Mafia.pdf

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ONE

Sicilian Mafia

The Mafia (also known as Cosa Nostra) is a criminal syndicate that emerged in the mid-

nineteenth century in Sicily. It is a loose association of criminal groups that share a common

organizational structure and code of conduct. Each group, known as a "family", "clan", or

"cosca", claims sovereignty over a territory in which it operates its rackets – usually a town or

village or a neighborhood (borgata) of a larger city.

According to the most commonly accepted definition, the Mafia is a criminality

originating in Sicily. However, the term "Mafia" is sometimes used as a pars pro toto for similar

organizations of many nationalities.

The Mafia proper frequently parallels, collaborates with or clashes with, networks

originating in other parts of southern Italy, such as the Camorra (from Campania), the

'Ndrangheta (from Calabria), the Stidda (southern Sicily) and the Sacra Corona Unita (from

Apulia). However, Giovanni Falcone, the anti-Mafia judge murdered by the Mafia in 1992,

objected to the inflation of the use of "Mafia" to organized crime in general:

While there was a time when people were reluctant to pronounce the word

'Mafia' ... nowadays people have gone so far in the opposite direction that it has become

an overused term ... I am no longer willing to accept the habit of speaking of the Mafia in

descriptive and all-inclusive terms that make it possible to stack up phenomena that are

indeed related to the field of organized crime but that have little or nothing in common

with the Mafia.

The American Mafia arose from offshoots of the Mafia that emerged in the United States

during the late nineteenth century, following waves of emigration from Sicily. There were

similar offshoots in Canada among Italian Canadians. However, while the same has been

claimed of organized crime in Australia, this appears to result from confusion with 'Ndrangheta,

which is generally regarded as more prominent among Italian Australians.

Definition

It is difficult to exactly define the Mafia or a single function or goal of the phenomenon.

Until the early 1980s, mafia was generally considered a unique Sicilian cultural attitude and form

of power, excluding any corporate or organizational dimension. Some even used it as a defensive

attempt to render the Mafia benign and romantic: not a criminal association, but the sum of

Sicilian values that outsiders never will understand.

Leopoldo Franchetti, an Italian deputy who travelled to Sicily and who wrote one of the

first authoritative reports on the mafia in 1876, saw the Mafia as an "industry of violence" and

described the designation of the term "mafia":

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The term mafia found a class of violent criminals ready and waiting for a name to define

them, and, given their special character and importance in Sicilian society, they had the right to a

different name from those defining vulgar criminals in other countries.

Leopoldo Franchetti, 1876

Franchetti saw the Mafia as deeply rooted in Sicilian society and impossible to quench

unless the very structure of the island's social institutions were to undergo a fundamental change.

Some observers saw "mafia" as a set of attributes deeply rooted in popular culture, as a

"way of being", as illustrated in the definition by the Sicilian ethnographer, Giuseppe Pitrè:

Mafia is the consciousness of one's own worth, the exaggerated concept of individual

force as the sole arbiter of every conflict, of every clash of interests or ideas.

Giuseppe Pitrè, 1889

Like Pitrè, many scholars viewed Mafiosi as individuals behaving according to specific

sub cultural codes, but did not consider the Mafia a formal organization. Judicial investigations

and scientific research in the 1980s provided solid proof of the existence of well-structured

Mafia groups with entrepreneurial characteristics. The Mafia was seen as an enterprise and its

economic activities became the focus of academic analyses. Ignoring the cultural aspects, the

Mafia is often erroneously seen as similar to other non-Sicilian organized criminal associations.

However, these two paradigms missed essential aspects of the Mafia that became clear

when investigators were confronted with the testimonies of Mafia turncoats, like those of

Buscetta to judge Falcone at the Maxi Trial. The economic approach to explain the Mafia did

illustrate the development and operations of the Mafia business, but neglected the cultural

symbols and codes by which the Mafia legitimized its existence and by which it rooted itself into

Sicilian society.

The economic paradigm was prevalent when the Italian Penal Code definition of criminal

conspiracy (Article 416) was extended by Pio La Torre. Article 416 bis defines an association as

being of Mafia-type nature "when those belonging to the association exploit the potential for

intimidation which their membership gives them, and the compliance and Omertà which

membership entails and which lead to the committing of crimes, the direct or indirect assumption

of management or control of financial activities, concessions, permissions, enterprises and public

services for the purpose of deriving profit or wrongful advantages for themselves or others. The

term Mafia-type organizations is used to clearly distinguish the uniquely Sicilian Mafia from

other criminal organizations such as the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta, the Sacra Corona Unita – that

are structured like the Mafia, but are not the Mafia. According to historian Salvatore Lupo, ―if

everything is Mafia, nothing is Mafia.‖

There are several lines of interpretation, often blended to some extent, to define the

Mafia: it has been viewed as a mirror of traditional Sicilian society; as an enterprise or type of

criminal industry; as a more or less centralized secret society; and/or as a juridical ordering that

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is parallel to that of the state – a kind of anti-state. The Mafia is all of these but none of these

exclusively.

Etymology

There are several theories about the origin of the term "Mafia" (sometimes spelled

"Maffia" in early texts). The Sicilian adjective mafiusu (in Italian: mafioso) may derive from the

slang Arabic mahyas (صايهم), meaning "aggressive boasting, bragging", or marfud (ضوفرم)

meaning "rejected". Roughly translated, it means "swagger," but can also be translated as

"boldness, bravado". In reference to a man, mafiusu in 19th century Sicily was ambiguous,

signifying a bully, arrogant but also fearless, enterprising, and proud, according to scholar Diego

Gambetta. In reference to a woman, however, the feminine-form adjective "mafiusa" means

beautiful and attractive.

Other possible origins from Arabic:

maha - quarry, cave

mu'afa - safety, protection

The public's association of the word with the criminal secret society was perhaps inspired by

the 1863 play "I mafiusi di la Vicaria" ("The Mafiosi of the Vicaria") by Giuseppe Rizzotto and

Gaetano Mosca. The words Mafia and mafiusi are never mentioned in the play; they were

probably put in the title to add a local flair. The play is about a Palermo prison gang with traits

similar to the Mafia: a boss, an initiation ritual, and talk of "umirtà" (Omertà or code of silence)

and "pizzu" (a codeword for extortion money). The play had great success throughout Italy. Soon

after, the use of the term "mafia" began appearing in the Italian state's early reports on the

phenomenon. The word made its first official appearance in 1865 in a report by the prefect of

Palermo, Filippo Antonio Gualterio.

According to legend, the word Mafia was first used in the Sicilian revolt – the Sicilian

Vespers – against rule of the Capetian House of Anjou on 30 March 1282. In this legend, Mafia

is the acronym for "Morte Alla Francia, Italia Anela" (Italian for "Death to France, Italy cries!").

However, this version is now discarded by most serious historians.

"Cosa Nostra" and other names

According to Mafia turncoats (pentiti), the real name of the Mafia is "Cosa Nostra" ("Our

thing"). When the American Mafioso Joseph Valachi testified before the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations in

1963 (known as the Valachi hearings), he revealed that American Mafiosi referred to their

organization by the term cosa nostra ("our thing" or "this thing of ours"). At the time, it was

understood as a proper name, fostered by the FBI and disseminated by the media. The

designation gained wide popularity and almost replaced the term Mafia. The FBI even added the

article La to the term, calling it La Cosa Nostra (in Italy, the article la is not used when referring

to the Sicilian Mafia).

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Italian investigators initially did not take the term seriously, believing it was used only by

the American Mafia. In 1984, the Mafia turncoat Tommaso Buscetta revealed to the anti-mafia

magistrate Giovanni Falcone that the term was used by the Sicilian Mafia as well. Buscetta

dismissed the word "mafia" as a mere literary creation. Other defectors, such as Antonino

Calderone and Salvatore Contorno, confirmed the use of Cosa Nostra to describe the Mafia.[13]

Mafiosi introduce known members to each other as belonging to Cosa Nostra ("our thing") or la

stessa cosa ("the same thing"), meaning "he is the same thing, a Mafioso, as you".

The Sicilian Mafia has used other names to describe itself throughout its history, such as

"The Honored Society". Mafiosi are known among themselves as "men of honor" or "men of

respect".

Cosa Nostra should not be confused with other mafia-type organizations in Italy such as

the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria, the Camorra in Campania, or the Sacra Corona Unita in Apulia.

TWO

History

Post-Feudal Sicily

The genesis of Cosa Nostra is hard to trace because Mafiosi are very secretive and do not

keep historical records of their own. However, it is widely believed that its seeds were planted in

the upheaval of Sicily's transition out of feudalism in 1812 and its later annexation by mainland

Italy in 1860.

Under feudalism, the nobility owned most of the land and enforced law and order through

their private armies. After 1812, the feudal barons steadily sold off or rented their lands to

private citizens. Primogeniture was abolished, land could no longer be seized to settle debts, and

one fifth of the land was to become private property of the peasants. After Italy annexed Sicily in

1860, it redistributed a large share of public and church land to private citizens. The result was a

huge boom in landowners: from 2,000 to 20,000 by 1861.

The nobles also released their private armies to let the state take over the task of law

enforcement. However, the authorities were incapable of properly enforcing property rights and

contracts, largely due to their inexperience with free market capitalism. Lack of manpower was

also a problem: there were often less than 350 active policemen for the entire island. Some towns

did not have any permanent police force, only visited every few months by some troops to

collect malcontents, leaving criminals to operate with impunity from the law in the interim.

With more property owners came more disputes that needed settling and properties that

needed protecting. Because the authorities were undermanned and unreliable, property owners

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turned to extralegal arbitrators and protectors. These extralegal protectors would eventually

organize themselves into the first Mafia clans.

Banditry was a growing problem at the time. Rising food prices, the loss of public and

church lands, and the loss of feudal common rights pushed many desperate peasants to banditry.

In response, local elites in countryside towns recruited young men into "companies-at-arms" to

hunt down thieves and negotiate the return of stolen property, in exchange for a pardon for the

thieves and a fee from the victims. These companies-at-arms were often made up of former

bandits and criminals, usually the most skilled and violent of them. Whilst this saved

communities the trouble of training their own policemen, this may have made the companies-at-

arms more inclined to collude with their former brethren rather than destroy them.

