MAGAZINE OF THE PEOPLES - Instituto Europa de los Pueblos

Foreword: Igor Barrenetxea Marañón The Sorbs or Wends: Javier Ruiz de Aguirre

MAGAZINE OF THE PEOPLESH E R R I E N A L D I Z K A R I A

Número 11. Año 2008 / 11. Issue Year 2008

Circassians: Merab Tchukhua Chechenia: Taisa Isaeva La Complejidadlas Lenguas del Cáucaso: Amaia Donés Mendia The Role of Memory: Igor Barrenetxea

Marañón News in brief

EDITORIAL EDITORIAL

THE IDENTITY OF A PEOPLE

The historian Anthony Smith indicates that “the re-cent proliferation of the ethnic conflicts and eth-nic nationalisms in so many parts of the world has

put in perspective the urgency of an in depth study of the bases of the national identity”. It would be a long process to explain the

evolution of the European identity. If we understand that nationalism was

born in the nineteenth cen-tury as an ideological mo-

vement of enormous relevance as it affec-

ted the drawing of real, or at times, imaginary bor-ders between nations and peoples, we s h o u l d n ’ t forget that all nationa-lisms start from a uni-

form identity at the dawn of

time, and have been changing

ever since. The main question continues

to be the wide range of political implications which

comes with the national identity of a people. This identity contains a

series of important considerations of how it develops, how it is exercised, and how it is made possible. Personal identities are easily conside-

red when they are framed in a rule of law, but on the contrary, these identities are more difficult in a sta-te that does permit full development. In this area, we are free to speak, feel, and behave according to our cultural and political identity. No one can tell us how to be, to feel while we have a framework of rights that allows us to define our cultural and po-litical identity. Nevertheless, we must consider that there are identities that do not always have these liberties. This means the right to live with their own identity, with their own language and customs.

In general, minority identities have been mistrea-ted by History. In the former USSR, the multitude of identities in this impressive collection of existing nationalities was undervalued during the stage of

LA IDENTIDAD DE LOS PUEBLOS

El historiador Anthony Smith señala que “la reciente proliferación de los conflictos étnicos y nacionalismos étnicos en tantas partes del mundo ha puesto de re-lieve la urgencia de un estudio en profundidad de las bases de la identidad nacional”. Sería un largo proceso el dibujar la evolución de la identidad europea. Si entendemos que el nacionalismo nació en el siglo XIX como un movi-miento ideológico de enorme rele-vancia a la hora de dibujar las fronteras reales y, en oca-siones, imaginadas de los pueblos, no debemos de olvidar que todos los nacionalistas parten de una única identidad uniforme des-de los albores de los tiempos, sino que han ido cambian-do. Ahora bien, la cuestión principal sigue siendo la amplia gama de impli-caciones políticas que trae consigo la identidad de los pue-blos. Esa identidad con-tiene una serie de conside-raciones importantes ante el modo en el que se desarrolla, se ejerce y se posibilita. Las identidades personales son fáciles de considerar cuan-do se enmarcan en un Estado de derecho pero, por el contrario, más difíciles cuando no existe un Estado que las permita un desarrollo pleno. En ese ámbito, el Estado de derecho, somos libres de ser, podemos hablar, sentir y comportarnos de acuerdo a nuestra identidad cultural y política. Nadie nos puede decir cómo hemos de ser ni de sentir, y disponemos de una serie de marcos que nos permite definirla de la manera más plural y diversa posible. Sin embargo, he-mos de considerar que hay identidades que no siempre ostentan esa libertad de configurarse. Eso implica la reivindicación de vivir en su propia identidad, con sus costumbres y sus lenguas.

En general, las identidades minoritarias han sido mal-tratadas por el peso de la Historia. En la extinta URSS, sin ir más lejos, las identidades diferenciadas en este impresionante abanico de nacionalidades existentes fueron minusvaloradas durante la etapa del comu-

Geography

The

Institute for the Europe of the Peoples, Basque Foundation

the Communism. In the schools, it was not possi-ble to be taught in the native language, and other characteristics of identity, such as religious mani-festations, were severely limited by the state. The imposition of a way of dress, of a way to express themselves, the use of the past as a formula for jus-tifying traditions, are integral parts of this attempt to annul identities.

But this vindication of identity does not intend to provoke a debate on nationalism, but to insist on respect for the implicit plurality that exists in all countries, in all cultures, and in all social groups. No country, no state, is characterized exclusively by a single identity. Although the ideal of many contem-porary states has been to impel a homogenous na-tionalism that erases the existing divergences, that effort has been demonstrated to be impossible and as time goes by, it becomes even more unrealistic as more waves of immigration enter the country. The policies to curtail minority identities in favour of the dominant one have not been effective at all because these identities have prevailed since they go beyond a language or a form of dress, because they bring with them a form to think and to feel. The fall of the USSR, and the processes of openness in Europe have demonstrated it.

The defense of minority identities is a question that has not been answered. The recent secessionist pro-cesses in former Yugoslavia that, unfortunately, brought with them an ethnic and criminal compo-nent, take us to raise this question seriously because it is necessary that the defense of the identity of the people is not only an advertising slogan, but a com-mitment of all to safeguard human rights.

The solidification of identity does not have to re-sult in social fracturing, except if repressive attitu-des have become the only reaction and coexistence is annulled. The cultural wealth of human societies does not have to be based on the belief in an identi-ty superior to others, but on the contributions that all of them make a common human cause. Diver-se identities can coexist in an integral form within the same society of which they comprise, no matter how different they might be. They do not have to be opposing nor equal. One does not have to dissolve since in general all human identities evolve, change and adapt. These opened channels of communica-tion and interaction are what the European Peoples Institute -Basque Foundation tries to maintain open and full of respect.

Igor Barrenetxea MarañónHistorian

nismo. Ello llevó a que en las escuelas no se pudiera enseñar en lengua autóctona y que aquellos rasgos de identidad, como pueden ser las manifestaciones reli-giosas, fuesen coartadas. A eso debemos añadir, el me-nosprecio a las formas propias de vestir, de expresarse, la anulación de un pasado que se suele utilizar como una fórmula para justificar e imponer tradiciones, sus-tituido por otro ficticio, son una muestra de este inten-to de anular identidades.

Pero reivindicar la identidad no implica suscitar un de-bate sobre el nacionalismo sino sobre el respeto a la pluralidad implícita que existe en todos los países, en todas las culturas, en todos los grupos sociales. Nin-gún país, ningún Estado, está caracterizado exclusi-vamente por una sola identidad. Aunque el ideal de muchos Estados contemporáneos ha sido impulsar un nacionalismo homogéneo que borre las divergencias existentes, eso se ha demostrado imposible y cada vez es más complicado a tenor de la ola de inmigración procedente de otros países. Las políticas que han pre-tendido difuminar las identidades minoritarias en las dominantes, no han resultado eficaces porque, aún así, las identidades han prevalecido ya que van más allá de una lengua o de una forma de vestir, traen consigo una forma de pensar y de sentir. El fin de la URSS o bien los procesos abiertos en Europa lo han demostrado ante el nacimiento de nuevas realidades políticas que enraízan en unas identidades comunes.

