‖28, although it appears no formal readings were taken. At 12:11, a spot over was identified rising out of lower ground previously unsighted and heading to the northwest. At 12:13, a request to upgrade the incident to a 3rd Alarm was made along with a request for aerial support and additional appliances. DM P Ryan was contacted and responded at 12:15, assuming control as IC on arrival as an accredited Level 3 IC. He assessed the scene and by 13:08 had the ICP relocated to the Roleystone Fire Station and the incident upgraded to 4th Alarm. Vehicle Control Points (VCP) were established to assist relocating residents and limiting traffic into fire affected areas. DM Ryan also quickly requested the senior WAPOL officer at the scene to assist by forming an ISG as soon as possible. The SOC at FESA House was activated at 13:10 and the CFRS ICV responded. Limited reporting from the field meant that the IMT had poor situational awareness until the arrival of air intelligence aircraft sometime after 14:30. A Section 13 declaration under the Bush Fires Act 1954 was made at 14:15 and Supt G Kennedy was appointed as IC. The MIR was advised this was to provide additional depth and experience within the IMT for this challenging interface fire. DM Ryan remained as Deputy and Operations Officer within the IMT, acting as IC when Supt Kennedy was called away from the IMT. The IMT was limited in size to less than 10 personnel and local bushfire volunteers acted as scribes for the principal officers within the IMT. The Roleystone Fire Station was a planned Incident Control Centre (ICC) but was not specifically set up to house an IMT. There were limited communication facilities (only two telephone lines) and access was open, allowing media and others to walk freely through the ICC. It is understood there are few purpose built ICC‘s in the State. The operations for the IMT established itself in the ICV located outside the Fire Station but other facilities were limited as officers had deployed to the fire with limited support equipment such as computers. The developing fire, fanned by gusting winds, channeled by valleys and gullies, and hastened by often burning uphill, travelled up to 1.5 km per hour, effectively completing its main run from east to west by about 14:00. This highlights the speed of the fire runs and the limited opportunity to deploy resources to protect homes, including redeploying resources from Red Hill to inhibit the progress of the fire. The MIR was advised that because of this, the response effort was focused on saving life as its main priority, with property as a secondary objective. The potent fire behaviour was not indicative of the extant Fire Danger Index and highlighted the severe drought conditions being experienced over summer. Because of the speed of the fire, a defensive posture was generally adopted, focusing on extracting residents from the multiple paths of the fire, protecting properties where possible. The fire was managed through operating four sectors around the perimeter. Responding fire appliances were directed through the COMCEN to report to the Roleystone Fire Station, some being confronted by burning buildings en route and being required to manage these incidents prior to formal fireground briefings. The Buckingham Bridge was identified as key infrastructure, but was subsequently lost. The MIR notes there was significant vegetation in the Canning River and the wooden bridge structure was treated with highly flammable creosote to avoid termite attack. Evacuation was through self-relocation of residents, as well as directed and assisted evacuation by WAPOL and fire crews. Some residents chose to remain with their properties and this was accepted. It was suggested to the MIR that the FESA message, ―Put your

27

SO Briggs, Draft Witness Statement, pp 3-4 28

Mr N Plowman, Draft Witness Statement, p 7


18

bushfire survival plan into action‖ and the subsequent message to ―Leave for a safer place, if you are not prepared or your plan is to leave‖ were not compatible, although FESA MPA indicated they were not messages used at the same time, with the first being initial advice and the second being used when required. Advice to evacuate was communicated by police and fire crews visiting homes, StateAlert broadcasts, ABC local radio and other media outlets, the FESA website, RSS feeds and the FESA information line. While initially operating in the Clifton Hills area assisting FESA crews with asset protection, Local Government BFB‘s generally operated in the northern Sectors 3 and 4 with DEC crews and heavy machinery, establishing a mineral earth break with four machines and securing the northern flank of the fire in preparation for any south westerly wind change should it occur. It failed to eventuate and although largely contained, reports at 23:00 on 6 February 2011 and 00:00 on 7 February 2011 record the northern flank being ―not yet controlled‖. FRS crews generally operated in Sectors 1 and 2 to the south and west, within the urban areas, and after the initial run of the fire and its intrusion into urban areas generally through spotting, these crews were able to hold the fire to the urban edge. Initial indications are that house loss was largely a result of ember attack. Where fire crews or aircraft were present, houses were able to be saved. Aircraft operations were limited due to the gusty conditions. As was the case at the Red Hill fire earlier in the day, it was deemed unsafe for fixed wing aircraft to operate in the vicinity of the escarpment, and rotary wing aircraft at times operated with lower payloads due to the flying conditions. This in turn impacted effectiveness on the ground, as drop accuracy was more challenging and the winds dissipated the drop. The following air operations data was provided to the MIR in regard to the Roleystone Fire:

o Total hours flown by Helitacs 37.5 hrs o Total drops conducted 261 o Total water delivered 437,571 lt o Total foam concentrate used 873 lt o Total hours flown Air Intelligence 11.3 hrs

Road closures were implemented by WAPOL on direction of the IC. After the initial run of the fire, vehicle control points became contentious as some residents who had remained with their houses when the evacuation occurred were permitted to move about within the declared ‗unsafe‘ area, while those who evacuated were not permitted back to their homes. This inconsistency was problematic and is discussed further in Chapter 7. Public advice The first media advice was issued on the FESA website at 12:45, within 30 minutes of the IC determining life and/or property was under threat. This was timely advice to the public and is discussed further in Chapter 4, together with the issuing of StateAlert messages. Evacuation was directed soon after the arrival of the first Level 3 IC. Community briefings occurred at Armadale Arena, which were considered effective. The MIR commends IC‘s Ryan and Kennedy on the afternoon of Sunday, 6 February 2011 for their decisiveness to evacuate residents in Roleystone. They quickly identified the risk, the available resources and the likelihood of successfully containing the fire. ABC local radio is also to be commended for their support to the local community at the time of the fire and during the subsequent recovery phase. In total 45 alerts were issued for the Roleystone bushfire, including: 29

22 Emergency Warnings with SEWS

6 Watch and Acts

29



19

16 Advices and

final All Clear.

Five StateAlert messages were issued and these are analysed further in Chapter 4. The initial Operational Area Support Group (OASG) Meeting was held on 6 February 2011 at 16:00 in the FESA SOC with the focus on the Roleystone fire. The development of the Roleystone fire, while the Red Hill fire continued, and the subsequent competing resources from the metropolitan and regional areas, required the Emergency Management (EM) arrangements to be elevated from the District to the State level. Representatives from FESA, DEC, WALGA, WAPOL, Main Roads WA, Western Power, Department of Health, Department of Education and the Department for Child Protection shared information and coordinated a Whole of Government response for both the Roleystone and Red Hill fires. Subsequently the State Emergency Coordination Group met at 18:30. Further OASG meetings as well as teleconferences involving the State Duty Director (SDD)/State Duty Coordinator (SDC) and IC‘s at each incident were held at regular intervals on 6, 7 and 8 February 2011. Fire resources at the incident peaked at 56 appliances at approximately 18:30 on 6 February 2011. Subsequent crew deployments centered on blackening out the fire, maintaining a secure perimeter and ensuring the affected areas were safe. Two additional IMT shifts were arranged to deploy from Victoria and arrived on 7 February 2011. This is discussed later in Chapters 6 and 8. IMT‘s rotated over the following days until the incident was handed back to Local Government on 10 February 2011. Investigation of training records indicated that all appointed IC‘s were accredited Level 3 for bushfire apart from Mr B Stringer who has extensive experience but is Level 2 accredited. Recovery arrangements were coordinated through the Incident Support Group established at Armadale Council. Community meetings were held at the Armadale Arena in the City of Armadale. Losses An over flight of the site and examination of pre-fire Google imagery by the MIR identified that houses in the area were built close to surrounding vegetation, some with very little separation from bushland. A total of 71 houses were severely damaged and effectively lost to the fire, and 39 homes and structures were assessed as partially damaged but are repairable. Initial assessment teams were deployed into the burnt areas immediately after the fire was extinguished in urban areas on 6 February 2011 to gain information on house loss and identify points of danger. Concurrently, Western Power deployed crews to assess damage, isolate exposures and, where possible, commence repairs and reconnections. FESA and the Bushfire CRC are conducting detailed research into the house losses although these findings were not available at the time the MIR was completed. Figures 5 and 6 show the locations of houses which were destroyed or suffered partial damage. Bushfire Prone Area

The area burnt by the fire was not declared as bushfire prone by the City of Armadale. It was evident to the MIR that the area of the fire was bushfire prone and should be so declared.

Finding 2C The area of Roleystone should be declared bushfire prone either through review and update of regional or town planning schemes, or via the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960.


20

Figure 5: House Loss – Roleystone fire

Figure 6: Partial Damage – Roleystone fire


21

3. Preparedness WESTPLAN Bushfire As the peak emergency management body within Western Australia, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) has a number of functions, one of which is to ensure the preparation of State emergency management policies and plans. Known as WESTPLANs, State emergency management plans provide strategic, State-level arrangements for managing the particular hazard to which they apply. FESA is the prescribed Hazard Management Agency for bushfire in accordance with the Emergency Management Act 2005 and is supported within the hazard management framework by DEC and Local Government. With responsibility to ensure the currency and relevance of WESTPLAN Bushfire, during 2009 and 2010 FESA undertook an extensive review in consultation with those Government agencies and organisations involved in the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery aspects of bushfire, and delivered a contemporary plan that was approved by the SEMC for use during the 2010-11 southern bushfire season. The MIR considers this plan is appropriate and relevant for State bushfire management, albeit it should be reviewed in the light of recent experience. Interagency Bushfire Management Committee The IBMC is an Executive Group established during 2010 by the Minister for Emergency Services to improve information sharing, coordination and collaboration among Government agencies. With representatives from FESA, DEC, WALGA, BoM and the Bush Fire Service Consultative Committee (BFSCC), the IBMC through its five sub-committees30 has made significant progress towards improving fire agency understanding, cooperation and operational effectiveness. With specific consideration of matters arising from the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC), the Toodyay MIR and key State legislative amendments, the IBMC is continuing to provide the means by which all fire agencies can examine opportunities and initiatives to progress towards seamless delivery, whole of government efficiencies and collaboration in bushfire management.

Finding 3 FESA, cooperatively with DEC, WALGA, BoM and the Bush Fire Service Consultative Committee as the IBMC, has recently completed significant preparation at a strategic level including the re-writing of WESTPLAN Bushfire, with ongoing consideration of a broad range of issues.

Land Use Planning Guidelines The MIR was advised of land use planning occurring within WA relating to natural hazard mitigation including bushfire. This is being progressed through the SEMC State Mitigation Committee – Land Use Planning Working Group (LUPWG). As such, the current focus of the LUPWG is to identify and address gaps in the WA legislative framework, including policy arrangements for planning, development and building matters. The LUPWG has considered the relevant VBRC recommendations and has prepared advice to the State Mitigation Committee on their relevance to Western Australia and status of implementation. Local Government Responsibilities – Land Use Planning The MIR had the opportunity to fly over the Darling Escarpment. The author has previously appraised the Blue Mountains in NSW, the Dandenong Ranges in Victoria, the bush interface around Hobart and the Adelaide Hills. All these areas are declared ‗Bushfire Prone Areas‘ and all development is subject to appropriate Australian Standards, specifically

30

The five sub-committees of the IBMC are Bushfire Research, Fire Operations, Fuel Load Management, Aerial Fire Suppression and Training.


22

AS3959. This is not the case for the Darling Escarpment because, as understood by the MIR, Local Government (responsible for the declaration of bushfire prone areas through the review and update of regional or town planning schemes or via the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960) has not done so. In the view of the MIR, there is no doubt the Darling Escarpment is bushfire prone and it is irresponsible of Local Government not to declare these areas. In turn, failing to declare these areas bushfire prone inhibits the effectiveness of FESA‘s operational response. Arguably there is a duty of care to do so and the MIR sees no reason why this should not occur. Ironically, in attempting to cushion costs of new development along the Darling Escarpment, Local Governments are failing to highlight bushfire risk to the very same residents. This is unacceptable. Those areas that require such declaration will require detailed consideration. In the first instance, however, the Zone 2 and 2A FESA response areas, identified by FESA Operations for enhanced response on fire ignition including aerial support, would be an initial indication of areas identified as having heightened bushfire risk.

Finding 4 The Darling Escarpment is ‗bushfire prone‘ and should be declared so by Local Government. Failing to do so inhibits FESA‘s operational response.

Shared responsibility and lack of individual preparedness The Bush Fires Act 1954 highlights land owner responsibility under Sections 28 and 33, and together with common law obligations, all landholders are required to prepare for, prevent and manage bushfires on their land. Consistent feedback from CBFCO and IC‘s for all three fires reported that with some notable exceptions, individual householder preparation at Lake Clifton, Red Hill and Roleystone/Kelmscott was poor. Apart from buildings not reflecting the standards that would inhibit ember attack from bushfire, native vegetation was growing adjacent, and near, to houses, combustible material is stored near houses and the presence of evaporative air conditioners does appear to provide ready access into the roof space. The 20m ‗defendable zone or circle of safety‘ commonly advocated by FESA and other fire authorities throughout Australia as providing a realistic opportunity for house survival, together with construction meeting approved bushfire standards, was not readily evident. This was confirmed by the MIR. The reality appears to be that few residents had prepared their properties for the bushfire threat. The fact is also that residents should not expect a fire truck at their property or aerial support to assist with defending their home. While either or both of these may appear, these are operational assets that are likely to be directed to putting out the fire and cannot be expected to protect every home. The VBRC highlighted the shared responsibilities of those who live in areas vulnerable to bushfire. While all have a role to assist in reducing the risk of bushfire, reliance cannot only be on fire agencies responding. There is a requirement for land managers to reduce fuel loads and/or Local Government approving safe urban developments. Individual residents must also accept a degree of responsibility for reducing the risk around their properties, insure against loss, be aware of options and requirements should a bushfire emergency arise, and remain vigilant on high risk bushfire days. These are obligations during the season for residents living in the bush.

Recommendation 1 Local residents must take a degree of shared responsibility to prepare their properties by reducing the risk of bushfire around their properties and planning for a bushfire emergency.


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FESA Community Education Campaign The MIR reviewed the existing FESA Community Education Campaign, a five year bushfire education program. FESA has prepared an extensive range of materials and publications, including:

A ‗Community Engagement‘ Framework

A comprehensive ‗Prepare. Act. Survive.‘ Brochure of some 30 pages providing excellent advice on preparing for and surviving the bushfire season, consistent with national messages and standards

This information in a ‗pocket guide‘ format

An ‗After the Fire‘ brochure for bushfire which the MIR author had not seen previously in any jurisdiction

‗Fire Danger Ratings and what it means to you‘

‗Bushfire Warnings and what should you do‘

In the lead up to 2010-11 fire season, FESA Media and Public Affairs developed a significant range of media activities including a major feature that was published in the Sunday Times during ‗Bushfire Action Week‘ in October 2010 and

FESA Information Note dated 18 December 2009 describing ‗Bushfire Ember Protection Screens for Evaporative Air Conditioning Units‘.

A more extensive range of materials and publications developed by FESA were also reviewed by the MIR but are not listed here. The MIR was also made aware of the activity of Bushfire Ready (volunteer) facilitators in the City of Armadale and 75 (volunteer) Street Coordinators. In addition there were mail drops and shopping centre displays in Roleystone and Kelmscott in October and November 2010. Much of this information is available on the FESA website, as well as from Bushfire Ready Group facilitators or Local Government. Having reviewed similar material in other jurisdictions, the FESA material is rated as professional, current and useful for residents. The MIR would have liked to have seen this information readily available in Council reception areas, although this was not the case at the time the MIR visited Council offices. In addition, the MIR conducted limited analysis of the distribution of this material into the community and noted the detailed records of the Community Engagement Directorate. The MIR is confident that, where residents show interest, or ask for the information, it is available and is provided. FESA advises that local stations and brigades in high risk bushfire areas are provided with the ‗Prepare. Act. Survive‘ publication for further distribution and that the highest priority areas are targeted for specific localised engagement activities. The guide is not currently disseminated to all households within every high risk bushfire area due to resource limitations.

Finding 5 FESA has an effective community education approach, offering appropriate and current bushfire safety information to residents and communities in high risk bushfire areas. The distribution of this material was not reviewed in detail. It is for FESA to make it accessible and for responsible residents to gain the information and act upon it.

Encouraging communities to learn about and implement bushfire safety is not about spoon-feeding residents. All those who live in high risk bushfire areas need to make the effort themselves to find out the appropriate measures and implement them. Drivers do not rely on police to teach them driving. Just as for road safety, all drivers:

Learn the road rules

Gain a driver‘s license and

Are obliged to operate within the road rules and respond to local dangers such as other vehicles on the wrong side of the road.