There was little Mafia activity in the eastern half of Sicily. In the east, the ruling elites

were more cohesive and active during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. They

maintained their large stables of enforcers, and were able to absorb or suppress any emerging

violent groups. Furthermore, the land in the east was generally divided into a smaller number of

large estates, so there were fewer landowners and their large estates often required full-time

patrolling. This meant that guardians of such estates tended to be bound to a single employer,

giving them little autonomy or leverage to demand high payments. This did not mean there was

little violence - the most violent conflicts over land took place in the east, but they did not

involve Mafiosi.

Mafia activity was most prevalent in the most prosperous areas of western Sicily,

especially Palermo, where the dense concentrations of landowners and merchants offered ample

opportunities for protection racketeering and extortion. There, a protector could serve multiple

clients, giving him greater independence. The greater number of clients demanding protection

also allowed him to charge high prices. The landowners in this region were also frequently

absent and could not watch over their properties should the Mafioso withdraw protection, further

increasing his bargaining power.

The lucrative citrus orchards around Palermo were a favorite target of extortionists and

protection racketeers, as they had a fragile production system that made them quite vulnerable to

sabotage. Mafia clans forced landowners to hire their members as custodians by scaring away

unaffiliated applicants.

Cattle ranchers were also very vulnerable to thieves, and so they too needed Mafioso

protection.

In 1864, Niccolò Turrisi Colonna, leader of the Palermo National Guard, wrote of a "sect

of thieves" that operated across Sicily. This "sect" was mostly rural, composed of cattle thieves,

smugglers, wealthy farmers and their guards. The sect made "affiliates every day of the brightest

young people coming from the rural class, of the guardians of the fields in the Palermitan

countryside, and of the large number of smugglers; a sect which gives and receives protection to

and from certain men who make a living on traffic and internal commerce. It is a sect with little

or no fear of public bodies, because its members believe that they can easily elude this." It had

special signals to recognize each other, offered protection services, scorned the law and had a

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code of loyalty and non-interaction with the police known as umirtà ("humility"). Colonna

warned in his report that the Italian government's brutal and clumsy attempts to crush

unlawfulness only made the problem worse by alienating the populace. An 1865 dispatch from

the prefect of Palermo to Rome first officially described the phenomenon as a "Mafia". An 1876

police report makes the earliest known description of the familiar initiation ritual.

Mafiosi meddled in politics early on, bullying voters into voting for candidates they

favored. At this period in history, only a small fraction of the Sicilian population could vote, so a

single mafia boss could control a sizeable chunk of the electorate and thus wield considerable

political leverage. Mafiosi used their allies in government to avoid prosecution as well as

persecute less well-connected rivals. The highly fragmented and shaky Italian political system

allowed cliques of Mafia-friendly politicians to exert a lot of influence.

In a series of reports between 1898 and 1900, Ermanno Sangiorgi, the police chief of

Palermo, identified 670 Mafiosi belonging to eight Mafia clans that went through alternating

phases of cooperation and conflict. The report mentioned initiation rituals and codes of conduct,

as well as criminal activities that included counterfeiting, ransom kidnappings, robbery, murder

and witness intimidation. The Mafia also maintained funds to support the families of imprisoned

members and pay defense lawyers.

Fascist suppression

In 1925, Benito Mussolini initiated a campaign to destroy the Mafia and assert Fascist

control over Sicilian life. The Mafia threatened and undermined his power in Sicily, and a

successful campaign would strengthen him as the new leader, legitimising and empowering his

rule. Not only would this be a great propaganda coup for Fascism, but it would also provide an

excuse to suppress his political opponents on the island, since many Sicilian politicians had

Mafia links.

As prime minister, he visited Sicily in May 1924 and passed through Piana dei Greci

where he was received by the mayor, Mafia boss Francesco Cuccia. At some point Cuccia

expressed surprise at Mussolini’s police escort and whispered in his ear: "You are with me, you

are under my protection. What do you need all these cops for?" After Mussolini rejected Cuccia's

offer of protection, Cuccia instructed the townsfolk to not attend Mussolini's speech. Mussolini

felt humiliated and outraged.

Cuccia’s careless remark has passed into history as the catalyst for Mussolini’s war on

the Mafia. When Mussolini firmly established his power in January 1925, he appointed Cesare

Mori as the Prefect of Palermo in October 1925 and granted him special powers to fight the

Mafia. Mori formed a small army of policemen, carabinieri and militiamen, which went from

town to town, rounding up suspects. To force suspects to surrender, they would take their

families hostage, sell off their property, or publicly slaughter their livestock. By 1928, over

11,000 suspects were arrested. Confessions were sometimes extracted through beatings and

torture. Some mafiosi who had been on the losing end of Mafia feuds voluntarily cooperated

with prosecutors, perhaps as a way of obtaining protection and revenge. Charges of Mafia

association were typically leveled at poor peasants and gabellotti (farm leaseholders), but were

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avoided when dealing with major landowners. Many were tried en masse. More than 1,200 were

convicted and imprisoned, and many others were internally exiled without trial.

Mori's campaign ended in June 1929 when Mussolini recalled him to Rome. Although he

did not totally crush the Mafia as the Fascist press proclaimed, his campaign was nonetheless

very successful. As the Mafia informant Antonino Calderone reminisced: "The music changed.

Mafiosi had a hard life. [...] After the war the mafia hardly existed anymore. The Sicilian

Families had all been broken up."

Sicily's murder rate sharply declined. Landowners were able to raise the legal rents on

their lands; sometimes as much as ten-thousand fold. Many Mafiosi fled to the United States.

Among these were Carlo Gambino and Joseph Bonanno, who would go on to become powerful

Mafia bosses in New York City.

Post-Fascist revival

In 1943, nearly half a million Allied troops invaded Sicily. Crime soared in the upheaval

and chaos. Many inmates escaped from their prisons, banditry returned and the black market

thrived. During the first six months of Allied occupation, party politics in Sicily were banned.

Most institutions, with the exception of the police and carabinieri, were destroyed, and the

American occupiers had to build a new order from scratch. As Fascist mayors were deposed, the

Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) simply appointed replacements.

Many turned out to be Mafiosi, such as Calogero Vizzini and Giuseppe Genco Russo. They

could easily present themselves as political dissidents, and their anti-communist position made

them further desirable. Mafia bosses reformed their clans, absorbing some of the marauding

bandits into their ranks.

The changing economic landscape of Sicily would shift the Mafia's power base from the

rural to the urban. The Minister of Agriculture – a communist – pushed for reforms in which

peasants were to get larger shares of produce, be allowed to form cooperatives and take over

badly used land, and remove the system by which leaseholders (known as "gabelloti") could rent

land from landowners for their own short-term use. Owners of especially large estates were to be

forced to sell off some of their land. The Mafia, which had connections to many landowners,

murdered many socialist reformers. The most notorious attack was the Portella della Ginestra

massacre, when 11 persons were killed and 33 wounded during May Day celebrations on May 1,

1947. The bloodbath was perpetrated by the bandit Salvatore Giuliano who was possibly backed

by local Mafia bosses. In the end, though, they couldn't stop the process, and many landowners

chose to sell their land to mafiosi, who offered more money than the government.

In the 1950’s, a crackdown in the United States on drug trafficking led to the

imprisonment of many American Mafiosi. Furthermore, Cuba, a major hub for drug smuggling,

fell to Fidel Castro. This prompted the American mafia boss Joseph Bonanno to return to Sicily

in 1957 to franchise out his heroin operations to the Sicilian clans. Anticipating rivalries for the

lucrative American drug market, he negotiated the establishment of a Sicilian Mafia Commission

to mediate disputes.

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Sack of Palermo

The post-war period saw a huge building boom in Palermo. Allied bombing in World

War II had left more than 14,000 people homeless, and migrants were pouring in from the

countryside, so there was a huge demand for new homes. Much of this construction was

subsidized by public money. In 1956, two Mafia-connected officials, Vito Ciancimino and

Salvatore Lima, took control of Palermo's Office of Public Works. Between 1959 and 1963,

about 80% of building permits were given to just five people, none of whom represented major

construction firms and were probably Mafia front men. Construction companies unconnected

with the Mafia were forced to pay protection money. Many buildings were illegally constructed

before the city's planning was finalized. Mafiosi scared off anyone who dared to question the

illegal building.

Mafia organizations entirely control the building sector in Palermo – the quarries where

aggregates are mined, site clearance firms, cement plants, metal depots for the construction

industry, wholesalers for sanitary fixtures, and so on.

First Mafia War

The First Mafia War was the first high-profile conflict between Mafia clans in post-war

Italy (the Sicilian Mafia has a long history of violent rivalries).

In 1962, the mafia boss Cesare Manzella organized a drug shipment to America with the

help of two Sicilian clans, the Grecos and the La Barberas. Manzella entrusted another boss,

Calcedonio Di Pisa, to handle the heroin. When the shipment arrived in America, however, the

American buyers claimed some heroin was missing, and paid Di Pisa a commensurately lower

sum. Di Pisa accused the Americans of defrauding him, while the La Barberas accused Di Pisa of

embezzling the missing heroin. The Sicilian Mafia Commission sided with Di Pisa, to the open

anger of the La Barberas. The La Barberas murdered Di Pisa and Manzella, triggering a war.

Many Non-Mafiosi were killed in the crossfire. In April 1963, several bystanders were

wounded during a shootout in Palermo. In May, Angelo La Barbera survived a murder attempt in

Milan. In June, six military officers and a policeman in Ciaculli were killed while trying to

dispose of a car bomb. These incidents provoked national outrage and a crackdown in which

nearly 2,000 arrests were made. Mafia activity fell as clans disbanded and mafiosi went into

hiding. The Sicilian Mafia Commission was dissolved; it would not reform until 1969. 117

suspects were put on trial in 1968, but most were acquitted or received light sentences. The

inactivity plus money lost to legal fees and so forth reduced most Mafiosi to poverty.

Smuggling boom

The 1950s and 1960s were difficult times for Mafiosi, but in the 1970s their rackets grew

considerably more lucrative, particularly smuggling. The most lucrative racket of the 1970s was

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cigarette smuggling. Sicilian and Neapolitan crime bosses negotiated a joint monopoly over the

smuggling of cigarettes to Naples.