La defensa de las identidades minoritarias es una cues-tión que no ha concluido. Los recientes procesos sece-sionistas en la extinta Yugoslavia que, por desgracia, trajeron consigo un componente étnico y criminal, nos llevan a plantear seriamente esta cuestión porque es necesario que la defensa de la identidad de los pueblos sea no sólo un eslogan publicitario, sino un compromi-so de todas las partes implicadas en la salvaguarda de los Derechos Humanos.

La identidad, de todos modos, no tiene que traer con-sigo una fractura social, salvo si las actitudes represivas se convierten en la única fórmula válida y se anula la convivencia. La riqueza cultural de las sociedades hu-manas no debe de regirse ni basarse en la creencia de una identidad superior a las demás, sino en los aportes que todas ellas realizan a un fondo humano común. Diversas identidades pueden convivir de una forma in-tegral en una misma sociedad de la que forman parte por divergentes que éstas sean. No tienen por qué ser contrarias ni iguales, no tienen por qué disolverse una frente a la otra ya que, en general, todas las identida-des humanas evolucionan, cambian, adoptan posturas prestadas de otras. Esos canales abiertos de comunica-ción e interacción son los que el Instituto de Europa de los Pueblos-Fundación Vasca pretende mantener abier-tos, apoyados, claro está, en la fórmula del respeto.

Igor Barrenetxea MarañónHistoriador

the Lusatia Mountains, which lie in what is now the Czech Republic. The soil is mainly a silty mate-rial known as loess, which is capable of sustaining intensive farming.

LANGUAGE

A western Slavic language of the Indo European family. It is spoken by around 100,000 people in Lusatia, all of them bilingual in Sorbian and Ger-man. In spite of being surrounded by Germany speakers for centuries, the Sorbs have maintained the Slavic nature of their language. The German government has now set up schemes to encoura-ge the spread of Sorbian, which is recognised as a minority language in the fundamental legislation which makes up the constitution. It is studied in primary schools and used in publications and the media. However, it is still a seriously endangered language.

It has two distinct dialects: Upper Sorbian, which is spoken in the south by the two thirds of the Sorbs who live in and around the cities of Bautzen (called Bydy_in in Sorbian) and Görlitz (Zhorjelc), and Lower Sorbian, spoken in the north by the remaining third of the population in and around Cottbus (Chośebuz). Although they coexist in a stretch of land no more than 90 km from north to south, these dialects are very different. Upper Sorbian is similar to Czech, while Lower Sorbian is closer to Polish.

It is the last remaining Slavic language within Ger-many. In the late 16th century it was spoken in an area twice the size of its present territory.

Sorbian is written using the Latin alphabet, though

Instituto Europa de los Pueblos, Fundación Vasca

2

THE SORBS OR WENDS

(1) Flag and Coat of Sorbs

(2) The land of Sorbs

(3) Sorbs national costume

PEOPLE

T he Sorbs or Wends number around 100,000. They are a Slavic people who live in a small area of south eastern Germany.

At the turn of the 20th century there were around 47,000 Wends in the Saxon part of Upper Lusatia (Ober-Lausitz) and around 28,000 in the Prussian part, with over 40,000 more in the Prussian region of Lower Lusatia (Nieder-Lausitz). Not counting those scattered throughout the rest of Germany and southern Europe the total population accor-ding to the 1900 census was 117,000.

TERRITORY

The Sorbs or Wends live in Lusatia (Lausitz in Ger-man and Luzyce in Polish), whose name means “swampy depression” or “country of small lakes”. This region lies on the frontier between Germany and Poland, between the River Oder to the north and the Elba to the south, in the Spree and Neisse basins. The region is divided into Lower Lusatia in the north (in Brandenburg) and Upper Lusatia to the south, which lies partly in Saxony and partly in Poland.

Lower Lusatia is flat and swampy, with relatively infertile sandy soil and large woods of conifers. It is a major lignite producer, and also has large iron deposits. This mineral wealth led to the region’s being settled early in human history. This settle-ment was documented by the so-called Lusatian culture.

Upper Lusatia stretches from the swamplands of the north up to a granite plateau in the south, in

(1) (3)(2)


3

with some letters modified by the use of diacritical marks.

RELIGION

Around 10% of the population of Lower Lusatia are Catholic, and the remainder are Evangelical Luthe-rans. Catholic Lusatia encompasses 85 towns in the districts of Bautzen, Kamenz and Hoyerswerda.

On Sundays, during holidays and weddings people wear women’s regional costumes rich in decora-tion, embroidery and encrusted with pearls.

Upper Lusatia, a territory that forms a rough trian-gle between the cities of Bautzen, Kamenz/Kam-jenc and Wittichenau/Kulow, crosses along the roadsides and in yards, well-preserved churches and chapels bear witness to deep-rooted religious belief, mainly in the form of Catholicism, which has helped to maintain the Sorbian spirit.

HISTORY

10th century: Lusatia incorporated into the Holy Roman Empire.1013: The Poles formally annex the region via the Treaty of Bautzen.1033: Re-conquered by Germans and incorpora-ted into the states of Meissen and Brandeburg.1147: Henry the Lion of Saxony and Albert of Ballenstedt take up a crusade against the Wends which culminates with the occupation of their lands.1360-1635: Lusatia governed by the kings of Bo-hemia.1467-90: Governed by the Hungarians.1635: Treaty of Prague incorporates the area into the Electorate of Saxony.1815: Lower Lusatia handed over to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna.

19th century: Growth of a strong nationalist mo-vement, in spite of the policy of “Germanisation” implemented by Berlin.1904: Opening of the Wendish House/Serbski dom in Bautzen and establishment of the Gene-ral Foundation of the 31 Sorbian Federations, the Domowina.1919: Failed attempt to attain independence.1920: Founding by Jan Skala of the Wendish Na-tional Party/Wendische Volkspartei, which failed to win any seats in Parliament.1925: The Domowina and the “Maclica Serbska” Scientific Union form the Wendish National Coun-cil/Wendischer Volksrat. 1945: Eastern Lusatia (east of the River Neisse) becomes part of Poland.1948: Approval by the Parliament of Saxony of the “Act for the Protection of the Rights of the Sorbian Population”.1968: Article 40 of the Constitution of the Ger-man Democratic Republic recognises the Sorbs as a national minority.1990: The Domowina pronounces itself in favour of German reunification. Opening of the Wendish House in Cottbus.1991: Creation of the Foundation for the Sorbian People as a state instrument of the Republic and the länder of Brandenburg and Saxony.