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Residents do not rely on security firms to secure their properties and are responsible for:

Putting locks on doors and locking their homes when they are out

Putting locks on windows for additional security and

Installing alarms for additional security. So too, residents in high risk bushfire areas should not be reliant on fire agencies for:

Clearing combustible material away from their homes

Developing a bushfire survival plan and

Being aware in their local environment of potential threats and smoke. These are individual responsibilities that FESA assists with by providing material and information, facilitating Bushfire Ready Groups and, when required during threatening fires, issuing alerts and warnings through Media and Public Affairs. Individual residents and local communities cannot expect FESA, DEC or Local Government Brigades to attend every residence under threat or compensate for local residents who have not undertaken measures that are their individual responsibility. Indeed, crew leaders may make a decision not to attempt to defend a residence that is a threat to those who live in it and fire crews should they attempt to protect it. This is national approach which is endorsed by the MIR. Fuel reduction The MIR acknowledges the work being done by the Fuel Load Management Sub Committee of the IBMC. Fuel reduction is not well understood and the challenges are not easy to convey. The only practical means of broad scale fuel reduction in native bushland is burning. Any prescribed burn runs the risk of becoming an unplanned fire. There are a limited number of suitable days, perhaps 20 days for any one site in a year, to conduct these burns and after dry winters such as 2010, the opportunities for spring burning are further reduced. Each burn requires extensive planning and approvals and its execution requires significant resources including ground crews and aircraft. Conducting a prescribed burn is a high risk activity at any time; conducting it when conditions do not meet the prescriptions of weather, moisture and prevailing conditions only increases the risk. In addition, conducting burns near houses increases complexity. There is the risk of the fire burning out of control, and/or smoke impacting local communities and horticultural crops. Despite these challenges, prescribed burning must occur to reduce overall fuel loads and some advocate much more prescribed burning is required. DEC conducts fuel reduction on its estate, including the Darling Escarpment and urban interface areas as part of its land management responsibilities. FESA is also responsible for significant tracts of land by way of Unmanaged Reserves and Unallocated Crown Land in the metropolitan area and rural town-sites. Local Government has significant prevention responsibilities including many urban interface areas requiring fuel reduction treatment. Bush Fire Front The MIR met with the Bush Fire Front Inc, having received two submissions from them. They expressed clear concerns regarding insufficient levels of fuel reduction burning, and the impact this has on spotting, particularly leading to the large number of house fires suspected to have been ignited through evaporative air conditioners in Roleystone. They raised a range of concerns including the need for a State Bushfire Policy; no independent oversight of performance and outcomes; DEC fire management being constrained by bureaucracy prior to conducting prescribed burns and FESA doing too little hazard reduction; and landowners taking too little responsibility for minimising fire hazards on their property. The MIR notes these concerns and various other issues are commented on in this report. In particular, the MIR acknowledges that greater fuel reduction will reduce the likelihood and


25

impact of bushfires in the Perth Hills and coastal regions. This issue is not included in the MIR Terms of Reference and will be specifically addressed by the Perth Hills Bushfire Review.

Finding 6 Greater fuel reduction will reduce the likelihood and impact of bushfires in the Perth Hills and coastal regions.

Volunteer Firefighter Concerns The MIR sought and received comment from volunteers through their Associations. The Association of Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades of WA (Inc), representing the interests of 25,000 volunteer firefighters, provided a detailed submission. It highlighted that feedback from volunteer firefighters varied significantly. Some were critical; others were not. Issues raised by volunteers have been reflected in the text of the MIR including their inability to communicate on the fireground due to the partial implementation of the WAERN system, the value of volunteers supporting IMTs, providing local knowledge and being used as Sector Commanders, the need to utilise the SMEACS format for briefings and for further training of career crews in aspects of bushfire fighting.

Figure 7: Fuel age within the fire area. Lloyd Hughes Reserve The management of Lloyd Hughes Reserve, a 17 ha native park in the foothills of the Darling Ranges at Kelmscott, was raised in submissions to the MIR. The Reserve forms part of the Banyowla Regional Park and is managed by the City of Armadale. In relation to the Lloyd Hughes Reserve, the MIR reviewed both the:

Lloyd Hughes Management Plan (currently on the Armadale Council website) adopted by Council on 7 February 2000 and

Lloyd Hughes Park, Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan dated May 2002.


26

Lloyd Hughes Management Plan This plan (currently on the Armadale Council website) refers to general management of the park, and flora and fauna management, including fire management. The MIR was advised that the fire management aspects were superseded by the Armadale Council when it adopted the Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan in 2003 – this is discussed below. The MIR noted that the 2000 Plan stated, ―There should be no controlled burning of Lloyd Hughes Park for the term of this Implementation Management Plan [i.e. 2000-2005]‖31, although the Council also advised the MIR that the Reserve had been a site used by arsonists on a number of occasions in the last 10 years. In effect, there had been some unauthorised burning, despite what the Management Plan specified. Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan This plan was developed by Ecoscape in May 2002 and provides a comprehensive fire management strategy for the Reserve. The MIR notes that the Plan states, ―at least 12 years between fires is required for adequate buildup of the soil seed bank to allow regeneration‖32 and that the actual fire interval to reduce fuel load ―should be negotiated with CALM [now DEC]‖33, although it referred to consideration of some manual removal at high risk ignition areas such as road verges. It is unclear to the MIR when the last fuel reduction prescribed burn occurred in the Reserve. The Plan also refers to vulnerable properties adjacent to the reserve, leading to the statement, ―Residents should be notified immediately in the event of a bushfire, with contingency plans for relocating people away from the site of the fire.‖34 This supports the subsequent actions of the IC, discussed later in the MIR. An examination of house losses at the Roleystone fire indicates that five properties were lost directly west of Lloyd Hughes Reserve – in the direction of prevailing winds. It is not possible for this MIR, without having completed any individual house site inspections, to directly relate house loss to ember attack and overall Reserve management. In any event, the MIR assesses that due to the location of the Reserve on the western edge of the fire, its management had a minor impact on the overall house loss from the fire. That is not to say that more could not be done to better manage fuel loads in the Reserve and thereby reduce the risk from bushfire ignitions.

Finding 7 The City of Armadale is to be credited with the development of management plans for Lloyd Hughes Reserve including fire management plans, but needs to stridently manage fuel loadings.

Banyowla Regional Park The management of the Banyowla Regional Park was not specifically raised with the MIR as it was to be considered as part of the Perth Hills Bushfire Review. In relation to the context of fuel management and prescribed burning, it was not pursued by this operational review. The MIR understands large areas of the Park are freehold land owned by the WA Planning Commission (WAPC) and managed by DEC in accordance with Section 16 of the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984. Even greater areas are managed by a variety of vested authorities or landowners. In addition to its prescribed burning program, works undertaken by DEC on the portions of the regional park for which it has management responsibility on behalf of the WAPC are listed at Appendix 9. There is no management

31

City of Armadale, Lloyd Hughes Park Management Plan, adopted by Council 7 February 2000, p 21 32

Ecoscape, Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan, May 2002, p 17 33

Ecoscape, Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan, May 2002, p 17 34

Ecoscape, Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan, May 2002, p 17


27

plan for the Park which covers an extensive area of the Perth Hills, although a broader regional scale plan is intended.

Finding 8 Noting the challenges of developing a regional scale management plan, this is required for the Banyowla Regional Park, including detailing specific objectives for fire management, fuel management and prescribed burning.

Local Government Emergency Management The MIR reviewed the City of Armadale ‗Bush Fire Management Arrangements‘.35 This publication is impressive, with detailed planning and considerations reflected in the document. There would be benefit in all municipalities developing a similar document to provide emergency managers with comprehensive consideration of risk, potential mitigation, available resources, facilities and response planning. The City of Swan also indicated they had much of this information in a local emergency management plan, including the ‗Avon Valley Response Plan‘, with local brigades having response plans linked to map books. These were not reviewed by the MIR and the Shire of Waroona did not comment on its emergency management documentation in response to the Lake Clifton fire. The MIR also noted the City of Swan had engaged external risk auditors to review bushfire risk across the municipality. Community Emergency Service Manager When visiting the City of Swan, the MIR had the opportunity to discuss bushfire preparedness and response issues with the local Community Emergency Service Manager, Mr B Finlay. His knowledge and ownership of the relevant issues highlighted the effectiveness of the role and the benefit to both FESA and Local Government. Mr Finlay, with the City of Swan, displayed a strong risk management approach which was both reassuring and professional. The MIR commends the program and encourages its adoption by other Local Governments and in particular the City of Armadale and Local Governments on the rural urban interface. Major Incident Training FESA delivers a Major Incident Management for IC‘s (MIMIC) course for senior operational emergency responders involved in major emergency management that requires a multi-agency response. The course focuses on the role of the IC in an ‗all hazards‘ environment, using common terminology, defined functional areas, roles and structures that enable operational and support organisations to work effectively together. Participation can include emergency and non-emergency agencies which may have diverse jurisdictional powers and priorities. DEC is committed to participation on this program. In addition, DEC, FESA and WAPOL conduct AIIMS (Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System) training. DEC also conducts an Advanced Incident Leadership Course which focuses on incident leadership and rural fire applications. Both courses have merit and FESA sending participants on the DEC course would provide value. The merits of linking the courses more closely should be investigated and this is pursued further at Chapter 8. The MIR was advised that the IBMC through the Training sub-committee is currently examining joint agency training and exercise opportunities. Understanding of Weather Weather is the fundamental element of bushfire danger. Understanding weather is crucial to effective incident management and is a critical element of pre-incident intelligence and preparation. FESA has a weekly teleconference with BoM which provides weather updates

35

City of Armadale, ‗Bushfire Management Arrangements‘, endorsed 24 September 2009


28

for the coming week and the opportunity to ask questions of BoM Severe Weather specialists. In instances of severe weather or on the advent of an Emergency Services Briefing, more frequent meetings and briefings occur. DEC conducts twice daily separate teleconferences relaying BoM weather detail, noting the DEC meetings include ongoing concerns with smoke management during prescribed burning. The MIR identified opportunities to further develop some IC‘s knowledge of the BoM‘s ‗Spot Weather Forecast‘ capability together with responsibilities for those in the field to identify the latitude and longitude of the fire location and local weather readings. Opportunities to improve engagement with the BoM and enhance cooperation with DEC using these BoM teleconferences are discussed in Chapter 8. Exercising The MIR acknowledges the COO‘s arrangement for the conduct of a desk-top exercise conducted prior to the 2010-2011 season which included DEC and other relevant State agencies, and exercises arranged by the Assistant Chief Operations Officers (ACOO‘s), each responsible for a Major Emergency Team (MET), discussed further in Chapter 5. These desk-top activities do not, however, practice the COO and ACOO‘s, nor do they provide robust preparation for IC‘s and IMT‘s. The MIR also acknowledges FESA has had extensive operational activity over recent years, which is enhanced by its all hazards coverage. Through this, managers are deployed to complex and diverse incidents, which adds to their skills base, although their direct involvement in specific roles is dependent on availability and circumstance. Incident management, however, is a perishable skill. Exercising was identified by a number of the IC‘s across the three fires as a vital element of preparation and they indicated they were seeking greater opportunities to practice. To provide both IC‘s and their IMT with the best possible opportunity to perform well when managing bushfires, they should be provided with regular exercising, more than once per year.36 These should require ‗hands-on‘ consideration of issues requiring the IMT to conduct meetings, liaison, planning and produce a summary Incident Action Plan.

Recommendation 2 To provide Level 3 IC‘s (and FESA) with a level of confidence and to maintain currency across the pool of accredited IC‘s, regular exercising of IC‘s and Level 3 IMT‘s is required.

United Firefighters Union (West Australian Branch) The MIR met with the United Firefighters Union, West Australian Branch (UFU) who raised a myriad of issues from wearing Breathing Apparatus and Level 2 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) at bushfires to concerns over the increase in house losses in recent years. Their most significant concerns rested with inadequacies in the ‗risk to resource‘ modeling impacting on preparedness. The UFU noted that the number of bushfire tankers in the FRS fleet is three, which has not changed for some time. The MIR did not review in any detail the risk to resource modeling. The existing appliance mix is an issue that warrants further comment below, but the MIR does acknowledge the increase in Local Government medium tankers since the introduction of the ESL in 2003, and the significant increase in other operational capabilities such as aerial firefighting. The MIR is satisfied that FESA‘s overall bushfire resourcing and capability has made significant gains in the last 10 years. Vehicles and training for bushfire

36

As previously highlighted to FESA, the author declares a potential conflict of interest regarding exercising, as he is a director of a firm that provides exercise support to emergency services.


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The MIR acknowledges the regular attendance of CFRS crews to bushfires in the urban interface of Perth. However, the following observations were made in regard to vehicles, equipment and training that warrant FESA reviewing current practice. Vehicles CFRS stations respond to bushfires in an urban Scania pumper and a Light Tanker. FESA advised the existing FRS fleet has a prime structural firefighting responsibility, which is acknowledged. This unique combination within the Australian fire industry provides extensive pumping capability from static, reticulated water supplies, with a degree of mobility and flexibility provided by the Light Unit. The MIR is unconvinced, however, it is the best vehicle allocation for high impact, fast moving bushfires in the urban interface, noting that up to 40% of fires attended by CFRS crews are bushfires. The MIR notes the use of light tankers by career crews in the metropolitan area and commends this innovation, but not to the detriment of an offensive bush firefighting capability. The MIR also acknowledges a previous project to introduce 1,500 lt appliances into the CFRS fleet for stations near the urban interface. This appears a valid approach and warrants further consideration. With Local Government and DEC tankers available, these contribute to the overall operational interface capability, although access to these appliances is vital, noting the limitations on the existing CFRS fleet. The MIR is aware that in the ACT, Tasmania and with the Country Fire Authority (CFA) in Victoria, career crews who regularly attend interface fires have dual crewing arrangements and respond in either pumpers or tankers, depending on the urban or rural threat. An alternative is to have more flexible pumpers as used in SA, Victoria and NSW, which are 4WD trucks with high capacity pumps, while having greater water capacity than the standard urban pumper and added safety features of contemporary tanker appliances. The MIR does also acknowledge additional bulk water carriers have been acquired to overcome the limited water capacity in either the Light Tanker of Pumper vehicles. Training Concerns raised to the MIR in regard to training include:

Limited knowledge by some IC‘s of fire weather detail

The reactive rather than proactive approach of some Sector Commanders

The initial IMT‘s for the fires being relatively small, limiting capacity to manage fast moving fires on a number of fronts and

A lack of effective SMEACS (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command and Signal) orders to the fire ground.

These vehicles and training limitations may restrict the offensive bush firefighting by FRS crews and need to be reviewed through re-considering fire appliance allocations and conducting training to ensure that crews and Sector Commanders are fully proficient in interface and bushfires. The MIR was advised that an urban interface procedure and training process is currently being circulated for feedback with a view to developing a specific course for all WA agencies and this is likely to assist. While acknowledging that DEC and Local Government crews, who are equipped for bushfire fighting in tanker appliances, comprehensively support FRS crews in the metropolitan area and in particular the Perth Hills, this capability should not in itself diminish the need for FRS crews to maintain an offensive bushfire capability.

Recommendation 3 FRS fire appliance allocation and training needs to be reviewed to enhance offensive bushfire capability within the metropolitan area.


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4. Information Management Advice before the day Advice before the day of the fires, apart from the ongoing community education material discussed in Chapter 3, came in the form of:

Fire Danger Ratings issued by FESA as ‗Severe‘ for 5-7 February 2011. The broadcasting of these warnings (on ABC local radio, FESA website, BoM fire weather warnings, sent to RSS subscribers and reflected on roadside signs),37 when related to advice in FESA publications such as ‗Prepare. Act. Survive‘, provides the public with practical advice on what to do and what fire behaviour to expect and

Declaration of Total Fire Bans, which is based on the weather forecast and local conditions. Total Fire Bans were in place from 5 to 8 February 2011.

The MIR is aware the FESA Media and Public Affairs (MPA) unit is seeking greater exposure of these advisories in daily media. Media management during the fires FESA engaged a total of 28 staff in the Public Information Unit who had responsibility for communicating warnings. This team includes call takers and uniformed staff in the field, as well as members of the Media and Public Affairs branch. A total of 125 ‗alerts‘ were issued over the period of the Red Hill and Roleystone fires, although the MIR notes a number of these related to incidents elsewhere in the State. MPA has noted a significant increase in demand and expectation for warnings and alerts through the media over the last two years. Detailed in Chapter 2 are summaries of alerts issued for each fire reviewed by the MIR. MPA organises staff to support both the IMT and the SOC. At the IMT a Public Information Officer (PIO) oversees both a Media Liaison Officer (MLO) and a Community Liaison Officer (CLO). The MIR considers that having two support staff is essential to Level 3 IMT‘s if adequate support is to be provided. At the SOC, a Media Management and Public Warnings team is maintained to manage these two critical elements of information collection and distribution. The MIR highlights the imperative for the Public Information/Media Liaison Officer to deploy concurrently with the IC and Operations Officer, to ensure that information is collected and disseminated quickly on the developing incident and also to prevent the IC from being corralled into being the sole initial source of public information. In turn, Public Information/Media Liaison need to place greater effort on seeking information from other sources such as talk back radio and social media, which may be able to supplement direct reports from the fireground. Currency of Information A number of submissions from members of the public to FESA refer to broadcast warnings (presumably on ABC Radio) not being updated or the level of warnings not being downgraded sooner, leading to inappropriate messages causing distress and distrust. The authority and credibility of FESA is being eroded if redundant messages are repeated long after they are relevant. The MIR is advised that ABC is obliged to continue broadcasting the messages until FESA provide updated information or the issued message expires as per FESA advice. FESA indicates that due to the challenging conditions, IC‘s insisted that the level of warnings were appropriate and it would have been irresponsible to downgrade the level of emergency warning when there was still a significant threat. This concern is challenged, however, if ABC news reports contradict existing FESA Alerts. 37



31

Strategies that can reduce the likelihood of these damaging practices include:

IC‘s with the support of PIO‘s/MLO‘s reducing the warning level and downgrading the level of alert as soon as possible, noting community safety needs to remain the highest priority

The warning messages being more specific to communicate the need for the level of warning and why it remains in place

FESA issuing advisories with a ‗drop dead‘ time, e.g. ―This advisory is no longer valid after [a set period]‖, ensuring the media do not continue the advice when it is no longer current, and prompting media staff to re-issue and update as required.