When heroin refineries operated by Corsican gangsters in Marseilles were shut down by

French authorities, morphine traffickers looked to Sicily. Starting in 1975, Cosa Nostra set up

heroin refineries across the island. As well as refining heroin, Cosa Nostra also sought to control

its distribution. Sicilian Mafiosi moved to the United States to personally control distribution

networks there, often at the expense of their U.S. counterparts. Heroin addiction in Europe and

North America surged, and seizures by police increased dramatically. By 1982, the Sicilian

Mafia controlled about 80% of the heroin trade in the north-eastern United States. Heroin was

often distributed to street dealers from Mafia-owned pizzerias, and the revenues could be passed

off as restaurant profits (the so-called Pizza Connection).

Second Mafia War

In the early 1970s, Luciano Leggio, boss of the Corleon clan and member of the Sicilian

Mafia Commission, forged a coalition of mafia clans known as the Corleonesi, with himself as

its leader. He initiated a campaign to dominate Cosa Nostra and its narcotics trade. Because

Leggio was imprisoned in 1974, he acted through his deputy, Salvatore Riina, to whom he would

eventually hand over control. The Corleonesi bribed cash-strapped Palermo clans into the fold,

subverted members of other clans and secretly recruited new members. In 1977, the Corleonesi

had Gaetano Badalamenti expelled from the Commission on trumped-up charges of hiding drug

revenues. In April 1981, the Corleonesi murdered another rival member of the Commission,

Stefano Bontade, and the Second Mafia War began in earnest. Hundreds of enemy mafiosi and

their relatives were murdered, sometimes by traitors in their own clans. By manipulating the

Mafia's rules and eliminating rivals, the Corleonesi came to completely dominate the

Commission. Riina used his power over the Commission to replace the bosses of certain clans

with hand-picked regents. In the end, the Corleonesi faction won and Riina effectively became

the "boss of bosses" of the Sicilian Mafia.

At the same time the Corleonesi waged their campaign to dominate Cosa Nostra, they

also waged a campaign of murder against journalists, officials and policemen who dared cross

them. The police were frustrated with the lack of help they were receiving from witnesses and

politicians. At the funeral of a policeman murdered by mafiosi in 1985, policemen insulted and

spat at two attending politicians, and a fight broke out between them and military police.

Maxi trial and war against the government

In the early 1980s, the magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino began a

campaign against Cosa Nostra. Their big break came with the arrest of Tommaso Buscetta, a

mafioso who chose to turn informant in exchange for protection from the Corleonesi, who had

already murdered many of his friends and relatives. Other Mafiosi followed his example.

Falcone and Borsellino compiled their testimonies and organized the Maxi Trial, which lasted

from February 1986 to December 1987. It was held in a fortified courthouse specially built for

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the occasion. 474 Mafiosi were put on trial, of which 342 were convicted. In January 1992 the

Italian Supreme Court confirmed these convictions.

The Mafia retaliated violently. In 1988, they murdered a Palermo judge and his son; three

years later a prosecutor and an anti-mafia businessman were also murdered. Salvatore Lima, a

close political ally of the Mafia, was murdered for failing to reverse the convictions as promised.

Falcone and Borsellino were killed by bombs in 1992. This led to a public outcry and a massive

government crackdown, resulting in the arrest of Salvatore Riina in January 1993. More and

more defectors emerged. Many would pay a high price for their cooperation, usually through the

murder of relatives. For example, Francesco Marino Mannoia's mother, aunt and sister were

murdered.

After Riina's arrest, the Mafia began a campaign of terrorism on the Italian mainland.

Tourist spots such as the Via dei Georgofili in Florence, Via Palestro in Milan, and the Piazza

San Giovanni in Laterano and Via San Teodoro in Rome were attacked, leaving 10 dead and 93

injured and causing severe damage to cultural heritage such as the Uffizi Gallery. When the

Catholic Church openly condemned the Mafia, two churches were bombed and an anti-Mafia

priest shot dead in Rome.

After Riina's capture, leadership of the Mafia was briefly held by Leoluca Bagarella, then

passed to Bernardo Provenzano when the former was himself captured in 1995. Provenzano

halted the campaign of violence and replaced it with a campaign of quietness known as Pax

Mafiosi.

Provenzano years

Under Bernardo Provenzano's leadership, murders of state officials were halted. He also

halted the policy of murdering informants and their families, with a view instead to getting them

to retract their testimonies and return to the fold. He also restored the common support fund for

imprisoned Mafiosi.

The tide of defectors was greatly stemmed. The Mafia preferred to initiate relatives of

existing Mafiosi, believing them to be less prone to defection. Provenzano was arrested in 2006,

after 43 years on the run.

Modern Mafia in Italy

The incarcerated bosses are currently subjected to harsh controls on their contact with the

outside world, limiting their ability to run their operations from behind bars under the article 41-

bis prison regime. Antonino Giuffrè – a close confidant of Provenzano, turned pentito shortly

after his capture in 2002 – alleges that in 1993 Cosa Nostra had direct contact with

representatives of Silvio Berlusconi who was then planning the birth of Forza Italia.

The alleged deal included a repeal of 41 bis, among other anti-Mafia laws in return for

electoral support in Sicily. Nevertheless, Giuffrè's declarations have not yet been confirmed. The

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Italian Parliament, with the full support of Forza Italia reinforced the provisions of the 41 bis,

which was to expire in 2002 but has been prolonged for another four years and extended to other

crimes such as terrorism. However, according to one of Italy’s leading magazines, L'Espresso,

119 Mafiosi – one-fifth of those incarcerated under the 41 bis regime – have been released on an

individual basis. The human rights group Amnesty International has expressed concern that the

41-bis regime could in some circumstances amount to "cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment"

for prisoners.

In addition to Salvatore Lima, mentioned above, the politician Giulio Andreotti and the

High Court judge Corrado Carnevale have long been suspected of having ties to the Mafia.

By the late 1990s, the weakened Cosa Nostra had to yield most of the illegal drug trade to

the 'Ndrangheta crime organization from Calabria. In 2006, the latter was estimated to control

80% of the cocaine imported to Europe.

Three

Structure and composition

Cosa Nostra is not a monolithic organization, but rather a loose association of groups

known alternately as "families", "cosche", "borgatas" or "clans" (despite the name, their

members are generally not related by blood). Today, according to the Chief Prosecutor of

Palermo, Francesco Messineo, there are 94 Mafia clans in Sicily subject to 29 Mandamenti, with

a total of at least 3,500 to 4,000 full members. Most are based in western Sicily, almost half of

them in the province of Palermo.

Clan Hierarchy

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Hierarchy of a Cosa Nostra clan

In 1984, the Mafioso informant Tommaso Buscetta explained to prosecutors the

command structure of a typical clan. A clan is led by a "boss" (capofamiglia or rappresentante),

who is aided by an underboss (a sotto capo) and supervised by one or more advisers

(consigliere). Under his command are groups (decina) of about ten "soldiers" (soldati or operai).

Each decina is led by a capodecina (or sometimes caporegime).

The actual structure of any given clan can vary. Despite the name decina, they do not

necessarily have ten soldiers, but can have anything from five to thirty. Some clans are so small

that they don't even have decinas and capodecinas, and even in large clans certain soldiers may

report directly to the boss.

The boss of a clan is typically elected by the rank-and-file soldiers (though violent

successions do happen). Due to the small size of most Sicilian clans, the boss of a clan has

intimate contact with all members, and doesn't receive much in the way of privileges or rewards

as he would in larger organizations (such as the larger Five Families of New York). His tenure is

also frequently short: elections are yearly, and he might be deposed sooner for misconduct or

incompetence.

The underboss is usually appointed by the boss. He is the boss' most trusted right-hand

man and second-in-command. If the boss is killed or imprisoned, he takes over as leader.

The Consigliere ("counselor") of the clan is also elected on a yearly basis. One of his jobs

is to supervise the actions of the boss and his immediate underlings, particularly in financial

matters (e.g. preventing embezzlement). He also serves as an impartial adviser to the boss and

mediator in internal disputes. To fulfill this role, the consigliere must be impartial, devoid of

conflict of interest and ambition.

Other than its members, Cosa Nostra makes extensive use of "associates". These are

people who work for or aid a clan (or even multiple clans) but are not treated as true members.

13 | P a g e

These include corrupt officials and prospective Mafiosi. An associate is considered by the

mafiosi nothing more than a tool, someone that they can "use", or "nothing mixed with nil."

The media has often made reference to a "capo di tutti capi" or "boss of bosses" that

allegedly "commands all of Cosa Nostra". Calogero Vizzini, Salvatore Riina, and Bernardo

Provenzano were especially influential bosses who have each been described by the media and

law enforcement as being the "boss of bosses" of their times. While a powerful boss may exert

great influence over his neighbors, the position does not formally exist, according to Mafia

turncoats such as Buscetta. According to Mafia historian Salvatore Lupo "the emphasis of the

media on the definition of a 'capo di tutti capi' is without any foundation".

Membership

Membership in Cosa Nostra is open only to Sicilian men. A candidate cannot be a

relative or have any close links with a lawman, such as a policeman or a judge. There is no strict

age limit: boys as young as sixteen have been initiated. A prospective Mafioso is carefully tested

for obedience, discretion, ruthlessness and skill at spying. He is almost always required to

commit murder as his ultimate trial, even if he doesn't plan to be a career assassin. The act of

murder is to prove his sincerity (i.e. he is not an undercover policeman) and to bind him into

silence (i.e. he cannot break Omertà without facing murder charges himself).

Traditionally, only men can become Mafiosi, though in recent times there have been

reports of women assuming the responsibilities of imprisoned Mafiosi relatives.

Membership and rank in the Mafia are not hereditary. Most new bosses are not related to

their predecessor. The Commission forbids relatives from holding positions in inter-clan bodies

at the same time. That said, Mafiosi frequently bring their sons into the trade. They have an

easier time entering, because the son bears his father's seal of approval and is familiar with the

traditions and requirements of Cosa Nostra.

A Mafioso’s legitimate occupation, if he has any, generally does not affect his prestige

within Cosa Nostra. Historically, most Mafiosi were employed in menial jobs, and many bosses

did not work at all. Professionals such as lawyers and doctors do exist within the organization,

and are employed according to whatever useful skills they have.