CULTURE

Several Sorbian language newspapers were set up in the 19th century. In 1912 a cultural organisa-tion called the Domowina was set up, but did not really get going until after World War II, because of the drastic interruption for the normalisation of Sorbian which came with the prohibition by the Nazis of publications in Sorbian and the mass de-portation of Sorbs.

After the war the Sorbs found themselves part of the German Democratic Republic, which guaran-teed their cultural rights in its constitutions and supported the publication of newspapers and the activities of the Domowina. The Sorbian langua-ge and culture have enjoyed special status since 1948.

The Sorbian people now receive aid from the Ger-man government under Note 14 of the protocol for Article 35 of the German Unification Treaty.

The Foundation for the Sorbian People, as an ins-trument of the federal state and the states of Brandenburg and Saxony, promotes the protec-


4

tion, development and dissemination of the lan-guage, culture and traditions of the Sorbs as an expression of the identity of the Sorbian people. The Sorbian National Arts Centre in Bautzen was founded in 1952by the Domowina. Its ballet, choir and orchestra section maintain and promote the cultural traditions of the Sorbs. The Foundation for the Sorbian People provides support for these efforts.

The chief works of Sorbian music include the ora-torio “Spring” by Korla Awgust Kocor (1826-1904), which inspired by a cycle of poems by Handrij Ze-jle, and the overture “The Goddess of Death/Sm-jertnica” by Jurij Pilk.

The German-Sorbian National Theatre performs works in German and Sorbian. The theatre in Baut-zen is a communal enterprise of the Bautzen re-gion, partly funded by the Foundation for the Sor-bian People and the Culture Departments of Upper Lusatia and Lower Silesia.

Javier Ruiz de Aguirre

The bilingual part of Lusatia, where the Sorbs make more than 10% of the population


5

Originally Circassians occupied vast territories in the Caucasus from the Black and Azov seas coasts to the present-day Ingushetian republic. If we analyze two place names situated at extremely far distances, we could be easily convinced in the correctness of this statement. By this I mean to-ponyms: Dagwa-mыz (Russian Дагомыс) – on the Black Sea coast and Maz-dagw (Russian Моздок) in the central Caucasus. These toponyms have quite transparent Circassian etymology. Both toponyms are translated into English as dense forest - dagwa – dense, deaf; and maz – forest.

Due to these and many other facts we can assume that Circassians` historical settlement was stret-ched from today’s Ingushetia up to the Black and Azov seas and its north border reached the pre-sent Rostov-on-Done. The fact that even nowadays there is a town in the North called –Черкас- and by all accounts this name refers to the ethnonym Circassian (Russian Черкес, English Circass) seems very significant. Obviously, it means that histori-cally Circassians were the inhabitants of this te-rritory.

Georgians have quite a close relationship with Circassians. This concept can easily be proved by comparing Georgian and Circassian language data, and the evident similarity between these two lan-guages. The ethnonym Circassian itself undergoes reconstruction down to the Georgian parent lan-guage chronological level. Let’s compare Georgian cherkez-i and Megrelian chargaz-i. (Georgian na-mes: Cherkhez-ishvili, Charkhaz-ia; The Megrelian word ato-chargaz-apa, that means: to defeat, to beat, most likely might be connected with Circas-sians` invinciblity.)

CIRCASSIANS

(1) Circassians Flag

(1) (2)

(2) Circassian harmonica players

LANGUAGE AND ETHNOGENESIS

T he ethnic structure of the Circassian nation should be considered in relation to its cog-nate – Adighian and Cabardian peoples. The

following ethnic groups: Abazians, Bzhedughians, Beslenians, Zhanaians, Temirgoians (same Tchem-guians), Khatukaians, Shapsughians, Hakuchians… consider themselves as Circassians (self athnonym – Adighe).

From the point of view of its origin, contempo-rary Circassian language is connected with Khati-Apkhaz -Adighian language unity of Paleocauca-sian (Protoiberian) language.

Primarily Khati (protokhetian) and other Apkhaz-Adighian languages /peoples/ separated from the above-mentioned Unity and, as a result, developed an independent Circassian language. The genesis of Circassian languages (at the same time ethno-genesis) diagrammatically looks as follows:

Proto Protoiberian language

Khati-Apkhaz-Adighian language unity

Khati Language(people)

Apkhaz-Adighian parent language (people)

Circassian language (people)

Ubikhian language (people)

Apkhaz-Abazian language (people)

A great number of ancient word stems clearly de-monstrate Georgian – Circassian common paren-tage In particular, the Georgian word stem – deghe “day” is interrelated with Circassian dagha “sun”. In Circassian language the composite of this word - dagh –vasa – means: the last day. It is interesting to overview such cultural terminological unit as: Georgian dzarkhu “copper” and Circassian dzakhe “tin”, “zink”; Georgian kasri “castle” and Circassian kvash “house”, “camp”…

At the beginning of the 19th century the Circas-sian population was a bit more than 1,5 million, but later, as a result of Russia’s aggressive politics, the Circassian population decreased a great deal and in the middle of 20th century (census.1959) its number fell down to 300 000.

Fortunately, from the 1960s of the last century the demographic growth of Circassian population is clearly outlined. According to 2002 data, the num-ber of Circassians in the Russian Federation increa-sed to 717 000 and reached more than 3 mullion throughout the world. The Mukhajir movement evoked a strong tendency towards repatriation among Circassian emigrants. In the 1990s, seve-ral hundreds of Circassian families returned and settled in the present-day Circassian autonomies.However, nowadays, due to the Russian Federation legislation, their further repatriation seems rather hopeless. Recently, the Russian Duma passed a re-solution, according to which, the repatriation right can be granted exceptionally to a person fluent in Russian, comment is superfluous.

Presently Circassians reside in three north Cauca-sian autonomous regions. They are: Cabardo-Ba-lkaria – Circassians 48%; Adige – Circassians 22%; Karacha-Circassia – Circassians 10% . For some reason in 1945 Russians eliminated the fourth au-tonomous region – Shapsughia.

History, Way of life, Culture

There is an evident incessant trace of human pre-sence on the territory of Circassia since the Sto-ne Age and up to date. It is common knowledge that there are some ruined dwellings of upper and lower Paleolithic age. In the 5th century BC Sindhi established an independent kingdom.

From the first several centuries AD Circassians were involved in the continuous wars, at first against Alan-Scythians and then against Huns. Since the13th century Circassians endured the Golden


6

Horde’s political influence. In the 16th century Cir-cassia suffered from the Ottoman-Crimean khana-te political expansion.