The MIR was advised that FESA aims to update advice every hour in the emergency warning phase and over the three fires considered as part of this MIR, this was generally achieved for the 77 emergency warnings. However, warnings having a ‗drop dead time‘ overcome the possibility that old messages continue to be promulgated, and any out of date messaging will erode credibility.

Likewise, failing to have information on the website when it is being transmitted on other mediums is also a source of potential criticism. The web is a growing source of information and FESA also received criticism from the public for a lack of web messages posted to the FESA website regarding the Red Hill fire on 6 February 2011. The MIR did not investigate this in detail although FESA indicates the website was updated within 15 minutes, and in most cases updates occur concurrently. Some perceived delays may have been web users not refreshing their access to the website. Regardless, this concern needs to be monitored closely. Such deficiencies can rapidly erode the credibility of public information/media liaison, and currency remains very close to accuracy in order of priority. Indeed, when information is no longer current, it is no longer accurate. While the MIR supports the concept of a single source for incident information and promoting the FESA website as that source, it should not exclude other agency websites also reflecting incident information. The ‗one source, one message‘ approach adopted in Victoria and now reflected in other agencies provides for various agencies to reflect the same information on different websites. The MIR received advice that during the Lake Clifton fire, opportunities appear to have been lost to replicate warnings and other information on both the FESA and DEC websites. The MIR has not reviewed this example in detail. It does consider however, that the dissemination of information needs to be closely coordinated between agencies and the same detail needs to be reflected on both agency websites, if both agencies are to disseminate information on current fires. This needs to be a 24 hour commitment. Such arrangements need to be clarified and responsibilities identified well before the fire season. The responsibility to resolve this lies with both FESA and DEC.

Finding 9 FESA has an effective public information/media liaison service that is subject to increasing demands to provide timely and accurate advice regarding fast moving, complex and high impact events.


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Information Demands on the IC The FESA Manager Media and Public Affairs‘ evaluation report into the fires states that ―Information is gathered from the IC in the field and distributed by MPA‖.38 This appears an accurate description during the early stages of an incident, before the IMT is in place. It highlights the initial single point of focus for information being the IC and the tension that arises early during an incident when situational awareness is poor, information requirements are high and timeliness is all important. The IC should be the final authority for information release and confirmation, but not the sole source of information. A number of IC‘s raised specific concerns about the amount of time, particularly early during an incident, that they are required to talk to members of the MPA about the fire. Noting the increased priority for public information to meet community expectations, some regarded this demand, together with demands from many other functions as identified in the diagram below, disproportional to their other operational responsibilities. The MPA needs to diversify its information collection sources and focus less on the IC during the early stages of a fire. Once the IMT is established, the MIR acknowledges the PIO/MLO‘s gather information from the Deputy IC, Operations Officer, Planning Officer, Situations Officer, Incident Support Unit, WAPOL, onsite media, attendance at planning meetings, ISG meetings, community meetings and on-ground observations. While noting the FESA approach is ‗all hazards‘, there are distinct differences in time demands from providing information regarding a cyclone progressing towards the coast to conveying information on a short duration, high impact bushfire which is threatening houses within 15 minutes of ignition. How information demands can be consolidated so IC‘s satisfy a number of requirements in the one request needs to be pursued by FESA. Further, while the MIR commends FESA‘s focus on information at operational incidents, it also urges both FESA and IC‘s to ensure that Media Liaison/Public Information Officers are responded with the same priority to the incident as the IC, so this task can be delegated. A Deputy IC is very well placed to oversee this vital element of incident management. Figure 8: Information demands on the IC StateAlert It is to WA‘s credit that the StateAlert emergency warning system was developed well before other national initiatives and ‗paved the way‘ for telephone alerting in Australia. The system became operational in December 2009 and has been used about 20 times, mostly for fires. Within a selected area, it has the capability to identify home telephone numbers and billing addresses for mobile phones and to send a pre-recorded message expeditiously to those

38

Michelle Harris, Manager Media and Public Affairs, ‗Recent Bushfires Response Evaluation Report‘ dated March 2011

COO/CEO Commercial

media

ROC support requirements Incident

Controller

SDD to identify

threats and operational

requirements

SOC SDC and Media

for initial information and

releases

COMCEN seeking

additional information for

responding crews


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numbers. The total time taken to reach all phones depends on the number of residents identified to be warned. Advice from FESA, which jointly developed the system with WAPOL, is that the technical system worked effectively on 5 and 6 February 2011, with messages being sent as identified. Reports indicate that for the five messages sent in relation to the Roleystone fire, the number of undelivered messages averaged 3.3%.39 However, the MIR was advised by IC‘s of frustrations as to the time taken for initial StateAlert messages to be passed to the SOC, checked and released. The SOC acknowledged there were unacceptable delays in releasing StateAlert messages for the Lake Clifton fire, with the fire reported at 11:47 and the first StateAlert message released at 16:00. In turn, many of the messages for all three fires appeared too specific, thereby requiring greater time to check the detail. The polygons (shapes drawn on data bases to identify call numbers) were relatively small when considering a fast moving bushfire burning out of control. The MIR acknowledges that the SOC will take time to prepare, check and send the messages, and that there has been a mindset that StateAlert messages would be ‗for life threat only‘ and limited to the essential households. It is proposed that this mindset needs to change. The initial StateAlert message in particular needs to be viewed as a general broadcast of a local threat. For example:

―An out of control bushfire has been reported burning near the Red Hill rubbish tip in a westerly direction. Residents to the west of Red Hill are to leave for a safer place or get ready to actively defend.‖

This broader approach will require less checking, can be readily confirmed and sent to residents 3-5 km to the west of the point of origin. As StateAlert is an additional messaging tool along with radio, websites and other advisories, the initial message can afford to be limited in detail. While acknowledging the system has the capability for surgical identification of street telephone numbers, adopting a broader approach for bushfires would contribute to identifying suburbs, not streets, under threat. It is considered that timeliness is more important than specifics at that stage. Regular practising of preparing StateAlert messages by duty staff will assist in familiarity and timeliness and provide rostered staff such as the SDD with the confidence to authorise the release of these messages.

Recommendation 4 Initial StateAlert messages should provide timely broad advice to a wide audience authorised by the SDD, while subsequent messages may provide more detail.

39

Summary Report of StateAlert messages for the Roleystone fire.


34

Figure 9: Map identifying the polygons and order of transmission used to send the five messages during the Roleystone fire. StateAlert is not a failsafe service and in areas such as Brigadoon, where telephone coverage is poor, StateAlert is unreliable. In areas of poor mobile telephone reception, it needs to be confirmed with residents that StateAlert will be less effective and is reliant on fixed telephone facilities. It appears issues arose previously at Brigadoon after a fire in January 2010, although the MIR was advised these issues have been addressed. It is suggested the advice on the FESA website should be less promotional and more realistic. For example, rather than:

―StateAlert automatically delivers emergency warnings direct to you when lives may be in danger in your neighborhood‖

it is suggested:

―Where there is fixed and mobile telephone coverage, and FESA has the available information, StateAlert automatically delivers emergency warnings direct to you‖.

Commercial Warning Systems The MIR was provided with information on two commercial warning systems: Sentinel Alert and Yellow Bird Alert. FESA is familiar with both systems. The MIR has not assessed the merits of these systems in detail and is aware that trials are currently underway in WA with the Sentinel Alert product. The MIR encourages the use of radio and notes that the Yellow Bird system turns on existing AM/FM radios, requiring residents to have no additional infrastructure. The MIR supports the broadest range of options for warning local communities but also considers that local communities, not governments, need to accept the responsibility and cost of adopting these additional warning capabilities. Individuals and communities, not government reviews, need to engage sufficiently to lobby for an outcome and become truly more resilient, rather than increasingly rely on government to provide solutions. Both products have considerable merit and the MIR is aware of other commercial alerting systems

Point of Origin

Fifth 18:05

Fourth 15:58

Third 15:51

Second 15:46

First 13:50


35

in operation. It supports highlighting their availability and capabilities but places the weight of responsibility on communities to engage on the issue. Sirens The issue of local audible sirens was raised through public submissions to FESA after the Roleystone fire. The MIR understands FESA has no specific policy regarding the placement and use of sirens. In some older fire stations, sirens are in place but they are not installed in new stations. In all cases, sirens are not used for calling out brigades as this function has been replaced by pagers. The MIR did not reach a firm position on the merits of sirens and is aware other jurisdictions have a range of positions regarding their use. Where local communities understand the intent of using a siren, e.g. ‗for local community warnings only‘, sirens remain one form of effective community communication, along with the broad range of more sophisticated warnings such as radio, television, StateAlert, ‗Yellow Bird‘ and ‗Sentinel‘. The MIR considers there is merit in using a siren for warning local communities where that local community is supportive and understands its use, limitations and impact.

5. Operational Response Role of the COMCEN The FCAD system incorporates defined turnout of suitable resources with options for nearest alternatives should a preferred appliance be already tasked. The system incorporates vulnerable bushfire sites and provides a prompt for the radio operator to dispatch multi agency resources into identified higher risk areas within the metropolitan area. Call out and paging of resources became problematic over 5-6 February 2011. Some glitches appeared with the SDD being telephoned, not paged, when initially alerted to the Red Hill fire, leading to him having to make further calls to respond staff. There are inconsistent accounts regarding the initial advice to DEC of the Roleystone fire within the Zone 2 and 2A Operational Protocol, as outlined in Chapter 2, requiring clarity in the Protocol and consistent application by the COMCEN. The lack of clarity in the Metropolitan Regional Operations Centre (MROC) of who was deployed appears not to have been assisted by the COMCEN. Unrelated but equally troubling was the lack of career firefighters who responded to public requests to ‗call back‘ at the height of the operational response on 6 February 2011. The most significant concern about the COMCEN is clarity of function during a bushfire response. There appeared to be a degree of duplication between actions initiated by the COMCEN and the MROC, and it is not clear to the MIR where the IMT seeks support from – the COMCEN or the MROC – and when this may change. Further, there needs to be clarity that the COMCEN is a call taking and dispatch facility, and has no role in the formal chain of command apart from situational awareness and passage of information. They should not be referred to as ‗operations‘. Whether this function changes for urban fires was not considered by this MIR. Urban Escalated Alarm A number of IC‘s commented that the existing urban response escalation of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Alarm is not appropriate for an escalating bushfire event. The escalation of resources for bushfire needs to occur exponentially, rather than responding a second, third or fourth station, as is the requirement for a standard structure fire. The MIR was advised the process of responding resources to a rapidly developing bushfire was currently being reviewed to


36

better provide the IC on scene with an escalation of resources to reflect the rapidly developing threat. Resource allocation and priority Considering the level of activity, and the urgency of deployments and source of firefighters from FESA, DEC and Local Government, it is probably not surprising that there was some doubt on the afternoon of Sunday, 6 February 2011 of how many resources were where in relation to the Red Hill and Roleystone fires. This function needs to be closely coordinated between the COMCEN and MROC so the SOC has a clear picture of deployed and available resources. A lack of clarity places the SDD, who is required to prioritise incidents and resource requirements, in a difficult position. The MIR was advised that the availability of the FESA crews are displayed visually on the FCAD screen and where Mobile Data Terminals (MDT‘s) are fitted they are also Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) enabled on the COMCEN screens, as are the aircraft through air operations. Local Government metropolitan crews are displayed on magnetic whiteboards and are attached to incident displays in the MROC. Other regional resources are available through the OMS – RMS (Operational Management System – Resource Management System) module which has recently been upgraded to link in with FCAD system. The MROC in particular, needs to ensure this process is timely and maintained. The number, location and availability of DEC resources are reliant on advice from DEC to FESA. On the morning of 6 February 2011, prior to the Roleystone fire, a FESA officer was tasked to identify further metropolitan capacity in anticipation of potential fires. Up to ten additional appliances were identified and the call back of staff was commenced later in the day. Resource availability and location is recognised by FESA as an important element of the new FESA SOC at Cockburn. It is a clear opportunity to have a consolidated database with State resources. The MIR was advised planning is already well underway to incorporate the latest technology in the new SOC to assist with this capability. It appears the fire at Red Hill was leaving the foothills and threatening houses at the base of the escarpment around the same time that the Roleystone fire ignited. So while there were ―over 20 resources in the one western sector‖ protecting properties at the base of the foothills at the Red Hill fire, demands were being made for additional resources at Roleystone. These decisions were removed from the MROC, who might normally decide on resourcing within a region (while the SOC would normally address resourcing across regions, including resourcing at regional fires), and the SDD at the SOC gave direction as to the priority of resourcing between the two fires. This is in line with the chain of command detailed in the WESTPLAN and the Major Emergency Coordination Guidelines. ‗Google Maps‘ indicates that the travel time from Middle Swan to Roleystone via the Roe and Tonkin Highways is 40 minutes. Perhaps under lights and sirens this could be reduced, but getting off the fireground at the Red Hill fire would have also taken some time. This suggests that had there been greater clarity as to the resourcing at Red Hill and the risk at Roleystone, some rapid redeployment could have occurred to the Roleystone fire. However, with the decision to focus on evacuation, these resources may not have assisted that endeavour. Aircraft redeployment also took time, noting refuelling and base support requirements. Some volunteer resources sourced from Roleystone did redeploy, as did aerial resources, and these became engaged in protecting houses as soon as they arrived. In the end it is dangerous speculation with the clarity of hindsight to postulate what difference redeployment of ground resources would have made at Roleystone, noting the fire‘s main run was complete by 14:00. In turn, it is unclear whether a reduction of resources at Red Hill would have led to house losses. What it does highlight, however, is the priority for


37

IC‘s to provide accurate and timely ‗Size Up‘ (discussed below) so fire managers at a higher level have the available information to make informed decisions. There was significant redeployment out of much of the metropolitan area, reducing to five stations remaining in Perth on the afternoon of 6 February 2011 during the height of the Roleystone, compared to the 22 stations normally operational across the city. Such occasions mean the SOC must prioritise life and other values at risk against available resources, and FESA advised it does have a planned draw-down strategy which was implemented on 6 February 2011. The MIR would encourage FESA to regularly exercise such draw-down contingencies so those at the SOC, MROC and COMCEN are all aware of the criteria and implications. Size Up On arrival at a bushfire, commanders at all levels – Sector Commander, Divisional Commander and IC – should pass up the chain of command a ‗Size Up‘ report – a first impression assessment of the fire, what it is doing and where it is threatening. These may be needed subsequently, when resourcing requirements are being reviewed. There is a clear need for responding crews to provide timely and accurate information, to assess the immediate risks and to establish/confirm command and control arrangements. This provides initial guidance on appropriate offensive and defensive strategies. Providing this in a common format assists understanding at every level. It was not a feature of the three fires considered by this MIR. The MIR is unaware if this requirement is currently in SOPs for bushfires, and if it is, it appears to have been poorly followed for these three fires. An example ‗Size Up‘ initial report is set out at Appendix 10.

Recommendation 5 All responding crews and the incident command appointments should adopt a ‗Size Up‘ reporting format.

Communications Fireground communications were generally sound using the VHF network although some difficulty was reported at the Red Hill fire. The use of ICVs ensured there was adequate coverage. While communications did not feature as a significant issue with local crews, regional crews currently operating West Australian Emergency Radio Network (WAERN) expressed strong concern that when operating with metropolitan crews and control centres, they were unable to communicate using the radio. The compatibility issues are known to FESA during this transition period but do present a significant risk to crews operating in the metropolitan area. The fact that crews may need to revert to using mobile telephones is an undesirable means of operational communications. It raises significant risks if red flag warnings are required on the fire ground. Increased numbers of hand held radios were sought, to provide greater flexibility for ground crews.

Recommendation 6 FESA must actively manage the transition to WAERN and provide alternative means for regional crews to communicate when in areas where WAERN is not operated.

Aerial support and effectiveness The MIR received only favourable comment regarding the provision of aerial support by FESA and DEC air resources, noting DEC resources were limited on 5-6 February 2011 due to the flying conditions. The most consistent concern raised by air operations was communication difficulties with ground crews and the requirement for a dedicated communications officer during aerial support operations. An important lesson from the fires on 5-6 February 2011 is that aerial support cannot be relied upon as weather conditions may


38

limit or prohibit aerial firefighting – as occurred with the fixed wing fleet. FESA indicated this is highlighted to fire crews. Comment was also received regarding the sound coordination of air resources between FESA and DEC, despite no single ‗State Air Desk‘. The question needs to be asked, why not collocate and integrate these teams, further enhancing existing good cooperation, coordinating a strategic State resource and reducing the requirement for Air Attack Supervisors?40 This is further discussed in Chapter 8. Neighbourhood Safer Places There was very little reference to Neighbourhood Safer Places (NSP) as the fires all occurred in interface areas that allowed residents to relocate or evacuate away from the fires, in many instances into suburbia. For developments and towns surrounded by vegetation, such as Brigadoon, NSP remain important options and need to be maintained. However, for these fires, they did not feature within the operational review.