Commission

Since the 1950s, the Mafia has maintained multiple commissions to resolve disputes and

promote cooperation among clans. Each province of Sicily has its own Commission. Clans are

organized into districts (Mandamenti) of three or four geographically adjacent clans. Each

district elects a representative (capo Mandamento) to sit on its Provincial Commission.

Contrary to popular belief, the commissions do not serve as a centralized government for

the Mafia. The powers of the commissions are limited and clans are autonomous and

independent. Rather, each Commission serves as a representative mechanism for consultation of

14 | P a g e

independent clans who decide by consensus. "Contrary to the wide-spread image presented by

the media, these super ordinate bodies of coordination cannot be compared with the executive

boards of major legal firms. Their power is intentionally limited. And it would be entirely wrong

to see in the Cosa Nostra a centrally managed, internationally active Mafia holding company,"

according to criminologist Letizia Paoli.

A major function of the Commission is to regulate the use of violence. For instance, a

Mafioso who wants to commit a murder in another clan's territory must ask the permission of the

local boss; the commission enforces this rule. Any murder of a Mafioso or prominent individual

(police, lawyers, politicians, journalists, etc.) must be approved by the commission. Such acts

can potentially upset other clans and spark a war, so the Commission provides a means by which

to obtain their approval.

The Commission also deals with matters of succession. When a boss dies or retires, his

clan's reputation often crumbles with his departure. This can cause clients to abandon the clan

and turn to neighboring clans for protection. These clans would grow greatly in status and power

relative to their rivals, potentially destabilizing the region and precipitating war. The

Commission may choose to divide up the clan's territory and members among its neighbors.

Alternatively, the commission has the power to appoint a regent for the clan until it can elect a

new boss.

Rituals and codes of conduct

Initiation ceremony

One of the first accounts of an initiation ceremony into the Mafia was given by

Bernardino Verro, a leader of the Fasci Siciliani, a popular movement of democratic and socialist

inspiration, which arose in Sicily in the early 1890s. In order to give the movement teeth and to

protect himself from harm, Verro became a member of a Mafia group in Corleone, the Fratuzzi

(Little Brothers). In a memoir written many years later, he describes the initiation ritual he

underwent in the spring of 1893: "[I] was invited to take part in a secret meeting of the Fratuzzi.

I entered a mysterious room where there were many men armed with guns sitting around a table.

In the center of the table there was a skull drawn on a piece of paper and a knife. In order to be

admitted to the Fratuzzi, [I] had to undergo an initiation consisting of some trials of loyalty and

the pricking of the lower lip with the tip of the knife: the blood from the wound soaked the

skull." (Soon after Verro broke with the Mafia and – according to police reports – became their

most bitter enemy. He was killed by the Mafia in 1915 when he was the mayor of Corleone).

After his arrest, the Mafioso Giovanni Brusca described the ceremony in which he was

formally made a full member of Cosa Nostra. In 1976 he was invited to a "banquet" at a country

house. He was brought into a room where several Mafiosi were sitting around a table upon which

sat a pistol, a dagger and an image of a saint. They questioned his commitment and his feelings

regarding criminality and murder (despite him already having a history of such acts).When he

affirmed himself, Salvatore Riina, then the most powerful boss of Cosa Nostra took a needle and

pricked Brusca's finger. Brusca smeared his blood on the image of the saint, which he held in his

15 | P a g e

cupped hands as Riina set it alight. As Brusca juggled the burning image in his hands, Riina said

to him: "If you betray Cosa Nostra, your flesh will burn like this saint."

Introductions

A Mafioso is not supposed to introduce himself to another Mafioso he does not

personally know, even if both Mafiosi know of each other through reputation. If he wants to

establish a relationship, he must ask a third Mafioso that they both personally know to introduce

them to each other in a face-to-face meeting. This intermediary can vouch that neither of the two

is an impostor, thus preventing outsiders or undercover policemen from infiltrating the Mafia.

This tradition is upheld very scrupulously, often to the detriment of efficient operation.

For instance, when the Mafioso Indelicato Amedeo returned to Sicily following his initiation in

America in the 1950s, he could not introduce himself to his own Mafioso father, but had to wait

for a Mafioso from America who knew of his induction to come to Sicily. In another case, in the

1970s the New York Mafioso Lefty Ruggiero wanted to expand his business to Milwaukee, but

didn't know anyone who could immediately introduce him to the Milwaukee Mafia boss. He had

to go through a chain of intermediaries until he could finally be introduced to the Milwaukee

boss, a process which took weeks.

Etiquette Mafiosi of equal status sometimes call each other "compare", while inferiors call their

superiors "padrino". Both are Sicilian terms for "godfather".

Ten Commandments

In November 2007 Sicilian police reported to have found a list of "Ten Commandments" in

the hideout of mafia boss Salvatore Lo Piccolo. They are thought to be guidelines on how to be a

good, respectful and honorable Mafioso.

1. No one can present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third

person to do it.

2. Never look at the wives of friends.

3. Never be seen with cops.

4. Don't go to pubs and clubs.

5. Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty - even if your wife is about to give

birth.

6. Appointments must absolutely be respected.

7. Wives must be treated with respect.

8. When asked for any information, the answer must be the truth.

9. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to others or to other families.

10. People who can't be part of Cosa Nostra: anyone who has a close relative in the police,

anyone with a two-timing relative in the family, anyone who behaves badly and doesn't

hold to moral values.

16 | P a g e

Omertà

Omertà is a code of silence and secrecy that forbids Mafiosi from betraying their

comrades to the authorities. The penalty for transgression is death, and relatives of the turncoat

may also be murdered. Mafiosi generally do not associate with police (aside perhaps from

corrupting individual officers as necessary). For instance, a Mafioso will not call the police when

he is a victim of a crime. He is expected to take care of the problem himself. To do otherwise

would undermine his reputation as a capable protector of others, and his enemies may see him as

weak and vulnerable.

The need for secrecy and inconspicuousness deeply colors the traditions and mannerisms

of Mafiosi. Mafiosi are discouraged from consuming alcohol or drugs, as in an inebriated state

they are more likely to blurt out sensitive information. They also frequently adopt self-effacing

attitudes to strangers so as to avoid unwanted attention. Mafiosi are also forbidden from writing

down anything about their activities, lest such evidence be discovered by police.

To a degree, Mafiosi also impose Omertà on the general population. Civilians who buy

their protection or make other deals are expected to be discreet, on pain of death. Witness

intimidation is also common.

Current clans

The following data is based mainly on the biannual reports of the Direzione Investigativa

Antimafia (Antimafia Investigation Department): This information is several years old, and since

clans come and go, it may not be perfectly accurate.

The city of Palermo itself has 28 clans divided among 8 Mandamenti, whilst the

surrounding province is divided into 6 Mandamenti.

Mandamenti and clans in the city of Palermo

Mandamento Capo Mandamento Clans

Brancaccio Ludovico Sansone Brancaccio, Ciaculli, Corso

dei Mille, Roccella

Noce Luigi Caravello Malaspina-Cruillas, Noce

Pagliarelli Giovanni Nicchi Borgo Molara, Corso

Calatafimi, Pagliarelli, Rocca-

Mezzo Monreale

Passo di Rigano

Boccadifalco

(unknown) Altarello, Passo di Rigano -

Boccadifalco, Torretta,

Uditore

Porta Nuova (unknown) Borgo Vecchio, Palermo

Centro, Porta Nuova

Resuttana Gaetano Fidanzati Acquasanta - Arenella,

Resuttana

San Lorenzo (unknown) Capaci, Carini, Cinisi,

17 | P a g e

Partanna Mondello, San

Lorenzo, Terrasini, Tommaso

Natale - Sferracavallo

Santa Maria de Gesu' Sandro Capizzi Santa Maria di Gesu',

Villagrazia di Palermo

Mandamenti in the province of Palermo

Mandamento Capo mandamento

Bagheria/Villabate Giuseppe Scaduto

San Giuseppe Jato Gregorio Agrigento

Corleone Rosario Lo Bue

Belmonte Mezzagno Antonino Spera

San Mauro Castelverde Francesco Bonomo

Partinico (unknown)

The province of Agrigento has 42 active clans within 6 Mandamenti. Giuseppe Falsone is

the current provincial representative to the Commission.

The province of Trapani has 17 clans, divided among 4 Mandamenti. Matteo Messina

Denaro is the current provincial representative to the Commission.

Protection rackets

Protection racketeering is one of the Sicilian Mafia's core activities. Some scholars, such

as Diego Gambetta, see it as a defining characteristic. He describes the Mafia as a cartel of

"private protection firms". Other scholars have called it "an industry of violence". In exchange

for money or favors, Mafiosi use violence to punish anyone who harms the interests of their

clients, whether through theft, violence, fraud or competition. Mafiosi have protected a great

variety of clients over the years: landowners, plantation owners, politicians, shopkeepers, drug

dealers, etc. Whilst some people are coerced into buying protection and some do not receive any

actual protection for their money (extortion), by and large there are many clients who actively

seek and benefit from Mafioso protection. This is one of the main reasons why the Mafia has

resisted more than a century of government efforts to destroy it: the people who willingly solicit

these services protect the Mafia from the authorities.

It is estimated that the Sicilian Mafia costs the Sicilian economy more than €10 billion a

year through protection rackets. Roughly 70% of Sicilian businesses pay protection money to

Cosa Nostra. Monthly payments can range from €200 for a small shop or bar to €5,000 for a

supermarket. In Sicily, protection money is known as pizzo; the anti-extortion support group

Addiopizzo derives its name from this. Mafiosi might sometimes ask for favors instead of

money, such as assistance in committing a crime.

18 | P a g e

Protection from theft

Protection from theft is one service that the Mafia provides to paying "clients". Mafiosi

themselves are generally forbidden from committing theft (though in practice they are merely

forbidden from stealing from anyone connected to the Mafia). Instead, Mafiosi make it their

business to know all the thieves and fences operating within their territory. If a protected

business is robbed, the clan will use these contacts to track down and return the stolen goods and

punish the thieves, usually by beating them up. Since the pursuit of thieves and their loot often

goes into territories of other clans, clans routinely cooperate with each other on this matter,

providing information and blocking the sale of the loot if they can.

Although the Mafia mostly protects merchants from thieves, sometimes they protect

thieves as well. They might protect thieves from retribution from unprotected merchants, or from

being swindled by untrustworthy fences. Small-time thieves operating in a clan's territory are

usually not forced to give a cut of their takings, as the money involved in small thefts is not

worth the trouble. Aside from payoffs or favors, protecting thieves encourages crime, which puts

more pressure on merchants to seek Mafioso protection.