In 1791 Russia moved the Caucasian borderline to the river Khuban. It was the very beginning of the outbreak of Circassians` systematic armed conflict with the aggressive army of the Russian Empire. In the 1840s Circassian soldiers achieved a conside-rable military success; they liberated the Black Sea coast and annihilated the borderline with Russia. The Circassian people fought in Shamil`s military coalition under Muhamed-Emin`s leadership. Ne-vertheless, Circassians were defeated, but it was not the only mischief. They were involved in the so-called Mukhajir movement, which was quite an undisguised provocation. Russia deported everyo-ne who escaped from the physical extinction to the Islamic countries of the Middle East: Turkey, Syria, Jordan… At present, Circassians who live in Turkey have become Turks; those who live in Syria - are Syrians, in Jordan – Jordanians, in Germany – Germans and in America – Americans.

In the 15th – 18th centuries the social order in Circassia cab be characterized as the early feudal epoch. At that time, the country was governed by an elected, or elderly and respectable prince. In the local folklore this period is called the happiest and the most heroic golden age. During those cen-turies Cabardian mounted troops were among the best in the whole world. Military etiquette was in-separable from such spiritual values and ideals as: honour, generosity, courage , sense of responsibili-ty, special attitude and respect towards women.

Chivalrous Etiquette – Vark khabze implied honour, generosity, courage, eloquence, liberality, hospi-tality, respect and complaisance to the elderly; as well as the ability of bearing torture patiently, be-ing gallant and attentive towards women, skillful

Circassia in 1840


7

wielding all kinds of weapons and the observance of rules during chivalrous battles. It should be said in Circassians praise that they have preserved the above-mentioned rules of etiquette almost un-changed.

The hospitality tradition stands above all. In the old times head of the family used to build a special house for guests in his yard, where any traveller had a right to dwell without permission. There he could find everything he needed - bed, nutritious food and besides, he could feel safe and protected from an enemy or pursuer. According to traditions head of the family was obliged to defend his guest and even fight for him, if needed. A guesthouse, at the same time, used to be a public place whe-re people discussed different political, economic, social and everyday problems. They sang heroic songs, danced and passed on the ancient legends about the brave heroes - Narts, from generation to generation.

The compactly populated Circassian village had ei-ther oval or square. Houses were situated along its perimeter in the middle of which there were big yards for cattle, wells, and grain storage places, a village square and other facilities. Each settlement was surrounded by a high and solid fence.

Circassians` domestic economy was quite rich and multifarious. They sowed oats, rye, wheat, maize, millet and barley. They were engaged in gardening and vine-growing. Hunting and beekeeping bore only a supplementary character. They reared cattle and small cattle. Horse breeding was something of an exceptional importance. Steel processing dates back from an early period of the Maikop Culture. In the 3rd millennium BC smithcraft was an extre-mely honored and respected profession. As for the smithery, its significance was raised to the level of a chapel.

In Circassia princes and gentry belonged, to the privileged strata of the society. All the rest, the majority of the population were free members of the community. Their social order and way of life was that of a democratic, free society.

According to 1867 data, nobility constituted 2,9% of the whole population, 1,7% – clergy, 74% – free members of the community and 20, 5% – villeins.

While sitting at a table, Circassians strictly keep to the etiquette, including respectful and polite atti-

tude towards the elderly and guests. Blood kinship was of great significance. Marriage, (which is only monogamic), between the persons of the same kin, even nowadays, is strictly prohibited. The traditio-nal blood feud – vendetta - still remains in force. The custom of entrusting a baby to a wet nurse, the relationship between the sworn brothers, the tradition of adopting a child and many others are still very common.

The spread of Christianity from Byzantium and Georgia started at the beginning of our era. In the 6th century Djiket Eparchy was put in the Mts-kheta eparchy subordination. In the 16th century Crimean Tatars` contributed greatly to the wides-pread expansion of the Islamic religion among Cir-cassians. The Caucasian war hastened the Islami-sation process in the region ever more. I s l a m became an ideological basis in the war against aggressive Russia.

Neither Christianity nor Islam had enough power to overshadow the local religious faiths and be-liefs. Here people mainly worshiped the oak-tree, particularly after a thunderclap. A thunderstruck person was buried with great honours. He was considered to be a saint. Circassians, up to the present day, they worshiped Virgin Mary, St Elias and St George. They had a very respectful attitude towards the Holy Cross, but they worshiped and respected Holy Cross as an idol. However, there is a part of Circassians –Cabardians in Mozdoc region, who are Orthodox Christians even nowadays.

Merab TchukhuaDoctor of Ibero-Caucasian Studies

Circassians traditional costume


8

CHECHENIA/ Доклад: Чеченский народ и его реальность

(1) The territory of Southern Russia today.

(2) The flag of Chechenia.

(1) (2)

У важаемые делегаты и гости форума! Я представляю здесь республику, чья новейшая история ознамено-

валась двумя кровопролитными войнами. Рубеж двух тысячелетий стал для Чечни и ее народа периодом жестоких испытаний, которые наш народ выдержал с честью, хотя и заплатил за это десятками тысяч жизней, полностью разрушенной эконо-микой и определенной деградацией своих общественно-политических институтов.

Российские власти не перестают повторять, что война в Чечне завершилась победой над международным терроризмом, однако воо-руженное противостояние продолжается и сегодня, хотя масштабы его и несоизмери-мы с тем, что имели место буквально два-три года назад. Возможно, слово «война» уже вряд ли применимо по отношению к тому, что происходит в Чеченской Респу-блике, но уверенно можно констатировать наличие глубоко законспирированного антироссийского подполья, насчитываю-щего в своих рядах несколько сотен актив-но действующих боевиков. Причем, чаще всего они действуют в населенных пунктах или на прилегающих к ним территориях. Именно этим объясняется вынужденное признание бывшего президента Российской Федерации В. Путина, сделанное им в ян-варе текущего года о том, что ситуация на Северном Кавказе все еще не находится под полным контролем российских властей и террористическая угроза в этом регионе все еще велика.Было бы, однако, ошибкой утверждать, что активно действующие в Чеченской Респу-блике боевые группы имеют широкую под-

держку у населения – идея создания ислам-ского государства никогда не пользовалась особой популярностью в чеченском обще-стве. Более того, курс на создание в Чечне шариатского государства встречает проти-водействие и со стороны значительной ча-сти сил чеченского сопротивления.

Но вместе с тем, значительная часть чечен-ское общество не приемлет и установив-шийся в Чечне режим – предельно коррум-пированный и авторитарный, откровенно попирающий все гражданские свободы. Таким образом, чеченскому народу сегодня в равной степени угрожают политический экстремизм (в том числе выступающий под религиозной окраской) с одной стороны и властный режим с другой стороны. Поло-жение в Чеченской Республике предельно кратко можно охарактеризовать как «со-стояние несвободы» и именно в этом кро-ется главная причина сохраняющейся здесь напряженности.

В постоянном «состояние несвободы» сле-дует искать объяснение и тому факту, что ситуация с массовым нарушением прав человека в Чеченской Республике вот уже много лет кардинально не меняется к луч-шему. Единственное, что изменилось – на смену одним видам преступлений против личности и ее прав пришли другие виды. Так, за последние годы резко сократилось число внесудебных казней и похищений (хотя эти виды преступлений и не исчезли полностью), зато широкое распространение получила практика фабрикации уголовных дел и выбивание признательных показаний


9

у задержанных с использованием незакон-ных методов, включая избиения, запугива-ние и т.д.