6. Incident Management FESA has in place ‗Major Emergency Management Coordination Guidelines‘ (all hazards), subsequently referred to as Coordination Guidelines, dated January 2011. Their intent is to standardise emergency management frameworks within FESA and ensure they are aligned to the State‘s emergency management arrangements and legislation. The Coordination Guidelines identify that IMT‘s, also referred to as Emergency Management Teams, report through the chain of command to ROC‘s who in turn report to the FESA SOC. The SOC and the MROC are located in FESA House, Perth, while the other ROC‘s are located in regional centres around the State. The Guidelines refer to the role of the SOC being ―primarily the coordination of FESA Operations resources. However, where applicable, the COO or his/her delegated officer the SDD, may direct certain actions be taken at the regional level.‖ 41 It is unclear to the MIR what ‗certain actions‘ refers to, and it is suggested that this be clarified in the Coordination Guidelines. Chain of Command for bushfire Speaking to individuals involved, there appeared to be doubt with some officers regarding the chain of command for the fires reviewed. WESTPLAN Bushfire identifies the chain of command:

From the ‗State Operations Controller‘ - FESA COO

To the ‗State Operations Command‘ where the FESA SDD and DEC State Duty Officer should be located42

To the ‗Regional Operations Command‘ where the FESA Regional Duty Coordinator and DEC Regional Duty Officer are located

To the IMT.

This was apparently briefed to agency staff and was practised in pre-season exercises. The MIR can only conclude that despite the detail in WESTPLAN and the advice to staff, further

40

FESA have individual air attack supervisors per aircraft; DEC have a single oversight. 41

FESA Major Emergency Management Coordination Guidelines, dated January 2011, p 25 42

DEC State Duty Officer not present on 6 February 2011 because, as advised by DEC he was not informed that the incident(s) had been elevated to a State level


39

training and exercising is required, as various individuals interviewed by the MIR indicated a lack of knowledge or understating illustrated by:

Some IC‘s indicating they were not clear who was in the reporting chain

The Regional Duty Coordinator at the MROC did not consider he was part of the chain of command

Some interviewed considered the COMCEN, referred to as ‗operations‘, to be part of the chain of command.

Some of these issues appeared to be specific to bushfire response in the metropolitan area. It is suggested the title ‗Coordination Guidelines‘ is unhelpful in confirming compliance. Changing the title from ‗Coordination Guidelines‘ to a ‗Command, Control and Coordination Operational Procedure‘ is likely to better reflect the document‘s authority. The role of the MROC As part of this clarification, the role of the MROC needs to be reviewed. While the MIR notes the merit of having other ROC in the chain of command for incidents outside the metropolitan area, the MROC appears to serve little command function, although it provides resourcing assistance to the SOC. For incidents within the metropolitan area, in particular for interface fires, but foreseeably for other short duration, high impact events such as train or ferry accident, counter-terrorism or Hazmat incidents, there appears to be good reason to remove the MROC from the chain of command. This is due to the proximity to large populations in and around the city, and the urgent need for rapid transfer of information. The MROC would remain in a support capacity, liaising with the IMT and other regions as required. This would clarify the role in the metropolitan area, remove one reporting layer and hasten information flow for localised metropolitan incidents.

Recommendation 7 Review the command function of the MROC for Level 3 incidents when the SOC is activated.

The Coordination Guidelines further identify that where FESA is the Hazard Management Agency (as is the case for bushfire) they have responsibilities:

To appoint a suitability qualified IC

For the IC to establish a control point and communications plan, once having established initial resource requirements and

When the emergency management functions exceed the capability of a single IC, the responsible Region is to resource an IMT.

Pre-formed IMT A so called pre-formed IMT is a preparedness measure initiated by FESA where members of an IMT are identified from FESA staff and rostered based on forecast increases in the Fire Danger Rating. WESTPLAN Bushfire indicates the teams will be activated in the following situations:43 44

When the FDR for the FESA region is forecast as being ‗Severe‘ or ‗Extreme‘ the teams will be available and able to respond and

When the FDR for a FESA region is forecast as being ‗Catastrophic‘ the teams may be stood up on the direction of the Regional Director and/or the SDD. If the teams are not stood up then they will remain identified and available.

43

WESTPLAN Bushfire, Section 3 and MEM & CG Document, para 13.7 44

The MIR was advised the IBMC agreed as an interim measure for the 2010/11 fire season that based on agreed high risk areas, multi-agency pre-formed teams will be identified and agreed by FESA Regional Directors and DEC Regional Manager on first advice of fire weather ‗Severe‘ or above.


40

The benefits of a pre-formed IMT are:

Decisions regarding the IMT composition have been made before responding to an evolving incident and

Individuals are in an appropriate mindset, have the appropriate equipment and manuals, and are prepared for the role. They can focus on weather and are best placed to respond.

FESA introduced ‗Coordination Guidelines‘ only on 20 January 2011 to reflect this requirement and because of this, it was not well practiced for February 2011. For the Lake Clifton fire, the FDI was rated as Very High and no pre-formed IMT was required under the Guidelines. For the weekend of 5-6 February 2011, although the FDI was forecast below 50, the Fire Danger Rating was upgraded to Severe by the BoM at the request of FESA. As per the new Coordination Guidelines, this should have meant a pre-formed IMT was identified, although this did not occur. That said, early on 6 February 2011, with the Red Hill fire active and the prospect of another Severe fire day forecast, additional appliances and resources were identified as one readiness measure to increase preparedness. For both the Red Hill and Roleystone fires, however, IMT‘s were established as the fires developed and had not been identified beforehand.

Finding 10 Identifying pre-formed IMT‘s prior to the weekend of 5-6 February 2011 would have assisted those involved to prepare for and respond to the Red Hill and Roleystone bushfires.

The pre-formed IMT requirement comes in addition to existing rosters for staffing the SOC and the multiple ROC‘s across the State, as well as four Major Emergency Teams (MET) that are drawn from FESA staff. The impression gained by the MIR was that the available staff were heavily engaged in existing rosters, but also that too few non-operational staff were utilised to assist in the IMT requirements. Further, FESA and DEC operate IMT rosters in isolation of each other, and Local Government volunteers generally did not appear to be utilised to assist FESA rosters. DEC pre-formed IMT‘s are designed to provide the ‗second shift‘ capability for an extended fire incident, relying on local DEC Regions to generate the first shift. The Lake Clifton fire highlighted that despite the FDI being less than ‗Severe‘ (not requiring a pre-formed IMT in the metropolitan or regional area), fire behaviour can be uncontrolled and destructive. To avoid the potential dilemma of appointing a pre-formed IMT when specific weather triggers are reached, having teams identified through the summer will overcome the tendency to link initial IMT preparedness solely to weather. Such teams should be focused on providing a ‗first shift capability‘ to high impact, short duration bushfires in high risk areas. Their only delay once responded will be travelling time to the incident. Expecting all 10 Regions across WA to maintain IMT‘s throughout the summer is unrealistic. Having a smaller number, rostering FESA, DEC and Local Government staff, becomes much more sustainable. While these rostered, pre-formed teams would not necessarily be located where a fire occurs, maintaining a number of pre-formed teams in the metropolitan area (perhaps one north and south) and in the south-west land division would provide increased preparedness. The MIR notes the work the IBMC had already done in 2010 initiating this approach across five regions in the south-west land division and fully supports its ongoing implementation.

Recommendation 8 FESA should continue to develop with DEC and Local Government a number of rostered, pre-formed IMT‘s available throughout the fire season, regardless of predicted weather.


41

Major Emergency Teams The MIR also noted the existing four Major Emergency Teams (MET) each headed by an ACOO, who is responsible for exercising the team on an annual basis. It is understood these teams, provide a pool of operational staff for surge capacity when required, while not intending that they would operate directly within the SOC or a ROC. Personnel identified in these METs, may be available for pre-formed IMT‘s. While the MIR notes the intent, it is concerned that the MET rosters may be unmanageable or of no benefit, in addition to the SOC, ROC and other operational rosters as well as pre-formed IMT‘s. Accreditation and Appointment of Level 3 IC’s There can only be one basis for appointment of an IC, and that must be experience, competence and currency.45 The MIR did not review the accreditation, appointment and competence of Level 1 or 2 IC‘s within FESA or any other agency. Its focus was on the accreditation and appointment of Level 3 IC‘s for the three Level 3 fires. Ensuring individuals have the appropriate training and keeping them current to complete the demanding role of managing complex, interagency incidents is a FESA responsibility. Appointing experienced, competent and current IC‘s, together with exercising their IMT‘s, are the most effective actions to promote effective incident management. The importance of FESA and DEC maintaining common and transparent accreditation arrangements for Level 3 IC‘s is discussed further in Chapter 8. There was a concern expressed to the MIR that Level 3 accreditation was linked to position or rank, not just competency. This approach, if customary, is flawed. When Section 13 of the Bush Fires Act 1954 is declared, FESA should appoint an IC based on experience, competency and currency. Appointing CBFCO‘s or FESA staff as Level 3 IC‘s when they are not formally accredited is ill advised and should be avoided, although there should be no exclusion of Local Government personnel from Level 3 appointments if they have met the requirements. Indeed, FESA has a responsibility to provide training to Local Government and FESA volunteers, in order for them to improve their capabilities. That said, the available Level 3 IC‘s need to maintain their perishable skills, and for this reason it is suggested that FESA does not need an extensive list of Level 3 IC‘s – 10 to 20 may well be sufficient to meet ongoing roster requirements.

Recommendation 9 FESA and DEC need to appoint accredited Level 3 IC‘s based on experience, competency and currency.

While noting existing legislative and policy arrangements, the MIR considers there is merit in considering that the future management of Level 3 fires in Local Government areas should be based on a Section 13 declaration. The implications of such an arrangement are beyond the scope of this MIR, but may lead to Local Government volunteers remaining responsible for Level 1 and 2 fires, and FESA being responsible for the management of Level 3 fires, particularly in Local Government areas, appointing experienced, competent and current Level 3 IC‘s. The management of Level 3 fires which are DEC‘s responsibility needs to be further analysed and is not considered here.

45

VBRC Recommendation 18


42

Recommendation 10 Noting existing legislative and policy arrangements, there is merit in considering options for the future management of Level 3 fires in Local Government areas.

SOC Functionality Discussions with FESA and DEC regarding the functionality of the SOC identified that DEC has also intended to establish a parallel SOC facility. Discussions were informal only, but there appeared to be some willingness to collocate both facilities at Cockburn if the space was available – if only during State-level operations. Co-location is an attractive option from a State fire management perspective, having a single joint SOC facility. The MIR identified that this approach has been adopted in all other States, with a single State level operations centre for bushfire and where required, joint regional level centres. The MIR‘s clear preference, drawing on this interstate experience, is that FESA and DEC operate from the one SOC. There will be marginal improvement only if joint operations are only when ‗state level operations‘ are declared. The significant benefits result from ongoing co-location leading to improved understanding, communication and integrated operations. Potentially, this should include prescribed burning operations as well as response to bushfires. The MIR is aware that any enduring co-location will impact on existing FESA plans for the new Cockburn facility, and perhaps more so for DEC‘s existing fire management arrangements, which are regionally based and roster key personnel such as DEC Fire Management State Duty Officer in regional locations. The MIR does not underestimate the impact of such a proposal; however, points to co-location in joint facilities as a necessary move to improve coordination and integration of fire operations at every level with WA. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 8. Operations operating separately within the IMT For both the Red Hill and Roleystone fires, once the IMT reached a ‗steady state‘, the operations function operated separately from the remainder of the IMT. At the Red Hill fire, once the IMT moved to the old Swan Council Offices, operations were conducted from a nearby sports oval and the reminder of the IMT was some distance away in the office accommodation. At Roleystone Fire Station, the IMT was operating from inside the fire station and operations were undertaken from the FRS ICV in the car park. The MIR would discourage this approach as during bushfires, operations are a key source of information for the IMT, as well as being the implementation function of the plan. Effective coordination within the IMT needs the operations function to be central to the remainder of the IMT, not operating independently, some distance away. Safety Safety Advisors have a specific role in assisting the IC to review safety measures and potentially identify unsafe practices on the fireground. They were not appointed by the initial IC‘s for the three fires and the IC‘s acknowledged this deficiency. While there is ongoing discussion as to where the Safety Advisor should be located (in the field or in the IMT) they should be in place. The MIR does not consider the lack of a Safety Advisor contributed to the only significant injury reported from the three fires, where one volunteer firefighter was knocked down by her crew vehicle during the Roleystone fire.46 There needs to be acknowledgement, however, that firefighting is an inherently dangerous activity and the appointment of Safety Advisors assists in reducing the risk of injury or worse. Their utility was affirmed by the VBRC.

46

This incident is being formally investigated by FESA Health, Safety & Welfare Branch


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Recommendation 11 FESA needs to place greater priority on the appointment of Safety Advisors to Level 3 incidents as is reflected in WESTPLAN Bushfire.

Administrative Support to IMT The Roleystone IMT appointed an administrative manager to support the IMT. This proved effective and is considered an enhancement to assist in the efficient functioning of the IMT. In addition, the appointment of administrative support should aid in post activity administration such as gathering documents and mapping for subsequent review and compliance with the State Records Act 2000. Furthermore, IMT‘s lacked appointed scribes. The Roleystone IMT engaged radio operators from the Roleystone Brigade to act in this capacity, but this was an opportune arrangement that happened to work well. Other IC‘s were not that fortunate. This support needs to be planned, and non-uniform staff in FESA House are well placed to assist in the metropolitan area. Finally, the Red Hill and Roleystone IMT‘s lacked IT support. In part this was because the IMT staff were not pre-formed, and deployed without dedicated equipment. IMT support caches are required and should be passed to staff whenever they are on call, as part of a pre-formed IMT handover. IMT Resources The key requirements of a Level 3 IMT are listed in WESTPLAN Bushfire as:47

Level 3 IC

Deputy IC

Safety Advisor

Public Information Officer

Operations Officer

Planning Officer

Information Unit

Situation Unit

Logistic Officer

Supply Unit

Management Support (11 staff in total)

Some FESA IC‘s considered their IMT staffing to be adequate, although others interviewed by the MIR had a view that greater capacity was required. It is understood this was the impression of the visiting Victorian contingent at Roleystone. The initial IMT at Lake Clifton did not have the capacity to adequately plan initial response operations or identify predicted fire spread some hours ahead of the fire. Deficiencies with Safety Advisors have already been highlighted and a greater number of public information staff would ease the demands on the IC and PIO to furnish that detail. Noting none were formally identified or responded, it was fortuitous at Roleystone that scribes were identified from volunteer brigade radio operators. WAPOL expressed a concern (detailed further below) regarding insufficient engagement by IC‘s and extended absences from the IMT that made their liaison more difficult and the emergency coordination functions less effective. The MIR understood the IMT‘s were about nine people strong including those in the left column below, but proposes pre-formed IMT‘s should include the additional positions identified in the right column:

47

WESTPLAN Bushfire – Appendix H


44

Existing pre-formed IMT Proposed pre-formed IMT

IC o Deputy IC o Safety Advisor

Operations Officer o Assistant Operations Officer

Planning Officer o Situation Officer

Logistics Officer

Public Information Officer (9 staff in total)

IC + Scribe o Deputy IC o Safety Advisor

Operations Officer + Scribe o Assistant Operations Officer

Public Information Officer + Scribe

Media Officer

Planning Officer + Scribe o Assistant Planning Officer o Situation Officer

Logistics Officer

IMT Office Manager (16 staff in total)

Recommendation 12 FESA should review the size of the existing pre-formed IMT to include additional Information and Planning officers, and increased resourcing of scribes and management support for all Level 3 incidents.

While many of the FESA IC‘s considered the existing ICC facilities were adequate, the MIR does not share the view. The Lake Clifton initial ICC facilities were clearly inadequate and the DEC mobile facility resolved that deficiency. At Red Hill, the initial ICC location was an open shed buffeted by the prevailing easterly winds. The following morning it moved to a nearby office building. It is understood the FRS ICV was unavailable. At Roleystone, the ICP was moved to the Roleystone Fire Station quickly after the fire outbreak developed, and while this facility was an identified ICC and the FRS ICV was deployed to provide additional capacity, the site was deficient. There are only two fixed telephone lines; the layout was not planned nor was the equipment in place; access was open which meant the ICC was compromised by media and visitors; and operations moved to the FRS ICV which was a potentially dysfunctional placement of a key IMT function. Enhanced administrative support to Level 3 IMT‘s through an IMT office manager, scribes and dedicated equipment is required by FESA to ensure optimum operational outcomes.

Policing Issues

Declaration of an Incident The MIR was advised that WAPOL had an expectation they would have been formally advised that a Level 3 Incident had been declared. In essence, WAPOL were seeking clear advice that the incident had escalated to a major level. The MIR reviewed the State Emergency Management Policy 4.1 (SEMP 4.1) and WESTPLAN Bushfire to confirm the process. In the overarching SEMP 4.1 there is no stated expectation of a declaration across agencies as to the level of the incident, whereas WESTPLAN Bushfire does refer to the IC declaring the level of the incident. The MIR was informed the intent of this was to ensure adequate support was identified within FESA.48 It could also act as a trigger for an OASG meeting, where agencies are brought together to coordinate the response and plan the recovery.