Protection from competition

Mafiosi sometimes protect businessmen from competitors by threatening their

competitors with violence. If two businessmen are competing for a government contract, the

protected can ask his Mafioso friends to bully his rival out of the bidding process. In another

example, Mafioso acting on behalf of a coffee supplier might pressure local bars into serving

only his client's coffee.

More often than simple intimidation of competitors, Mafiosi are often asked to oversee

collusive agreements between businessmen. Mafia-enforced collusion typically appear in

markets where collusion is both desirable (inelastic demand, lack of product differentiation, etc.)

and difficult to set up (numerous competitors, low barriers to entry).

Protection from fraud

Mafioso protection is not always one-sided. A Mafioso might also be asked to arbitrate

transactions in cases where the parties do not trust each other, such as black market deals where

the law does not intervene. In exchange for a commission paid by both parties, the Mafioso will

threaten punishment against either party if one or both cheats the other.

Client relations

Mafiosi approach potential clients in an aggressive but friendly manner, like a door-to-

door salesman. They may even offer a few free favors as enticement. If a client rejects their

overtures, Mafiosi sometimes coerce them by vandalizing their property or other forms of

harassment. Physical assault is rare; clients may be murdered for breaching agreements or talking

to the police, but not for simply refusing protection.

19 | P a g e

In many situations, mafia bosses prefer to establish an indefinite long-term bond with a

client, rather than make one-off contracts. The boss can then publicly declare the client to be

under his permanent protection (his "friend", in Sicilian parlance). This leaves little public

confusion as to who is and isn't protected, so thieves and other predators will be deterred from

attacking a protected client and prey only on the unprotected.

Mafiosi generally do not involve themselves in the management of the businesses they

protect or arbitrate. Lack of competence is a common reason, but mostly it is to divest

themselves of any interests that may conflict with their roles as protectors and arbitrators. This

makes them more trusted by their clients, who need not fear their businesses being taken over.

Protection territories

A protection racketeer cannot tolerate competition within his sphere of influence from

another racketeer. If a dispute erupted between two clients protected by rival racketeers, the two

racketeers would have to fight each other to win the dispute for their respective client. The

outcomes of such fights can be unpredictable (not to mention bloody), and neither racketeer

could guarantee a victory for his client. This would make their protection unreliable and of little

value. Their clients might dismiss them and settle the dispute by other means, and their

reputations would suffer. To prevent this, mafia clans negotiate territories in which they can

monopolize the use of violence in settling disputes. This is not always done peacefully, and

disputes over protection territories are at the root of most Mafia wars.

Other activities

Vote buying

Politicians court Mafiosi to obtain votes during elections. A Mafioso’s mere endorsement

of a certain candidate can be enough for his clients, relatives and associates to vote for said

candidate. A particularly influential Mafioso can bring in thousands of votes for a candidate;

such is the respect a Mafioso can command. The Italian Parliament has a huge number of seats

(945, roughly 1 per 64,000 citizens) and a large number of political parties competing for them,

meaning a candidate can win with only a few thousand votes. A mafia clan's support can thus be

decisive for his success.

"Politicians have always sought us out because we can provide votes. Between friends

and family, each man of honor can muster up forty to fifty other people. There are between 1,500

and 2,000 men of honor in Palermo province. Multiply that by fifty and you get a nice package

of 75,000 to 100,000 votes to go to friendly parties and candidates."

By Antonino Calderone

Politicians usually repay this support with favors, such as sabotaging police

investigations or giving contracts and permits.

20 | P a g e

Although they are not ideological themselves, Mafiosi have traditionally opposed

extreme parties such as Fascists and Communists, and favored center candidates.

Smuggling

Mafiosi provide protection and invest capital in smuggling gangs. Smuggling operations

require large investments (goods, boats, crews, etc.) but few people would trust their money to

criminal gangs. It is Mafiosi who raise the necessary money from investors and ensure all parties

act in good faith. They also ensure that the smugglers operate in safety.

Mafiosi rarely directly involve themselves in smuggling operations. When they do, it is

usually when the operations are especially risky. In this case, they may induct smugglers into

their clans in the hope of binding them more firmly. This was the case with heroin smuggling,

where the volumes and profits involved were too large to keep the operations at arm's length.

Bid rigging

The Sicilian Mafia in Italy is believed to have a turnover of €6.5 billion through control

of public and private contracts. Mafiosi use threats of violence and vandalism to muscle out

competitors and win contracts for the companies they control. They rarely manage the businesses

they control themselves, but take a cut of their profits, usually through payoffs (Pizzo).

Loan sharking In a 2007 publication, the Italian small-business association Confesercenti reported that

about 25.2% of Sicilian businesses were indebted to loan sharks, who collected around €1.4

billion a year in payments. This figure has risen during the late-2000s recession, as tighter

lending by banks forces the desperate to borrow from the Mafia.

Forbidden crimes

Certain types of crimes are forbidden by Cosa Nostra, either by members or freelance

criminals within their domains. Mafiosi are generally forbidden from committing theft (burglary,

mugging, etc.). Kidnapping is also generally forbidden, even by Non-Mafiosi, as it attracts a

great deal of public hostility and police attention. These rules have been violated from time to

time, both with and without the permission of senior Mafiosi.

Violence and reputation

Murder

Murders are almost always carried out by members. It is very rare for the Mafia to recruit

an outsider for a single job, and such people are liable to be eliminated soon afterwards because

they become expendable liabilities.

21 | P a g e

Reputation

The Mafia's power comes from its reputation to commit violence, particularly murder,

against virtually anyone and get away with it. Through reputation, Mafiosi deter their enemies

and enemies of their clients. It allows Mafiosi to protect a client without being physically present

(e.g. as bodyguards or watchmen), which in turn allows them to protect many clients at once.

Compared to other occupations, reputation is especially valuable for a Mafioso, and they

are especially vulnerable to blows in reputation. The reputation of a Mafioso is dichotomous: he

is either a good protector or a bad one; there is no mediocrity. This is because a Mafioso can only

either succeed at an act of violence or fail utterly. There is no spectrum of quality when it comes

to violent protection. Consequently, a series of failures can completely ruin a Mafioso’s

reputation, and with it his business.

The more fearsome a Mafioso’s reputation is, the more he can win disputes without

having recourse to violence. It can even happen that a Mafioso who loses his means to commit

violence (e.g. his soldiers are all in prison) can still use his reputation to intimidate and provide

protection if everyone is unaware of his weakness and still believes in his power. However, in

the tough world of the Mafia, such bluffs generally do not last long, as his rivals will soon sense

his weakness and challenge him.

When a Mafia boss retires from leadership (or is killed), his clan's reputation as effective

protectors and enforcers often goes with him. If his replacement has a weaker reputation, clients

may lose confidence in the clan and defect to its neighbors, causing a shift in the balance of

power and possible conflict. Ideally, the successor to the boss will have built a strong reputation

of his own as he worked his way up the ranks, giving the clan a reputable new leader. In this

way, established Mafia clans have a powerful edge over newcomers who start from scratch;

joining a clan as a soldier offers an aspiring Mafioso a chance to build up his own reputation

under the guidance and protection of senior Mafiosi.

Violent successions

Mafia violence is most commonly directed at other Mafia families competing for territory

and business.

Violence is more common in the Sicilian Mafia than the American Mafia because Mafia

families in Sicily are smaller and more numerous, creating a more volatile atmosphere.

Four

22 | P a g e

Prominent Sicilian Mafiosi

Vito Cascioferro (1862–1943 or 1945), often depicted as the "boss of bosses", although

such a position does not exist in the loose structure of Cosa Nostra in Sicily, imprisoned

by Cesare Mori.

Calogero Vizzini (1877–1954), boss of Villalba, was considered to be one of the most

influential Mafia bosses of Sicily after World War II until his death in 1954.

Giuseppe Genco Russo (1893–1976), boss of Mussomeli, considered being the heir of

Calogero Vizzini.

Michele Navarra (1905–1958), boss of the Mafia Family in Corleone from 1940s to 1958

Salvatore "Ciaschiteddu" Greco (1923–1978), boss of the Mafia Family in Ciaculli, he

was the first "secretary" of the first Sicilian Mafia Commission that was formed

somewhere in 1958.

Gaetano Badalamenti (1923–2004), boss of the Mafia Family in Cinisi

Angelo La Barbera (1924–1975) boss of the Mafia Family in Palermo Centro

Michele Greco (1924–2008), boss of the Mafia Family in Croceverde

Luciano Leggio (1925–1993), boss of the Corleone clan and instigator of the Second

Mafia War

Tommaso Buscetta (1928–2000), a mafioso who turned informant in 1984. Buscetta's

evidence was used to great effect during the Maxi-Trials.

Salvatore Riina (born 1930), also known as Totò Riina, emerged from the Second Mafia

War as the "boss of bosses" until his arrest in 1993.

Bernardo Provenzano (born 1933), successor of Riina as head of the Corleonesi faction

and as such was considered one of the most powerful bosses of the Sicilian Mafia.

Provenzano was a fugitive from justice since 1963. He was captured on 11 April 2006 in

Sicily. Before capture, authorities had reportedly been "close" to capturing him for 10

years.

Stefano Bontade (1939–1981), boss of the Santa Maria di Gesù clan. His murder by the

Corleonesi in 1981 inaugurated the Second Mafia War.

Leoluca Bagarella (born 1941), member of the Mafia Family in Corleone arrested in 1995

Salvatore Lo Piccolo (born 1942), considered to be one of the successors of Provenzano.

Salvatore Inzerillo (1944–1981), boss of the Mafia Family in Passo di Rigano

Giovanni 'Lo Scannacristiani' Brusca (born 1957), who was involved in the murder of

Giovanni Falcone.

Matteo Messina Denaro (born 1962), considered to be one of the successors of

Provenzano.