Как и прежде остро стоит проблема без ве-сти пропавших (отсутствие расследования похищений, идентификация тел), которых согласно официальным данным насчиты-вается от трех до пяти тысяч человек, а по неофициальным – в несколько раз выше.В прежние годы, когда в республике велись активные боевые действия, правозащитни-ки и работники гуманитарных организаций еще говорили о неизбирательных обстрелах населенных пунктов, низкой дисциплине среди сотрудников силовых структур, об эксцессе исполнителя. Для тех, кто не знает: эксцесс исполнителя - это, когда преступле-ние изначально никем не планировалось, но в силу каких-то причин, например, гибели в бою сослуживца, военные или милиционе-ры начинают «валить» ни в чем не повинных жителя или, в чеченском варианте, несколь-ких жителей сразу. Тогда мы еще говорили именно так, подразумевая, точнее – желая надеяться, что происходящее явление вре-менное и даже случайное. Теперь же вряд ли у кого еще остаются сомнения, что пре-ступления в Чечне совершаются по едино-му сценарию, спущенному с самых верхних этажей российской властной вертикали.

16 марта 2003 года за две недели до начала объявленного им же самим т.н. конститу-ционного референдума президент России В. Путин выступил с телевизионным об-ращением к жителям Чечни. Он сказал буквально следующее: «после плебисцита «вам не нужно будет бояться ночного стука в дверь». Свое слово он сдержал, но только на месяц. С этого дня и до середины апреля того года в республике не было зафиксиро-вано ни одного похищения или убийства. Я

подчеркиваю, это – единственный случай за все 8 лет войны, когда в течение столь дли-тельного времени российские военные не совершали масштабных преступлений.

Это выступление В. Путина и то, что про-изошло вслед за этим, свидетельствует о высокой степени управляемости конфлик-та, о том, что российские силовые структу-ры на самом деле подчиняются приказам, и, что ни о каком «эксцессе исполнителя» речи вести не нужно. Если преступления можно прекратить, но они все равно со-вершаются, значит, руководству России это необходимо, следовательно, насилие над гражданским населением – составная часть государственной политики в Чечне. По дру-гому это уже называется геноцидом. Война на Кавказе – это тот фундамент, на котором, помимо высоких цен на нефть, держался режим В. Путина. Во власть он вознесся на волне античеченской истерии, вызван-ной начавшимися боевыми действиями. И укрепился в Кремле, благодаря кровавым всполохам, которые время от времени вы-рываются за пределы Чеченской Республи-ки. Так, чудовищный террористический акт в Беслане, был использован им для отмены губернаторских и президентских выборов. Сотни детских жизней легли в основу укре-пления режима личной власти бывшего российского президента, привели к ликви-дации последних, быть может, только зри-мых свидетельств того, что Россия все еще продолжала оставаться демократическим, федеративным государством.

Конфликт, который в 1999-2000 годах, огра-ничивался административными границами Чечни, распространился теперь на сопре-дельные территории. Как нам кажется, во многом благодаря изначально неправильно


10

поставленному диагнозу и тем методам, в кавычках, лечения, которые применялись политическим руководством России. В Чечне идет война, а не какая-то «контртер-рористическая операция». На этой войне обе стороны применяют террористические методы и неизвестно, какая из них в этом больше преуспела. Но вот совершенно точ-но в военных преступлениях, в преступле-ниях против человечества, в формировании системы, при которой одни структуры по-хищают и убивают людей, а – другие покры-вают их, официальная российская сторона, вне всякого сомнения, абсолютно лидирует

В ходе двух военных кампаний в Чечне по различным данным были убиты до 160 ты-сяч граждан республики. Более 17 тысяч чеченских детей стали инвалидами. Мы очень надеемся, что когда-нибудь будет дана юридическая оценка событиям в Чеч-не, и чтобы по ее итогам будет организован гласный судебный процесс над военными преступниками, на какой бы стороне они не находились. Хотя бы даже в рамках между-народного общественного трибунала.

Еще одна из заметных тенденций последнего времени в Чеченской Республике – все более откровенное вмешательство государства во все сферы жизни общества и даже частную жизнь граждан, которое происходит под предлогом «морально-нравственного воз-рождения общества». В частности, власти в обязательном порядке требуют выполне-ния некоторых внешних религиозных атри-бутов, таких как, обязательное ношение женщинами (включая и девочек, учащихся школ, начиная с 1-го класса) платка, а на местном телевидении значительное время отводится передачам религиозного содер-жания. При этом в эфире республиканского телевидения отсутствуют какие-либо кри-тические или даже проблемные сюжеты о жизни республики. Одновременно с этим в республике фактически действует полная цензура и контроль над средствами массо-вой информации, и наложен негласный за-прет на публикацию материалов негативно-го характера.

В настоящее время перед Чеченской Респу-бликой и чеченским обществом стоят слож-ности не только восстановительного перио-

да, но и проблемы, характерные для моло-дого, бурно развивающегося социального организма. Необходимо учитывать также, что в последние годы активно идет процесс миграции избыточного сельского населе-ния в города, что также способствует кар-динальным изменениям в образе жизни.

К тому же, еще не окрепшая Чеченская Ре-спублика уже в полной мере начинает ощу-щать на себе последствия идущих во всем мире процессов глобализации экономиче-ской и духовно-культурной жизни. По су-ществу, после 15 лет борьбы за физическое выживание, чеченское общество заново пе-реосмысливает свой духовный багаж и пы-тается заново сформировать потребность в духовной культуре.

Таким образом, у чеченского народа сегод-ня много проблем: политических, социаль-ных, демографических… Единственное, что заставляет с оптимизмом смотреть в буду-щее – это убежденность абсолютного боль-шинства чеченцев в том, что они должны и впредь сохранять собственную националь-ную идентичность и шаг за шагом идти к подлинной демократии и внутренней сво-боде.

Таиса Исаева


11

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE LANGUAGES OF THE CAUCASUSLA COMPLEJIDAD DE LAS LENGUAS DEL CÁUCASO

(1) y (2) The map of the Caucasus.(3) A woman with traditional attire.

(1) (2) (3)

T he Caucasus region, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, is the great mountain crossroads that divide Europe and Asia. In

their valleys cultures, languages and peoples have mixed since time began. The great cultural wealth that hides within its valleys has always fascina-ted outsiders: Ancient Greeks declared that the Kaukasos was one of the pillars that held up the Earth. It is there where Zeus chained Prometheus and where Jason and the Argonauts looked for the Golden Fleece. It has been conjectured that pre-historic Europeans originated in these mountains. For centuries, more than a hundred ethnic groups have brought here their cultures and languages, many incomprehensible between them. This is why Pliny the Elder once wrote that the Romans needed more than 80 interpreters to run their bu-sinesses in the Caucasus, and that Arab travelers called the region, Jabal al-Alsine, “the Mountain of the Languages”.