48

WESTPLAN Bushfire, December 2010, p 19


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The MIR would expect that WAPOL would have gained an awareness of the size of the incident from responding patrols at the scene, liaison with the IC including the first Roleystone Incident Support Group meeting at 14:30, and liaison with the FESA COMCEN through the Police Operations Centre. WAPOL also had a liaison officer located at the SOC. Those measures should provide WAPOL with sufficient ‗situational awareness‘ regarding the incident to appropriately react the Police Major Incident Room and other police support, but a formal declaration by FESA, as detailed in WESTPLAN, would put the issue beyond doubt. For the Roleystone fire, FESA responded a Level 3 IC at 12:15 and a second after 14:00. They sought the first OASG at the FESA SOC at 16:00, having asked attendees to meet from around 15:00 to prepare for the meeting. A subsequent State Emergency Coordination Group (SECG) meeting involving the Premier and other top level government representatives occurred at FESA House at 18:30. While arguably the advice of these meetings, provided early in the afternoon of 6 February, should have signalled the significance of the fire event, there is a requirement to clarify the level of the incident, which does not appear to have occurred, and this requirement needs to be made clearer in SEMP 4.1. If any agency is in doubt as to the level of the incident, they should ask. It also highlights to FESA the importance of communicating with all levels of WAPOL in a timely manner. Emergency Declaration The MIR discussed with WAPOL the merits of an Emergency Declaration under the Emergency Management Act 2005. Police consider such a declaration has value as it provides WAPOL officers with greater flexibility to respond to the IC‘s operational requirements and operating under the Bush Fires Act 1954 means police cannot necessarily ‗give effect to their powers‘ in the most efficient manner. The MIR did not deliberate on the issue but does consider such options need to be thoroughly examined and exercised well before a bushfire season, so that all agencies have a clear expectation of how they will be managed and under the powers of what legislation. WAPOL having a senior officer at the FESA SOC would assist in these deliberations at the time, and may prove more effective than the liaison officer arrangement that was present on the day. Liaison While some feedback from WAPOL highlighted the need for more effective liaison, particularly at the Roleystone fire, the Police Superintendent on scene, had indicated to FESA he had received effective direction. There is an opportunity for both FESA and WAPOL to clarify expectations regarding incident liaison and for FESA to identify whether the IC or a Deputy IC becomes responsible for liaison with the Incident Support Group and the Emergency Coordinator specifically. WAPOL was also seeking more regular, formatted briefings from the IMT. In contrast, WAPOL did comment on the effective functioning of the OASG at the SOC.

Other Issues Electronic Tool Box The MIR was advised by a number of IC‘s that although the concept of an ‗operational tool box‘ (an electronic folder of key forms) was commendable; the existing FESA ‗tool box‘ was not optimal. While some of the issues appeared to be related to software upgrades, there is a clear demand for an effective operating ‗tool box‘ and the existing facility is not meeting IC requirements. The MIR notes that some upgrades had occurred prior to the 2010/11 fire season. This issue is further pursued in Chapter 8. Interstate Support On 6 February 2011, arrangements were put in place by FESA for ―two nine person strong IMT‖ (plus three support staff) from Victoria to deploy in support of FESA‘s operations. The MIR was advised that:


46

the intent of this strategic planning was to ensure FESA had sufficient incident management resources into the following week, when weather forecasts for the following weekend were severe; and

this interstate support request was raised at the State Emergency Coordination Group on 6 February 2011 when the Director General of DEC was present.

The request was not communicated clearly to DEC, who has indicated to the MIR that they had IMT staff available, and also indicated that when it was raised at the 18:30 SECG meeting at FESA House, it was presented as a fait accompli, not an issue raised for discussion with the Minister and Premier present. Why DEC was not formally asked to contribute IMT resources is unclear; perhaps it was because the DEC liaison officer at the SOC did not offer the resources, or that FESA assumed the DEC IMT staff were committed, as DEC was responding to a number of smaller incidents across the state at the time. Whatever the reason, FESA should be in no doubt that it was an unhelpful approach and the lack of communication with DEC over this issue has been a significant aggravation. This issue is commented on further in Chapter 8. While each situation will need to be assessed on its merits, jurisdictions should plan on utilising existing resources before seeking additional interstate support. Indeed, this principle is important when seeking Australian Government assistance during emergencies. In this situation, misunderstandings appeared to develop as a result of poor communication. FESA indicated the interstate support was intended for the following weekend, rather than to manage the existing incidents, and if this was the case, it needed to be clearly advised to DEC Fire Management. Greater involvement of FESA non-operational staff in supporting operations The IMT‘s for both the Red Hill and Roleystone fires had IMT‘s of less than 10. The Lake Clifton IMT was larger due to the support of DEC staff. DEC has five IMT‘s rostered in weekly rotation, each currently totaling approximately 68 staff, although fire management staff indicated this is likely to reduce in the near future. The MIR was advised that all DEC IMTs have significant numbers of non-operational staff in support roles. This is a substantial capability, with principal officers well supported. It is not proposed that FESA adopts IMT‘s of a similar size. It does illustrate however, what can be achieved if a greater number of staff are directly involved in supporting operations, for example within IMT‘s. It is unclear to the MIR whether IMT‘s were small due to limited on call staff, limitations in planning, or assessments that no one else was needed. Some IC‘s indicated that they thought their IMT was adequate, although this was not the view of the MIR. There is a range of positions where non-operational staff can effectively support principal officers, particularly in planning, information and logistics. Greater opportunity should be provided for non-operational staff to become involved in IMT‘s, thereby expanding capability. As it was on the day, volunteer radio operators at Roleystone Fire Station were seconded to become scribes and personal assistants, invaluable functions for principal officers within an IMT. Potentially, recalled firefighters could have become drivers and radio operators for Divisional and Sector Commanders on the fire ground. Without this support, key decision makers become distracted by driving, answering calls and radio traffic, and with personal administration that can be better provided by other staff. Development of Incident Action Plan and the use of SMEACS The MIR reviewed available Incident Action Plans (IAP) and received comment regarding the issuing and delivery of direction and orders.


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IAP‘s were not available for the initial shifts from the fires so the MIR was unable to comment on them. IC‘s did make reference to their priority and the MIR reinforces their importance –particularly in summary format – as much to confirm that the appropriate operational deliberations have occurred, as completing the actual format. The MIR favours a minimalist approach for IAP‘s in the field, and the use of an A3 map on one side and a SMEACS format on the other is an approach some other agencies have found very practical for Divisional and Sector commanders. Of course an IAP is essential for shift handover and the absence of a useful IAP is vulnerability for both the off-going and incoming IMT. Providing orders and briefings in the SMEACS format is equally important. Increasingly those in the field are seeking direction in this format for bushfires, and the MIR received advice particularly from the Volunteers Associations that this was often not forthcoming. SMEACS has become the industry standard for orders briefings for bushfires, and all IC‘s, Divisional and Crew Commanders need to pass on information and give orders in this format. Handovers The issue of crew handovers was raised on a number of occasions with the MIR and it appears greater efforts need to be made to ensure crews arrive on time and that handovers are completed efficiently and effectively. Too much time appears to have been wasted waiting for a crew to arrive, conducting the actual handover, or handovers not being completed at all, leaving incoming crews at a disadvantage.

7. Consequence Rapid Assessment Team Once house loss was reported and concurrently while the fire was being contained, the deployment of Rapid Assessment Teams provided a timely and effective means of identifying house loss, verifying information and centralising a database that could be subsequently accessed by the IMT for both the Lake Clifton and Roleystone fires. House Loss There is no doubt that the loss of houses at both Lake Clifton and Roleystone were devastating for the individuals and families involved. There is great emotional and physical trauma in living through the bushfire itself and the subsequent loss. Those involved deserve a great deal of sympathy and support. FESA‘s development of the ‗After the Fire‘ publication provides much practical information, and as identified earlier in Chapter 4, is a leading document across fire agencies nationally. The recent increase in house loss from bushfire in WA is significant as a result of the Toodyay, Lake Clifton and Roleystone fires. The number of houses lost to bushfire over the last six years is illustrated in the table below. In the last two years 122 houses have been lost. In the previous four years the total is three. While this can be very dependent on the severity of fire seasons, the difference is worthy of further examination. While the weather over the last two summers has been more severe, the MIR concluded that a change in national policy has led to the increased house loss rather than a change in operational performance.


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Residential House Loss July 2005 to March 201149

2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 Total

Damaged 8 19 10 19 36 28 120

Destroyed 0 2 0 1 43 79 125

Total 8 21 10 20 79 107 245

The change in policy reflects the national policy position as advised by the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC).50 The position, developed after the VBRC had considered the issue, leads to greater consideration by IC‘s of evacuation, rather than the previous ‗Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early‘ policy that was reliant on individual decision making by residents. IC‘s are more likely to advocate evacuation, and in turn there is likely to be greater house loss due to residents not staying to protect their homes. So in the future, residents are likely to continue to be directed to leave when fires threaten their houses and any that stay will be in greater danger. Lives Saved Without in any way devaluing the loss of property and the emotional trauma, the fact that no lives were lost is of immense significance and a great credit to FESA. The IC‘s where they have made the decision to evacuate, and the firefighters and police on the ground who actioned the evacuation also deserve recognition. Property can be replaced and should be insured. Lives cannot. Those in high risk bushfire areas need to consider the likelihood and consequence of losing their homes and property and what mitigation owners themselves can put in place to reduce the impact on their immediate environment. The fact that no lives were lost is the single greatest achievement by FESA at the time of these fires. In seeking evacuation as a deliberate strategy, there is likely to have been greater house loss under the prevailing conditions than leaving residents in place. On balance, however, for these fires, the approach is fully supported by the MIR.

Finding 11 The decision to evacuate residents at Roleystone was a deliberate operational decision made by the IC‘s at the time, taking into account the conditions on the day and the exposures to the fire. It is a decision that is fully supported by the MIR.

National Position Paper The AFAC Position Paper Version 4.1, dated 8 September 2010, provides the current industry position taking into account the considerations and recommendations of the VBRC. It makes three specific references to house loss and evacuation:

1. The steps that people take to prepare for bushfire are crucial to the protection of lives and property. Fire agencies will provide support and assistance during bushfires when and where possible, but their effectiveness will be compromised if people or properties are not adequately prepared for bushfire.‖51

2. ―… it must be recognised that some buildings, due to their construction methods, construction materials, the site they are located on or their proximity to high and

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Detail provided by FESA‘s Operational Information Systems Unit report dated 1 April 2011. (House totals vary from Section 2 narratives in this MIR due to only residential properties used as ‗year round dwellings‘ being listed in FESA reporting) 50

AFAC Position Paper, ‗Bushfires and Community Safety V4.1, dated 8 September 2010 51

AFAC Position Paper, ‗Bushfires and Community Safety‘ V4.1, dated 8 September 2010, p 6


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unmanaged fuels, cannot for all practical purposes be defended against high intensity bushfires.‖52

3. ―While well executed evacuations are likely to save lives, increased property loss is almost inevitable. When considering whether or not to recommend evacuation, incident controllers must give priority to the protection of life, and should refer to the relevant evacuation plan if available.‖53

The actions at the three fires by IC‘s are consistent with this national policy. Operational Dilemma There remains the challenging issue of when to evacuate and when to leave residents in place. Some will always choose to relocate and this should be encouraged, to preserve the primacy of life, and the earlier the better.

Figure 10: Proposed change in focus as FDR increases The diagram seeks to illustrate the changing focus for firefighters depending on the Fire Danger Rating (FDR) over time. As the fire danger increases and after ‗first attack‘ to suppress the fire has been attempted, there should be less focus on suppression and more on safety. This may lead to residents being allowed to remain when the FDR is Low to High, but being directed to evacuate where the FDR is Severe, Extreme or Catastrophic. This is emerging rationale within the fire industry, without a policy position in place, but it does illustrate that firefighters need to consider the extant conditions and risks before making a decision to evacuate, as it will not be appropriate in all circumstances. A further unresolved issue is the management of residents post fire, during the early recovery phase, when most residents have either self-relocated or been evacuated, but some remained in place to protect their properties. Utilities such as Western Power and emergency services will operate more efficiently if they have unfettered access, which in turn would speed up the recovery process and reduce the time residents are excluded from the

52

AFAC Position Paper, ‗Bushfires and Community Safety‘ V4.1, dated 8 September 2010, p 9 53

AFAC Position Paper, ‗Bushfires and Community Safety‘ V4.1, dated 8 September 2010, p 14


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area. After the fire, those who have defied the evacuation order are residing in a declared ‗dangerous area‘ while other residents are excluded. This inconsistency is challenging and remains a vulnerability for FESA. Should one of those remaining residents be injured or worse due to exposures in the acknowledged ‗dangerous area‘, FESA could be legally exposed, apart from this inconsistency not reflecting well on WAPOL or FESA.

Recommendation 13 FESA seek legal and policing advice regarding the policy to leave residents who chose not to evacuate in a declared ‗dangerous area‘ after a bushfire.

The MIR understands that Police in Victoria have reviewed their Traffic Management Policies after the February 2009 fires. Innovative measures such as using hospital tags to track residents entering and leaving restricted areas have been well received. The MIR encourages FESA and WAPOL to review the Victoria Police approaches.

8. Greater Coordination with DEC The MIR identified a number of issues that warrant comment, highlighting opportunities for greater cooperation between FESA and DEC to enhance operational outcomes. Application of Zone 2 and 2A protocols Zone 2 and 2A Special Response Area mobilisation protocols require greater clarity and consistent application. Any delays in advising agencies together with inconsistent advice regarding the requirement to respond is unhelpful, erodes confidence in the system and inhibits operational response. FESA COMCEN recordings confirm advice to other agencies was not delayed, even though agencies had inconsistent accounts regarding advice and mobilisation. DEC indicated to the MIR that these protocols are ‗somewhat equivocal‘ and the MIR agrees. Advice to DEC from the COMCEN is by phone to Duty Officers rather than through paging – which is the case for FESA and Local Government resources. Any potential ambiguity needs to be eliminated and clarification and consistent application of the Zone 2 and 2A mobilisation protocols is essential. Use of mobile ICC facility As identified in the Lake Clifton fire narrative, DEC maintains a mobile ICC that was deployed to assist the management of that fire. This is a ‗state of the art facility‘ which would be the envy of any State. Discussing the facility with DEC during the MIR, there appears to be no impediment for FESA to seek use of the facility when required by larger IMT‘s. Use of the facility by FESA would also serve as an effective ‗vehicle‘ to enhance joint IMT‘s across both agencies. The MIR acknowledges the FESA ICV as a valuable facility in itself, but less suited to interface fires which require large ICC facilities. Common Tool Box The need for an optimal operational ‗tool box‘ for IMT management has been raised previously in the report. The MIR sees this as an excellent opportunity for FESA and DEC to develop a single ‗tool box‘, generating consistency, efficiencies and improved performance in operational procedures. The MIR has been advised there is work being undertaken under the auspices of the IBMC to develop a common ‗tool box‘, and the MIR considers this requires increased priority.


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Common jurisdictional arrangement for interstate support Underpinning any request for interstate support is the requirement for a bi-lateral or national jurisdictional agreement detailing authorities to act, cost recovery, compensation and work cover arrangements, and a myriad of other administrative requirements linked to transport, vehicle, accommodation etc. FESA did not have a bilateral arrangement with Victoria regarding the engagement of firefighters in WA, so the exchange was formalised using the extant DEC agreement with the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) in Victoria. This was confirmed by letter from Mr Keiran McNamara, the Director General of DEC, to Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer the DSE Victoria, dated 7 February 2011. The MIR considers now would be a suitable time for FESA and DEC to develop a single jurisdictional MOU with interstate agencies or if need be, for FESA to mirror the existing DEC agreement to enhance consistency, flexibility and reduce duplication. Seeking future IMT or firefighter support should be Duplication of Information on websites During the Lake Clifton fire, opportunities were lost to replicate warnings and other information on both the FESA and DEC websites. While there is the potential for inconsistencies in information between agency websites this is unlikely if both agencies operate in joint IMTs reporting to a single IC – as for the Lake Clifton fire. Both FESA and DEC need to further explore how information can be presented in a broad range of formats that best meets the requirements at local fires, noting information consistency is essential. The MIR notes FESA‘s focus on ‗one source one message‘, a key learning from the VBRC. It encourages FESA and DEC to clarify prior to the next fire season what information is to be posted on each agency‘s website, whether all information is to be duplicated automatically, or if one site only is to be used for current fire information. The MIR does not have a firm position on which option should be engaged, but considers clarity of responsibilities between agencies and the public is paramount. Single State Air Desk All jurisdictions other than WA manage their aerial firefighting resources through a single ‗air desk‘ that is managed either by one agency on behalf of all firefighting agencies in the State or jointly across agencies. Such an approach:

Enhances coordination of what is a strategic and expensive resource

Reduces contractual requirements

Reduces staffing requirements, for example the number of air attack supervisors54 and

Ensures the best possible prioritisation of air resources to multiple incidents.

While all interviewed said that there is sound coordination with the existing arrangements, the MIR considers a single State air desk would further reduce duplication and enhance operational effectiveness. Common training for community meetings Community meetings after a major incident occur occasionally but tend to be high impact events as emotions are high and media are numerous. There was much favorable comment regarding the conduct of community meetings after the Lake Clifton and Roleystone fires. There were also some criticisms. As both agencies are required to facilitate these from time

54

At the Lake Clifton fire, DEC had a single air attack supervisor operating, capable of coordinating all aircraft responding to the fire. In addition, FESA had additional Air Attack Supervisors in each Type 1 aircraft deployed. Were this capability managed as a single entity, such duplication could be avoided and the existing requirement for 10 Air Attack Supervisors from FESA on standby over summer could be reduced.