Five

Sicilian Mafia Commission The Sicilian Mafia Commission, known as Commissione or Cupola, is a body of

leading Mafia members to decide on important questions concerning the actions of, and settling

23 | P a g e

disputes within the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra. It is composed of representatives of a

Mandamento (a district of three geographically contiguous Mafia families) that are called capo

Mandamento or rappresentante. The Commission is not a central government of the Mafia, but a

representative mechanism for consultation of independent Mafia families who decide by

consensus. "Contrary to the wide-spread image presented by the media, these super ordinate

bodies of coordination cannot be compared with the executive boards of major legal firms. Their

power is intentionally limited. And it would be entirely wrong to see in the Cosa Nostra a

centrally managed, internationally active Mafia holding company," according to criminologist

Letizia Paoli.

The jurisdiction extends over a province; each province of Sicily has some kind of a

Commission, except Messina, Siracusa and Ragusa. Initially the idea was that the family bosses

would not sit on the Commission, but in order to prevent imbalances of power some other

prominent member would be appointed instead. However, that rule was not obeyed from the

start. According to the pentito Tommaso Buscetta the Commission first came into being "to settle

disputes between members of the various families and their bosses" in order to discipline

members of each family. Only later did its function expand to "the regulation of the activities of

all families in a province.

Exposure

The first time the existence of such a Commission filtered out to the rest of the world was

in 1965 during the inquiry into the so-called First Mafia War by Judge Cesare Terranova.

Terranova based himself on a confidential report of the Carabinieri of May 28, 1963, where a

confidential informant revealed the existence of a commission composed of fifteen persons – six

from Palermo city and the rest from towns in the province – "each with the rank of boss of either

a group or a Mafia family." Judge Terranova did not believe that the existence of a commission

meant that the Mafia was a tightly unified structure. In 1973, Leonardo Vitale – a lower level

Mafioso – revealed the existence of the Commission, but his revelations were discarded at the

time and Vitale judged insane.

The existence of the Commission was first established by a court of law during the Maxi

Trial in 1986-87. The groundwork for the Maxi Trial was done at the preliminary investigative

phase by Palermo's Antimafia Pool, created by judge Rocco Chinnici in which the judges

Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino worked as well. It was Tommaso Buscetta who

definitively revealed the existence and workings of the Commission, when he became a state

witness and started to give evidence to judge Giovanni Falcone in 1984. It enabled Falcone to

argue that Cosa Nostra was a unified hierarchical structure ruled by a Commission and that its

leaders – who normally would not dirty their hands with criminal acts – could be held

responsible for criminal activities that were committed to benefit the organization.

The existence and functioning of the Commission was confirmed by the first degree

conviction. The Mafia was identified with the Cosa Nostra organization, and defined a unique,

pyramidal and apex type organization, provincially directed by a Commission or Cupola and

regionally by an interprovincial organism, in which the head of the Palermo Commission has a

24 | P a g e

hegemonic role. This premise became known as the Buscetta theorem. That vision of Cosa

Nostra was not immediately recognized. Other magistrates, in particular Corrado Carnevale –

also known as the Sentence Killer – of the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), sustained that

Mafia associations are autonomous groups, not connected amongst themselves, and therefore, the

collective responsibility for the Commission members did not exist. Carnevale’s view prevailed

at the appeal of the Maxi Trial, but at the theorem was confirmed upheld by the final sentence of

the Supreme Court in January 1992. (Carnevale did not preside the court that did the ruling). In

the meantime, the Antimafia Pool of Palermo was dismantled and Judge Rocco Chinnici had

been murdered in 1983.

Many Mafia bosses were condemned to life in prison and Cosa Nostra reacted furiously

and started a series of revenge killings because of the Supreme Court sentence. The Mafia had

counted on the politicians Salvo Lima and Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to appoint Corrado

Carnevale to review the sentence. Carnevale had overturned many Mafia convictions on the

slenderest of technicalities previously. Carnevale, however, had to withdraw due to pressure

from the public and from Giovanni Falcone – who at the time had moved to the ministry of

Justice. Falcone was backed by the minister of Justice Claudio Martelli despite the fact that he

served under Prime Minister Andreotti. In March 1992, Lima was killed, followed by Falcone

and Paolo Borsellino later that year.

Interprovincional Commission

Beyond the provincial level details are vague. According to the pentito Tommaso

Buscetta a commissione interprovinciale – Interprovincional Commission – was set up in the

1970s, while the pentito Antonino Calderone claims that there had been a rappresentante

regionale in the 1950s even before the Commissions and the capi mandamento were created. The

rappresentante regionale in those days was a certain Andrea Fazio from Trapani.

The Interprovincional or Regional Commission was probably set up in February 1975 on

the instigation of Giuseppe Calderone from Catania who became its first "secretary". The other

members were Gaetano Badalamenti for Palermo, Giuseppe Settecasi (Agrigento), Cola

Buccelato (Trapani), Angelo Mongiovì (Enna) and Giuseppe Di Cristina (Caltanissetta).

According to the pentito Leonardo Messina, the Regional Commission in 1992 was made

up by Salvatore Riina for the province of Palermo, Nitto Santapaola for the province of Catania,

Salvatore Saitta for the province of Enna, Giuseppe "Piddu" Madonia for the province of

Caltanissetta, Antonio Ferro for the province of Agrigento and Mariano Agate for the province

of Trapani.

History and rules

According to Tommaso Buscetta the first Sicilian Mafia Commission for the province of

Palermo was formed after a series of meetings between top American and Sicilian mafiosi that

took place in Palermo between October 12-16 1957, in the hotel Delle Palme and the Spanò

seafood restaurant. US gangsters Joseph Bonanno and Lucky Luciano suggested their Sicilian

25 | P a g e

counterparts to form a Commission, following the example of the American Mafia that had

formed their Commission in the 1930s.

The Sicilians agreed with their suggestion and Buscetta, Gaetano Badalamenti and

Salvatore Greco "Ciaschiteddu" set the ground rules. Sometime in early 1958 the Sicilian Mafia

formed its first Mafia Commission. It was formed among Mafia families in the province of

Palermo, which had the highest concentration of cosche (Mafia families), approximately 46.

Salvatore "Ciaschiteddu" Greco was appointed as its first segretario (secretary) or rappresentante

regionale, essentially a "primus inter pares" – the first among equals. Initially, the secretary had

very little power. His task was simply to organize the meetings.

Before that time the Mafia families were not connected by a collective structure.

According to Judge Cesare Terranova they "were a mosaic of small republics with topographical

borders marked by tradition."[3]

In the days before the Commission coordination inside Cosa

Nostra was ensured by informal meetings among the most influential members of the most

powerful families. In fact, the decision to form a Commission was a formalization of these

occasional meetings into a permanent, collegial body.

Originally, to avoid excessive concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals it

was decided that only "men of honor" holding no leadership position within their own family –

in other words simple "soldiers" – could be appointed as members of the Commission. That rule

was immediately dropped due to the opposition of some Family-bosses who threatened to

abandon the project from the start.

The Commission had two main competencies. The first was to settle conflicts among

Mafia families and single members, and to enforce the most serious violations of the normative

codes of Cosa Nostra. Second, the Commission was entrusted with the regulation of the use of

violence. It had exclusive authority to order murder of police officials, prosecutors and judges,

politicians, journalists and lawyers, because these killings could provoke retaliation by law

enforcement. To limit internal conflicts, it was agreed that each Family boss had to ask the

Commission’s authorization before killing any member of another Family.

Until the early 1980s the Commission’s competencies were often disregarded due to its

collegial character and the wide autonomy for the Family bosses. Only when Totò Riina,

Bernardo Provenzano and the Corleonesi imposed their rule, the Commission became a central

leadership body. However, the Commission in fact lost its autonomy and became a mere

enforcement body that endorsed the decisions made by Riina and Provenzano.

The First Commission

According to Buscetta the first Commission numbered "not many more than ten" and the

number was variable. Among the members of the first Commission in the province of Palermo

were:

Salvatore Greco "Ciaschiteddu" for the Ciaculli mandamento (Palermo)

Antonio Matranga for the Resuttana mandamento (Palermo)

26 | P a g e

Mariano Troia for the San Lorenzo mandamento (Palermo)

Michele Cavataio for the Acquasanta mandamento (Palermo)

Calcedonio Di Pisa for the Noce mandamento (Palermo)

Salvatore La Barbera for the Palermo Centro mandamento

Cesare Manzella for the Cinisi mandamento

Giuseppe Panno for the Casteldaccia mandamento

Antonio Salamone for the San Giuseppe Jato mandamento

Lorenzo Motisi for the Pagliarelli mandamento (Palermo)

Salvatore Manno for the Boccadifalco mandamento (Palermo)

Francesco Sorci for the Santa Maria di Gesù mandamento (Palermo)

Mario Di Girolamo for the Corso Calatafimi mandamento (Palermo).

The Commission, however, was not able to prevent the outbreak of a violent Mafia War in

1963. Casus belli was a heroin deal going wrong, and the subsequent killing of Calcedonio Di

Pisa on December 26, 1962, who was held responsible. Instead of settling the dispute, the

Commission became part of the internal conflict.

On June 30, 1963, a car bomb exploded near Greco’s house in Ciaculli, killing seven police

and military officers sent to defuse it after an anonymous phone call. The outrage over the

Ciaculli massacre changed the Mafia war into a war against the Mafia. It prompted the first

concerted anti-mafia efforts by the state in post-war Italy. The Sicilian Mafia Commission was

dissolved and of those mafiosi who had escaped arrest many went abroad. "Ciaschiteddu" Greco

fled to Caracas in Venezuela.

According to Tommaso Buscetta it was Michele Cavataio, the boss of the Acquasanta quarter

of Palermo, who was responsible for the Ciaculli bomb, and possibly the murder of boss

Calcedonio Di Pisa in late 1962. Cavataio had lost out to the Greco’s in a war of the wholesale

market in the mid 1950s. Cavataio killed Di Pisa in the knowledge that the La Barbera’s would

be blamed by the Greco’s and a war would be the result. He kept fuelling the war through other

bomb attacks and killings.

Cavataio was backed by other Mafia families who resented the growing power of the Mafia

Commission to the detriment of individual Mafia families. Cavataio was killed on December 10,

1969, in the so-called Viale Lazio massacre in Palermo as retaliation for the events in

1963.According to Buscetta and Grado, the composition of the hit squad was a clear indication

that the killing had been sanctioned collectively by all the major Sicilian Mafia families: not only

did it include Calogero Bagarella and Bernardo Provenzano from Corleone, and members of

Stefano Bontade's family in Palermo, but also a soldier of Giuseppe Di Cristina's family on the

other end of Sicily in Riesi.