Today, the area of the Caucasus belongs to Arme-nia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Federa-tion, which itself has internal divisions of seven Autonomous Republics of Chechnya, North Osse-tia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, Adygea and Dagestan. Geographically it is divided in two: the Greater Caucasus, to the nor-th, and the Lesser Caucasus to the south, separated by the rivers Rioni and Kura and presided over by the highest summit of Europe, Mount Elbrus (5,642 meters). Glaciers, mountains and valleys cover this

E l Cáucaso se encuentra entre el mar Caspio y el mar Negro, en la gran encrucijada de mon-tañas que dividen Europa y Asia. En sus valles

se han mezclado culturas, pueblos y lenguas desde tiempo inmemorables. La gran riqueza cultural que se esconde entre sus valles ha despertado siempre tal fascinación que ya para los antiguos griegos el Kaukasos era uno de los pilares que sujetaba la Tierra. Es allí donde Zeus encadenó a Prometeo y donde Jasón y los Argonautas buscaron el vellocino de oro. Incluso se ha conjeturado que los europeos proceden de dichas montañas. Durante siglos, más de un centenar de grupos étnicos ha traído hasta aquí su cultura y lengua, muchas incomprensibles entre ellas. Es por eso que Plinio el Viejo escribió que los romanos necesitaron más de 80 intérpretes para dirigir sus negocios en el Cáucaso, y que los viajeros árabes llamaron al lugar Jabal al-Alsine, “la Monta-ña de las Lenguas”.

Hoy en día, el área del Cáucaso pertenece a Armenia, Azerbaiyán, Georgia y a la Federación Rusa, dentro de la cual se divide en las siete Repúblicas Autó-nomas de Chechenia, Osetia del Norte, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, Adigue-sia y Daguestán. Geográficamente se divide en dos: el Cáucaso Mayor, al norte, y el Cáucaso Menor, al sur, separados por los ríos Rioni y Kura y presididos por la cumbre más alta de Europa, el monte Elbrus (5.642 metros). Glaciares, montañas y valles cubren esta zona transitada por gentes y civilizaciones des-de tiempos inmemorables. Ello, junto con el escar-pado terreno, ha posibilitado el aislamiento de los


12

area where different people and civilizations have journeyed since history began. These mountains, along with the craggy terrain, have made possible the isolation of the various human settlements, hiding the rich ethnic and linguistic diversity that we see today.

It is thought that at the present time up to forty five different languages coexist in less than 1200 kilometres, the length of the mountain chain than names the Caucasus. The cultural value of the zone is, therefore, unquestionable, but at the same time it demonstrates its fragility, clearly reflected in the extreme socio-political conditions of the re-gion. This is one of the major reasons for which it is difficult to define the main linguistic families of the Caucasus, and to study the ethnic groups who coexist next to each other. The Russians have tradi-tionally lead investigations in the area, but armed conflicts after the fall of the USSR have de-moti-vated the linguists and ethnologists from further study. To add even more complexity to this issue,

asentamientos, escondiendo la rica diversidad étni-ca y lingüística que hemos recibido como herencia.

Se cree que en la actualidad coexisten hasta cua-renta y cinco lenguas distintas en no más de los 1200 kilómetros de longitud que tiene la cadena montañosa que atraviesa el Cáucaso. El valor cul-tural de la zona es, por tanto, incuestionable, pero al mismo tiempo demuestra su fragilidad, que se refleja en las difíciles condiciones sociopolíticas de la zona. Es ésta una de las principales razones por las que resulta difícil definir las principales familias lingüísticas del Cáucaso y hacer un estudio claro de las etnias que conviven unas junto a otras. Han sido los rusos los que tradicionalmente han investigado la región, pero los conflictos armados surgidos tras la caída de la URSS han desmotivado a los lingüis-tas y etnólogos. Para mayor complejidad de este estudio, se debe añadir que alrededor de cuarenta y cinco lenguas se hablan en la región y muchas están apunto de desaparecer. Por lo tanto, delimi-tar las características culturales y étnicas de cada

Children of the Caucasus

Caucasian people


13

Caucasus landscape

of the 45 languages spoke in the region, many of them are at the verge of extinction. To delimit the cultural and ethnic characteristics of each group in a geographical area is extremely complicated. In general terms, the ethnic groups that coexist in the zone can classify into three main groups: Caucasian, Indo-European and Altaic. Of the three groups, only the Caucasians, including Georgians, Chechens and Abkhazians have lived here since prehistoric times. But do not forget that diffe-rent civilizations have crisscrossed the Caucasus throughout history, and have left their settlements there: Russians, Iranians, Greeks, Armenians… hun-dreds of cultures have brought their own customs and religion to these valleys.

Attempts to classify and define the characteristics and origins of each ethnic group go back to XIX century. But since control of the Caucasus region has been disputed by Iran, Turkey and Russia, po-litical interests have interfered with any objective attempts to decipher and to classify the ethnic se-crets of the valleys. Nevertheless, in spite of cons-tant disputes and invasions, the spirit of freedom of these peoples, which inspired Russian poets and novelists in the 19th century, is still prevalent. Pus-hkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy immortalized the stru-ggle of these groups against Russian attempts to make them submit. The variety of languages that still closely coexists in the Caucasus demonstrates what is well known: a language is the test of the existence of a people. When a language dies, the culture also dies, and the people are assimilated.

Amaia Donés Mendia

grupo y situar la expansión geográfica de cada uno resulta aún extremadamente complicado. En térmi-nos generales, los pueblos que conviven en la zona se pueden clasificar en tres grandes grupos: pueblos caucásicos, indoeuropeos y altaicos. De los tres gru-pos, sólo el de los caucásicos habita allí desde la Prehistoria. A él pertenecen los georgianos, cheche-nios, abjasios e ingusetios. Pero no se debe olvidar que el Cáucaso ha sido una zona muy transitada por diferentes civilizaciones y que a lo largo de la his-toria han llegado a poblar sus tierras muchos más grupos. Rusos, iranios, griegos, armenios… cientos de culturas han traído consigo sus costumbres y su religión hasta estos valles.

Los intentos de clasificación y definición de las ca-racterísticas y orígenes de cada uno de los pueblos se remontan al siglo XIX. Pero, el control del Cáu-caso se lo han disputado países como Irán, Turquía y Rusia, y, desafortunadamente, los intereses po-líticos han condicionado más de lo deseado todos los intentos objetivos de descifrar y clasificar sus secretos. Sin embargo, a pesar de las disputas e in-vasiones, todavía pervive el espíritu de libertad de aquellos pueblos en los que buscaron inspiración grandes poetas y novelistas rusos del siglo XIX. Pus-hkin, Lérmontov o Tolstói inmortalizaron las luchas de estos pueblos frente al enemigo ruso al que se negaban a someterse. La variedad de lenguas que todavía convive estrechamente en el Cáucaso de-muestra lo que para todos es sabido: una lengua es la prueba de existencia de un pueblo. Cuando una lengua muere, la cultura también muere, y el pueblo queda asimilado.