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to time and may be required to manage these jointly (Lake Clifton), conducting joint training into this sensitive community activity appears warranted. In addition, the inclusion of a dedicated Community Liaison Officer at these events warrants consideration. Joint IMT’s The interstate deployment of Victorian fire managers has been discussed previously in Chapter 6. The point the MIR makes here is that communication between FESA and DEC needs to be effective at multiple levels and the MIR considers there is merit in both FESA and DEC operating joint IMT‘s for Level 3 fires – regardless of tenure, responsibility or location. Both agencies have skills and experience to contribute to complex fire management. The MIR understands this occurred during the John Forrest National Park fire in 2010 and is being progressed by the IBMC. In such an arrangement, IMT appointments should be based on individuals being suitably experienced, competent and current. Daily weather teleconferences Enhancing FESA‘s IC‘s and key staff understanding of weather and the requirements and capabilities of the BoM was discussed earlier in Chapters 3 and 5. The MIR noted that while FESA had weekly teleconferences with the BoM, DEC conducts twice daily BoM briefings to the State Duty Officer who in turn briefs the regional duty staff. The MIR considers it would be prudent for FESA duty staff, perhaps the SDC and, if on roster, the IC of any pre-formed IMT, to participate at least daily in these weather briefings with DEC, to receive the latest weather advice and understandings, and to further develop relationships with DEC and BoM staff. More regular BoM teleconferences conducted jointly with DEC are likely to develop a more incisive understanding of weather and nuances in weather forecasting with participating FESA staff. Develop a Joint State Operations Centre SOC functionality is discussed in Chapter 6. During the time the MIR was conducted, planning was being finalised to enhance the SOC at the new FESA facility at Cockburn. Measures were being taken to maximise the size of the SOC and provide it with increased flexibility. The opportunity was also identified to develop a joint FESA/DEC SOC, to enhance State service delivery, avoid both agencies operating separate facilities and using the opportunity of a joint facility as a vehicle for improved cooperation and understanding. The MIR notes there have been ongoing discussions with BoM regarding placing a BoM officer in the FESA SOC on a permanent basis. The MIR considers this is a vital enhancement, with the requirement taking on greater significance noting FESA‘s all hazard responsibilities. Developing a joint FESA/DEC SOC would further support the argument to have a BoM officer permanently posted to the SOC and reduce the cost for FESA. The requirement to develop a joint SOC is detailed in Chapter 6 and the MIR places considerable weight on pursing that initiative. It will be challenging and demanding for both agencies, but unless FESA and DEC fire management staff develop and manage a joint facility, joint processes and joint operations using a single SOC, management of future significant fires is likely to be problematic. This will mean having senior DEC representatives in the SOC when it is fully activated and other DEC staff being present when there is less significant fire activity – planned or unplanned. IC accreditation Appointing experienced, competent and current IC‘s is essential for effective incident management. The need for FESA and DEC to maintain common and transparent accreditation arrangements for Level 3 IC‘s is discussed in Chapter 6. The MIR was advised that FESA Training Section is currently reviewing a range of training processes including Level 3 accreditation. FESA and DEC need to have common and transparent accreditation


53

arrangements for Level 3 IC‘s. It needs to be clear to both agencies and Local Government who is accredited to manage Level 3 bushfires. Operating a single mapping system FESA and DEC currently do not use common mapping systems. They were not well integrated at the Lake Clifton fire. Understandably, GIS and user requirements have differed, leading to the acquisition and development of different capabilities using different software. The MIR notes the progress made across Whole of Government with the ‗Shared Land Information Platform‘ (SLIP). While it will no doubt take time and there will be ongoing challenges, the MIR strongly promotes the goal of FESA and DEC moving to a single common fire mapping capability. What was pleasing was to be advised that DEC GIS staff assisted FESA mapping staff in the SOC through peak periods of 7-8 February 2011. Naming Conventions The MIR identified that between FESA and DEC, the same fire was called by two names: ―the Lake Clifton fire‖ and ―the Dorset Road fire‖. While not a significant issue, it is a potential source of confusion within agencies and with the public. Within FESA, the Roleystone fire was referred to by differing names. IC‘s and SOC duty staff need to reinforce single naming conventions and reinforce these across agencies during and after the fire. Local Government were concerned that the Roleystone fire was so named, although all house damage occurred in Kelmscott. Their concern centred on potential increases in house insurance through reference to Roleystone (where the fire started), when the damage occurred in Kelmscott. While the MIR understands that insurance calculations are based on postcode, not suburb name, this further highlights the need to review and standardise naming conventions.

Recommendation 14 There are a range of opportunities identified from reviewing the three fires that will improve coordination between FESA and DEC, requiring limited resources, potentially generating some efficiencies and reflecting a joint, tenure blind approach to fire management in WA. The MIR acknowledges the progress made through the IBMC in these matters and notes these measures will require ongoing strong leadership. These include:

Clarification and consistent application of the Zone 2 and 2A mobilisation protocols

Duplicating available information on websites

Establishing a single State air desk and cross-utilising Air Attack Supervisors

Completing common training for the conduct of public meetings

Coordinating IMT training and exercises

Operating joint IMT‘s during interface fires

FESA utilising the DEC mobile ICC when suitable ICP are not available

FESA engaging in daily weather teleconferences together with DEC

Developing a common ‗Tool Box‘ of forms and operational procedures for fire response

Developing common jurisdictional arrangement to accommodate interstate support

Developing a joint FESA/DEC SOC at the new (FESA) Emergency Services Complex at Cockburn

Adopting common and transparent Level 3 IC accreditation

Using a single mapping capability across both agencies and

Using common naming conventions for fires.


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9. Other Issues

Recognition of Volunteer and DEC crews Both the Association of Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades of WA (Inc) and DEC commented on the lack of public recognition of their efforts. With FESA Media and Public Affairs having the dominant responsibility for communicating with the public through the media during fire incidents, FESA has a responsibility to actively promote volunteer and DEC contributions to common fire response. Currently neither party considers this is being done adequately with potential impacts on morale, commitment and interagency relationships. FESA confirmed with the MIR that recognising volunteer and DEC contributions to emergency incidents does form part of the templates and warnings communicated to the media, with each service named specifically along with supporting government agencies. It also forms part of the talking points for the IC‘s, MLO‘s, ACOO‘s and the COO when completing media interviews. FESA needs to stress the importance of this recognition to all individuals discussing joint fires with the media and internally. The media, however, make editorial decisions on this type of information and FESA cannot insist that this level of detail is broadcast.

Finding 12 FESA does acknowledge the importance of recognising the participation of volunteer and DEC crews in joint fires. It needs to continue to stress the importance of this recognition. FESA does have this detailed in media comment and releases, although often the media choose not to reflect this.

Delays in reviewing operational events In conducting the MIR, it became evident that despite the best efforts of individuals, there were delays in conducting debriefs and collecting incident material. The MIR referred to FESA‘s ‗Incident Analysis Policy‘, dated 22 November 2004. Timeframes in the policy document refer to completing a draft report in 5-6 weeks. The Lake Clifton Debrief Report was not received by the MIR until three months after the fire, and the Red Hill and Roleystone PIA‘s were delayed. Undoubtedly 2010-11 has been a busy bushfire season and there have been ongoing demands (for both bushfire and other hazards) on operational staff across the state. After these incidents there is, however, no delay in resting crews, and refurbishing equipment and vehicles, ready for future call outs. This professional readiness and operational routine does not appear to extend to finalising incident paperwork, gathering IMT material and completing debriefs and post-incident analysis. These post-incident activities to be incomplete three months after an incident where there were significant house losses has the potential for information to be incomplete, forgotten or ignored. Delaying these important actions can only increase the difficulty in recollecting what occurred, what went well and what did not, and erodes the effectiveness of collecting and actioning lessons learnt. What has become evident to the MIR is that a lack of resources, as much as a lack of resolve, is impacting on finalising these important reports within the specified timeframes. Dedicated individuals are required who are capable researchers and writers – the task cannot be delegated to any available individuals. With additional resources this task could be undertaken by professional standards staff, within a ‗lessons learnt‘ team or others. In any case, emphasis needs to be placed on completing initial drafts soon after the incident, and it needs to be consistent operational practice aligned to crew rest and equipment refurbishment. The appointment of an office manager to any Level 3 IMT, as discussed earlier, would further assist this.


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Finding 13 FESA requires additional resources, as well as a steadfast resolve, to comply with the existing policy of completing debriefs/PIA within six weeks of an incident.

10. Previous Reports

In developing this MIR, the most recent 2010 Toodyay MIR was reviewed. The following was identified: Toodyay MIR55 The Toodyay MIR included a number of broad recommendations which all have some application to the 2011 events. However, the following appear to closely align to issues in this MIR regarding operational performance:

Recommendation 1: FESA implements measures that will ensure unity and clarity of command.

Recommendation 2: FESA and DEC take a whole of capability approach to joint operations, including developing joint doctrine that provides a common and articulated understanding of roles and responsibilities, resources and capabilities.

Recommendation 3: FESA, in partnership with other agencies and the community, develops Western Australia‘s urban interface firefighting capability and capacity

Recommendation 6: FESA establishes a process (and associated systems and policies) to mobilise staff to an incident, incorporating pre-formed multi-agency Incident Management Teams. The development of Incident Management Teams should align with the principles of seamless and integrated escalation of command and control arrangements, and be based on a whole of capability approach (people, organisations, systems, training, procedures etc.).

Recommendation 7: FESA maintains inter-agency relationships and arrangements, and develops formalised arrangements across the entire emergency management cycle for joint activities such as training, exercises and procedure development.

While noting the action taken to implement the Toodyay MIR recommendations, the re-occurring comment in this current MIR would appear to require increased understanding of the issues and greater focus on implementing the changes required. WA Auditor General’s report No 7, ‘Responding to Major Bushfires’ October 2004 Amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 and the Emergency Management Regulations 2006 provide FESA with legislative authority to take control of fire on Local Government or DEC managed lands when:

A bushfire has assumed or is likely to assume such proportions as to be incapable of control or suppression by the firefighting authority or agency in whose area or locality it is burning, or

55

Noetic Solutions, Toodyay MIR, dated August 2010


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The prevailing conditions are conducive to the outbreak of a bushfire likely to assume such proportions, or

A bushfire is not being effectively controlled or suppressed by the firefighting authority or authorities in whose area or locality it is burning, or

A fire requires or may require the coordination of resources.56 While this approach improves on the previous arrangement, it does not assist the State to improve on building planning and preparation before response is required. Further legislative amendment is required to improve performance in these areas.

Finding 14 Further legislative amendment is required to improve performance in the area of building planning and preparation, to align with the legislative arrangements already made in 2009 regarding response.

11. Summary of Findings and Recommendations The MIR identified the following Findings and Recommendations:

Findings F 1: FESA was exposed on the afternoon of 10 January 2011 as it lacked situational awareness and appointed a non-accredited IC to a Level 3 fire at a time when Armstrong Hills were under threat. F 2: The areas of Lake Clifton, Red Hill and Roleystone should be declared ‗bushfire prone‘ either through review and update of regional or town planning schemes, or via the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960. F 3: FESA, cooperatively with DEC, WALGA, BoM and the Bush Fire Service Consultative Committee as the IBMC, has recently completed significant preparation at a strategic level including the re-writing of WESTPLAN Bushfire, with ongoing consideration of a broad range of issues. F 4: The Darling Escarpment is ‗bushfire prone‘ and should be declared so by Local Government. Failing to do so inhibits FESA‘s operational response. F 5: FESA has an effective community education approach, offering appropriate and current bushfire safety information to residents and communities in high risk bushfire areas. The distribution of this material was not reviewed in detail. It is for FESA to make it accessible and for responsible residents to gain the information and act upon it. F 6: Greater fuel reduction will reduce the likelihood and impact of bushfires in the Perth Hills and coastal regions.

56

Department of the Premier and Cabinet WA, ‗Review of Western Australia‘s Bushfire Preparedness‘, April 2009, p 15


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F 7: The City of Armadale is to be credited with the development of management plans for Lloyd Hughes Reserve including fire management plans, but needs to stridently manage fuel loadings. F 8: Noting the challenges of developing a regional scale management plan, this is required for the Banyowla Regional Park, including detailing specific objectives for fire management, fuel management and prescribed burning. F 9: FESA has an effective public information/media liaison service that is subject to increasing demands to provide timely and accurate advice regarding fast moving, complex and high impact events. F 10: Identifying pre-formed IMT‘s prior to the weekend of 5-6 February 2011 would have assisted those involved to prepare for and respond to the Red Hill and Roleystone Bushfires. F 11: The decision to evacuate residents at Roleystone was a deliberate operational decision made by the IC‘s at the time, taking into account the conditions on the day and the exposures to the fire. It is a decision that is fully supported by the MIR. F 12: FESA does acknowledge the importance of recognising the participation of volunteer and DEC crews in joint fires. It needs to continue to stress the importance of this recognition. FESA does have this detailed in media comment and releases, although often the media choose not to reflect this. F 13. FESA requires additional resources, as well as a steadfast resolve, to comply with the existing policy of completing debriefs/PIA within six weeks of an incident. F 14: Further legislative amendment is required to improve performance in the areas of building planning and preparation, to align with the legislative arrangements already made in 2009 regarding response.

Recommendations R 1: Local residents must take a degree of shared responsibility to prepare their properties by reducing the risk of bushfire around their properties and planning for a bushfire emergency. R 2: To provide Level 3 IC‘s (and FESA) with a level of confidence and to maintain currency across the pool of accredited IC‘s, regular exercising of IC‘s and Level 3 IMT‘s is required. R 3: FRS fire appliance allocation and training needs to be reviewed to enhance offensive bushfire capability within the metropolitan area.

R 4: Initial StateAlert messages should provide timely broad advice to a wide audience authorised by the SDD, while subsequent messages may provide more detail.

R 5: All responding crews and the incident command appointments should adopt a ‗Size Up‘ reporting format.

R 6: FESA must actively manage the transition to WAERN and provide alternative means for regional crews to communicate when in areas where WAERN is not operated.


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R 7: Review the command function of the MROC for Level 3 incidents when the SOC is activated. R 8: FESA should continue to develop with DEC and Local Government a number of rostered pre-formed IMT‘s available throughout the fire season, regardless of predicted weather.

R 9: FESA and DEC need to appoint accredited Level 3 IC‘s based on experience, competency and currency. R 10: Noting existing legislative and policy arrangements, there is merit in considering options for the future management of Level 3 fires in Local Government areas. R 11: FESA needs to place greater priority on the appointment of Safety Advisors to Level 3 incidents as is reflected in WESTPLAN Bushfire. R 12: FESA should review the size of the existing pre-formed IMT to include additional Information and Planning officers and increased resourcing of scribes and management support for all Level 3 incidents. R 13: FESA seek legal and policing advice regarding the policy to leave residents who chose not to evacuate in a declared ‗dangerous area‘ after a bushfire. R 14: There are a range of opportunities identified from reviewing the three fires that will improve coordination between FESA and DEC, requiring limited resources, potentially generating some efficiencies and reflecting a joint, tenure blind approach to fire management in WA. The MIR acknowledges the progress made through the IBMC in these matters and notes these measures will require ongoing strong leadership. These include:

Clarification and consistent application of the Zone 2 and 2A mobilisation protocols

Duplicating available information on websites

Establishing a single State air desk and cross-utilising Air Attack Supervisors

Completing common training for the conduct of public meetings

Coordinating IMT training and exercises

Operating joint IMT‘s during interface fires

FESA utilising the DEC mobile ICC when suitable ICPs are not available

FESA engaging in daily weather teleconferences with DEC

Engaging a permanent BoM officer to support a common FESA and DEC SOC

Developing a common ‗Tool Box‘ of forms and operational procedures for fire response

Developing common jurisdictional arrangements to accommodate interstate support

Developing a joint FESA/DEC SOC at the new (FESA) Emergency Services facility at Cockburn

Adopting common and transparent Level 3 IC accreditation

Using a single mapping capability across both agencies and

Using common naming conventions for fires.


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12. Conclusion

The 2010-11 bushfire season was always going to be challenging. WA had experienced a very dry winter. Concurrently, northern WA was exposed to cyclones and flooding. FESA has had a busy six months from October 2010 when the bushfire season started 6 weeks early. Three fires over the summer have warranted detailed examination and have been the subject of this MIR: Lake Clifton and Roleystone because of the house loss and Red Hill because of the concurrent demand on resources, since it occurred on the same weekend as the Roleystone fire. The fundamental success has been no loss of life as a result of three fires that occurred during dangerous weather conditions. This deliberate and planned outcome through a defensive evacuation strategy is to be commended, particularly for the Roleystone fire that developed during difficult conditions in hilly terrain where exposed houses were close to the seat of the fire and firefighters had little time to react. This considered approach of evacuation, reflecting a similar strategy in Toodyay in 2010, comes at a cost – house loss. By removing residents in the face of the fire, there is an increased likelihood of property loss. There is also an increased chance of survival. Noting the poor preparation by many residents and the absence of bushfire prone planning standards in all three Local Governments impacted by the bushfires, this approach of evacuation is supported by the MIR. More can be done, however, to increase the chance of house survival even if residents are not present and, even more importantly, further improve the chance of survival for when there is little or no warning. Improved planning provisions and building to Australian Standards in Bushfire Prone Areas will do much to improve the chance of survival. And together with residents accepting greater responsibility, the resilience of communities living in urban interface areas will increase. Greater fuel reduction is required and will be an ongoing challenge in interface areas. FESA, DEC and Local Government need the resources to conduct this vital risk reduction measure, but communities need to also understand it is a long-term strategy, dependent on favorable weather conditions, available resources, smoke impacts and the risk of prescribed burns turning into unprescribed bushfires. Prescribed burning alone will not eliminate the risk. FESA has been open and forthright in accepting external review of its operational performance. In initialising this MIR, FESA has illustrated the open and learning culture it has adopted to ensure it provides the best possible service to the WA community. There are many positive observations together with some opportunities for improved performance. The benefits of this MIR will be limited unless these observations lead to reinforcing positive performance and changing negative behaviour. The MIR is simply the tool and mirror to reflect what members of the agency have seen. Together with the Perth Hills Bushfire Review 2011, the WA community will benefit from investigations coming from different angles, both intent on identifying what happened and identifying how the risk of bushfires can be reduced in the future and where they do occur, better managed.