Triumvirate

The crackdowns on the Mafia resulted in a period of relative peace – a ―Pax Mafiosi‖ –

while many Mafiosi were held in jail or were banished internally. The verdict of the Trial of the

114 against the Mafia in Catanzaro in December 1968 resulted in many acquittals or short

27 | P a g e

sentences for criminal association. The vast majority of Mafiosi had to be released given the time

they had already spent in captivity while awaiting trial.

Under these circumstances, the Sicilian Mafia Commission was revived in 1970. It would

consist of ten members but initially it was ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Gaetano

Badalamenti, Stefano Bontade and the Corleonesi boss Luciano Leggio, although it was

Salvatore Riina who actually would represent the Corleonesi, substituting Leggio who was on

the run until his arrest in 1974.

In 1974 the 'full' Commission was restored under the leadership of Gaetano Badalamenti.

Among the members were:

Gaetano Badalamenti for the Cinisi Mandamento

Stefano Bontade for the Santa Maria di Gesù Mandamento (Palermo)

Luciano Leggio for the Corleone Mandamento, substituted by Salvatore Riina since

Leggio was arrested in 1974

Antonio Salamone for the San Giuseppe Jato Mandamento, often substituted by Bernardo

Brusca (father of Giovanni Brusca)

Rosario Di Maggio for the Passo di Ragano Mandamento (Palermo)

Salvatore Scaglione for the Noce Mandamento (Palermo)

Rosario Riccobono for the Partanna Mandamento (Palermo)

Giuseppe Calò for the Porta Nuova Mandamento (Palermo)

Filippo Giacalone for the San Lorenzo Mandamento (Palermo)

Michele Greco for the Ciaculli Mandamento (Palermo)

Nenè Geraci for the Partinico Mandamento

(Several pentiti, such as Salvatore Cancemi, Francesco Di Carlo and Giovanni Brusca say

that Giuseppe Farinella, for the Gangi-San Mauro Castelverde Mandamento, Francesco Intile for

the Caccamo Mandamento and Antonio Mineo for the Bagheria Mandamento, were or became

members as well.)

During these years tensions between different coalitions within the Commission increased. In

this period the Commission was increasingly dominated by the coalition led by Totò Riina and

Bernardo Provenzano that was opposed by Gaetano Badalamenti and Stefano Bontade. Riina and

Provenzano secretly formed an alliance of Mafiosi in different families, cutting across clan

divisions, in defiance of the rules concerning loyalty in Cosa Nostra. This secretive inter-family

group became known as the Corleonesi. The wing headed by Badalamenti and Bontade defended

the existing balance of power between the single Mafia families and the Commission.

Thanks to a shrewd manipulation of the rules and elimination of its most powerful rivals (in

particular the killings in 1978 of Giuseppe Calderone and Giuseppe Di Cristina, members of the

Interprovincional Commission) the Corleonesi coalition was able to increase its power within the

Commission. Their rivals were overwhelmed and lost any power to strike back. Besides using

violence, the Corleonesi also imposed their supremacy by shrewdly exploiting a competence of

the Commission: the power to suspend leaders of a Family and to name a reggente, a temporary

boss.

28 | P a g e

The 1978 Commission

In 1978, Gaetano Badalamenti was expelled from the Commission and as head of his Family.

Michele Greco replaced him as the secretary of the Commission. Badalamenti’s removal marked

the end of a period of relative peace and signified a major change in the Mafia itself. In 1978 the

Commission was composed by:[9][10]

Michele Greco for the Ciaculli Mandamento (Palermo), acting as the secretary

Salvatore Riina, for the Corleone Mandamento, often accompanied by Bernardo

Provenzano

Stefano Bontade for the Santa Maria di Gesù Mandamento (Palermo)

Salvatore Inzerillo for the Passo di Rigano Mandamento (Palermo)

Giuseppe Calò for the Porta Nuova Mandamento (Palermo)

Antonio Salamone for the San Giuseppe Jato Mandamento, often substituted by Bernardo

Brusca (father of Giovanni Brusca) because Salamone resided in São Paulo in Brazil

Salvatore Scaglione for the Noce Mandamento (Palermo)

Rosario Riccobono for the Partanna Mandamento (Palermo)

Francesco Madonia for the Resuttana Mandamento (Palermo)

Nenè Geraci for the Partinico Mandamento

Calogero Pizzuto representing Agrigento

Ignazio Motisi for the Pagliarelli Mandamento (Palermo)

The Commission was divided between the Corleonesi (Riina, Calò, Madonia, Brusca, Geraci,

Greco Scarpuzzedda, Motisi and probably Scaglione as well) and the group Bontade, Inzerillo

and Pizzuto. A third group, Michele Greco, Riccobono and Salamone were not hostile to the

group of Bontade but were against Gaetano Badalamenti.

While the more established Mafia families in the city of Palermo refrained from openly

killing authorities because that would attract too much police attention, the Corleonesi

deliberately killed to intimidate the authorities in such a way that the suspicion fell on their rivals

in the Commission. In 1979 Pino Greco from Ciaculli also known as Scarpuzzedda and Riina’s

favorite hit man entered the Commission as well.

Instead of avoiding conflict the Commission increasingly became an instrument in the

enfolding power struggle that would eventually lead to the quasi-dictatorship of Toto Riina.

Members of the Commission were no longer freely selected by the provinces but were chosen on

the basis of their allegiance to Riina's faction, and eventually were only called to legitimize

decisions that had already been taken elsewhere.

Second Mafia War

The Second Mafia War raged from 1981-1983. On April 23, 1981, Bontade was machine

gunned to death in his car in Palermo. Bontade’s close ally, Salvatore Inzerillo, was killed three

weeks later with the same Kalashnikov. The Corleonesi slaughtered the ruling families of the

Palermo Mafia to take control of the organisation while waging a parallel war against Italian

29 | P a g e

authorities and law enforcement to intimidate and prevent effective investigations and

prosecutions. More than 200 Mafiosi were killed and many simply disappeared.

In 1982 the Commission members were:

Salvatore Riina and Bernardo Provenzano for the Corleone Mandamento

Giuseppe Calò for the Porta Nuova Mandamento (Palermo)

Michele Greco for the Ciaculli Mandamento (Palermo)

Giovanni Scaduto for the Bagheria Mandamento

Rosario Riccobono for the Partanna Mandamento (Palermo)

Francesco Madonia for the Resuttana Mandamento (Palermo)

Andrea Di Carlo for the Altofonte Mandamento

Nenè Geraci for the Partinico Mandamento

Bernardo Brusca for the San Giuseppe Jato Mandamento

Mariano Agate for the Mazara del Vallo Mandamento (province of Trapani)

Pino Greco of Ciaculli

The Commission was now dominated by Riina and Provenzano. More and more the

independence of Mafia families was superseded by the authoritarian rule of Riina. The killing

end when the main rivals of the Corleonesi were defeated. Whoever could challenge Riina or had

lost its usefulness was eliminated. Rosario Riccobono and a dozen men of his clan were killed in

November 1982. In 1985 Pino Scarpuzzedda Greco, Riina’s favorite hit man, was murdered on

the orders of Riina, who thought Greco was getting a bit too ambitious for his own good.

The Commission in fact lost its autonomy and became a mere enforcement body that

endorsed the decisions made by Riina and Provenzano and their close group of allies. According

to Buscetta: "With the power gained by the Corleonesi and their allies the traditional

organizational structures had a purely formal value … the decisions were taken before … and the

Commission was nothing but the faithful executor of orders."

Meanwhile new Mandamenti were formed in 1983, whose members entered the

Commission: Raffaele Ganci for the Noce Mandamento, Giuseppe Giacomo Gambino for the

San Lorenzo Mandamento, Matteo Motisi for the Pagliarelli Mandamento and Salvatore

Buscemi for the Passo di Ragano-Boccadifalco Mandamento. In 1986-87 the Santa Maria di

Gesù Mandamento (the former fiefdom of Stefano Bontade) was reinstated, represented by

Pietro Aglieri.

Since the arrests as a result of the revelations of pentiti such as Tommaso Buscetta, Salvatore

Contorno, Francesco Marino Mannoia and Antonino Calderone, and the Maxi Trial in the 1980s

many Commission members ended up in jail. They were substituted by a so-called sostituto or

reggente.

30 | P a g e

The 1992 Commission

In 1992 the Commission that decided to kill the politician and Prime Minister Giulio

Andreotti’s right-hand man on Sicily Salvo Lima and the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo

Borsellino was composed of:

Salvatore Riina and Bernardo Provenzano for the Corleone Mandamento

Salvatore Cancemi for the Porta Nuova Mandamento (Palermo), substituting Giuseppe

Calò who was in prison.

Raffaele Ganci for the Noce Mandamento (Palermo)

Matteo Motisi for the Pagliarelli Mandamento (Palermo)

Salvatore Biondino and/or Mariano Tullio Troia for the San Lorenzo Mandamento

(Palermo), substituting Giuseppe Giacomo Gambino who was in prison

Pietro Aglieri and Carlo Greco for the Guadagna-Santa Maria di Gesù Mandamento

(Palermo)

the brothers Giuseppe Graviano and Filippo Graviano for the Brancaccio-Ciaculli

Mandamento, substituting Giuseppe Lucchese who was in prison

Francesco Madonia for the Resuttana Mandamento (Palermo)

Michelangelo La Barbera for the Passo di Ragano-Boccadifalco Mandamento (Palermo),

substituting Salvatore Buscemi who was in prison

Giuseppe Farinella for the Gangi-San Mauro Castelverde Mandamento

Giovanni Brusca for the San Giuseppe Jato Mandamento, substituting his father Bernardo

Brusca who was in prison.

Giuseppe Montalto for the Villabate Mandamento, substituting his father Salvatore

Montalto who was in prison.

Antonino Giuffrè for the Caccamo Mandamento

Nenè Geraci for the Partinico Mandamento

Benedetto Spera for the Belmonte Mezzagno Mandamento

Provenzano's new Mafia

Provenzano proposed a new less violent Mafia strategy instead of the terrorist bombing

campaign in 1993 against the state to get them to back off in their crackdown against the Mafia

after the murders on Anti-mafia prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Following

the months after Riina's arrest, there were a series of bombings by the Corleonesi against several

tourist spots on the Italian mainland – the Via dei Georgofili in Florence, Via Palestro in Milan

and the Piazza San Giovanni in Laterano and Via San Teodoro in Rome, which left 10 people

dead and 93 injured as well as severe damage to centers of cultural heritage such as the Uffizi

Gallery.