Amaia Donés Mendia


14

THE ROLE OF MEMORYpast is reflected in a framework of social learning, characterized by increasing knowledge, thanks to the role played by historians; while historical me-mory is subjective, it is more flexible yet it is more exclusive and closed to other memories creating therefore its own joining elements and reinforcing an identity with regard to others. The relationship between memory and identity allows us, in this way, to create the cornerstones of a more complex social framework, and historical memory to be conside-red an active historical subject. In other words, the vision that we have of ourselves and of yesterday, derives directly from this memory. It is not indepen-dent of History, but memory is not limited to real lived experiences, but to the meaning that we give to the facts that we have experienced regarding the inherited construction of reality.

The way in which we construct reality within me-mory results for example in the different concepts French, Spanish and British people have of Europe. These are similar to the different visions that the countries that were once part of the USSR and of Yugoslavia have of themselves. That is due to the di-fference of mentalities, of cultures and of registries of memory. History, of course, can be interpreted respecting the will of a society in their relation with the past. Despite their didactic vocation, human societies construct their particular memories, in relation to significant contexts in which they take part.

All memories, even the most elaborate or those that are less given to change by the form in which they have been codified, also are flexible in the face of historical change. For that reason, our aspiration to construct a more and more open History, more shared, and more European, has acquired a power-ful commitment that has never been seen before, thanks to the creation of the European Union. Thus, in Europe a re-interpretation of different existing national identities is underway. These identities, which can not be waived, are in collision with an emerging identity, one that is more plural since it is accommodating new groups (immigrants), thus re-quiring the creation of a wider collective memory.

2. THE DANGERS OF MEMORY

The serious dangers that memory brings with itself are caused by unsuitable appropriation for divine or political purposes, thus ignoring the important qua-lities in which it must excel, such as its integrating profile. Memory, we must not forget, is developed

1. EUROPE AND MEMORY

All societies live with memory. For that reason, we can consider that a social memory exists whether it is considered collective or individual. The central idea of this article is to separate us from the theore-tical reflection on what memory means, and to pur-sue the nature that memory has acquired in human society. Memory does not exist just on single pla-ne. This is where the complexity of the matter lies, and no matter how much it is rejected, forgotten, or slighted, it forms the true character of society. There are no societies without memory except for those which no longer exist.

Memory is not developed from a single viewpo-int, but from various: there can be group memory, commemorative memory, traumatic memory, local memory, national memory, etc. Without a doubt, there are people that because of their own histo-rical realities have codified memory on the basis of their own identity. Thus identity, social characteris-tics and culture, which occupy an important pla-ce in the formation of tradition, have become an identifying memory of the personality of these his-torical communities, which can develop into a na-tional conscience. This is another characteristic that shows the complex disposition of memory. For that reason, memory is not just a repository of identity and representation, but a holder of historical value. The memory is neither alone nor inert - is a living organism.

Crossing the threshold of identifying memory, we enter another place that contains the landmarks that build historical memory, another branch of that social memory referred to above. Historical memory gathers together the ascendants of an identity, but frames them in historical time, rituals and the location of those actions and facts that are considered relevant (such as, at a local level, the na-ming of streets or at a national level, the building of commemorative monuments) because they mark the stages of evolution and the vocational change within societies – even if it is not always accura-te – in search of shared destiny. Consequently, this memory is not only a direct witness to history, but constitutes the way in which all peoples, commu-nities and countries register their past according to their own subjective conceptions, depending on the social group, class, etc.

History should not be confused with historical me-mory. History is the objective place in which the


15

from the sum of experiences, experiences which are considered a series of individual memories. There does not exist, therefore, one global memory that includes a whole population, which is no lon-ger local, but must be considered world-wide. The compilation of memories and oral histories weave a complete blanket from a selection of testimonies. But integrating memories does not mean excluding some testimonies in favor of others dominant or trying to construct a more homogenous memory, which would not be real in any case. Any attempt of this nature would not only create strong resistance from non-conformist groups, but far from facilita-ting the meeting, it would fossilize the past, idealize it, and therefore invent it. Consider the composition of Russian memory which includes the geographic limits of the times of the Tsar, but does not corres-pond to the new national realities that have emer-ged after the end of the USSR. Of course there will be very strong components, elaborated and even invented by the collective imagination. No society, people or community are immune to these actions, and at times they fall into a crisis which demands a reiteration of identity. Cinema is a very revealing element on this matter. Problems arise when that imaginary identity is confused with History and an instrument is made of it to project ideological goals which end up excluding, ignoring or justifying old quarrels and rivalries.

The point is that when the elements that construct memory (experiences, oral history, education, the mass media, image, etc.) show values where human rights do not have a specific weight, or include ele-ments of superiority, exclusion, and fear, they can awake the basest human instincts, as happened in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

History, Memory and Identity participate in social and psychological mechanisms which have allowed the consolidation and the constitution of wider identities (not only those that are observed in towns or cities), being the main base of what has been considered the nation-state. There’s absolutely no doubt that beyond history, the states have boosted a national memory consisting of commemorations (battles and generally other bloody acts), symbols and rituals.

These memories have been changing, democrati-zing, and becoming more flexible and have become a place that is neither the exclusive club of the elite nor is so receptive to social issues. The memory of a society is evolving to include the idea of registering not only days of glory, but also daily values within society, placing identity on a more common basis, plural and open to participation. Clearly to reach this new place, a period of recognition is necessary.

3. CONCLUSION: THE ESSENTIAL VALUE OF MEMORY

The memories of traumatic experiences, like a war or a situation of conflict, have modeled the cons-ciousness of societies in a very determined way. In these experiences it is easy to find pieces of different histories, contrary ones many of the times, which populate the collective imagination. Therefore, the approach we have to memory not only allows us to confront and assimilate traumatic events, but to re-lease them, to recognize them and to convert them into a therapeutic reference point. This therapeutic value of memory helps us to accommodate in a more harmonious way the new emerging realities around us, be they accommodating to a democratic plural society, accommodating to conflicting communi-ties, or to create pluralistic spaces where different memories and identifies can be integrated. Social memory contributes to creating an understanding of identity, and historic memory bridges the distan-ce between this new accommodating zone and the historic events that have surrounding the society, such as civil wars, revolutions, worldwide conflicts, independence, and the foundation of new states.