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Appendices

1. The Major Incident Review‘s Terms of Reference 2. List of those interviewed 3. Documentation Reviewed 4. Perth Hills Bushfire Review Terms of Reference 5. Detailed Timeline Fire One: Lake Clifton 6. Detailed Timeline Fire Two: Red Hill 7. Detailed Timeline Fire Three: Roleystone 8. Details of StateAlert Warnings 9. Pre Fire Season Suppression Works – Banyowla Regional Park 2010/2011 10. Size up – An initial Assessment and Reporting tool


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Appendix 1: The Major Incident Review Terms of Reference

The Major Incident Review terms of reference are:

examine the effectiveness of preparedness leading up to the bushfires

assess the effectiveness of FESA Public Information systems

examine the effectiveness of the response to the bushfires including existing fire response procedures, multi-agency response and coordination, and resource deployment

recommend future bushfire management strategies, including any required improvements to existing arrangements including public communications, community advice systems, infrastructure, training and overall resourcing and

examine any other matters relevant to the incident.


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Appendix 2: Those who were interviewed as part of the MIR

Date Who Title/Rank Why

15/2/11 Mr Darren Klemm FESA District Manager Newburn Incident Ground

15/2/11 Mr Stuart Wade FESA District Manager South East Incident Ground

16/2/11 Mr David Caporn FESA Executive Director Community Development

Hydrants/Building Safety/FIA

16/2/11 Aviation Services N/A Aerial view – incident grounds

22/2/11 Mr Murray Carter DEC Manager, Fire Management Services Branch

Unscheduled meeting

23/2/11 Mr Robbie Lefroy Mr Brendan Power Mr Anthony Benbow

FESA Director IT FESA Manager Systems Dev FESA A/Manager Radio Comms

FESA Comms / IT systems

25/2/11 Mr Darren Klemm FESA District Manager Newburn IC Red Hill

25/2/11 Mr Graeme Geer Mr Kevin Jolly Ms Lea Anderson

Secretary United Fire Fighters Union WA Branch President United Fire Fighters Union WA Branch Industrial Officer United Fire Fighters Union WA Branch

Key stakeholder

25/2/11 Mr Roger Underwood Chairman Bushfire Front Inc Key interest group

28/2/11 Mr Bruce Jones FESA Regional Director Central Metropolitan Fire

Overview – MIMIC course

28/2/11 Mr Doug Whitfield FESA Director Aviation Services Overview of Air Services

28/2/11 Mr Allan Daw FESA District Manager North East IC Red Hill

28/2/11 Mr Ray Tame Ms Yvonne Coin Mr Brian Watkins

CEO City of Armadale City of Armadale Recovery Coordinator City of Armadale Chief Bush Fire Control Officer

Local Government (Roleystone Incident)

1/3/11 Ms Suellen Shea FESA Director Community Engagement

Community meeting Roleystone

1/3/11 Mr Paul Ryan FESA District Manager Cockburn Sound

IC Roleystone

1/3/11 Mr Gary Kennedy FESA Director Operational Effectiveness

IC Roleystone

2/3/11 Mr Edmond Brooks FESA Regional Director North Metropolitan

IC Red Hill

2/3/11 Mr Murray Carter Mr Keith Low Mr Murray Mitchell

DEC Manager, Fire Management Services Branch DEC staff DEC staff

DEC involvement (Lake Clifton)

2/3/11 Mr Mike Foley Ms M Lockyer-Benzie Ms Shannon MacPherson Ms Cavell Altman

CEO City of Swan Executive Manager, Community Services A/Manager Safety & Places

Local Government (Red Hill incident)


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Mr Brett Finlay Coordinator Community Safety Community Emergency Services Manager

8/3/11 Mr Mick Keelty Perth Hills Bushfire Review Perth Hills Bushfire Review

8/3/11 Mr Brad Stringer FESA District Manager IC Roleystone

9/3/11 Mr John Twaddle Shire of Waroona Chief Bush Fire Control Officer

IC Lake Clifton

14/3/11 Mr Stephen Johnston FESA Superintendent – Manager Special Risks

SDC Lake Clifton

14/3/11 Mr Chris Arnol FESA Assistant Chief Operations Officer Country

SDD (relief) (Red Hill / Roleystone)

15/3/11 Mr Craig Waters FESA District Manager Fire Investigation & Analysis Unit

Fire Cause (Red Hill / Roleystone /Lake Clifton)

15/3/11 Mr Mike Bergin Mr Grahame Reader Mr Brad Santos

BoM Regional Director BoM Manager Weather Services BoM Manager Severe Weather Services

Bureau of Meteorology

15/3/11 Mr Lindsay Cuneo FESA Assistant Chief Operations Officer Coordination

SDD (Red Hill / Roleystone / Lake Clifton)

16/3/11 Mr Mal Cronstedt FESA Superintendent Rural Operations Coordinator

SDD (Red Hill /Roleystone)

16/3/11 Mr John McMillan FESA Fire Safety Officer MROC RDC (Red Hill / Roleystone / Lake Clifton)

22/3/11 Mr Murray Carter Mr Keith Low Mr Greg Napier Mr Kevin Pollock Mr Michael Pasotti

DEC Manager, Fire Management Services Branch DEC Staff DEC Staff DEC Staff DEC Staff

DEC involvement (Red Hill / Roleystone)

28/3/11 Mr Greg McKay FESA Regional Director South West Bunbury ROC (Lake Clifton)

28/3/11 Mr Craig Hynes FESA Chief Operations Officer Lake Clifton/Red Hill/Roleystone

30/3/11 Mr Greg Knott Mr Mark Ryan Mr Peter Sawyer

WA Police Inspector EM & CT Div WA Police Asst Director EM & CT Div WA Police Inspector EM & CT Div

Interagency liaison

5/4/11 Ms Michelle Harris FESA Director Media & Public Affairs Public Information

6/4/11 Mr Mark Taylor FESA Manager Spatial Services GIS / Mapping


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Appendix 3: Documentation Reviewed as part of the MIR

Number

Document Type

001 IBMC Terms of Reference – Training / Aerial Fire Suppression / Fire Operations / Fuel Load Management / Bushfire Research Subcommittee Terms of Reference. Overview of IBMC & reporting framework. VBRC recommendations – allocation across WA Public Sector

002 Draft Capstone Doctrine (Fundamentals of Operations)

003 FESA Policy 54 – Incident Analysis Policy

004 WESTPLAN Bushfire

005 Toodyay MIR – Report (Noetic)

006 Toodyay MIR – recommendations update

007 Extract from Hansard – Thursday, 11 November 2010 – Minister for ES – Annual Seasonal Outlook Briefing

008 Copy of letter sent to all Members of the House by the Minister for ES – Predictions for the 2010/11 Fire Season (including Seasonal Outlook Information Pack)

009 2010 WA Seasonal Outlook Cyclone & Bushfire Program (held at Challenge Stadium 5/11/10)

010 Operational Circular 70/2010 – Air Operations 2010/11 Fire Season

011 SOP 71 – Aerial Fire Suppression – DEC/FESA Aerial Suppression Operating Procedure 2010/11 dated 15 November 2010

012 DEC/FESA – Aerial Suppression Operating Procedure 2010/11

013 Minutes – State Operations Centre Weekly Teleconference WC 06/1/11

014 Minutes – State Operations Centre Weekly Teleconference WC 3/2/11

015 Air Operations Incident Data (Roleystone & Red Hill)

016 Fire Weather Directive 2010/11 Western Australian Regional Office

017 Bushfire Management Arrangements (City of Armadale / FESA) including CD

018 SAP 37 Total Fire Ban – Administrative Procedure

019 Zone 2 & 2A Operational Protocols 2010/2011

020 Email by Burrell titled ‗Kelmscott Bush Fires – Relevant Information‘

021 Review of Western Australia‘s Bushfire Preparedness & Status update of Review committee recommendations & notes (as at October 2009)

022 Premier Media Statement – Terms set for Perth Hills Bushfire Review

023 StateAlert Boundaries used in the Roleystone Area (map)

024 StateAlert emails (6 copies (5) Roleystone & (1) Red Hill)

025 StateAlert voice message left on answer machine

026 StateAlert Audio Files and incident reports from Roleystone

027 FESA MPA Operational Plan (January 2010)

028 Major Incident Management for Incident Controllers (Activity Workbook) Major Incident Management for Incident Controllers (Participant Resource)

029 DEC Lever Arch folder – Incident related documentation (Lake Clifton) Roleystone-Kelmscott Fire (PHD105) – Summary of DEC resources Red Hill Fire (PHD103) – Summary of events FESA Red Hill Fire

030 Community Engagement Activities (spreadsheet) Roleystone & Kelmscott Full size & Pocket size Booklet – PAS / A4 laminated Fire Danger Rating – ‗What it means to you‘ Fact Sheet / ‗After the Fire‘ pamphlet / Community Engagement


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Framework (hard cover)

031 4 x Lever Arch files containing CD publications catalogue

032 Planning for Bush Fire Protection Guidelines (book)

033 StateAlert emails (Lake Clifton (2) Red Hill (1))

034 Bushfire Mutual Aid Arrangements DEC Swan Region & FESA Metro Regions (2010/11 Fire Season Draft v2)

035 Toodyay Major Fire 2009 – MIR Recommendation (document progress update) and Information Flow – current systems processes (V3) (Toodyay MIR Rec 8)

036 Document re ‗resource to risk‘ as provided by UFU (sent direct to MIR author)

037 Feedback re questions MIR (unable to meet due to ill health)

038 Feedback re questions MIR (unable to meet due to operational deployment)

039 Major Emergency Teams (Operational Principles / Operational Instructions)

040 Major Emergency Management Coordination Guidelines (all hazards)

041 IMT Matrix L2/3 Wildfire / Urban Fire (Brooks / Daw / Kennedy / Klemm / Ryan / Stringer / Widmer)

042 Training Records a/c Eddy Brooks (IC Red Hill)

043 Training Records a/c Allan Daw (IC Red Hill)

044 Training Records a/c Gary Kennedy (IC Roleystone)

045 Training Records a/c Darren Klemm (IC Red Hill)

046 Training Records a/c Paul Ryan (IC Roleystone)

047 Training Records a/c Brad Stringer (IC Roleystone)

048 Training Records a/c Chris Widmer (IC Lake Clifton)

049 Training Records a/c John Tillman (IC Lake Clifton)

050 FESA File – Fire Prevention-Planning-Lloyd Hughes Park Armadale – containing documents:

Lloyd Hughes Park Management Plan

Report to Council 7 February 2000 adopting the Lloyd Hughes Park Management Plan

Lloyd Hughes Park Urban Bushland Fire Management Plan (currently used by City of Armadale)

Report to Council, 22 April 2003 adopting Urban Bushland fire Management Plans (including Lloyd Hughes Reserve)

051 Draft Report – Meteorological aspects of the Kelmscott/Roleystone Fire 6 February 2011

052 Draft (unsigned) Witness Statement – Noel Raymond Plowman (Captain Roleystone VFRS & BFB)

053 Draft (unsigned) Witness Statement – SO John Robert Biggs (Armadale Fire Station)

054 Air Operations Major Incident Review Summary – Lake Clifton / Red Hill / Roleystone

055 Air Operations – Helitac Incident Report Lake Clifton (171042)

056 Air Operations – Helitac Incident Report Red Hill (173336)

057 Air Operations – Helitac Incident Report Roleystone (173393)

058 Disc containing images of damaged houses (Lake Clifton / Roleystone / Red Hill), maps (Lake Clifton / Roleystone / Red Hill), ignition points (Lake Clifton) and video clip – Roleystone & Red Hill

059 FDI Calculation in Western Australia (definition & calculation of FDI & FDR used by


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the BoM

060 WA District Forecasts for 5/2/2010

061 Government Gazette Extract – TFB 28 – 30/1 & 5-7/2/11

062 TFB 5/2/11 documentation (TFB declaration – supporting memo and maps of localities affected)

063 TFB 6/2/11 documentation (TFB declaration – supporting memo and maps of localities affected)

064 Seasonal Outlook Preparedness – Copy of letter sent to all Members of Parliament including list of documents provided to members as a Seasonal Outlook Education pack

065 Copy of Extract from Hansard – Assembly – Thursday 11 November 2010 titled ‗Fire and Emergency Services Authority – Annual Seasonal Outlook Briefing (Statement by the Minister for Emergency Services)‘

066 Copy of Agenda – 2010 WA Seasonal Outlook Cyclone & Bushfire Briefing held at Challenge Stadium on Friday 5 November 2010 (including list of attendees)

067 Response to Recovery Hand Over Form – Roleystone/Kelmscott Bushfire (173393), FESA to Local Government

068 Letter from Mr AA (Sandy) Lewis, Secretary, Locals Against Wildfires Inc. (including committee report and reference notes on Bush Fire History in WA)

069 AVBFB submission sent direct to Stuart Ellis‘ email address

070 FESA File 13789-01, 13789-02 & 13789-03 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – T Cards

071 FESA File 13761 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Incident Action Plan (IAP) & Incident Controller (IC)

072 FESA File 13672 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Planning

073 FESA File 13764 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Miscellaneous Incident Documentation

074 FESA File 13765 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Miscellaneous Maps

075 FESA File 13766 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 –Maps

076 FESA File 13767 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Operations

077 FESA File 13768 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Urban Search & Rescue (USAR)

078 FESA File 13769 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Weather

079 FESA File 13770 Fire & Emergency Operations – review – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Logistics

080 FESA File 13772 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Media

081 FESA File 13778 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Incident Control Vehicle (ICV)

082 FESA File 13780 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Incident Control Vehicle (Miscellaneous)


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083 FESA File 13783 Fire & Emergency Operations – Reviewing – Major Incident Review (MIR) Kelmscott Roleystone Fire February 2011 – Incident Control Information

084 Assorted maps

085 Summer edition – 24Seven – FRS Incident Control Vehicle article

086 Major Incidents leading up to and around the time of the Roleystone Incident & Lake Clifton Incident

087 Submission by Sean Groombridge, CEO of Sentinel Alert Pty Ltd. (sent direct to MIR author)

088 MPA – Activity Catalogue 2010 – 2011 Season

089 2 x Lever arch folder – Red Hill Incident Documents (miscellaneous)

090 Lever arch folder – State Operations Centre Documents (miscellaneous)

091 Folder – Letters/emails (positive and negative) from members of the community

092 FESA MPA - Recent Bushfires Response Evaluation Report

093 Copy of DEC letter to DSE Victoria re Fire Fighting Support for Western Australia

094 Timeline Perth Hills Fires

095 House Exposure Data 2005 – March 2011

096 Email submission from Association of Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades of WA, Emergency Services Volunteers Association & State Emergency Service Volunteers Association of WA

097 Minutes – SOC Debrief – Lake Clifton Fire

098 Minutes – SOC Debrief – Roleystone / Red Hill Fires

099 StateAlert Reports

100 Red Hill Fire Debrief Report

101 Lake Clifton Debrief Report

102 Final Report (6 April 2011) – Meteorological aspects of the Red Hill/Gidgegannup and Kelmscott/Roleystone Fires 5 & 6 February 2011


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Appendix 4: Perth Hills Bushfire Review Terms of Reference The Inquiry will seek to address all aspects of bushfire risk management in the Perth Hills area with specific reference to:

The adequacy of current preventative measures, specifically prescribed burning and other bushfire mitigation activities.

The impact of land use, environmental and building laws, practices and policies in the affected areas, affecting bushfire prevention, mitigation and response and what, if any, changes may be required.

The actions that can and should be taken by landowners, residents and tenants in relation to bushfire risk management including undertaking vegetation clearance, operation of evaporative air-conditioners and storage and/or removal of hazardous inflammable material surrounding their dwellings and buildings. This should include consideration of associated enforcement regimes and penalties.

The adequacy and effectiveness of information and communication campaigns and mechanisms, including systems for alerting residents in relation to the fire or potential fires.

Improvements that can be made in relation to the coordination of activities across all levels of government, including with volunteer groups.

A report will be drafted within four months and submitted to the Premier for consideration before it is tabled in State Parliament and publicly released.