Provenzano's new guidelines were patience, compartmentalization, coexistence with state

institutions, and systematic infiltration of public finance. The diplomatic Provenzano tried to

stem the flow of pentiti by not targeting their families, only using violence in case of absolute

necessity. Provenzano reportedly re-established the old Mafia rules that had been abolished by

Totò Riina under his very eyes when, together with Riina and Leoluca Bagarella, he was ruling

the Corleonesi faction.

31 | P a g e

Giovanni Brusca – one of Riina's hitmen who personally detonated the bomb that killed

Falcone, and later became an informant after his 1996 arrest – has offered a controversial version

of the capture of Totò Riina: a secret deal between Carabinieri officers, secret agents and Cosa

Nostra bosses tired of the dictatorship of the Corleonesi. According to Brusca, Provenzano

"sold" Riina in exchange for the valuable archive of compromising material that Riina held in his

apartment in Via Bernini 52 in Palermo.

Apparently, the Sicilian Mafia at present is divided between those bosses who support a

hard line against the Italian state – mainly bosses currently in jail such as Salvatore 'Totò' Riina

and Leoluca Bagarella – and those who support the more moderate strategy of Provenzano. The

incarcerated bosses are currently subjected to harsh controls on their contact with the outside

world, limiting their ability to run their operations from behind bars under the article 41-bis

prison regime. (The human-rights group Amnesty International has expressed concern that the

41-bis regime could in some circumstances amount to "cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment"

for prisoners.)

Antonino Giuffrè – a close confidant of Provenzano, turned pentito shortly after his

capture in April 2002 – alleges that in 1993, Cosa Nostra had direct contact with representatives

of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi while he was planning the birth of Forza Italia. The

deal that he says was alleged to have been made was a repeal of 41 bis, among other anti-Mafia

laws in return for delivering electoral gains in Sicily. Giuffrè's declarations have not been

confirmed.

During a court appearance in July 2002, Leoluca Bagarella suggested unnamed

politicians had failed to maintain agreements with the Mafia over prison conditions. "We are

tired of being exploited, humiliated, harassed and used as merchandise by political factions," he

said. Nevertheless, the Italian Parliament, with the support of Forza Italia, subsequently

prolonged the enforcement of 41 bis, which was to expire in 2002, for another four years and

extended it to other crimes such as terrorism. However, according to one of Italy’s leading

magazines, L’Espresso, 119 mafiosi – one-fifth of those incarcerated under the 41-bis regime –

have been released on an individual basis.

Division and rivalry

In 2002 a rift within Cosa Nostra became clear. On the one hand there were the hardline

"Corleonesi" in jail – led by Totò Riina and Leoluca Bagarella – and on the other the more

moderate "Palermitani" – led by Provenzano and Antonino Giuffrè, Salvatore Lo Piccolo and

Matteo Messina Denaro. Apparently the arrest of Giuffrè in April 2002 was made possible by an

anonymous phone call that seems to have been made by loyalists to the Mafia hardliners Riina

and Bagarella. The purpose was to send a message to Provenzano. The incarcerated bosses

wanted something to be done about the harsh prison conditions (in particular the relaxation of the

41-bis incarceration regime) – and were believed to be orchestrating a return to violence while

serving multiple life sentences.

Targets were to have been Marcello Dell'Utri and former Defence Minister Cesare

Previti, both close advisors of then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, according to a leaked

32 | P a g e

report of the intelligence service SISDE. Riina and Bagarella felt betrayed by political allies in

Rome, who had promised to help pass laws to ease prison conditions and reduce sentences for its

jailed members in exchange for Mafia support at the polls. The SISDE report says they believed

that hits on either of the two embattled members of Berlusconi's Forza Italia party — each under

separate criminal indictments — would have been less likely to provoke the kind of public

outrage and police crackdown that followed the 1992 murders of the widely admired Sicilian

prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino.

According to press reports, when Provenzano was moved to the high security prison in

Terni, Totò Riina’s son Giovanni Riina, who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for three

murders, yelled that Provenzano was a "sbirro" – a popular Italian pejorative expression for a

police officer – when Provenzano entered the cell block. The pentito Antonino Giuffrè has said

in October 2005 that there had been rumours within Cosa Nostra that Provenzano was an

informer for the Carabinieri while he was on the run.

After Provenzano's arrest

After the arrest of Bernardo Provenzano on April 11, 2006 – on the same day as Romano

Prodi's victory in the 2006 Italian general election against Silvio Berlusconi – several mafiosi

were mentioned as Provenzano's successor. Among the rivals were Matteo Messina Denaro

(from Castelvetrano and the province of Trapani), Salvatore Lo Piccolo (boss of Tommaso

Natale area and the mandamento of San Lorenzo in Palermo), and Domenico Raccuglia from

Altofonte. Provenzano allegedly nominated Messina Denaro in one of his pizzini – small slips of

paper used to communicate with other mafiosi to avoid phone conversations, found at

Provenzano's hide out.

This presupposes that Provenzano has the power to nominate a successor, which is not

unanimously accepted among Mafia observers. "The Mafia today is more of a federation and less

of an authoritarian state," according to anti-Mafia prosecutor Antonio Ingroia of the Direzione

distrettuale antimafia (DDA) of Palermo, referring to the previous period of authoritarian rule

under Salvatore Riina. Provenzano "established a kind of directorate of about four to seven

people who met very infrequently, only when necessary, when there were strategic decisions to

make."

According to Ingroia "In an organization like the Mafia, a boss has to be one step above

the others otherwise it all falls apart, It all depends on if he can manage consensus and if the

others agree or rebel." Provenzano "guaranteed a measure of stability because he had the

authority to quash internal disputes." Among the members of the directorate were Salvatore Lo

Piccolo; Antonino Giuffrè from Caccamo; Benedetto Spera from Belmonte Mezzagno; Salvatore

Rinella from Trabia; Giuseppe Balsano from Monreale; Matteo Messina Denaro from

Castelvetrano; Vincenzo Virga from Trapani; and Andrea Manciaracina from Mazara del

Vallo.[22]

After the arrests of Benedetto Spera, Vincenzo Virga (both in 2001) and Antonino

Giuffrè in 2002 (who decided to cooperate with the authorities), the leadership of Cosa Nostra

was in the hands of the fugitives Bernardo Provenzano, Salvatore Lo Piccolo and Matteo

33 | P a g e

Messina Denaro. Following Provenzano's capture in April 2006, Italy's intelligence service

report warned of "emerging tensions" between mafia groups as a result of Provenzano's failure to

designate either Salvatore Lo Piccolo or Matteo Messina Denaro as his successor. The Antimafia

Investigative Directorate (DIA) cautioned that the capture of Provenzano could potentially

present mafia leaders an opportunity to return to violence as a means of expressing their power.

Two months after Provenzano’s arrest, on June 20, 2006, authorities issued 52 arrest

warrants against the top echelon of Cosa Nostra in the city of Palermo (Operation Gotha). Study

of the Pizzini showed that Provenzano’s joint deputies in Palermo were Salvatore Lo Piccolo and

Antonio Rotolo, Capo-Mandamento of Pagliarelli. In a message referring to an important

decision for Cosa Nostra, Provenzano told Rotolo: "It's up to you, me and Lo Piccolo to decide

this thing."

The investigations showed that Rotolo had built a kind of federation within the mafia,

comprising 13 families grouped in four clans. His right-hand men were Antonio Cinà – who used

to be the personal physician of Salvatore Riina and Provenzano – and the builder Francesco

Bonura. The city of Palermo was ruled by this triumvirate replacing the Commission whose

members are all in jail.

What emerged as well was that the position of Salvatore Lo Piccolo was not undisputed.

Authorities said they avoided the outbreak of a genuine war inside Cosa Nostra. The first clash

would have been between Rotolo and Lo Piccolo. What sparked off the crisis was a request from

the Inzerillo family, one of the clans whose leaders – among them Salvatore Inzerillo – were

killed by the Corleonesi during the Second Mafia War in the 1980s and which are now in exile in

the United States. Rotolo had passed a death sentence on Lo Piccolo and his son, Sandro, even

before Provenzano's arrest – and even procured the barrels of acid that are used to dissolve the

bodies of slain rivals.

Reconstitution thwarted

In December 2008, an attempt to reconstitute a new Commission was foiled, when 94

Mafiosi were arrested after a nine-month investigation dubbed "Operation Perseus" (Perseo in

Italian; after the Greek mythological hero Perseus who beheaded Medusa). From tapped phone

conversations and surveillance, police had obtained a full list of those present and those who had

sent their apologies, as well as details of the issues discussed and the decisions adopted.

The object, as one tapped Mafioso put it, was to "re-establish Cosa Nostra" in the old

style, with a single all-powerful boss, a "capo di capi". Benedetto Capizzi, a 65-year-old boss

from Villagrazia, had been nominated as the possible head of the Commission. Among the other

members were other historical Cosa Nostra bosses, such as Gerlando Alberti, Gregorio

Agrigento from San Giuseppe Jato, Giovanni Lipari, Gaetano Fidanzati, Giuseppe Scaduto from

Bagheria and Salvatore Lombardo, the 87-year old boss from Montelepre. Many of those

arrested had recently been released from prison on health grounds, and were serving out their

sentences under house arrest.

34 | P a g e

Among the younger bosses were Gianni Nicchi, the young and upcoming boss from

Pagliarelli and Giuseppe Biondino, the son of Salvatore Biondino who had been Riina’s driver.

A preliminary summit meeting had been held on November 14, 2008, with Lo Presti, Scaduto,

Capizzi – and also Nicchi. The new Commission had the blessing of the old bosses Totò Riina

and Bernardo Provenzano, as well as Matteo Messina Denaro, the boss from the province of

Trapani. Not everyone agreed, however. Gaetano Lo Presti from the Porta Nuova family

objected to the choice of Capizzi as the new head. He committed suicide after his arrest. Police

feared the outbreak of a new Mafia war and decided to interfere. Nicchi and Fidanzati escaped

the arrests.