As we said, memory brings with it a series of intrin-sic dangers since the tradition that builds memory provokes a series of attitudes and mechanisms that have prevented societies from being able to conci-liate well, which results in conflicts, more for rea-sons of hatred or distrust, than of responding to real injustices. For this reason, it is essential that me-mory is not directed, and that it does not search for a single truth that restricts the value of History nor the processes of change that define societies. When elaborating a memory, it is important that it is not so much based on an ideal to forget the fundamen-tal sources of historical rigor or the social profile of the society being studied. Memory is not only a registry of the past, but it is the will to turn the past into an enriching meeting place hence the im-portance of the role the historical knowledge plays in prioritizing these parameters of integration that form the social plurality and the identity of social communities. Memory can be a shelter for all of us, if we are capable of turning it into an effective meeting place.

Igor Barrenetxea MarañónHistorian


16

BREVES

NEWS IN BRIEF

Pour Alex Salmond: “I’Écosse a pour destinée d’être indépendante”

THE WORLD’S NORTHERNMOST MOSQUE

DEPECHEDe notre correspondant: Jacques-Yves Le Touze Publié le 20/10/08PERTH - ECOSSE — La 74e conférence annuelle du parti nationaliste écossais SNP qui s’est tenue á Perth de jeudi á dimanche [voir l’article] fut exceptionnelle á plusieurs titres.

Un parti confiant et dynamique

En 2007, la conférence était en pleine euphorie aprés que le SNP eût gagné les élections au Parlement écossais; cette an-née, c’est en parti de gouvernement que le SNP recevait ses délégués . Et la différence était visible, notamment, dans le hall accueillant les exposants, plus de 50 organisations les plus diverses, du WWF á l’Union des Étudiants écossais, de Scottish Power á Coca Cola, de l’Union des Pompiers á la Lutte contre le psoriasis, bref un joyeux mélange de militants, de lobbyistes et d’institutions, signe de l’importance prise par le SNP dans la politique et la société écossaises.

Autre signe révélateur: plus de 200 journalistes accrédités pour suivre les débats, soit le double d’il y a quelques années.

Ce fut aussi l’occasion d’accueillir le 15.000e membre du SNP, un jeune étudiant de l’université de Stirling, Andy Pyle. À com-parer avec les 8.000 membres d’il y a 7 ans.

Un clin d’æil á son 75e anniversaire prévu en 2009, ce fut aussi l’occasion pour le SNP de lancer son propre tartan.

Au milieu des multiples débats, soirées, rencontres, l’ambiance était assez sereine et enthousiaste parmi les 1200 délégués ve-nus de tout le pays, malgré la crise financiére et économique, malgré les attaques répétées des leaders et médias unionistes.

2008-11-28

Tromsø The Muslim community in Tromsø. Norway, wants to build the world’s northernmost mosque. With the help of funding from Sau-di Arabia, the mosque is planned as a local landmark building.The mosque will not be traditional one with towers and arches but a modern building which can become a local attraction both for locals and visitors, the initiators say to NRK.

The Muslim community in Tromsø has about 1000 members. They have long worked for the construction of their own mosque. Now, the community has secured funding with the help of a 20 million NOK grant from a Saudi Arabian financer. Also other donors are reported to have signaled interest in the project.

Municipal authorities have expressed their support to the project. The community might get land for the building centrally located by the seaside.

Tromsø is the administrative centre for the county of Troms. It has about 53,000 inhabitants.

The Tromsø mosque will be located slightly further north than the planned mosque in Murmansk, Russia. That project has the last couple of years been deadlocked however following major protests from local inhabitants.

Tromsø


17

FIGHTING FOR SAMI PARLIAMENT IN RUSSIA

2008-12-01 The Norwegian Sami Parliament

The Norwegian Sami Parliament supports the Russian Sami population’s bid for the establishment of their own legislative as-sembly in the Kola Peninsula.

Representatives of Sami organizations in Russia last week visited the Norwegian Sami Parliament in Karasjok. The organi-zations are fighting for the establishment of their own Sami Parliament in the Kola Peninsula, and now want to learn more about the Norwegian structure.

There is a long way to go before a Sami Parliament can be established in Russia. Vice President of the Norwegian Sami Par-liament, Ms. Marianne Balto, is not sure whether Russia is ready for the adoption of such an assembly. The Norwegian Sami Parliament has promised to support the Russians in their bid for their parliament.

The Norwegian Sami Parliament (Sámediggi) is elected by the Sámi every four years in counjunction with Norways general election. The Sámediggi consists of 43 representatives elected by direct vote. The first election was held in 1989. The Sámedi-ggi is now in its fifth period, 2005-2009.

MAGAZINE OF THE PEOPLESHERRIEN ALDIZKARIANúmero 11. Año 2008 / 11. Issue Year 2008

Published by:

Instituto Europa de los Pueblos- Fundación Vasca.President: Javier Salcedo Eguía

Editor:

Tamara Gamilagdishvili Gagua

Editorial Board:

Juan Ignacio de Uría, Juan José Pujana, Vladimir Kikilashvili, Enver Sheikhov, Alberto Letona, Teresa Querejazu, Emil Kopaliani.

Translations:

Tradutecnia [email protected]

Depósito legal:BI-1945-04

Guía del Colaborador

Guide fo r Cont r ibuto rs

1.- Lea la revista y envíenos sus sugerencias, opiniones y colaboraciones para la difusión de los Pueblos de Europa.

2.- Solicitamos artículos con lenguaje claro, y que no sobrepasen las 500 pala-bras.

3.- Los protagonistas de los artículos son las diferentes comunidades culturales europeas y los temas fundamentales deben centrarse sobre: a) la historia, lengua, religión, folklore y gastronomía, así como los lugares de interés turístico en su País, b) la forma de “pensar”, “sentir” y “actuar” de su pueblo en la actualidad.4.- Para la ilustración de los artículos les agradeceríamos nos enviasen imágenes representativas de su región con diseños realizados por artistas locales o fotogra-fías.

1.- Read the magazine and send us your suggestions, opinions and contribu-tions to help disseminate knowledge of the peoples of Europe.

2.- Articles should be written clearly and should be no more than 500 words long.

3.- Articles should centre on the various cultural communities of Europe, and specifically on (a) history, language, religion, folklore, gastronomy and tourist sites in each country; and (b) the current thoughts, feelings and actions of each people.

4.- Articles may be accompanied by artwork produced by local artists or photo-graphs representative of each area.

INSTITUTO EUROPA DE LOS PUEBLOS - FUNDACIÓN VASCAIbaigane, 15-4º , dpto. 3 - 48930 Getxo - Bizkaia (Spain)

Tel . 34 94 464 81 76 e-mail : [email protected]

Sami Parliament in Russia

Instituto Europa de los Pueblos - Fundación VascaHerrien Europa Institutua - Euskal Fundazioa

http://www.inst-europ.org

MAGAZINE OF THE PEOPLES - Instituto Europa de los Pueblos

Documents