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Appendix 5: Detailed Timeline Fire One: Lake Clifton From information available to the MIR in February – April 2011, the following has been collated: 10 January 2011 11:47 DEC‘s Wellington District fire tower smoke report was forwarded by DEC‘s Collie

office to FESA COMCEN 11:54 CBFCO Waroona paged and initiated response 12:10 DEC fire crews dispatched from Wellington 12:20 DEC aerial bombers being dispatched from Bunbury 12:24 Additional DEC ground crews dispatched 12:25 FESA State Duty Coordinator received notification that a fire was developing near

Dorset Road, Lake Clifton 12:26 DEC Regional Duty Officer contacted the FESA South West Regional Duty Coordinator in Bunbury CBFCO Waroona called out Preston Beach and Lake Clifton Brigades en route to the

fire 12:30 CBFCO Waroona indicated he arrived on scene as initial IC and responded ground crews to ‗Fire One‘ 12:55 DEC report first bomber drop 13:05 DEC Air Attack overhead fire 13:09 First Emergency Warning with SEWS issued 13:13 CBFCO Waroona allocated resources from the Shire of Murray to ‗Fire Two‘ 13:30 Information received at SOC from aircraft observation that Lake Clifton fire appeared

‗out of control‘ Air intelligence aircraft and Type 3 aircraft approved to deploy to fire 14:12 FESA Bunbury ROC received the initial field sketch of the fire 14:10 SOC activated 14:14 Second Emergency Warning issued 14:29 Fire size was reported as 732 ha 15:19 Fire burning into Armstrong Hills with a total fire size of 803 ha 15:20 SOC to ROC teleconference 16:00 First StateAlert Message issued 17:00 Section 13 Declared. Incumbent Incident Controller (IC) confirmed as Section 13 IC 17:03 Second StateAlert Message issued 17:00 House loss reported by aerial observation 17:20 Further teleconference SOC with Bunbury ROC. 17:33 Spot Weather Forecast for 18:00: 32 C, RH 21%, winds ESE at 20 km/h Overnight DEC mobile ICC deployed at the request of FESA 19:00 IC Handover from Mr J Twaddle to Mr C Widmer 21:56 Three Divisions in place 23:45 Bunbury ROC sought metropolitan resources of managers and vehicles MROC activated to assist with resource requests 23:46 Third StateAlert Message issued 11 January 2011 00:00 Advised Bunbury ROC closing down 03:00 Fire declared contained 08:45 IC Handover from Mr C Widmer to Mr J Tillman 09:00 ISG Meeting


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10:00 Community meeting 12:22 Teleconference SOC to ROC 17:00 Teleconference SOC to ROC 21:00 IC Handover from Mr J Tillman to Mr C Widmer 12 January 2011 08:30 IC Handover from Mr C Widmer to Mr J Tillman Teleconference SOC to ROC 19:00 IC Handover to Local Government Mr J Twaddle


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Appendix 6: Detailed Timeline Fire Two: Red Hill

From information available to the MIR in February – April 2011, the following has been collated: 05 February 2011 21:14 Fire reported to FESA COMCEN 21:17 Brigade pagers activated Pager group A89 21:20 FESA COMCEN advise having received a report from the incident ground of a fire at

the ―base of power pole; size 100m deep and 50m wide; moving very quickly – moving in a westerly direction‖ Brigade pagers activated Pager group A87 and Mundaring VFRS

21:22 Pager group B36 activated 21:30 Request received from fireground for 3rd Alarm and Police attendance to close

Toodyay Road ICP established in shed at entrance to Red Hill Waste Management Facility 21:58 Request to SOC for an emergency warning message for the communities of

Brigadoon, Baskerville and Millendon 21:59 MROC activated 06 February 2011 00:15 Section 13 Declared and Mr E Brooks appointed IC ICP moved from shed at entrance to nearby offices 01:27 SOC activated 02:32 SOC sought WAPOL and Department for Child Protection representation 02:14 First StateAlert message issued 02:20 Second StateAlert message issued 02:31 Third StateAlert message issued 03:19 Fourth StateAlert message issued 03:38 Fifth StateAlert message issued 03:54 Sixth StateAlert messages finalised 05:15 Aerial support requested 06:50 Helitacs 670 and 671 arrived at fireground 06:55 Helitac 681 arrived at fireground Helitacs 688 and 669 arrived at fireground 07:15 Air Intelligence aircraft arrived 08:00 IC Handover from Mr E Brooks to Mr D Klemm 16:00 Operations Area Support Group meeting conducted 20:00 IC Handover from Mr D Klemm to Mr A Daw 07 February 2011 08:00 IC Handover from Mr A Daw to Mr E Brooks

ICP moved from offices at entrance to vacant Swan Shire Offices and nearby Jack Mann Oval


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Appendix 7: Detailed Timeline Fire Three: Roleystone From information available to the MIR in February – April 2011, the following has been collated: 06 February 2011 11:41 Fire reported to FESA COMCEN 11:45 Armadale 1st Pump and Light Tanker turned out Zone 2 and 2A enhanced response initiated involving response of Roleystone VFRS

and BFS, Bedfordale BFS and DEC fixed wing bombers as Helitac deployed to Red Hill Fire

11:56 Armadale 1st Pump crews arrived on scene Roleystone VFRS and BFS arrived on scene 12:03 Fire reported as contained; stand down air support 12:11 Spot over identified to northwest. FESA COMCEN advised 12:13 Request to upgrade to 3rd alarm and re-activate aerial support 12:14 Initial request for road closures 12:15 DM P Ryan deployed as initial IC in the DM vehicle 12:21 Multiple reports from then on as to houses under threat 12:30 Initial media alert on FESA website 12:35 Helitacs 670 and 671 re-tasked to deploy from Red Hill to Roleystone 13:00 Helitac 682 activated and deployed to Roleystone from Perth followed by Helitac 681 13:08 Incident Control Point relocated to Roleystone Fire Station Request to upgrade to 4th alarm 13:10 SOC activated ICV responded 13:13 Media Liaison Officer en route to ICC 13:50 First StateAlert message issued 14:05 Western Power advised to liaise with Operations Officer 14:06 IC requested Air Intelligence platform 14:15 Section 13 declared Supt G Kennedy assumed IC – diary commenced 14:00 DM Ryan Operations Officer 14:17 IC liaised with Police regarding vehicle control points IC directed the operational priority to be saving life and ordered an evacuation 14:19 Air intelligence platform released from Red Hill to Roleystone 14:19 Spot weather forecast issued: 29 C, RH 28%, ESE wind at 31 km/h gusting to 50

km/h 14:30 ISG meeting held 14:51 IC aware 14 homes lost 14:59 IC requested for evacuation centre to be established 15:15 Likely IMT meeting:

o Western Power advised electricity shut down o IC made aware Buckingham Bridge burnt o DEC resources report in Sector 1 o Multiple house lost recorded o All sectors uncontrolled

15:42 IC advised 15 homes lost south division and 5 homes lost north division 15:47 Second StateAlert message issued 15:53 Third StateAlert message issued 15:59 Fourth StateAlert message issued 16:00 Initial Operations Area Support Group meeting at FESA House IC became aware of degree of house loss


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16:34 Likely IMT meeting: o Sea breeze reported in IC log o 30-40 houses lost as reported by Operations Officer o All sectors uncontrolled – Lives priority at present

16:55 IC notes firefighter welfare highlighted as no relief in sight 18:00 Media interview Channel 7 18:06 Final StateAlert message issued 18:30 State Emergency Coordination Group meeting held at FESA House 18:35 Planning Officer estimates running fire out by 2300 19:30 ISG conducted at Armadale 19:40 Briefing:

o Properties remain under threat on southern flank 20:00 IC Hand over from Mr G Kennedy to Mr B Stringer Further Relief Areas established 23:00 Likely IMT meeting:

o Two Divisions established o Northern flank of fire ‗rounded up‘ o 30-60 houses burnt o Road closures remain in place o Power lines down o Brookton Highway closed o 1 x firefighter hospitalised o 60 appliances and 150-200 firefighters on scene

7 February 2011 00:00 OASG Meeting 05:00 IMT Meeting Consolidated mineral earth break 95% complete 08:00 IC Handover from Mr B Stringer to Mr G Kennedy 20:00 IC handover Mr G Kennedy to Mr B Stringer 23:00 IMT meeting 08 February 2011 08:00 IC handover Mr B Stringer to Mr P Ryan 20:00 IC handover Mr P Ryan to Mr B Chamberlain 09 February 2011 08:00 IC handover Mr B Chamberlain to Mr S Wade 18:00 IC handover Mr S Wade to Mr G Millar 10 February 2011 00:00 IC handover Mr G Millar to Mr G Feeney 08:00 IC handover Mr G Feeney to Mr S Wade 14:00 Handover to Local Government with support continuing from FESA


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Appendix 8: Detail of StateAlert Warnings Figure 10: Red Hill Fire StateAlert Warnings

Time Type of Warning Brief Description

02:14 Emergency Warning for Brigadoon and Millendon (You will be impacted by fire)

At 02:00am on 6 February 2011, a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people residing within William St, Range Rd, Weir Rd, Joshua Mews, Boulonnais Dve, Campersic Rd, Haddrill Rd and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted by fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy.

The bushfire is moving fast in a westerly direction towards Joshua Mews. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 200 metres ahead of the fire. Beware of firefighters and emergency services personnel working on site and take their advice.


At 02:00am on 6 February 2011, a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people residing within William St, Range Rd, Weir Rd, Joshua Mews, Boulonnais Dve, Campersic Rd, Haddrill Rd and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted by fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy. The bushfire is moving fast in a westerly direction towards Joshua Mews. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 200 metres ahead of the fire. Beware of firefighters and emergency services personnel working on site and take their advice.


At 02:00am on 6 February 2011, a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people residing within William St, Range Rd, Weir Rd, Joshua Mews, Boulonnais Dve, Campersic Rd, Haddrill Rd and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted by fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy.



At 03:00am on 6 February 2011, a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people residing within William St, Range Rd, Weir Rd, Joshua Mews, Boulonnais Dve, Campersic Rd, Haddrill Rd and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted by fire in the next 30


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minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy.


03:38 Emergency Warning for Brigadoon (You will be impacted by fire)

At 03:40am on 6 February 2011, this is a re-broadcast of a bushfire Emergency Warning for people residing within William St, Range Rd, Hardwick St and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted by fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy.

The bushfire is moving fast in a westerly direction towards Padbury Ave. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 200 metres ahead of the fire. Beware of firefighters and emergency services personnel working on site and take their advice.

03:54 Emergency Warning for Baskerville (you will be impacted by fire)

At 4:00am on 6 February 2011, this is a re-broadcast of a bushfire Emergency Warning for people residing within Haddrill St, Weir Rd, Range Rd, Hardwick Rd and Railway Pde. Homes within this area will be impacted fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. A relocation point has been set up at the Swan Park Leisure Centre on Grey Dve Midvale. Leave via Haddrill Rd towards Gt Northern Hwy.

The bushfire is moving fast in a westerly direction towards Padbury Ave. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 200 metres ahead of the fire. Beware of firefighters and emergency services personnel working on site and take their advice.

Figure 11: Roleystone Fire StateAlert Warnings


13:49 Emergency Warning for Roleystone (homes will be impacted by fire within half an hour)

Evacuation warning issued for homes in Kylie Rd, Urch Rd, Ronan Rd, Buchanan Rd, Coventry Rd, Canning Mills Rd, Scott Rd, Mount St, Bromfield Dve, Nookawarra Pl, Anderson Pl, Rowley Rd, Howard Pl

15:45 Emergency Warning for parts of Roleystone, Kelmscott, Mt Nasura (you will be impacted by fire)

Homes in the SW part of Roleystone, Mt Nasura. Homes bounded by Turner Rd, Kelmscott, Carawatha Ave, Mt Nasura, Albany Hwy to the west and Brookton Hwy Roleystone. Relocation point set up at Roleystone Town Hall. (bushfire is moving fast in a NW direction towards Albany Hwy. Embers likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up ahead of the fire).

15:50 Emergency Warning Homes in the SW part of Roleystone, Kelmscott and Mt


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for parts of Roleystone, Kelmscott, Mt Nasura (you will be impacted by fire)

Nasura. Homes bounded by Turner Rd, Kelmscott, Carawatha Ave, Mt Nasura, Albany Hwy to the west and Brookton Hwy Roleystone will be impacted by fire. Relocation point set up at Roleystone Town Hall. (bushfire is moving fast in a NW direction towards Albany Hwy. Embers likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up ahead of the fire).

15:57 Emergency Warning for parts of Roleystone, Kelmscott, Mt Nasura (you will be impacted by fire)

Relocation point set up at Roleystone Town Hall. (bushfire is moving fast in a NW direction towards Albany Hwy. Embers likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up ahead of the fire).

18:04 Emergency Warning for Roleystone (you will be impacted by fire)

Homes in contour Rd, Pound Pl, Croasdale Rd, High Rd, Gilcoe Pl, Barnes Rd and the west part of Mackie Rd will be impacted by fire in 60 minutes. It is too late to leave. Relocating at the last minute is deadly. You need to take shelter in your home and actively defend it. (shelter furthest away from the fire front and before the fire arrives as the very hot radiant heat will kill you before the flames reach you. The bushfire is moving fast in an NE direction towards Canning Mills.

Figure 12: Lake Clifton Fire StateAlert Warnings


16:01 Emergency Warning for Lake Clifton (you will be impacted by fire)

At 4:00pm on 10 January 2011 a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people in Tuart Grove and Armstrong Hills subdivisions. Homes in these subdivisions will be impacted by fire in the next 30 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. Take your bushfire survival kit with you. If you have not prepared your home your safest option is to leave. Relocating at the last minute is deadly.

The bushfire is moving fast in a westerly direction towards Old Coast Rd. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 500 metres ahead of the fire. road closures include Tuart Gve, Southern Estuary Rd, Armstrong Hills Dve and Old Bunbury Rd between Forrest hwy and Old Coast Rd. If you live in the area leave via Old Coast rd heading north. To keep up to date visit www.fesa.wa.gov.au call 1300 657 209 or listen to your local radio or other news bulletins.


At 5.00pm on 10 January 2010 a bushfire Emergency Warning has been issued for people in the Herron subdivision. Homes in this subdivision will be impacted by fire in the next 60 minutes. If the way is clear, leave for your safety place now. Take your bushfire survival kit with you. If you have not prepared your home your safest option is to leave. Relocating at the last minute is deadly. A relocation point has been set up at the Waroona Recreation and Aquatic Centre Hill St, Waroona.

http://www.fesa.wa.gov.au/


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The bushfire is moving fast in a west north west direction towards Old Coast Rd. Embers are likely to be blown around your home and spot fires are starting up to 400 metres ahead of the fire. Road closures include Southern Estuary Rd, Armstrong Hills Dve, Old Bunbury Rd between Forrest Hwy and Old Coast Rd and Old Coast Rd between Old Bunbury Rd and Southern Estuary Rd. To keep up to date visit www.fesa.wa.gov.au, call 1300 657 209 or listen to your local radio or other news bulletins.


At 11:00pm on 11 January (11 January) 2011 a bushfire Emergency warning has been issued for people in Tuart Grove, Old Coast Road, Old Bunbury Road and Willy Wagtail Close. Homes in these subdivisions will be impacted by fire in the next 1-2 hours. If the way is clear, leave for your safer place now. Take your bushfire survival kit with you. If you have not prepared your home your safest option is to leave. Relocating at the last minute is deadly.

Weather conditions expected overnight have greatly elevated the risk to residents in the Tuart Grove area. Relocate to a safer place now. The relocation point is the Waroona Recreation Centre. To keep up to date visit www.fesa.wa.gov.au, call 1300 657 209 or listen to your local radio or other news bulletins.




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Appendix 9: Pre-Fire Season Suppression Works – Banyowla Regional Park 2010/2011 The following outlines fire pre-suppression works as advised to the MIR by DEC that were completed prior to the 2010/11 fire season in Banyowla Regional Park. Pre-suppression works include:

1. firebreak maintenance 2. slashing of grass areas 3. maintenance of signs, gates and locks and 4. liaison with other agencies.

All on ground works were completed by 30 November 2010.

1. Firebreak maintenance

Machine works

Five days of firebreak machine works were completed by DEC utilising a contractor (Goad Resources) in November 2010.

Every firebreak on DEC-managed land in the regional park was traversed by the front end loader under DEC supervision.

Works were completed to ensure firebreaks are maintained to a mineral earth standard and meet the requirements of the Bush Fires Act 1954.

Machine work addressed erosion issues (washouts) along the firebreaks to ensure safe and unconstrained access for fire and emergency vehicles.

DEC contracted a front end loader to construct a temporary crossing over Stoney Brook, which dries out over summer, to enable access across the watercourse for fire and emergency vehicles. A culvert is to be constructed in April/May 2011.

Pruning

Each firebreak was pruned by DEC personnel to ensure they met the 3.6 metre wide and 4 metre height clearances as required under the Bush Fires Act.

Pruning was undertaken at the request of residents living adjacent to the regional park, particularly along Taronga Drive and near the corner of Ashley and Taronga Drives.

Machine works and pruning are completed simultaneously were possible.

2. Slashing of grass areas

Slashing was completed by a DEC-managed contractor in early November in the following areas:

Mills Road East 0.7 hectares


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Turner Road paddock 0.3 hectares Turner Road verges 2.5 kilometres

These areas have been identified for slashing given their grass fuel loading.

3. Maintenance of signs, gates and locks

DEC personnel sprayed and brush cut around boundary and directional signs to aid navigation and to identify the regional park.

All gates were checked to ensure they were accessible.

All locks on gates were maintained with graphite to ensure they were in working order.

4. Liaison with other agencies

DEC provided copies of the Banyowla Regional Park Fire Working Arrangements and Fire Response Plan to the City of Armadale and Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) in 2009. Subsequent copies were made available to the City of Armadale on request prior to the 2010/11 season.

DEC ensured that relevant FESA stations and local government authorities had regional parks keys.


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Appendix 10: ‘Size up’57 – An initial Assessment and Reporting Tool Fire: What is it doing and where is it heading?

Type

Location

Point of origin Threats: What is being threatened?

Life

Property

Environment

Cultural

Future Threats Action: What do we need to do and who is going to do it?

Warnings

Offensive

Defensive

Planning ahead Support: What support is needed now and in the future?

Resources ground and air

Support/staging/catering

Future requirements Command, Control and Communication: Who is in control and how are they communicating

IMT

Divisions

Sectors

NSP

Communication planning

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A variation on a NSW RFS ‗Size Up‘ tool.